The Conflict Resolution Program would like to thank Margareta Sollenberg and Peter Wallensteen at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) for their generous assistance in providing information for this publication, as well as all of our interns who worked on this project, especially Ian Jefferson, Josh Lincoln, John Brownlee, Christopher Burdett, Jason Carter, Melissa Halbach-Merr, and Alex Yanoslavsky. We would also like to acknowledge Pam Aushmayer, publications manager at The Carter Center, for her time and assistance, Gill Design for design of the publication, and several Carter Center volunteers. We especially would like to thank the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation for their generous support of the International Negotiation Network.

This is the third edition of the State of the World Conflict Report in a series that includes editions published for 1991-92 and 1994-95.

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An Interview with Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter

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These figures represent a decline from 1994-95, when 33 major armed conflicts were waged in 27 locations, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Conflict locations are designated by the internationally recognized borders of a state. In some cases, countries are involved in more than one conflict, which accounts for the larger number of conflicts than conflict locations.

Discussion of world conflicts depends on the manner in which “conflict” is defined. As in the first two editions of the State of World Conflict Report, we employ here the definition for a “major armed conflict” used by Margareta Sollenberg and Peter Wallensteen of SIPRI as follows:

**Major Armed Conflict:** prolonged combat between the military forces of two or more governments, or of one government and at least one organized armed group, and incurring the battle-related deaths of at least 1,000 people during the entire conflict.¹

All major armed conflicts for 1995 were armed civil or intrastate conflicts, as opposed to those between states. SIPRI notes, however, that “in 1995 there were brief armed conflicts between states, e.g., that between Ecuador and Peru, which did not fulfill the criteria for major armed conflicts.”² Other conflicts do not appear because they also fail to meet the above definition. These include armed combat that did not involve government forces, as well as lower-level combat, which would be considered “minor” armed conflict. Efforts were made to detail some of these cases in the narrative summaries for each conflict location or in the feature articles that appear throughout this publication. Many of the summaries and articles were contributed by experts in the field, and the views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect positions held by The Carter Center, its staff, or members of its International Negotiation Network.

For statistical data, efforts were made to supply the most current information available. Those instances where no figures were available are indicated with “na.” In all cases, statistical information is provided for the government of the country listed rather than for opposition or rebel groups, unless otherwise specified. Consequently, figures listed in some statistical categories, such as “Total Deaths,” are frequently lower than the true total. At times, these numbers vary greatly, such as in Sudan, where we employ SIPRI’s total of 37,000 to 40,000 for the entire length of the conflict, while some press reports indicate that more than 1.5 million people have died since 1983.

In the category labeled “The Conflict,” the term “Incompatibility” refers to the notion that the conflicts are contests for control of either government (type of political system, a change of central government, or a change in its composition) or territory (control of territory, secession, or autonomy).³ Data on arms flows provided by the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database represent “trend-indicator values” for major conventional weapons imports and should be used as an indicator of the volume in numbers and capacity of weapons transfers rather than as real flows of money. Thus, these figures should be used to measure a trend over years or between countries rather than for comparisons of official statistics on imports or exports.⁴

The United Nations Development Program's (UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI) measures the distance a country has to go to attain the UNDP's 1995 Human Development Report goals in life expectancy, educational attainment, and income indicators on a 1.000 scale. The nearer a country's HDI total is to 1.000, the closer it is to attaining these goals.

The State of World Conflict Report strives to be neutral and unbiased in its reporting. In choosing how to list each conflict, we employ the name recognized by the United Nations. It must be noted, however, that while Myanmar is the official name for the state of Burma, we have chosen to list both names in recognition of the dispute between the majority of the population and the ruling military council on the status of that country's name. Also, we list “Russia(Chechnya)” to denote that the major armed conflict in the country of Russia has been waged in the republic of Chechnya, and data pertaining to this conflict relates specifically to the region rather than the country as a whole. Finally, for the purpose of continuity, we follow SIPRI in listing “Central and South America” on our regional page, yet include information on countries traditionally labeled as “Latin America” or the “Caribbean” when relevant.

² Ibid.
³ Ibid.
⁴ SIPRI Arms Transfers Project Database, 1996.
The State of World Conflict Report is a product of The Carter Center's International Negotiation Network (INN) designed to inform governments, international and nongovernmental organizations, educational institutions, the media, and the general public about the status of the world's major armed struggles in the hope of lending insights toward their peaceful resolution. In this issue, we are pleased to present topical feature articles by INN members Andrew Young, Kumar Rupesinghe, and Brian Urquhart, plus a candid interview on peacemaking with Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter.

In 1987, President Carter founded the INN as a flexible, informal network of eminent persons, conflict resolution practitioners, Nobel Peace laureates, and former heads of state dedicated to resolving international conflicts through peaceful means. Since then, the INN has coordinated third-party assistance, provided expert analysis and advice, and convened consultations and international conferences in an effort to resolve conflicts in the Baltics, Ethiopia, Korea, Liberia, Sudan, and other areas.

The 1992 INN conference drew more than 200 guests from 40 countries and 150 organizations to The Carter Center to focus attention on conflicts in Myanmar/Burma, Cyprus, Angola, Liberia, Cambodia, the Korean Peninsula, and Afghanistan. The following year, 200 representatives from governmental, intergovernmental (IGO), and nongovernmental (NGO) organizations met to examine conflict resolution strategies for the Caucasus, Macedonia, Kosovo, Zaire, Myanmar/Burma, and Haiti. In 1994, INN members and guests explored the relationship between governments, IGOs, and NGOs in the prevention and resolution of conflicts in Myanmar/Burma, Haiti, Liberia, Nicaragua, and Zaire.

Last year, the INN meeting focused on possible roles for itself and others in Iraq, the Korean Peninsula, and the Great Lakes region of Central Africa (particularly Zaire and Burundi). This gathering contributed, in part, to subsequent heads-of-state summits in Cairo and Tunis, which made bold strides toward lessening the suffering in this devastated region of Africa.

During the latter part of 1996, the INN began examining its performance over the past decade with an eye toward improving its effectiveness in the decade to come.

INN members remain actively engaged in various peacemak-
ing efforts, and the 1995-96 edition of the *State of World Conflict Report* highlights some of their recent achievements. In addition to work on major armed conflict locations, members have made other contributions, including:

**Burundi:** where INN member Kumar Rupesinghe helped establish International Alert’s presence in early 1995 to support the emergence of bipartisan groups working for peace at the elite and grassroots levels; to strengthen the national debate process; to encourage dialogue between conflicting parties; and to facilitate moderate reform of major institutions. INN members Desmond Tutu and President Carter co-facilitated a heads-of-state summit in Cairo in November 1995, focusing on the crisis in Burundi and Rwanda.

**Cuba:** where President Carter and INN member Robert Pastor have worked for several years to promote dialogue between government officials and various institutions in Cuba and the United States. Last May, Pastor met with President Fidel Castro and other Cuban government officials.

**Estonia:** where INN members Vamik Volkan and Harold Saunders, in collaboration with Joyce Neu, associate director of The Carter Center’s Conflict Resolution Program, have established a process of sustained dialogue in Estonia to reduce tension between ethnic Russians and Estonians.

**Greece-Macedonia:** where INN member Cyrus Vance has been chairing the U.N. mediation team in negotiations between Greece and Macedonia in an effort to prevent the renewal of hostilities in the region. Vance convened talks this February as part of the New York Interim Accord signed in September 1995 between Athens and Skopje.

**Haiti:** where President Carter, U.S. Sen. Sam Nunn, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Colin Powell, and INN member Dr. Robert Pastor returned in February 1995 to assess that country’s progress five months after they successfully negotiated President Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s peaceful return to power. The visit focused on the transfer of authority from U.S.-led troops to U.N. forces and on Haiti’s preparations for elections.

**Horn of Africa:** where new INN member Eileen Babbitt and her staff at the U.S. Institute of Peace have been working with USAID and the U.S. State Department on the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative. The project includes conducting training programs in conflict analysis and resolution, with a goal of creating greater food security for the region.

**South Africa:** where INN member Desmond Tutu was appointed by President Nelson Mandela in January to chair the 17-member Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa. Its mandate includes investigating political crimes committed under apartheid which is pivotal to the success of reconciliation in South Africa.

The continual request by people at war for INN members to help in the search for peaceful, democratic, and mutually beneficial ways of ending these conflicts testifies to the need for their ongoing work. We hope that you will share with us your comments and suggestions about the *State of World Conflict Report*. We believe that through communication, information, and increased knowledge about conflicts, we can all play a role in trying to resolve them.
MEMBERS OF THE INN

Jimmy Carter—former President of the United States; Founder and Chair, The Carter Center

Oscar Arias Sánchez—Nobel Peace Prize laureate; former President of Costa Rica; Founder, Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress

Eileen Babbitt*—Director of Education and Training, United States Institute of Peace

Tahseen Basheer—former Egyptian ambassador; former Permanent Representative to the League of Arab States

Javier Pérez de Cuéllar—former United Nations Secretary-General

Hans Dietrich Genscher—former Vice Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Federal Republic of Germany

Tommy Koh—Professor, former Singapore Ambassador to the United States

Christopher Mitchell—Professor, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University

Olusegun Obasanjo—former President of Nigeria; Founder and Chair, Africa Leadership Forum

Lisbet Palme—Director, Swedish Committee for UNICEF

Robert Pastor—Director, Latin American and Caribbean Program, The Carter Center; Professor of Political Science, Emory University

Shridath Ramphal—former Secretary-General of the Commonwealth of Nations; Co-Chair, Commission on Global Governance

Barnett Rubin*—Director, Center for Preventive Action, Council on Foreign Relations

Kumar Rupesinghe—Secretary-General, International Alert

Harold Saunders—former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State; Director, International Programs, Kettering Foundation

Marie-Angélique Savané—Director, Africa Division, U.N. Population Fund

Desmond Tutu—Nobel Peace Prize laureate; President, All Africa Conference of Churches

Brian Urquhart—former United Nations Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping; The Ford Foundation

William Ury—Associate Director, Program on Negotiation, Harvard University

Cyrus Vance—former U.S. Secretary of State; U.N. Special Envoy to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

Vamik Volkan—Director, Center for the Study of Mind and Human Interaction, University of Virginia

Peter Wallensteen—Professor, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University

Elie Wiesel—Nobel Peace Prize laureate; Professor, Boston University

Andrew Young—former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations; Co-Chair, Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games

I. William Zartman*—Jacob Blaustein Professor of International Organization & Conflict Resolution, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University

* New INN members

OBASANJO’S PLIGHT

The INN has joined the international community in calling for the release of one of its members, Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo, from a Nigerian prison. Obasanjo was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment after the military administration of Gen. Sani Abacha accused him of planning an alleged coup. The only former military leader of Nigeria to hand over power to a democratically elected government, Obasanjo has fought for the end of apartheid in South Africa and was instrumental in helping to free President Nelson Mandela from jail. He has participated in peace missions to Angola, Burundi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sudan, and other African states. In an April 1996 letter to President Carter, Obasanjo’s wife expressed increased concern about her husband’s failing health, inhumane treatment, and lack of access to friends and family. We publish this edition of the State of World Conflict Report noting that another year has passed with no change in Olusegun Obasanjo’s status and encourage all those concerned to press the Nigerian government for his release.

Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo, former president of Nigeria, addresses fellow INN members at the annual INN consultation at The Carter Center in April 1994, prior to being arrested in March 1995. (Photograph by Billy Howard)
INTRODUCTION

by Andrew Young

Former ambassador Andrew Young is chairman and CEO of Law International Inc. and co-chairman of the Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games (ACOG). He was a top aide to Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. during the civil rights movement of the 1960s. Young left the U.S. Congress in 1977 to serve as the Carter-appointed U.S. ambassador to the United Nations. He was mayor of Atlanta from 1981-89.

This year, the world celebrated the 100th anniversary of the modern Olympiad. Consider this vision of a world at peace: The opening ceremonies in Atlanta’s Centennial Olympic Stadium, where more than 10,000 athletes from 197 countries gathered to demonstrate the highest ideals—teamwork, sportsmanship, and recognition of personal achievement. All invited countries participated, free of the ideological and political restraints that prevented many from attending in years past. For 16 days in July and August the world came together to honor those striving to surmount universal standards of excellence. Our hearts reached out to the hurdler who stumbled just before the finish line, the marathon runner who shook off fatigue, the Paralympian who rose above all expectations. We saw, for a brief moment, the potential all of us have to better ourselves and our world.

In ancient Greece, nations at war set a time during which all conflicts were temporarily halted so athletes and spectators could travel to and from the Games. Centuries later, hope endures that the brief peace achieved in the spirit of competition will extend beyond the walls of the stadium to embrace all peoples in all nations. Count Henri de Baillet Latour, one of the pioneers of the modern Olympic movement, recognized the connection between the Olympic ideal and the quest for a truly peaceful world community. He spoke the following words to the Organizing Committee of the Games of the XIth Olympiad:

“May the young athletes of the whole world come, through the Olympiad, to know and recognize its greatness and practical value, and may endeavors germinate to make an end of hate, to eliminate misunderstanding, and to contribute in association with all men of good will to the restoration of harmony among the peoples.”

The restoration of harmony described by Count Latour has been the focus of Olympic Aid, a United Nations-led effort to provide health care and educational tools to children in war-torn countries. Far away from the flag-waving and television cameras, many of those athletes who visited Atlanta returned to countries ravaged by war. Millions of war-affected and displaced people are engaged, not in athletic competitions, but in a desperate struggle to survive the destruction of intrastate conflict. The 1995-96 State of World Conflict Report highlights this disparity between the reality of war and the peaceful ideal of the Olympic dream.

Millions of innocent civilians continue to be killed, raped, maimed, displaced, and traumatized by war. In 1995 alone,
between 30,000 and 60,000 military personnel and civilians were killed. Another 15 million people now live as refugees, forced to flee their homes as a result of armed conflicts. The human costs of these government and opposition war-machines do not end with lives and refugees. UNICEF notes in its 1996 State of the World’s Children Report that in addition to the 2 million children killed by war in the past decade, entire generations of children in war-affected countries will grow up shell-shocked and demoralized. The horrible effects of war on children is one of the topics covered in this publication.

This past year saw major violence erupt in the breakaway Russian republic of Chechnya and in Sierra Leone. The breakdown of a cease-fire in Sri Lanka and an escalation of violence between the Turkish government and its Kurdish population added to the human suffering around the globe. Most disturbing, in all of these and the many other armed conflicts, civilians keep being used as military targets and objects of great human rights abuse. Meanwhile, in Burma, the ruling military council continued to stifle the voices of democracy, including that of Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi, who has focused world attention on her country’s plight since her release from six years of house arrest.

There is, however, reason for hope. Forty-three months of fighting ended in Bosnia and Herzegovina last year with the negotiation of the Dayton Peace Accords in November, paving the way for reconstruction to begin. In the Middle East, implementation of the 1994 peace agreement between the Israeli government and Palestinians continued despite the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzakh Rabin in November 1995.

Sadly, these steps in the long road toward lasting peace are less visible in Africa. Violence in the Great Lakes region of Burundi, Rwanda, and Zaire, as well as Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, and other countries continues to deplete the continent of many of its rich resources and human capital. Solving the problems of Africa must involve a recognition of its economic and social potential and the adoption of a decidedly nonpaternalistic view that includes facilitation of regional solutions to crises. Cooperation among regional and international bodies, including nongovernmental organizations, has become a necessity when seeking solutions to the complex and all too frequently tragic conflicts.

As we begin the second 100-year chapter in the Olympic saga, we must embrace its higher ideals and begin taking responsibility for the world around us. The time has come to find the shortest and most humane path toward the end of global suffering, poverty, malnutrition, maiming, trauma, and the hopelessness caused by war and human rights abuse. I hope the information contained in these pages provides some insight into the costs of conflict and the avenues for peace available to all of us, if we choose to follow them.
The 50th anniversary of the United Nations in 1995 was not only a disillusioning but an alarming affair. Behind routine celebratory speeches by heads of state there was little substance and even less enthusiasm. The basic questions about international organization that need to be answered if the world organization is to be reformed virtually were ignored. Very little real interest was manifested in redefining, renewing, and empowering the United Nations. Instead, the talk was about cutting back and reducing.

Fifty years without a world war seems to have bred, in some influential quarters at least, a contagious anti-internationalism with strong ostrich-like and flat-earth overtones. This fashion finds a perfect target in the United Nations. In five years we have gone from President Bush’s New World Order of “dynamic multilateralism” and the U.N. “renaissance” to an extraordinary loss of confidence in, and respect for, the United Nations.

In five years we have gone from President Bush’s New World Order of “dynamic multilateralism” and the U.N. “renaissance” to an extraordinary loss of confidence in, and respect for, the United Nations.

These and other successes led to an extraordinary expansion of U.N. responsibilities and operations—operations that were increasingly over-mandated and under-resourced. During this enthusiastic interlude, governments were slow to realize that the primary task of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security had changed fundamentally in nature and direction. Dealing with international
conflicts had given way almost completely to trying to control intrastate conflicts and humanitarian disasters.

Before the implications of these changes had become clear, the United Nations was committed in Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, and several other places in situations with which it could not possibly deal effectively, either with its well-tried peacekeeping techniques, or within the limitations imposed by its member states in matters both of jurisdiction and financing. Although the media and the public seem to expect the United Nations to act as the public sector of a supportive world community, it is, in fact, still very much a restricted intergovernmental institution with minimal authority, resources, or infrastructure.

The result has been a disillusionment and a downgrading of the United Nations as exaggerated and foolish as the euphoria of the post-Cold War period. Although only four of the 17 operations launched since 1990 have had serious setbacks, the organization’s stock has never been lower, and it is now frequently ignored altogether in vital matters of peace and security.

The main emphasis at U.N. headquarters is on downsizing and cost-cutting, masquerading as “reform,” and dealing with a “financial crisis” which is, in fact, an ideological and political crisis, especially as far as the United States is concerned.

Although only four of the 17 operations launched since 1990 have had serious setbacks, the organization’s stock has never been lower, and it is now frequently ignored altogether in vital matters of peace and security.

In many parts of the world, there is now a strong antipathy to, and distrust of, governments, multilateralism, and international institutions. The United Nations is a prime target for such thinking, especially in Washington. There is no doubt that the United Nations, in its 52nd year, needs radical restructuring, streamlining, and reorienting. It needs to be realigned with the realities of half a century of technological, political, and social revolution. Its member states, however, show little sign of undertaking this effort, preferring the easier course of denouncing the organization’s administration and its alleged wastefulness and bureaucratic speed.
Fundamental Questions

The questions to be faced are relatively simple, but fundamental. Is the United Nations supposed to be an international system for maintaining peace, security, human rights, and human welfare? Or is it simply a dumping ground for problems that governments either cannot, or will not, take on themselves? Is the United Nations predominantly a moral and legal organization, the guardian and executor of its charter principles, and of the norms, conventions, and treaties it has sponsored? Or is it primarily a political organization—a screen, safety net, and fig leaf—through which its members can save face and disentangle themselves from impossible situations, often without much regard for principle or treaty obligation? Is it to be guided by law or by the caprices of its major powers? Is it a purely intergovernmental organization, or should civil society and the private sector play an increasing role in its proceedings?

These are only a few of the questions that should provide the magnetic pull for a process of genuine reform. Unfortunately, in the present parochial and neo-isolationist climate, governments seem to have little or no inclination to discuss them. Thus, the endlessly invoked need for reform is an arid, limited process dictated more by political and ideological forces than by the desire to make a vital investment in the future. The concept of the world organization was Franklin Roosevelt’s great legacy. It is going through cold and stormy times in a period where governments apparently feel less threatened by world disaster than at any time since 1945.

An isolationist mood prevails in addition to a singular lack of sense either of history or of the possibilities, both good and bad, of the future. This is, I believe, a dangerous, and quite possibly disastrous, tendency. A new generation of international leadership, both realistic and visionary, is desperately needed.

The concept of the world organization was Franklin Roosevelt’s great legacy. It is going through cold and stormy times in a period where governments apparently feel less threatened by world disaster than at any time since 1945.

An Afghani man and boy support each other as they learn to walk with artificial limbs in a Red Cross hospital in Kabul. UNICEF and other agencies provide medical and food aid for these and other victims of war. (Photograph by UNICEF/5526/John Isaac)
Dr. Kumar Rupesinghe is secretary-general of International Alert, an international NGO established in 1985 that seeks to contribute to the resolution of internal conflict by promoting peace and conciliation through dialogue. Earlier, he served as deputy director and director of the Program on Ethnic Conflict and Conflict Resolution at the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo. Dr. Rupesinghe has written and edited numerous books and articles in the fields of development and conflict.

In 1992, in the wake of the Gulf War, and just three years after the demise of the Soviet empire, U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali published *An Agenda for Peace*, a framework for the United Nations’ role in future international security matters. With the East-West standoff at an end, Boutros-Ghali wrote that the United Nations had emerged as the “central instrument for the prevention and resolution of conflicts and for the preservation of peace.”1 His vision of a new international security system was founded on the principles of preventive diplomacy, defined as “action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.”2

If the Gulf War had created an impression of world powers willing to set aside their differences and fight against a perceived common enemy, then the ineptitude over Bosnia was a sharp reminder of the realities of world politics. By 1995, and the aftermath of Somalia and Rwanda, the reluctance of member states to commit personnel and resources to military operations under the auspices of the United Nations had become evident. In *A Supplement to Agenda for Peace*, Boutros-Ghali acknowledged that the United Nations had neither the power, nor the means to tackle these crises. Peace enforcement has tended to overshadow many other methods of preventive diplomacy, such as mediation, negotiations, peacemaking, and peacebuilding.

It was also clear that the threat of nuclear war to global security had been replaced by a more realistic threat of intrastate conflicts. Conflicts rooted in disputes over resources, identity, and power, often left suppressed and unresolved, gradually were emerging and sometimes exploding onto the world stage. In reality, though, the U.N. organization was not at fault. The end of the Cold War caught the international community off guard—on the one hand assessing the benefits of the changes, while on the other unable to predict the effects. There was no comprehensive framework through which internal conflicts could be resolved.

The concept of preventive diplomacy had, in the meantime, come into vogue throughout the international community. Among inter-
governmental bodies such as the Organization for African Unity (OAU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the principles of conflict prevention and early warning were welcomed not only as means aimed at preventing violence but as methods that would prove to be more cost-effective than military measures. Yet, a study published in February 1996 reveals the lack of commitment and concrete application of these principles by a range of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). In effect, the concepts of early warning and conflict prevention are barely distinguishable and are often interchanged.

The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations

I would like to suggest here that conflict prevention and conflict resolution must now be explored through a broader range of nonmilitary and nonstate systems. Already nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as Amnesty International, Oxfam, and The Carter Center are active in developmental, humanitarian, and human rights issues. As “unofficial organizations,” they have the advantage of building trust and confidence between two sides and using their resources to work toward negotiation. With no strategic or political motivations, NGOs have greater flexibility than IGOs in responding to the needs of people. It is therefore time to draw on the experience and potential of these agencies to contribute to peacebuilding for the future.

Official diplomatic maneuvers are often circumscribed by political interests, a lack of trust concerning the intentions of the mediator, short-term domestic considerations, and an unwillingness to address the depth and complexity of social and economic problems that are caused by internal conflicts. Second-track approaches, such as the Norwegian involvement in the Middle East, stand a greater chance of success if they are intended to complement official negotiations but cannot focus on all areas of concern that have affected the causes and duration of the conflict. Nongovernmental or unofficial diplomacy may be effective in creating dialogue but does not have the necessary resources or political leverage to bring about change. Yet the combined force of these approaches can address the fundamental issues and still bring the necessary political momentum.
However, the extended involvement of the nongovernmental sector should not undermine the importance of the moral authority of the United Nations as a global organization and its wide technical capacity and expertise. The problems the world faces today require solutions that the United Nations cannot meet alone. The United Nations can often provide the strategic framework for preventive diplomacy. At the very least, a better form of partnership is needed at every level between U.N. bodies, governments, NGOs, and regional citizen-based organizations. Drug trafficking and international terrorism demonstrate the willingness of governments in every part of the world to collaborate with each other in preventive action. The need is for this cohesion to move onto additional areas of concern.

Multi-Track Diplomacy

Multi-track diplomacy, defined as the application of peace-making from different vantage points within a multicentered network, reflects the different levels and variety of factors which need to be addressed. The involvement of multiple actors at every level of a conflict is intended first to bring greater accountability and adherence to human rights and humanitarian law by all sides, and second to ensure that all those affected by and involved in a conflict are given the opportunity to voice their concerns. In Mozambique, for example, the involvement of the Italian government, the Vatican, the community of Sant’Egidio, local churches, the British-based company Lonrho, the United Nations, and the American government ensured that simultaneous and complementary negotiating streams took place.

The strategic aim in the coming years must be to create an umbrella of concern that involves the participation of the whole international community. By this I mean that through multiple and complementary action it is possible to generate international political will to resolve such conflicts. Just as interstate diplomacy alone cannot successfully address deep socioeconomic issues, neither can NGOs alone generate international political action. The combination of the two forces, however, can bear fruit. In addition, working at a variety of levels ensures that if negotiations fail at one level, it does not necessarily result in a failure of the entire peace process. Whenever there is this umbrella of concern, the greater the likelihood exists of reducing tension and resolving differences. In essence, it is the notion of burden-sharing and strategic alliances that has already proven successful in the campaign against landmines, torture, and environmental destruction. Preventive diplomacy is a means of drawing upon the entire potential of civil societies around the world to transform the handling of “conflict systems” from a reactive one to a preventive one.

Conclusion

It is ironic that throughout the Cold War, the United States, the USSR, and regional powers overtly and covertly intervened in the internal affairs of other states and referred to their actions as “helping democracy” or “bringing freedom.” Now, however, when assistance and concern are needed to bring freedom and peace, U.N. member states declare “their deepest concerns” but are unwilling to intervene.

It is not argued that prevention of further violence or the resolution of an ongoing conflict be attempted for purely altruistic reasons. Sociopolitical stability offers opportunities for economic growth and investment, whereas continued insecurity leads to refugee flows and the destabilization of entire regions. Nor is it argued that conflict prevention as discussed above is a quick solution to the world’s problems; rather it is a long-term approach requiring long-term financial, technical, and personnel support. The signing of a peace agreement does not bring peace. Peace in internal conflict can only come through a process that involves the very people who were at war with each other. It is they who need to reconcile their differences and reconstruct their lives. Military peace enforcement is a particular tool, not a panacea.

---

2 Ibid., 11.
4 L. Diamond and J. McDonald, Multi-Track Diplomacy (West Hartford, Conn: Kumarian Press, 1993), 1. This term is also defined as “the web of interconnected parts (activities, individuals, institutions, communities) that operate together...for a common goal; a world at peace.”
MAJOR ARMED CONFLICTS

Countries in red depict the 25 locations where 30 major armed conflicts occurred in 1995. These figures represent a decrease from 1994, when 33 major armed conflicts were waged in 27 locations. Major armed conflicts listed in 1994 in Rwanda, the United Kingdom (Northern Ireland), Georgia, and Azerbaijan were removed from the list for 1995, while conflicts in Russia (Chechnya) and Sierra Leone were added.

Battle-Related Deaths in 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict Location</th>
<th>Estimated Number Killed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia (Chechnya)</td>
<td>10,000-40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>5,000+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>4,000+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>800-2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1,000+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>500-1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1,000+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>500-1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>500+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar/Burma</td>
<td>500+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>500+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>500+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>200-500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>500-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>50-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>25-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* greater than
* less than
* no reliable figures were given in the sources consulted

**Peters Projection:** Throughout the *State of the World Conflict Report*, we use the Peters Projection (below), which shows countries in actual proportion to their relative size. Based on the work of the German historian Arno Peters, this map provides a helpful corrective to the distortions of traditional maps, such as the Mercator Projection, which presents the world to the advantage of European and colonial powers. Countries of the Northern Hemisphere traditionally are shown to be one-third larger than those of the South, yet the North is actually half the size of the South. By dividing the surface of the world into 100 longitudinal fields of equal width and 100 latitudinal fields of equal height, the Peters Projection displays the accurate relative sizes of land masses and provides us with a more realistic world view. It should be noted that no single projection is universally accepted as precisely depicting features of the earth.
Five of the 33 major armed conflicts detailed in the 1994-95 State of World Conflict Report no longer met the definition in 1995-96. Cease-fire agreements led to suspension of hostilities in Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina (between Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat forces), Georgia, Rwanda, and the United Kingdom (Northern Ireland). These and other developments were responsible for an overall decline in major armed conflicts to a post-Cold War low of 30 and the omission of these conflict locations from the 1995-96 State of World Conflict Report.

It should be noted, however, that renewed hostilities broke out in the United Kingdom in 1996, and remained a possibility in the other four countries, where all had failed to reach peace agreements. The mid-1996 status of the five conflicts are examined below:

**Azerbaijan:** Fighting over the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan, where 90 percent of the population is Armenian, ended after the warring parties signed a May 1994 cease-fire. More than 7,000 individuals perished in the struggle before talks facilitated by the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) succeeded in curtailing the conflict. That cease-fire remained in effect despite stalled mediation efforts of the OSCE and Russia.

**Bosnia and Herzegovina:** U.S.-led negotiations resulted in a February 1994 cease-fire between the Bosnian government and Bosnian Croat forces. The “Washington Agreement,” signed one month later, established a federation between the two groups. Although implementation of the federal accord proved difficult and relations between Bosnian and Croat leaders remained strained, the agreement succeeded in ending one of the many conflicts in the former Yugoslavia.

**Georgia:** A cease-fire signed in May 1994 led to the deployment of Russian peacekeeping forces and a U.N. observer mission (UNOMIG), bringing an end to fighting between Georgian government troops and separatist forces in the breakaway region of Abkhazia. More than 3,000 people died, and up to 300,000 individuals fled the northwest region during a single year of fighting. While the 3,000 Russian troops stationed in Abkhazia under the auspices of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) succeeded in preventing further military action, little progress was made with regard to the repatriation of refugees.

**Rwanda:** The wave of genocide that struck Rwanda in mid-1994, leaving between 500,000 and 1 million people dead, ended in July of that year when the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) seized control of most of the country. More than 2 million Hutus fled to neighboring Zaire, Tanzania, and Burundi, fearing vengeance from the new government. Prospects for a permanent peace seemed fragile, however, as the previous government and its troops responsible for the genocide escaped the country along with the many civilian refugees.

**United Kingdom:** In September 1994, British authorities and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) agreed to a cease-fire in the conflict over control of Northern Ireland. The fighting, which began in 1969, left more than 3,000 people dead. Renewed IRA bombings in Great Britain, including London bombings in February and June 1996, shattered the cease-fire and threatened to derail the overall peace process between the British government and republican separatists.
Refugees: These are persons outside the country of their nationality who are unable or unwilling to return due to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion. (United Nations, 1951 Convention Relating to the Rights of Refugees and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Rights of Refugees)

IDPs: Internally displaced persons are those who have been forced to flee their homes suddenly or unexpectedly in large numbers...and who are within the territory of their own country. (Working definition taken from United Nations, Analytical Report of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, Feb. 14, 1992)

Africa has seen a steady decline in major armed conflicts—from 10 in 1991 to seven in each of the years between 1992-94 to six in 1995. Nevertheless, as of mid-1996, some of the world’s most volatile areas included Algeria, Somalia, and southern Sudan. Major armed conflicts abated for a time in Liberia and Rwanda, yet these countries, as well as Burundi, Nigeria, and several others, remained potential flash points for future strife. On a positive note, the U.S. Committee for Refugees cited a decrease in total refugees for all African countries over the past year, although 30 nations still produced or hosted large numbers of displaced people. While Africa received 35 percent of the world’s total development assistance last year, debt for the continent remained 1.15 times that of its gross domestic product. UNICEF reported that life expectancy in Africa was again the lowest in the world, yet under-5 mortality rates continued to decline as they have since 1960.

### Under-5 Mortality Rates

African countries are listed with rank in descending order compared to all countries for 1994 estimated rates of under-5 mortality. The rates represent the probability of a child dying between birth and exactly 5 years of age expressed per 1,000 live births. Some figures are rounded. Major armed conflict locations for 1995 are shown in red.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Human Development Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% access to safe water (1990-95)</th>
<th>Total adult literacy rate (% in 1990)</th>
<th>Population growth rate (1980-94)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>37*</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Africa Conflict Countries Average 48.0**
**Overall Africa Average 55.2**

* Averges are derived from calculations based on data given by UNICEF, but do not represent figures provided directly by UNICEF.


### Arms Flows

Total imports of major conventional weapons from 1990-95. Figures represent trend-indicator values (volume in numbers and capacity of transfers rather than real money flows; U.S. $ million at constant 1990 prices).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>748</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SIPRI, Arms Transfers Database, 1996.

### Aid Flows

Total net Official Development Assistance (ODA) from Development Assistance Committee (DAC)* countries, multilateral organizations, and Arab countries to developing countries and territories (U.S. $ million for 1994).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Africa</td>
<td>23,510</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The DAC is one of a number of specialized committees of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which includes 16 Western European countries, Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, the United States, and the Commission of the European Communities.

Civil war has raged across Algeria since the cancellation of Algeria’s first multiparty general elections at the beginning of 1992, although outbreaks of violence occurred throughout the 1980s and during preparations for elections in 1991. Current totals of fatalities are usually given at 40,000-50,000, although figures as high as 60,000 are credible. The Islamic Protest movement rose to a peak level of popularity in the local elections of 1990 because of popular dissatisfaction with the regime and an absence of other channels to express political protest.

The current near-civil war broke out when the military took over to prevent an electoral shift from the ruling secular single party, the National Liberation Front (FLN), to a religious single party, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). The present government banned the FIS, arrested its leaders, and declared a state of emergency, leaving the Islamic movement in the hands of its militant wing. Since then, Islamic terrorist groups, including the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) associated with the FIS, the more radical Islamic Armed Group (GIA), and a scattering of personal bandit bands, have waged a violent campaign to overthrow the government.

The military has responded with counter-terror, regaining the upper hand after 1995, particularly in many rural areas, but still unable to reduce terrorist attacks in the cities and in the countryside around the capital. Rigid government control of the media and terrorist attacks against journalists prevent accurate information, despite the heroism of many Algerian journalists (see article opposite page).

In an effort to bring the violence under control and to create a political middle between the warring extremes, eight parties and other organizations, including the FLN and the FIS, met in Rome under the aegis of the Sant Egidio community in September 1994 and January 1995, and issued a platform rejecting violence and calling for the replacement of the government by a sovereign national conference and national elections. The government rejected this proposal and instead seized the initiative, holding presidential elections in November 1995. The elections were free and fair, relatively uninterrupted by violence, and marked a revolutionary event in the process of democratization—the first time ever that the Arab world has seen a competitive multi-candidate election for the presidency.

Turnout was about 75 percent of the electorate, significantly higher than that of 1990 and 1991, and the incumbent, former Gen. Liamine Zeroual, was elected by 62 percent of the vote, slightly less than

### DEMOGRAPHICS
- **Area:** 919,595 sq. mi. (2,381,741 sq. km.)
- **Population:** 27,965,000
- **System of Government:** Provisional Military
- **Languages:** Arabic, Berber dialects, French
- **Ethnic Divisions:** Arab-Berber 99%, Other 1%
- **Religions:** Sunni Muslim 99%, Christian & Jewish 1%

### ECONOMIC INDICATORS
- **Gross Domestic Product (GDP):** U.S. $48.3 billion
- **GDP per capita:** U.S. $6,000
- **External debt:** U.S. $29.5 billion
- **Human Development Index (HDI), 1992:** 0.732

### CONFLICT TIMELINE
- **1954**
  - FLN forms, initiates war of independence against colonizer France
- **1962**
  - One million die before France grants independence; Ben Bella forms first government
- **1965**
  - Col. Boumediene deposes Ben Bella, sets up military government

---

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The New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists said that 24 of the 51 journalists killed last year died in Algeria. Russia came in a distant second with seven deaths, Brazil third with four and Colombia fourth with three.

“Algeria continues to be by far the most dangerous country for journalists. The campaign of terror against local reporters constitutes the single most serious threat against journalists anywhere in the world and it should be vigorously condemned by everyone who values press freedom,” said Kati Marton, the committee’s chairwoman.

Since May 1993, when Islamic rebels began targeting local reporters and editors, 52 journalists have been assassinated in Algeria—the largest number the committee has recorded in any country in the last 10 years.

The editor of the French-language newspaper L’Independant Guitoun Noureddine was seriously wounded in a militant attack outside the daily office in central Algiers five days later.

Khaled Aboulkacem, aged 30 and working as a researcher at L’Independant, was killed in the same attack blamed by the authorities on Muslim fundamentalist gunmen.

Reuters, Jan. 25, 1996

Dr. I. William Zartman, a member of the INN, is the Jacob Blaustein Professor of International Organization and Conflict Resolution, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.

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Reuters, Jan. 25, 1996

### The Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incompatibility</th>
<th>Warring Parties</th>
<th>Troop Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Government vs. FIS* vs. GIA</td>
<td>150,000 na na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths in 1995: greater than 3,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Deaths: 25,000-45,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FIS: Front Islamique du Salut, “Jihat al-Inqath” (Islamic Salvation Front)

GIA: Groupe Islamique Armé (Armed Islamic Group)

*The Islamic Salvation Army (Armée Islamique du Salut, AIS) is considered to be the armed wing of the FIS. There are also several other armed Islamic groups under the FIS military command.


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### Life expectancy at birth (years), 1994:

- 67

### % fully immunized 1-year-old children, 1990-94:

- TB 92
- DPT 72
- polio 72
- measles 65

### % population with access to health services:

- 98

---

### DEFENSE EXPENDITURE

(All figures U.S. $)

- 1994 total (million)
  - (1993 constant prices): 1,249
- 1994 per capita
  - (1993 constant prices): 44
- Top major conventional weapons exporters:*
  - 1995: Russia/USSR 143
  - Egypt 19
  - France 4
  - China 112
  - Egypt 80

* Trend-indicators; million at 1990 constant prices

Since a U.N.-brokered cease-fire agreement in November 1994, Angola’s two warring parties—the Popular Liberation Movement of Angola (MPLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)—have attempted to bring peace to a country torn apart by 35 years of continuous fighting. Implementation of the Nov. 20, 1994, Lusaka Protocol has been a slow and uneven process, producing an environment of neither war nor peace in this southern African nation.

The peace process is currently overseen by the largest U.N. peacekeeping operation in the world. Headed by U.N. Special Representative (UNSR) Alioune Blondin Maitre Beye, the U.N. Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) was established on Feb. 9, 1995, and consists of 6,500 U.N. soldiers and 500 military observers. Beye is also responsible for chairing the Joint Commission, which is the forum in which all issues concerning the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol are addressed. Although optimism about the peace process is growing in the Angolan capital of Luanda, many obstacles remain.

Limits on civilian freedom of movement, both physical and political, hinder the peace efforts at the grassroots level. Angola remains one of the most heavily mined countries in the world, and, in the provinces, MPLA and UNITA forces still tightly control the interaction of civilians under their authority. The human rights records of both MPLA and UNITA forces are dismal, and despite the presence of a U.N. human rights mission, very little has been done to curb abuses. Sporadic fighting continues in the diamond-rich provinces of Lunda-Sul and Lunda-Norte, as UNITA, government troops, and diamond companies fight to control these resources. In the northernmost enclave of Cabinda, where 60 percent of Angola’s oil is produced, the government faces a secessionist movement led by three armed factions of the Frente de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC). Finally, Angola remains heavily dependent on humanitarian aid from the international community, and efforts to control rampant inflation (3,000 percent per year) have met with little success.

While conditions in Angola remain tense, progress has been made in the peace process on several fronts. As of June 1996, 10 of the 15 proposed quartering sites were operational, and UNITA has nearly finished quartering 50,000 of its soldiers, honoring a UNITA pledge made to UNSR Beye in May 1996. (The quartering...
sites serve as the temporary homes for UNITA soldiers and their families who are being demobilized in accordance with the Lusaka Protocol.) In addition, 15 UNITA officers have taken their positions in the newly created Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) as the UNITA military force is dismantled. The demobilization of the quartered soldiers was scheduled to begin in August 1996, and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) will take responsibility for preparing soldiers to reintegrate into civilian life.

Angola continues to face many challenges as it begins its transition from war to peace. However, the strengthening of Angola’s nascent indigenous NGO community and the resumption of trade across former battle lines are hopeful signs that Angola will overcome the horrors of 35 years of conflict and create a better future for its children.

Liz McClintock is a consultant with the Conflict Management Group (CMG) in Boston, Mass., and has recently returned from Angola, where CMG is training leaders at all levels of Angolan society in negotiation, facilitation, and conflict management skills.
Thirteen peace agreements and more than six years after faction leader Charles Taylor’s armed insurrection against President Samuel K. Doe’s government, Liberia is no closer to peace. Of a pre-war population of 2.5 million, the country’s human toll now stands at an estimated 150,000 deaths, one million internally displaced civilians, and an additional 750,000 refugees in neighboring states. In addition, the conflict, which is fundamentally a contest for power and control with ethnic undertones, has given rise to some of the worst looting, banditry, rape, torture, and mass killings on the African continent.

The outlook remains grim: over the past year, the hopeful expectations generated by the Abuja Agreement of August 1995—brokered by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)—were dashed by the resumption of factional fighting in the capital of Monrovia in April 1996. While the redeployment of the ECOWAS peacekeeping forces (ECOMOG) in Monrovia has since returned some peace and security to the city’s streets, factional fighting continues in the west and southeast of the country. Finally, regional governments, NGOs, and the international community as a whole are increasingly frustrated with the lack of progress.

Fighting continued throughout the first half of 1995 between various factions in the southeast (Sinoe and Rivercess counties) and in the west (Bomi and Grand Cape Mount counties), with repeated civilian massacres. The populations of Monrovia and the port city of Buchanan swelled to more than four times their pre-war levels, and several tens of thousands of additional refugees fled to neighboring Guinea and the Côte d’Ivoire. The malnutrition rate for children rose to 42 percent in some areas, and an outbreak of cholera claimed up to 500 lives.

The peace process faltered in early 1995 over the composition and membership of a transitional Council of State, an executive body composed of the major faction leaders. However, a series of meetings paved the way for the Aug. 19, 1995, Abuja Agreement. Abuja created a compromise sixth seat on the Council of State, which began work in September. The agreement also called on ECOMOG to deploy into faction areas and, in cooperation with an expanded U.N. observer force (UNOMIL), to disarm the factions.

A lack of funding for ECOMOG delayed both deployment and disarmament and laid the ground for the fighting that finally broke out on April 6, 1996, when troops from Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and Al-Haji Kromah’s United Liberation Movement for Democracy (ULIMO-K) tried to arrest ethnic Krahn faction leader Roosevelt Johnson in Monrovia. ECOMOG peacekeepers redeployed in Monrovia after seven
weeks of fighting, returning the city but not the countryside to relative stability.

Since the April wave of plundering, relief agencies and other NGOs have grown wary about returning to Liberia. On the diplomatic front, Ghana, the current ECOWAS chair, has continued its mediating role to improve the immediate security situation and try and restart the peace-process. Regional leaders, NGOs, and others in the international community are coming to the consensus that elections for a transitional government based on proportional representation may be the only available path to reconstruction.

Josh Lincoln is a Ph.D. candidate from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, and was a summer 1996 intern in The Carter Center’s Conflict Resolution Program, where he worked on the Liberia Project.

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### The Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incompatibility</th>
<th>Warring Parties</th>
<th>Troop Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Government      | Government of Liberia, ECOMOG vs. NPFL* | 7,000  
| Deaths in 1995: na** | 10,000 |
| Total Deaths: 1989-92: 20,000*** |

ECOMOG: the ECOWAS (Economic Organization of West African States) Monitoring Group
NPFL: National Patriotic Front for Liberia

*In August 1995, seven armed factions in Liberia (including the NPFL) signed a peace agreement, and their leaders formed a transitional Council of State. Elections were scheduled for August 1996.

**No figures for battle-related deaths are available. War-related deaths (military and civilian) are estimated at 10,000-15,000 in 1993. Total war-related deaths are estimated at 150,000.

***Note: this figure includes the fighting in 1990-91 (incurred 15,000 deaths) in which more than the two parties listed above participated.


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### Central Government Expenditure (1986-93)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Health</th>
<th>Defense</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


---

### Health and Social Welfare

- Life expectancy at birth (years), 1994: 55
- % fully immunized 1-year-old children, 1990-94:
  - TB: 84
  - DPT: 45
  - polio: 44
- % population with access to health services: 39


---

### Defense Expenditure

(All figures U.S. $)

- 1994 total (million) (1993 constant prices): 34
- Top major conventional weapons exporters:* 1995:
  - United Arab Emirates 2
  - Zambia 2

* Trend-indicators; million at 1990 constant prices

Five years of civil conflict came to an apparent end with the presidential run-off election victory of Ahmad Tejan Kaba on March 15, 1996. The election became possible when Foday Sankoh, leader of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), who had waged war against Sierra Leone government forces since early 1991, agreed to a cease-fire and an election. Sankoh did not run in the election but has begun to participate in negotiations with Kaba’s government, establishing working groups to negotiate frameworks for a global peace accord, disarmament and demobilization, and the reintegration of government and RUF forces. In 1991, the RUF began launching attacks in eastern and southern Sierra Leone employing hit-and-run guerrilla tactics to capture territory and control diamond mining areas.

In 1991, the RUF began launching attacks in eastern and southern Sierra Leone employing hit-and-run guerrilla tactics to capture territory and control diamond mining areas.

Thought to be only a small and easily contained force, the RUF became stronger and began attacks in the north and west. The government strengthened its military position by inviting troops from the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) to assist in its anti-rebel efforts and by increasing the size of the army of Sierra Leone.

In 1992, a coup against President James Momoh replaced the government with the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), headed by Capt. Valentine Strasser. The NPRC increased the armed forces of Sierra Leone (RSLMF) to more than 10,000 through 1994. In 1994, the NPRC further sought to strengthen its military capability by hiring former British Army Gurkhas. Their service proved less than satisfactory, and in 1995 the NPRC contracted with Executive Outcomes, a South African firm which had provided mercenary services to the government of Angola and UNITA. Executive Outcomes focused its efforts on clearing rebel forces from the mining districts but proved unable to defeat the RUF through early 1996.

Instability in Liberia contributed to the start of the war in Sierra Leone. Soldiers of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by Charles Taylor, began border incursions into Sierra Leone with the intent of disrupting Sierra Leone’s participation in ECOMOG, the West African regional force engaged against the NPFL in Liberia. The NPFL gave support to Foday Sankoh’s RUF, which emerged as an independent Sierra Leone-based guerrilla movement.

The government and ECOMOG contacted and supported refugee Liberian Mandingo and Krahn communities living in Sierra Leone following NPFL victories in Liberia in 1990. Elements of these com-

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DEMOGRAPHICS

Area: 27,925 sq. mi. (72,325 sq. km.)
Population: 4,690,000
System of Government: Transitional Military
Languages: English, Krio, Mende, Temne, Indigenous
Ethnic Divisions: Temne 30%, Mende 30%, Other 40%
Religions: Muslim 30%, Animist 30%, Christian 10%, Other 30%

ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Gross Domestic Product (GDP):* U.S. $809 million
GDP per capita:* U.S. $750
External debt:* U.S. $1.51 billion
Human Development Index (HDI), 1992: 0.221

*1994 estimated


CONFLICT TIMELINE

1951
New constitution introduced

1961
Britain grants independence

1967
Military assumes control of government, returns power to civilians
munities formed the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO), which attacked the NPFL in Sierra Leone and Liberia from bases in Sierra Leone. The NPFL was forced to retreat into Liberia, and the RUF began to operate on its own and focused on controlling the diamond-rich region district of Kono and the provincial towns of Bo and Kenema.

The conflict in Sierra Leone has resulted in terrible civilian hardships. RUF and government forces have frequently targeted towns and villages, resulting in high numbers of civilian casualties. Fighting has forced even more to flee their homes. The total number of internally displaced and refugee Sierra Leoneans is estimated to be 2.1 million, or 47 percent of the country’s total population of 4.47 million people. However, with the March elections having apparently succeeded, and negotiations under way for a permanent peace, Sierra Leoneans may be returning to their homes soon.

John Langlois has been the director of The Carter Center’s office in Liberia since May 1995. He holds a master's degree in international development from American University and served in Liberia as a Peace Corps volunteer from 1985-87.

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### The Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incompatibility</th>
<th>Warring Parties</th>
<th>Troop Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Government of Sierra Leone vs. RUF</td>
<td>5,000-6,000 2,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Deaths in 1995: greater than 500

Total Deaths: 3,000*

* RUF: Revolutionary United Front

---

### INN ACTION

International Alert (IA) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) facilitated the release of 16 hostages in April 1995. IA concentrated on working to bring the parties to the conflict for round-table talks. A breakthrough came in December 1995, when IA arranged for the (RUF/SL) to meet with the OAU and the U.N. in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire. Five rounds of talks, chaired by the Ivorian government and its foreign minister, Amara Essy, have taken place between the RUF/SL and the National Provisional Ruling Council, and subsequently with the newly elected Sierra Leonean government. The talks have been attended by the United Nations, the OAU, the Commonwealth Secretariat, and IA. INN member and IA Secretary General Kumar Rupesinghe led the IA delegation, which took part in the talks as part of an ongoing facilitation effort.

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### Central Government Expenditure (1986-93)

![Central Government Expenditure (1986-93)](image)


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### HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE

Life expectancy at birth (years), 1994: 46

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% fully immunized 1-year-old children, 1990-94:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TB 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPT 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>polio 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>measles 46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% population with access to health services:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

### DEFENSE EXPENDITURE

(All figures U.S. $)

1994 total (million) (1993 constant prices): 35
1994 per capita (1993 constant prices): 8

Top major conventional weapons exporters:*

1995: Belarus 7
1990-95: Belarus 7 Slovakia 1

* Trend-indicators; U.S. $ million at 1990 constant prices


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### Education

13%

### Health

10%

### Defense

10%

### Other

67%

---

Five years after the overthrow of Siad Barre in January 1991, Somalia remains plagued by widespread armed conflict and without a recognized government. In 1991-92, southern Somalia was devastated by factional warfare over control of the government, key cities, riverine areas, and humanitarian relief supplies. That conflict pitted the Somali National Alliance (SNA), led by Gen. Mohamed Farah Aideed, against a loose coalition known as the “Group of 12,” nominally headed by Ali Mahdi of the United Somali Congress (USC).

Heavy fighting and banditry between the SNA and USC destroyed most of the capital Mogadishu, while recurrent battles in the countryside between the SNA and Darod clan militias triggered a massive famine in southern Somalia. Only the northeast and northwest regions of Somalia were spared. An estimated 300,000 Somalis lost their lives to famine and 30,000 to war in 1991-92. To end the famine, 37,000 multinational troops were deployed in the U.S.-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) from December 1992 to May 1993. Its successor, the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNISOM II), was given an expansive mandate to facilitate national reconciliation, reconstruction, and disarmament.

Despite a national peace accord signed in March 1993 and dozens of subsequent peace initiatives, national reconciliation was never achieved. The U.N. operation was derailed when it became embroiled in protracted hostilities with Aideed’s militia; when it withdrew from Somalia in March 1995, it left behind a country still divided and without a central government.

Since March 1995, the nature of armed conflict in Somalia has shifted, with as many outbreaks of violence within clans and factions as between them. Triggered by struggles over leadership, scarce resources, and valued real estate, these hostilities have tended to be localized and sporadic, but have yielded hundreds of casualties.

Much of the fighting has occurred in Mogadishu, where hostilities broke out in March and April 1995 between rival Hawiye subclans scrambling to occupy strategic locations vacated by departing U.N. forces. A split between Aideed and his former financial backer, Osman Atto, led to heavy intermittent fighting between their rival subclans in south Mogadishu since July 1995. Aideed’s militia also fought Ali Mahdi’s USC along the city’s “Green Line” for control of the airport and seaport, both of which were shut down in October 1995. [Gen. Aideed died Aug. 1, 1996, after suffering gun wounds in a battle in Mogadishu, and was replaced as head of the SNA by his 33-year-old son, Hussein Mohammed Farah Aideed.—Editor]
Armed conflicts have flared in the Somali countryside too. The most significant include the military occupation of the city of Baidoa by Aideed’s SNA forces, which have encountered armed resistance from inhabitants; SNA forays along the Juba river against rival militias; a “banana war” in the Shabelle valley, between rival Hawiye subclans, over control of banana exports; and protracted armed conflict in the northwest, between the forces of the self-proclaimed government of “Somaliland” and rival clan militias.

Collectively, these conflicts are creating famine conditions in some regions and threaten to erupt into full-scale civil war. In the aftermath of the failed U.N. peace operation, modest efforts to reconcile Somali factions have been made by the Organization for African Unity, Ethiopia, and the factions themselves, but with no success.

Dr. Ken Menkhaus is associate professor of political science at Davidson College. In 1993-94, he served as special political advisor to the U.N. Operation in Somalia and in 1994-95 was visiting professor at the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute. He is the author of several articles on Somalia, including a recent assessment of conflict management in Somalia in the Spring 1996 issue of International Peacekeeping.

### The Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incompatibility</th>
<th>Warring Parties</th>
<th>Troop Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Government of Somalia* vs. USC faction (Aideed)</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths in 1995:</td>
<td>200-500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Deaths:</td>
<td>na</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*SC United Somali Congress

* Taken to be the USC faction (Mahdi).


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**DEFENSE EXPENDITURE**

(All figures U.S. $)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total (million)</th>
<th>Per capita (constant prices)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Top major conventional weapons exporters:

1995: Imports not listed from 1991-95
1990-95: Libya 10

* Trend-indicators; U.S. $ million at 1990 constant prices


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**HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE**

Life expectancy at birth (years), 1994: 47

% fully immunized 1-year-old children, 1990-94:

- TB 48
- DPT 23
- Polio 23
- Measles 35

% population with access to health services: 27*

* Data refers to years or periods other than those specified, or pertains to a region of a given country rather than the entire country, or differs in some way from the standard definition.


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**1977**

11-year war with Ethiopia begins

**1988**

Ethiopian war ends; SNM rebels launch civil war

**1991**

Military coalition overthrows Barre; SNM declares independent Somaliland

**1994**

United States withdraws five months after 18 Americans killed; U.N. force leaves following year

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“THE PENTAGON IS NOW DANCING IN THE RUINS OF YUGOSLAVIA, AND SOMALIA HAS SLIPPED BACK INTO ITS PRE-INTERVENTION STATELESS STATE. THERE IS ALMOST NO EVIDENCE THAT THE UNITED STATES AND UNITED NATIONS WERE EVER THERE, LITTLE TRACE OF THE $4 BILLION THAT WAS SPENT.”

SUDAN

BY FRANCIS M. DENG

Sudan has been torn by civil conflict since 1955, with a decade of precarious peace from 1972 to 1983. Although the conflict is complex, the war has largely been between successive governments in Khartoum, dominated by the Arab-Muslim North, and rebel movements in the more indigenously African South, whose leadership is predominantly Christian. During the first phase of the war, from 1955 to 1972, the objective of the southern liberation struggle was secession from the north.

With the resumption of hostilities in 1983, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and its military wing, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLM/A), although southern-based, embraced elements from the north, especially in the non-Arab regions of the Nuba and the Ingassana bordering the south. Commensurately, the SPLM/A postulated the liberation of the whole country from Arab-Islamic domination. This objective threatens to transform the Arab-Muslim dominated identity of the Sudan, and the north has reacted by imposing a radical Arab-Islamic fundamentalist agenda. On June 30, 1989, the Islamic fundamentalists or revivalists, as they prefer to be known, seized power through a military coup and have since tightened their Arab-Islamic grip. The SPLM/A has since reactivated a call for self-determination for the south and for marginalized regions of the north.

Since hostilities resumed in 1983, numerous peace initiatives have been undertaken by various mediators from the African continent and the international community, all of which have ended with no appreciable success. Perhaps the most sustained has been the peace initiative undertaken since 1993 by a committee of four member states of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The four contributing states—Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda—work together under the chairmanship of President Daniel arap Moi of Kenya. In 1994, IGADD adopted a Declaration of Principles (DOP) as a basis for negotiations, which included recognizing the right of self-determination and freedom of religion for the south. Since these principles were not acceptable to the Sudanese government, talks stalled.

The IGADD mediation effort was further compromised by the deterioration of relations between Sudan and two members of the mediation committee, Eritrea and Uganda, which, accusing the Islamist regime in Khartoum of spreading its religious agenda regionally and endangering its national security, broke relations with Sudan. Relations with Ethiopia also deteriorated following the assassination attempt against President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, in June 1995 by Egyptian Islamic terrorists allegedly connected with the Sudan government.
Regional response to the regime became linked to international concern with terrorism. In January 1996, the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution demanding that Sudan hand over the terrorists within 90 days. With the expiration of the deadline, Sudan became threatened with the imposition of severe sanctions. Egypt, however, opposed tough sanctions on the Sudan, fearing a Southern rebel movement that could impose a political solution detrimental to the unity of the country. Since the terrorist profile of the regime is disconnected from its domestic policies, the international community remains only marginally concerned about the war in the south and the cause of democracy and human rights in the country as a whole.

Dr. Francis Mading Deng is a senior fellow and head of the Africa Project in the Brookings Institution’s Foreign Policy Studies Program. He is also the representative of the U.N. secretary-general on internally displaced persons. He is a former Sudanese ambassador to Canada, Scandinavian countries, and the United States, and was Sudan’s minister of state for foreign affairs for five years.

**The Conflict**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incompatibility</th>
<th>Warring Parties</th>
<th>Troop Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Territory</td>
<td>Government of Sudan vs. SPLA (Garang faction)</td>
<td>81,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30,000-50,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Deaths in 1995: 1,000

Total Deaths: 37,000-40,000 (military)*

SPLA: Sudanese People’s Liberation Army

* Figure for 1991. As noted, this figure concerns military deaths. Many reliable sources indicate that more than 1.5 million have died since 1983 as a result of the war, either from military activity, famine, or disease.


**DEFENSE EXPENDITURE**

(All figures U.S. $

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total (million)</th>
<th>Per Capita (1993 constant prices)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Top major conventional weapons exporters:

- 1995: Kyrgyzstan 3
- 1990-95: China 11, Yugoslavia 10,*** Egypt 6

*** All deliveries were made in 1991, before the breakup of Yugoslavia.


**HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>1994</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy at birth (years)</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% fully immunized 1-year-old children</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPT</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>polio</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>measles</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% population with access to health services</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FOCUS: GREAT LAKES

by Sara Tindall

As we go to press in early December 1996, the situation in the Great Lakes region of Africa remains in a state of flux. Roughly 500,000 refugees have returned to Rwanda from Zaire, and the international community, led by Canada, is considering sending a multinational force to assist another 700,000 refugees in eastern Zaire cut off from aid by the latest fighting. Meanwhile, the political climate in Burundi remains unstable, and neighboring countries continue to impose sanctions against the Buyoya regime.

The Great Lakes region in Africa, including the countries of Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zaire, has been wracked with violence for many years. The most recent round of conflict ensued with the assassination of President Melchior Ndadaye, the first democratically elected leader of Burundi, in 1993 and the genocide in Rwanda sparked by the assassination of Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana. The conflict in Burundi has cost some 100,000 lives, and between 500,000 to 1 million people died in the Rwandan genocide. In addition, as of mid-1996, some 1.7 million Rwandan refugees and 200,000 Burundi refugees remained in Burundi, Tanzania, and Zaire, destabilizing these countries.

Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and The Carter Center have had a longstanding interest in Rwanda, Burundi, and Zaire. Several meetings of the International Negotiation Network (INN) and expert roundtables at the Center have focused on Burundi and Zaire from both a conflict prevention and democratization perspective. By the summer of 1995, there was growing concern that international efforts to bring stability to the region and invigorate the repatriation process were proving ineffective.

In September 1995 meetings in Africa and Europe, Uganda President Yoweri Museveni, Zaire President Mobutu Sese Seko, Kenya President Daniel arap Moi, and Ethiopia Prime Minister (and Organization of African Unity [OAU] President) Meles Zenawi discussed with President Carter means to seek a regional solution to the continuing crises in the Great Lakes. As a follow-up to these discussions, at an Oct. 22, 1995, press conference in New York, Presidents Museveni, Mobutu, and Ali Hassan Mwinyi of Tanzania (who was not present), with the agreement of Presidents Pasteur Bizimungu of Rwanda and Sylvestre Ntibantunganya of Burundi, invited President Carter, INN member Archbishop Desmond Tutu of South Africa, and former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere to act as facilitators for a summit meeting of the Great Lakes heads of state. The co-conveners also requested that The Carter Center organize the event.

A Historic Meeting

President and Mrs. Carter, along with Carter Center staff, traveled to the Great Lakes region from Nov. 18-23, 1995, on a fact-finding mission and to prepare further for the forthcoming summit, which was held in Cairo, Egypt, Nov. 27-29. The Cairo Summit brought together for the first time the heads of state from the Great Lakes countries most directly affected by the crises, at their own initiative, to discuss means of solving common problems. Presidents Mobutu, Museveni, Bizimungu, and Ntibantunganya attended, and newly elected Tanzanian President Benjamin William Mkapa was represented by a high-level special envoy. At the request of the heads of state, no outside organizations were invited to the summit, led by President Carter and Archbishop Tutu. The private nature of the meeting promoted frank examination of the highly sensitive issues facing the region, resulting in the signing of the “Cairo Declaration on the Great Lakes Region” on Nov. 29. All parties pledged to take “joint concrete actions to advance peace, justice, reconciliation, stability, and development in the region” through specific steps that would encourage repatriation to Rwanda and improve stability in Burundi. These pledges included actions to prevent cross-border incursions, arms flows, and military training; remove and neutralize intimidation in the refugee camps; improve the judicial systems in Rwanda and Burundi; and several others.

Following the Cairo Summit, Zaire began to return military equipment to Rwanda, and Rwanda conducted several high-level visits to refugee camps and began to alleviate conditions in its prisons and rebuild its justice system. Meanwhile, Zaire and Tanzania began removing intimidators from the camps, and the International Tribunal handed down its first indictments of genocide perpetrators. Former Presidents Nyerere and Amadou Toumani Touré of Mali traveled through the region on several occasions, and the regional heads of state consulted with one another, but more work was needed.

Reassessing the Situation

A second summit was held March 16-18, 1996, in Tunis, Tunisia. The five heads of state, along with former Presidents Carter, Nyerere, and Touré, assessed progress made toward fulfilling the commitments made in Cairo and further actions to be taken. The Tunis Declaration added greater detail to the Cairo plan, called for pledged funds for targeted initiatives, and elicited commitments from Burundi on positive steps to end violence and widen political dialogue.

Following the Tunis summit, President Nyerere convened representatives of the major Burundian political parties, FRODEBU and UPRONA, in Mwanza, Tanzania, in April, May, and June to examine key issues that impede the resolution of Burundi’s problems. In May 1996, Gen. Touré and President Carter met in Atlanta to share ideas on what steps were needed to move the Great Lakes process forward. At the end of June, the heads of state in the region met under the leadership of Tanzanian President Mkapa to find ways to stem the still-growing violence in Rwanda.

Despite these efforts, many problems remained in the Great Lakes region midway through 1996: rates of Rwandan repatriation had slowed to a crawl; incursions from the camps into Rwanda continued unabated; and Burundi was spiraling further into violence and chaos. The heads-of-state initiative had made progress, however, in creating a climate in which the countries in the region might address and resolve the urgent crises facing the Great Lakes.

Sara Tindall, program coordinator in The Carter Center’s Conflict Resolution Program, focuses on the Great Lakes region, Burma, and Korea. Tindall participated in the Cairo and Tunis summits and traveled to Rwanda with the World Bank in June 1996.
Refugees: These are persons outside the country of their nationality who are unable or unwilling to return due to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion. (United Nations, 1951 Convention Relating to the Rights of Refugees and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Rights of Refugees)

IDPs: Internally displaced persons are those who have been forced to flee their homes suddenly or unexpectedly in large numbers...and who are within the territory of their own country. (Working definition taken from United Nations, Analytical Report of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, Feb. 14, 1992)

RLS: Persons in “refugee-like situations” are those who may fear persecution or harm if returned to their home countries, and thus who may be refugees, but who are not recognized by governments as refugees or asylum seekers. (U.S. Committee for Refugees, World Refugee Survey, 1996, Washington, D.C.: Immigration and Refugee Services of America)

na: Figures not available for given country

* Sources vary widely in numbers reported

Asia's nine major armed conflicts in 1995 represented the highest total for all regions for the fourth straight year. While the level of violence increased dramatically in Sri Lanka, and countries such as Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Tajikistan continued to suffer, most conflicts in the region were at a lower level than for other regions. In India, conflict resumed in the Punjab after a short hiatus, but fighting was minimal. Also promising were the negotiations and cease-fires attempted in the Philippines, Myanmar/Burma, and other countries. On the down side, more than 38,000 Vietnamese refugees remained in asylum in other countries. Malnutrition continued to plague the region, yet increased economic growth contributed to general improvements in under-5 mortality, life expectancy, and immunization rates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human Development Indicators</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
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<td>Bangladesh</td>
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<td>Cambodia</td>
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<td>India</td>
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<td>Indonesia</td>
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<td>Myanmar/Burma</td>
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<td>Philippines</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asia Conflict Countries Average</td>
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<tr>
<td>Overall Asia Average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia Average</td>
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<tr>
<td>East Asia &amp; Pacific Average</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Data refers to years or periods other than those specified, or pertains to a region of a given country rather than the entire country, or differs in some way from the standard definition.

** Averages are derived from calculations based on data given by UNICEF, but do not represent figures provided directly by UNICEF.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arms Flows</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total imports of major conventional weapons from 1990-95. Figures represent trend-indicator values (volume in numbers and capacity of transfers rather than real money flows) of arms imported to each Asian country engaged in a major armed conflict in 1995 (U.S. $ million at constant 1990 prices).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
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<td>Bangladesh</td>
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<td>Myanmar/Burma</td>
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<td>Philippines</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No imports of major conventional weapons were recorded for Tajikistan for 1991-95.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SIPRI, Arms Transfers Database, 1996.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Under-5 Mortality Rates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asian countries are listed with rank in descending order compared to all countries for 1994 estimated rates of under-5 mortality. The rates represent the probability of a child dying between birth and exactly 5 years of age expressed per 1,000 live births. Some figures are rounded. Major armed conflict locations for 1995 are shown in red.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
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<td>79</td>
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<td>111</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>98*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aung San Suu Kyi, Nobel laureate, Aug. 31, 1995</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aid Flows</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total net Official Development Assistance (ODA) from Development Assistance Committee (DAC)* countries, multilateral organizations, and Arab countries to developing countries and territories (U.S. $ million for 1994).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
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<td>Bangladesh</td>
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<td>India</td>
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<td>Philippines</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asia Total</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* The DAC is one of a number of specialized committees of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which includes 16 Western European countries, Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, the United States, and the Commission of the European Communities.

Since the fall of ex-Communist President Najibullah in April 1992, Afghanistan has suffered from a new civil war. When the USSR dissolved and the Communist regime fell, the Islamic groups (mujahidin) that had fought him and the Soviet Army could not agree on a successor government. Former mujahidin and army factions devastated the capital, Kabul, as they fought for power.

There have been four main combatants, the first being the predominantly Tajik Jamiat-i-Islami (Islamic Society), led by “President” Burhanuddin Rabbani and military commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, which controls northeast Afghanistan and the capital, and therefore claims to be the government, which has been aided by Russia, India, and Iran. The second combatant has been the predominantly Pashtun Hizb-i-Islami (Islamic Party) of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, supported by Pakistan, which attacked Kabul. A third combatant has been the Shia Hizb-i-Wahdat (Unity Party), supported by Iran, which controlled part of Kabul and central Afghanistan. And finally, the fourth combatant has been a faction of the ex-Communist army and administration based in Mazar-i-Sharif in the north, led by Uzbek Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum, supported by Uzbekistan.

In the fall of 1994, the Taliban, or Islamic students’ movement, burst on the scene in Qandahar and in a few months’ time took control of southern Afghanistan with Pakistani support, supplanting Hikmatyar as the Pashtun besiegers of Tajik-controlled Kabul. And finally, the fourth combatant has been a faction of the ex-Communist army and administration based in Mazar-i-Sharif in the north, led by Uzbek Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum, supported by Uzbekistan.

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In March 1995, Massoud had repulsed the Taliban’s assault on Kabul and appeared to be consolidating. This effectively ended the effort by U.N. envoy Mahmoud Mestiri to convince Rabbani to resign in favor of a “broad-based” government. For the first time in years, no rockets fell on the capital, and displaced people started to return. This trend was reversed in September, when the Taliban quickly overran Herat, expelling Jamiat commander Ismail Khan. Herat failed to resist, exposing breaks in Ismail Khan’s ranks and his rivalry with Massoud. Fortified by this victory and by Pakistani aid, the Taliban soon were at the gates of Kabul, which they began rocketing again in October, as Mestiri returned to Afghanistan.

In the fall of 1994, the Taliban, or Islamic students’ movement, burst on the scene in Qandahar and in a few months’ time took control of southern Afghanistan with Pakistani support, supplanting Hikmatyar as the Pashtun besiegers of Tajik-controlled Kabul.

Iran and Russia reacted to the Taliban advance, which they saw as a Pakistani threat, by pouring aid into the Kabul regime, which held firm. Civilians have contin-
ue'd to die in intermittent rocket and bomb attacks from both sides. Mestiri failed to make progress and resigned on May 29. Hikmatyar, abandoned by Pakistan and lacking a base, allied himself with Rabbani again at the end of May, but this had little military significance. The United States raised its diplomatic profile in 1996, calling on all states in the region not to aid Afghan factions and on Afghans to cooperate with the United Nations.

Dr. Barnett R. Rubin, a member of the INN, is director of the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the author of The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State and The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System. He has taught political science on the faculties of Yale and Columbia Universities and was a fellow of the United States Institute of Peace.

"AFGHANISTAN HAS PRODUCED MORE REFUGEES THAN ANY OTHER SINGLE COUNTRY. MORE THAN 2.7 MILLION AFGHANS—OVER 12 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL 1993 POPULATION—WERE RESIDING WITHIN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES AT THE END OF 1995. "


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Conflict</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incompatibility: Warring Parties, Troop Strength</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths in 1995: greater than 1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Deaths: greater than 1,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


GUERRILLAS TAKE AFGHAN CAPITAL

KABUL, Afghanistan, Sept. 27 (AP)— Fundamentalist Islamic rebels captured Kabul Friday, swarming through the ruined capital, promising to impose strict Islamic rule and hanging a former president in one of their first acts of retribution.

The rebels, members of the Taliban militia, which has slowly seized two-thirds of the country, met little resistance as they moved into Kabul overnight. Government troops loyal to President Burhanuddin Rabbani, along with hundreds of civilians and foreign aid workers, had abandoned the city on Thursday.

The capture of the capital climaxed two days of fighting on the city’s eastern edge that had left hundreds dead, according to the Red Cross. It also ended an offensive that began 15 days ago with the taking of Jalalabad, to the east.

The Taliban roamed through the presidential palace today, rifling through stocks of uniforms and weapons and leaving trucks piled with missile launchers parked outside the gate.

Earlier they had swept through the nearly deserted streets in pickup trucks, tanks and battered cars, all flying the white Taliban flag, and set up checkpoints outside government buildings and at intersections.

“AFGHANISTAN is the common house of all Afghans,” the Taliban said, announcing their victory on Kabul radio.

In one of their first acts Friday, the Taliban removed a former president, Najibullah, from the United Nations compound where he had lived since his Communist regime was overthrown in 1992. The rebels then shot him in the head and hanged his beaten and bloated body from a tower.


HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE

| Life expectancy at birth (years), 1994: | 43 |
| % fully immunized 1-year-old children, 1990-94: |
| TB | 44 |
| DPT | 18 |
| polio | 18 |
| measles | 40 |
| % population with access to health services: | 29 |


DEFENSE EXPENDITURE

(All figures U.S. $)

| 1994 total (million) (1993 constant prices): | na |
| 1994 per capita (1993 constant prices): | na |
| Top major conventional weapons exporters: |
| 1995: |
| Russia/USSR | 3,660 ** |
| Saudi Arabia | 18 |

*Trend-indicators; U.S. $ million at 1990 constant prices
** Deliveries from Saudi Arabia are to rebel forces.

The past year witnessed little change in the low-level guerrilla conflict that has plagued the Chittagong Hill Tract (CHT) region of Bangladesh since the early 1970s. Comprising some 10 percent of Bangladesh and covering an area of more than 5,000 square miles, the CHT is the ancestral home to 12 recognized tribal populations representing Buddhist, Hindu, and Christian communities. Strife continues to plague the region as the Parbattya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samiti (JSS) and its military wing, Shanti Bahini (SB), maintain their armed struggle against the government in Dhaka.

In 1972, one year after Bangladesh seceded from Pakistan, tribal elements in the CHT formed the JSS in response to numerous outstanding grievances, including compensation for a 1963 hydroelectric project that displaced more than 100,000 indigenous people from their ancestral lands and government settlement policies that opened the CHT to successive waves of Bengali settlers from the plains. In 1973, the JSS created the SB to forcefully agitate for tribal rights and counter the influx of Bengali settlers into the region.

Led by Shantu Larma, and his brother, Manobendra (who was later assassinated by a rival faction within the JSS/SB), the SB initiated a fierce guerrilla campaign against Muslim settlers in the CHT. By 1980, the conflict had developed into a full-scale guerrilla war between the SB and government police and military forces, empowered with extrajudicial authority to engage the SB’s 3,000 to 5,000 guerrilla cadres.

During the 1980s, the Bangladesh government made several attempts to negotiate with the SB, including a general amnesty for militants, the creation of three semi-autonomous hill districts, and the extension of limited control to the JSS over future Muslim settlements in the region. Despite these overtures, the SB continued to agitate for greater autonomy, demanding the withdrawal of government troops and the removal of all nontribals from the CHT. Fighting intensified throughout the remainder of the decade, ultimately forcing some 60,000 tribal refugees to flee the Chittagong Hill Tract into India.

Fighting intensified throughout the remainder of the decade, ultimately forcing some 60,000 tribal refugees to flee the Chittagong Hill Tract into India.

In 1992, the SB signed a cease-fire accord and agreed to enter into negotiations with the government in Dhaka. Despite numerous rounds of peace talks since 1992, no permanent settlement has yet been reached. There was at least one major incident in the CHT in 1995, in which a tribal student council clashed with Bengali settlers and police in Bandarban. Unofficially, violence between the SB, nontribal settlers, and government...
Forces continue sporadically. Indicative of the situation is the fact that 1995 saw little repatriation of CHT refugees who had fled to India to escape the fighting.

The Bangladesh government continues to talk with the JSS/SB, and most recently both sides agreed to extend the cease-fire until March 1996, after which talks between the two groups were scheduled to resume. However, given the political instability in Dhaka over the past six months, and the June 1996 elections that resulted in a change of government, it remains to be seen what direction the cease-fire and future peace talks will take in 1996.

Shaun Gill is deputy director of the India Program and external affairs officer for South Asia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

**A FRESH START?**

“The elections held in Bangladesh on June 12 put an end to two years of political agitation, strikes and demonstrations...but it will take more than six weeks to convince most people that Bangladesh’s cycle of political instability has really been broken.”

*The Economist, Aug. 3, 1996*

### The Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incompatibility</th>
<th>Warring Parties</th>
<th>Troop Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Territory</td>
<td>Government of Bangladesh vs. JSS/SB</td>
<td>115,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,000-5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths in 1995:</td>
<td>less than 25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Deaths:</td>
<td>(since 1975) 3,000-5,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Central Government Expenditure (1986-93)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Health</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Other 74%</th>
<th>Defense</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE**

- **Life expectancy at birth (years), 1994:** 55
- % fully immunized 1-year-old children, 1990-94:
  - TB 95
  - DPT 94
  - polio 94
  - measles 95
- % population with access to health services: 45


**DEFENSE EXPENDITURE**

(All figures U.S.$)

1994 total (million)
(1993 constant prices): 462
1994 per capita
(1993 constant prices): 4
Top major conventional weapons exporters:
1995:
- Russia/USSR 57
- Czechoslovakia 40
- Ukraine 14
1990-95:
- China 353
- Pakistan 185
- Russia/USSR 121

*Trend indicators; U.S. $ million at 1990 constant prices ** SIPRI lists Czechoslovakia for the purpose of its database, but notes the 1993 split into the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic.


### Defense

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHT residents launch guerrilla war against police and Muslim settlers</td>
<td>Gen. Ershad assumes power in bloodless coup</td>
<td>Government offers limited autonomy in CHT region to JSS</td>
<td>Gen. Ershad declares state of emergency, resigns office, placed under arrest</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**“DREAMS DON’T LAST LONG IN BANGLADESH, ONE OF THE WORLD’S POOREST COUNTRIES. THERE IS LITTLE INDUSTRY, AND PRODUCTIVITY IS EXTREMELY LOW. PER-CAPITA GNP IS JUST $230 A YEAR, COMPARED WITH, SAY, $2,200 IN THAILAND AND $34,600 IN JAPAN. A SINGLE INCOME IS Seldom ENOUGH TO SUPPORT A FAMILY.”**

**GORDON FAIRCLOUGH REPORTING ON CONDITIONS IN BANGLADESH, WHERE UNEMPLOYMENT NEARS 35 PERCENT AND POSSIBLY AS MANY AS 15 MILLION CHILDREN ARE FORCED TO WORK**


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**Shaun Gill is deputy director of the India Program and external affairs officer for South Asia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.**
CAMBODIA

BY ROBERT P. MYERS JR.

Historically, Cambodia has experienced both internal strife and external interference, particularly from more powerful neighbors. After Cambodia gained independence from France in 1953, Prince Norodom Sihanouk’s efforts in the 1950s and 1960s to pursue a policy of neutrality became inextricably caught up in the crosscurrents of the Cold War. By the mid-1960s, North Vietnamese and Viet Cong guerrillas were using the eastern region of Cambodia to attack South Vietnam.

With the collapse of the U.S-backed, right-wing regime of Gen. Lon Nol, in power from 1970-75, a reign of terror ensued from 1975-78. The Khmer Rouge rule under Pol Pot was scarred by an estimated 1 to 3 million deaths. During this period, Democratic Kampuchea was involved in serious border clashes with Vietnam and became a pawn in the Sino-Soviet dispute, with China backing Pol Pot and the Soviets supporting Vietnam.

In late 1978, Vietnamese forces invaded Cambodia, overthrowing Pol Pot. The Vietnamese occupation of the 1980s, combined with the weakness of the Vietnam-supported Peoples Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) regime, fueled anti-Vietnamese sentiment. Convinced that they could not win a decisive military victory and facing a deteriorating economic situation at home, the Vietnamese began to seek a way out of Cambodia; in September 1989, they unilaterally withdrew their troops.

Informal peace talks began in Jakarta in July 1988, which led to a comprehensive peace agreement signed in October 1991 in Paris. The Paris Accords established the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) to work with the interim Supreme National Council headed by Prince Sihanouk. Subsequently, the United Nations embarked upon its most complex and costly (nearly $2 billion) peacekeeping effort. While encountering serious difficulties in implementing imperfectly drafted accords, UNTAC successfully resettled nearly all displaced persons and prepared Cambodia for democratic elections.

Despite nearly four decades of undemocratic rule, civil strife, and external interventions, Cambodia appears to be making some progress, thanks in large part to massive economic assistance from the international community.

In May 1993, 89 percent of all eligible voters participated in free and fair multiparty elections, despite Khmer Rouge efforts to keep the approximately 6 percent of the population in their area of control from voting. The National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooper-

DEMOGRAPHICS

Area: 69,898 sq. mi. (181,035 sq. km.)
Population: 9,713,000
System of Government: Monarchy
Languages: Khmer, French
Ethnic Divisions: Khmer 90%, Vietnamese 5%, Other 5%
Religions: Buddhist 95%, Other 5%

ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Gross Domestic Product (GDP):* U.S. $2.6 billion
GDP per capita: U.S. $590
External debt, 1993 estimated: U.S. $124 million
Human Development Index (HDI), 1992: 0.337

* 1994 estimated

CONFLICT TIMELINE

1953 1969 1975
Cambodia gains independence from France U.S. bombings help depose Prince Sihanouk, install Lt.-Gen. Lon Nol in power Pol Pot and Khmer Rouge take over Cambodia after United States withdraws from Vietnam
ative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) won 45 percent of the vote and, facing threats from the runner-up Cambodian Peoples Party (CPP) to divide the country, formed a coalition with FUNCINPEC leader Prince Ranariddh as first prime minister and CPP leader Hun Sen as second prime minister. Sihanouk was named king.

Despite nearly four decades of undemocratic rule, civil strife, and external interventions, Cambodia appears to be making some progress, thanks in large part to massive economic assistance from the international community. Yet, chronic problems such as political dissension, corruption, violence, and administrative inadequacies persist, thereby clouding the future of the fledgling and fragile Royal Cambodian Government (RCG), especially because of growing policy and personality differences between the co-prime ministers as the nation moves toward local and national elections in 1997 and 1998, respectively.

The Khmer Rouge continue to pose a real, albeit diminished, military threat to the RCG. In May 1996, there were reports that Pol Pot was critically ill and Sihanouk predicted that when Pol Pot dies, the Khmer Rouge will disintegrate. For the moment, the Khmer Rouge appear to be playing a waiting game, hoping that harsh economic times and a possible split in the coalition will create a political opening for them.

Robert P. Myers Jr. spent 1995-96 as a diplomat-in-residence with The Carter Center’s Conflict Resolution Program. A career foreign service officer, he has served among other posts as coordinator for ethnic minorities affairs in Saigon; chief of refugee affairs in Bangkok; U.S. consul general in Belfast, Northern Ireland; and the State Department’s first dispute resolution specialist.

**The Khmer Rouge had far and away the worst human rights record, having presided over the deaths of some 1 million Cambodians during its 1975-78 government; during the past two years the party has not renounced its past practices and continued to commit serious abuses.”

The Lost Agenda, edited by Cynthia Brown for Human Rights Watch, 1993

### HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE

| Life expectancy at birth (years), 1994: | 51 |
| % fully immunized 1-year-old children, 1990-94: |
| TB | 78 |
| DPT | 53 |
| polio | 54 |
| measles | 53 |

### DEFENSE EXPENDITURE

| (All figures U.S.$) |
| 1994 total (million) (1993 constant prices): | 59 |
| 1994 per capita (1993 constant prices): | 6 |
| Top major conventional weapons exporters: |
| 1995: |
| Czechoslovakia | 30 |
| Ukraine | 14 |
| 1990-95: |
| Russia/USSR | 58 ** |
| Czechoslovakia | 46 *** |
| China | 18 |

* Trend indicators; U.S. $ million at 1990 constant prices.
** SIPRI lists “Czechoslovakia” for the purpose of its database but notes the 1993 split into the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic.
*** Deliveries from China are to rebel forces.


| PDK: Party of Democratic Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge) |
| * Regarding battle-related deaths in 1979-89, not only involving the government and PDK, the only figure available is from official Vietnamese sources, indicating that 23,300 Vietnamese soldiers died in Cambodia. An estimated figure for the period 1979-89, based on various sources, is greater than 50,000; and for 1989 greater than 1,200. The figures for 1992, 1991, and 1992 were lower. |

During the last year, two conflicts continued to cause political instability in India: the insurgency in the northern province of Kashmir and the ethnic conflict in the state of Assam in the northeast. In contrast, the trouble-prone state of Punjab was relatively calm. In Kashmir, Indian security forces were still engaged in attempts to quell the militant insurgency, which has claimed more than 20,000 lives since 1990. The militants are demanding independence or accession to Pakistan.

June 1996 parliamentary elections and the possibility of local elections in late 1996 have raised hopes of the return of popular government to the province after six years of direct rule from New Delhi. But Kashmir will continue to remain a troubled area even if the security forces succeed in combatting the insurgency. Resentment at New Delhi's policies is intense and widespread, and the large-scale human rights violations by Indian security forces over the last six years have further estranged the people from India.

Punjab's Sikh Separatists are fighting a losing battle with very little popular support left in the state for an independent Sikh nation, Khalistan.

Only stray incidents of violence are reported, and the average level of violence in Punjab today is no higher than most states in India. In 1995, one separatist group did succeed in assassinating Punjab's chief minister, Beant Singh, but this was clearly the last gasp of a dying militant campaign. The most significant symbol of Punjab's return to mainstream politics was the 1996 parliamentary election, in which even earlier disaffected Sikh groups participated actively. New Delhi's two-pronged, carrots-and-sticks policy seems to have worked in Punjab.

On the periphery, and less written about, India's northeast has been a festering sore for at least the last three decades. While ethnic clashes or anti-India protests continued in many of the states in the northeast, it was Assam which was at the center of the most violent clashes. In the western part of the state, members of the Bodo ethnic group attacked rival Muslims, then Santhals. These attacks were inspired by the Bodo Security Force, an insurgent group demanding independence of Western Assam. More than 200 people are believed to have been killed in these attacks in 1996 alone, and nearly 200,000 people have been displaced. The Santhals, too, have now retaliated and more than 300 villages have been destroyed in the clashes.

Dr. Amitabh Mattoo is associate professor in the Center for International Politics, Organization and Disarmament at the Jawaharlal Nehru University School of International Studies in New Delhi, India.
FOCUS: CONFLICT IN THE KASHMIR

BY LEO E. ROSE

Ongoing conflict between Indian security forces and militant groups based in the Kashmir Valley continued to mid-1996 at about the same intensity but with some significant changes in the composition and objectives of the Kashmiri militant factions and in the strategies pursued by the Government of India (GOI). Disagreements between the pro-Pakistan factions and those that demanded an independent Kashmir became even more strident, but with the pro-independence factions gaining the upper hand in most areas of the Valley.

The pro-Pakistan factions, headed mainly by non-Kashmiri militants who were pro-Islamic veterans of the Afghanistan War, became increasingly antagonistic to the Kashmiri public’s more moderate views. Thus in 1995-96, former Kashmiri militants organized, with the support of the Indian army, “Village Defense Forces.” These forces opposed both the pro-Pak and the pro-independence factions.

GOI policies also underwent major change in 1995-96. There is still virtual unanimity among Indians that India should not make any concessions on Kashmir’s status as an integral part of the Indian Union. The March 1996 GOI decision, however, to hold May parliamentary elections in Kashmir as well as Kashmir State Assembly elections later in the year, reflected broad support by all but some of the most fundamentalist Hindu organizations on the “broader autonomy” issue. Allegations that the May elections were not fully “free and fair” have some substance. However, the Kashmir Valley people were determined to restart a political process; approximately one-third participated in the elections, despite the threats of several militant factions against anyone who voted. The question now is whether New Delhi is willing to enter discussions with an assortment of Kashmiri factions on the relevant issue—Kashmir’s status in the Indian Union.

Dr. Leo E. Rose is editor of Asian Survey and professor emeritus of political science at the University of California, Berkeley. He has worked on both the Indian and Pakistani side of Jammu and Kashmir since the 1960s.

Central Government Expenditure (1986-93)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Conflict</th>
<th>Incompatibility</th>
<th>Warring Parties</th>
<th>Troop Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Territory</td>
<td>Government of India vs. Kashmir insurgents vs. Sikh insurgents vs. ULFA vs. BdSF</td>
<td>1,145,000 na</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths in 1995: greater than 500*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Deaths: greater than 37,000*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BdSF: Bodo Security Force
ULFA: United Liberation Front of Assam

*Only the Kashmir and Sikh conflict. Of the total deaths, approximately 25,000 were killed in the Sikh conflict and at least 12,000 in the Kashmir conflict.

**Several groups are active, several of the most important being the Janmata and Kashmir Liberation Front (JLF), the Hizb-Mujahideen, and the Harkat-ul-Ansar.

***Several groups exist; however, in 1995 only a few were active, i.e. the Khadistan Liberation Force (KLF).

In the former Portuguese colony of East Timor, the "Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor" (known by its Portuguese acronym Fretilin) has waged a campaign for independence against the Indonesian authorities, who occupied the territory after Dec. 7, 1975, after the Marxist-influenced Fretilin declared independence nine days earlier. The nature of the East Timor conflict has altered since the Indonesian invasion more than 20 years ago, with ethnic and religious divisions (most East Timorese profess Roman Catholic Christianity) exacerbating the conflict.

From a preinvasion population of more than 600,000 people, the loss of life occurring in the first decade after the Indonesian invasion may have been as high as 200,000, with famine and disease inflicting high mortality on Timorese civilians herded into holding camps during 1975-79. In 1976, Jakarta annexed East Timor as Indonesia’s 27th province; 20 years later, riots and repression continue.

Indonesian counterinsurgency efforts have been rewarded with sporadic success, the most recent being the capture and imprisonment of Fretilin leader Xanana Gusmao in 1992, and that of second-in-command Ma’Huno in April 1993. From 1975-89, Jakarta had closed the new province to all outsiders; it did so again in November 1994 after East Timorese students entered the U.S. Embassy compound in Jakarta to protest Indonesian policy at the time of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Bogor, which was attended by 18 Asia-Pacific heads of government including U.S. President Bill Clinton. The Jakarta protest commemorated the killing by Indonesian troops of an estimated 180 civilians at the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili, East Timor’s capital.

Indonesian repression includes the use of civilian thugs against the resistance, “disappearances,” and extrajudicial killings.

Indonesian repression includes the use of civilian thugs against the resistance, “disappearances,” and extrajudicial killings. But despite high per capita develop-
ment spending and the molding of literate younger generations in Indonesian language schools, the separatist struggle refuses to expire.

International support for the resistance comes from Western human rights groups, former Portuguese colonies, Timorese emigre settlements in Australia and Western Europe, and from Portugal itself, which refuses to accept the incorporation of East Timor as final or legitimate and wants a referendum in the territory. U.N. human rights agencies periodically criticize Indonesia for abuses in East Timor, and the U.N. General Assembly does not accept that an act of legitimate decolonization has occurred. Since July 1995, a so-called “All-Inclusive Intra-East Timor Dialogue,” involving pro- and anti-Indonesian Timorese, and promoted by U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, has been fitfully under way. Dr. James Clad is professor of Southeast Asian Studies at Georgetown University and an adjunct fellow at the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington, D.C. From 1990-93 he served as a senior associate in Asian investment, trade, political research, and commentary at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He has written numerous books and articles on Southeast Asia.

The Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incompatibility</th>
<th>Warring Parties</th>
<th>Troop Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Territory</td>
<td>Government of Indonesia vs. Fretilin</td>
<td>276,000 200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Deaths in 1995: less than 50

Total Deaths: 15,000-16,000 (military)

---

**Central Government Expenditure (1986-93)**

- Education: 10%
- Health: 3%
- Defense: 6%
- Other: 7%

---

**Health and Social Welfare**

| Life expectancy at birth (years), 1994: | 62 |
| % fully immunized 1-year-old children, 1990-94: |
| TB | 100 |
| DPT | 94 |
| Polio | 93 |
| Measles | 92 |
| % population with access to health services: | 80 |


---

**Defense Expenditure**

(All figures U.S.$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total (million)</th>
<th>Per Capita (1993 constant prices)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>2,256</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Top major conventional weapons exporters:

- 1995:
  - FRG/Germany 733
  - UK 193

- 1990-95:
  - FRG/Germany 1,949
  - UK 301
  - USA 271

*Trend indicators, U.S. $ million at 1990 constant prices


---

**Eliminating Illiteracy and Molding Literate Generations**

- **1966**:
  - Lt.-Gen. Suharto takes power, forces Sukarno to resign
  - Fretilin faction wins civil war in East Timor; Indonesia invades, annexes East Timor

- **1975**:
  - Indonesia opens East Timor to outsiders but denies independence

- **1989**:
  - Government arrests Fretilin leader Gumoa; repression continues in East Timor

- **1992**:
  - Indonesia opens East Timor to outsiders but denies independence

---

**The Economist, “If Indonesia Erupts,” Aug. 3, 1996—One week after at least two people were killed, as many as 100 injured, and 200 more jailed when Indonesia’s worst rioting in 22 years broke out in Jakarta following a police and government-backed civilian raid on the headquarters of ousted opposition leader Megawati Sukarnoputri to evict her supporters**

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**The Conflict**

- Incompatibility
- Warring Parties
- Troop Strength

---

**Education, Health, Defense, Other**

- Education: 10%
- Health: 3%
- Defense: 6%
- Other: 7%

---

**The Conflict**

- Incompatibility
- Warring Parties
- Troop Strength

---

**Genocide and Human Rights Violations**

- **1966**:
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  - Fretilin faction wins civil war in East Timor; Indonesia invades, annexes East Timor

- **1975**:
  - Indonesia opens East Timor to outsiders but denies independence

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  - Measles: 92
- % population with access to health services: 80

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**Defense Expenditure**

(All figures U.S.$)

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**Central Government Expenditure (1986-93)**

- Education: 10%
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- Other: 7%
MYANMAR/BURMA

BY JOSEF SILVERSTEIN

Since the Burma Communist Party (BCP) revolted against the government three months after independence in 1948, warfare between the state and ethnic opposition groups has continued. While the BCP fought to replace the democratic government, several minorities fought either for greater autonomy and power in their states or to secede from the Union of Burma. After nearly five decades, neither the democratic government nor the military dictatorships, which seized power in 1962, have been able to end civil war.

For the past eight years, the ruling State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) has sought to end internal warfare by fighting and negotiating. SLORC uses military pressure, primarily against civilian members of opposition ethnic groups, or cease-fires to get its enemies to halt their wars. Under SLORC's cease-fire terms, the opposition is allowed to keep its weapons, continue administering its areas and pursuing its economic activity; in exchange, they agree to stop fighting against the state.

The cease-fires do not address political issues; these, SLORC declares, can only be addressed after a new constitution is adopted and a new government is in place. The first cease-fires were made in 1989 with the ethnic cadres of the BCP, who after revolting against the party, formed their own groups and accepted negotiations. By March 1996, 15 cease-fires were signed. All but one are holding; the Karenni National Progressive Party, which signed in March 1995, resumed fighting shortly after agreeing because the army violated its terms. The two remain at war.

For the past eight years, the ruling State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) has sought to end internal warfare by fighting and negotiating.

The Karen National Union (KNU) also remains at war, even after its 1995 setbacks. Following SLORC success in splitting the Buddhist and Christian KNU members, the former, organized as the Democratic Karen Buddhist Organization (DKBO), led attacks in January 1995 against KNU headquarters at Manerplaw. The defenders retreated across the border to Thailand or into the surrounding countryside. The DKBO, together with SLORC, continued attacks against Karen refugee camps in Thailand, thereby threatening Thai villagers and undermining Thai authority on its own territory. Throughout the year, sporadic fighting continued between the KNU and SLORC. At the same time, inconclusive talks between the two took place. The KNU rejects the cease-fire formula and demands instead that talks include discussion of politics, civil war, and national peace and reconciliation; SLORC is unwilling to alter its terms.

DEMOCRATICS

Area: 216,228 sq. mi. (676,577 sq. km.)
Population: 44,675,000
System of Government: Provisional Military
Languages: Burmese Indigenous
Ethnic Divisions:
Bamar 69%
Shan 9%
Kayin 6%
Rakhine 5%
Other 11%
Religions:
Buddhist 89%
Muslim 4%
Christian 4%
Other 3%

ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): * U.S. $13.8 billion
GDP per capita: * U.S. $860
External debt: * U.S. $5.2 billion
Human Development Index (HDI), 1992: 0.457

* 1994 estimated

CONFLICT TIMELINE

1947
Britain grants independence; U Nu becomes first prime minister

1962
Gen. Ne Win deposes U Nu, suspends constitution, establishes authoritarian control

1973
National referendum establishes new democratic constitution

One other group remains at war, the Shan State Army (SSA). It is the successor to the Mong Tai Army (MTA) of Khun Sa, the international drug dealer. On Dec. 29, 1995, he entered into a special agreement with SLORC, which transformed his army into a regional militia under its command. His action followed desertions from the MTA by Shans who felt he had abandoned their cause in favor of narcotics. The SSA has 8,000 former MTA officers and men who fight under the banner of the Shan State Progressive Party.

In December 1995, the U.N. General Assembly passed a Burma resolution calling on the secretary-general to help the Burmese achieve national reconciliation; as in 1994, when a similar resolution was adopted, SLORC rejected it on the grounds that it was interference in internal affairs. With fighting continuing, cease-fires capable of breaking down, and rejection of international help in ending the civil wars, there is no peace in Burma.

Dr. Josef Silverstein is professor emeritus in the Department of Political Science at Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Conflict</th>
<th>Incompatibility</th>
<th>Warring Parties</th>
<th>Troop Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Territory</td>
<td>Government of Myanmar vs. KNU vs. MTA</td>
<td>286,000 vs. 4,000 vs. 10,000-20,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths in 1995: greater than 500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Deaths: (from 1948-50) 8,000, (from 1981-88) 5,000-8,500, (from 1993-94) greater than 1,000*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This figure includes deaths only in the Shan conflict.


### INN ACTION

President Jimmy Carter and INN members Oscar Arias Sanchez, Elisabet Palme, and Elie Wiesel participated in a letter-writing campaign that contributed to the July 11, 1995, release of democratic leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest. Human Rights Watch organized the campaign to pressure Burma’s ruling military regime, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), to free the Nobel laureate Suu Kyi after six years of detention. Carter Center Conflict Resolution Program Director Harry Barnes met with Suu Kyi in March 1996 in Burma and heard her plans for rebuilding the National League for Democracy (NLD) party. Upon his return, Barnes debriefed several NGOs in New York on Suu Kyi’s suggestions for how international NGOs might support the democratic movement in Burma. The NGOs discussed the possible creation of an informal consultative mechanism to coordinate information-sharing and travel to the region.

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### HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE

- **Life expectancy at birth (years), 1994:** 57
- **% fully immunized 1-year-old children, 1990-94:**
  - TB: 83
  - DPT: 77
  - Polio: 77
  - Measles: 77
- **% population with access to health services:** 60


---

### DEFENSE EXPENDITURE

- **1994 total (million) (1993 constant prices):** 415
- **1994 per capita (1993 constant prices):** 9
- **Top major conventional weapons exporters:**
  - 1995:
    - China: 310
  - 1990-95:
    - China: 1,035
    - Poland: 47
    - Yugoslavia: 42

* Trend-indicators; U.S. $ million at 1990 constant prices
** All deliveries ended in 1992 before the breakup of Yugoslavia.

Internal political and armed conflict continues to be a central feature of current Philippine reality. Political violence in the Philippines is rooted in the basic structures of economic exploitation and political exclusion that are a legacy of its colonial history. During the period of martial law and the Ferdinand Marcos dictatorship from 1972-86, political violence developed into brutal state policy, on the one hand, and widespread, organized, armed opposition, on the other.

A major party to the armed conflict since its founding in 1969 has been the New People's Army (NPA), constituting the armed component of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), and its political wing, the National Democratic Front (NDF). The NPA reached its peak of more than 25,000 guerrilla fighters in 1976-78.

Peace talks with the Communist rebels initiated by President Corazon Aquino shortly after she assumed power in 1986 did not prosper.

On the basis of these two agreements, the formal phase of the talks was scheduled to begin in June 1995.

Following two brief postponements, formal talks opened June 26, 1995, in Brussels, Belgium. Within a day, however, the government panel suspended the talks over the imprisoned Sotero Llamas, who had been arrested by government troops in May 1995 and whom the NDF insisted was one of their political consultants in the peace talks and was thus protected under the terms of the JASIG. This triggered the surfacing of other problems arising from unclarified provisions of the JASIG, resulting in suspension of talks throughout 1995 and the first half of 1996.

Informal discussions, were, however, reopened between the two parties. Formal talks reopened in June and included agenda items such as clarification of the framework, the principles to guide further substantive discussions, and the start of substantive discussions on reciprocal working committees on human rights and international humanitarian law. The latter constituted the first substantive topic under the Hague Declaration.
and were intended to move the negotiations from procedural issues to the substantive agenda of the talks.

While the GRP claims that the NPA has decreased 16 percent in troop strength since 1987 and has gone from a high of 8,496 barangays (villages) under NPA influence in 1986 to 445 barangays in 1995, the CPP firmly denies government claims of its dwindling numbers and asserted in its statement on the 27th Founding Anniversary of the NPA (March 29, 1996) that "the personnel and arms of the NPA are increasing."

A church-related NGO, the Ecumenical Commission for Displaced Families and Communities (ECDFC), makes the observation in the November-December 1995 issue of its newsletter that "military operations, aimed at curbing the insurgency problem and at protecting and safeguarding so-called development projects under the government’s Philippines 2000 banner, continued amidst government-initiated peace talks, and remained a major source of displacement incidents in 1995."

Within the last few years, national democratic forces have been troubled by internal debate and dissenion. In 1993, after a year of intense inner-party struggle, the CPP split into two or more factions, more popularly referred to locally under the “reaffirm-reject” labels. The Utrecht-based leadership firmly declares its “absolute leadership” over the NPA. Local peace advocates have been pursuing “citizens’ third-party participation” in the peace talks and submitted proposals to the two contending panels in 1991 and then again in 1995 for a “citizens’ panel” to sit directly in the talks. This is still subject to discussion by the two parties.

Teresa Quintos Deles is executive director of the Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute. She was the founding convenor of the Coalition for Peace and currently serves as the secretary-general of the National Peace Conference. She served as the convenor of the International Consultation on Women as Peacemakers, held in May-June 1995 in the Philippines.

**Central Government Expenditure (1986-93)**

- **Education**: 15%
- **Health**: 4%
- **Defense**: 10%
- **Other**: 71%

**The Conflict**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incompatibility</th>
<th>Warring Parties</th>
<th>Troop Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Government of the Philippines vs. NPA</td>
<td>106,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths in 1995: less than 100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Deaths: 21,000–25,000*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NPA: New People’s Army

* Official military sources claim that 6,500 civilians were killed during 1985-91.


**Health and Social Welfare**

- **Life expectancy at birth (years), 1994**: 66
- **% fully immunized 1-year-old children, 1990-94**:
  - TB: 89
  - DPT: 86
  - polio: 88
  - measles: 87
- **% population with access to health services**: 76


**Defense Expenditure**

- **1994 total (million)** (1993 constant prices): 855
- **1994 per capita (1993 constant prices)**: 13
- **Top major conventional weapons exporters:**
  - 1995:
    - South Korea: 22
    - USA: 17
    - UK: 14
  - 1990-95:
    - USA: 336
    - Italy: 48
    - UK: 33

* Trend indicators, million at 1990 constant prices.


**Education**

- **1973**: 15%
- **1986**: 4%
- **1990**: 10%
- **1992**: 71%


Marcos establishes new constitution, suspends it under martial law

Corazon Aquino becomes president, puts down pro-Marcos coup attempt

NPA declares limited cease-fire, resumes fighting following year

U.S. forces withdraw; President Ramos offers amnesty to NPA, other dissidents
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have been fighting for a separate Tamil state consisting of northern and eastern parts of Sri Lanka since 1983. Following the assassination of Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa in May 1993, the LTTE increased its attacks on Sri Lankan forces. With the August 1994 election of a moderate president, Chandrika Bandaranaike-Kumaratunga, the government’s gestures, including the partial lifting of an economic embargo against LTTE-controlled areas, led to preliminary peace talks with the LTTE in October 1994.

After the LTTE and the new Sri Lankan government (People’s Alliance) agreed to a cessation of hostilities in November 1994, there was much hope that the decade-long civil war might be nearing an end. Formal peace began in late January 1995 when an official delegation from the government was sent to Jaffna to meet with the LTTE and begin discussions on unresolved issues at the core of the conflict. The government agreed to lift the embargo in the LTTE-held areas in the north, although the LTTE claimed there was little actual compliance on the part of the government.

On April 19, 1995, the five-month cessation of hostilities ended when four LTTE suicide bombers blew up two navy vessels in Trincomalee Harbor in the eastern part of the island, resulting in many deaths. Pressure built for a military response by the government even as the president went forward with plans to release and implement a peace package offering political reforms and devolution to all sections of the country. In July and September, major military offensives, launched by government forces in the Jaffna area, resulted in the loss of civilian lives and produced some 400,000-500,000 refugees. In January 1996, the retaliatory suicide bombing by the LTTE of the financial center in Colombo caused nearly 100 civilian deaths. At mid-year, there appeared to be little hope for resumption of peace talks in the near future.

On April 19, 1996, the government extended a countrywide state of emergency and launched Riviresa II, a major military offensive in the Jaffna peninsula. The offensive resulted in the government takeover of Jaffna and adjoining areas, expelling the LTTE from its home and headquarters. Efforts were under way in early July by the government for the return of the refugees to Jaffna. Defense Ministry sources reported that during the past year, as a result of the conflict, more than 6,300 people were killed, including more than 1,000 civilians.
Amid continued fighting, the LTTE renewed its call for third-party mediated talks with the government. In the midst of its military offensive, the government, expressed reluctance to re-enter bilateral talks with the LTTE. As of mid-1996, Tamil, Muslim, and Sinhalese civilians suffered displacement, violence, and the threat of violence as clashes between the government and LTTE continued.

Dr. Donna Hicks is the deputy director of the Program on International Conflict Analysis and Resolution (PICAR) at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University.

**INN ACTION**

International Alert, a London-based NGO, has worked to develop a strong will for peace throughout the various sectors of Sri Lankan society. Steps include collaborating with the National Peace Council, training prominent journalists on the reporting of conflict, and training teachers in conflict resolution in conjunction with Colombo University. International Alert has also worked to build strong channels of communication between the warring parties in Sri Lanka and with parliamentarians from all parties to identify the strategies for peace. INN member Kumar Rupeesinghe, secretary general of International Alert, helped establish the Common Ground Media Project in Sri Lanka in August 1995. The project included a series of 10 nationally televised programs that presented two opposing viewpoints on a variety of issues. The debates, facilitated by trained mediators, explored areas of agreement between people from different walks of life and from different ethnic backgrounds in Sri Lanka.

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**Central Government Expenditure (1986-93)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE**

- Life expectancy at birth (years), 1994: 72
- % fully immunized 1-year-old children, 1990-94:
  - TB: 86
  - DPT: 88
  - polio: 88
  - measles: 84
- % population with access to health services: 93*

* Data refers to years or periods other than those specified, or pertains to a region of a given country rather than the entire country, or differs in some way from the standard definition.


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**DEFENSE EXPENDITURE**

(All figures U.S.$)

- 1994 total (million) (1993 constant prices): 504
- Top major conventional weapons exporters:* 1995:
  - Ukraine: 43
  - China: 115
  - Russia/USSR: 47

* Trend-indications; U.S. $ million at 1990 constant prices


**The Conflict**

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<tr>
<th>Incompatibility</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Territory</td>
<td>Government of Sri Lanka vs. LTTE</td>
<td>126,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6,000-10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths in 1995: greater than 5,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Deaths: greater than 32,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LTTE: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam


---

**1983**

- LTTE begins fight for separate Tamil state

**1987**

- Indian troops sent to monitor cease-fire between government and LTTE

**1990**

- Indian troops withdraw; clashes resume

**1993**

- President Premadasa assassinated; LTTE-government fighting kills 2,000
TAJIKISTAN

**BY HAROLD H. SAUNDERS**

Tajikistan, the poorest of the former Soviet republics, declared independence in August 1991 but was unprepared both politically and economically. In 1992 and early 1993, this country of 5.5 million experienced a vicious internal conflict resulting in deaths with estimates ranging from 25,000 to 200,000 victims and an estimated one-in-seven fleeing their homes.

The battle lines were drawn in complex ways—between clan-based regional power centers aspiring to rule, between traditional-minded leaders bred in the Communist system and new democrats, between militant Islamists and the government. In April 1994, an emissary of the U.N. secretary-general launched negotiations between the government and the opposition—a coalition of secular democratic and national forces and both political and military Islamists.

The battle lines were drawn in complex ways—between clan-based regional power centers aspiring to rule, between traditional-minded leaders bred in the Communist system and new democrats, between militant Islamists and the government.

The negotiations continued haltingly through March 1996, having produced several cease-fires and some agreement on the direction of national reconciliation but no comprehensive peace agreement. A protocol signed in August 1995 set an agenda for the peace talks. But participants in nonofficial dialogue agreed that the primary obstacle to peace was the absence of an understanding on sharing power across regions, political movements, and nationalities. The narrowly based negotiating teams in the official peace process are locked in a struggle for power, and the negotiations remained deadlocked as of mid-1996. Citizens began to call for a broadening of both negotiating teams.

Periodic violence continued to result from clashes between Afghanistan-based Islamic groups and Russian and Tajikistani border forces, as well as from guerrilla action within the country. Individual security within the country remained uncertain with periodic kidnappings generating a sense of daily danger.

By March 1995, a constitution had been approved in a popular referendum and a new president and parliament elected, albeit with much of the opposition in exile, many Tajikistanis still displaced from their homes, and a government that tightly controlled the nominating process and limited open elections. Despite the general judgment that the elections did not meet international standards, the opposition decided to accept the elected government as setting the framework within which peace had to be negotiated. Some opposition parties and...
papers remained banned, and the economy continued to deteriorate. The government remained narrowly based in one southern region—the Kulyab.

Since the beginning of 1996, leaders of three significant regional uprisings demanded dismissal of officials imposed by the government from the Kulyab where the government's power base lies. In each case, the government conceded. These uprisings and a spiraling public disillusionment with both the government and the opposition negotiating teams provide strong evidence of rising popular pressure for broadening participation both in the government and in the peace process.

Harold H. Saunders, INN member and director of International Affairs at the Kettering Foundation, co-chairs the Inter-Tajik Dialogue within the framework of the Dartmouth Conference. A nonofficial group of citizens from different factions, the Dialogue met 16 times between March 1993 and June 1996. Saunders was a member of the National Security Council staff, flew on the Kissinger shuttles in the Middle East, and was assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs during negotiation of the Camp David accords and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.
The extent of the present landmine crisis would be difficult to overstate. In comparison to the total number of mines planted around the world (85 to 110 million) and their annual proliferation rate (2 to 5 million), the United Nations' 1994 efforts in mine clearance, which destroyed about 100,000 of the deadly devices, seem almost insignificant. As the prevalence of mines has grown and improvements in technology have made them easier to deploy, more difficult to detect, and cheaper to produce, recent changes in the nature of warfare have also contributed to the increased threat that mines pose to innocent individuals.

With conflicts increasingly being waged internally and entire countries becoming battlefields, fighting has, inevitably, begun to affect civilians directly. Inexpensive mines, a vital weapon to many cash-starved military forces, are frequently placed in areas of high civilian concentration. Even more hideous, the resurgence of ethnic conflict has transformed civilians into actual targets in some areas.

The resultant toll in human suffering is staggering. Landmines kill or maim more than 26,000 people a year, 90 percent of whom are civilians. In a country such as Cambodia, where at least one mine exists for each of its 8 million inhabitants, one in every 236 individuals has had a limb amputated (in the United States, the ratio is one in every 22,000). To make matters worse, victims often do not receive proper medical treatment for their injuries, as the majority of the most heavily mined countries are in the developing world.

The Drive for an International Ban

The idea of a comprehensive ban on landmines stems from the 1977 Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions—a series of refinements to humanitarian law designed to minimize suffering in war. A Landmines Protocol was added to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) to restrict the use of such weapons. Proponents of the international movement to ban landmines have asserted that those guidelines outlined by the Additional Protocols and the CCW condemn the indiscriminate and brutal nature of such weapons as landmines and demand restrictions intended to protect civilians. Further, many point to international bans on chemical and biological weapons, also enacted due to the inherent inhumaneness of such implements of war, as precedent for similar legislation on landmines.

The number of individuals and organizations behind the campaign for a comprehensive ban has grown substantially in recent years; even the International Committee of the Red Cross, which is not an advocacy organization, announced its support in 1995. This increase in attention and pressure has made the landmines issue a top priority in global politics. In July 1995, the United Nations convened a three-day conference on the subject and secured nearly $20 million for a mine-clearing fund. INN member Cyrus Vance, former U.S. secretary of state and head of the U.S. delegation to the meeting, insisted that while the political will did not yet exist for a global ban, measures designed to reduce, control, and eventually eliminate the problem should be enacted. Many of the participants in the U.N. landmine conference looked to an upcoming review of the CCW as the best means of achieving such goals. Yet, three rounds of CCW talks (held in September 1995 and in January and May 1996) produced nothing more than a new set of restrictions on the use of landmines. In light of such failure, proponents of an outright ban have asserted that only their approach can succeed.

The Need for U.S. Leadership

The United States has played a mixed role in the campaign against landmines. Since 1992, when Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) passed through Congress a U.S. moratorium on the export of landmines, more than 20 countries have followed suit with similar moratoria of their own. After President Bill Clinton first announced in a September 1994 speech that the eventual elimination of all landmines had become a top U.S. goal, the U.N. General Assembly passed a U.S.-sponsored resolution echoing this stance.

Yet, America has failed to take the lead on the complete banning of landmine use. Thus, as Sen. Leahy has long insisted, U.S. leadership on the issue of landmines remains vital. Although a comprehensive ban would be nearly impossible to monitor, and many countries would refuse to agree to such a pact, it would represent an effective means of at least limiting the threat of landmines to civilian populations. While the international community did not, until recently, attempt to enforce the ban on chemical and biological weapons, the use of these abhorrent weapons has been rare. There are few weapons more devastating and malevolent than landmines. An international ban on the use of these weapons is long overdue.

Ian Jefferson, an intern in The Carter Center’s Conflict Resolution Program during the 1996 Spring and Summer semesters, is expected to graduate from Emory University in May 1997.
CONFLICT REGION:

CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

COLOMBIA
GUATEMALA
PERU
CARTER CENTER INITIATIVES IN THE CARIBBEAN

Cuba: President Carter and INN member Robert Pastor, director of the Latin American and Caribbean Program at The Carter Center, have worked for several years to stimulate dialogue between individuals and institutions in Cuba and the United States. They met with Congressmen and administration officials and then with members of the Cuban-American community in September 1995 to discuss the possibility of future Carter Center involvement in Cuba. In May 1995, Dr. Pastor met with President Fidel Castro and other Cuban government officials.

Haiti: President Carter, Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Colin Powell, and INN member Robert Pastor returned to Haiti in February 1995 to assess that country’s progress five months after they successfully negotiated President Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s peaceful return to power. The delegation met with President Aristide and members of his cabinet, representatives from 18 political parties, human rights and religious leaders, and other influential Haitian figures. Dr. Pastor went back in June 1995 to assess Haiti’s parliamentary and municipal elections, which, while flawed, still offered more grounds for hope than Haiti had previously experienced.

Refugees: These are persons outside the country of their nationality who are unable or unwilling to return due to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular group, or political opinion. (United Nations, 1951 Convention Relating to the Rights of Refugees and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Rights of Refugees)

IDPs: Internally displaced persons are those who have been forced to flee their homes suddenly or unexpectedly in large numbers...and who are within the territory of their own country. (Working definition taken from United Nations, Analytical Report of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, Feb. 14, 1992)

RLS: Persons in “refugee-like situations” are those who may fear persecution or harm if returned to their home countries, and thus who may be refugees, but who are not recognized by governments as refugees or asylum seekers. (U.S. Committee for Refugees, World Refugee Survey, 1996, Washington, D.C.: Immigration and Refugee Services of America)

* Sources vary widely in numbers reported


1 square inch = 395,000 square miles
1 square centimeter = 159,000 square kilometers

ra: Figures not available for given country
Central and South America maintained a relatively low level of strife, with only three major armed conflicts waged for the fourth straight year—two less than occurred in 1990. Despite brief interstate disputes, such as the conflict between Ecuador and Peru, the overall level of violence in the region continued to decline. Among the major armed conflicts, negotiations were attempted in Colombia and Guatemala but not in Peru. The Peruvian government’s vigorous attack against guerrilla forces, however, helped keep battle-related deaths in that country to less than 500.

Turning to the region as a whole, Official Development Assistance (ODA) remained at an annual rate of roughly $10 billion, while economic growth and private investment increased from 1992 to 1994. Meanwhile, under-5 mortality rates continued to be the lowest in the developing world, having dropped from 15 percent in 1960 to just 5 percent by 1993.

**Under-5 Mortality Rates**

Latin American and Caribbean countries are listed with rank in descending order compared to all countries for 1994 estimated rates of under-5 mortality. The rates represent the probability of a child dying between birth and exactly 5 years of age expressed per 1,000 live births. Some figures are rounded. Major armed conflict locations for 1995 are shown in red.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Rate</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>127</td>
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<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>110</td>
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<td>58</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
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<td>Nicaragua</td>
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<td>Brazil</td>
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<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>58</td>
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<tr>
<td>66</td>
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<td>72</td>
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<td>78</td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
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<td>85</td>
<td>Paraguay</td>
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<td>95</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
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<td>100</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
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<td>105</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
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<tr>
<td>108</td>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>109</td>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
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<td>112</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>115</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>116</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122</td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conflict Countries Average 49.0
Overall Latin American and Caribbean Average 44.0

* Averages are derived from calculations based on data given by UNICEF, but do not represent figures provided directly by UNICEF.

COLOMBIA

BY BECKY CASTLE

Although allegations that President Ernesto Samper knowingly accepted money from drug cartels to finance his 1994 winning presidential campaign dominated Colombian news in 1995-96, the kidnappings, extortion, assassinations, and armed strikes of the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) shared the headlines.

Some of the more sensational activities included FARC’s murder of 16 former People’s Liberation Army (EPL) members for reintegrating into society, the assassination of two U.S. missionaries, the killings of the former governor of Cesar Department and a former conservative presidential candidate, and the murder of five mayors in Antioquia Department in the first five months of 1996. Although the rural Antioquia and Uraba Departments continue to be a focal point for guerrilla violence, in October 1995 FARC’s urban arm outlined plans to increase its presence in Bogota.

For the last three decades, since the inception of the ELN and FARC in the mid-1960s, the Colombian government has struggled to end the guerrilla movements. Although the Colombian government and the Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinating Board (CGSB), a group which often acts as a FARC and ELN clearinghouse for negotiations with the government, have not held peace talks since César Gaviria’s government and the CGSB suspended talks in Tlaxcala, Mexico, in 1992, the past year was characterized by several attempts to establish the setting for a peace agreement.

In early June 1995, with the help of Costa Rican mediation, President Samper’s commissioner for peace, Carlos Holmes Trujillo, and the CGSB agreed that peace talks should begin soon and that the initial point for their further negotiation should include the “humanization of the conflict.” Negotiations stalled, however, with the assassination of two U.S. missionaries by FARC in late June 1995 and the ELN’s refusal to negotiate with the government while it still offered rewards for information leading to guerrilla arrests.

The Costa Rican government again facilitated negotiations in late March 1996. By the end of April, however, both sides were disenchanted with the prospect of peace talks. The CGSB was threatening not to engage in discussions with Samper because of his lack of moral stature and his govern-

DEMOGRAPHICS

Area: 440,831 sq. mi. (1,141,748 sq. km.)
Population: 34,870,000
System of Government: Republic
Language: Spanish
Ethnic Divisions:
Mestizo 58%
White 20%
Mulatto 14%
Black 4%
Other 4%
Religions:
Roman Catholic 95%
Other 5%


ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Gross Domestic Product (GDP):* U.S. $52.4 billion
GDP per capita:* U.S. $1,600
External debt:* U.S. $19.1 billion
Human Development Index (HDI), 1992: 0.836

* 1994 estimated


CONFLICT TIMELINE

1949
Period of La Violencia lawlessness claims 280,000 lives over next decade

1953
Gen. Rojas overthrows civilian President Gomez

1957
Five-man military junta deposes Rojas
ment’s expressed indignation at the increased violence, in particular FARC’s execution and burning of 16 peasants in May.

While both FARC and ELN have Marxist roots, both movements have taken on a “capitalist” dimension in recent years. Several Colombian government agencies conducted a joint study on guerrilla businesses and calculated that the CGSB had revenues of 490 billion pesos (about U.S. $580 million) and profits of 432 billion pesos (about U.S. $510 million), exceeding the profits of Colombia’s largest legal company. The largest sources of guerrilla income are from the poppy industry and drug trafficking, followed by kidnapping and extortion. The guerrillas purportedly engage in these “business” activities to finance their movements, but it is estimated that they now have sufficient funds to run for 20 years even with no further “business activity.”

Becky Castle joined The Carter Center’s Latin American and Caribbean Program as program coordinator in February 1996. Prior to working at the Center, Castle promoted Northern Ireland in the Southeastern United States and in 1993 worked in Costa Rica as a Rotary Fellow for Fundación Mujer, an NGO which provides training and loans to small businesses.

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**The Conflict**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incompatibility</th>
<th>Warring Parties</th>
<th>Troop Strength</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Government of Colombia vs. FARC vs. ELN</td>
<td>146,400, 5,700, 2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths in 1995: less than 1,000</td>
<td></td>
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**Central Government Expenditure (1986-93)**

- Health: 12%
- Defense: 9%
- Education: 28%
- Other: 62%


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**FARC, ELN launch guerrilla attacks against government**

**ANAPO challenges election results; M-19 group launches guerrilla warfare**

**United States, Colombia sign extradition treaty**

**National state of emergency called amid political, drug-related violence**

**Health and Social Welfare**

- Life expectancy at birth (years), 1994: 69
- % fully immunized 1-year-old children, 1990-94:
  - TB: 99
  - DPT: 91
  - Polio: 95
  - Measles: 87
- % population with access to health services: 60


**Defense Expenditure**

(All figures U.S. $)

- 1994 total (million) (1993 constant prices): 1,178
- 1994 per capita (1993 constant prices): 34
- Top major conventional weapons exporters:
  - 1995: USA 29, Spain 28, Canada 17
  - 1990-95: USA 128, Russia/USSR 48, Spain 35

* Trend-indicators; U.S. $ million at 1990 constant prices


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“OF 30,000 POLITICAL MURDERS OVER THE PAST 10 YEARS, 70 PERCENT WERE CARRIED OUT BY DEATH SQUADS AND THE ARMY, OFTEN WORKING TOGETHER, WHILE 20 PERCENT WERE PERPETRATED BY GUERRILLAS, AND 2 PERCENT BY THE DRUG TRADE. THE REMAINDER CANNOT BE DOCUMENTED.”

Linda Diebel of The Toronto Star in World Press Review, October 1996

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**Education**

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<tr>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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*FARC: Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)

*ELN: Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army)

*In the past three decades the civil wars of Colombia have claimed a total of some 30,000 lives.

The civil conflict that has raged in Guatemala since the 1960s has claimed 150,000 lives and 45,000 missing in fighting between the government and the four revolutionary guerrilla groups that comprise the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG). The conflict reached its height in the early 1980s when the military regime of Gen. Rios Montt began a brutal counterinsurgency campaign, displacing hundreds of thousands of peasants, and implementing a system of civilian patrols (PACs). Over the years, thousands of deaths, disappearances, and other human rights abuses have been linked to the government and armed death squads.

Although the conflict continues, 1995-96 has seen slow but continued progress in the peace negotiations that first began in 1990. With the support of a U.N. mission (MINUGUA), the Group of Friends countries, the Guatemalan Civil Society Assembly, and others, agreements were reached on several of the major issues on the agenda: human rights, indigenous identity and rights, and resettlement of refugees. Significant progress was also made on socio-economic issues and land tenure/agrarian reform.

Over the years, thousands of deaths, disappearances, and other human rights abuses have been linked to the government and armed death squads.

Nevertheless, the government of President Ramiro de Leon Carpio, the former human rights ombudsman who came to power in June 1993 after ex-President Jorge Serrano’s attempted auto-coup, remained severely constrained by the military and was unable to curb human rights abuses. A U.N. report in late 1995 concluded that the human rights situation was actually worsening. The most dramatic incident was the October 1995 massacre in Xamán in which 11 Indian villagers were killed and 30 wounded by an army patrol, an event which threatened the peace negotiations and the elections in November 1995.

In August 1995, the URNG declared a cease-fire for the November elections, and for the first time ever encouraged its supporters to participate in the process and to vote for the leftist New Guatemala Democratic Front (FDNG). In the January 1996 run-off, Álvaro Arzú of the National Advancement Party (PAN) defeated Alfonso Portillo, the candidate of Rios Montt’s Guatemalan Republican Party (FRG). Although abstentionism remained a serious problem, with Indian communities facing many obstacles to participate, the FDNG emerged as an important third force, winning six seats in the 80-seat Congress.

President Arzú moved quickly to resume peace talks, and an agreement was signed in May 1996 on socio-economic issues and land tenure/agrarian reform. Constitutional reform, the role of the military, and demobilization, including issues such as amnesty and the dissolution of the PACs, still require negotiated settlements.
Overall, the climate for the peace process is positive. Despite continued opposition to peace accords, the hard-line military factions and the conservative agrarian elite are being checked by moderate military and political leaders and by the growing strength of civil society.

Dr. David Carroll is associate director of the Latin American and Caribbean Program at The Carter Center, where he has worked extensively on democratization and development projects and has participated in the program’s election-monitoring missions in Latin America, the Middle East, Asia, and the United States.

GOVERNMENT, REBELS SIGN PACT

MEXICO CITY, Sept. 19 (UPI)—The Guatemalan government and leftist rebels signed an agreement in Mexico City Thursday cementing the role of the army after the country’s civil war, one of the most controversial issues in the country’s peace process.

“This is the agreement that lays the groundwork for reconciliation and for the development of Guatemala,” Guatemalan President Alvaro Arzú said in a recorded message played during the signing ceremony at the Mexican Foreign Ministry.

Rolando Moran, of the rebel Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union, said the accord decided the last of the “vital issues” in the U.N.-mediated negotiation process to end 35 years of civil conflict in Guatemala.

Guatemalan Defense Minister Gen. Julio Balconi said Sunday that under the agreements, the armed forces would reduce their number of 44,200 regular troops by 33 percent during a period between six and 12 months.

Central Government Expenditure (1986-93)

The Conflict

Incompatibility | Warring Parties | Troop Strength
---|---|---
Government | Government of Guatemala vs. URNG | 44,200 800-1,100
Deaths in 1995: less than 200
Total Deaths: less than 2,800 (military) less than 43,500 (civilian)

URNG: Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (Guatemalan Revolutionary Unity). URNG is a coalition of three main groups: Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres (EGP), Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (FAR), and Organización del Pueblo en Armas (ORPA).


Source: SIPRI, Arms Transfers Database, 1996.

HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE

Life expectancy at birth (years), 1994: 65
% fully immunized 1-year-old children, 1990-94:
TB 70
dPT 71
polio 73
measles 66
% population with access to health services: 34


DEFENSE EXPENDITURE

(All figures U.S. $)
1994 total (million) (1993 constant prices): 123
1994 per capita (1993 constant prices): na
Top major conventional weapons exporters:* Imports not listed from 1986-95

* Trend-indicators; million at 1990 constant prices

During the 1980s, Peru experienced a dramatic wave of violence instigated by the country’s principal insurgency movements—the Shining Path, which took up arms in 1980, and the Tupac Amaro Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), which started its campaign against the Peruvian government in 1984. Fueled primarily by the violent attacks of the Maoist-based Shining Path, internal conflict cost the country an estimated 26,000 lives and $20 billion between 1980 and 1992.

Frustrated with deteriorating political and economic conditions, Peruvians elected political outsider Alberto Fujimori to power in 1990. Two years into his presidency, Fujimori dissolved the Congress and courts, called a state of emergency, and granted Peruvian security forces unchecked authority to counter the activities of the Shining Path and the MRTA. Hardline measures implemented by the government devastated both groups and led to the capture of Shining Path leader Abimael Guzman and much of the group’s central committee. Fujimori’s aggressive approach also led to countless human rights abuses and a general bypass of due process.

Although the number and intensity of attacks have decreased significantly since Fujimori began his campaign against terrorism, some killings, bombings, and propaganda actions—primarily on the part of the Shining Path—have continued through 1995 and 1996.

The government continued its vigorous assault on the leftist guerrillas during 1995 and 1996. In December 1995, anti-terrorist police raided an MRTA stronghold in Lima, capturing the group’s second in command. This blow and convictions of more than 150 suspected MRTA guerrillas by Peruvian military tribunals during 1995 and early 1996 have extinguished the movement. The use of anonymous military courts to convict suspected members of the MRTA and Shining Path, plus a controversial...
amnesty for members of the Peruvian security forces accused of human rights violations, continues to prompt strong criticism—including recent charges from the Organization of American States Human Rights Commission—about the government’s dismal human rights record and policy of military impunity.

Kirk Gregerseu is program officer for Latin America and the Caribbean with the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs in Washington, D.C. He has worked on NDI programs in Peru, Guyana, Mexico, and Nicaragua. He is a graduate of Tufts University and a former Fulbright scholar to Costa Rica.
Focus: Children and War

by Shara Frase

“The weather is growing very cold now. No longer can you hear the singing of the birds, only the sound of children crying for a lost mother or father, a brother or a sister. We are children without a country and without hope.” —Dunja, age 14, from I Dream of Peace (UNICEF/Harper Collins, 1994)

War is a devastating force whose impact on civilians is far greater than on the armies of the warring parties themselves. UNICEF notes in The State of the World’s Children 1996 that civilians accounted for approximately 14 percent of war-time deaths in World War I, 70 percent in World War II, and by 1990, the total had reached almost 90 percent. Among these civilians are millions of children, who have always suffered in times of war but who have increasingly come under fire in recent years as more conflicts take place within nations rather than between them.

In the post-Cold War conflict, battles are fought not in the skies above or across distant borders, but in towns and villages. The weapons of choice are not always the high-tech missiles of Desert Storm but light and cheap guns, inexpensive landmines and mortars, even rocks and machetes. These realities place the non-combatant, and especially the child, in the middle of the fighting, used more and more not only as targets but as shields, weapons, recruits, and hostages in ethnic and other civil wars.

Easy Targets

More than 2 million children have been killed in the last decade by war, and indirect effects of war such as famine and malnutrition are responsible for millions more child deaths. Those who escape death by bullets, bombs, or starvation face other horrible fates. Child victims of war include 4 to 5 million disabled, more than 1 million orphaned or separated from their parents, and some 10 million psychologically traumatized. Children represent more than half of the 53 million people who have been forced to flee their homes from war.

Military commanders have deliberately targeted children in war. There are reports of landmines being disguised as toys and planted near schools and playgrounds where children find them. In ethnic wars, enemy groups attempt to justify the mass slaughter of children, such as the 300,000 killed in Rwanda in 1994, by viewing children as the potential future enemy. Conscription of children as young as 10 has been reported in some countries in Africa. In 1988, some 200,000 children fought in wars, and recently, thousands of children under 16 have fought in wars in as many as 25 countries. Light and efficient weapons can easily turn inexperienced children into killers: A child of 10 can strip and reassemble an AK-47 rifle, which can cost as little as $6 in West Africa. Child soldiers have been forced to kill members of their own families and walk ahead of advancing armies as human shields.

The international community has begun to address the needs of the child in wartime. The 1990 U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child recognized the precarious and unprotected status of the child and accepted a universal standard for the child’s basic human rights, including the right to survival and development as well as protection from abuse and neglect. The Convention also explicitly condemns involvement of children under 15 in hostilities and prohibits recruitment of children under age 15.

Only six countries have yet to ratify the Convention — including the United States, which has passed but not ratified it — making it the most widely accepted international document ever. The challenge now is to bridge the gap between acceptance and implementation — a step made even more difficult in wartime. Nevertheless, the Convention is a vehicle for the exercise of children’s rights, and is an important step toward protecting children from the impact of war.

Recognizing the need to build on the Convention, UNICEF announced in The State of the World’s Children 1996 an Anti-War Agenda, which outlines a series of recommendations designed to promote the welfare of the child and the child’s family. The challenge is now for governments and NGOs to take direct responsibility for the protection of children in war by putting into practice the articles of the Convention and the recommendations of the Anti-War Agenda.

States party to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols and to the Convention on the Rights of the Child have a responsibility to respect international law and encourage the spread of humane practices which consider the well-being of the child in wartime. Only then can the rhetoric of these agreements translate into reality for the hundreds of thousands of children affected by armed conflict each year.

Shara Frase served as a temporary research assistant in The Carter Center’s Conflict Resolution Program, where she helped produce the 1995-96 State of World Conflict Report and monitored the civil conflict in Sudan.
Refugees: These are persons outside the country of their nationality who are unable or unwilling to return due to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion. (United Nations, 1951 Convention Relating to the Rights of Refugees and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Rights of Refugees)

IDPs: Internally displaced persons are those who have been forced to flee their homes suddenly or unexpectedly in large numbers...and who are within the territory of their own country. (Working definition taken from United Nations, Analytical Report of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, Feb. 14, 1992)
Europe experienced another decline in major armed conflicts, falling from five in 1994 to just three last year. By the end of 1995, fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia had come to an end with the signing of the Dayton peace accords, and the only major armed strife on the continent was the sporadic fighting between Russia and rebel forces in Chechnya. Although the U.S. Committee for Refugees reported that the number of asylum applicants in Europe decreased for the third consecutive year, the life expectancy of males dropped by five years between 1989 and 1993.

The fighting in Chechnya was by far the most brutal of the past year, killing as many as 40,000 people—more than twice that of any other conflict. On the positive side, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics received the largest increase in development aid, and assistance to the former Yugoslav states rose from virtually nothing to approximately $2 billion per year between 1992 and 1994. Deterioration in the health and welfare of Eastern Europeans, however, led to a rise in child mortality rates in Albania, Russia, and the Ukraine, and in the latter two countries the life expectancy of males dropped by five years between 1989 and 1993.

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**CONTINENTAL CONTRIBUTION**

Fighting in the Balkans has engulfed Europe like no other warfare since the end of World War II. By the beginning of 1995, military personnel involved in the conflict totaled roughly 40,000. Listed below are total contributions from Europe and other countries as of Nov. 30, 1994:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>Observers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>1,038</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>971</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>1,230</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>4,493</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1,803</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>826</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1,109</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1,464</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak Republic</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>1,267</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1,212</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>3,405</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>727</td>
<td>38,130</td>
<td>680</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other major contributors (Troop totals only):
- Jordan (3,367); Pakistan (3,017); Canada (2,091); Malaysia (1,550); Turkey (1,464); Bangladesh (1,235); Ukraine (1,147); Kenya (967); Nepal (899); Argentina (854); United States (748); Egypt (427); New Zealand (249); Indonesia (220)

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**Cost of Conflict**

European countries are listed with rank in descending order compared to all European countries for 1994 defense expenditure as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Some figures may have been rounded. Major armed conflict locations for 1995 are shown in red.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>%GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>69.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Federal Rep. of Yugoslavia</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>9.6*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Total Other Europe</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total NATO Europe 2.4
Total Other Europe 6.1
United States 4.3
Canada 1.7

* Figures provided for Russia as a whole rather than for Chechnya specifically.

**Under-5 Mortality Rates**

Figures may vary from month to month due to rotation. "Troops" include infantry, logistics, engineering, medical, staff, and other personnel.

Source: UNPROFOR website http://unprofor.un.org

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* Figures provided for entire Russian Federation rather than Chechnya specifically.
** Averages are derived from calculations based on data given by UNICEF, but do not represent figures provided directly by UNICEF.


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**“THERE LIES BEFORE US, IF WE CHOOSE, CONTINUAL PROGRESS IN HAPPINESS, KNOWLEDGE AND WISDOM. SHALL WE, INSTEAD, CHOOSE DEATH, BECAUSE WE CANNOT FORGET OUR QUARRELS?”**

—Bernard Russell, founder of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, a nuclear disarmament advocacy organization which received the 1995 Nobel Peace Prize
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

BY SUSAN WOODWARD

In November 1995, American-led negotiations ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina with a cease-fire agreement, the Dayton (Paris) accords. In December, a NATO-led, multinational force (IFOR) launched Operation Joint Endeavor to replace the United Nations humanitarian operation (UNPROFOR) and to assist the parties in implementing their agreement and to move toward peace.

The war that began in March 1992 was a direct result of the dissolution of federal Yugoslavia into nation-states, based on the claims of self-determination for the majority nation of each republic, beginning with Slovenia and Croatia in 1991. In Bosnia there was no majority nation, but three constituent nations—Muslims, Serbs, and Croats—represented by national parties in a coalition government after the elections of November 1990. Their disagreements over whether to become independent (which Serbs opposed) and whether the state should be integral (favored by Muslims) or confederal (which Croats required) were pre-empted by international action.

A European Community-required Feb. 18, 1992 referendum on independence and U.S. insistence on recognition (April 6-7, 1992) pre-empted European Union negotiations on a plan for ethnic cantonization of the republic. The Bosnian Serb party (SDS), aided by the Yugoslav National Army, chose separation and the expulsion by force or terror of all non-Serbs from areas they claimed.

The Bosnian Croat party (HDZ), aided by the Croatian Army, rapidly integrated contiguous territories into neighboring Croatia and moved to purify and separate areas of central Bosnia shared with Muslims. The rump Bosnian presidency and Bosnian Muslim party (SDA) fought on two fronts for survival and the creation of a new state.

Eight peace plans later—with more than half of the pre-war population of 4.4 million living as refugees or displaced to create ethnically pure regions, more than 100,000 dead, and a country in near total ruin—the Dayton accords divided the country into two entities, a federation of Croats and Muslims (created by an agreement signed in Washington in March 1994) and a Serb Republic.

The Dayton accords divided the country into two entities, a federation of Croats and Muslims and a Serb Republic.

In the first six months of 1995, IFOR successfully separated warring parties, destroyed or cordoned heavy weapons, and oversaw demobilization. In the spring of 1996, an international civilian operation

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**DEMOGRAPHICS**

Area: 19,741 sq. mi. (51,129 sq. km.)

Population: 4,481,000

System of Government: Republic

Language:* Serbo-Croatian

Ethnic Divisions:

- Muslim: 44%
- Serb: 31%
- Croat: 17%
- Other: 8%

Religions:

- Muslim: 40%
- Orthodox: 31%
- Roman Catholic: 15%
- Other: 14%

* Major languages are also now identified as Bosnian, Serbian, Croatian.


**ECONOMIC INDICATORS**

Gross Domestic Product (GDP):* na

GDP per capita:* U.S. $1,000-3,000

External debt:* na

Human Development Index (HDI), 1992: * na

* 1994 estimated


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**CONFLICT TIMELINE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1944</th>
<th>1954</th>
<th>1968</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tito creates Bosnia-Herzegovina as one of six Yugoslav republics</td>
<td>Yugoslavia guarantees freedom of religion</td>
<td>Bosnian Central Committee confirms Muslims as distinct nation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
New Yugoslav constitution recognizes Muslims as separate constituency.

Tito dies; nationalism re-emerges within republics.

Serbian leader Milosevic ignites Serb nationalism with Battle of Kosovo speech.

Bosnia declares independence; war with Croatian and Yugoslav armies begins.

HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE

1994 Life expectancy at birth (years): 72

% fully immunized 1-year-old children, 1990-94:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vaccine</th>
<th>1990-94</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TB</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPT</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>polio</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>measles</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

% population with access to health services: na


DEFENSE EXPENDITURE

(All figures U.S.$)

1994 total (million) (1993 constant prices): 878

1994 per capita (1993 constant prices): 204

Top major conventional weapons exporters:*

Imports of major conventional weapons were not recorded for 1992-95.

* SIPRI notes, however, that in spite of an arms embargo on the former Yugoslav countries, “there are indications, in some cases even concrete proof, that at least Croatia and Bosnia received major conventional weapons in spite of the embargoes.”


BOSNIAN ELECTIONS HELD

SARAJEVO, Sept. 19 (Reuters) — Election organizers said Wednesday that Bosnia’s Muslim president, Alija Izetbegovic, had narrowly defeated his Serb nationalist rival, Moma Cekic, to head a new collective presidency.

The collective presidency will be made up of one representative from each of the three ethnic groups in Bosnia. The Croatian seat was won by a nationalist, Kresimir Zubak.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which supervised the elections last Saturday, said a completed count gave Mr. Izetbegovic 729,034 votes, Mr. Cekic 690,373 and Mr. Zubak 342,077.

“IT appears clear that President Izetbegovic will serve as the new president of the presidency,” said Robert Frowick, the American diplomat who oversaw the elections for the organization. Reporting on turnout, Mr. Frowick said nearly 1.3 million people voted for candidates in the Muslim-Croat Federation and 1.02 million in the Serb Republic.

Reuters, Sept. 19, 1996

INN ACTION

INN member Eileen Babbitt, director of the Education and Training Program at the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP), spent two weeks in Bosnia in March 1996 and arranged two conflict resolution skills training sessions for local and international NGO field staff working in and around Sarajevo. The seminars were held in May, focused on negotiation skills and collaborative problem-solving. Each three-day session brought together about 30 individuals from the NGO community. Dr. Babbitt and other USIP faculty also conducted a four-day conflict resolution training for foreign ministry officials from southeastern Europe, in collaboration with the Athens-based Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, in Greece in June, with representatives from 10 countries and four international organizations attending.

Coordinated by High Representative Carl Bildt, including the European Union, the OSCE, the UNHCR, and many others, began a process of economic reconstruction, reconciliation, repatriation of refugees, and reintegration. Elections held on Sept. 14, 1996, aimed to create common institutions for the two entities and three nations. Whether the cease-fire will hold and turn into lasting peace will depend on the Dayton process of implementation and international assistance over the next three to five years.

Dr. Susan Woodward is a senior fellow with The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.
As conflict continued in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the issue that sparked the wars of Yugoslav succession in 1991—the status of the Serb minority within Croatia—remained no closer to settlement. A cease-fire from 1992, monitored by a U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR), had separated the Croatian forces from those of the rebel Serbs and ended violent conflict, which had caused the death of more than 10,000 and the displacement of hundreds of thousands. But the conflicting positions—Croatia’s demand for territorial sovereignty versus the desire of the “Serbian Republic of Krajina” for independence and unification with other Serbian-controlled lands—did not soften. With no progress being made toward the reintegration of the territory or the return of refugees, Croatia threatened repeatedly to expel the U.N. peacekeepers.

With no progress being made toward the reintegration of the territory or the return of refugees, Croatia threatened repeatedly to expel the U.N. peacekeepers.

The renegotiation of the U.N. mandate in March 1995 reduced the U.N. deployment from 18,000 to 5,000 and shifted the focus from patrolling between the parties to monitoring Croatia’s international borders with Serbia and Bosnia. It thus opened the way for the military assaults that would, in a matter of hours, crush the four-year-long Serb rebellion.

With the international presence out of the way, Croatia staged two blitzkrieg attacks, achieving the total collapse of the Serbian entity, as well as the single largest population movement of the war, as the majority of Serbs fled. In Operation Flash, on May 1-3, 1995, the Croatian military secured the U.N. Protected Area (UNPA) Sector West in western Slavonia.

The Economic Impact of Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Croatia’s Gross Domestic Product (U.S. $ billion)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Estimated


* Estimated

that it was in complete control of the territory. An estimated 180,000 Serbs fled across the border to Serb-held territory in Bosnia and on to Serbia, where some were resettled in the disputed province of Kosovo. In this case, widespread accusations of systematic burning and looting of houses and sustained attacks on civilians—a process known in Bosnia as "ethnic cleansing"—could not be easily denied.

Yet the action was declared by U.S. President Bill Clinton to offer "a moment of real promise" for peace in the region. Destroying the Serb stronghold in Croatia, the attacks thus substantially weakened the strategic position of the Bosnian Serbs. They also served to underscore the potential benefits of "diplomacy backed by force," which the U.S. government would pursue in the steps leading up to the Dayton peace accords in Bosnia. But in expelling the bulk of the remaining Serbs in Croatia, they also confirmed the approach, fundamentally accepted by the western powers, of achieving settlement through ethnic apartheid. Subsequent internal crackdowns by Zagreb confirmed that the results meant ominous prospects for the process of democratization in Croatia.

A critical component of the Dayton negotiations in November 1995 was the status of the remaining Serb-held territory in Croatia, that of eastern Slavonia on the Serbian border. A point of potential renewed conflict, the issue was finally resolved through a separate agreement on a two-year U.N. Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES), after which Croatia sovereignty is to be restored. As the international implementation began in Bosnia in early 1996, the Eastern Slavonia administration began slow but positive steps. Bosnian Croats bitterly contended that during the Dayton talks Zagreb had abandoned significant Croat-held territory in Bosnia in its determination to win back Eastern Slavonia. But this only confirmed, toward the close of war as at the beginning, the clear interrelationship of all the Balkan conflicts.

Anthony Borden is director of the London-based Institute for War and Peace Reporting and editor of its magazine, War Report.

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**HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE**

| Life expectancy at birth (years), 1994: 71 |
| % fully immunized 1-year-old children, 1990-94: |
| TB | DPT | polio | measles |
| 92 | 85 | 85 | 90 |
| % population with access to health services: na |


**DEFENSE EXPENDITURE**

(All figures U.S. $)

| 1994 total (million) (1993 constant prices): 1,089 |
| 1994 per capita (1993 constant prices): 229 |

Top major conventional weapons exporters:

* SIPRI notes, however, that in spite of the arms embargo on the former Yugoslav countries, "there are indications, in some cases even concrete proof, that at least Croatia and Bosnia received major conventional weapons in spite of the embargoes."*

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| The Conflict |
| Incompatibility | Warring Parties | Troop Strength |
| Territory | Government of Croatia vs. Serbian Republic of Krajina, Serbian Irregulars |
| | | 100,000-110,000 |
| | | 35,000-50,000 |
| Deaths in 1995: 500-1,000 |
| Total Deaths: 6,000-10,000* |


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**Central Government Expenditure (1986-93)**

- Education: 5%
- Health: 17%
- Defense: 21%
- Other: 57%


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| Tito’s death fuels Croat demands for greater autonomy | Ethnic Serbs declare autonomy for the Krajina; Croatia holds free elections | Croatia declares independence, begins war against Serb, Bosnian forces | Serbs driven from Krajina; Dayton agreement ends 43 months of fighting |

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RUSSIA (CHECHNYA)

BY STEPHEN JONES

Fighting in the Russian republic of Chechnya, which by the spring of 1996 had led to an estimated 30,000 mostly civilian deaths and 437,000 refugees, represented the deadliest conflict in the world during 1995-96. The origins of the confrontation can be traced to a national referendum, held soon after Air Force Gen. Dzhokhar Dudayev became president of the Republic of Chechnya in October 1991 and declared the republic independent.

In June 1992, Chechnya formally split from the Republic of Chechen-Ingushetiya. A Moscow-backed Chechen opposition, which declared itself the Chechen government in August 1991, tried unsuccessfully to capture the capital city of Grozny three months after its emergence. On Dec. 11, 1994, frustrated by the three-year standoff with Dudayev, Russia launched a massive military intervention. The Russian troops soon proved poorly prepared, requiring more than two months to capture Grozny, which finally fell in March 1995.

There were no serious peace talks until May 1995, when the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) supervised unproductive negotiations between Dudayev’s representatives, the Russian government, and the Moscow-backed Chechen Government of National Salvation led by Salambek Khadzhiev. In June 1995, Chechen commander Shamil Basayev led a raid on the Russian town of Budennovsk and took more than 100 hostages. The crisis was brought to an end by Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, who promised to remove Russian troops from Chechnya. On July 30, a cease-fire that stipulated the disarming of Chechen forces and the withdrawal of Russian troops was signed, but the question of Chechnya’s future status was not resolved and fighting continued.

Doku Zavgayev replaced Khadzhiev as head of the pro-Moscow government in October 1995 and then claimed victory in a questionable election held two months later.

In January 1996, there was a further hostage crisis in Kizlyar and Pervomaisko, located on the intranational border between Chechnya and the republic of Dagestan. The conflict spread beyond Russia’s borders when a Turkish ship was taken hostage by Chechen sympathizers in the Turkish port of Trebizond that same month.

After fighting in the Chechen republic intensified between January and March 1996, Russian President Boris Yeltsin, partly to avoid losing the upcoming presidential election in Russia, launched a March 31 peace plan. It consisted of an immediate cease-fire, accompanied by the gradual withdrawal of most of Russia’s 41,000 troops and the disarming of Chechen volunteers; a forum of all political forces to prepare for free and democratic elections to a new Chechen parliament; and a resolution of the status of Chechnya within the Russian Federation. While Yeltsin ruled out any independent Chechnya outside Russia, he did promise maximum autonomy.

The Yeltsin plan echoed a similar peace proposal put forward in mid-February by Tatarstan’s President Mintimer Shaimiev. Dudayev, however, greeted Yeltsin’s proposal skeptically, and before peace talks could be

DEMOGRAPHICS

[Note: The following information is for the Russian republic of Chechnya only.]

Area: 7,350 sq. mi. (19,300 sq. km.)
Population: 1,308,000*
System of Government: Provisional Council
Languages:
  Chechen
  Ingush
  Russian
  Batsbi
Ethnic Divisions:**
  Chechen & Ingush 71%
  Russian 23%
  Armenian 1%
  Ukrainian 1%
  Other 4%
Religion: Sunni Muslim

* January 1992
** 1989 census

ECONOMIC INDICATORS*

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): na
GDP per capita: na
External debt: na
Human Development Index (HDI): na

* Various sources provide information for Russia as a whole, but not specifically for Chechnya.

CONFLICT TIMELINE

1944
Stalin dissolves Chechen autonomous republic, deports Chechens; one-third die

1957
Khrushchev allows Chechens to return; most walk back to Chechnya

1964
Brezhnev becomes Soviet leader, launches campaign against dissidents
scheduled, 73 Russian soldiers were killed in an April 16 ambush by Chechen forces. Within a few days, on April 21, a Russian helicopter killed Dudayev himself.

Dudayev was replaced by Vice President Zelimkhan Yandarbiev, considered a hardliner and skeptical of negotiations with the Russian government. The situation was further complicated by the influential but varied voices of the Chechen field commanders. Nevertheless, Yandarbiev traveled to Moscow on May 27 for peace talks brokered by the OSCE, and a cease-fire to begin May 31 was initialed.

Yeltsin visited Chechnya at the end of May and a project on power-sharing was drawn up. Armistice talks between both sides began June 3 in Nazran, the capital of Ingushetia, to detail the peace agreement, and two protocols were signed June 10—one on the withdrawal of Russian troops by late August and the surrender of weapons by Chechen militants; the second on the release of all hostages and prisoners of war.

Dr. Stephen Jones is associate professor of Russian and Eurasian studies at Mount Holyoke College, South Hadley, Mass. Dr. Jones is a specialist in Caucasian affairs and has written more than 40 articles and book chapters on the subject.
FOCUS: WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS

by Kirk Wolcott

The war crimes trials that took place at the end of World War II—from Nov. 20, 1945, to Oct. 1, 1946, in Nuremberg and from May 3, 1946, to Oct. 4, 1948, in Tokyo—decreed that the world would no longer tolerate acts of genocide. Yet, less than 50 years later, the international community found itself forced to take a stand again after vicious drives for power in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda resulted in the ethnically motivated slaughter and expulsion of millions of innocent people.

Bringing the guilty to trial has proven to be no easy task. Many of the accused war criminals in the former Yugoslavia—unlike those found guilty in Germany and Japan, whose fate lay at the hands of the Allied nations that had defeated them—remained at-large when the Dayton peace agreement was signed in November 1995 and refused to stand trial. To take them forcibly risked the return of mass bloodshed. In Rwanda, lack of a functioning judicial system has hampered efforts to prosecute those responsible for the 1994 genocide massacres. Complicating matters, more than 75,000 individuals suspected of committing genocide were placed in custody, forcing the prosecutors and the world-at-large to ask the critical question: At what cost is justice served?

Former Yugoslavia

In May 1993, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 827, establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the first international body for the prosecution of war crimes since the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials. The tribunal was granted jurisdiction over individuals accused of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.

Judge Antonio Cassese of Italy was appointed president of the tribunal. Judge Richard Goldstone of South Africa was selected as the chief prosecutor, later succeeded by Judge Louise Arbour of Canada. The tribunal was created with the following structural components:

- two trial chambers, each with three judges and one appeals chamber with five judges;
- no police force of its own;
- a maximum sentencing of life in prison and no authority to try suspects in absentia; and
- trials with no juries, but defendants could challenge a conviction before the separate panel of five appeals judges.

The tribunal began its first trial May 7, 1996, with Dusan Tadic, a Bosnian Serb cafe owner and karate instructor, charged with killing, torturing, and raping Muslims and Croats at prison camps in northwest Bosnia in 1992. His trial was expected to last several months, with more than 100 witnesses being called.

On June 27, 1996, the Tribunal announced the indictment of eight Bosnian Serb military and police officers for the rape of Muslim women, marking the first time sexual assault was treated separately as a war crime. Those indictments brought the total number to 75—54 Bosnian Serbs, 18 Croats, and three Muslims. Only seven of the indictees, however, were being held due to the reluctance of foreign peacekeeping troops in Bosnia to arrest war criminals.

The two most prominent suspects indicted, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and his military commander, Gen. Ratko Mladic, were charged with genocide and crimes against humanity in connection with the siege of Sarajevo and their part in the killing of more than 6,000 Muslim men in Srebrenica. Midway through 1996, they remained at-large, despite numerous public appearances, and their status threatened peace in Bosnia.

Rwanda

On April 6, 1994, the fatal downing of an aircraft carrying Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana and Burundian President Cyprian Ntaryamira ignited one of the most expeditious acts of genocide in modern history. In the days that followed, about 20,000 people, primarily from the minority Tutsi ethnic group, were killed by members of the majority Hutus. The next three months saw the slaughter of roughly 800,000 individuals. Over a four-day period in mid-July 1994, more than 1 million people were forced to flee Rwanda into neighboring Zaire.

Four months later, on Nov. 8, the Security Council passed Resolution 995, which established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The Rules of Procedure and Evidence established by the Yugoslav tribunal were adopted by the ICTR.

The Rwandan tribunal, which began operation in June 1995, quickly encountered a series of obstacles. First, it was difficult to sort out who exactly was responsible for the 500,000 to 1 million killings of 1994. Little physical evidence existed, so most cases were built around eyewitness testimony alone, risking false accusations. Many of the worst offenders, including some of the architects of the genocide, had fled the country. The tribunal was short on funds and personnel, with many of the Rwandan judges and prosecutors killed during the ethnic carnage of 1994. As of July 1996, only three suspects were held by the tribunal, and not one person had stood trial.

Kirk Wolcott, program coordinator in The Carter Center's Conflict Resolution Program, served as editor of the 1995-96 State of World Conflict Report.

CONFLICT REGION:

MIDDLE EAST

IRAN
IRAQ
ISRAEL
TURKEY
Refugees: These are persons outside the country of their nationality who are unable or unwilling to return due to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion. (United Nations, 1951 Convention Relating to the Rights of Refugees and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Rights of Refugees)

IDPs: Internally displaced persons are those who have been forced to flee their homes suddenly or unexpectedly in large numbers...and who are within the territory of their own country. (Working definition taken from United Nations, Analytical Report of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, Feb. 14, 1992)

RLS: Persons in "refugee-like situations" are those who may fear persecution or harm if returned to their home countries, and thus who may be refugees, but who are not recognized by governments as refugees or asylum seekers. (U.S. Committee for Refugees, World Refugee Survey, 1996, Washington, D.C.: Immigration and Refugee Services of America)

na: Figures not available for given country

* Sources vary widely in numbers reported


1 square inch = 213,000 square miles
1 square centimeter = 86,000 square kilometers

**IRAQ**

IDPs: 1,000,000
Refugees: 622,900*
  - Iran: 599,000*
  - Saudi Arabia: 13,200
  - Jordan: 6,500
  - Turkey: 3,000*
  - Pakistan: 1,200

RLS:
  - Jordan: 30,000
  - Yemen: 10,000

**IRAN**

IDPs: na
Refugees: 49,500
  - Iraq: 39,200
  - Turkey: 10,000
  - Pakistan: 300

**ISRAEL**

IDPs: na
Palestinian Refugees:
  - 5,286,100*
    - Jordan: 1,288,200
    - Gaza Strip: 683,600
    - West Bank: 517,400
    - Lebanon: 346,200
    - Syria: 332,300
    - Iraq: 60,000
    - Other: 53,400

RLS:
  - Jordan: 700,000
  - Egypt: 100,000
  - Lebanon: 50,000

**TURKEY**

IDPs: 2,000,000
Refugees: 15,000
  - Iraq: 15,000

na: Figures not available for given country

* Sources vary widely in numbers reported

Middle East major armed conflicts remained in the same four locations over the past year. In Iraq, fighting between Saddam Hussein's government and Kurdish factions in March 1995 led to the return of a conflict that had been active in 1993 but dormant in 1994. Conflict in the Middle East was waged at a relatively low level of intensity, except for in Turkey, where ongoing fighting between the Turkish government and the Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK) resulted in more than 4,000 deaths. Iran also continued to struggle against a Kurdish rebellion force. Meanwhile, world attention focused squarely on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. In January 1996, PLO leader Yasser Arafat won a landslide victory in the Palestinian elections, yet Israel's shelling of southern Lebanon later in the year and its election of a hard-line prime minister threw the fragile peace process into doubt. As for the region as a whole, despite a recent decline in overall military spending, the Middle East continued to spend more on defense as a proportion of gross domestic product than any other area in the world.

### Human Development Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% access to safe water (1990-95)</th>
<th>Total adult literacy rate (% in 1990)</th>
<th>Population growth rate (1980-94)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>92*</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Conflict Countries Average**

- % access to safe water: 69.3
- Total adult literacy rate: 71.3
- Population growth rate: 2.83**

**Overall Middle East Average**

- % access to safe water: 30.7
- Total adult literacy rate: 73.6
- Population growth rate: 3.07

* Data refers to years or periods other than those specified, or pertains to a region of a given country rather than the entire country, or differs in some way from the standard definition.

** Averages are derived from calculations based on data given by UNICEF, but do not represent figures provided directly by UNICEF.


### Under-5 Mortality Rates

Middle East countries are listed with rank in descending order compared to all countries for 1994 estimated rates of under-5 mortality. The rates represent the probability of a child dying between birth and exactly 5 years of age expressed per 1,000 live births. Some figures are rounded. Major armed conflict locations for 1995 are shown in red.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96</td>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Conflict Countries Average**: 46.5

**Overall Middle East Average**: 35.1


### Arms Flows

Total imports of major conventional weapons from 1990-95. Figures represent trend-indicator values (volume in numbers and capacity of transfers rather than real money flows) of arms imported to each Middle East country engaged in a major armed conflict in 1995 (U.S. $ million at constant 1990 prices).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>777</td>
<td>703</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>1,295</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1,309</td>
<td>1,096</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>976</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>801</td>
<td>954</td>
<td>1,639</td>
<td>2,288</td>
<td>2,089</td>
<td>1,127</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SIPRI, Arms Transfers Database, 1996.

### Aid Flows

Total net Official Development Assistance (ODA) from Development Assistance Committee (DAC)* countries, multilateral organizations, and Arab countries to developing countries and territories (U.S. $ million for 1994).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1,237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine adm. areas</td>
<td>478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Middle East**: 4,553

* The DAC is one of a number of specialized committees of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which includes 16 Western European countries, Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, the United States, and the Commission of the European Communities.

The Government of Iran presently faces armed opposition by two militant groups, the Mujahideen e-Khalq and the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI). Both groups have battled the Iranian government since the 1970s. The Mujahideen group is opposed to the present government in Tehran and wishes to install the wife of its leader as the new president. The KDPI, alternatively, is fighting for a separate Kurdish homeland in northwestern Iran. Violent clashes between the Iranians and the two opposition groups have resulted in more than 800 deaths since 1991.

The Mujahideen currently have more than 100,000 followers and are based in neighboring Iraq, with camps on the Iran-Iraq border and headquarters located in Baghdad. The several-thousand-strong military arm of the Mujahideen, the National Liberation Army (NLA), includes nearly 40 percent women and is well-trained and heavily armed.

Iraq has continually refused to restrict Mujahideen activities in its confines and in 1995 rejected an Iranian request to extradite the Mujahideen leader to Iran. As a result and through early 1996, Iranian government forces continued to violate Iraqi ground and airspace in a series of armed attacks on Mujahideen camps. In more covert missions, Iran has also attacked the Mujahideen headquarters in the Iraqi capital.

The KDPI is also based in Iraq and maintains a number of armed units. Since 1992, however, the KDPI has not engaged in any significant military activity against Iran. Regardless, Iranian forces have continued their campaign against the KDPI, including shelling KDPI camps along the Iraqi side of the Iraq-Iran border into 1995. Despite this, the KDPI has not resumed military activity and remains in close contact with other Iranian opposition groups in the hopes of finding a political solution to the present turmoil.

The Mujahideen currently have more than 100,000 followers and are based in neighboring Iraq, with camps on the Iran-Iraq border and headquarters located in Baghdad. The several-thousand-strong military arm of the Mujahideen, the National Liberation Army (NLA), includes nearly 40 percent women and is well-trained and heavily armed.
In 1995, Iran began to broker peace talks between two Kurdish factions in northern Iraq, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The talks specifically excluded the KDPI, however, and Iran pressured the PUK to drop its support for the KDPI during the talks.

Aside from launching covert military strikes against these two groups, the Iranian government has also worked through early 1996 to systematically neutralize specific individuals. Iranian agents assassinated several members of both the Mujahideen and the KDPI in Iraq and in other countries. In addition, numerous KDPI prisoners have been executed in Iranian prisons. As of mid-1996, there were no efforts to end these conflict situations peacefully.

Sean Mayberry, a graduate student in the MBA program at Emory University, was a Carter Center graduate assistant in the Conflict Resolution Program. A U.S. foreign service officer since 1988, he was last assigned to Nairobi, Kenya.

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**Defense Expenditure and Manpower Comparisons**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Defense Expenditure</th>
<th>Numbers in Armed Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>36.0 3.8</td>
<td>419 37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>25.9 14.6</td>
<td>1,064 132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>21.2 9.5</td>
<td>1,568 1,230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>9.1 12.2</td>
<td>1,380 2,019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mideast</td>
<td>12.2 6.7</td>
<td>711 443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>6.5 4.3</td>
<td>1,418 1,074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>2.2 1.9</td>
<td>405 329</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


---

**Central Government Expenditure (1986-93)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Defense 20%</th>
<th>Other 4%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education 12%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health 4%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense 20%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other 4%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since its invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the Government of Iraq has suffered the consequences both in international and domestic affairs. President Saddam Hussein’s aim of making Iraq a regional superpower has been upset by war, an economy crippled by the toughest U.N. sanctions in history, defections by key political figures, and rebellious internal struggles.

Following the end of the Gulf War in February 1991, Shi’ite Muslims and disaffected soldiers mounted a rebellion, reportedly taking control of Basra and other southern Iraqi cities. The revolt, led by the Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI), was quickly crushed by troops loyal to Saddam. The Iraqi government instigated a program to deplete vital marshland water supplies in the south and has continued a series of repressive policies aimed at quashing Shi’ite aspirations for an autonomous state.

President Saddam Hussein’s aim of making Iraq a regional superpower has been upset by war, an economy crippled by the toughest U.N. sanctions in history, defections by key political figures, and rebellious internal struggles.

In the north, ethnic Kurds have sought autonomy since the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) launched a rebellion in 1961. Armed conflict between Saddam’s ruling Ba’th government and the main Kurdish opposition party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), led in 1984 to the death of more than 100,000 people and left 300,000 Kurds homeless. Saddam’s forces brutally put down another uprising in the summer of 1991. Fearing genocide, nearly 2 million Kurds fled into Turkey and Iran, returning only after government troops were withdrawn. Kurdish elections in May 1992 established a self-governing authority in the region, protected from Saddam’s forces by U.S.-led “no-fly zones,” but the Kurdish factions soon turned their forces against each other.

Fighting between troops loyal to KDP leader Masoud Barzani and PUK leader Jalal Talabani continued in 1996, despite a series of peace talks, including efforts by a U.S. delegation in April. Meanwhile, distribution of humanitarian aid to the Kurds became one of several stumbling blocks to Saddam’s regime exporting oil under U.N. Security Council Resolution 986. This resolution would permit Iraq to sell $2 billion worth of oil over six months under strictly controlled conditions to buy humanitarian supplies for its people. Much of the population, especially young children, faced danger from malnutrition and disease due to a combination of Saddam’s policies and comprehensive trade sanctions imposed by the Security Council in 1991. The sanctions cannot be lifted until Iraq meets several conditions regarding Kuwait and eliminates its own weapons of mass destruction.

It was not until late May 1996 that Iraq, still protesting violations against its sovereignty, agreed...
to the “oil-for-food” deal. Economic sanctions remained in place, however, as Iraq continued to withhold information about its chemical and biological weapons supplies and hindered on-site investigations by U.N. weapons inspectors. Speculation that Saddam’s regime might be in jeopardy surfaced after his sons-in-law, brothers Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamel al-Majid and Col. Saddam Kamel al-Majid, fled to Jordan in August 1995 with the president’s two daughters. Upon their return to Iraq in January 1996, the brothers, both high-ranking officials of Saddam’s “inner circle,” were slain along with their father and another brother. In March, Naza Kharraji, one of Iraq’s top Gulf War generals, also defected to Jordan, where he reportedly joined a group opposed to Saddam.

Kirk Wolcott is program coordinator in the Conflict Resolution Program at The Carter Center, where he focuses primarily on the former Yugoslavia, international economic sanctions, and the Middle East. A former newspaper journalist, he received a master’s degree in international communication from American University in Washington, D.C.

### The Economic Impact of Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Iraq’s Gross Domestic Product (U.S. $ billion)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993*</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994*</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Estimated totals


### Recent U.N. Security Council Resolutions Imposed on Iraq

- **1060 (June 12, 1996)** on Iraq’s refusal to allow access to sites designated by the Special Commission
- **1051 (March 27, 1996)** on approval of the mechanism for monitoring Iraqi imports and exports, pursuant to Security Council resolutions and decisions 715 (1991)
- **986 (April 14, 1995)** on authorization to permit the import of petroleum and petroleum products originating in Iraq, as a temporary measure to provide for humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people
- **949 (Oct. 15, 1994)** on demanding that Iraq immediately complete the withdrawal of all military units recently deployed to southern Iraq to their original positions
- **899 (March 4, 1994)** on compensation payments to the Iraqi private citizens whose assets remained on Kuwaiti territory following the demarcation of the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait


### Heath and Social Welfare

- Life expectancy at birth (years), 1994: 66
- % fully immunized
- % population with access to health services: 93


### Defense Expenditure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total (million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>(1993 constant prices)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1994 per capita (1993 constant prices) | 132

Top major conventional weapons exporters:

- **1995**: Imports not listed from 1991-95
- **1990-95**: Russia/USSR 533, France 99, FRG/Germany 11

* Trend-indicators; million at 1990 constant prices

Despite terrorism and acts of violence, portions of the Arab-Israeli conflict continue to be resolved. Building on the November 1991 Madrid Middle East Peace Conference, the September 1993 Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)-Israel Declaration of Principles (DOP), and the October 1994 Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty, correct and at times even warm relationships began replacing absolute reductionism and strife.

By signing the September 1995 agreement for the implementation of the DOP, Israel and the PLO further operationalized their guarded association. Israeli military withdrawal from major Arab cities and virtually all Arab villages in the West Bank gave Yasser Arafat's Palestinian National Authority (PNA) control over one-third of the West Bank territory and 90 percent of the Palestinian population. As also prescribed by the DOP, in January 1996, Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank elected an 88-member council and Ra'ees (chairman or president). Israel and the PLO carried out their commitments despite the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin the previous November by an Israeli law student, regular closure of the borders between Israel and Palestinian territories, and the killing of a Palestinian committed to thwarting PLO-Israeli negotiations.

Meanwhile, the PLO made a verbal commitment to amend its National Charter by removing those articles, words, and phrases that were contradictory to the spirit and intent of the PLO-Israeli mutual recognition of September 1993. Final status talks commenced in May 1996 on sensitive matters of Jewish settlements, Jerusalem borders, water, and other issues. Throughout the time period, the PNA struggled to obtain international funding to provide investment, jobs, and support for the West Bank and Gaza Palestinian populations. Secular and militantly religious Palestinian opponents to the recognition of Israel continued to attack Arafat and Israelis for reaching their series of understandings.

Syrian and Israeli ambassadors in Washington carried on a dialogue aimed at narrowing differences on major issues: access to water sources, the nature of peace, the pace and degree of Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights, and security matters. Those talks continued under U.S. auspices in late 1995 until broken off in early 1996. Israeli-Lebanese talks were held in abeyance pending progress on Syrian-Israeli discussions. U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher traveled to and through the Middle East to narrow Syrian-Israeli differences and to keep other Arab capitals

**CONFLICT TIMELINE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1948</th>
<th>1956</th>
<th>1967</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State of Israel comes into existence, begins war with Arab League</td>
<td>Suez War breaks out; Israel temporarily occupies Gaza, Sinai; UNEF established</td>
<td>Israel wins Six Day War with Syria, Egypt, Jordan; occupies West Bank, Golan, Gaza</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
informed of the status of negotiations.

Israel’s diplomatic relations with Oman, Tunisia, Morocco, Qatar, and other Muslim states grew, despite Arab fears that Israel’s successful economy might overwhelm those of lesser developed Arab states. In the aftermath of four bombing incidents in Israel, Egypt hosted a conference in March 1996 where Arab, European, and North African states joined Israel, the United States, and Russia to confront Middle Eastern terrorism. Finally, via a very narrow margin, the May 1996 Israeli elections witnessed the return of a Likud-led government to power, placing the burden of responsibility for upholding Israel’s agreements with its Arab neighbors upon a different political orientation in Israel society.

Dr. Kenneth Stein is director of the Middle East Studies Program at Emory University. He accompanied the joint National Democratic Institute-Carter Center delegation to the January 1996 Palestinian elections.

The Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incompatibility</th>
<th>Warring Parties</th>
<th>Troop Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Territory</td>
<td>Government of Israel vs. PLO groups* vs. Non-PLO groups**</td>
<td>170,000-180,000 na</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Deaths in 1995: 250

Total Deaths: (since 1948) 12,500

DFLP: Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PFLP: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

* The PLO is an umbrella organization; armed action is carried out by member organizations. Although Al-Fatah, the largest group within the PLO, did not use armed force in 1995, other groups (DFLP and PFLP) which reject the 1993 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (Oslo Agreement), did. These groups opposed PLO leadership, but were still part of the PLO in 1995.

** Examples are Hamas, PFLP-General Command, Islamic Jihad, and Hizbollah.


The Carter Center and the National Democratic Institute (NDI), based in Washington, D.C., jointly monitored the Palestinian electoral process, concentrating on voter registration in November 1995 through the elections appeals process in February 1996. The Carter Center and NDI also organized an observation delegation to the Jan. 20, 1996, elections, which was invited and welcomed by the Palestinian Authority, the government of Israel, political parties, electoral authorities, and Palestinian civic organizations. The delegation was co-led by President Carter and former Prime Minister of Poland Hanna Suchocka and consisted of 40 political and civic leaders, elected officials, scholars, and journalists from 11 nations and included INN members Lisbet Palme of the Swedish Committee for UNICEF, Harold Saunders of the Kettering Foundation, Robert Pastor, a Carter Center fellow and senior advisor on elections, and Harry Barnes, director of the Conflict Resolution and Human Rights programs at The Carter Center. Assistant Director for Projects Sue Palmer facilitated pre-, during, and post-election monitoring activities with NDI in Jerusalem.
In 1995 and early 1996, the 12-year war between the Turkish government and Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) against the Kurdish nationalist guerrilla force known as the Partiya Kararen Kurdistan (PKK), or Workers Movement of Kurdistan, continued unabated. The PKK forces, estimated at 20,000-30,000 regular fighters, faced more than 300,000 TAF buttressed by 67,000 Village Guards, Kurdish militias fighting with government forces. The war commenced in 1984 and by early 1996 had resulted in more than 21,000 deaths of mostly Kurds, hundreds of which occurred by assassination. The war has also resulted in the destruction of more than 2,600 villages, most of them Kurdish, by TAF. Some 2 to 3 million people have fled, with emigration heaviest from the southeast region of Turkey, which is predominantly Kurdish.

Fighting escalated dramatically after the Gulf War in 1991 as Turkish and PKK forces fought in and over the “safe haven” created by the Allied forces in northern Iraq. In March 1995, Turkey sent 35,000 troops into northern Iraq against the PKK, and in July 1995, Turkey made another 3,000-5,000-troop commando incursion. In March 1996, Turkey staged another 2,000-3,000 commando-led incursion. In late March and in April 1996, TAF launched its spring offensive against PKK forces in Turkey and northern Iraq.

In spring 1996, the conflict spread to areas outside of the southeastern region to include the province of Sivas, located in the middle of Anatolia, some 75 to 110 miles from the Black Sea. The fighting in Sivas represented a significant expansion of the armed conflict. Throughout 1995 and early 1996, the Turkish air force bombed almost daily PKK bases in Turkey and northern Iraq, furthering the devastation.

The PKK receives arms and support from Syria (PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan has headquarters in the Syrian controlled Biq’a valley in Lebanon), Iraq, Iran, probably Russia, European sources, Kurdish workers in Europe, and a host of international arms dealers. Turkey receives ample weapon systems, military, and economic aid from the European Union (EU) and the United States. In the last decade, Turkey has received $15 billion in military aid and grants from the EU and United States—$7 to $8 billion from the U.S. alone.

Dissent against the war in Turkey is not tolerated. Since 1991, some 460 Turkish writers and intellectuals opposed to the war have been incarcerated or indicted on one charge or another, while more than 40 Kurdish journalists and writers have been assassinated by government operatives. In 1995, Yassar Kemal, the Turkish-Kurdish author who has several times been nominated for the Nobel prize in literature, was indicted on charges of sedition for opposing the government’s war against the Kurds.

While there have been seeming occasions for earnest negotiations to end the war—notably in 1993 when the PKK announced a three-month unilateral ceasefire, and in December 1995 when the PKK again
declared a three-month cease-fire—as of March 1996, there had been no official government response. The Turkish armed forces who dictate policy on the “Kurdish Question” have vetoed any negotiations to discuss a political solution, favoring a military victory. The latter seems unlikely as the 12-year-old conflict has created immense and, potentially, irreconcilable differences between the two conflicting nationalisms.

In fall 1995, the PKK forces commenced an armed struggle with the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) in northern Iraq led by Ma’sud Barzani. By March 1996, the KDP had not been able to expel the PKK from northern Iraq. PKK forces in northern Iraq solidified their presence by forging closer relations with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led by Jalal Talabani, an opponent of Barzani. The possibility of an emerging alliance between the PKK and PUK could mean that the Turkish government’s struggle against the PKK in 1996 may entail fighting the PUK forces in northern Iraq as well as the PKK forces, while KDP forces remain aligned with the TAF.

Dr. Robert Olson is professor of Middle East and Islamic history and a University Research Professor at the University of Kentucky in Lexington, Ky.

### The Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incompatibility</th>
<th>Warring Parties</th>
<th>Troop Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Territory</td>
<td>Government of Turkey vs. PKK</td>
<td>500,000 - 10,000-12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths in 1995: greater than 4,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Deaths: greater than 17,000</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

PKK: Parties Kararen Kurdistan, Kurdistan Workers Party, or Apocus

An Interview with Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter

This past year was another challenging and rewarding one for The Carter Center and President and Mrs. Carter. Among other achievements, The Carter Center and its partners convened two heads-of-state summits on the conflict in Rwanda and Burundi and monitored the Palestinian elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Conflict Resolution Program staff members spoke with the former president and first lady in June 1996 about their approach to conflict resolution, their collaboration with others, and the state of world conflict today.

You have chosen to intervene in many of the conflicts that have stymied the international community. What gives you the courage or the confidence to take on these conflicts?

President Carter: Well, I don’t feel that it requires courage, because I don’t have anything to risk. I believe that a major purpose of The Carter Center is to fill vacuums—when it is obvious that no international organization or government has been able to resolve a specific crisis, then naturally that gives us the opportunity to act.

Mrs. Carter: One thing that is unique about The Carter Center is that we look for situations that need help, where others have not been successful or are not involved.

Could you give some examples?

President Carter: The most vivid examples are the two that occurred in 1994. One involved North Korea. We were facing a possible war on the Korean Peninsula—the Chinese thought so, I thought so, and the commanding general of the U.S. forces in South Korea thought so. Had the U.N. Security Council gone through with the resolution branding North Korea as an outlaw nation and branding their revered leader a criminal, North Korea told us they were prepared to go to war. This was a perfect example of a vacuum to be filled. The U.S. government refused to have any direct communications with the leaders in Pyongyang, the United Nations was unable to do so, but The Carter Center was free to go in at the invitation of then-North Korean President Kim Il Sung and the approval of the White House.

Later on that year, with the Haitian crisis, 30,000 troops were marshaled and poised to invade Haiti, which, I think, would have been very costly in Haitian lives. At the last minute, we got permission from the White House to go in. When our efforts are approved by Washington, and we see a real need to resolve a crisis, it doesn’t require courage because we feel that we are welcome, and we might potentially be successful. These are the kinds of issues where we find ourselves filling a need when others either will not or cannot.

Mrs. Carter: We have opportunities that a lot of other people don’t have. We get to know the leaders in the countries—sometimes revolutionaries as well—when we are there because of health and agriculture programs or other Carter Center programs. Also, one main factor is that people trust Jimmy largely because of his
human rights policy when he was in the White House. He tried to be fair, and he had the reputation of being fair and caring for people. That makes a lot of difference in the way people accept and trust him and think he will be even-handed if a conflict occurs.

Do you agree with this, President Carter?

President Carter: Yes, but I think you must look at The Carter Center independent of me. Concerning North Korea, for example, we not only had information from the U.S. government, much of which was erroneous, but we also had information from CNN and evidence from Billy Graham and others who had actually been there. The reservoir of material that The Carter Center staff develops in preparation for this kind of trip is a precious possession for us.

When I was asked to participate in the Great Lakes region, we did not have to start from scratch. All I had to do was turn to the staff that we have developed here, and within a few days I had a definitive report on what to do. When the door opened up for me in Haiti, I only had two days to prepare. I didn’t have to spend a month getting ready because what we derived from the International Negotiation Network and other sources gave me as good a briefing as I could have received as president.

It is always a team effort that makes possible the things that we accomplish. In monitoring elections, we work side by side with the National Democratic Institute and others. Because of The Carter Center’s nonpartisan, nongovernmental status, we can reach into the inner circles of the United Nations, the Organization of American States, and the Organization of African Unity. We can turn to individuals such as Sen. Sam Nunn, Gen. Colin Powell, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, former Malian President Amadou Touré, and others to join us in these efforts.

Turning to the mediation process itself, before meeting with the parties to a conflict, what type of information is critical to you?

President Carter: Obviously, I need to know the history of the conflict or crisis: what caused it, what has been attempted in the past, the geographical disputes for territory, whether there are ethnic divisions, struggles for political power, what alliances the antagonists have with outside forces that might be influencing them, and the political orientation and psychological characteristics of the leaders on both sides. Then, I try to ascertain what there is that both sides have in common. It’s always surprising and gratifying when you analyze all the issues and see that the overwhelming portion of the issues is shared. Maybe they both want peace, or they both want stature within the international community. There is a lot of commonality.

Then, I identify the issues that are still in contention—the ones that divide the two parties. My basic approach, as far back as Camp David, is to type up my vision of a final agreement before we meet. I try to envision what would be a reasonable solution, and I type it up knowing that it is going to be modified. Then I go back and forth between the two antagonists and modify the proposed agreement as necessary. I try to make sure that every time either side makes a concession, they know that the benefits are greater than what they give up. And obviously, realizing that, in the end both sides must win. I always am absolutely honest with both sides. I don’t tell one side one thing and the other side something different. That is why I use a single document, so that both antagonists have exactly the same words with which they deal. I also try to form a personal relationship with both sides. During Camp David, I signed photographs for Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin’s grandchildren. You have to have some way to let people relate to you, let them save face, and let them feel confident they are not going to be betrayed. But you also must be tenacious and keep on plugging away.

Returning to you, Mrs. Carter, how do you view your role in the mediation process?

Mrs. Carter: I sit in on all the discussions and take notes, which are important for Jimmy. Sometimes it takes a while to get the official transcripts, but I’ve got my notes right there for him to see.

Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter function as a team within the framework of The Carter Center. During a November 1995 trip to the Great Lakes region of Rwanda and Burundi, they talk with a woman who escaped the genocide massacres. (Photograph by the Carter Center)
President Carter: Rosalynn does more than that. She’s in the room, and the ostensible purpose is that she is taking notes. Of course, quite often, the leaders don’t want anyone else in the room. They want to deal with me personally. But Rosalynn is kind of an extension of me. Afterwards, she and I confer. She knows as much about the issues as I do...

Mrs. Carter: I read all the briefings he gets.

President Carter: (laughing)... and she tells me what to do.

Mrs. Carter: If I think he’s pressing too hard, I’ll pass him a note and say—

President Carter: —“back off.” That’s the part she likes the best. Sometimes you achieve a real breakthrough by building personal relationships. We would never have succeeded in Haiti if we had not gone to meet Haitian leader Gen. Raoul Cedras’ wife. And I don’t think we would have had any breakthrough in North Korea unless we had gone out on a boat for five or six hours with Kim Il Sung and his wife. While public opinion is still against Rosalynn and my being fairly close to Zaire President Mobutu and his wife and his daughter, these kinds of personal connections are very important.

Looking toward the future, what are your primary conflict resolution goals for The Carter Center in the coming years?

Mrs. Carter: We would like to have peace in Liberia and an election and stabilized political situations in Burundi and Rwanda.

President Carter: A successful election in Zaire. Peace in Sudan. These are areas in which we are already deeply involved. And we’ll help in the Middle East when called upon; I think that our role in the January 1996 Palestinian elections was very important.

What areas are you watching with concern?

President Carter: Those that we just mentioned. We obviously have been concerned about Burma, but we never have been able to get approval for The Carter Center to come in. We’re concerned about Cuba. There again, we will monitor the situation, but we haven’t entered directly because the opportunities are not there yet. We are poised, and once we get—even if at the last minute—an opportunity to move, we can move in a hurry based on the previous work we have done.

A final question: What gives you hope about the state of world conflict?

President Carter: One of the things we have accomplished in the Great Lakes is that we have refocused world attention on it, though that is still not enough. In fact, the U.S. government has become directly involved as a result of what The Carter Center and others have done there. They just weren’t interested until we began to raise the visibility of this crisis. So, one of the things that gives me hope for the future is at least the possibility that there will be a more constant and effective melding of official and non-governmental organizations, as is the case now in some countries, such as Norway. And I would hope that in the future the United Nations and the U.S. government, when they can’t successfully resolve a crisis on their own, will naturally turn to NGOs—not particularly as partners, but as a second or sometimes a primary channel. That’s a hope I have, but it hasn’t been realized yet.

Mrs. Carter: Also, despite always hearing in the news about all the bad things going on around the world, when we travel to see the progress of our projects, in Africa for instance, we see many good things happening, too. People getting better health care, being able to grow their own food—those things that can prevent war. Seeing those things happening now in so many of the countries gives us hope that they might spread to those places where the conflicts are now.
SELECTED FURTHER READINGS

**General Conflict Resolution**


**International Conflict Resolution**


**Cultural Factors in Conflict Resolution**


**Psychological Dimensions of Conflict**


**Recent Publications (1995-96)**


**Journals**

*American Political Science Review*

*Foreign Affairs*

*Foreign Policy*

*Global Governance*

*International Journal of Conflict Management*

*International Peacekeeping*

*International Studies*

*Journal of Conflict Resolution*

*Journal of Peace Research*

*Medicine, Conflict and Survival*

*Negotiation Journal*

*Peace & Change*

*Political Psychology*

*Security Dialogue*
The following is a list of selected regional and international organizations related to governance, democratization, development, diplomatic relations, economics, and security. Member nations of these organizations often are involved in the prevention or resolution of inter- and intrastate conflicts. Debate continues as to how to effectively use the organizational capacities of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) in conflict prevention and management. Organizations such as the United Nations have been active in such practices for some time. Other groups, such as the Organization of African Unity, are still exploring ways to facilitate an end to wars in their regions. This information was effective as of March 1996.

**African Development Bank (ADB)**
Established in 1963, the Bank began operations in July 1966 with the aim of financing economic and social development in African countries. 52 members.
**Headquarters:** 01 BP 1387, Abidjan 01, Côte d’Ivoire
**Secretary-General:** Hedi Meliane

**Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)**
Created through the Bangkok Declaration in 1967 to accelerate economic growth, social progress, and to increase the stability of the South East Asian region. 7 members.
**Headquarters:** 70a Jalan Sisingamangaraja, Jakarta 12110, Indonesia
**Address:** P.O. Box 2072, Jakarta 12110, Indonesia
**Secretary-General:** Ajijit Singh (Malaysia)

**Commonwealth of Nations (CW)**
A free association of sovereign independent states with no charter, treaty, or constitution, first defined by the Imperial Conference of 1926 to include a group of “autonomous Communities within the British Empire,” the modern Commonwealth was born in 1949. 51 members.
**Headquarters:** Commonwealth Secretariat, Marlborough House, Pall Mall, London, SW1Y 5HX, UK
**Secretary-General:** Chief E. Chukwuemeke (Emeka) Anyaoku (Nigeria)

**Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)**
Established by the 1975 Treaty of Lagos with the object of promoting trade, cooperation, and self-reliance in West Africa. 16 members.
**Headquarters:** Secretariat Building, Asokoro, Abuja, Nigeria
**Executive Secretary:** Edouard E. Benjamin (Guinea)

**European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)**
Founded in 1990 to contribute to the progress and economic reconstruction of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and put into practice the principles of multiparty democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and a market economy. 57 members.
**Headquarters:** One Exchange Square, 175 Bishopsgate, London EC2A 2EH, England
**President:** Jacques de Larosière (France)

**European Union (EU)**
The European Economic Community (EEC) was formally changed to the European Community (effective November 1993). The new Treaty established a European Union (EU), which aimed to increase intergovernmental cooperation in economic and monetary affairs; establish a common foreign and security policy; and introduce cooperation in justice and home affairs.
**EC Headquarters:** 200 rue de la Loi, B-1049, Brussels, Belgium
**President:** Jacques Santer (Luxembourg)

**Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)**
Founded in 1959 to promote the individual and collective development of regional developing member countries through the financing of economic and social development projects and the provision of technical assistance. 46 members.
**Headquarters:** 1300 New York Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20577, USA
**President:** Enrique V. Iglesias (Uruguay)

**Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)**
Founded in 1968 by six drought-affected states to coordinate measures to combat the effects of drought and desertification.
**Address:** BP 2653, Djibouti
**Executive Secretary:** Dr. David S. Muduuli (Uganda)

**International Olympic Committee (IOC)**
Founded in 1894 to ensure the regular celebration of the Olympic Games.
**Headquarters:** Château de Vidy, 1007 Lausanne, Switzerland
**President:** Juan Antonio Samaranch (Spain)

**International Organization for Migration**
Founded in 1951 to meet immigration and emigration needs and to move refugees, displaced persons, and others in need of international migration services.
**Headquarters:** 17 route des Morillons, Case postale 71, 1211 Geneva 19, Switzerland
**Director General:** James Purcell Jr. (USA)

**League of Arab States**
A covenant establishing the Arab League was signed in Cairo on March
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
The Atlantic Alliance was established as a defensive political and military alliance of independent countries to provide common security for its members. It links the security of North America to that of Europe. NATO transformed its structures and policies following the London (1990), Rome (1991), and Brussels (1994) Summits to meet the new security challenge in Europe. 16 members, with 25 countries associated through the Partnership for Peace.

Headquarters: B-1110 Brussels, Belgium
Secretary-General: Dr. Javier Solana (Spain)

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
Established to promote economic and social welfare throughout the OECD area by assisting its members in the formulation of supporting policies and stimulating its members' efforts in favor of developing countries. 25 members.

Headquarters: 2, rue André Pascal, 75775 Paris Cedex 16, France
Secretary-General: Jean-Claude Paye (France)

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
The 1975 Helsinki Final Act laid out 10 principles of human rights, self-determination, and inter-relations of participant states. In 1990, member states institutionalized the OSCE through the Charter of Paris, which sets out principles of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, and lays down the bases for east-west cooperation. 53 participating states.

Headquarters: Kärntnererring 5-7, Vienna 1010, Austria
Chairman-in-Office: Flavio Cotti (Switzerland)
Address: P.O. Box 20062, Prinsessegracht 22, 2514 AP The Hague, Netherlands

High Commissioner: Max van der Stoel (Netherlands)

Organization of African Unity (OAU)
Chief objectives are to further African unity and solidarity; coordinate political, economic, cultural, health, scientific, and defense policies; and eliminate colonialism in Africa. In 1991, member countries signed a treaty to create an Africa-wide economic community by the year 2000, and in 1993, they adopted a mechanism for conflict prevention, management, and resolution. 53 members.

Headquarters: P.O. Box 3243 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Secretary-General: Salim Ahmed Salim (Tanzania)

Organization of American States (OAS)
Chief purposes include strengthening peace and security of the continent; promoting representative democracy, with respect for nonintervention; and preventing possible causes of difficulties and ensuring the pacific settlement of disputes among member states. 18 members.

Headquarters: 17th St. and Constitution Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006, USA
Secretary-General: César Gaviria Trujillo (Colombia)

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
Principal aims include unifying the petroleum policies of member countries and determining the best means for safeguarding their interests, individually and collectively. 12 members.

Headquarters: Obere Donaustrasse 93, 1020 Vienna, Austria
Secretary-General: Amar Mekhloufi (Algeria)

United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)
Established in 1946 by the U.N. General Assembly to meet the emergency needs of children in postwar Europe and China. Through its extensive field network in developing countries, UNICEF undertakes in coordination with governments, local communities, and other aid organizations, programs in health, nutrition, education, water and sanitation, the environment, women in development, and other fields of importance to children. U.N. member states.

Headquarters: 3 United Nations Plaza, New York, NY 10017, USA
Executive Director: Carol Bellamy (USA)

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
UNHCR seeks to ensure that refugees and asylum-seekers are protected against forcible return, that they receive asylum, and that they are treated according to internationally recognized standards. 207 field offices in 115 countries.

Headquarters: CP 2500, 1212 Geneva 2 depot, Switzerland
High Commissioner: Sadako Ogata (Japan)

The American University, School of International Service—International Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution Program, Washington, D.C. 20016; Phone: (202) 885-1622

Antioch University—The McGregor School Office of Admissions, 800 Livermore St., Yellow Springs, Ohio 45387; Phone: (513) 767-6325; Website: 192.131.123.125:/macr/

Australian National University—Research School of Pacific Studies, G.P.O. Box 4, Canberra, A.C.T. 2601, Australia; Phone: (61) 6-259-3098

Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution—Rochusplatz 1, A-7461 Stadtschlainin, Austria; Phone: (43) 3355-2498

Bethel College and Theological Seminary—Global Studies Program, 3900 Bethel Drive, St. Paul, Minn. 55112-6999; Phone: (612) 638-6400

Carleton University—Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (NPSIA), Paterson Hall, 2A55 OH, Ottawa, ON K1S 5B6, Canada; Phone: (613) 788-6655

The Catholic University of America—School of Religious Studies, Washington, D.C. 20064; Phone: (202) 319-5700

Catholic University of Leuven—Center for Peace Research Department, Politieke Wetenschappen, Van Evenstraat 2B, 3000 Leuven, Belgium; Phone: (32) 16-28-32-41

Colgate University—Peace Studies Program, 13 Oak Drive, Hamilton, N.Y. 13346-1398; Phone: (315) 824-7806

Conrad Grebel College—Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, N2L 3G6, Canada; Phone: (519) 885-0220, ext. 261

Cornell University—Peace Studies Program, 130 Uris Hall, Ithaca, N.Y. 14853-7601; Phone: (607) 255-6484

Erlham College—Peace and Global Studies Program, Richmond, Ind. 47374-4095; Phone: (317) 983-1305

Eastern Mennonite University—Conflict Analysis and Transformation Program, Harrisonburg, Va. 22801; Phone: (540) 432-1449

Eastern Mennonite University—International Center for Cooperation and Conflict Resolution, Box 53, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York, N.Y. 10027; Phone: (212) 678-3289; Website: www.tc.columbia.edu/~iccr/

Earlham College—Peace and Global Studies Program, 180 College St., Richmond, Ind. 47374-4095; Phone: (317) 983-1305

Fresno Pacific College—Center for Peacemaking and Conflict Studies, 1717 S. Chestnut Ave., Fresno, Calif. 93702; Phone: (209) 455-5840 or (800) 909-8677; E-mail: pacs@fresno.edu

Gallaudet University—Department of Communication Arts, 800 Florida Ave., N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002; Phone: (202) 993-1300

George Mason University—Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, 4400 University Drive, Fairfax, Va. 22030-4444; Phone: (703) 993-1300; Website: web.gmu.edu/departments/ICAR/

George Washington University—Elliot School of International Affairs, Graduate Admissions, Stuart Hall, Room 107, 2013 G. St., Washington, D.C. 20052; Phone: (202) 994-7050; Undergraduate Admissions, 2121 I. St., Washington D.C. 20052; Phone: (202) 994-6040

Hampshire College—Peace and World Security Studies Program, 893 West St., Amherst, Mass. 01002; Phone: (413) 549-4600

Harvard University—Program on Negotiation, 513 Pound Hall, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Mass. 02138; Phone: (617) 495-1684; Website: www.harvard.edu/vine/providers/program_on_negotiation/

Irish School of Ecumenics—Center for Peace Studies, Milltown Park, Dublin 6; Phone: +353 1 260 1144

Johns Hopkins University—Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, 1740 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20035-1983; Phone: (202) 663-5700

Lancaster University—Department of Politics and International Relations, Cartmel College, Lancaster LA1 4YL, United Kingdom; Phone: (044) 0524 594266 or (044) 031 225 2639; E-mail: M. Bradley@lancaster.ac.uk

MacQuaire University—Centre for Conflict Resolution, Sydney 2109, Australia

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management—Program on Modeling for Negotiation Management, Cambridge, Mass. 02139; Phone: (617) 253-2659; Website: www.clark.net/pub/diplonet/PMNM.html
Mount Vernon College School of Business — Communication and Policy Studies Program, 2100 Fowhall Road, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20007; Phone: (202) 625-4558

Nova Southeastern University — Department of Dispute Resolution, 3301 College Ave., Ft. Lauderdale, Fla. 33314; Website: www.nova.edu/CWIS/centers/sss/index.html

School of International Training — Kipling Road, P.O. Box 676, Brattleboro, Vt. 05302-0676; Phone: (802) 257-7751

Stanford University — Center for International Security and Arms Control, 320 Galvez St.; Stanford, Calif. 94305-6165; Phone: (415) 723-9625

St. Bonaventure — Justice, Peace, and Conflict Studies, Box 107, St. Bonaventure, N.Y. 14778; Phone (voice): (716) 375-2212 or 2041; E-mail: bgan@sbu.edu

Syracuse University Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs — Program on the Analysis and Resolution of Conflicts, 410 Maxwell Hall, Syracuse, N.Y. 13210; Phone: (315) 443-2367

Tufts University — Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Medford, Mass. 02155; Phone: (617) 627-3700; Website: www.tufts.edu/fletcher

Universitat Jaume I — Research Group Project: Philosophy of Peace and Conflict Resolution, Departament d’Humanitats, Castello de la Plana, Campus Cra. Borriol, 12080 Castello, Espanya; Phone: 34-(9)64-34 57 00 (ext. 3466) or 34-(9)64-34 57 04; E-mail: martguz@hum.uji.es.

University of Akron — Center for Peace Studies, University of Akron, Akron, Ohio 44325-6201; Phone: (216) 972-6513

University of Bradford — Department of Peace Studies, Bradford, West Yorkshire, England BD7 1DP; Phone: (44) 12-743-8523

University of California, Berkeley — Peace and Conflict Studies, Division of Undergraduate and Interdisciplinary Studies, 301 Campbell Hall, Berkeley, Calif. 94720; Phone: (510) 642-6000

University of California, Irvine — Global Peace and Conflict Studies, Social Science Tower 418, Irvine, Calif. 92717; Phone: (714) 824-6410

University of California, San Diego — Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, Mail Code 0518, 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, Calif. 92039-0518; Phone: (619) 534-3352

University of Cambridge — Global Security Program, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Free School Lane, Cambridge, United Kingdom; E-mail: gsp.cam.ac.uk/gsp.html

University of Colorado, Boulder — Peace and Conflict Studies Website: csf.colorado.edu:80/peace/; The University of Colorado maintains a directory of academic peace and conflict studies programs at csf.colorado.edu:80/peace/academic.html

University of Hawaii — Spark M. Matsunaga Institute for Peace, 2424 Maile Way, Porteus Hall 717, Honolulu, Hawaii 96822; Phone: (808) 956-7427; Website: www2.hawaii.edu/uhip/

University of Idaho — The Martin Institute for Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution, Moscow, Idaho 83844-3229; E-mail: vincentj@uidaho.edu

University of Lancaster — Richardson Institute for Peace Studies, Department of Politics and International Relations, Lancaster LA1 4YI, United Kingdom; Phone: (44) 05-246-5201

University of Lubumbashi — Centre d’Etudes Politiques d’Afrique Centrale (CEPAC); P.O. Box 1825 Lubumbashi, Zaire

University of Massachusetts, Boston — The Graduate Programs in Dispute Resolution, 100 Morrissey Blvd., Boston, Mass. 02125-3393; Phone: (617) 287-7421

University of Notre Dame — Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, P.O. Box 639, Notre Dame, Ind. 46556-0639; Phone: (219) 631-6970; E-mail: kroc-admissions.1@nd.edu

University of Saint Thomas — Justice and Peace Studies Program, 2115 Summit Ave., Saint Paul, Minn. 55105-1096; Phone: (612) 962-5325; E-mail: DWSMITH@STTHOMAS.EDU

University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee — Certificate Program in Peace Studies, Department of Educational Policy & Community Studies, P.O. Box 413, Milwaukee, Wis. 53201; Phone: (414) 229-4724; E-mail: imh@csd4.csd.uwm.edu

University for Peace — P.O. Box 199-1250, Escazu, Costa Rica; Phone: (506) 49-10-72 and 49-15-11

Uppsala University — Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Box 514, S-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden; Phone: (46) 18-23-49

Villanova University — The Center for Peace and Justice Villanova, Pa. 19085; Phone: (610) 519-4499
U.S.-Based Conflict Resolution Organizations

Listed below are membership organizations involved in conflict resolution that provide information, referrals, and literature on mediation, negotiation, and arbitration training and practice. For a listing of international organizations involved with international conflict resolution, The Carter Center’s Conflict Resolution Program annually publishes the International Guide to NGO Activities in Conflict Prevention and Resolution.

Academy of Family Mediators
355 Tyrol W., 1500 S. Hwy. 100, Golden Valley, Minn. 55416; Phone: (612) 525-8670; E-mail: office@igc.apc.org
Supports professional family (especially divorce and custody) mediation and public awareness and education of family mediation services.

The American Bar Association Standing Committee on Dispute Resolution
1800 M St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036-5802; Phone: (202) 331-2258; The Standing Committee acts as a resource center for citizens, attorneys, bar leaders, and judiciary and also holds workshops and assists in the introduction of alternatives to court programs. It publishes the Dispute Resolution newsletter.

American Arbitration Association
140 W. 51st St., New York, N.Y. 10020-1203; Phone: (212) 484-4100; Thirty-five regional offices with a pool of 54,000 trained mediators/arbitrators who can assist on a wide variety of topics.

Children’s Creative Response to Conflict
Box 271, Nyack, N.Y. 10960; Phone: (914) 358-4601; E-mail: formatl@igc.apc.org; Provides conflict resolution skills to those who work with young people. Twenty branches provide various programs including mediation, bias awareness training, and conflict resolution.

Consortium on Peace Research, Education and Development (COPRED)
George Mason University, 4400 University, Fairfax, Va. 22030; Phone: (202) 273-4485; E-mail: copred@igc.apc.org; COPRED is a community of educators, activists, and researchers working on alternatives to violence and war.

Council of Better Business Bureaus—ADR Division
4200 Wilson Blvd., Suite 800, Arlington, Va. 22203; Phone: (800) 334-2406; The Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Division of the BBB provides training in arbitration and mediation.

CONFLICTNET
18 De Boom St., San Francisco, Calif. 94107; Phone: (415) 442-0220; E-mail: jrhelie@igc.apc.org; The computer network, CONFLICTNET, assists in the facilitation of information and resource exchange in conflict resolution through computer access.

Conflict Resolution Center International
2205 E. Carson St., Pittsburgh, Pa. 15203-2107; Phone: (412) 481-5559; E-mail: crcii@igc.apc.org; A resource center that maintains an international data base of interveners, trainers, and consultants to match those needing such services with service providers.

Educators for Social Responsibility
23 Garden St., Cambridge, Mass. 02138; Phone: (617) 492-1764; An international organization of educators who help students to understand conflict and acquire personal conflict resolution skills and social responsibility.

National Association for Community Mediation
1726 M St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005; Phone: (202) 331-2258; Provides conflict resolution information, which provides resources, technical assistance, and training.

National Institute for Dispute Resolution
1726 M St. N.W., Suite 500, Washington, D.C. 20036-4502; Phone: (202) 466-4764; E-mail: nidr@igc.apc.org; Promotes development of fair, effective, and efficient conflict resolution. Publishes NIDR News and Forum.

National Peace Foundation
1835 K St. N.W., Suite 610, Washington, D.C. 20006; Phone: (202) 233-1770; E-mail: npifnatl@igc.apc.org; Promotes peace and conflict resolution, from the community to international, and publishes Peace Reporter. Provides conflict resolution training programs in former Soviet republics and Eastern Europe.

Program for Community Problem Solving
915 15th St. N.W., Suite 600, Washington, D.C. 20005; Phone: (202) 783-2961; Publishes Directory of Consultants Helping Communities Collaborate. Geared for state and local officials, government staff, and community leaders to locate conflict resolution service providers for public policy problems.

Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution (SPIDR)
815 15th St. N.W., Suite 530, Washington, D.C. 20005; Phone: (202) 783-7277; Website: http://www.igc.apc.org/spidr/ SPIDR seeks greater acceptance of the dispute resolution process and to enhance the standards of practice in the field of dispute resolution.
**General Information**

Children and War:  
www.intac.com/PubService/human_rights/CHILDREN

DiploNet  
www.clark.net/pub/diplonet/DiploNet.html

The Global Democracy Network  
www.gdn.org

Human Rights Watch gopher menu  
gopher://gopher.igc.apc.org:5000/11/int/hrw

The International Affairs Network (IANWeb) Resources  
www.pitt.edu/~ian/ianres.html

Peace and Conflict Resolution site:  
www.pitt.edu/~ian/resource/conflict.htm

MAP International  
map.org

National Public Radio Online  
www.npr.org

The New York Times  
www.nytimes.com

OneWorld News Service  
www.oneworld.org

Peace and Security Integrated Internet Resource Guide  
www.cfcsc.dnd.ca/links/

The Progressive Directory  
Includes ConflictNet and PeaceNet among its information resources  
www.igc.apc.org

University of Michigan Documents Center  
www.lib.umich.edu/libhome/Documents.center/index.html

**Nongovernmental Organizations**

CARE  
www.care.org

The Carter Center  
www.emory.edu/CARTER_CENTER

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)  
www.csis.org

Commission on Global Governance  
www.cgg.ch

Foundation for Global Community  
www.globalcommunity.org

InterAction  
www.interaction.org

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)  
www.icrc.org

The Institute for War and Peace Reporting  
www.demon.co.uk/iwpr.htm

Medecins sans Frontieres  
www.tiac.net/users/dwb

National Peace Corps Association  
www.vita.org/npca

The Nobel Foundation  
www.nobel.se

Project Ploughshares  
watserv1.uwaterloo.ca/~plough

Refugees International  
www.clark.net/pub/refri.html

Soros Foundation  
www.soros.org

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)  
www.sipri.se

U.S. Committee for Refugees  
www.irsu_user.org/user/usrc/index.htm

U.S. Institute of Peace  
witloof.sjsu.edu/peace/conflict.html

**WWW Virtual Library United Nations Information Services**  
www.undep.or.at/unlinks.html#rights

The United Nations Web Server  
www.un.org

United Nations Information Services  
www.un.or.at/unlinks.html

United Nations International Computing Center (ICC)  
www.unicc.org/

The World Bank  
www.worldbank.org

**Regional Listings**

Africa  
For many countries in Africa, try  
www.sas.upenn.edu/African_Studies/Country_Specific; For various countries and cities, try www.city.net

Africa Online  
www.africaonline.com/

Balkan Monitor  
users.aol.com/Balkanlust/monitor.html

Baltics Online  
www.viabalt.ee

Country Pages  
www.yahoo.com/Politics/Countries

Greater Horn Information Exchange  
www.usaid.gov/HORN/

Latin American Network Information Center (LANIC)  
info.lanic.utexas.edu/

Political Database of the Americas  
www.georgetown.edu/LatAmerPolitical/home.html

U.S. Department of State  
dosfan.lib.uic.edu/dosfan.html
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. Report to the Board of Trustees, Carnegie Corporation of New York, April 11, 1996.


The Carter Center brings people and resources together to resolve conflicts; promote democracy; fight disease, hunger, and poverty; and protect and promote human rights worldwide. It is guided by the principle that people, with the necessary skills, knowledge, and access to resources, can improve their own lives and the lives of others.

Founded in 1982 by Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter in partnership with Emory University, the nonprofit Center undertakes action-oriented programs in cooperation with world leaders and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). In this way, the Center has touched the lives of people in at least 65 countries.

The Center’s programs are directed by resident experts or fellows, some of whom teach at Emory University. They design and implement activities in cooperation with President and Mrs. Carter, networks of world leaders, other NGOs, and partners in the United States and abroad. Private donations from individuals, foundations, corporations, and multilateral development assistance programs support the Center’s work.

The Center is located in a 35-acre park just two miles east of downtown Atlanta. Four circular interconnected pavilions house offices for the former president and first lady and most of the Center’s program staff. The complex includes the nondenominational Cecil B. Day Chapel, other conference facilities, and administrative offices. The Jimmy Carter Library and Museum, which adjoins The Carter Center, is owned and operated by the National Archives and Records Administration of the federal government and is open to the public. The Center and Library are known collectively as The Carter Presidential Center.

More information about The Carter Center, including Center publications, press releases, and speeches, is available on the Internet’s World Wide Web. The Carter Center site is at: http://www.emory.edu/CARTER_CENTER
10 Things You Can Do for Peace

1. Write your Congressional representative advocating a reduction of arms traffic, including Congressional action to halt arms sales to developing nations, and support an international ban on landmines.

2. Lobby your political leaders to fund conflict prevention and early warning mechanisms as much as they do military readiness.

3. Be trained as a third-party mediator or facilitator—encourage the teaching of these skills in local schools and churches or start a peer mediation program in your school.


5. Educate yourself about other cultures and cultural values and try to meet people of different backgrounds, religions, languages, and ethnicity.

6. Learn to talk through conflicts as a way of solving them rather than resort to fighting.

7. Speak to local civic organizations about the need to eliminate war as a method of resolving conflicts.

8. Foster local peace or conflict resolution essay contests in schools or write to newspapers advocating for peace.

9. Take responsibility. Try to help others in conflict or in difficult situations.

10. Write to us at the Conflict Resolution Program of The Carter Center and give us feedback on the 1995-96 State of World Conflict Report.

Send your ideas to State of World Conflict Report IDEAS c/o International Negotiation Network
The Carter Center, One Copenhill, 453 Freedom Parkway, Atlanta, Ga. 30307 Fax: (404) 420-3862