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Observing the 2001 Guyana Elections
THE CARTER CENTER STRIVES TO RELIEVE SUFFERING
BY ADVANCING PEACE AND HEALTH WORLDWIDE;
IT SEeks TO PREVENT AND RESOLVE CONFLICTS, ENHANCE FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY,
AND PROTECT AND PROMOTE HUMAN RIGHTS WORLDWIDE.
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# Carter Center Election Observer Delegation and Staff List

March 15-21, 2001

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Mrs. Rosalynn Carter, former First Lady of the United States and Vice Chair of The Carter Center, United States  
The Honorable Lloyd Erskine Sandiford, former Prime Minister, Barbados

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Delegation Photo

The Carter Center delegation consisted of observers from 10 countries.
OBSERVING THE 2001 GUYANA ELECTIONS

TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CARICOM .................. Caribbean Community
CEO .......................... Chief Electoral Officer
DRO .......................... Deputy Returning Officer
DSF ........................... Disciplined Service Forces
EAB .......................... Electoral Assistance Bureau
EU ............................ European Union
GAP/WPA .................... Guyana Action Party/Working People’s Alliance
GAWL .......................... Guyanese Association of Women Lawyers
GDP .......................... Guyana Democratic Party
GECOM ....................... Guyana Elections Commission
GFTE .......................... Guyana Field Test Exercise
GLTOG ........................ Guyana Long-Term Observation Group (supported by UNDP and EU)
IFES .......................... International Foundation for Electoral Systems
JFAP .......................... Justice for All Party
JITA .......................... Joint International Technical Assessor
LTO ............................ Long-Term Observers
MOU .......................... Memorandum of Understanding
MRC .......................... Master Registration Card
MTO ............................ Medium-Term Observer
NDI .......................... National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
NFA ............................ National Front Alliance
NRR ............................ National Registrar of Registrants
OAS .......................... Organization of American States
OLE .......................... Official List of Electors
PAVE .......................... Public Awareness and Voter Education Program
PO ............................ Presiding Officer
PNC .......................... People’s National Congress
PNC/R ........................ People’s National Congress/REFORM
PPP .......................... People’s Progressive Party
PPP/C ........................ People’s Progressive Party/CIVIC
PR ............................. Proportional Representation
PRP .......................... People’s Republic Party
PVT .......................... Parallel Vote Tabulation
RO ............................. Returning Officer
ROAR ........................ Rise, Organize and Rebuild
SOP .......................... Statement of Poll
TUF .......................... The United Force
UN ............................ United Nations
UNDP ........................ United Nations Development Program
located physically in South America but considered culturally to be part of the Caribbean, Guyana has suffered in the past decade from the dual burdens of poverty and external debt and a political system marked by ethnic division and mistrust between the two major political parties, the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) and the People’s National Congress (PNC). Support for these two parties divides closely along ethnic lines with Indo-Guyanese of East Indian descent supporting the PPP and Afro-Guyanese descendants of enslaved Africans supporting the PNC. Because of the ethnic basis of politics, elections in Guyana have tended to look like demographic census profiles and to accentuate divisions in the society rather than to consolidate a pluralistic democratic system.

The Carter Center first became involved in Guyana prior to the critical transitional elections of 1992, which were held following the implementation of economic reforms and a gradual opening of the political system by President Desmond Hoyte. Although the electoral process nearly collapsed due to violence on election day, the final results were accepted as legitimate by both parties and were hailed by international observers, including a team from The Carter Center, as free and fair elections.

The next round of elections held in December 1997 encountered serious problems during the tabulation process after the balloting. The results showed an apparent victory for the PPP but were rejected by the opposition PNC, and the process was marred by days of violent protests. A protracted mediation effort by the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) resulted in the signing of the Herdmanston Accord, a compromise agreement between the two major political parties to reform the Constitution and hold new elections within three years.

The 2001 elections were a direct result of the Herdmanston Accord and represented a critical test of the condition of Guyana’s democracy. In October 2000, following a request from the government of Guyana for The Carter Center to monitor the elections, the Center sent an initial assessment team to learn the views of key stakeholders regarding the electoral process. In February 2001, the Center opened an election field office and began deployment of a team of six medium-term observers (MTOs) to observe and assess the pre-election period. For the March 19 elections, Rosalynn and I were joined by former Prime Minister of Barbados Sir Lloyd Erskine Sandiford as heads of a 44-person Carter Center observer delegation.

Unfortunately, the Guyana Elections Commission (GECOM) faced serious administrative and logistical challenges in order to conduct the elections within the tight schedule created by the political conditions flowing from the Herdmanston Accord. Because of questions about the quality of the voters list, GECOM conducted extensive reviews and revision exercises. Nonetheless, the accuracy of the voters list was questioned by both major parties. The electoral timetable was also squeezed by delays in the production and distribution of the national ID cards, a fact which necessitated changes in the official criteria for voter identification. Voter education was insufficient and materials were sometimes unclear, leading to confusion about certain aspects of the recently revised electoral system. The difficulties in each of these areas were exacerbated by the partisan differences that surfaced among some of the members of GECOM.
One of the most disturbing phenomena observed during the electoral process was the media’s lack of professionalism and impartiality. Campaigning and diffusion of propaganda, especially on TV talk shows, continued through election day. One talk show host’s “reporting” bordered on incitement to violence.

Despite these challenges, which are explained further in this report, the Carter Center delegation concluded that the electoral process met minimum international standards and that the Guyanese people were able to express their will freely on election day. With high voter turnout, the PPP won 52.9 percent of the vote, and incumbent President Bharrat Jagdeo was reelected. Although there were serious incidents of violence and rioting in Georgetown, the capital city, following the announcement of results, the opposition PNC ultimately recognized the outcome. Questions about the accuracy of the voters list were resolved in August 2001 when an independent audit by International IDEA, conducted at the request of GECOM, concluded that the voter list was 99 percent accurate.

The 2001 elections, while certainly important in terms of sustaining democratic legitimacy, have demonstrated once again that democratic elections alone cannot provide the solutions to Guyana’s problems of political and social development. Serious efforts to bridge the gap between the two major communities in the country will be required.

In the months following the elections some positive changes have taken place. One of the most important has been the ongoing dialogue between President Jagdeo and former President and PNC opposition leader Desmond Hoyte on a wide range of critical issues. This dialogue can bear fruit in the form of a sustained commitment by all parties to work together to solve Guyana’s problems, including steps to ensure more inclusive governance and to provide the foundation for sustainable development with the full participation of all sectors of Guyanese society. It is my sincere hope that this great country, endowed with abundant human and natural resources, will have a future in which all citizens can fully participate and enjoy their democratic rights, while also fulfilling their responsibilities of tolerance, dialogue, and respect.

Rosalynn and I would like to thank our respected co-leader, Sir Erskine Sandiford Lloyd, whose presence on the delegation contributed greatly to our efforts. We also would like to thank all the Carter Center delegates and MTOs for their valuable contributions and the Democracy Program staff for organizing the mission.

On behalf of The Carter Center, we also wish to express our appreciation to the members of GECOM, in particular Chairman Major General Joe Singh (ret.), for their support and cooperation during the project. Likewise, we wish to acknowledge the collaboration and efforts of other observer groups, including the Guyana Long-Term Observation Group (GLTOG), the European Union Election Observation Mission, the Commonwealth, CARICOM, the Organization of American States (OAS), and the Electoral Assistance Bureau (EAB).

We are especially grateful for the generosity of The Ashcroft Foundation, established by philanthropist Sir Michael A. Ashcroft. Our mission would not have been possible without this vital support.
The electoral process in Guyana has made significant progress since the Carter Center’s first involvement in the early 1990s. In 1992, the Center monitored Guyana’s first elections in 28 years that were accepted by all parties as free and fair and that resulted in a peaceful transfer of power. The elections in 1997, which the Center did not observe, were challenged by the opposition PNC and marred by violent protests. Subsequent mediation by CARICOM led to the Herdmanston Accord, which called for implementing constitutional reforms and holding new elections within three years.

A Constitutional Reform Commission was established in 1999 to strengthen the role of parliament, create constitutional commissions, and reform the electoral system. The parliament passed, among other reforms, a new electoral system and the permanent GECOM. The commission consisted of six members appointed by political parties and was led by Major General Joseph Singh (ret.).

GECOM initially set the election date for Jan. 17, 2001, but due to difficulties meeting deadlines the date was delayed until March 19.

Meanwhile, on Jan. 15, 2001, a long-running court challenge to the 1997 elections was concluded with a High Court decision to void the 1997 elections and call for new elections before March 31, 2001. The High Court ruled that the use of voter identification cards in 1997 as the only means of establishing eligibility violated the Constitution. The government abided by this decision, and, despite technical glitches and political pressure for delays, general elections were scheduled for March 19, 2001. Due to the importance of the 2001 elections, the international community took several steps to show its support for the electoral process, including an EU assessment mission which led to the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the government of Guyana and the donor community. There was also agreement on the need for international monitoring of the election process.

In October 2000, the Carter Center responded to an invitation by President Bharrat Jagdeo to observe the general elections by sending a team to Guyana to assess the status of electoral preparations and the prospects for Carter Center involvement. The team met with political parties, GECOM, and others and found that political tensions were high due to the tight schedule set by the Herdmanston Accord. The Carter Center sent a second team to Guyana in February 2001 to open a field office and deploy MTOs. The MTOs monitored all aspects of the pre-electoral process, including finalization of the voter registration list and ID cards, the campaign, media coverage, voter education, poll worker training, and other election preparations.

Nomination day was held on Feb. 15, and 13 parties submitted applications in a relatively smooth, if burdensome, process. Eight parties qualified to contest on the national list, and only one party appealed its rejection through a petition to the High Court. The Court denied the petition, stating the nomination application was submitted a day late, which the Center verified.

GECOM went to great lengths to ensure the voter registration process concluded with an accurate and updated voters list, but this remained a contentious issue for the political parties throughout the electoral process. GECOM executed both computer and field tests of the voters list from the 1997 elections and also conducted a nationwide voter registration exercise during October and November 2000.
One major complaint during elections was that the names of registered voters were recorded in the wrong part of the country, which led to some citizens not being able to vote on election day. Although the Center did not conduct a field test of the voters list, a team from a domestic monitoring organization, the Electoral Assistance Bureau (EAB), located 93 percent of the 1200 names sampled from the 2001 voters list. While GECOM asserted that the list was 95 percent accurate, the PNC/R believed the list was padded and that last-minute addenda to the list deliberately disenfranchised some of their supporters. On election day, Carter Center observers did not witness large numbers of voters on polling day who were disenfranchised because of problems in the voters list.

The production and distribution of voter ID cards was slow, especially in the coastal areas of the country. Since many of the cards were not distributed by the day before the election, GECOM decided that the only requirement for voting would be that an individual’s name appeared on the voters list. Voters without identification were allowed to take an oath to swear to their own identity, leaving indelible ink as the only safeguard against multiple voting. On election day, Carter Center observers witnessed small numbers of people being turned away because their names were not on the list or they were registered for another polling station.

GECOM suffered from several managerial and administrative problems that adversely affected the electoral process. First, GECOM election commissioners were selected based on party affiliation and worked primarily to protect party interests. While the core secretarial staff consisted of workers from previous elections, other staff and poll workers were recruited and trained. International training support unfortunately did not yield expected results. Training sessions were well attended and organized, but their quality varied.

On March 12, The Carter Center observed voting by the Disciplined Service Forces (DSF), who were to be deployed to provide security on election day. Preparations for DSF voting went slowly, but balloting went well with only a few irregularities.

Despite high levels of tension throughout the process, the political campaign was largely free of violence. Political parties were able to move around the countryside freely to campaign and to conduct rallies. While some parties, such as GAP/WPA, ran positive campaigns, many other party speakers used inflammatory language that attacked their opponents. To combat these problems, GECOM issued a political party code of conduct on March 3.

Although there were no censorship issues or restriction on the freedom of the press, the media played a significant role in fueling tensions throughout the electoral process. More than 50 media outlets signed a code of conduct in October 2000, but an independent panel of media referees found that the code was ignored by almost all signatories. Television talk shows were particularly notable in their lack of objectivity. Carter Center observers also found that government-owned media was biased in favor of the incumbent PPP.

The GECOM voter education program included civic education activities throughout the country, as well as a large number of posters and leaflets. Though extensive, these efforts were insufficient in remote regions, where there were substantially higher numbers of rejected ballots on election day than in the coastal regions.

Several days before the election, the Center’s field staff was joined by a delegation of 37 short-term observers, led by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, former First Lady Rosalynn Carter, and former Prime Minister Sir Lloyd Erskine Sandiford of Barbados. The delegation was briefed in Georgetown and deployed to all 10 regions in Guyana, where
they met with local election and party officials to review the state of electoral preparations.

In general, observers found that election day was peaceful, as Guyanese turned out in large numbers. Poll workers were generally well trained and acted professionally and impartially, and most polling stations were clearly marked and stocked with polling materials. Political party agents were present at all of the polls visited by Carter Center observers, and there were no reports by the observers of any significant security incidents or intimidation. Voters were able to cast their votes in secret, and the ballots were counted at each polling station with political party agents present to certify, along with poll workers, the accuracy of the count. There was a great deal of confusion over what time the polls closed, but the Center concluded that this did not affect the integrity of the results.

Carter Center observers gathered data from a sample of polling station results as part of its election observation mission. This “quick count” did not differ meaningfully from the final results announced by GECOM. While these findings were not made public, they were used by the Center delegation’s overall assessment of the electoral process.

In spite of considerable planning for the processing and computerization of the elections results, GECOM fell behind schedule and strayed from these plans due to time constraints. International observers observed the hand tabulations of results at GECOM headquarters, but party agents were not allowed access. In the post-election period, international observers reviewed about 90 percent of the Statement of the Polls (SOPs) collected in GECOM headquarters and found that more than 99 percent were signed by polling officials and party agents and that less than one percent had mathematical errors.

Georgetown, Guyana. Guyana is the only English-speaking country in South America.
On March 20, President Carter and Prime Minister Sandiford, along with the heads of other international observation groups, met with Chairman Singh and two other members of GECOM to address the slow release of preliminary results to the public. GECOM recognized the problem and indicated that results were to be released soon. After the meeting, President Carter and Prime Minister Sandiford held a news conference and announced that the elections process was generally peaceful and orderly and that the Center’s observers reported very few irregularities on election day. At the end of the press conference, President Carter made an impromptu plea for all Guyanese to work together for national reconciliation.

After the press conference, two prominent members of civil society with ties to the opposition sent a letter to President Carter expressing concern about electoral violence and requesting his assistance to facilitate agreement on key issues of governance and reconciliation. In response, President Carter drafted a short statement outlining key points on governance that should be acceptable to both sides and which could form the basis for additional steps in the future. Although PNC/R leader Desmond Hoyte and PPP/C leader Bharrat Jagdeo were both in agreement with the substance of the points outlined in the statement, neither signed the document and Hoyte later indicated that he had not agreed in any way to the statement.

On March 23 GECOM announced the results of the elections and subsequently approved the allocation of seats and issued a Declaration of President, with the PPP/C as the party with the most votes. The political atmosphere remained tense for several weeks, during which there were numerous protests and several violent demonstrations in Georgetown and along the coast. In an effort to prevent further violence, President Jagdeo and Hoyte agreed to meet on April 24 to begin a high-level political dialogue.

In May 2001, the Center issued a final statement on the electoral process, concluding that overall, the electoral process met international standards, the voters of Guyana were able to freely express their democratic choices on March 19, and the official results reflected the will of the voters. The statement also provided specific assessments of several key aspects of the process, including election day processes, voter registration, party observers, election management systems, and the media.

In a spirit of respect and support, the Center offers several recommendations for improving future elections, as follows: (1) There should be a comprehensive review of the electoral system and legislation, based on the audit and systems review completed by International IDEA; (2) Parliament should reform the legal framework for the electoral process to eliminate
outdated statutory provisions and establish more efficient systems for GECOM, including procedures for voter registration and verification of the voters list; (3) Careful consideration should be given to alternative models of election administration, possibly by reducing or eliminating political party representation and increasing the role of independent members of civil society; (4) GECOM should maintain a policy of open and transparent election administration through all phases of the electoral process, including tabulation and consolidation of results, allocation of seats, and pronouncement of the new president. GECOM should also ensure that complete polling station level results are announced and publicized on a timely basis to allow all parties and candidates to cross-check results; (5) Parliament should enact broadcast legislation to set standards for appropriate use of public airwaves and ensure equitable coverage for all parties by the state-owned media; (6) Parliament should enact legislation to give GECOM or another independent body the power to enforce election-related codes of conduct for political parties and the media, and ensure that inflammatory propaganda cannot be used to incite violence.

While credible and accurate elections are essential to democratization, it is clear that in Guyana’s “winner-take-all” political system with its recurring patterns of ethnic voting and political polarization, elections alone will not produce an inclusive system of governance with broad participation by all major groups. In order to promote genuine political reconciliation and development, the government and the major parties in Parliament, working together with civil society, should continue the process of constitutional and electoral reform. This would allow all parties to participate meaningfully in development of policy and legislation and serve as part of a system of checks and balances that promotes accountability. The Carter Center plans to support Guyana’s democratic consolidation and sustainable development through an integrated program of initiatives drawing on the Center’s expertise in democracy, conflict resolution, economic development, and transparency. The initiative is designed to help Guyana realize its National Development Strategy and will build on existing Carter Center activities in support of rule of law and civil society strengthening.
1992 Elections and Carter Center Involvement

The October 1992 elections in Guyana were the first elections in 28 years that were internationally monitored, accepted by all parties as free and fair, and resulted in a peaceful transfer of power. The PPP/C and its presidential candidate Cheddi Jagan emerged as the winner with 53 percent of the vote. The PNC and incumbent President Desmond Hoyte received 42 percent of the vote.

The largest observer delegation to monitor the 1992 elections was organized by the Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government, an informal group of leaders from the Western Hemisphere chaired by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and based at The Carter Center. The Commonwealth also sent a large observer delegation, which coordinated efforts with the Carter Center team.

During two years of involvement between October 1990 and October 1992, the Council or Carter Center played a significant role by mediating agreements between the government of Guyana and opposition parties about key aspects of the electoral process. After the 1992 elections, the Center continued to play an important role in Guyana’s democratic evolution. In 1994, in collaboration with the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), the Center helped produce a comprehensive analysis of the electoral system, including recommendations for improving its effectiveness. Since 1995, the Center also has worked in collaboration with the government, private sector, and civil society to facilitate the production of a National Development Strategy.

1997 Elections and Aftermath

In 1997, President Cheddi Jagan died in office and Prime Minister Sam Hinds became president to complete Jagan’s term. Elections were held later that year on Dec. 17, 1997. Jagan’s widow, Janet Jagan, was the PPP/C presidential candidate, and Desmond Hoyte was again the PNC presidential candidate. As in 1992, the election results were divided along ethnic lines, with the Indo-Guyanese PPP/C winning the majority of seats in Parliament and the presidency, while the largely Afro-Guyanese PNC remained the minority party.

Although voting transpired largely without incident, problems became apparent in the aftermath of the election, when Janet Jagan was sworn in with only 90 percent of the vote counted. The PNC refused to accept the results and boycotted Parliament while violent demonstrations disrupted the capital for several weeks. Shortly afterwards, a PNC supporter, Esther Pereira, filed suit in the High Court to challenge the election, alleging massive fraud and the unconstitutional use of voter identification cards.

To stem the escalating violence, CARICOM negotiated the Herdmanston Accord, an agreement between the government and the PNC which provided for a CARICOM audit of the 1997 election results, revisions to the Constitution within 18 months, and new elections within three years instead of five (see Appendix 1). Violence continued even after the CARICOM audit found the election results to be acceptable. At a CARICOM annual summit in July 1998, the PPP/C and the PNC signed the Saint Lucia Statement, in which both parties agreed to pursue constitutional reforms while the PNC agreed to take its seats in Parliament (see Appendix 2). After suffering a mild heart attack, Janet Jagan stepped down and Bharrat Jagdeo, former minister of finance, was sworn in as president in August 1999.
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND TIME FRAME FOR ELECTIONS

CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM COMMISSION

In 1999, in accordance with the Herdmanston Accord, a Constitutional Reform Commission was created to lead the reform process. The commission reached consensus on several key reforms, including strengthening the role of Parliament, creating constitutional commissions (on ethnic relations, human rights, and the rights of children and indigenous people) under the umbrella of a human rights commission, and reforming the electoral system.

A Joint Management Committee, comprised of PPP/C and PNC members, was created in Parliament to review the reforms and draft amendment legislation. Amendments related to the elections were approved to enable the holding of national elections in 2001, but other reforms such as the creation of committees on ethnic relations and finance were not brought to the floor for a vote.

INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

Because of the importance of the 2001 elections, the international community provided significant levels of assistance and played a large role in monitoring the process. In February 2000, at the request of the government of Guyana, the EU sent a needs assessment mission to Guyana. The mission recommended a review of the 1997 voter registration and counting systems, an international technical quality control mechanism, and comprehensive international and domestic observation of the electoral process.

Based on this assessment, a MOU was signed between the government of Guyana and the major donors in June 2000. The MOU established the

Carter Center observers Richard Klein (left) and Rachel Fowler (right) meet with Joe Singh (second from left) and other GECOM members.
terms and conditions for financial and technical assistance, including benchmarks to measure progress in electoral preparations and a set of international standards to be met. It also created a Joint International Technical Assessor (JITA) to monitor progress and provide monthly reports to the Election Commission, donors, and the government of Guyana on progress made.

**GECOM, THE NEW ELECTORAL SYSTEM, AND THE ELECTORAL CALENDAR**

Legislation was passed to create a permanent secretariat for the Election Commission, and the former head of the Disciplined Forces, Major General Joseph Singh (ret.), was appointed chairman of the Election Commission in May 2000. The commission members were selected following the “Carter Model” first introduced prior to the 1992 elections following President Carter’s mediation, whereby the government and opposition parties each named three representatives, with the chairman chosen by the president from a list of six acceptable nominees put forward by the opposition.

Under Chairman Joe Singh the commission adopted the acronym GECOM for the Guyana Elections Commission. After consultation with the political parties, GECOM published a timetable in August 2000 which followed statutory dates required by legislation and scheduled elections for Jan. 15, 2001, consistent with the deadline established in the Herdmanston Accord.

However, due to the extended political wrangling between the major parties over constitutional reform and related issues, GECOM was left with a very tight schedule. The time line provided GECOM with only five months to complete all electoral preparations, including hiring registrars and other polling officials, updating and verifying the voter registration list, photographing voters for new national ID cards, training polling day officials, and conducting voter education exercises.

Not surprisingly, GECOM had difficulty meeting deadlines. The situation was made worse by the fact that Parliament did not pass the key enabling legislation and electoral reforms until November 2000. The electoral reforms created a new electoral system that blended elements of a national proportional representation (PR) system together with regional representation in order to enhance the representation of smaller parties and regional interests. In addition, the reforms provided for the direct election of all the members of Parliament. Previously, only 53 of 65 seats were elected directly,

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<tr>
<th>TABLE 1: Important Statutory Dates</th>
<th>STATUTORY SCHEDULE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nomination day</td>
<td>32 days before election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approval of nominations</td>
<td>28 days before election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appeal of rejections</td>
<td>26 days before election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publish final nominations</td>
<td>23 days before election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publish polling station list</td>
<td>20 days before election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publish candidates/voters/polls lists</td>
<td>14 days before election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Request for recounts</td>
<td>1 day after election</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
while the other 12 were elected indirectly through regional councils. The details of the system were not completely finalized until February 2001, when a final constitutional amendment was adopted which set the minimum number of legislative seats at 65, with 25 seats elected as regional seats. The other 40 were “top-up” seats calculated on the basis of national results in order to compensate for any disproportionality arising from the regional results. The reforms did not affect the process for the presidency, which is won by the leader of the party that gains the most votes.

Because of difficulties in completing electoral preparations, most importantly revising and verifying the voters list and producing and distributing national ID cards, GECOM eventually realized it would not be possible to hold the elections in January. This was made public on Nov. 13 when GECOM informed the government that it was not technically prepared to hold the elections in January. This was made public on Nov. 13 when GECOM informed the government that it was not technically prepared to hold an acceptable election by the scheduled date and that the elections would need to be postponed for at least two months. The JITA endorsed this decision.

While acknowledging GECOM’s rationale for the delay, the leadership of the PNC indicated that the PPP/C government would not be viewed as legitimate beyond the Jan. 17 deadline established by the Herdmanston Accord. Amidst growing political tension and fears of political violence, leaders of the four parties represented in Parliament met with President Jagdeo in early December and agreed to set the election for March 19, 2001. However, the parties were not able to agree on the question of governance and the role of the incumbent PPP government during the interim period between Jan. 17 and March 19 and decided to refer the issue to an all-party committee for further discussion.

THE HIGH COURT DECISION OF JAN. 15, 2001

On Jan. 15, 2001, the long-running legal challenge against the 1997 election results was finally resolved by a High Court ruling. In a dramatic decision announced just two days before the start of the “interim” governance period, the High Court issued a judgment which declared the 1997 elections “vitiating,” because the statutory requirement of using voter identification cards violated the Constitution.1

However, at the same time, the Court also declared that in order to uphold the rule of law and prevent the creation of a legal vacuum, the sitting government elected in 1997 should remain in power until March 31, 2001. This gave GECOM a final deadline that could not be moved without provoking a constitutional crisis. During the interim period, the High Court limited the government’s powers to those necessary for day-to-day operations and for election preparations.

The court decision struck a fine balance that left both parties feeling somewhat vindicated. For the PNC, the decision confirmed their view that the 1997 elections were flawed and unconstitutional. The PPP was satisfied because the court decision did not find that the flaws in the 1997 election would have affected the final results and did not force the PPP government to step down before the March elections.

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1 The ruling also meant that the cards being produced by GECOM for the 2001 elections could only be used as one form of identification and not as the only acceptable means of establishing eligibility to vote.
Establishment of the Carter Center Election Observation Office

In October 2000, The Carter Center sent a three-person team to Guyana to assess the status of electoral preparations and to learn the views of parties, GECOM, and other groups. This trip followed an Oct. 19, 2000, request from the government of Guyana to observe the general elections (Appendix 3). The team found that GECOM and most of the major parties and political actors welcomed the Center involvement as observers. The PNC position was somewhat vague, however, in that they indicated that they welcomed international observers generally but did not specifically endorse The Carter Center.

The Center team reported that political tensions were high as a result of the squeeze created by the need to complete electoral preparations and hold elections within the time frame established in the Herdmanston Accord. In this context the team felt that international observers could help build confidence in the process by serving as an independent voice to assess the credibility and integrity of that process.

In early February 2001 the Center opened an election observation office staffed by a field office director and six MTOs. Although the Center’s MTOs were not present to monitor voter registration, they were able to observe many of the key aspects of the electoral process, including candidate nomination, the electoral campaign, polling day voting and counting process, post-election vote tabulations, and the swearing-in of the newly-elected president. Carter Center observers visited all 10 regions during the pre-election period.

Medium-term observers Jason Forrester, Catherine Clarke, and Patrick Berg (left to right) frequently traveled the country in small planes.
The Center’s field office and MTOs benefited significantly from the assistance provided by the GLTOG, an observation program supported by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), which included an EU mission as a component part. The GLTOG established a field office with long-term observers (LTOs) in October 2000 – several months prior to the Center – and played a key role throughout the electoral process.

**PARTY AND CANDIDATE REGISTRATION**

Nomination Day was held on Feb. 15, 2001. Thirteen parties submitted applications to the Chief Electoral Officer (CEO) and the Statutory Officer at City Hall. Although the submission process went smoothly, a few of the parties had complained earlier to Carter Center observers that the application process was burdensome because it required original signatures from voters on each of the multiple copies necessary. GECOM had also imposed a 6:00 p.m. deadline for applications, which the GAP/WPA delegation questioned, saying the Constitution set an end date limit for nominations and the day ended at midnight.

GECOM posted a copy of each application, as required by law, and advised the parties of problems with their applications within the statutory deadline of Feb. 17. The parties then had until Feb. 18 to correct the problems. GECOM published the final list of 11 parties accepted to contest the March 19 elections on Feb. 18, also a date within the statutory deadline (see Appendix 4). Only eight of the 11 parties were contesting in enough of the geographic regions to qualify to contest on the national list. The parties and presidential candidates for the national elections are shown in Table 2. (below)

One of the smaller parties, the People’s Republic Party (PRP), whose application was rejected in all regions but one, appealed its rejection through a petition to the High Court. At the hearing, the High Court ruled that because the ballots had been ordered and printed almost immediately after GECOM certified the party lists, to find in favor of the PRP would mean reprinting the ballots and delaying the election. The Court eventually denied the petition on the ground that it was filed a day too late. This process was followed by Carter Center observers, who reviewed the paperwork on file with GECOM and concurred with GECOM’s decision that the PRP’s application had not met statutory requirements.

### Table 2: Parties / Presidential Candidates Competing Nationally in the 2001 Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Presidential Candidate</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GAP/WPA</td>
<td>Paul Hardy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Asgar Ally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFAP</td>
<td>C.N. Sharma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFA</td>
<td>Keith Scott</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNC/R</td>
<td>Desmond Hoyte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP/C</td>
<td>Bharrat Jagdeo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROAR</td>
<td>Ravi Dev</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUF</td>
<td>Manzoor Nadir</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
VOTER REGISTRATION

For the 2001 general and regional elections, GECOM went to significant lengths to ensure the voter registration process culminated in an accurate updated list of all registered voters. GECOM undertook both computer and field tests of the voters list from the 1997 elections, conducted new registration and photographic exercises, provided an opportunity for political parties and the public to review the voters list and to file claims and objections, and provided contesting political parties with the updated and final voters list in electronic format.

Throughout the process, however, the accuracy of the voters list remained contentious with all political parties. In particular, both the PPP/C and the PNC/R indicated they had concerns about the list. One of the most serious complaints was that the names of some people who had registered, or who had updated their registration information, had been recorded on the voters list in the wrong part of the country and hence they would not be permitted to vote on election day. By GECOM’s own admission, the voter registration process was overly bureaucratic and outdated, a problem that contributed to some of the errors in the voters list.

While the 2001 voter list contained errors, as will be detailed later in the report, Carter Center monitors did not observe a significant number of individuals who were unable to vote because their names were not on the voters list. Clearly, however, the process of registering voters needs to be improved in order to build the confidence of contesting political parties and the public in the accuracy of the voters list for future elections.

In Guyana, people are able to vote only if they have previously registered. Further, they are permitted to vote only at one polling station within the subdivision where they registered to vote.\(^2\)

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\(^2\) Administratively, Guyana’s 10 regions are subdivided into divisions and subdivisions.

Elections officers explain procedures to Carter Center field office director Sue Nelson.
Official List of Voters (OLE), also known as the Final Voters List (FVL), is the authoritative list of all eligible persons who are registered to vote. For the elections, the OLE is sorted by region, division, subdivision, and polling station, and each polling station is provided with the section of the OLE containing the names of people designated to vote there. No one is permitted to vote at a polling station if his/her name does not appear on the OLE for the polling station. When the OLE is accurate, it provides a substantial safeguard against multiple voting and against voting by people who are not eligible.

In 1996, in preparation for the elections held in Dec. 1997, Guyana conducted a door-to-door registration of Guyanese citizens 14 years of age or older. This yielded the National Register of Registrants (NRR), from which the 1997 FVL was produced by extracting the names of qualified voters 18 years of age or older. Following the 1997 elections, the PNC charged that the 1997 FVL was inflated to the advantage of the ruling PPP/C party. The party charged that the list contained names of people who had registered more than once, were not yet 18 years old, resided outside of Guyana, or who did not exist. According to the PNC, evidence that the database had been tampered with and “padded” with extra names was found in the fact that the 1997 FVL showed a larger than expected increase in registered voters compared to the 1992 FVL.

In response to these complaints, GECOM formed an integrity committee to analyze the 1997 FVL. In August 2000, the committee found that the main NRR registration database was intact but reported some evidence of names of the same person appearing more than once on the 1997 FVL. The committee recommended, therefore, that GECOM conduct a field test in order to assess the accuracy of the list and determine whether there was any basis to charges that the list was padded.

Based on the findings of the integrity committee, GECOM decided to use the 1997 NRR list of 516,049 names as the Preliminary Voters List (PVL) for the 2001 elections rather than conduct an entirely new registration. In order to provide an opportunity for any eligible Guyanese who had not registered to vote in 1996 to register for the 2001 elections, as well as for those people who had moved since 1996 to reregister, GECOM conducted a nationwide voter registration exercise during October and November 2001. Further, GECOM decided in September that everyone who wished to vote in the 2001 election, whether or not his or her name appeared on the 2001 PVL, had to go to a registration center to be photographed. The photographic exercise served to provide registered voters with voter ID cards that they would use on election day as proof of their eligibility to vote.

At the same time, GECOM commissioned a Guyana Field Test Exercise (GFTE) of the 2001 PVL to more precisely determine its accuracy. The GFTE, which was designed and managed by a working group comprised of GECOM officials and representatives of both major parties, entailed a field survey of about 22,000 randomly chosen names drawn from the 2001 PVL representing all
10 regions of Guyana. GFTE teams attempted to locate these persons based on the address information contained in the 2001 PVL. The GFTE started in late October and was completed in mid-December. Of the people sampled in the GFTE, 93 percent (20,271) were found or accounted for, while seven percent were designated as “unknown.” However, when the seven percent “unknown” were added together with those that had been determined as dead (four percent) or migrated (five percent), the result was the conclusion that an estimated 16 percent of the names on the 2001 PVL should not be included in the voters list. Although the two major parties drew different conclusions from the GFTE about the overall accuracy of the PVL, GECOM concluded from the findings of the GFTE that the 2001 PVL was inflated.

Following political wrangling between the PPP/C and the PNC/R, the two sides agreed that as a means to purify the list, persons who did not come forward to be photographed prior to the completion of the final voters list would be removed from the list. In effect, GECOM decided to treat any name for whom no picture was taken as a person who had migrated or died since 1996 or who never existed and therefore should be removed from the 2001 PVL. Although GECOM’s stated policy was that no voter would be knowingly disenfranchised, political parties and the public complained that insufficient information and time was provided to adequately conduct the voter registration and photographic exercise in the interior of the country. Ultimately, GECOM extended the period of voter registration, via the claims and objections period and photographic exercise, through the first half of December as well as for the week between Christmas and New Year’s.

Based on the 2001 PVL and the information collected during the voter registration and photographic exercise, GECOM created the 2001 Revised Voters List (RVL), sometimes referred to as the Supplementary Voters List (SVL). New names were added and information updated for people who had moved since 1996. In addition, as indicated above, GECOM took steps to remove all names for which no photograph was taken in order to eliminate any “ghost” names in the voters list. The resulting 2001 RVL contained 433,478 names and was provided to political parties in electronic format on CD-ROM on January 31, 2001, for their review. After compiling

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**Chronology of the 2001 Voters List**

| NRR 1996 | National Register of Registrants, 1996 |
| PVL 1997 | Preliminary Voters List, 1997 |
| FVL 1997 | Final Voters List, 1997 |
| PVL 2001 | Preliminary Voters list, 2001 |
| GFTE | Guyana Field Test Exercise |
| RVL 2001 | Revised Voters List, 2001 (PVL, plus new registration minus deletions) |
| FVL/OLE 2001 | Final Voters List, or Official List of Voters, 2001 |
| Addendum 2001 | Addendum to OLE 2001 |

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6 The final sample size was only 21,804. The GFTE did not process any information for 341 of the original 22,145 sampled people.

7 Following the political agreement, this step was passed into law in October 2000.
the additions, deletions, and other reconciliation steps, the RVL represented a net reduction of 82,571 names from the original PVL.8

In spite of these steps, many political parties continued to express concern about the quality of the 2001 RVL. Most political parties, including both the PNC/R and the PPP/C, possessed anecdotal evidence about people who had registered in 1996 or 2001 and were not on the 2001 RVL at all or who were listed under the wrong region. Further, the PNC/R charged that the 2001 RVL was still inflated. By their calculation, the voters list should contain only about 410,000 names. However, the Guyana Bureau of Statistics estimated the voting age population in the country as 480,000.

Initially, GECOM intended that the 2001 RVL would be the 2001 FVL. However, after consulting the electoral act and the Constitution, GECOM determined that the RVL must be posted for 21 days, during which claims and objections could be made by political parties and the public for addition, corrections, and deletions to the 2001 RVL. Because GECOM had not planned for this additional step, staff members had to be devoted to this task who were originally scheduled to partake in training on election day activities.

This also delayed the production of the voter ID cards, which, because of time constraints, were to be produced based on information contained on the RVL instead of the OLE as originally planned. This additional claims and objections period following the posting of the RVL was initially scheduled for Feb. 1-21, 2001. During this period, political parties continued to be critical of the quality of the RVL. As with the voter registration and photographic exercise, GECOM extended this process for an additional week until Feb. 26, under pressure from political parties and the public for more time to check the 2001 RVL.

In an effort to build public confidence in the 2001 RVL, the Electoral Assistance Bureau (EAB), an independent domestic monitoring organization with experience dating back to the 1991 elections, conducted a field test of the 2001 RVL similar to the field test conducted by the GFTE on the 2001 PVL. In a press release, the EAB announced that its teams were able to locate 93 percent of the 1200 names they sampled from the 2001 RVL.

GECOM amended the RVL based on the input from individual citizens as well as contesting political parties during the period of claims and objections. GECOM is required by law to publish the 2001 OLE (FVL) at least 14 days prior to election day. On March 5, GECOM released the 2001 OLE with 438,940 names, including 6,179 additions, 717 deletions, and 967 corrections in address. As with the 2001 RVL, the 2001 OLE was provided to all contesting political parties in electronic format on CD-ROM.

Complaints about the accuracy of the 2001 OLE continued from all political parties, but primarily the PNC/R and PPP/C. Both parties argued that names were still missing or assigned to the wrong region of the country. The PNC/R also demonstrated that some persons who were on the 2001 RVL were inexplicably excluded from the OLE. According to the PNC/R, the 2001 OLE was inflated by almost 30,000 names. While this represents only six percent of the 2001 OLE, the PNC/R pointed out that it could translate into four seats in Parliament according to Guyana’s proportional seat allocation system. Citing problems with the voters list, high-ranking members of the PNC/R indicated to Carter Center observers and others that they were considering a boycott of the elections.

In a last attempt to address parties’ concerns, GECOM announced that it would issue an Addendum

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8 Approximately 16,000 new names were added and 99,000 old names removed from the PVL to arrive at the RVL.
that would correct some of these problems. The Addendum, which was published on March 16, increased the total number of electors on the list (OLE plus Addendum) to 440,185. On the same day, GECOM announced that voters without ID cards would be allowed to vote as long as their names were on the list.

Production and Distribution of ID Cards

Production of ID cards for voter registration was a slow process. The international firm De la Rue was contracted and produced cards of high quality with security features. However, production was based on entering information from the Master Registration Cards (MRCs) created during the registration process, and this system proved to be unwieldy. Before cards could be produced, MRCs had to be transported from the point of registration back to the capital and sorted into administrative divisions. This process took much longer than expected and delayed production of the cards. Postal workers were asked to help sort in an effort to speed up the process.

Due in part to the delays in production, the process of distributing cards was also delayed. This was another area of concern for the political parties and voters. Although GECOM’s policy of producing and sending the cards out to the farthest regions first ensured that the logistically difficult and remote regions had their cards on time, it also meant that the populated coastal areas received their cards very late.

Because many cards remained to be distributed in Region 4 (Georgetown) three days before the elections, GECOM decided on March 16 that the only requirement for voting would be to have one’s name on the list. Voters without accepted forms of identity were allowed to take an oath to swear to their own identity. This bypassed the problem of distributing the cards in time for polling but eliminated one of the principal safeguards adopted by
GECOM to ensure voter identity. It also left indelible ink as the only safeguard against multiple voting.

Given the problems with the voters list, discussed above, the PNC/R also requested that voters whose names were not on the list but who possessed new ID cards be allowed to vote. This request was denied several times by GECOM, with the final four-two vote (against) made just before the close of the polls on election day. This issue caused confusion on polling day and is discussed further in the polling section of the report.

Although it was difficult for observers to determine the extent of this problem, evidence on voting day suggested that only a small number of potential voters were affected. About half of Carter Center observers witnessed small numbers (averaging one-two voters per polling station) being turned away because their names were not on the list or because they were listed for another polling location. The PNC/R nonetheless continued to claim that tens of thousands of people had been disenfranchised.

As a post-election exercise, because of the controversy surrounding the list and the lingering perception by PNC/R supporters that the list was not accurate, GECOM asked donors to fund an independent audit of the list. In response, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) was asked to organize a team of experts to conduct an audit that would evaluate and assess GECOM’s work in the 2001 elections. The audit team’s report, which was published in August 2001, concluded that the voters list produced by GECOM was highly accurate (more than 99 percent), that there was no evidence of manipulation or electoral fraud in any of the areas reviewed, and that none of the errors and problems investigated appeared likely to have led to electoral advantages for any particular party nor would they have affected the result of the election.9

These were highly significant findings as they served to discount any claims of serious inaccuracies in the voters list that might have undermined the credibility or legitimacy of the elections.

ELECTION STAFFING, MANAGEMENT, AND TRAINING

With the exception of the chairman, the GECOM Election Commissioners were selected on the basis of their party affiliation and were seen by each party as instruments to ensure that their partisan interests were protected. The core secretariat staff was part of the electoral machinery from previous elections, and the remaining staff and temporary registrars/poll workers were supposed to have been recruited on merit. Although jobs were advertised and candidates tested, recruitment remained a political issue. There were complaints of test scores not being taken into consideration and of imbalances in ethnic representation at polling stations. The manner and selection of staff was a major concern for the PPP/C, which repeatedly told Carter Center observers that the PNC/R party members controlled the electoral apparatus. Haggling over staff, especially in the politically volatile Region 4 (Georgetown), dragged on into March, holding up the administrative and election preparation process.

Efficient and effective management of the process and of staff was also an issue. GECOM personnel worked long hours, sometimes 20 hours a day in the days leading up to the election, yet they were unable to meet many of their planning and logistical deadlines. Although improved strategic planning and better management of personnel and resources would have helped, GECOM was faced with unrealistic deadlines, in part because of its efforts to respond to problems raised by the major parties.

There appeared to be a reasonable delegation of responsibilities to the field, which enabled competent Returning Officers (ROs) and Deputy Returning Officers (DROs) to resolve local logistical and staffing problems. However, cumbersome procedures and multiple forms for most aspects of the process were inefficient and added opportunities for human error. Systems designed to streamline operations, such as the one designed for relaying the count information, were either not used or broke down in implementation.

Some GECOM staff became political targets and grist for the mill of talk show hosts. The computer section and those individuals seconded from the private sector were especially targeted. The ridicule, along with long hours and low wages, made it difficult to attract and keep quality staff. Many GECOM employees only agreed to stay at the behest of Chairman Joe Singh and his calls to serve the national interest.

GECOM made extensive efforts to train its staff but was hampered by administrative problems. For example, most candidates for positions at the polls received written notice too late to be able to attend the initial weeklong training in January 2001. There were also initial shortages of training manuals.

Carter Center observers attended a number of GECOM training sessions, which generally took place in schools and public halls, and which were well attended, well organized, and constructive.
Trainees worked closely with GECOM instruction manuals and in group sessions to conduct role-plays of different election day scenarios, including proxy voters, voters without ID cards, and blind and incapacitated voters. The role-plays were followed by a question-and-answer period to clarify confusion by means of discussion, group consensus, and direction from the trainer. In addition to the instruction manual, an addendum of Frequently Asked Questions was produced to address common problems and areas of misunderstanding.

There were, however, differences in the quality of training, which seemed largely dependent on the competence of DROs. In some subdistricts, the stations were well equipped with mock election materials, and trainees were well informed with a good understanding of procedures. In other areas, trainees received last-minute notifications, had no materials, and seemed apathetic and uncertain.

A national test of the methods and means of communicating results from the polling stations to the DROs, to the ROs, and then to GECOM was scheduled for the weekend before the elections. Only Region 6 conducted this test, as the other regions were not prepared or were consumed with the distribution of ID cards. The test in Region 6 revealed an immediate need for more training for this critical part of the process.

Carter Center observers found no significant problems during the actual polling and polling station counting process that related directly back to training. However, GECOM’s failure to train its workers adequately to consolidate the count and to communicate the results back to GECOM was evident. There was also evidence of logistical and managerial lack of organization that adversely affected the efficiency of the operations, such as the late arrival of the voters list Addendum for the Disciplined Service Forces (DSF) voting and missing MRCs during election day.

DISCIPLINED SERVICE FORCES BALLOTING

On March 12, the DSF (which includes police, defense force, and prison guards) went to the polls to cast their ballots. By law, the DSF were able to vote prior to the elections, since many of the DSF would be deployed and providing security on election day. In all, 7,022 members of the DSF were registered to vote, and 5,983 cast their ballots at one of 44 designated polling stations across the nation.

As required by law, GECOM publicized the polling places for the DSF prior to voting day. Preparations for DSF voting went slowly, with ballots for each voter pulled manually according to the region where the DSF member was registered. Each ballot was sealed in an envelope with the DSF member’s name handwritten on it. A separate envelope marked with the region was provided for the DSF member to place his/her ballot in before casting it in the ballot box. The regional envelopes allowed the DSF votes to be sent back to the regions to be mingled with the ballots cast on March 19. This procedure, established by an election law amendment, was designed to ensure the secrecy of the DSF vote.

The preparation of ballots was well monitored by political party agents. Preparations continued late into the night of March 11, with some of the materials not being sent out until 4:00 a.m. on March 12. As a result, some polling stations opened later than the planned 6:00 a.m. time, but most stations were open by 8:00 a.m.

The Carter Center observed poll openings at seven polling stations, the voting process at 26 stations, and poll closings at five stations. As a whole, the DSF balloting went well, with only a few irregularities or areas of concern.

10 Because not every party contested in every region, the ballots for each region differed.
At the opening, about half of the seven stations observed reported minor problems. These included a PNC/R van parked outside a polling station in Linden and a PPP/C flag hanging from a nearby telephone pole. Although there were no domestic observers from the EAB, there were agents present from the PNC/R at all seven polls, from the PPP/C at six polls and from the GAP/WPA at two.

At the 26 polling stations where the Center observed the voting process, the majority of observers reported a few minor problems but no major problems. A common problem was the late arrival of the voters list Addendum. Another issue noted was the number of voters who voted with no form of identification. At 16 of the 26 polling stations, numerous individuals were permitted to vote who did not show proper identification. These voters took an oath and had superior officers present vouch for their identity.11

Materials for voting were present at all 26 stations observed, and GECOM staff appeared well trained and nonpartisan. Voters’ fingers were checked for indelible ink at all polls observed, and there were no reported instances of voter intimidation.

No problems were reported at any of the five polling stations where the close of polls was observed. The ballot boxes were sealed for return to Georgetown. With international observers and party agents present, the boxes were opened several days later at GECOM headquarters, and the envelopes were sorted by region. The envelopes were then sent out to designated polling locations in each region to be opened and mingled with the March 19 ballots.

**Political Campaign**

Although the political atmosphere in Guyana was tense, the political campaign was largely free of violence, with parties able to campaign and to move about the countryside freely. Citizens were also free to attend rallies and other political events. Campaigns started in earnest with Nomination Day in mid-February. Large campaign billboards and posters dotted the cities and countryside. Ads were placed in the newspapers and broadcast on TV and radio. Parties had publicized kick-offs where they unveiled their platforms and presented their main candidates.

Rallies were a common form of campaigning, and these rallies grew in size and frequency in the run-up to election day. The PPP/C and PNC/R generated larger crowds and held more rallies than the smaller parties. Speakers of all parties focused on similar issues such as education, economy, infrastructure, and jobs, and often blamed each other for the problems facing Guyana. A few persons and parties ran a positive campaign, most notably GAP/WPA. Unfortunately, some party speakers used inflammatory language and made personal attacks on opposing candidates. Of particular concern was the PNC/R’s use of the slogan “slow fire,” that was perceived as implying support for political violence against the ruling PPP/C and its supporters. Fortunately, this rhetoric was toned down during the last month of the campaign.

In contrast, however, the language at PPP/C rallies became more strident and inflammatory as the elections drew near. In addition, several of the smaller parties reported to Carter Center observers that they were being harassed or intimidated by PPP/C supporters or government officials. In particular, ROAR blamed the PPP/C for a series of incidents that culminated in shots being fired in

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11 At Brickdam Police Station (Region 4), a Carter Center observer noted that 91 electors voted with no identification. At a police station in Region 7 all 12 GDF soldiers on the OLE voted without an ID, and at a police station in Region 10 observers witnessed four GDF voters who appeared to be underage voting without an ID.
the vicinity of ROAR activists putting up posters in Region 6. These incidents appeared to be concentrated primarily in hotly contested areas or where it appeared that the smaller parties (such as GAP/WPA or ROAR) were making inroads.

There were also incidents of stone throwing against speakers at some of the PPP/C rallies, and the escalating number and intensity of incidents resulted in a press release from the GLTOG that condemned election-related violence. The GECOM chairman also issued a public appeal for an end to the violence. Although the incidents did not escalate into a serious disruption of the campaign and police reported only a handful of election-related misdemeanors, the atmosphere remained extremely volatile and tense.

In an effort to curb the negative tone and number of incidents, which left some GECOM staff feeling intimidated, GECOM issued a political party code of conduct on March 3. This initiative came very late in the process because GECOM had been waiting for the political parties to develop their own code, as had been done by the media. Subsequent party inaction led to a GECOM decision to set some ground rules for the remainder of the campaign and for the acceptance of the results. Lacking a formal code endorsed by the parties, GECOM had no enforcement powers and the code was largely ignored.

GECOM also proposed a series of televised debates among the presidential candidates. Two debates were held among the presidential candidates from TUF, ROAR, GDP, and PNC/R. The PPP/C candidate, President Bharrat Jagdeo, who had been calling for a televised debate between only himself and PNC/R candidate Desmond Hoyte, did not participate in the GECOM’s program of debates. The GAP’s presidential candidate, Paul Hardy, was in the hinterlands campaigning, so the party sent another representative.

Supporters often displayed campaign posters on schools and houses.
MEDIA MONITORING

There were no censorship issues or restrictions on the freedom of the press in the 2001 elections. Instead, Guyana suffered from an irresponsibly partisan press. Of particular concern to observers was the continuation of campaign commercials and talk show propaganda throughout the electoral period, including election day. Some of the independent television stations and newspapers attempted to act in a responsible and balanced nature, but they were overshadowed by a few popular and inflammatory talk show hosts. State television, which has the only nationwide coverage, was pro-government in its broadcasts.

The lack of objective reporting and accurate information available to voters was a concern to observers, as it not only limited the ability of voters to make a reasoned choice on polling day but also increased political and ethnic tensions and, in some cases, incited the public to violence.

To address these issues, representatives from more than 50 radio, television, and print media outlets came together in October 2000 to sign a media code of conduct. The nine-page code was meant to lay the ground rules for the upcoming political season. It declared that time and space allotted to coverage of the political parties should be balanced. It also committed the signatories to provide free space and 10 minutes of airtime daily to each party competing in the election. Though the agreement was not legally binding, it was hoped that it might help temper partisan reporting and coverage of the news and electoral campaign.

An independent panel of media referees was established to monitor the media environment, including the ability of the press to live up to its commitments. The panel, which featured two Caribbean journalists, issued regular reports throughout the election season. Their work was augmented by other media monitoring units, including a 15-person team at GECOM, an 11-person team in the GLTOG, and a group that was subcontracted by the EAB.

In general, these monitoring groups found that the code of conduct was ignored by almost all of the signatories. Most media outlets continued to report the news in a manner that was biased, often in favor of one of the two major parties. In addition, some of the talk show hosts blatantly portrayed party propaganda as news and used inflammatory language throughout the electoral process.

Media monitors found that the government-controlled television, radio, and newspaper outlets made modest efforts to present the opposition parties’ campaign platforms, but their pre- and post-election day coverage was pervaded by an overtly pro-government tone and bias. In its final report, the GECOM monitoring unit called the outlets a “mouthpiece” for the government. The GLTOG monitoring group found that they gave 57 percent of their news coverage to the PPP/C campaign (all positive) and only 10 percent to the PNC/R (predominately negative). The Chronicle, the government-controlled newspaper, had the same bias in its coverage. On the positive side, monitors noted that the independent newspaper, the Stabroek News, made efforts to portray the news in a balanced manner. Media monitors also reported that the PPP/C and the PNC/R received more coverage than all of the smaller parties combined.

Television talk show hosts were active political actors during the 2001 campaign. Presidential candidate C.N. Sharma hosted his own daily show and used it to promote his campaign. Also of concern were talk show hosts who presented rumor as fact and used their television outreach and personality in an inflammatory manner. One of the most notable was Mark Benschop, who was arrested several times in front of GECOM while urging his viewers to demonstrate against the slow distribution of election results.
of ID cards, and who spent election day on the air promoting the PNC/R and deriding the PPP/C, the chief of police, and other targets.

Channel 9, which carries Benschop’s program and other pro-PNC/R talk shows, was noted in all of the monitoring reports as having violated nearly every provision of the media code of conduct. GECOM’s monitoring unit found that Channel 9 “pushed the limits of irresponsibility to dangerous and incendiary levels” in the days following the elections.

Voter Education

Voter education plays an important role in the perception of integrity in the electoral system. In addition to understanding the practicalities of voting, such as the date of the election, poll opening and closing times, and how to mark the ballot paper, the electorate needs a basic understanding of their rights and responsibilities under the Constitution and election law.

In Guyana, there were three new elements in the electoral legislation for 2001, including the allocation of 25 seats for geographical representation, the allocation of 40 seats for the national “top-up” list, and mandatory gender representation, whereby at least one-third of the candidates nominated by each party had to be female. This did not mean that one-third of a party’s representation in Parliament had to be female, because once the number of seats was allocated after the election, parties were free to select the members of Parliament from candidate lists without regard to either gender or place of residence. This also meant that a party could select a representative for a particular region, even though that representative did not live in, or even visit, that region.

In the pre-election observation period, Carter Center observers monitored the outreach of voter education programs and had concerns that the messages were not reaching people in more remote communities. The GECOM voter education plan came into effect at the end of January. Despite its

The Returning Officer in Region 8 coordinates polling station returns from this office.
late start, GECOM made a concerted effort to inform the electorate through its public awareness and voter education (PAVE) program. The PAVE program incorporated a number of initiatives to reach all levels and sectors of society in all regions. The initiatives included education forums, outreach project teams, production and distribution of posters and leaflets, and a voter education caravan. GECOM worked in collaboration with the Guyanese Association of Women Lawyers and the Washington, D.C.-based National Democratic Institute (NDI) to host educational forums on the constitutional changes and the electoral system. Some forums were targeted at specific audiences, such as women NGO representatives or representatives of youth and Amerindian communities. There were also several open sessions held across all regions. These meetings enabled GECOM to disseminate information to prominent civil society figures and encourage them to go out into communities to inform the electorate, to motivate people to exercise their right to vote, and to assure voters of the secrecy of the ballot.

A large number of posters and leaflets were produced and distributed. These posters were helpful for the most part, but some of the information supplied in the leaflets was confusing and misleading. In some instances, the electorate believed that the term “geographical representation” meant that they would be represented in Parliament by someone who hailed from their region and was known to the constituents. This was not necessarily the case, as the candidate lists submitted by the parties for the “regional” seats could include persons from any region in the country.

Similarly, some voters understood the “gender agenda” to mean that one-third of seats in Parliament would be taken up by women, when in reality the legislation required only that one-third of the candidates on the party lists were women. Voters did not always understand the ballot paper design, and the explanation of the proportional representation system and the mechanism for allocating seats left some voters feeling confused and frustrated.

A schedule was drawn up for the voter education caravan to travel throughout the regions with a group of performers to act out parts of the voting process. The schedule and its revisions were rarely followed. Observers reported a general lack of organization and found that the performances did not portray a clear message.

The problems with voter education outreach and with poll worker training in the remote regions were reflected in the number of rejected ballots on election day, which was significantly higher in the hinterland than in the coastal regions.
In addition to The Carter Center, four other international groups sent observer missions to monitor the elections. As noted above, the GLTOG, which had a field presence starting in October, deployed a total of about 65 observers to monitor the polls. There were also observer teams from the OAS, CARICOM, and the Commonwealth. In general, there was good coordination between the international observer groups, including coordination of the deployment of observers across the country’s 10 regions.

In addition, the domestic civil society monitoring group EAB fielded a large number of observers and was able to cover about half of the polling stations on election day.

CARTER CENTER OBSERVER BRIEFINGS AND DEPLOYMENT

The Carter Center’s MTOs were supplemented by a team of short-term observers to monitor the period surrounding the polls. The Center delegation, which totaled 44, was led by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, former First Lady Rosalynn Carter, and former Prime Minister Sir Lloyd Erskine Sandiford of Barbados and included observers from 10 countries.

On March 16, the observers participated in a full-day briefing that included training on how to observe elections and the Center’s methodology for gathering and reporting observation data. In addition, delegates received information on the political history and electoral system of Guyana from experts within the delegation. Representatives of the PNC/R, GAP/WPA, and ROAR provided overviews of their electoral issues and concerns. The head of the GLTOG presented a summary of what their observers had witnessed since their arrival in fall 2000, and the Chairman of GECOM and two commissioners provided an in-depth update on the status of election preparations.

David Carroll, Mrs. Carter, and President Carter meet with GECOM Chairman Joe Singh.
Carter Center observers were deployed in 25 teams of one or two persons to all 10 regions, with the highest number of teams deployed to the coastal areas, including Region 4 around Georgetown (see Appendix 5). Deployment was coordinated with the other international observation groups in order to ensure that the maximum number of polling stations was covered.

Upon arrival, President Carter issued an arrival statement and then held a series of meetings, along with co-leaders Prime Minister Sandiford and Rosalynn Carter. These included meetings with the presidential candidates for the major parties, representatives of other parties in Parliament (WPA, TUF), ambassadors from the major donor group, the heads of the other international observation groups, and several representatives from civil society organizations.

**Voting Process and the Count**

On Saturday, March 17, observers were deployed to their regions and spent Saturday and Sunday visiting the ROs, DROs, political parties, and polling stations within their areas, observing the end of the electoral campaign and the final preparations for polling day.

On election day, March 19, observers were at the polls by 5:00 a.m. in order to watch set-up for the 6:00 a.m. opening. Carter Center observers watched the poll opening at 24 stations. During election day, observers visited anywhere from about five to 15 polling stations, depending on their deployment area. In total, Carter Center observers monitored the voting process at 415 polling stations in all 10 regions of the country. At the close of voting, Carter Center observers monitored the closing and counting process at 23 stations. Most of the Center observers returned to Georgetown after the conclusion of the count on March 19 or early on Tuesday, March 20. Some of the Center’s observers were redeployed to their areas in the days after the elections to monitor the consolidation of the count at the subregional and regional level.
Carter Center observers reported that the poll-opening process went smoothly with only a few minor procedural irregularities. These irregularities included a missing voters list at one station, missing electoral ink at three stations, and a late opening at five of the 24 stations observed. For the most part, however, the prescribed procedures were followed: at every station observed, the MRC canisters arrived sealed, the six-digit number for the official seal was selected randomly, and the ballot boxes were shown to be empty and sealed.\(^\text{12}\)

The presence of party polling agents is one of the most important means to ensure adequate monitoring of the electoral process. Party polling agents from the PPP/C and PNC/R were present at more than 90 percent of the 24 openings observed by Carter Center monitors, while GAP/WPA had agents at 25 percent, TUF at 12.5 percent and ROAR at 4.2 percent of the stations. The EAB had observers at about half of the stations. All of the party agents had GECOM accreditation, and the EAB observers were clearly identified with blue armbands. Almost every polling station had a police officer present, but their presence was inconspicuous and nonthreatening.

Of the 415 stations where Carter Center delegates observed voting, there were no irregularities reported at more than 85 percent of stations, while 14 percent had minor irregularities, and only one percent reported major or many irregularities.\(^\text{13}\)

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\(^{12}\) One of the integrity mechanisms used in the elections was to place a stamp mark with a unique, six-digit polling station code on the back of each ballot as it was issued to each voter. As there were two parts to the ballot, the poll workers were required to stamp the back of each half.

\(^{13}\) Two major irregularities were reported: (1) In one station in Region 9, the polling official was not folding ballots properly. This was not discovered until after almost 50 percent of the ballots had been cast. Officials later considered the improperly folded ballots spoilt, so almost 70 out of approximately 140 ballots were not counted; (2) In one station in Georgetown, during the period around 6-7 p.m. when there was confusion as to whether or not polls were closed, approximately 15 people came to the polls and appeared to be voting by impersonating people whose names were on the list but who had not voted.

Using information gathered from polling officials, Carter Center observer Ransford Palmer completes a checklist at a polling station.
Additional statistical information collected by Carter Center observers reinforced the overall assessment that polling went well. At 99.3 percent of the stations observed, there were no reports of intimidation, and 97.3 percent of the stations were reportedly free from political campaigning of any kind. The ballot boxes were firmly sealed in all but one of the stations observed. Polling officials appeared to be dedicated, working a very long day for polling and well into the night for the count. (Appendices 6-8 provide summary statistics from the Center’s observation forms.)

Most of the polling officials encountered by Carter Center observers seemed to be adequately trained, and most of the polling stations had the principal materials necessary for voting. In general, polling stations were well organized and enabled a smooth flow of voters, although some stations were of necessity located in small schools, other public buildings, or private residences. Voter turnout was high, especially in the early morning hours, when voters waited patiently, sometimes in very long lines. Observers noted the special care given to voters with disabilities. Polling officials painstakingly ensured that these voters understood how to mark the ballot and helped the elderly or infirm into and out of the polling stations and voting booths.

Carter Center observers noted several problems related to a lack of training, such as giving ballot papers to voters who already had electoral ink on their fingers and neglecting to stamp both sections of the ballot (3.3 percent of the stations observed). Observers reported confusion among some voters, especially in the hinterlands, as to how the ballot paper should be marked and folded. In some cases, voters took longer than five minutes to mark their papers and returned from the ballot booths looking confused. In other cases, voters did not know how to fold the ballot correctly so that the stamp marks placed on the back

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14 One poll worker, however, reported being disenfranchised, because her employment letter had not been forwarded by GECOM, and as a result she was not able to vote at the station where she was working.
of the ballots (both top and bottom section) were visible. On a number of occasions, the PO was required to give further instruction on how to mark and fold the ballots. Observers witnessed voters being given more than one ballot on six occasions and noted problems with secrecy of the ballot in three percent of the polls visited.

In spite of the procedures GECOM implemented to address problems with the voters list and incomplete distribution of ID cards, problems were evident on polling day. In addition to requiring ID cards or other forms of identification, GECOM provided for the use of MRCs on election day as a backup integrity mechanism to verify voter identification. During the voting process the MRC was pulled for each voter and cast along with the ballot into the ballot box to avoid multiple voting. However, observers noted that it was a time-consuming process for poll workers to find a voter’s MRC card in the stacks of 400 cards sent to each polling station. Also, MRCs were missing from some of the stations, so many voters voted without them. Based on Carter Center observations, the MRCs were not effective in serving either as a backup to catch errors on the registration list or in serving as an integrity mechanism to protect against multiple voting.

At more than 50 percent of polling stations visited, Carter Center observers saw at least one person vote without an ID card. At about 10 percent of the stations, observers saw more than 10 people vote without identification documents.

At almost half of the polling stations observed by the Center, at least one person was turned away for not having his or her name on the final voters list. A number of observers reported seeing many voters who appeared to have gone to the wrong polling station within their subdistrict, particularly in Georgetown, and after waiting in the queue had to be directed to a different polling station, causing confusion and frustration. While both parties complained that their supporters were being turned away, the PNC/R was particularly adamant and decided to request that GECOM allow voting by persons who had ID cards or receipt stubs from the
photographic exercise, but whose names did not appear on the list. By a vote of four to two, GECOM upheld its existing policy and reaffirmed that only persons listed on the OLE (as amended by the Addendum) could vote.

However, as the day wore on there was growing tension in the streets of Georgetown, where some PNC/R supporters were gathering to protest what they believed were deliberate attempts to prevent them from voting. Shortly before the close of polls, PNC/R leaders requested that GECOM reconsider its decision. GECOM did not announce its final decision confirming its prior ruling until 6:30 p.m. In the meantime, there was confusion in many areas of the country as a result of conflicting instructions coming from GECOM headquarters, as reported on television and radio. Depending on the region, POs received word before, during, or after the closure of the polls that the polls should remain open until further notice. Some POs received instructions that the poll closing should be extended from 6:00 to 7:00 p.m., while others heard a GECOM announcement on the radio that the polls were to close at a “designated hour” and thought that this meant that the polls should remain open until further notice. Shortly before 6:00 p.m., some polling officials reported receiving official instructions that voters who did not have their names on the voters list but who were in possession of the new ID card could vote. Carter Center and other international observers subsequently witnessed a small number of people casting ballots even though their names were not on the voters list.

Because of the conflicting nature and late notice of the instructions, several polls closed at 6:00 p.m. and started their count, leaving angry and frustrated persons shouting for them to reopen, especially in Region 4. The confusion ended by 8:00 p.m., when it became clear that the reference to the “designated” hour meant the scheduled 6:00 p.m. closing time and that GECOM had met that night and voted against the PNC/R request to allow votes to be cast by persons in possession of a ID card but not on the voters list.

After the close of polls, Carter Center observers monitored the closing and counting process at 23 stations. At all of these stations, counting went smoothly, with only one observer reporting a major irregularity. Eight teams reported minor irregularities, and 13 teams reported no irregularities.

In the polling stations monitored by Carter Center observers, the count was done in a transparent manner, with each ballot being shown to those present as it was being counted. POs were consistent in determining whether a ballot should be accepted or rejected, and they filled in forms correctly at all but three of the polling stations. The results were transcribed accurately onto the statements of poll (SOP) and were uniformly signed by polling officials, party agents, and observers present. In only one instance did an observer see a PO forget to sign the SOP. At all stations observed, SOP copies for both the general and regional elections were posted outside polling stations as required by law. Carter Center observers felt the party agents had accurately

15 During the photographic exercise, voters were provided with a receipt stub as evidence that their photo was taken. GECOM found that the stubs could be forged rather easily and decided not to allow them to serve as evidence that photographs had been taken.
16 Isolated areas nationwide and much of Region 6 did not receive instructions to remain open.
17 The one major irregularity reported during the closing and counting was a case in Region 6 where 58 ballots were rejected because the poll worker failed to stamp and fold the ballots correctly.
18 In these three cases, the PO neglected to fill in all of the Ballot Paper Account, which is the form to be completed before the ballot box is opened for the count.
recorded the results for their parties. The count took longer than expected, primarily due to bureaucratic requirements such as multiple forms and copies to be completed.

Despite the confusion at closing time, which detracted from an otherwise smooth election day process, the Carter Center delegation concluded that these irregularities did not materially affect the integrity of the process or the results. In a sense, it appears that keeping the polls open longer served as a release valve for some of the anger and frustration that had built up throughout the day in Region 4 due to the perception that voters were being deliberately disenfranchised by problems in the voters list.

Several recounts were requested, notably three in Region 3 (where the PPP/C disputed the number of ballots rejected because of illegible stamp marks) and one in Region 6. Observers reported that PNC/R agents stopped observing the recount process in Region 3 after party agents squabbled over the recount procedures. In the recounts, results did not significantly differ from the original figures.

**POST-ELECTION LEADERSHIP MEETINGS**

On March 20, President Carter and Prime Minister Sandiford, along with the heads of other international observation groups, met with GECOM Chairman Singh and two other members of the Commission to address a common concern: the slow release of preliminary results to the public. The GECOM commissioners recognized the problem and indicated that results were expected to be released soon.

After these meetings, President Carter and Prime Minister Sandiford held a news conference and released a preliminary statement summarizing the Carter Center delegation’s assessment of the electoral process leading up to the opening of polls, the casting of ballots, and poll closings (see Appendix 9). The statement noted that the process was generally peaceful and orderly and that the Center’s observers reported very few irregularities during the voting process. One important exception was the confusion that surrounded the closing of the polls, when polling officials received unclear instructions.
through GECOM personnel, the media, or others as to whether to allow voting after the 6:00 p.m. scheduled closing. The Center's statement also noted that all the political parties had expressed concern about the accuracy of the voters list before the elections and that some voters claimed they had registered but were not on the voters list. While the Center's observation data did not indicate any major systemic irregularities in the list, the statement noted that the magnitude of these problems was difficult to ascertain. Finally, the statement stressed that while the elections were an important and necessary element of Guyana's democratic process, they were not sufficient alone to solve the problems nor heal the wounds of Guyana's divided society.

After President Carter and Prime Minister Sandiford read portions of the prepared preliminary statement, President Carter made an impassioned impromptu plea in which he called on all Guyanese to work for national reconciliation and for putting the well-being of the country before that of any one party. He emphasized that, following the election, Guyanese faced a choice between a future with continued sharp ethnic and political divisions or one in which the country moved forward in a unified fashion. While noting that both major parties and their leaders had agreed privately that important constitutional reforms were necessary, he said the major responsibility to ensure that key steps be taken would rest with the victorious party (see Appendix 10).

Following the final press conference, two prominent members of civil society with ties to the opposition sent a letter to President Carter expressing concern about the potential for violence and requesting that he facilitate an agreement between the two presidential candidates on the issues of governance and reconciliation raised in the press conference.

Acting on this request, in the early morning of March 21, President Carter drafted a short statement summarizing what he believed were key points that would be acceptable to both sides and which could lay the foundation for additional steps. Copies of the draft statement were sent immediately...
to contacts with both parties, and meetings were arranged hastily before departure later that morning with PNC/R leader Desmond Hoyte and PPP/C leader Bharrat Jagdeo. In separate meetings, President Carter presented the draft to both leaders. Both Hoyte and Jagdeo indicated that they agreed to all the steps outlined in the draft statement, but Hoyte said he preferred not to sign it, since it reiterated commitments already made by both parties. Although it was not apparent at the time, it later became clear that Hoyte had not seen the draft prior to the meeting, as he had been unable to meet with his associates who had copies.

The following day, The Carter Center issued the statement in a press release noting that both sides agreed with the text and had pledged to implement its provisions. Media reports the next day mischaracterized the commitments as formal brokered agreements. In light of this, the Center issued another press release the following day that emphasized that the draft statement was intended as a reaffirmation of shared principles and not as a signed or brokered agreement. (See Appendices 11 and 12.) Shortly thereafter, Hoyte sent a terse letter to the Stabroek News that indicated that he was not aware of any accord brokered by Mr. Carter and had not agreed to anything with President Jadgeo or President Carter.

Given the active role played by the Center and President Carter in Guyana in the past, and in light of the post-election context of heightened political pressures, Hoyte’s reaction to the Center and President Carter’s interventions are understandable. While aware of the risks that its statements and actions might provoke a negative reaction from Hoyte and the PNC/R, the Center was motivated by a genuine desire to stimulate dialogue between the two leaders and to encourage them to agree to steps that would benefit all Guyanese. Although it was not until several weeks after the elections, the Center is pleased that the two parties and their leaders decided to initiate an ongoing process of political dialogue.

Carter Center observer John Graham traveled by boat to observe voting.
CONSOLIDATION OF REGIONAL COUNTS
AND ANNOUNCEMENT OF RESULTS

Considerable effort and expense had been expended by GECOM in planning and arranging for the processing and computerization of the results. However, in the push to release results quickly, GECOM strayed from its planning. In Region 4, for example, some of the statements of poll results were sent directly to GECOM for tabulation instead of being consolidated first at the electoral district (i.e., region) level by the RO. Complaints by political parties about the integrity of the computer system, generated in part by misinformation from talk show hosts and in part by the alleged computerized dislocation of voters on the voters list, resulted in a GECOM decision to tabulate the results manually before entering the information into computerized spreadsheets.

Tabulation of results at GECOM headquarters was observed by international observers, but party agents were not allowed to monitor the process, and this was of concern to Carter Center observers. Having party agents present at all stages of the process, especially during the consolidation of the results and the allocation of seats, is an integral part of ensuring the accuracy and transparency of elections. GECOM assured the Center’s field office director that party agents were free to observe the tabulation, but the smaller parties, in particular ROAR, continued to complain that they were unable to have open access to monitor the final phases of the process. ROAR officials argued that this was unfair to the smaller parties, since the two main parties in effect were monitoring the process through their GECOM commissioners.

Once the results were tabulated and checked late on March 22, they were signed by the chief electoral officer (CEO) and submitted to GECOM. With the unanimous approval of GECOM, results were announced very early on March 23. The Commission subsequently approved the allocation of seats and issued a Declaration of Election of President.

After the results were announced, however, a supervisor from Region 4 realized there had been an error in the totals in her submission and brought this to the attention of GECOM. The Commission met and heard a legal opinion from their counsel that suggested that the official results could still be changed because they had not yet been published in the official gazette. On March 27, the results were revised and the total votes for some parties were changed, thereby affecting the allocation of seats. This change gave a seat in Parliament to TUF and took away one of the seats held by the PPP/C. Table 3 shows the allocation of parliamentary seats.

The parties were notified on March 28 of these corrections by letter and met later that day with the CEO. The fact that some of the polling stations had been inadvertently left out of the original totals fueled requests by opposition and small parties for release of results at the polling station level. Up to that point, GECOM had released total figures but not the station-by-station results that the parties and observers needed for verification purposes.

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<th>TABLE 3: Allocation of Parliamentary Seats in the 2001 Elections</th>
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court case brought by PNC/R candidate Joseph Hamilton challenging the process of tabulating the results resulted in GECOM suspending its intention (pending the court decision) to scan the statements of poll for public release on a CD-ROM.

**CARTER CENTER QUICK COUNT AND REVIEW OF STATEMENTS OF POLL**

As part of its comprehensive monitoring effort, The Carter Center gathered data from a sample of polling station results to conduct a quick count or parallel vote tabulation (PVT). The quick count was undertaken to monitor indirectly the tabulation process by which vote counts from individual polling stations were added together by GECOM to arrive at the official results.

The election results predicted by the Center’s quick count did not differ meaningfully from the final results announced by GECOM, indicating that the tabulation process was conducted without significant mistakes or fraud. The findings of the quick count were not made public, but they were used to inform the Center delegation’s overall assessment of the electoral process. As the sample could not be drawn on a totally random basis due to logistical travel constraints, the Center did not treat the quick count as fully reliable in a scientific or statistical sense.

In order to conduct the quick count, the Center selected a representative sample of 100 polling stations, approximately five percent of the total number of stations, from all 10 regions. Prior to deployment, Carter Center observers were given precise instructions to collect vote count information from the posted SOPs at the selected polling stations along with their other monitoring duties. Carter Center observers did not count ballot papers themselves nor did they ask individuals for whom they had voted. Rather, late on election night and early the following morning, observers recorded the official vote counts from selected polling stations as posted on the official SOP. By noon on March 20, information had been received for 89 of the 100 polling stations.

The Carter Center quick count results suggested that PPP/C would receive approximately 54.2 percent of the vote and the PNC/R 41 percent, with the remaining 4.8 percent split among the other contesting parties. The margin of error for the quick count was seven percent with a 90 percent confidence interval. The election results announced by GECOM on March 27 did not differ significantly, awarding the PPP/C with 52.9 percent, the PNC/R with 41.9 percent, and the other parties with 3.2 percent of the vote. Several weeks later, on April 5, GECOM published an updated list of official results with minor revisions (see Appendix 13).

The EAB also considered undertaking a large scale PVT for the elections. However, the organization ultimately decided to tabulate unofficial results based on 835 of the nearly 1,900 polling stations. Their findings were also consistent with the final official results announced by GECOM and with the findings of the Center’s quick count.

Once GECOM had announced the official results, Carter Center observers, in coordination with the GLTOG, conducted an independent reconciliation of all but approximately 185 of nearly 1,900 official SOPs collected at the GECOM headquarters. This review showed that more than 99 percent of the SOPs had been signed by a PO as well as party agents, an issue in the 1997 elections. A comparison of vote count results from individual polling stations as collected by Carter Center observers with the official SOPs at GECOM headquarters showed no significant difference.

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19 The margin of error was calculated based on a 90 percent confidence interval.

20 The remaining statements of poll were not readily available by the time the observers had to leave.
In the days immediately following the election, the PNC/R and its supporters continued to complain of voters being disenfranchised because their names had not been on the voters list. The more ardent supporters gathered at Congress Place, PNC/R headquarters, to vent their dissatisfaction. The day the official election results were announced, PNC/R Election Commissioner Haslyn Parris was attacked by a crowd at Congress Place, apparently because of his part in the unanimous vote by GECOM commissioners to approve the results. Unrest broke out in Buxton, a small coastal town near the capital, and spread along the East Coast road. Businesses in Georgetown remained closed and school children stayed at home as citizens worried about the disturbances spreading.

Within hours of the announcement of the official results, PNC/R candidate Joseph Hamilton petitioned the High Court for an injunction to prevent president-elect Bharrat Jadgeo from being sworn in as president. Hamilton's petition claimed that GECOM and its CEO had not followed the provisions of the Representation of the People Act, because they bypassed consolidation of the count by the ROs.

The High Court heard the case until March 28, when it adjourned to make its decision. While the court was in session, crowds of protesters and onlookers gathered outside. Several times during the proceedings the court recessed because it could not hear over the noise of the crowd outside the courthouse and the sound of gunfire as police fired pellets over the heads of protestors.

The case was heard by Chief Justice Desiree Bernard, the same judge who had ruled in 1997 that the court had no jurisdiction to intervene at that point in an election. Her own words were quoted in court by both sides, one side claiming that she
should rule as she did in 1997, and the other
claiming that the two cases were different.
Acknowledging in court that she was under an
enormous amount of pressure to rule swiftly and
correctly, the Chief Justice said the country was
falling prey to mob rule and that people were
beginning to fear for their lives.

In her decision, read on March 31, the Chief
Justice dismissed the injunction to block the procla-
mation of Bharrat Jagdeo as president. However,
she expressed concern that party agents were not
present to monitor the tabulation of the results as
required by Section 84 (1) of the Representation
of the People Act. The latter requires:

The Returning Officer to ascertain the total
votes cast for each list by adding up the votes
recorded in the statements of poll in the
presence of persons entitled to be present as
set out in Section 86 (1) which includes
members of the Commission, duly appointed
candidates, counting agents, and such other
persons as, in the opinion of the Returning
Officer, have good reason to be present.

In view of the above, Justice Bernard ordered
GECOM and the CEO to fulfill the provisions of
Article 84 (1) of the Representation of the People
Act. The Commission subsequently ordered ROs to
recertify the statements of poll in front of party
agents. This process started on March 31 and
continued until April 4 but did not materially
change the results in the end. The PNC/R refused
to take part in the recertification process, as it
believed the swearing-in should not have taken
place before the process was completed. On March
31, the same day as Justice Bernard’s decision,
Bharrat Jagdeo was sworn in as President. (See
Appendix 13 for GECOM’s April 5, 2001, publica-
tion of official results.)

When the Center closed its election observation
office on April 6, the PNC/R still had not accepted
the results. The party was preparing a petition
challenging the election and suggested privately that
it might not take its seats in Parliament.

The political atmosphere remained tense for
several weeks. There were numerous protests, some
of which turned into violent demonstrations and
roadblocks in Georgetown and along the coast.
Tensions reached a boiling point shortly after
Hoyte’s April 7 declaration that the PNC/R
intended to escalate its protest against the
reappointment of Roger Luncheon as Head of the
Presidential Secretariat, on the grounds that his
appointment politicized a post that should have
been filled by a neutral civil servant. Violence
broke out after a PNC/R rally where calls for “slow
fire” were replaced by “more fire.” On April 9,
not long after a Channel 9 talk show host called
for “raging fires,” fires set by arsonists ripped
through the heart of Georgetown, destroying eight
buildings on Robb and Regent Streets. A woman
also was shot dead in the vicinity of the PPP/C’s
headquarters.

In an effort to prevent further violence, Presi-
dent Jagdeo and Hoyte agreed to meet on April 24.
During the meeting, the two leaders reached
agreements in six key areas, including steps to
reduce tensions and ensure a politically neutral
public service. In a follow-up meeting the next day,
the leaders issued a statement summarizing agree-
ments reached on a series of questions, including
the creation of committees on depressed communi-
ties, the bauxite industry, and house lot apportion-
ment. In a third meeting on May 2, the two leaders
agreed on additional follow-up steps. ■
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

THE CARTER CENTER’S
MAY 17 FINAL STATEMENT

About six weeks after closing its field office in Georgetown, the Center issued a final statement summarizing its assessment of the electoral process in Guyana (see Appendix 14). The statement, released on May 17, 2001, concluded that “overall, the Center finds that the electoral process met international standards, that the voters of Guyana were able to freely express their democratic choices on March 19, and that the official results reflected the will of the voters. Unfortunately, there was post-election street violence and lingering doubts about the accuracy of the voters list and final results. While it is critical to improve the electoral system for future elections, it is equally important that Guyanese work together toward political reconciliation, inclusiveness, and good governance.”

The Center's statement also provided specific assessments of several key aspects of the process, including election day processes, voter registration, party observers, election management systems, and the media. The Center found that the election day voting and counting processes went peacefully, that poll workers were well trained and professional, that voters were able to cast their vote in secret, and that there were no reports of significant security incidents or intimidation.

Regarding voter registration, the Center noted that problems with the voters list and voter registration were the principal reasons for opposition party claims that GECOM was not ready for election day and that these greatly affected the level of confidence of the Guyanese people in GECOM and the electoral process. Although GECOM had extended pre-election deadlines and issued supplemental voter registration lists in an effort not to disenfranchise voters, the final OLE still suffered from repeated but correctable errors. Finally, the Center's statement strongly supported GECOM's request for an independent external audit. (The audit, which was completed by International IDEA in August 2001, concluded that the voter list was 99 percent accurate and that none of the problems appeared likely to favor any particular party, nor would have affected the result of the election.)

The Center's statement noted problems in GECOM's election management and planning systems, which contributed not only to inaccuracies in the voters list and delays in producing and distributing voter identification cards, but also to meltdowns in the systems for vote reporting and tabulation. Although GECOM had developed sophisticated computerized systems, the software for the system was never completely verified and the systems had to be discarded, which meant that the final results had to be tabulated manually from nearly 1,900 SOPs. The vote count was ultimately accurate and honest, but it was inefficient and caused the announcement of final results to be delayed by more than 48 hours.
The Center also expressed concern regarding the absence of political party agents during the tabulation of results at the national level. Whereas the counting process at polling stations was transparent and open to party agents, access to GECOM headquarters was difficult. This was especially problematic for the smaller parties, including the WPA/GAP, TUF, and ROAR, which did not have representation in GECOM and therefore had no access whatsoever to these key parts of the tabulation exercise.

In regard to the media, the Center echoed the views of GECOM’s Media Monitoring Unit (MMU) and other observers regarding the unbalanced and biased coverage in the state-owned media and the irresponsible and inflammatory broadcasts of various TV talk shows.

RECOMMENDATIONS

As noted above, despite the technical glitches and political problems observed in the elections, some of which are inherent in administering a

Voters willingly endured long lines in order to participate in the process.
nationwide electoral apparatus, the Center concluded that Guyana’s 2001 electoral process met international standards, that the voters of Guyana were able to freely express their democratic choices, and that the official results reflected the will of the voters. The Center commends GECOM for its professional administration of the elections, for its commitment to developing and implementing reforms to improve the electoral process, and for its openness to accepting the scrutiny of international observers.

A number of recommendations for electoral reform already have been made by a range of groups, including civil society leaders, political parties, GECOM itself, and other election observation groups. Nonetheless, in a spirit of respect and support, and recognizing that it is up to the Guyanese people to decide, the Center offers the following recommendations for improving future elections:

**Comprehensive review of the electoral system and legislation.** The audit and systems review by International IDEA should serve as the basis for a comprehensive review of the electoral system and legislation by GECOM and Parliament. Guyana adopted a new electoral system in 2001 but retained elements of the old system on its books, hampering efficient administration of the process. The process should be studied as an integral whole, with problem areas and conflicting or missing legislation identified and corrected.

**Reform of electoral process and procedures.** Parliament should use the audit findings and GECOM’s internal reviews as the basis for its own review and reform of the legal framework for the electoral process. This should include constitutional provisions and enabling legislation to eliminate outdated or conflicting statutory provisions, and establishing systems and procedures within GECOM that are more efficient and less bureaucratic. Particular attention should be paid to the audit report’s recommendations for improving procedures for voter registration and verification of the voters list.

**Election administration.** Parliament and political parties should consider alternative models of election administration. The so-called “Carter formula,” which has been followed since 1992, provides for an election commission with balanced representation of ruling and opposition parties. While adoption of this model was critical to the success of the breakthrough transitional elections in 1992, in subsequent elections it has allowed party interests to interfere with effective electoral administration. As part of electoral reform efforts, Guyana should give careful consideration to alternative models, possibly reducing or eliminating political party representation and increasing the role of independent members of civil society and professional experts.

**Transparency of electoral processes.** GECOM should maintain a policy of open and transparent election administration throughout all phases of the electoral process, including exercises that cover tabulation and consolidation of results, the allocation of seats, and the pronouncement of the new president. In particular, GECOM’s policies and procedures should ensure that party agents from all contesting parties have adequate access to observe not only the counting of ballots at the polls, but also the tabulation and consolidation of results in the regions and at GECOM headquarters in Georgetown. GECOM should also ensure that complete polling station level results are announced and publicized on a timely basis. These steps will allow all parties and candidates to check SOP information against information collected on polling day and to challenge
specific incidents where they have evidence of a significant discrepancy that would materially affect the election results.

**Broadcast legislation.** Based on wide consultation with stakeholders, Parliament should enact broadcast legislation that sets standards for appropriate use of public airwaves to ensure equitable, impartial coverage for all parties by the state-owned media. Although freedom of speech and of the press should be limited only in cases where other basic rights and public safety are endangered, measures should be included to ensure that inflammatory broadcasting cannot be used to incite violence.

**Codes of conduct for political parties and media.** Parliament should enact legislation to give GECOM or another independent body the power to enforce election-related codes of conduct for political parties and the media.

Credible and accurate elections where the will of the voters can be freely expressed and accurately reported are essential to the democratization process and the accountability of elected officials. However, it is clear that given Guyana’s “winner-take-all” political system and its recurring patterns of ethnic voting and political polarization, elections alone will not produce an inclusive system of governance with broad participation by all major groups. Resolving Guyana’s deep-seated mistrust will be much more difficult than fixing technical problems in the electoral process.

There have been some encouraging signs, however, such as the initial set of constitutional reforms passed in 2001 after the elections and the high-level political dialogue that President Jadgeo and Minority Leader Desmond Hoyte sustained throughout 2001. In order to achieve the inclusiveness and good governance that will be necessary for genuine political reconciliation and sustained development, the government and the major parties in Parliament, working together with civil society, should continue the process of constitutional and electoral reform. This would allow all parties, whether in the majority or in opposition, to participate meaningfully in development of policy and legislation and serve as part of a system of checks and balances that promotes accountability.

The Carter Center plans to support Guyana’s democratic consolidation and sustainable development through an integrated program of initiatives drawing on the Center’s expertise in democracy, conflict resolution, economic development, and transparency. The initiative is designed to help Guyana realize its National Development Strategy and will build on existing Carter Center activities in support of rule of law and civil society strengthening.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The Carter Center would like to acknowledge the assistance and cooperation that a number of persons and organizations provided during this project.

In particular, we would like to acknowledge the cooperation and assistance of GECOM Chairman Joe Singh, whose unwavering dedication to a credible and accurate electoral process inspired admiration; the GECOM commissioners and CEO Gocool Boodoo, who met with our observers and shared their concerns and hopes for the process; Statutory Officer Albert Henry, whose unfailing good humor endeared him to our observers; and the GECOM staff, for their hard work and dedication. We also appreciated the commitment to the electoral process shown by regional returning officers, district returning officers, and poll workers and the assistance that they provided to our observers.

We would also like to thank the political parties and their members for participating in multiple meetings with our field office director and MTOs and for helping to brief our observer delegation.

A special note of appreciation is due to Police Commander Paul Slowe from Region 6 and Police Commissioner Laurie Lewis for providing a police

Carter Center Guyana office staff and MTOs with President Carter and Field Office Director Sue Nelson. From left: Winston Fordyce, Ralph Ogden, Sat Narain, Margaret Burke, Brian Lewis, President Carter, David Danzig, Sue Nelson, Sheila Jaghab, Patrick Berg, Karen Pratt, Catherine Clarke, and John Lewis
escort for the safe return of two Carter Center observers caught in Region 6 during disturbances along the coastal road.

Our mission in Guyana was facilitated greatly by the presence of the GLTOG, which was kind enough to share volumes of information collected during their five-month stay preceding our arrival. We would like to thank them and their director, Simon Osborne, for assisting our efforts and ensuring close coordination among all 10 observer teams in Guyana. We would also like to thank the domestic monitors who worked for the EAB, and other international observer groups, such as CARICOM, the Commonwealth, and the OAS, for their coordination and information-sharing.

In Atlanta, Democracy Program Director Charles Costello and Associate Director David Carroll were responsible for directing the Guyana Mission. Program Coordinator Rachel Fowler managed the project at headquarters with logistical support from Program Officer Laine Price, Program Assistant Tynesha Green, and program interns Matt Clark, Madhumati Deshpande, and Brett Lacy. The Center is grateful for the hard work and assistance of local Guyanese staff in Georgetown, in particular Brian Lewis, Margaret Burke, Karen Pratt, Sat Narain, and Winston Fordyce.

Field Office Director Sue Nelson, our senior in-country representative, drafted this report, with assistance from Richard Klein and from MTOs Patrick Berg, Catherine Clarke, Matt Clark, David Danzig, John Lewis, and Ralph Ogden. David Carroll, Charles Costello, Rachel Fowler, and Laine Price revised and edited the document. Laine Price managed the process of compiling appendices, with help from Brian Lewis, Madhumati Deshpande, Lauren Green, and Kirtley Fisher.
APPENDICES

1. Herdmanston Accord
2. St. Lucia Statement
3. Government of Guyana invitation to Carter Center to observe the elections
4. Contesting Political Parties
5. Carter Center deployment and region map
6. Summary Form: International Observers: Opening of Polling Stations
7. Summary Form: International Observers: Observation of Voting
8. Summary Form: International Observers: Observation of Counting
10. Remarks by President Carter after Preliminary Statement, March 20, 2001
13. General and Regional Elections, Official Results, GECOM, April 5
15-23. Newspaper Articles
CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY MISSION TO GUYANA

HERDMANSTON ACCORD

Signed in Guyana, 17th January 1998

Measures for Resolving Current Problems

The deliberations and consultations undertaken by the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Mission have confirmed an urgent need for the de-escalation of conflict emphasised in the Mission’s initial Statement. The Mission concluded that resolution of current problems in Guyana must begin; and that this can only happen through a political process to which all contribute. The Mission has recommended to the Leaders of the two parties the Menu of Measures set out below. It considers that, if agreed by the two main political parties as an integrated package, these measures can contribute significantly to the resolution of existing problems.

The Menu of Measures has taken into account the contributions of all political parties and of civic groups. The Mission is of the view that these measures will commend themselves to the society as a whole and invites all members of the society to give their full support to them.

In this context, the Leaders of the PPP/Civic and the PNC have agreed as follows:

1. AUDIT
   (i) Without prejudice to any judicial process arising from the 15 December 1997 elections, an independent inquiry (the audit) will be carried out in two stages, namely:

   (a) in the first stage, an urgent review of the due process of the count on and after 15 December 1997 (including the role of the Elections Commission) to be completed within three months of 17 January 1998 with a view to ascertainment of the votes cast for the respective political parties; and

   (b) in the second stage, an audit of systemic aspects of the electoral process, including the post-balloting phase.

(ii) The audit will be carried out under CARICOM auspices by a team proposed by the Chairman of CARICOM, after consultation with the Leaders of the political parties which participated in the 15 December 1997 elections, and agreed to by the Leaders of the PPP/Civic and the PNC. The Terms of Reference for the conduct of the audit team are annexed hereto.

(iii) The PPP/Civic and the PNC will cooperate in the enactment of any enabling legislation that may be required for the effective conduct of the audit.

(iv) The Parties to this Accord will accept the findings of the first stage of the audit as binding upon them: and the enabling legislation will provide for such findings to be admissible for the purposes of any Election Petition in respect of any matters of fact to which they relate.

2. MORATORIUM
   An immediate moratorium on public demonstrations and marches will be declared and implemented. The ban on these activities will be simultaneously lifted. These arrangements will subsist for a minimum period of three months from 17th January 1998.
3. DIALOGUE
The PPP/Civic and the PNC will “activate arrangements for sustained dialogue between them with a view to fostering greater harmony and confidence and resolving issues on which agreement can be reached.”

4. CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM
(i) A Constitutional Reform Commission will be established by law, with a wide mandate and a broad-based membership drawn from representatives of political parties, the Labour Movement, religious organisations, the private sector, the youth and other social partners. The Terms of Reference of the Commission and its membership will be determined by the National Assembly after a process of consultations with the political parties. It will be mandated to consult with civil society at large.

(ii) The Commission will also be mandated to conclude its deliberations and present its report to the National Assembly within eighteen months of 17 January 1998. The process for implementing the changes recommended by the Commission and approved by the National Assembly to be concluded in sufficient time to allow for post-reform general elections which will be held within eighteen months after the presentation of the report of the Commission to the National Assembly.

(iii) Among the matters to be addressed by the Constitutional Reform Commission will be measures and arrangements for the improvement of race relations in Guyana, including the contribution which equal opportunities legislation and concepts drawn from the CARICOM Charter of Civil Society can contribute to the cause of justice, equity and progress in Guyana.

5. CREATING A NEW ENVIRONMENT
The political Leaders of the PPP/Civic and the PNC will issue a joint statement confirming their commitment to the agreed process of dispute settlement and their resolve to avoid the use by or on behalf of their respective Parties of language which is accusatory and which might have an inflammatory effect in the political context.

6. IMPLEMENTATION
For the purposes of the implementation of these measures, the PPP/Civic and the PNC will each appoint a senior representative with plenipotentiary powers for ensuring the smooth and uninterrupted translation of these agreed undertakings and arrangements into practice in a manner which supports the return of Guyana to normalcy.

7. CARICOM’S CONTINUING ROLE
The Parties also accept that the Chairman and Bureau of CARICOM will retain a continuing interest in the implementation of the measures, and remain at the disposal of both Parties in that regard.

The Menu of Measures set out in paragraphs 1 to 7 above is agreed this 17th day of January 1998 by

_____________________________________
PEOPLE’S PROGRESSIVE PARTY/CIVIC

_____________________________________
PEOPLE’S NATIONAL CONGRESS

On behalf of the Chairman of the
CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY

Source: Taken from http://hostings.diplomacy.edu/iirt/chronology/Update91.htm
APPENDIX 2

GUYANA: THE SAINT LUCIA STATEMENT

Friday July 3, 1998

1. In signing the “Herdmanston Accord” on 17 January 1998, the Leaders of Guyana’s two main political Parties stated that they were doing so “specially mindful of the willingness of (their) CARICOM colleagues to remain engaged with Guyana in this endeavour”. It is in this spirit that as colleagues we have taken the opportunity of our Saint Lucia Summit, on occasion of the 25th Anniversary of CARICOM, to initiate a dialogue with them on the current situation in Guyana - conscious of our own full participation as signatories to the “Herdmanston Accord.

2. We are also fully resolved that it is pre-eminently our task to be in the front line of all efforts to assist Guyana as part of our own family.

3. Our conversation with President Jagan and Mr Hoyte have convinced us all of the necessity to return to Guyana to the agreed path of the ‘Herdmanston Accord’ - within the time-frame agreed in the Accord. Convinced that there is no time to lose in securing this, we have resolved together to place our collective commitment behind the undertakings, arrangements and measures in paragraphs (a) to (j) below to which President Jagan and Mr Hoyte, representing the PPP/Civic and the PNC respectively, have agreed between themselves and with CARICOM, namely:

(a) All parties to the ‘Herdmanston Accord’ reaffirm their commitment to the Accord, and to the implementation of its provisions as initially contemplated

(b) Both stages of the Electorate Audit as provided for in paragraph 1 of the ‘Herdmanston Accord’ have been presented to the parties in Guyana. All the parties to the Accord have agreed to accept the findings of the first stage of the Audit - as set out in paragraph 1 (i) (a) of the Accord - as binding upon them; but it is recognised that this does not preclude the pursuit of election petitions which have been filed in the courts by both parties.

(c) The next substantive step to which the parties are committed under the Accord is that of Constitutional Reform on the basis and within the framework provided for in paragraph 4 of the Accord. We recall that provision specifically and reaffirm our determination to pursue it in spirit and letter.

(d) Mindful that among the matters to be addressed by the Constitution Reform Commission will be: ‘measures and arrangements for the improvement of race relations in Guyana, including the contribution which equal opportunities legislation and concepts drawn from the CARICOM Charter of Civil Society can contribute to the cause of justice, equity and progress in Guyana - it is accepted that the parties will take steps for the early implementation of specific measures to achieve these objectives in advance of constitutional reform itself.

(e) We all agreed that it is feasible to complete the work of the Constitution Reform Commission and to have the Report submitted to the National Assembly by 16 July 1999 as originally contemplated, thereby maintaining the timetable in paragraph 4 (ii) of the Accord, and we commit ourselves to achieving it.

(f) To enable this timetable to be met, the parties have agreed that they will settle as soon as possible, by law in the manner required by the ‘Herdmanston Accord’, the terms of reference and the naming of the Constitution Reform Commission mindful that CARICOM is resolved to assist them in every way required, but more specifically by arranging for the provision of constitutional experts and facilitators.

(g) The parties have also agreed that the necessary enabling legislation should be enacted in time to allow the Opposition to take their seats in the National Assembly by 15 July 1998. Mr Hoyte has indicated his intention that, without prejudice to the outcome of the election petitions referred to above, the PNC will assume their seats in the National Assembly by the date, and President Jagan has indicated her agreement to secure the enactment of the necessary enabling legislation.
APPENDIX 2

(h) Mrs Jagan has also agreed to make all normal parliamentary arrangements to facilitate the due functioning of the Opposition in the National Assembly, including exploring in consultation with all Parties in the Assembly the establishment of a Parliamentary Management Committee for the better organisation and functioning of parliament as established in a number of parliamentary democracies.

(i) Building on this historic process of the meeting of Guyana’s political leaders with CARICOM Leaders in Saint Lucia and the demonstration that through dialogue lies the path to the resolution of Guyana’s problems, the parties have agreed to redouble their efforts for dialogue as provided in paragraphs 3 and 6 of the “Herdmanston Accord”. Further, the two leaders have given CARICOM Heads of Government their assurance that they will themselves meet on a periodic basis to facilitate the achievement of all the processes to which they committed their Parties by the “Herdmanston Accord”.

(j) The two leaders have recognised the value of high level Facilitator acceptable to them whose functions will be developed in conjunction with them. Therefore, they have accepted the offer of CARICOM to provide such a Facilitator who will be appointed as a matter of urgency to further assist in the due implementation of these several agreements.

3. In the context of the conversation in Saint Lucia CARICOM leaders are satisfied that there will be an end to illegal protest on the streets of Guyana as dialogue and parliamentary processes take their rightful and more prominent place in Guyana’s governance. We are strengthened in this by the assurance that the rule of law will be upheld and that as a consequence violence in the political life of the country will cease. None of us wish to stifle dissent in any of our countries; but none of us will accept disorder and threats to life and property as a way of political life.

4. CARICOM remains committed to the peaceful settlement of differences and disputes within our region and states. These goals are fully supported by both President Jagan and Mr Hoyte. We are therefore heartened by their assurance that this is the path along which they will work to achieve national unity and cohesiveness for the betterment of Guyana and all its peoples. We are certain that all Guyanese will lend their tangible support to this.

5. We express our genuine appreciation of the statesmanship shown by our colleagues in Guyana in making this historic Agreement possible and once again pledge the commitment of the Caribbean Community to remaining engaged with Guyana in the implementation of the “Herdmanston Accord” and this Agreement and to be at the disposal of the Parties for this purpose.

MADE THIS 2ND DAY OF JULY 1998, and accepted by:

...........................................
THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY
CHAIRMAN

...........................................
PEOPLE’S PROGRESSIVE PARTY/CIVIC

...........................................
PEOPLE’S NATIONAL CONGRESS

Source: Taken from http://hostings.diplomacy.edu/iirt/chronology/Update9o.htm

His Excellency President Jimmy Carter
Chairman of the Board
The Carter Center
1 Copenhill Avenue
453 Freedom Parkway
Atlanta, Georgia 30307
United States of America.

Dear President Carter,

At this time as our country prepares for General Elections, allow me to recall my Government’s appreciation for your past efforts in facilitating and observing the process that led to free and fair elections in our country in 1992. The results of those elections allowed Guyana to return to the fold of democratic nations.

Allow me also to reiterate my Government’s gratitude for the assistance your Center provided in the formulation of a National Development Strategy. This document has been tabled in the National Assembly.

The Carter Center has distinguished itself over the years for the promotion of democratic systems and institutions throughout the world. Your Center is highly recognised for its work in observing elections and its opinion on the conduct of national elections is highly respected.

It therefore gives me great pleasure to officially invite the Carter Center to send an observer mission to Guyana for the forthcoming elections. Your presence will enhance national and international confidence in the electoral process. The Government and people of Guyana would welcome your presence during these polls and will offer the normal assistance and privileges associated with observer missions.

Yours sincerely,

Braja D. Jagdeo
President of Guyana.
### Appendix 4

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Carter Center Team Deployment
Guyana General Elections
March 2001

**Region 1**
- Team 1: Catherine Clarke

**Region 2**
- Team 2: Clarence Dias
  - Philliat Matsheza

**Region 3**
- Team 3: Sheila Jaghab
- Team 4: Layna Mosley
  - Frank Boyd
- Team 5: Cara Hesse
  - Madhu Deshpande

**Region 4**
- Team 6: President Carter
  - Mrs. Carter
  - Charles Costello
- Team 7: Sir Lloyd
  - John Hardman
- Team 8: John Lewis
- Team 9: Ransford Palmer
  - Sue Nelson
- Team 10: Jason Calder
- Team 11: Jeffrey Mapendere
- Team 12: Archbishop Carter
  - Steven Hochman
- Team 13: Richard Klein
- Team 14: John Marsh
  - Susan Johnson
- Team 15: Rachel Fowler

**Region 5**
- Team 16: Andrew Reynolds

**Region 6**
- Team 17: Anthony Maingot
  - Cynthia Hooks
- Team 18: Ralph Ogden
- Team 19: David Pottie

**Region 7**
- Team 20: Chris Harris
  - Matt Clark
- Team 21: Jason Forrester

**Region 8**
- Team 22: John Graham
- Team 23: Patrick Berg

**Region 9**
- Team 24: Luc Lapointe

**Region 10**
- Team 25: David Danzig
  - Tim Wilcox
## INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS: OPENING OF POLLING STATION

(Please remember to write clearly and in ink)

Observation Mission: The Carter Center  Team number: 25 teams  Region Number: All regions
Division Number: N/A  Polling Station Number: 24 stations observed

*Numbers in bold represent totals from all 24 stations observed.

1. Were any of the following persons not present for the opening of the polling station? *(Please circle the appropriate answer)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presiding Officer</th>
<th>Assistant Presiding Officer</th>
<th>2 Poll Clerks</th>
<th>Ballot Clerk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 at 1 station</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Which of the following parties’ agents and domestic observers were present at the opening? *(Please circle the appropriate answer)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PNC/R</th>
<th>PPP/C</th>
<th>TUF</th>
<th>GAP/WPA</th>
<th>ROAR</th>
<th>EAB (domestic observers)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Others: *(please specify)*

3. Did the polling station have all the election materials? *(if you answer “Yes”, please do not answer question 3a, and 3b)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3a. Which of the following election materials were missing in the polling station? *(Please circle which materials were missing)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ballot Papers</th>
<th>Voters’ List</th>
<th>Electoral Ink</th>
<th>The Ballot Box</th>
<th>The Polling Station’s Official Stamp</th>
<th>MRCs</th>
<th>Other Election Materials</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3b. How long did the polling station staff have to wait to receive all the missing election materials? *(From the list below please circle how long it took)*

- Before the 6:00: 4
- Before the 7:00: 0

One station had to wait until noon. *(please indicate approximate time)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Was the MRC Canister and Ballot Box sealed when they arrived? *(Please circle)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Was the ballot box empty before the Presiding Officer sealed it? *(Please circle)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Did a polling station official set the randomly chosen 6 digit number on the official seal? *(Please circle)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Did the polling station open at 6:00 in the morning? *(Please circle)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. In general would you conclude that there were:
   - No irregularities
   - Minor irregularities
   - Many irregularities
   - Major irregularities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No irregularities</th>
<th>Minor irregularities</th>
<th>Many irregularities</th>
<th>Major irregularities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: The Carter Center observed the opening of 24 polling stations. If the figures entered for any given question do not add up to 24, it is because some forms were returned without every question answered.*
APPENDIX 7

INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS: OBSERVATION OF VOTING  
(Please remember to write clearly and in ink)

Observation Mission: The Carter Center Team number: 25 teams Region Number: All regions
Division Number: N/A Polling Station Number: 415 stations observed
Time of arrival: N/A Time of departure: N/A
(please use 24 hr clock)

1. Did you see anyone, within 200 yards of the polling station, campaigning for a political party? YES 11 NO 401

2. Did you see anyone attempting to intimidate voters outside or inside the polling station? YES 3 NO 407

2a. If “YES” to Q2 please comment here on what happened.

3. Did the polling station open on time (check page 1 of Poll Book)? YES 339 NO 67

3a. If “NO”, what was the reason for the delay in opening the polling station? (please circle the appropriate answer)
Key Election Materials not present 34 Insufficient staff present 8 Threat to the security of the Polling Station 0 Other reasons 0
(please specify)

4. How many voters are on the voters list for this polling station? *

5. How many voters have already voted in this polling station? (at time of arrival) *

6. How many voters have requested a proxy to vote for them? *

7. Is the ballot box sealed? YES 409 NO 1

8. Does every voter provide appropriate proof of identity? YES 362 NO 37

9. Were any ineligible voters allowed to vote? (if you answer NO please proceed to Q10) YES 10 NO 381

9a. If YES, how many of these voters (ineligible voters) were allowed to vote in this polling station? (please circle only one answer below)
Between 1 & 15 Voters 6 Between 15 & 30 voters 0 Over 30 Voters 0

10. Was any person who was eligible to vote denied the chance to do so? (if you answer NO please proceed to Q11)
YES 20 NO 343

*Notes: 1) No total figure has been entered next to the questions that were not easily quantifiable in summary fashion. 2) The Carter Center observed the voting process at 415 polling stations. If the figures entered for any given question do not add up to 415, it is because some forms were returned without every question answered.
INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS: OBSERVATION OF VOTING
(Please remember to write clearly and in ink)

10a. If YES, how many of these voters (eligible voters) were denied the right to vote?
(please circle only one answer below)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Between 1 &amp; 15 Voters</th>
<th>Between 15 &amp; 30 voters</th>
<th>Over 30 Voters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. Did the polling station staff give a ballot paper to any voter who already had electoral ink on their fingers?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>389</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12. Did any polling station official tell a voter which party to vote for?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>397</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13. Did the polling station staff stamp the ballot paper before handing it to each voter?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>385</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14. Did any polling station staff give any voters more than one ballot paper?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>393</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15. Has the Presiding Officer had to issue any voters with a tendered ballot?
(If you answer NO please proceed to Q16)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15a. How many tendered ballots have been issued?

* 

16. Did all voters, except the blind or incapacitated, vote in secret?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>375</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17. Did you see anyone, except a proxy, vote more than once?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>379</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18. Did the polling station officials forget to dip voters’ thumb or finger in the electoral ink?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>379</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18a. If YES how many?

* 

19. Which parties’ polling agents and domestic observers were present at the polling station?
(please circle those present)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PNC/R</th>
<th>PPP/C</th>
<th>TUF</th>
<th>GAP/WPA</th>
<th>ROAR</th>
<th>EAB (domestic observers)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>405</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other parties

(please specify)

20. In general would you conclude that there were:

No irregularities    Minor irregularities    Many irregularities    Major irregularities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>339</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 (see note below)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21. Do you have any other comments to make?

---

1 Observers at one station reported that people were impersonating voters whose names were on the list but who had not yet voted in order to vote illegally during the closing confusion between 6 and 7 pm.

*Notes: 1) No total figure has been entered next to the questions that were not easily quantifiable in summary fashion. 2) The Carter Center observed the voting process at 415 polling stations. If the figures entered for any given question do not add up to 415, it is because some forms were returned without every question answered.
### International Observers: Observation of Counting

(Please remember to write clearly and in ink)

**Observation Mission:** The Carter Center  
**Team number:** 25 teams  
**Region number:** All ten regions  

**Division number:** N/A  
**Polling Station number:** 23 stations observed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Did the Presiding Officer allow everyone in the queue before the close of poll to vote?</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Did the Presiding Officer fill in all the Ballot Paper Account before opening the ballot box?</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3a. The number of ballot papers issued to the Polling Station (line 1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3b. The number of unused ballot papers (line 2a)</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3c. The number of spoilt and destroyed ballot papers (sum of line 2b &amp; c)</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d. The number of disciplined services and non resident electors envelopes (sum line 4a &amp; b)</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3e. The total number of ballot papers expected in the box (line 5 of the Ballot Paper Account)</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3f. The actual number of ballot papers counted in the ballot box (SOP line 7)</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4. How many MRCs were there in the ballot box?</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. How many Certificates of Employment were used (poll book page 6)?</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. How many tendered ballots had been issued?</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Was the Presiding Officer consistent in determining whether a ballot paper should be rejected?</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. How many ballot papers were &quot;objected &quot; to by the Agents but the Presiding Officer decided were valid? (the Presiding Officer should write &quot;Q&quot; on the reverse of these ballot papers, see front of PE7)</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Did you see anyone steal ballot papers during the count?</td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8a. If YES, who?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Did you see anyone add extra ballot papers to the count, which had not been in the ballot box?</td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9a. If YES, who?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Did the Presiding Officer or another polling station official change the results of the election on a Statement of Poll?</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Did any Agent refuse to sign the Statement of Polls?</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11a. If YES, which one and why?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Notes: 1) No total figure has been entered next to questions that were not easily quantifiable in summary fashion. 2) The Carter Center observed the counting of ballots at 23 polling stations. If the figures entered for any given question do not add up to 23, it is because some forms were returned without every question answered.*
### Appendix 8

**INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS: OBSERVATION OF COUNTING**

*(Please remember to write clearly and in ink)*

12. Did the Presiding Officer sign all the Statement of Polls? **YES 19  NO 1**

13. Was the Statement of Polls posted outside the Polling Station? **YES 16  NO 0**

14. Did all the parties record the result accurately on their tally sheets? **YES 22  NO 0**

14. Were the envelopes containing the Statements of Poll (PE 13) and Ballot Paper Accounts (PE12) packed into the envelope for the Returning Officer (PE 2)? **YES 16  NO 0**

*Results for questions 15-16 represent the total count for ONLY the 23 stations where The Carter Center observed the counting process and do not necessarily reflect voting patterns throughout the nation.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>15. Please record the final results form the Statement of Polls accurately:</th>
<th>National Assembly</th>
<th>Regional Democratic Council</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15a. GAP/WPA</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15b. Guyana Democratic Party</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15c. Guyana National Congress</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15d. Justice for All Party</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15e. National Democratic Front</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15f. National Front Alliance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15g. People's National Congress/Reform</td>
<td>1573</td>
<td>1109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15h. People's Progressive Party/Civic</td>
<td>2265</td>
<td>1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15i. People's Republic Party</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15j. Rise Organisation And Rebuild</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15k. The United Force</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16a. Rejected: want of a legal mark</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16b. Total number of rejected ballots</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17. Did the Presiding Officer transmit the preliminary results to the Deputy Returning Officer immediately? **YES 9  NO 9**

18. Were the preliminary results transmitted the same as those on the Statement of Polls? **YES 11  NO 0**

19. In general would you conclude that there were:

- No irregularities
- Minor irregularities
- Many irregularities
- Major irregularities

**YES 13  NO 8  INSPECTED 0  OTHER 1 (see note below)**

20. Do you have any other comments to make?

---

1. At one station Carter Center observers reported that 68 ballots were spoiled/rejected due to improper folding and stamping.

*Notes: 1) No total figure has been entered next to questions that were not easily quantifiable in summary fashion. 2) The Carter Center observed the counting of ballots at 23 polling stations. If the figures entered for any given question do not add up to 23, it is because some forms were returned without every question answered.*
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Tuesday, Mar. 20, 2001

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF THE CARTER CENTER ON THE 2001 GUYANA GENERAL AND REGIONAL ELECTIONS

GEORGETOWN, GUYANA... The Carter Center would like to commend the Guyanese people for their conduct and participation in yesterday’s elections and present this preliminary statement on the electoral process. The delegation is co-led by former President Jimmy Carter, Rosalynn Carter, and former Prime Minister Sir Lloyd Erskine Sandiford of Barbados. The observation mission was invited by the government of Guyana and the Guyana Elections Commission (GECOM). The delegation included 44 observers from 10 countries.

The Carter Center has been active in Guyana for more than a decade, and our activities for the 2001 election began in October of 2000. An advance team visited Guyana in October to assess the status of electoral preparations and to learn the views of political parties, GECOM, and other groups.

The Center opened an election observation field office in February to support a team of six medium-term observers (MTOs). The MTOs monitored pre-election technical preparations for the vote, including the preparation of the voters list, production and distribution of national ID cards, training of elections officials, and voter education. In addition, they observed the campaign activities of the political parties and monitored the media for its impact on the political environment in which these elections would take place.

The election observation mission arrived on March 15 and joined the Carter Center MTOs to form 25 teams that deployed to all 10 regions of Guyana. On election day, these teams visited 401 polling sites of the 1,892 total polling stations. Although the voting is now over, the Center will continue to observe the counting and tabulation process throughout the country. The delegation will issue its final report in the coming weeks, but we can present the following preliminary findings. These remarks are confined to our observations on the electoral process leading up to opening of polls, casting of ballots, and poll closings. Since the process of vote tabulation is ongoing, it is too early to evaluate the election as a whole. Ultimately, the Guyanese people will judge the electoral process and its outcome.
The electoral process was generally peaceful and orderly throughout the country and delegations reported a high turnout in all regions. The delegation found citizens eagerly but patiently waiting in many areas, sometimes in long lines, to exercise their right to vote.

**Opening of polls.** The delegation visited 20 sites for opening and found either no irregularities or minor irregularities at each of these polling stations, which by and large opened on time. In the cases where minor irregularities were reported, observers found a shortage of materials or the late arrival of polling officials.

**Voting.** Polling officials were professional, well organized, and impartial. Delegates reported that the vast majority of polling sites had polling agents from the two major political parties. Also, domestic and other international observers were encountered throughout the country. Of the 378 polling stations observed, teams found no or minor irregularities in 98 percent of the sites.

The most common area of concern was the voters list. GECOM has stated the list is 95 percent accurate, leaving a five percent margin of error. All political parties have expressed concerns about the accuracy of the final voters list. The limited Carter Center observation data has to date not shown major systematic irregularities in the list. The observers reported some voters claimed to have registered but could not find their names on either the Official List of Electors or the Addendum. It is difficult to ascertain the magnitude of this issue at this point, given that there are no uniform mechanisms for tracking these complaints.

**The closing of polls and ballot count.** Nearly all of the Carter Center observation teams reported confusion at the closing of polling stations. Many polling officials received instructions through GECOM personnel, the media, or others to allow voting after the scheduled closing time of 6:00 p.m. Some polls that had been closed were reopened. Delegations deployed in Georgetown reported a rush of individuals during this period at some polling stations, while delegates in other regions reported few or no voters during this period. Without clear instructions from GECOM, polling officials were uncertain whether to allow further voting or to proceed with closing and the tabulation of results.

Carter Center teams observed the counting and tabulation of ballots at 21 sites throughout the country. Delegates reported significant error only at one polling station. The teams found that the administrative process during closing made the vote count extremely slow at most of the sites observed.

**Governance.** While these elections are an important and necessary element of Guyana’s democratic process, they are not sufficient alone to solve the problems nor heal the wounds in Guyana’s divided society. It is clear that Guyana’s biggest challenge is to develop the kind of constitutional and electoral institutions and arrangements which will further political and ethnic reconciliation.

The Carter Center believes that regardless of who wins these elections, it would help the cause of national unity if all Guyanese would recommit themselves to working and living together in peace and mutual respect, develop inclusive institutions of governance, and build a civil society that supports constructive political relations. This delegation has heard from Guyanese from across the length and breadth of the country. They have a clear desire to complete the constitutional reform process, pursue national reconciliation, strengthen an independent civil society, institutionalize permanent electoral reforms, deepen the rule of law, reform the media, especially the state media, and ensure that development is equitable and includes all ethnic groups.

####
President Carter’s comments at press conference on March 20, 2001, prior to question-and-answer period

We will take questions in a few minutes about our observations during the election process.

We have met since then with the observer teams and have also met on two occasions with top officials at GECOM. I think that you all know that none of the observation teams from foreign countries make any statements about the results of the election or the tabulation of votes. That’s the responsibility exclusively for GECOM and all of us have pledged that that’s something that we will not do. After the results of the election are announced and after the winning candidates are identified, this fine and small country will face two basic options, for the next five years: either to continue with sharp divisions, ethnically and politically, with a minimum of economic and social progress as has been the case in recent years regardless of which party was in power; or, the other option is to face the future in as unified a fashion as possible, with the two major parties agreeing to communicate easily with one another, with the candidates elected themselves and with party officials.

This has not been the case in the past. Guyana has made strides towards constitutional revision which would in effect, in general terms, reduce the power of the presidency and invest that power in the hands of the Parliament. Both parties have agreed to this basic change. But neither has been willing to make the necessary final legislative decisions to put it into effect. This is a very crucial element of government, because Guyana in the past, with its extremely divided society has had, in effect, a “winner take all” result from elections. This must be changed by the Guyanese people. If the country has any chance for substantial progress in the future, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Chancellor, must be chosen in such a way, for instance, that every citizen of this country, regardless of which party is their choice, would have confidence in the integrity of that choice. The auditor general, who monitors the expenditure of all funds and who has enormous power in Guyana, must be chosen in the same way, with an open, transparent process, and with the two major parties cooperating as much as possible in making that choice. The allocation of contracts by the government to build roads, to build schoolhouses, to replace the seawalls, involving the expenditure of enormous sums of federal money, must be made in a joint fashion within the Parliament. There has to be a revision so that the standing committees will be governed as much as possible by both major parties. I have talked at length with former President Hoyte and with the incumbent President Jagdeo as well, and both agreed privately that these changes must be made. And as you know, those of you who are familiar with the government process, a great deal has been done to bring a consensus in the constitutional reform committee. But we have not reached the point yet where a very open and generous — and victorious — party will have the sensitivity and the graciousness to extend a hand of friendship and cooperation to the losing party, and the losing party quite often has not been gracious enough to accept defeat in such a way that they can communicate freely and easily and cooperatively with those who win.
The Carter Center has been involved in 30 or so elections around the world—last year, six elections, in major countries around the world, recently in Indonesia and Nigeria, large countries where the divisions are very deep. But after the elections are over, generally people reach out to one another and say “let’s heal our wounds; let’s try to put our best foot forward” and hope that the losing party can set an example by which they can become popular enough to win in the future. And I hope that this will be done in Guyana. There has to be good will here, which so far, in my opinion as a foreigner, has not existed. And I would guess that 95 or 99 percent of the Guyanese people would like to see the political contention and disagreements minimized and their major leaders, in whom they have complete confidence, cooperate with each other. So, regardless of who wins this election, and we have no way to say who will win this election, my hope is there will be a gracious acceptance of the result with the major responsibility in my opinion being on the victorious party, to make sure that every step is taken to put these reforms into being.

There need to be moderate changes in the electoral process. This is the only country in which we have ever participated where there was vituperative and continuous negative advertising, right up to the moment of voting, even on election day. This is not done in most countries, where you have to stop campaigning and stop making any partisan comments while the people are trying to go to the polls, or the night before. So election reform needs to be instituted in Guyana. My comments are as a foreign citizen who is very interested in Guyana. And I’d like to emphasize, in closing my own comments, that everything I have said is with the predication that all the decisions have to be made by Guyanese people. Not by major donors, not by international observers, not by those who come here for a brief period of time, but by the citizens of Guyana themselves. And my prayer and my hope is that this great country, endowed with enormous human resources and natural resources, can have the kind of future that the people want.

I have been extremely impressed with the patience of the people and the deep dedication of the poll officials under very trying circumstances. This has been an admirable demonstration of the commitment of the people to democracy and to freedom and to fair and equitable elections. I hope that the political leaders will be as dedicated to the process of healing wounds as the people have shown they desire.

We’ll be glad to answer any questions that you might have on the election process.

Transcribed by Carter Center staff
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Wednesday, Mar. 21, 2001

Georgetown, Guyana....Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter drafted the attached statement and presented it to President Bharrat Jagdeo and to former President Desmond Hoyte. Both leaders and their associates approved the text and pledged to implement its provisions as expeditiously as possible.

Georgetown, Guyana
21 March 2001

Recognizing the need for political, cultural, and economic progress in Guyana, we agree that the first step must be to complete the work of the Special Select Committee, which will result in a new constitution for our nation. The constitution will be put to a referendum for approval by the citizens of Guyana within 12 months. Adequate staffing and resources will be provided to implement its provisions.

Our goal will be an inclusive organization of government, within which the majority and opposition political parties will both be involved in the leadership of parliamentary standing committees and the selection of leaders to fulfill major responsibilities of governing and management. These will include but not be limited to the Chief Justice and Chancellor, the Auditor General, members of a strong human rights commission and an ethnic relations commission, the allocation of lands and housing, the tendering of contracts, a permanent committee on constitutional reform, and a permanent elections commission. A new elections code is needed, with provision for the maintenance of an accurate voters list.

We will cooperate fully in maintaining a constructive dialogue between the top leaders of PPP/Civic and the PNC/Reform parties, and will include appropriate representation from other political and civic organizations, including the Amerindian community and women.
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Thursday, Mar. 22, 2001

CONTACT: Charles Costello
Local Cell 624-2665

CARTER CENTER REAFFIRMS STATEMENT OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN GUYANA’S PRESIDENT AND OPPOSITION LEADER

Georgetown, Guyana….On Wednesday, March 21, 2001, The Carter Center issued a press release with an attached statement drafted by President Carter. President Carter had shared a draft of the statement with the two main political party presidential candidates on Wednesday morning before leaving Guyana. While neither presidential candidate signed the statement, both indicated verbally to President Carter that they supported the content of the document.

The statement covers principles and objectives to help to find a way forward for Guyana after the elections and reflects already agreed upon goals emanating from the constitutional reform process. It also expresses a willingness to cooperate in achieving these goals and creating the necessary supportive political environment. As such, the statement is a reaffirmation of shared principles rather than a signed or brokered agreement.

####
# Appendix 13

## General and Regional Elections 2001

### Statement by Chief Election Officer

#### Official Results - General Elections

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>District No.</th>
<th>Reg. Voters</th>
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## General and Regional Elections 2001

### Statement by Chief Election Officer

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Introduction. On March 20, 2001, the day after the March 19 elections in Guyana, The Carter Center issued a preliminary statement (attached) about the electoral process. The statement characterized the elections up through the balloting process in positive terms, saying that the process was generally peaceful and orderly and that there were no irregularities at the vast majority of the polling sites visited by Carter Center observers. However, the Center’s statement noted that observers reported significant confusion surrounding the closing of polls, at least in the Georgetown area, due to conflicting information from the Guyana Elections Commission (GECOM), the media, and others regarding the possibility of extending voting beyond the scheduled 6:00pm closing time. In addition, while noting that the political parties had expressed concerns about the accuracy of the final voters list, the statement reported that it was difficult at that time to ascertain the magnitude of the problem. Finally, the statement echoed the sentiment of many Guyanese that the elections alone are not sufficient to solve the nation’s problems.

In the days following the Center’s preliminary statement, other international observer missions issued similar statements, indicating a large degree of consensus on the part of Guyana’s friends in the international community.

This statement is issued with benefit of the passage of weeks since the election and is intended to offer observations on the overall electoral process, especially vote tabulation and the voter registration list. Carter Center observers remained in Guyana for about three weeks after the elections and were able to observe the vote tabulation process, the declaration of official results, the court challenge to the swearing in of the president elect, the court’s decision, and the subsequent assumption of office by President Jagdeo.

Overall, the Center finds that the electoral process met international standards, that the voters of Guyana were able to freely express their democratic choices on March 19, and that the official results reflected the will of the voters. Unfortunately, there was post-election street violence and lingering doubts about the accuracy of the voters list and final results. While it is critical to improve the electoral system for future elections, it is equally important that Guyanese work together toward political reconciliation, inclusiveness, and good governance.
Election day processes. As noted in its preliminary statement, the Center found that election day and the vote count went peacefully, as voters turned out in large numbers to vote freely for the party of their choice. Pollworkers were well trained and acted professionally and impartially. Polling stations were, in most cases, clearly marked and stocked with polling materials. Political party agents were present at almost all of the 415 polls visited by Carter Center observers, and there were no reports of significant security incidents or intimidation. Voters were able to cast their vote in secret, and the ballots were counted at each polling station, with political party agents and poll workers certifying the accuracy of the statements.

In a completely different setting but reflecting this positive assessment only of election day processes in Guyana, President Carter characterized Guyana’s elections as “almost perfect” during an interview with CNN in Atlanta on March 26 at a meeting of the National Commission on Federal Election Reform, which is studying possible reforms needed for U.S. federal elections.

Voter registration. While The Carter Center’s overall assessment is positive, several issues arose during the process that GECOM and the government of Guyana will need to address before holding the next election. Voter registration was the principal issue and reason for opposition party claims that GECOM was not ready for election day. Although GECOM had extended pre-election deadlines and issued supplemental voter registration lists in an effort not to disenfranchise voters, the list appeared to suffer from repeated but correctable errors, e.g., last minute dislocation of an undetermined number of registered voters within the list. Another concern was that the revised voters list had too many names and contained the remnants of fictitious voters added during the original 1996 registration. Based on field testing performed, GECOM believes the list was 95% accurate and that this figure will be upheld by an independent external post-election audit to be performed by International IDEA. A 95% accurate voter registration rate is an accomplishment exceeding rates in many established democracies; however, unexplained changes to the list, which happened sometime during the final correction period, left political parties believing that many of their supporters were being deliberately disenfranchised.

Although Carter Center observers did not witness large numbers of voters on election day who were unable to vote because their names were not on the list, nor did they observe any systematic evidence of voters registering or voting more than once, the issues of the voter registration and accuracy of the list greatly affect the level of confidence of the Guyanese people in GECOM and the electoral process. To address these concerns, and to avoid future registration problems, The Carter Center strongly supports GECOM’s commission of an external audit, which will help determine the extent to which the list was inaccurate.

Election management systems. Inaccuracies in voter registration and the resulting delays in production and distribution of voter identification cards are only part of the larger election management and strategic planning process. Future election planning, management, and systems could also be addressed by the upcoming audit if it were expanded to include broader management issues. The audit could then make recommendations on integrating Guyana’s newly streamlined electoral management systems and procedural use of technology with the new electoral system that will be adopted by Parliament.
In this year’s election, for example, the sophisticated computerized vote reporting and tabulation systems designed with help from international experts was discarded for all practical purposes by GECOM and final results were tabulated manually from nearly 1,900 Statements of Poll at GECOM headquarters. The software for the system was never completely verified prior to the opening of the polls. The vote count was ultimately accurate and honest, but it was inefficient. As a result the announcement of final results was delayed by more than 48 hours, creating suspicions.

**Party observers.** Another issue noted by Carter Center observers was the absence of political party agents at the tabulation of results at the national level. The openness and transparency of the system, which had been commendable up to that point, seemed to close once the results were posted at the polling stations and the statements of poll were delivered to the Returning Officers. Access to the GECOM headquarters for party agents became difficult unless special accreditation or escorts were obtained. Although international observers were able to continue their observation of the statements of poll without hindrance after they obtained the extra accreditation, political party agents were absent. The two major parties, PNC/Reform and PPP/Civic, were less affected since both had representatives on GECOM. However, the smaller parties, including the WPA/GAP, TUF, and ROAR, lacked access to key parts of the tabulation exercise. The ability of party agents from all participating parties to freely monitor the electoral process to its conclusion, including the count and the resolution of electoral disputes, is an essential part of a free and fair process that GECOM should endeavor to facilitate in the future.

**The media.** The role of the media during the elections was monitored closely by GECOM’s Media Monitoring Unit (MMU) and others and thus was not a major focus of The Carter Center’s observation mission. Nonetheless, the Center wishes to echo the views of the MMU and other international observers by noting the unbalanced and biased coverage in the state-owned media, and the irresponsible and inflammatory broadcasts of various TV talk shows, including open partisanship under the guise of news, even on election day. In the future, while respecting freedom of the press, laws governing the media must be strengthened to address these problems.

**Conclusion.** Despite the problems encountered, some of which are inherent in administering a nationwide electoral apparatus with more than 9,000 temporary employees and almost 500,000 voters, The Carter Center found that the voters of Guyana were able to freely express their democratic choices on March 19 and that the official results reflected the will of the voters. The Carter Center congratulates the Guyanese people, GECOM, and the political parties on an electoral process that met international standards. Unfortunately, Guyana’s electoral achievements have been marred by arson, post-election street violence and lingering doubts among the opposition party and its supporters as to the accuracy of the results. Fixing technical deficiencies in the process should be comparatively easy; however, curing the deep-seated mistrust that finds sinister cause in routine election administration will be much more difficult.
Appendix 14

The new government and Parliament, together with civil society participants, must continue the process of constitutional and electoral reform. They should pledge to put the nation first and work for political reconciliation, inclusiveness and good governance in order to achieve the sustained development citizens yearn for. Dialogue now underway in Guyana is an encouraging sign.

Carter Center and Guyana. The Carter Center closed its election observation office in Guyana on April 6, 2001, after having been in country since February 5, 2001. The Center’s field office director and six medium term observers, supplemented by 37 short term observers, formed a delegation led by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, First Lady Rosalynn Carter and former Prime Minister Erskine Sandiford of Barbados. Delegates observed election preparations and the electoral process from the nomination of parties and candidates through the campaign period, polling and the announcement of the results, as well as the post-election activities described in this statement.

The Carter Center will issue a comprehensive final report in June on its two-month observation of the electoral process in Guyana and will include recommendations on how the electoral process can be improved. While The Carter Center and others are pleased to offer recommendations, it is up to the Guyanese people to capitalize on the gains made during the March 19 elections.

Beyond the elections, The Carter Center remains involved with Guyanese democratic development efforts through its support for the National Development Strategy and its work on rule of law and strengthening civil society in a long-term project partnered with NDI, IFES, and Guyanese stakeholders.
Guyana’s closely observed election

GEORGETOWN

Why should a small country draw so many invigators?

TEN days before Guyana’s election, on March 19th, all seemed calm in the capital, Georgetown. Rival candidates had set out their stalls at a street fair under the trees on Main Street. The youth minister and the foreign minister of Guyana’s People’s Progressive Party (PPP Civic) government could be seen in lively debate with teenage supporters of the opposition People’s National Congress (PNC Reform). Passers-by were splashed with red and blue paint in preparation for a Hindu festival. Across town, the West Indies had just opened a five-day test match against South Africa. Relaxed Caribbean democracy, you might think.

Not many others think so. On polling day, international observers will be out in force: 170 of them, from 45 countries and affiliated to six different organisations, including the European Union and the Organisation of American States. They are set to stay for ten days after the election. If necessary, they may stay longer.

Local observers will be out in force, too. The Electoral Assistance Bureau (EAB) will deploy independent Guyanese observers in most of the 1,879 polling stations. An elections commission, half of whose members are opposition nominees, has been working tirelessly since May. It is chaired by a former army commander, Major-General Joseph Singh, one of the few prominent Guyanese to be respected by both sides of the political divide. Yet, since April 4th last year, a former elections manager from the London borough of Hammersmith has also been keeping an eye on the commission, its staff, buildings and records. About $4m-worth of international help has come in the form of new ballot boxes, computer systems, organisation, transport and advice. That works out at $5 for each of the country’s 800,000 citizens, just to keep the election clean.

An awful lot of fuss for a small country? At first, it seems so. The extent of trouble so far has been a protest outside the elections commission office because the voters’ list was not up to standard, and because too many people either do not yet have the new identity cards that were planned for the vote or allegedly have cards bearing someone else’s photograph. The commission agrees that there have been delays, but believes it can deliver most of the cards by polling day, and says that no qualified voter will lose his right to vote.

Yet the invigators are necessary, because Guyana is trapped in a political miasm that has lasted almost 30 years. A history of disputed elections and ethnic bitterness divides the mainly Indo-Guyanese supporters of the PPP, now led by the 56-year-old president, Bharrat Jagdeo, from the mainly Afro-Guyanese PNC, led by a 72-year-old former president, Desmond Hoyte.

There are more Indo- than Afro-Guyanese, but the PNC held power from 1964 to 1992 through a series of blatantly rigged elections. Outside help, mainly from ex-President Jimmy Carter’s foundation in Atlanta, helped broker the return to democracy in 1992. Some PNC supporters rioted on election day, but the PPP’s victory was broadly accepted.

The next poll, in December 1997, was more troublesome. Three foreign observer groups and the EAB witnessed the preliminary count at the polling stations and broadly endorsed the result (victory, again, for the PPP). But the formal reporting procedure was chaotic. An angry PNC refused to accept the elections commission’s verdict. Its supporters rioted into the new year.

The Caribbean Community, Caricom, helped negotiate an agreement in July 1998. In return for peace, the PPP agreed to give up two years of its term of office. Diplomats talked of a power-sharing constitution. Both parties preferred instead to keep the winner-takes-all system, though with some limited reforms.

The PNC maintained its refusal to recognise the government, and sought justice in the courts. After three years, a ruling was handed down in January: the 1997 election had been illegal, because electeds had been required to produce a special identity card at the polling station. This, the court has now ruled, interfered with the constitutional right to vote.

Neither party was happy with this ruling, and both have appealed; but the judgment states that the present government must step down, at the very latest, by the end of March. So it is hard to see how the election can be postponed. Both the technical assessors from Hammersmith and Major-General Singh are confident that voting can get under way. A verdict that meets international standards and the 10 cards distributed. Guyanese voters will hope so, but cannot feel confident that the election will resolve the underlying rifts.
Monday's voting very good - Carter

By William Walker

In a preliminary position on Monday's election, US President Bill Clinton observed that the vote was very good and he hoped the winning party would offer the hand of cooperation to the opposition.

With the absence of conclusive results, the Carter Center stated it was too early to evaluate the election as a whole. Ultimately, the Guyanese people will judge the electoral process, Carter expressed "deep concern" over the lack of information coming out of the Guyana Elections Commission (GECom). Carter noted that the 16-member delegation will be leaving this morning without a clear indication of the outcome of the elections.

At a press briefing at Le Meridien Pegasus, where Carter recalled that 8:30 am observers were inside of results for some 76,000 ballots but up to 2:30 pm GECom had released the public only results for 46,000.

"This would not upset these figures," Carter said that the delay would create doubt in the electorate. He reportedly went into GECom at 2 pm yesterday afternoon and urged officials to speed up the process. The concern over the delays was echoed by Mark Stevens head of the European Union observer group and by CARECOM and Commonwealth officials.

Meanwhile, Carter added that the 380 stations personally observed by the Carter Center mission only three had serious problems and those occurred after polls were supposed to be closed. There were two instances in Region Four where groups of persons not totalling more than twenty were allowed to vote although they were not on the list. Carter said this was statistically insignificant. The impact of procedural errors and omissions from the list would only become apparent in a marginal race.

In a preliminary statement read by Erikka Sandford, co-leader of the team, the Carter Center said: "The electoral process was generally peaceful and orderly throughout the country and delegations reported a high turnout in all regions. The delegation found citizens eagerly but patiently waiting in many areas sometimes in long lines to exercise their right to vote."

The release noted: "The most common area of concern was the voters list. GECom has stated the list is 95% accurate, leaving a five percent margin of error. All political parties have expressed concern about the accuracy of the final voters list. The limited Carter Center observation data has to date not shown major systematic irregularities in the list...it is difficult to ascertain the magnitude of this issue at this point given these are no uniform mechanisms for tracking these complaints."

"The closing of polls and ballot count. Nearly all of the Carter Center observation teams reported confusion at the closing of polling stations. Many polling officials received instructions through GECom personnel, the media or others to allow voting after the scheduled closing time. Some polls that had been closed were reopened. Delegations deployed in Georgetown reported a rush of individuals during this period at some polling stations while delegations in other regions reported few or no voters during this period. Without clear instructions from GECom, polling officials were uncertain whether to allow or to proceed with closing and the tabulation of results."

This observation was corroborated by teams from the European Union Mission who returned to South Georgetown yesterday having been threatened by crowds late Monday. The Carter Center statement concluded that the delegations observed the counting and tabulation of ballots at 21 stations. The teams found that the administrative process during closing made the vote count extremely slow at most of the sites observed.

Stabroek News understands that a senior diplomat observed counting in a Georgetown station until 12:30 am. After closing, the staff was forced to secure the doors after crowds became restive.

The centre notes that polling officials were professional, well organised and impartial.

Carter also praised the peaceful persistence of polling day staff and of voters who made an impassioned call for the leaders to be similarly dedicated in bringing the nation together. Guyana faced two options after the elections, Carter said: either continue on a path of sharp political and ethnic divisions resulting in a minimum of social and economic progress; or to face a future in a unified nation as possible with two parties committed to communication.

And Carter pointed out the way forward lay in the unfinished constitutional reforms which would reduce the powers of the presidency and put the in the hands of the parliament. The victor in these elections must be willing to put these reforms into effect. The inherited "winner takes it all" system must be changed by Guyanese people; the Chancellor of the judiciary should be chosen in such a way so everyone has confidence in the integrity of the legal system; the Auditor General must be chosen in a similar way; important contracts should be decided in a bipartisan parliamentary committee. Carter said over the years he had spoken to the leaders of both parties and they had agreed privately that these changes needed to be made.

But in the past the victorious party has not had the sensitivity or grace to offer the hand of cooperation to a party that quite often had no grace in defeat.

There had to be goodwill which he said had not seemed to exist. Carter noted that this was the only country the centre had observed that still had vituperative advertising and campaigning even on election day. He prayed that this "great country endowed with enormous human and mineral resources" could prosper. Carter recalled he and his wife Rosalynn had been fascinated at the sight of three holy books in polling stations for use in the oath of democracy. It was an indication of the country's deep religious beliefs and such faith was conducive to a spirit of forgiveness.
Observers hail elections process

- Carter appeals for 'gracious acceptance of results'

by Shariel Khan

CERTAIN patterns emerged in the partial preliminary results released up to last night by the Guyana Elections Commission (GECOM) but international observers and political parties were waiting on the commission to make the call on Monday's elections.

Police reported all was quiet in Georgetown last night after a day in which the capital lost much of its usual bustle as the population awaited the final results now expected to be officially declared by tomorrow.

International observers hailed the conduct of the elections with former United States President Jimmy Carter saying that up to this point, "this has been a good election."

The electoral process was good, he told a news conference as he prepared to leave after heading a team of observers with former Barbados Prime Minister Erskine Sandiford.

Mr Carter is due to leave today and while stressing clear of projecting a winner after the monitoring, he issued a fervent appeal to the two main political parties to keep the interest of the nation.

The preliminary results GECOM had released up to last night, showed the contest was between the incumbent People's Progressive Party/Civic (PPP/C) and the main Opposition People's National Congress Reform (PNCR).

Carter said the observers and the international donor community supporting the electoral process, were concerned at the delay in the release of partial returns from the commission and told reporters they had raised the issue with GECOM Chairman, Major General Joe

(To be continued on page three)
Observers hail elections process

Carter appeals for ‘gracious acceptance of results’

Major General Joe Singh said that major parties to agree “to communicate easily with one another” something that has not been happening, he noted.

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Second edition

PPP/Civic declared 2001 poll winner

Elections Commission agreed by consensus

After a tortuous day-long wait, the incumbent PPP/Civic was this morning declared the winner of the 2001 elections with the Elections Commission agreeing by consensus that the counting of votes was transparent. The People's Progressive Party/Civic (PPP/Civic) garnered a 44.95% vote lead over the People's National Congress-Republican (PNC/R) secured 33 seats in the National Assembly.

The PNC secured 27 seats; the Guyana Action Party/Working People's Alliance (GAP/WPA) secured two seats and the Rass Organised and Reforming Guyana movement (ROAR) one seat, based on the highest remainder after geographic and national top up seats were awarded. The United Force - which had two seats in the previous Parliament - did not.

Turn to page 2

PPP/Civic declared 2001 poll winner

The PNC/R on the other hand, secured 13 geographic seats; four in Region 4, two in Region 10 and one each in every other region but none.

ROAR notched up a seat on the basis of the highest remainder after the geographic seats were assigned.

The number of votes cast represents 89.4% of the registered voters. The number of rejected ballots will be announced later today. The final results for the elections were declared after the media camped out for six hours at the Elections Commission media centre and four days after the close of polls. The results were first supposed to be available at 4 pm yesterday but this was put back repeatedly. After an exhausitive Commission meeting for most of the day yesterday its members finally gathered this morning to solemnise the results.

With the official declaration, the incumbent, President Bharrat Jagdeo is expected to be sworn in for a full five-year term after serving as head of state from August 1999 after President Janet Jagan stepped down because of ill health.

Yesterday, the Commission was also grappling with complaints from the PNC/R that tallying in Region Three and Four for the pastor was incorrect. The PNC/R had also called for a manual verification and this had taken up the bulk of the time yesterday. PPP/Civic officials could not be reached for comment this morning on the official declaration of the results.
APPENDIX 19

Courts mull outcome of
Guyana poll

By Canute James in Kingston

Bharrat Jagdeo is a president in waiting.

Having been declared the winner of last week’s general elections in Guyana, his installation awaits a decision from the courts on a charge by the main opposition party that he was not lawfully elected.

Meanwhile, the former British colony of 800,000 people is becoming increasingly tense. The army has joined the police in patrolling the streets of Georgetown, the capital.

The main opposition People’s National Congress says it is supporting street protests calling for Mr. Jagdeo to step down, and claiming widespread irregularities in the elections. Streets have been blocked with burning debris. Twelve people have been injured, several shot by the police.

There are fears that the situation could escalate and exacerbate the racial divide in the ethnically diverse country. The opposition party is asking for a recount of the votes, and has said that thousands of potential voters, most of whom it claimed were its supporters, were not allowed to vote.

The elections commission said that no recount was needed as the votes were fairly counted. However, elections authorities conceded that about 20,000 people - 5 percent of the electorate - were not allowed to vote, but that this was not deliberate but had to do with the status of their registration. “To add insult to injury, the elections commission seeks to explain disfranchisement as an acceptable 5 percent error,” says the PNC.

“The nature of some of the deficiencies identified suggested that there had been unauthorised interference with the records and a deliberate attempt to manipulate the voters’ list.”

The opposition claims are counter to the assessments of foreign observers who monitored the elections. A group led by Jimmy Carter, the former US president, concurred with monitors from the European Union, the Commonwealth and the Caribbean Community that the voting was generally free and fair.

They said that there were several administrative and logistical problems, but suggested that these were not severe enough to have overturned the outcome.

The protests have led to a near shutdown of commercial activity. Guyanese who fear the worst recall that the 1997 elections were followed by almost six months of violent street protests led by the PNC, during which several firebombs were exploded, one at the country’s biggest hotel.

“We are hoping we do not have a repeat of this because it would again severely damage the country,” a leading banker in Georgetown said yesterday.

“Any decision by the court on this matter will create a problem. Given the demands being made by the protesters, it seems that the PNC will not easily accept a rejection of its arguments by the court. If the opposition claims are successful, supporters of the PPP will take to the streets. The situation will become racially explosive.”

Guyanese of Indian extraction, which make up just over half the population, have generally supported the PPP, while those of African origin have tended to back the PNC.

The results of the elections suggest that this pattern was repeated. In reporting that the PPP had won 52.6 percent of the votes, and that the PNC received 42.2 percent of the vote, the election authorities declared that Mr. Jagdeo had been returned as president.

The political uncertainty overtook the country four days after Mr. Jagdeo, and Desmond Hoyte, leader of the PNC and a former president, agreed that they would seek “inclusive” government to overcome the country’s racial and political divisions.

FINANCIAL TIMES
3/30/01
Chief Justice Bernard yesterday dismissed the application for a stay of the elections by the opposition People's National Congress (PNC).

Chief Justice Cheddi Jagan yesterday dismissed the application for a stay of the elections by the opposition People's National Congress (PNC). He said that the military takeover of a government is a matter for the courts to determine and that the right of the people to vote is not a matter of controversy.

The Chief Justice said that the application was filed by the PNC in its capacity as the official opposition party. He said that the application was filed on the grounds that the elections were unconstitutional and that the military takeover of a government was a matter for the courts to determine.

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Small group protests at swearing in

A small but very vocal band of protesters positioned themselves outside the barriers erected outside the Umana Yana yesterday to air their disagreement over the swearing in of President Bharrat Jagdeo.

The group numbering about 75 persons, and consisting mostly of women, greeted every invitee who turned up to the swearing in ceremony with loud abuse.

Police ranks were deployed beyond the barriers erected to bar traffic from the area surrounding the Umana Yana.

The shouts from the group of protesters grew louder as the 1700 hrs starting time for the swearing in ceremony approached and members of the Riot Squad were sent to reinforce the other police ranks.

The protesters continued their tirade until President Jagdeo arrived accompanied by police escort. Then suddenly, the small crowd moved off down Main Street, still muttering their dissatisfaction over the swearing in of Guyana’s 37-year-old head of state.

Taking the lead: This young man took first jump over the rest of the demonstrators to lead the way over the barricades yesterday morning near the High Court. (Lawrence Fung photo)
Jagdeo, Hoyte issue joint call for calm

Make up of committees agreed

From page 2

undertake the task of implementing the provisions of Local Government Reform Legislation. (This committee has a 12 months time frame for the completion of its work and it was agreed that the task force would have been set up a fortnight from April 25.)

a joint committee to examine the various options for the resuscitation of the bauxite industry. (This committee is to submit its report within three months of its establishment.)

a committee to examine urgently and report on a national policy for the distribution of land and house lots including relevant criteria and mechanisms. (This committee is to submit its report within a time frame yet to be determined.)

a committee is to examine the needs of various depressed communities across Guyana and report back in six months. (While this committee is at work, they agreed to identify some areas where rehabilitation works will begin at an early date.) At yesterday’s meeting, President Jagdeo and Hoyte agreed that this committee “will be asked to immediately identify some communities for the commencement of this work.”

a committee to examine the issue of the government monopoly of radio and the question of non-partisan boards of directors for the state-owned media and the National Frequency Management Unit. They said too that this committee would examine the enacting of broadcast legislation for the responsible use of the media. The time frame set for the submission of this committee’s report is six weeks.

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Governance committees

Jagdeo, Hoyte, urge expediting of work

President Bharrat Jagdeo and PNC/R leader, Desmond Hoyte yesterday told their dialogues to a different level when they joint addressed six committees working at governance issues and urged them to expedite their work.

The six committees were agreed on by the two leaders in an ongoing series of meetings last week. The members were yesterday assembled in the Cabinet Office of the Office of the President when the charge was delivered to them.

The media was not permitted to cover the session, but sources say Jagdeo and Hoyte stressed the importance of the work of the six committees.

The members were also given the terms of reference of their committees as well as informed of the co-chairs and the resource persons from the ministries providing them with logistical and other support.

The co-chairs and resource persons for the committees are:
- Local Government: Minister Clinton Callymore
- Ministry of Finance: Minister Khemraj Ramjattan
- Ministry of Legal Affairs: Minister Fatima Harger
- Ministry of Natural Resources: Minister Vanja Rambarran
- Ministry of Public Affairs: Minister Reepu Daman Persaud
- Ministry of Private Sector Development: Minister David Granger
- Ministry of Social Cohesion: Minister Khalid B下面是小部分的文本，需要继续提供完整的文本。
Jagdeo, Hoyte, urge expediting of work

From page 1

Yvonne and Deryck Bernard with printers, Katharina, Lall as the resource person.

The two leaders also urged the committee to complete their work as early as possible. All of the committees are scheduled to meet today with the exception of the National Policy on Land and Housing. Those committees are scheduled to meet tomorrow.

Jagdeo urged the committees to complete their work as expediently as possible, advising that there were a number of issues that should be referred to the Ministry of Housing and the CHDA.

Prepared by the committees to complete their work as expediently as possible, advising that there should be no disagreements among the members or the leaders, and that they should resolve issues at that level. The committees appointed by the leaders in their representatives for the appointment of committee members and related matters.

The term of reference for the committees are as follows:

Local Government Reform
1. Generally, to ensure the conclusion of the constitutional reform process and give effect to the new constitutional provisions regarding local government.
2. Specifically, to monitor and evaluate the implementation of legislation to give effect to the new constitutional provisions regarding local government, including:
   a. The establishment of the local government commission
   b. The formulation and implementation of objectives, criteria, and procedures for the purpose of the allocation of resources to and the gathering of resources by local government entities.
   c. To recommend measures to improve the education and training of local government officials.
   d. To recommend the allocation of resources to the local government institutions and bodies.

Border and national security issues, including recapitalization of IDB
1. To prepare and present proposals for a bi-regional, multi-stakeholder approach to Border and National Security issues, and to advise on appropriate approaches to their solution, including short and long-term measures.
3. To examine the present capital needs of the Guyana Defence Force and to present proposals to the Defence Board.

National policy on distribution of land and house lots
1. Generally, to review and agree on a national policy for the distribution of land and house lots having regard to the need for transparency and equity.
2. To review the present system of allocation and distribution and make recommendations for improvements, if necessary.
3. To monitor the system of allocation and distribution of land and house lots to ensure that the policy is being implemented.

Bauxite Resettlement
1. To examine the present state of the bauxite industry, including the bauxite communities, in Guyana (within the context of the past, present and probable future position of the industry and the options for whatever rezoning or rehabilitation may be necessary and to make recommendations designed to ensure the optimal sustainable viability of the industry, including its contribution to the welfare of the Gyanese people, within the shortest possible time.
2. To give priority to the proposal by Alcora with respect to the Bauxite bauxite operations.
3. To submit a final report in that regard within one month.

Depressed community needs
1. To undertake a needs assessment survey in identified depressed communities throughout Guyana through visits, community outreach meetings, and consultations with community leaders, neighborhood Democratic Councils, community organizations and residents.
2. To prepare a list of projects for priority action in the public sector infrastructure programme.
3. To determine ways and means for maximising the involvement of the communities in the conceptualisation and execution of these projects.
4. To identify the need for additional projects for which incremental foreign aid may be appropriately sought and applied towards these projects.
5. To monitor the execution of projects and maintain close liaison with the Regional Administration during the implementation period.

Radio monopoly and non-partisan boards
The committee felt that the agreement between President Jagdeo and Hoyte is sufficiently self-explanatory to allow the committee to carry out its mandate.

The agreement according to the joint statement issued last month by them said: “We have agreed to set up a committee to examine the issue of government monopoly of radio and the question of non-partisan Boards of Directors for the state-owned media and the NPMU (National Frequency Management Unit). The enacting of Broadcast Legislation for the progressives use of the media will also be examined by this committee.”

This committee will report within six weeks.”

Announced yesterday by President Jagdeo and Hoyte were the appointments of former Public Service Commission chairman, Harold Sahadeo and former Permanent Secretary of the Public Service Ministry, Joyce Stinch, to recommend how the Head of the Public Service would be appointed.

Earlier the two leaders agreed to the appointment of the Head of the Public Service separate and distinct from the political post of Head of the Presidential Secretariat, which is the post occupied by Dr. Roger Luncheon.

Jagdeo and Hoyte have met for dialogue five times since April 24 and have announced a series of agreements.

The talks came in the wake of the tension and unrest generated by the March 19 elections and have been widely welcomed.
The Carter Center
At A Glance

What is The Carter Center?
The Center is a nonprofit, nongovernmental organization founded in 1982 in Atlanta, Ga., by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and his wife, Rosalynn, in partnership with Emory University. The Center has helped to improve millions of lives in more than 65 countries by waging peace, fighting disease, and building hope. We work directly with people threatened by war, disease, famine, and poverty to solve problems, renew opportunity, and create hope. A key to our success is the ability to make detailed arrangements with a nation’s top leaders and then deliver services to thousands of villages and family groups in the most remote and neglected areas.
What has the Center Achieved in 20 Years?

The Carter Center has alleviated suffering and advanced human rights by:

- Observing about three dozen multiparty elections in more than 20 countries
- Leading a worldwide campaign that has reduced cases of Guinea worm disease by 98 percent
- Preventing or correcting human rights violations worldwide
- Helping to provide some 35 million drug treatments to sufferers of river blindness in Africa and Latin America
- Creating new avenues for peace in Sudan, Uganda, the Korean Peninsula, Haiti, the Great Lakes Region of Africa, Liberia, and Ethiopia
- Working to erase the stigma against mental illness in the United States and abroad
- Strengthening human rights institutions, civil society, and economic development in emerging democracies
- Fostering improved agricultural practices, enabling 4,000,000 farmers in Africa to double, triple, or quadruple their yields of maize, wheat, corn, and other grains
- Building cooperation among leaders in the Western Hemisphere
- Helping inner-city families address the social issues most important to them

How is the Center Staffed and Funded?

The Center has about 150 employees, based primarily in Atlanta, Ga. The Center is financed by private donations from individuals, foundations, corporations, and international development assistance agencies. The 2000-2001 operating budget, excluding in-kind contributions, was approximately $34 million. The Carter Center Inc. is a 501 (c)(3) charitable organization, and contributions by U.S. citizens and companies are tax-deductible as allowed by law.

Where is the Center Located?

The Carter Center is located in a 35-acre setting 1½ miles east of downtown Atlanta. Four circular interconnected pavilions house offices for President and Mrs. Carter and most of the Center’s program staff. The complex includes the non-denominational Cecil B. Day Chapel and other conference facilities.

The Jimmy Carter Library and Museum, which adjoins the Center, is owned and operated by the National Archives and Records Administration of the federal government. The Center and Library are known collectively as The Carter Presidential Center.