

Resolving Intra-National Conflicts: A Strengthened Role for Intergovernmental Organizations

February 1993

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A Message from the Co-Chairmen

To the Reader:

As co-chairmen of The Carter Center's 1993 International Negotiation Network (INN) Consultation, we are pleased to bring you a written summary of that

meeting. We hope this report will prove useful to those of you involved in peace education and conflict resolution. More than 200 people from 25 countries attended the Atlanta conference to examine the role of intergovernmental organizations in resolving intra-national conflicts. Highlights included a keynote address by U.N. Undersecretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Jan Eliasson and a panel discussion moderated by ABC News "Nightline" anchor Ted Koppel. The Consultation provided a forum for open discussion between intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations on their respective roles in conflict resolution. We elicited from participants a delineation of steps that could be taken by those present at the Consultation to end specific conflicts. Finally, we formed task forces of participants to implement the recommendations made at the Consultation.

Consultation panelists included representatives from the Association of South East Asian Nations, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the League of Arab States, the United Nations, the Organization of American States, and the Organization of African Unity. The U.S. assistant secretary of state for African affairs attended the meeting, as did the former speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives and a number of ambassadors. Many government leaders and members of opposition parties from areas that are mired in violent dispute met and talked at the conference, some for the first time. Conflict resolution experts, practitioners, administrators of nongovernmental agencies, and business people from conflict areas enriched conference debate by offering their perspectives as well.

Each of you has skills, knowledge, or the political power to help resolve violent conflict. We encourage you to vigorously apply your individual talents and abilities in ways that will promote the peaceful resolution of conflict. Only by working together can we succeed in stemming the rising tide of violence in our global community.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter
Former President
of the United States
Javier Pérez de Cuéllar
Former Secretary-General
of the United Nations

Report Summary

On the following pages, the reader will find a comprehensive summary of the 1993 International Negotiation Network (INN) Consultation, "Resolving Intra-National Conflicts: A Strengthened Role for Intergovernmental Organizations." In the first section of the summary, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter offers background information on the origins and objectives for the INN, as well as his personal philosophy on peacemaking. The second section contains a transcript of the Consultation's keynote address, delivered by Jan Eliasson, U.N. undersecretary-general for humanitarian affairs. In it, he discusses how the "humanitarian imperative" has become a priority in world affairs. He tells how environmental degradation is compounding problems already posed by ethnic strife, economic gaps between countries, the arms race, and structural problems. He discusses how the United Nations is helping to address these problems and how the organization is under great pressure to do more. In conclusion, Undersecretary-General Eliasson suggests ways the United Nations can meet future challenges and its need for adequate funding and assistance from other organizations.

The third section offers a detailed review of the Consultation's plenary session. The session's first panel discussion examined the role played by intergovernmental organizations in resolving intra-national disputes. In it, panelists and audience members talked about the structure of and work conducted by a number of regional and intergovernmental organizations. Participants looked at the problems faced by these organizations and other

groups and considered how all these organizations might better coordinate their efforts to accommodate changed political realities. Intervention on behalf of human rights was discussed extensively, as were problems faced by various peacemaking groups in carrying out their respective goals.

The fourth section summarizes the second panel discussion, "Regional Perspectives on Conflict." In this session, panelists and audience members discussed notions of sovereignty. Additionally, the role of the media in conflict resolution, the responsibility of the international community in safeguarding human rights, and the need for states and organizations to work more closely together to solve environmental problems all received extensive attention.

In the fifth section, readers will find a paper by Uppsala University Professor Peter Wallensteen that was commissioned by the INN for the Consultation. In it, Dr. Wallensteen maintains the number of conflicts in the world has remained "depressingly high" and surprisingly stable. Contrary to many people's impressions, the world is not progressing uniformly toward greater chaos. However, certain regions are experiencing more trouble as a result of shifts related to the end of the Cold War. At the same time, Cold War conflict management techniques are no longer legitimate. The "loss of predictability" actually is giving rise to the perception of increasing disorder. Dr. Wallensteen concludes that what is needed are new ways of dealing with conflict, particularly those involving ecological issues with the potential of provoking future conflict on a global scale.

Section six includes summaries of seven working sessions held after the Consultation's panel discussions. Participants broke into smaller groups to hear the presentation of papers commissioned by the INN on various conflict topics including Burma, the Caucasus, Haiti, Macedonia and Kosovo, and Zaire. Some of these conflict areas were selected for scrutiny because they are undergoing transitions to democracy under very volatile circumstances. Some represent questions of nationhood, while others have extremely difficult ethnic problems requiring a balance of individual rights and national sovereignty. Finally, some

raise the question of dealing with struggles for statehood in the wake of disintegration of previous nations. In addition to these sessions on specific conflict areas, two working sessions examined early warning systems and small arms transfers.

Papers commissioned for the working sessions do not necessarily reflect the views of the participants, the INN, The Carter Center, or our funding agencies. Rather, they served as a starting point for discussion. Following presentation of the papers, INN Core Group members moderated discussions that addressed the cause of the conflict in question, barriers to resolving the conflict, and paths to resolution. Summaries of the working session discussions also are included in section six. Following the conference summary are appendices with biographies of speakers and Consultation planners, a participant list, and the 1993 Consultation agenda.

Welcoming Remarks

by Dayle Spencer

INN Secretariat

A as you read this report, consider that at this very moment, people of all races throughout the world are fighting in 35 separate major wars. Consider that there are at least 70 additional conflicts in our world that may escalate into major wars given the right conditions.

And consider this. What if, like modern-day firefighters, we could devise a system of early warning devices and means of containment that would stop such conflicts in their tracks before they engulf entire cities and populations? What if we could give these same centers of conflict new nonflammable foundations upon which they could build stronger, more cooperative futures? And what if we could marshal the efforts of every conceivable resource to help extinguish those conflicts already in full blaze?

At the International Negotiation Network (INN), we believe we can find ways of doing all these things. Our organization, along with hundreds of other groups and

thousands of individuals throughout the world, can develop systems to monitor and resolve political disputes and quell the flames of organized violence. This is why the INN initiated its Consultation series in 1992. Discussing and creating such monitoring and mediation systems are the primary goals of the annual meetings. This year's gathering was held Feb. 17-19 at The Carter Center in Atlanta, Ga.

We hope this conference report will remind those who attended the Consultation of the very real progress we made in only a few short days. To get some idea of the kind of significant problems our conferences can help address, take a look at the following page. It contains a "year in review" summary of activities and accomplishments that followed the 1992 INN conference. Similarly, we're currently acting on numerous plans and programs that were suggested and discussed at the 1993 Consultation.

Before closing, I'd like to acknowledge a number of organizations and individuals who helped make the conference and this report possible. First, I'd like to thank David Hamburg, Barbara Finberg, Patricia Rosenfield and Geraldine Mannion of the Carnegie Corp. of New York for their active participation and collaboration on this consultation. I would also like to acknowledge the generous financial support of both the Carnegie Corp. and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. Secondly, I'd like to thank the staff of the Conflict Resolution Program at The Carter Center. Associate Director Joyce Neu, Program Coordinator Susan Palmer, Research Associate Honggang Yang, Program Assistant Sara Tindall, and Consultant Nancy Berry all did an outstanding job in planning and organizing the conference. Other departments at The Carter Center also helped immensely, and I'd like to thank them as well.

Too, I'd like to acknowledge my colleagues in the INN Secretariat - William Ury and William Spencer - and the members of the INN Core Group - Robert Pastor, Kumar Rupesinghe, Harold Saunders, Brian Urquhart, and Vamik Volkan. And finally, I'd like to thank you, the reader, for your interest in The Carter Center's INN Consultation series.

The Year in Review: The International Negotiation Network

The first International Negotiation Network (INN) Consultation, held in Atlanta on Jan. 15-18, 1992, was titled, "Resolving Intra-National Conflicts: A Strengthened Role for Nongovernmental Actors." More than 200 participants representing more than 150 organizations from 36 countries attended. The conference analyzed eight geographical areas that were struggling with armed conflict: Afghanistan, Angola, Burma, Cambodia, Cyprus, the Korean Peninsula, Liberia, and the Sudan.

In the year following the conference, the INN has worked on many projects that were discussed at the 1992 Consultation. The Network focused the world's attention on Afghanistan by coordinating media interviews and lobbied for the appointment of a U.N. special envoy for Angola.

Network members met with a sizable delegation from the National Council for the Union of Burma to discuss possible INN intervention in the conflict in Burma.

Also, two Nobel laureate members of the INN Council attempted to visit Burma to try to secure the release of fellow laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, held under house arrest by the Burmese government since 1989. When the Nobel laureates were not allowed entry into the country, they visited Thailand and brought world attention to her case from Thailand's border with Burma.

In addition, an INN Core Group member visited Cyprus to assess its situation, and the INN hosted a Carter Center briefing on that conflict by consular officials. Two members of the INN Secretariat visited North and South Korea to explore reconciliation progress and to map out possible roles for the INN to play in reducing tensions between the two sides. In collaboration with The Carter Center's African Governance Program, the INN also opened a field office in Liberia to work on peace and election issues. During a trip to Liberia, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter secured the release of more than 500 West African peacekeeping troops held by one of the Liberian rebel groups.

Moreover, following last year's conference, President Carter gave a videotaped address to a U.N. gathering of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Three INN Core Group members spoke at that event.

About eight months after the Consultation, the INN convened a mid-year meeting in Dakar, Senegal, to strengthen the role that indigenous African-based NGOs play in intranational conflict resolution. Four Council members and four INN Core Group members joined representatives from several NGOs. Also participating in the meeting were representatives from the U.N. High Commission for Refugees and the Economic Community of West African States. Participants at that meeting suggested that Zaire, more than any other conflict area, was seriously in need of international attention. The INN responded by increasing its efforts to publicize that conflict and added Zaire to the list of conflicts at the February 1993 Consultation. Also, because the participants listed lack of adequate information and communication with the outside world as one of the biggest problems faced by African NGOs, the INN added 150 of them to its data base. They now regularly receive INN publications.

In addition, the INN published the *State of World Conflict Report*. The goal of the publication, which reached a wide audience, was to promote the message that war no longer is an acceptable means of resolving conflicts. The INN sent copies of the issue to all sitting heads of state, all member nations of the United Nations, all members of the U.S. Congress, and all members of the INN, among others.

Foreword

by Jimmy Carter

Former U.S. President

The Carter Center's International Negotiation Network (INN) was born of necessity. In 1987, I invited the secretaries-general of the United Nations, the Organization of American States (OAS), and the Commonwealth of Nations to come to The Carter Center to help us identify some of the major barriers that prevent the peaceful resolution of conflict. We were concerned that the vast

majority of armed conflicts at that time were within nations, not between them.

This still holds true today.

What we found at that first meeting was a serious "mediation gap" that exists due to the limitations of intergovernmental organizations to become involved in internal conflicts. The United Nations, OAS, and others are prevented by their charters from intervening in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. In addition, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) often do not have the resources or necessary access to world leaders to help bring about a peaceful settlement of complex issues. The INN was created to fill this gap by forming a network that would build partnerships and bridges among organizations and individuals to maximize all our efforts. About two dozen advisers attended that first meeting in 1987. Today, some 1,800 individuals and organizations in more than 75 countries are active participants in the INN.

In 1992, we held our first Consultation to examine how nongovernmental organizations could be more effective in resolving conflict. At the second annual INN meeting, which is summarized in this report, we focused on a strengthened role for intergovernmental organizations. My distinguished co-chair was former U.N. Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, who serves as a member of the INN Council. Other members of the INN who participated were: Sir Shridath Ramphal, former secretary-general of the Commonwealth of Nations; Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo, former president of Nigeria; Lisbet Palme, chair of the Swedish National Committee for the United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF); and Andrew Young, former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations. In addition, we included representatives from parties in the conflicts we chose to examine, some of whom had never been together in the same room. We invited the media to help convey our message to a larger international audience.

This gathering took place at a momentous time. The world has recently witnessed the end of the Cold War. With it came a dramatic change in the role and number of superpowers, East-West relations, and opportunities for the peaceful resolution of conflict. The United States and the former Soviet Union

now find their interests are more compatible; we no longer support opposite sides of internal conflicts in numerous countries. The end of the Cold War brought with it the successful resolution of some major conflicts, most notably a termination of the Iran-Iraq war, an end to the war in Cambodia, the end of the war and the beginning of democracy in Nicaragua, the end of two wars in Ethiopia (including one that had lasted for 30 years), and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

While these developments are significant, the news is not all good. When we look back over the past several years, the number of major armed conflicts has remained large and stable. There have been 35 to 40 major wars each year for the last six years, each resulting in 1,000 or more battle-related deaths. Ethnic conflict is booming in the republics of the former Soviet Union. By one account, there are more than 20 violent conflicts in the former Soviet republics that have resulted in the combined loss of thousands of lives and the displacement of well over 1 million people. In the former republic of Yugoslavia, war is raging in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and additional conflicts are brewing in Kosovo and Macedonia.

Questions of self-determination, national identity, and individual rights are central to these conflicts, but so are economic, cultural, and religious issues. The conflicts are significant not only for their devastating effects on the people directly involved, but also for their potential to escalate and draw surrounding nations into the fray. Conflicts today have a destructive effect on entire societies and a disproportionate impact on civilian populations. The statistics are frightening:

- About 40 percent of government spending in the developing world is devoted to funding the military and servicing debt. In some regions, this is twice as much as governments spend on health and education combined.
- Modern war takes a large toll on civilians. Battle-related death ratios are nine noncombatants to every one combatant. We are not killing soldiers; we are killing innocent bystanders, women and children.
- In the last decade more than 1.5 million children have been killed in wars. Four million more have been disabled, and 12 million have been left homeless.

Clearly, this destruction cannot be allowed to continue. We must stop the senseless bloodshed. For this to happen, there must be some significant changes in the way the global community addresses conflict. For the United Nations, this means an end to the Security Council gridlock we have seen for years. Other positive changes are already taking place. The role of secretary-general has been strengthened, and the United Nations is stepping up its peacekeeping operations. At the time the INN was formed, the United Nations had embarked on peacekeeping missions only 13 times in response to crisis situations. But since 1988, 14 new operations have been launched, signaling the United Nations' willingness to become a true peacekeeper in the world. Most recently, U.N. troops were deployed to Macedonia, marking the first use of peacekeeping forces to *prevent* conflict.

The United Nations and all the regional and intergovernmental organizations represented at this Consultation face crucial challenges. With shifting national boundaries and the rethinking of the meaning of national sovereignty, each must address increasing demands for its services in the face of financial burdens that have not been alleviated by member nations. These constraints raise the fundamental question of whether governments really want strong intergovernmental or regional organizations, and, if so, whether they are willing to pay the price.

There is one certainty: War is the most expensive and least effective means of resolving conflict. Unless we are willing to support nonviolent methods of conflict resolution, we will pay incalculable costs. That is why we created the INN, and that is why I am hopeful that through the combined efforts of intergovernmental, regional, and nongovernmental organizations, we can find new solutions for a new, post-Cold War world.

Keynote Address

by Jan Eliasson

U.N. Undersecretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs

Let me first convey greetings to you from the United Nations secretary-general, Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, whom I am very proud to represent at this distinguished gathering. I would like to express our deep appreciation to President Carter for his and The Carter Center's pioneering contributions to peacemaking all over the world. More specifically, I want to thank him for inviting me to address the Consultation of the International Negotiation Network on strengthening the role of intergovernmental organizations in resolving conflicts within nations. Let me also pay a special tribute to the co-chairman, former U.N. Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, whom I was honored to serve first with Olof Palme and later as personal representative for the Iran-Iraq conflict. Dramatic change has become, almost paradoxically, a permanent feature in today's world. Ours is a time of promise but also of profound peril. It is a time of promise, because the end of the Cold War could usher in a great era of cooperation. Major ideological barriers have fallen. Democratic forces and responsive governments are replacing authoritarian regimes. It is becoming far more difficult to treat nations as mere pawns on the geopolitical chessboard. On the contrary, nation-states are increasingly perceived as societies of human beings - human beings with the right to political freedom and equally important, to economic justice. The humanitarian imperative, if you will, has become a priority. Solidarity no longer stops at national borders - it extends to people in desperate need, wherever they are.

However, the current moment is also one of peril. Fierce assertions of nationalism and ethnic identity, long suppressed, have resurfaced and are causing intense strife in many parts of the world. This fragmentation, or "micro-nationalism" as the secretary-general has called it, is threatening the very cohesion of states.

Behind all this lies a host of devastating structural problems that undermine even the best efforts to achieve security and economic progress. Population pressures alone are daunting. Unchecked growth will add 97 million people a year throughout the 1990s. Poverty, disease, famine, and oppression together have

produced 17 million refugees and 24 million displaced persons within nations. Modern media have made us instant eyewitnesses to the loss of innumerable lives to drought and disease. Tens of thousands of people, in addition, have deliberately been denied food and medicine, as President Carter remarked at last year's Consultation.

Meanwhile, the gap between rich and poor countries continues to grow as economic difficulties in the North generate isolationist and protectionist tendencies. Environmental degradation compounds the problems. Finally, the accelerating diffusion of ever more lethal conventional arms is a danger surpassed only by the possibility that nuclear weapons could be following in their tracks.

It is in this situation of international turmoil and flux that the United Nations is being called upon to play a new and vigorous role. Historically, the United Nations' endeavors constitute collective efforts of nation-states based on the principle of sovereignty and noninterference in the domestic affairs of member states. Nevertheless, in a period of growing interdependence and in the face of internal conflicts of intolerable cruelty and devastation, the United Nations is undergoing decisive changes. During the Cold War, the Security Council was too often powerless because of the veto. Today growing consensus within the Security Council has enabled the United Nations to emerge as a key instrument for the prevention and resolution of both international and internal conflicts.

Let us look at some of the United Nations' tools to serve the cause of peace, also in situations of internal conflict. The concept of preventive diplomacy is, of course, fundamental. In the words of the secretary-general, "No other endeavor for peace repays our time, effort, and investment so well." Yet, in too many parts of the world we are caught in situations where conflict is already causing havoc. Responding to a crisis after it has erupted is often too late for the United Nations' operations to be effective. Our primary aim must be to ease tensions before open conflict erupts.

For this, we need effective mechanisms to provide early warning of impending crisis, based on independent and unbiased information. Given the deep root of many conflicts, early warning should include economic and social trends as well as political indicators. Fact-finding has been increasingly used as a tool of preventive diplomacy and early response, for example in the missions to Moldova, Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. In the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia, the United Nations has for the first time deployed forces for preventive purposes.

Indeed, the U.N. General Assembly's resolution in December 1992 on *An Agenda for Peace* gives a comprehensive mandate for the secretary-general to move forward in preventive diplomacy. These are all promising beginnings. However, if the crucial task of prevention is to be a sustained effort for the United Nations, we must be given the necessary political and financial support.

Growing demands are now subjecting the United Nations to enormous strain. Consider the task of peacekeeping, which is rightly high on the list of our obligations. There is, to begin with, a tendency in the public debate to forget the restrictions on the authorization and use of peacekeeping: It is to be a provisional measure, it needs the consent of the parties, and the forces deployed may use arms only to defend themselves. Furthermore, U.N. forces now are operating in increasingly trying and dangerous circumstances, nowhere more so than in situations of civil war. Our contingents have to work under agreements that often cannot be relied upon and must deal with irregular forces that sometimes are to be disarmed. Security Council decisions in the past two years reflect a growing willingness among the member states to authorize the use of force to ensure compliance with its resolutions. Current examples are the situations in Iraq, Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia.

Today, U.N. operations are confined to military measures. Civilian police, election supervisors, relief workers, human rights experts, and political advisers are often an integral part of these operations. Indeed as evidenced in El Salvador, Cambodia, and Somalia, the U.N. role may involve nothing less than assistance

in reconstructing state and society. It is all the more important, therefore, that the member states give the organization adequate financial and human resources to do the job well and that the United Nations organize itself accordingly.

The United Nations, geared in the past chiefly to resolving conflicts between states, thus finds itself struggling to cope with the humanitarian needs of millions of innocent civilians, caught in violent strife within nations. Expanding U.N. involvement in humanitarian diplomacy is in fact another expression of the quest for new ways of dealing with complex emergencies. Here we must remain mindful of the guiding principles of neutrality and impartiality in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. We must respect the sensitivities of nations who may fear that relief operations could become a pretext for furthering external interests. These concerns should not be cause for paralysis. If, at this dawn of a new era, we cannot put the welfare of human beings at the center of our collective concerns, if we cannot prove that the aim of forming societies and international organizations is to improve the conditions of humanity, then we are indeed failing that very humanity. Recent resolutions of the General Assembly demonstrate that member states overwhelmingly accept that governments and parties at war have a responsibility for the welfare of the civilian population. There is also a consensus that access must be provided to victims of natural and human-made disasters.

Thus, so long as the impartiality of humanitarian assistance is assured, the suffering of afflicted populations is a legitimate concern of the international community. Humanitarian assistance has become, in a way that was never the case before, an integral part of establishing peace and security in various trouble spots. Corridors of peace and zones of tranquility - tantamount, in effect, to local cease-fires on humanitarian grounds - have become helpful, not only in providing access to the affected people, but also in building bridges between parties in conflict.

Since the overarching goal is to maintain peace, it is important to support efforts and structures that can have confidence-building and peace-building effects.

Such measures, aside from disarming warring parties, include repatriating refugees, monitoring elections, protecting human rights, supporting democratic institutions, and last but not least, removing land mines. The gravity and cruelty of the threat posed by land-mines cannot be overemphasized. Tens of millions of mines - often plastic - remain scattered around former combat zones, taking and jeopardizing innumerable lives and impeding the restoration of normalcy. Experts estimate that it could take 40 to 50 years to get rid of these mines. The international community should take it upon itself to end this fatal scourge - this delayed form of warfare - before the century is over.

Universal recognition of the need for humanitarian relief allows the United Nations to play an active role in internal crisis situations. This is especially true where the central authority has disintegrated and is no longer capable of providing or facilitating humanitarian assistance. In performing this role, relief workers are with shocking frequency becoming targets of terror and violence. Many colleagues have been lost in tragic circumstances in recent months alone. I would like to pay a heartfelt tribute to the thousands of relief workers who are engaged in the delivery of humanitarian assistance, at great risk to themselves. Additional measures for respect of humanitarian aid and for protection of relief personnel are now necessary. The blue ensign of the United Nations and the symbols of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent, and of the other relief agencies, no longer provide sufficient protection.

I still believe that the United Nations has the moral obligation and authority to continue expanding its role in complex emergencies. Doing so will require a good deal of institutional reform. More fundamentally, it will require a strong commitment on the part of the member states. This, again, raises the issue of sovereignty and where to draw the line between, on the one hand, the solidarity for people in distress and, on the other, the accepted principles of noninterference in the internal affairs of states and consent and request for humanitarian assistance.

The secretary-general, in his *Agenda for Peace*, reiterated that the state must remain the foundation stone of the international system, "the fundamental entity of the international community," but also that the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty had passed. Former U.N. Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar earlier identified the irresistible shift in public attitudes toward the belief that defense of the oppressed in the name of morality should prevail over frontiers. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, he reminded us in his memorable speech of April 1991 in Bordeaux, implicitly calls into question the notion of inviolable sovereignty.

I was also interested by some of the opinions expressed on this issue at last year's inaugural Consultation here in Atlanta. Sir Shridath Ramphal made a plea to the developing world to provide intellectual leadership to redefine sovereignty, "to trim its edges." Former Nigerian President Obasanjo and Archbishop Tutu both echoed this sentiment. The secretary-general of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Salim Salim, emphasized the need to maintain a balance between national sovereignty and international responsibility, adding that "the world community must respond to violations of human rights" and that "we must equip ourselves to deal with intranational conflicts."

All this requires concerted action. Our new and innovative tools, from preventive diplomacy to peace-building, can only be effective if there is full collaboration with regional organizations, and the support and participation of all those committed to peace and development.

Aside from the veto issue, the most lively debate, when the U.N. Charter was being framed in 1945, was over the relative merits of regionalism and universalism. Both were recognized in the end, although the concept of universalism predictably emerged pre-eminent. Regrettably, the Cold War prevented the development of a close relationship between the Security Council and regional organizations, as foreseen in Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter.

Now that the Cold War is behind us, we should enhance the mutually enforcing roles of regional organizations and arrangements and the United Nations. The

Security Council will evidently retain the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. However, coordination with regional structures could promote peaceful settlement of disputes and at the same time contribute to a deeper sense of participation. There is a growing realization that many conflicts, particularly those with local roots, can be addressed by regional organizations. The choice is not "either/or" since both global and regional efforts must be strengthened within the theme of "Common Responsibility in the 1990s," as expressed in the Stockholm Initiative for Global Security and Governance. It is perhaps unrealistic to envisage quick and automatic implementation of the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter. Positive experiences must accumulate, and there must be the necessary political will. Noble aims must be matched by adequate resources. And the forms of cooperation have to be adapted with flexibility and creativity.

The United Nations has encouraged a wide range of complementary global and regional efforts around the world. Let us recall the collaboration between the Organization of American States (OAS), the Contadora Group, and the United Nations in Central America. The United Nations is now cooperating with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Cambodia, and with the OAU and the League of Arab States in Somalia. We are also working closely with the European Economic Community and members of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in trying to find solutions to the formidable problems in the former Yugoslavia. The excellent collaborative efforts with the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) are playing a vital role in averting famine in the worst drought ever to hit Southern Africa. Similarly, regional organizations and arrangements are now intensifying the promotion of peace within their respective areas and increasing their collaboration with the United Nations. The specialized agencies of the United Nations, as well as nongovernmental organizations and other private groups, are also actively engaged in the transition from conflict resolution to reconstruction. All in all, each has an important contribution to make. Ultimate responsibility for

peace and development, however, rests with the people of the country concerned.

In these efforts, the international community must provide support and solidarity on a wide spectrum. Lasting peace and stability require measures in the economic and social domain as well. Recognizing this, the secretary-general has restructured the economic and social sectors of the Secretariat and established a new integrated Department of Humanitarian Affairs to serve as a bridge between the political, economic, and social functions of the organization. The humanitarian action is part of a continuum from relief to rehabilitation and development.

The United Nations must provide leadership, but it cannot act alone. The organization is nothing more, or nothing less, than the expression of the political will of its member states. First and foremost, it is up to them, rich and poor, large and small, to invest in the multilateral process, so promising at this phase of history. It is in their interest to do so. For a strong United Nations, strong multilateralism is both an enlightened self-interest and a vehicle for achieving universal justice.

In Shakespeare's words, let us always remember that "there is a world outside Verona." Let us make it our collective goal to strive for peace, for development, and more than ever before, for a life in dignity for all.

Panel Discussion: The Role of Intergovernmental Organizations in Intra-National Conflict

Moderator Javier Pérez de Cuéllar opened the session with instructions to panelists to give a clear, brief overview of their organization's history and work. A question-and-answer period followed these initial speeches. The moderator first gave the floor to **Dato' Ajit Singh**, secretary-general of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Mr. Singh explained that the five member nations who founded ASEAN in 1967 had emphasized equality, partnership, the encouragement of nonviolent means

to settle conflict, respect for the sovereignty of member nations, and the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of member states. Through the years, ASEAN has remained true to these original principles, particularly the noninterference clause. He offered the 1986 People's Revolution in the Philippines and the 1990 crack-down on pro-democracy demonstrators in Thailand as examples of how this policy of noninterference worked well, since both states "were able to create order out of temporary chaos." The principle of noninterference has allowed the organization to achieve higher levels of social, cultural, and economic cooperation and to resolve sensitive issues in a nonconfrontational manner, he said.

However, ASEAN also has shown that it is prepared to actively intervene in situations that threaten regional peace, security, and stability. For example, ASEAN worked for 12 years to resolve the Cambodian conflict using diplomacy and the United Nations.

In the future, ASEAN will broaden its approach to conflict resolution by expanding the scope of its own consultation series to include additional formal discussion of regional, political, and security matters.

MODERATOR:

Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, former secretary-general of the United Nations

PANELISTS:

Dato' Ajit Singh, secretary-general, Association of South East Asian Nations

Nils Eliasson, director, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

Mahmoud Abul-Nasr, United Nations ambassador from the League of Arab States

José Luis Restrepo, special adviser to the secretary-general, Organization of American States

Jan Eliasson, undersecretary-general for humanitarian affairs, United Nations

Solomon Gomes, special political affairs officer, Organization of African Unity

"Throughout ASEAN's history, this principle (of noninterference) has remained unbroken, even during times of internal strife within member countries. ASEAN could have, for example, expressed concern during the People's Power revolution of 1986 in the Philippines or the military crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators of May 1990 in Thailand. But experience has developed in us a strong belief in the innate ability of each member state to resolve its own problems. And true enough, both these countries were able to create order out of temporary chaos. Respect for national sovereignty is the bedrock of trust and confidence among ASEAN members."

Dato' Ajit Singh,

secretary-general of the ASEAN

Following Mr. Singh's remarks, Dr. Pérez de Cuéllar invited panelist **Nils Eliasson** to speak. Ambassador Eliasson explained that his organization, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), was created to overcome the division of Europe after World War II. Having fulfilled its original purpose, the organization has since been transformed into a "community of values." The CSCE's revised charter specifies four general areas of agreement among members:

- belief in democracy as the only legitimate system of government,
- respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms,
- respect for the rule of law, and
- belief in the market economy.

The CSCE has decided that human rights issues no longer come under the category of "internal affairs" of a member state. This willingness to intervene on behalf of human rights has made a marked difference in the organization's character.

All CSCE agreements are voluntary and cooperative, explained Ambassador Eliasson, and the organization has found that the risk of public exposure helps ensure that member states keep to those agreements. The CSCE also is working to create an ad hoc tribunal to prosecute war crimes and to make individual leaders responsible for their actions.

Thanks to its new emphasis on "commonality of values," the CSCE now concentrates on preventive diplomacy and early-warning systems, the CSCE director continued. The group works closely with the United Nations and other organizations to coordinate its missions so that they complement, rather than duplicate, each other's activities. The organization, which introduced the concept of "confidence-building measures" almost two decades ago, now hopes to apply this approach to human rights monitoring. Also, the CSCE often utilizes the views and knowledge provided by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to reach its decisions. Ambassador Eliasson encouraged NGOs to keep the newly created CSCE office of High Commissioner on National Minorities fully informed of relevant concerns.

Ambassador **Mahmoud Abul-Nasr** spoke next, representing the League of Arab States. His organization was established in the mid-1940s, shortly before ratification of the U.N. Charter. Because the League of Arab States faced problems and challenges similar to other regional and international organizations, he chose not to address those particulars.

"From confrontation, we have a system entirely built on cooperation and common purpose. And this has also meant that it is now possible in the CSCE framework not to use words and terminology such as 'undue interference in internal affairs' when it comes to human rights issues. Instead, our heads of state and government have declared that the questions of human rights and human dimension issues are no longer exclusively internal affairs of its member states. This has made a marked change in the character of the CSCE."

Nils Eliasson,

director of the CSCE

"We in the Third World need to be assured that intervention in the domestic affairs of small countries is done with the same standard everywhere and not used for political ends. For those who follow the debates of the United Nations in the field of human rights... the work of the Commission on Human Rights, we note with regret that they pick on two or three countries every year, attacking

them, concentrating on violations that are taking place in those countries, while ignoring those taking place in other countries. Let me say that there is no country in the world that is immune to violations of human rights."

Mahmoud Abul-Nasr,

U.N. ambassador of the League of Arab States

Ambassador Abul-Nasr described the fears harbored by the Third World countries that comprise the League's membership over the new stated willingness of Western organizations to intervene in a country on behalf of human rights. Small countries are worried that this might be used as an excuse to interfere for political ends, he said. The United Nations was already guilty of applying separate standards to countries in its yearly "attacks" on human rights violators. And he noted what his organization views as a double standard employed by the U.N. Security Council in its decisions. For example, he said, the Council recently adopted a resolution that allowed for the immediate and unconditional deportation of Haitian refugees, "even though that resolution runs contrary to the Geneva Convention."

"But we note with regret," Ambassador Abul-Nasr continued, "that when the Arab League asks for a meeting with the Security Council or for action... or a resolution... no action is taken."

The next panelist to speak was **José Luis Restrepo**, special adviser to the secretary-general of the Organization of American States (OAS). Nonintervention was the cornerstone of the juridical system on which his organization was founded in 1948. The original charter emphasized nonintervention, as well as its aim to strengthen peace and security in the hemisphere by preventing possible disputes between member states and ensuring peaceful settlement of disputes when they did arise. For many years, he said, the OAS rarely intervened in intra-national conflict, with the exception of a few severe cases involving human rights violations. As an example, Dr. Restrepo mentioned the organization's action in Nicaragua in the late 1970s. And when conflicts arose that were perceived to

constitute a threat to security and peace of the hemisphere, the OAS tried to find solutions to those problems within their own organization.

In 1985, a new provision was added to the organization's charter that committed the OAS to the promotion of democracy. This change allowed the organization to expand its preventive activities to include electoral observations and direct mediation between parties to conflict. Another addition to the charter in 1992 has expanded OAS activities even more, Dr. Restrepo said. Because poverty is one of the major causes of conflict and revolution in the Americas, its eradication is a primary goal.

Next, Dr. Pérez de Cuéllar turned the floor over to **Solomon Gomes**, special political affairs officer for the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Dr. Gomes said people often criticize his organization, noting that the OAU is weak and indifferent. He said the first charge is true - the OAU is weak due to its structure. But those who accuse the organization of indifference are wrong, Dr. Gomes maintained. Rather, the OAU is like "a farmer out fighting a brush fire by himself. And every time he puts one out, another fire breaks out, and he has to run to that one."

The OAU's attitude toward intervention in the internal affairs of state is evolving. Prior to 1990, the group was opposed to intervention, a stance that was reinforced by suspicions relating to the Cold War. Now, however, the OAU feels compelled to address conflict resolution in Africa more directly. The basic legal instruments are in place for such direct action, such as the African Charter on Human and People's Rights and the African Charter on Popular Participation. But legal instruments aren't enough to close the gulf between aspirations and reality, Dr. Gomes said. A deep-rooted and persuasive human rights culture must be encouraged and developed, and he urged African NGOs to help educate and organize citizens to this end.

Unfortunately, Dr. Gomes added, the OAU lacks the resources necessary to carry out their aims, which is why help is needed from groups like the

International Negotiation Network (INN). The OAU must "walk a moral and political tightrope" to effectively protect and promote human rights, he said. Next to address the gathering was **Jan Eliasson**, U.N. undersecretary-general for humanitarian affairs. He emphasized that the world is at a crossroads and warned that the pressures of poverty, environmental degradation, population, and internal strife will test the limits of the international system. Therefore, regional and international organizations critically need the resources and mandates with which to do their jobs. Conference participants should also think very hard about ways to rationally divide up the enormous task of peace-making among various institutions throughout the world, he added. Ambassador Eliasson also cautioned regional and international organizations to pragmatically analyze whether to intervene in sensitive situations to avoid becoming part of the conflict.

Discussion

Following Ambassador Eliasson's comments, Moderator Pérez de Cuéllar opened the floor for questions and comments. A summary follows.

Delimitation of Borders in Europe: One participant said that "a Pandora's box has been opened in Europe regarding the delimitation of borders. There will be more and more calls for changes in borders. How are international organizations going to deal with this matter in a cooperative way?"

Response: Panelist Abul-Nasr reminded the group that borders in Africa were established not by the countries concerned but by the ex-colonial powers. In some cases, tribes are divided in half by national borders. Consequently, the OAU and League of Arab States charters respect existing borders to avoid opening the Pandora's box.

"I agree with the idea of having a U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights. We're always discussing opening the Charter of the United Nations to include new members of the Security Council, but there are some more important things we need to change. One is to make the Declaration of Human Rights part of the

U.N. Charter. Because right now, the Declaration is only that - a declaration. It is not compulsory, not like the Charter."

Javier Pérez de Cuéllar,

former secretary-general of the United Nations

"The pressures of population, poverty, environmental degradation, and internal strife will put the international system to an enormously important and difficult test. We are at a crossroads. We see strain on nations and the United Nations. I think we're also seeing a challenge to multilateralism. This is a challenge not only to the international organizations, the global organizations, but also the regional organizations."

Jan Eliasson,

undersecretary-general for humanitarian affairs of the United Nations

The U.N. Security Council: Another participant commented on suggestions that the U.N. Security Council be given expanded power, responsibility and resources for humanitarian affairs and peacemaking. He said that giving increased power to the U.N. Security Council, as well as to the funding institutions like the World Bank, for regulating and enforcing human rights issues will further strengthen the "weighted voting (power) of the rich."

Response: Jan Eliasson said it is important to ensure that there is little distance between the Security Council and the rest of the United Nations. "Bridge-building" methods of addressing imbalances between those with veto power and those without it are needed. The United Nations welcomes the "bridge building" work currently being conducted by think tanks and independent commissions as well as re-evaluations of the multilateral process by groups like the INN. However, he said, it is important to maintain the legitimacy of the Security Council at this stage. Although some type of democratization is necessary, the composition of the Council is a sensitive matter that must be resolved by the U.N. member states themselves. A more sophisticated approach to security that

acknowledges post-Cold War political realities is needed, suggesting that humanitarian dimensions of conflict should be one element of this new approach. And the Security Council has proven it can consider the humanitarian dimension of conflict, Ambassador Eliasson said.

Intervention: Another participant questioned whether intervention on behalf of human rights is acceptable. New norms of international law are needed so that countries will realize they must accept intervention when they commit an "illegal" act involving human rights.

Response: "I'm for the principle of interference in specific cases," Dr. Pérez de Cuéllar responded. "But at the same time we have to be careful about the possible abuses of the right of interference because it can be rightly or wrongly used." He suggested that the International Court of Justice could be strengthened to decide questions of intervention on a case-by-case basis. The Court was founded by member states, so they would possibly accept its jurisdiction over this area, he said.

"My fear is that unless we have the help of the INN, we may face the embarrassing problem of the OAU having a presence in a particular place but not having the ability to take advantage of a particular situation."

Solomon Gomes,
special political affairs officer of the OAU

Nils Eliasson clarified that his organization, the CSCE, does not condone intervention in internal affairs. "The concept (the CSCE employs) is that a country cannot claim noninterference to justify human rights violations, because human rights are no longer considered exclusively a matter of 'internal affairs,' " Ambassador Eliasson said. "The criterion is that in a case of clear, gross, and uncorrected violation of existing commitments agreed to voluntarily, the CSCE can, against the will of that state, decide on political measures that apply outside the territory of that state. This is an example of the kind of recourse available to

address the issue. The instrument is, of course, guarded by very strict limitations."

U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights: A participant discussed the importance of the appointment of a U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights. She noted Costa Rica's failure when it proposed that the United Nations appoint a (permanent) High Commissioner for Human Rights. The best Costa Rica could do, she said, was to have a (temporary) Special Commissioner for Human Rights appointed.

Response: Dr. Pérez de Cuéllar agreed with Costa Rica's suggestion of a U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights. "We're always discussing opening the U.N. Charter to include new members of the Security Council, but there are some more important things we need to change," he said. "One is to make the Declaration of Human Rights part of the U.N. Charter because the Declaration is only that - a declaration. It is not compulsory, not like the Charter." Jan Eliasson insisted that the United Nations attaches a high importance to human rights work and is making great strides in addressing the issue. The resolution that created the humanitarian affairs department he represents had been a break-through, he said, and its approval was based on the consent of the member states concerning sovereignty and impartiality. This joint-approval represents progress, he said.

Advantages of Regional Organizations: INN Core Group member Robert Pastor asked about the comparative advantages of each regional institution, information the United Nations would need to determine whether or not a matter would be better handled by an outside institution or the United Nations itself.

Response: Dr. Restrepo of the OAS said one comparative advantage of a regional organization is that it is closer to the conflict parties and is in a better

position to know the characteristics of the parties. "I don't think the OAS is any better than the United Nations in solving any given conflict," he said. "But then I don't think the United Nations is any better than OAS in solving any conflict, either. There are many problems in the world. And there should be more cooperation between regional organizations and the global organization."

"In 1992, the charter was amended to include as an objective the eradication of poverty, which is considered one of the main threats to democratic stability in the Americas. As President Carter said, the poor are those who are not able to satisfy their basic needs and therefore are easy prey to those who want to subvert order by force. The poor become revolutionaries because of the lack of response to their needs."

José Luis Restrepo,
special adviser to the secretary-general of the OAS

Panel Discussion: Regional Perspectives on Conflict

Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter initiated a casual question-and-answer period with audience members prior to the start of the formal session. First, President Carter told the audience how working with the International Negotiation Network (INN) had changed his views on the peacemaking process. After Camp David and the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, he believed a very strong and powerful mediator could go into a small group, with the participants' cooperation, and succeed in helping them compromise. He has since recognized the difficulties inherent in such an approach and now sees more possibilities for success in depending upon democracy as a "handmaiden or partner with peace." In situations where people aren't willing to negotiate or where mediators can't be successful, he said, the offer of a temporary cease-fire during which an election can be orchestrated is proving increasingly effective.

Following President Carter's introductory comments, a journalist asked him if the INN intended to devote time and energy to questions of freedom of the press and protection of journalists.

President Carter answered that there was no way to promote democracy or protect human rights without also protecting the press. But he suggested that agencies representing reporters might be more effective than other groups in forming an international organization to protect individual journalists in particular situations. This group could be similar to those that already exist for physicians and lawyers who work in conflict areas.

What the INN can do, President Carter added, is to show developing democracies how they might utilize a free press to address problems. Last year, after requests for help from Mikhail Gorbachev, the INN published a book explaining how television and radio can be used to conduct referenda, promote ethnic understanding, present candidates' views, and ensure the integrity of elections. The United Nations has since adopted and is distributing the book. Another audience member suggested that psychologists be included on all conflict resolution teams to help illuminate and predict behavior that seems irrational to most laymen. President Carter added there was a need to address the destruction of the "spirit of a community" in the aftermath of violence. In response to another question, President Carter talked about the need for followup monitoring after an election. "This is a very important aspect of peacekeeping," he said. "It's not just to have a cease-fire, or an election, but to preserve the benefits of what has been negotiated. In Nicaragua, we have a successful example of this; in Haiti, where Father Aristide was elected overwhelmingly but had no experience in politics, we have a failure. The Angolan case is another where had there been as much attention given to the follow-up as to preparation for the election, we might have prevented a re-outbreak of the war."

MODERATOR:

Ted Koppel, host of ABC News "Nightline"

PANELISTS:

Jimmy Carter, former president of the United States of America

Olusegun Obasanjo, former president of Nigeria

Lisbet Palme, chairperson, Swedish National Committee, United Nations

Children's Emergency Fund

Shridath Ramphal, former secretary-general of the Commonwealth of Nations

Brian Urquhart, former undersecretary-general for peacekeeping, United Nations

Andrew Young, former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations

Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo, former president of Nigeria and a panelist, agreed with President Carter's remarks. "After the conflict preceding an election, there will be bitterness on both sides, there will be fear, there will have been abuse of human rights - all sorts of things that need time to heal," he said. "One place where (planned follow-up) seems to be working is South Africa, where they have rightly decided there will be a transition government for about five years. By the time they fully implement the constitution, all the parties will be in the government. This transitional period allows for fears to be alleviated, wounds to be healed, and expectations to be moderated. It gives people time to learn to live with one another."

When moderator Ted Koppel, host of the ABC News program "Nightline," arrived in the conference room, President Carter introduced him as one of the "shapers of accurate information in our country." Mr. Koppel asked President Carter to speak first.

According to **President Carter**, conflict analyses have shown that the number of major wars in the world has remained surprisingly constant. Despite new technology and changes in the global political situation, an average of 35 major wars occurs every year. (The term "major war" refers to one in which more than 1,000 people are killed in battle-related deaths.) The scope of many of these wars is horrendous, President Carter added. The Iran-Iraq war and the war in the Sudan both killed more than 1 million people; more than 200,000 were killed in one year during the 30-year Ethiopian war. In these wars, as in many others, civilians have been killed deliberately as part of military strategy.

President Carter noted that nearly all modern conflicts are civil wars, fought within the boundaries of sovereign nations. This sovereignty and the civil nature of the conflict constrains other countries and the United Nations from intervening. Also, shifts in the basic international political structure since *perestroika* in the former Soviet Union have allowed long dormant ethnic conflicts to surface, President Carter said. He suggested that the INN and groups like it can resolve these regional and ethnic conflicts by ensuring, among other things, fair and honest elections. Increasingly, parties to conflict are open to such assistance. Even in Zambia, where the last election was held to prevent a breakdown in the country's political structure, parties allowed a representative from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to monitor the event for the first time in history.

President Carter concluded by suggesting that in addition to discussing ways of resolving conflict, conference participants should examine the causes of war, keeping in mind worldwide environmental issues that will have an increasing impact in years to come.

Gen. Obasanjo, who spoke next, focused on Africa. With few exceptions, most recent African conflicts had, indeed, been civil wars. In Africa, more conflict is brewing because of increasing poverty and democratization. Unfortunately, he added, Africa has few tools to deal with existing and future conflicts.

"At all levels, those who should devise instruments and mechanisms (to solve conflict) are the beneficiaries of the status quo," Gen. Obasanjo said. "There are documents that could reduce conflict, documents such as the African Charter on Human and People's Rights. But these documents lack the sanctions that public exposure for noncompliance would provide... Under the OAU's so-called principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of states, the culprit is, at best, the accuser, the jury, the advocate, and the judge."

His proposed Kampala Document on security, stability, development, and cooperation in Africa might help solve some of these problems because it would allow for public exposure and sanctions. He also suggested that African

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), which are growing increasingly visible and more active, need encouragement and support, particularly from international NGOs. International organizations should be even-handed and fair in dealing with all human rights cases and internal conflicts. In conclusion, he emphasized the need for increased media coverage and international concern for human rights abuses.

Former U.N. Secretary-General **Javier Pérez de Cuéllar** spoke next. One way of achieving peaceful, negotiated, and enduring solutions to international problems is for the United Nations and organizations like the INN to encourage bilateral contacts. International conferences might also be helpful in resolving disputes, he said. But he preferred that countries take their arguments to the International Court of Justice. Unfortunately, expense sometimes prohibits parties from taking this route. A legal aid fund similar to the one he set up at the United Nations is necessary, he said.

"Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar pointed out that the Universal Declaration on Human Rights of the United Nations is only a declaration and not part of the U.N. Charter. Whether it is part of the charter or the declaration, whatever it is, it must include sanctions that can be imposed almost automatically for noncompliance."

Olusegun Obasanjo,
former president of Nigeria

"In most of the reports on war I read, I don't find any direct references to the number of children who've been killed, or the number of schools or health clinics destroyed, or the number of children made orphans by a particular war, or the number of children wounded by trauma. Only in UNICEF reports is this stated. It is as if man is trying to deny that modern wars are in fact waged against children."

Lisbet Palme,
chairperson of the Swedish National Committee for UNICEF

Panelist **Lisbet Palme**, executive director of the Swedish National Committee of the United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), spoke next, emphasizing the terrible suffering war imposes on children. Yet statistics on children are almost never included in academic and conference reports on war. "It is almost as if man is trying to deny that modern war is in fact waged against children," Mrs. Palme said.

She lamented the scandal of U.N. relief workers who beg to cross borders. Resources to prevent crises are needed and should be used within the context of the United Nations. Active diplomacy, fact-finding missions, regional conferences, and cooperation between governmental organizations and NGOs must be established, she said. In addition, young people throughout the world must be educated to understand the preconditions necessary for developing a peaceful society. Mrs. Palme suggested that mediation groups always include women, psychologists, and special advocates for children.

The next panelist, **Shridath Ramphal**, talked about how the "culture of smaller loyalties" is ingrained in everyone and how perceptions must shift to a "global neighborhood" mentality. The former secretary-general of the Commonwealth of Nations, Mr. Ramphal emphasized that environmental issues will spawn new conflicts.

Mr. Ramphal suggested that in light of these issues, the "sacred cow" of sovereignty be put "out to pasture," with states acknowledging that the rationale for it has long since disappeared.

Brian Urquhart, former undersecretary-general for peacekeeping at the United Nations, discussed how U.N. founding members envisioned a world where the United Nations would deal with global problems, regional organizations would deal with regional problems, and where governments "held the real key to the future." However, the world and the global political situation have changed drastically in the past 50 years, and he echoed Mr. Ramphal's comments on the need to move toward the essential features of a global community. "Those

essentials are very clear," he said. "They are law, order, justice, human rights and - very important - gun control."

"The needs of community, of sharing the planet and its life-giving and life-sustaining properties, will spawn new conflicts. Some are already casting their shadows. Water, food, energy, fishing, land use, issues like global warming and ozone depletion,...linked crises like those of consumption and waste on a third of the planet, and the overpopulation endemic to poverty on the other two-thirds (are) straining the earth's capacities."

Shridath Ramphal,

former secretary-general of the Commonwealth of Nations

A new combination of global, regional, intergovernmental, nongovernmental, private sector, and individual efforts are needed, Mr. Urquhart said.

Communication among these entities is vital to promote cooperation instead of competition.

The last panelist to speak was **Andrew Young**, former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations. Although no part of the world is immune to ethnic conflict, a clear relationship exists between the severity of the conflict and economic considerations. Therefore, the link between democracy and development must be maintained, he said. Ambassador Young also stressed the need for affirmative action, saying a "tiny minority can wreck a civilization" if its rights are not protected. "Nigeria learned this the hard way," he said. "After 13 or 14 civil wars, they finally developed an affirmative action constitution, and all of the civil service positions, ambassadorships, appointments, and contracts are, by and large, apportioned by the 30 states now."

Discussion

When Ambassador Young finished, Mr. Koppel tried to "fine-tune" the discussion's focus and asked panelist Brian Urquhart to elaborate on his comment about the need for gun control. "What makes the destruction of a society possible," he said, "is the enormous proliferation of small conventional

weapons. Nobody has been killed by nuclear explosions since 1945, but millions of people, tens of millions, have been killed by small arms. It's a universal problem."

Arms control: Mr. Koppel urged audience members to expand the scope of talk on gun control to international arms control. A participant said arms control agreements would not greatly reduce violence because people will continue to find ways of killing one another until the world community learns to stress "norms of peace" rather than war. And with the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council also dominating the world's weapons industry, he said, there is no balance in arms control agreements anyway. Regarding Dr. Pérez de Cuéllar's remarks on the International Court of Justice, the participant said the Court cannot force sovereign entities to participate. Therefore, it is a "marginal" option, at best.

Response: Dr. Pérez de Cuéllar acknowledged the need for changes in Article II of the U.N. Charter to allow intervention in countries guilty of flagrantly violating human rights. Also, he said, the Declaration of Human Rights should be incorporated into the U.N. Charter. This would give the International Court of Justice concrete international laws to apply in cases involving substantial human rights violations.

Sovereignty: One audience member criticized panelists who wanted to "throw sovereignty out the window" and suggested that encouraging sovereign "responsibility" was a much more realistic approach.

"I think it's incumbent on the world community to say that with assertion of one's self-determination, of taking one's destiny into one's hands, comes a responsibility," he said. "And that the world community, if necessary,... will be obliged to help you live up to the sovereignty for which you are reaching."

Mr. Koppel continued the discussion of sovereignty by recalling a *Wall Street Journal* article that speculated on an "endless diminution toward sovereignty," where one community after another in ever diminishing groups seeks that status.

Mr. Koppel asked President Carter to comment on this trend.

President Carter answered that the international community has yet to adequately address the need for and ways to accommodate wide-ranging ethnic and religious diversity within a sovereign nation. Sometimes autonomy can be a substitute for total sovereignty. In any case, strengthening the role of the United Nations in protecting human rights would help since denial of human rights is one major cause of minority revolts. This could be accomplished in part by incorporating the Declaration of Human Rights into the U.N. Charter, as Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar suggested, and by giving the International Court of Justice the authority to enforce the Declaration. Without ways to address their sense of deprivation, President Carter added, minorities will continue to revolt, which will spark civil wars and cause nations to fragment even further.

Cooperation and Exposing Human Rights in Africa: The topic shifted to Africa when an audience member asked Gen. Obasanjo to explain how grassroots organizations might work more effectively with regional organizations. These regional organizations often seem inaccessible, elitist, and ineffective, he said.

Gen. Obasanjo acknowledged that one of the OAU's main problems is that it serves as an organ of government rather than serving the people of Africa. He suggested that organizing African NGOs under a "continental umbrella" would help those organizations work more effectively with regional and international groups. But external or nonpartisan funding is also needed so that NGOs and other organizations can operate independently of governments.

Another vital need is an African organization that routinely will expose human rights violations on the continent, perhaps similar to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Currently, only international organizations like

Amnesty International are available to address and publicize such problems, he said.

The moderator suggested that Gen. Obasanjo consider another option. "One of the enormous gifts that is available to the world right now that was not available 50 years ago is precisely the technology that the media uses," Mr. Koppel told him. "You're looking for a way in which human rights violations, for example, can be discussed in such a way that the discussion itself will have an impact. Let me suggest that television is precisely the right place to do that."

Mr. Koppel added he wasn't suggesting that leaders appear on existing network programs but that they use broadcast technology to create a media outlet that could be used to expose human rights abuses.

President Carter suggested that Cable News Network might be willing to set aside one hour a week to address the world's most troublesome human rights violations, and he urged participants to inquire about such a possibility.

Donor Stipulations: As the meeting progressed, the subject of donor stipulations was raised by an audience member. She asked President Carter and Dr. Pérez de Cuéllar to comment on the need for donors to impose conditions for democracy, human rights, and development.

President Carter reported on the recommendations made by participants at a recent Carter Center conference. Participants agreed a country's level of need or deprivation was an obvious yardstick to determine funding from donors like the World Bank and the U.S. Agency for International Development. A second factor is the way the money will be used, with consideration given to economic reforms. Another is the degree to which a country or government has moved toward honoring democracy and human rights.

A fourth important consideration, he later added, is the percentage of the country's budget used for buying weapons. "If a country can afford to spend 20 or 30 percent of its income on weapons, why should we give them money to help the government give its people a better life?" President Carter asked.

U.N. Capability: One participant pointed out that those who had criticized the United Nations for its lack of action and effectiveness should consider its size and limited resources. "The United Nations is extremely small," he said. "The Dutch Ministry of Education probably has more civil servants than the whole of the United Nations, with its 2,600 employees. If we want it to do more than simply act as a fire brigade, we must face facts. Less than 1 percent of the U.N.'s annual budget is devoted to human rights. In London, Amnesty International employs two or three times the number of people employed by the U.N. Center for Human Rights in Geneva." Another participant expressed a similar idea, noting the need to re-examine the mandates and budgets of U.N. departments responsible for humanitarian aid.

Academic Exchanges: Later, in response to a question on "brain drain" in conflict areas, President Carter talked about the need for academic exchanges with underdeveloped countries. If he had been re-elected president, he would have established a special fund to finance formal partnerships between universities and the most needy countries on earth.

For instance, he said, the nearby University of Georgia, which has great expertise in agriculture, could form a partnership with Haiti. The university could teach Haitians how to replant their forests and show them how to grow more crops, he said. Too, he added, academics from other disciplines at the same university could help Haiti build up its tourist industry and show Haitians how to better promote trade and commerce.

After additional comments by audience members, Mr. Koppel asked Lisbet Palme to offer a summary statement before he adjourned the meeting. First, she commented on how women were underrepresented at the meeting.

"I'm a child psychologist by profession," Mrs. Palme continued, "and it occurs to me that there is a lack of maturity in this male-dominated society. As a woman, I feel a bit responsible for that, not to give you all the blame. Weapons, for example, are developed mostly by men. Women sometimes use them but not in

the same percentages as men. I feel there will be no real progress until we shift the focus from the marketplace of arms to the social-economic arena.

"UNICEF's worldwide annual budget equals five or six hours of the world's annual armament costs. When men no longer ask to buy weapons from each other, when they put guns back in their toy baskets where they belong once a male reaches 6 or 7 years of age, we can progress. But then, maybe we have. Maybe we are finally taking the leap from this maleish aggressive society to a more human society."

She then shared with the audience an account of the Nordic experience, whereby Sweden peacefully gave up claims to both Finland and Norway. In the case of Finland, the International Court of Justice decided the outcome. "Now, we seem to love one another, the Finnish and the Swedes," she said. "Of course it took time. But it is possible both to settle conflicts and fight poverty. It costs something, you know. It costs the rich something to fight poverty, and it costs energy and persistence to organize. But it can be done."

"There is only one way of solving international problems - through negotiations. What is important is to achieve a peaceful, negotiated, endurable, lasting solution. That can be done in three ways. One is through bilateral contacts (like the INN), which would have to be encouraged by the United Nations. The second is through an international conference. The third way . . . is for countries to go to the International Court of Justice."

Javier Pérez de Cuéllar,
former secretary-general of the United Nations

Background Paper: Conflict Resolution After the Cold War: Five Implications

by Peter Wallensteen [1](#)

The number of wars, or major armed conflicts, in the world is depressingly high and surprisingly stable.

The total number of wars in the world appears annually to be in the vicinity of 35-40 major armed conflicts.² This has been the case for a long period of time (See Table 1). It means that there are more than 30 countries or border areas in the world where heavy armed conflicts are going on in any given year, including smaller armed conflicts, some with a potential for escalation and intensification. For the years 1989-91, a total of 107 armed conflicts were identified.³ By any standard, these are very high numbers, and it is important that all efforts are concentrated on ending or reformulating these conflicts away from military action, human hardships, and societal strain.

As Peter Wallenssteen noted in his background paper, the end of the Cold War era meant the end of a number of conflicts and an increase in others.

When the Cold War was winding down, there was an expectation that the peace dividend was to be collected. Army expenditures would go down, and so would the number of conflicts. Critics were saying the opposite, arguing that the Cold War, the nuclear threat, and the global division into two blocs had imposed order and stability on the world. The end of the Cold War would imply chaos and disorder.

Remarkably, it seems that both predictions were right. On the one hand, the end of the Cold War has meant the end of a number of conflicts. It brought about - through united East-West efforts of conflict resolution - a termination of the Iran-Iraq, Namibia, and Cambodia wars, and by finally allowing regional initiatives to prevail, a solution to the war in Nicaragua. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan removed this issue from superpower contention and thus also served as a means of confidence-building between the superpowers.

Furthermore, conflicts maintained through Cold War tension by arms deliveries, economic aid, and political support from one or the other side were terminated, e.g. the two conflicts involving Ethiopia. Thus, the end of the Cold War has been associated with a reduction of conflicts. It appears that some of the momentum toward conflict resolution is still there, notably in efforts to handle Southern African conflicts. In addition, we may note that Stockholm International Peace

Research Institute (SIPRI) data shows global arms expenditures to be declining. Thus, there is a general positive impact of the receding superpower conflict. However, it is likely that this impact is gradually tapering off.

Table 1. Major Armed Conflicts in the World, 1986-1991

	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1986-1991
Major Armed Conflicts							
	38	40	40	37	37	36	55
Locations with Major Armed Conflicts							
	36	38	35	33	31	30	46

Note: A major armed conflict is one with more than 1,000 battle-deaths during the course of the conflict. Some locations may have more than one major armed conflict (e.g., Ethiopia). Source: Wallensteen 1992, pp.12-13.

The other fear, that the end of the Cold War would mean an increase in the number of conflicts, has also come true. There is now a set of local wars in the wake of Communist rule. Some of the conflicts have become very cruel and inhumane. To these belong the wars in former Yugoslavia but also the conflicts in the Caucasian region and Central Asia. The conflicts are local in character; that is, they do not, for the time being, engage regional or global powers as direct actors. They cannot easily be subsumed under a convenient heading as being religious, ethnic, or historical. However, these conflicts do make the questions of human identity very central to world politics, as they show the difficulty of reconciling collective (national) rights and human (individual) rights. Several such conflicts have already become major armed conflicts, and others may be in early phases of escalation.

The remarkable fact then is that while some conflicts disappear, others emerge and, thus, the total number of conflicts remains stable and high. There may no longer be a war in Ethiopia and Eritrea, but instead there are wars in former Yugoslavia. There is no confrontation between China and Vietnam, instead there is a war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. There is no war in El Salvador, instead there is one in Tadzhikistan. The total picture of major armed conflicts can be seen in Table 1.

We do not have data on casualties for the conflicts presently going on. It is clear, however, that by early 1993 some of the most devastating wars during the last 10 years had been terminated. Both the Iran-Iraq and Afghanistan wars have been estimated to cost more than 1 million deaths (Singer 1991). Both of these wars were, belatedly, brought to a halt - within the U.N. framework - in 1987-88 by the very powers that, through their involvement, contributed to the intensity of the conflicts. The endings were not immediately complete as it took until 1990 for Iraq to return territories to Iran and until 1992 for the Communist regime in Kabul to fall. The world today has no war of such magnitude as these two conflicts.

There are situations with this potential, but without major involvement from the big powers, few of them are likely to rise to such levels of destruction.

Instead we find actors who locally exploit their advantages militarily, such as Iraq in Kuwait, Serbian groups in Yugoslavia, and Somali warlords. These actors also resort to means not within the range of armed action, such as deliberately victimizing women, preventing food deliveries, forcefully removing people, and pursuing ecological destruction. These actions are aimed at the civilian population. They should be seen as signs of weakness, not as expressions of military strength. They negate modern advances in humanitarian law protecting civilians from the scourge of war. World reaction has also been uniformly negative, and thus it has been difficult for the parties committing these crimes to find international acceptance or allies.

As part of the ending of the Cold War, there is an important regional shift in the location of conflicts.

The Cold War had the strongest freezing impact in *the enlarged European area* (from Vladivostok to San Francisco). This is also where the end of the Cold War has had the most unsettling effects. A number of the new armed conflicts of the last few years are located in this area: Romania and Croatia were among these conflicts in 1989-91 (Heldt 1992), and Armenia-Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Tadzhikistan belong to this group in 1992. This means that

Europe has again become a scene of fairly large-scale battles. This conflict pattern is combined with economic hardships following the fall of the command economies and initial difficulties in making a market economy operative. It is commonly thought that economic decline increases frustration and fuels accusation and conflict against other groups. At the same time, the conflicts make it more difficult to rebuild the economy. There is a danger of conflicts becoming self-perpetuating and proliferating.

There is, however, a region that contrasts with the gloomy picture of the enlarged European area: *East and Southeast Asia*. This region also was severely polarized by the Cold War (e.g., the divisions of Korea, China, and Vietnam) and by the Soviet-China conflicts (e.g., over Cambodia). However, the thawing of the Cold War has occurred parallel to economic growth. The NIC (Newly Industrialized Countries) and ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) groupings as well as Hong Kong and China bear witness to this development. Like Europe, this area is densely populated and ridden by old ethnic conflicts, dynastic disputes, and strategic considerations. For the time being, the expectation of economic growth seems to move parties into new contacts and stimulates the drive toward conflict resolution. Cambodia is a case that comes to mind, where - under U.N. auspices - a major effort is well underway. Underlying this development, one may find a desire by the primary parties to move away from conflict and instead participate in economic development.

The difference between Europe and East/Southeast Asia can be expressed as an economic one. Western Europe finds itself in economic difficulties and has been unwilling/incapable of involving itself in the economic reconstruction of Eastern Europe. The experience of developing Eastern Germany has set a strong imprint also on the other countries, making caution the virtue. The dynamism of the Asian economies instead infuses expectations and boldness. However, there is also a political difference. In some parts of the contrasting Asian region, authoritarian Communist regimes remain in place. The domestic political scene remains closed, and opportunities for business are provided by

coerced stability. In the enlarged European area, the agenda is one of democratization and political reform, parallel to the economic changes. It is a greater task, and involves more problems. It may still, however, create a better foundation for the long-term future.

This means the world is not uniformly progressing toward greater chaos: There are trends and counter-trends, and there is regional variation.

Why then the common feeling of disorder, and, hence, the desire for a "new world order?" It appears that *what is being lost is predictability*. The Cold War, in an odd way, provided predictability in analyzing future trends and understanding emerging conflicts. Much of the work associated with the swings between detente and confrontation, aimed at improving predictability: This was the purpose of the hot line and the satellite systems, and it was a benefit of arms control negotiations, which provided clues into the priorities of the other side, etc. Uncertainty was being removed. The last period of detente actually began with agreements on confidence- and security-building measures (in Stockholm in 1986). With these measures the major powers wanted to guard against surprises from the other. Part of this was the fact that, ultimately, many ongoing armed conflicts were dependent on these very powers.

This predictability is now lost. The Gulf War showed that old predictions no longer worked. Few expected Iraq to invade Kuwait, as such actions would earlier have been held back by the relevant super-power. Few expected a global coalition against the invasion, as the world (and Iraq!) was accustomed to a familiar pattern of Cold-War polarization. Thus, predictability was reduced, opening new possibilities. Some of these would favor conflict initiation, as we have just seen; others would be beneficial for conflict resolution.

On the beneficial side is the *liberation of the United Nations*. Before the Gulf War, it had already begun to be engaged in central conflicts, as Table 2 shows. But 1991 was the real breakthrough, undoubtedly followed up in 1992, although we still lack data for that.

It is now less conceivable than before that a major armed confrontation anywhere will not come under the scrutiny of the U.N. system. Earlier, however, the United Nations was blocked from actions by the superpower veto. That is still in operation, and may become used again, although it has been out of use since May 1990. For a great number of cases, however, U.N. attention is now more likely than before. For many parties, this may be a deterring factor. The question remains: *What* can the United Nations effectively do and *when*?

It is likely that the effectiveness of the United Nations will depend on its *consistency*. If it acts in the same way in similar conflicts, it becomes a more predictable actor. Support for the organization will be enhanced. The record on this score has largely been hampered by the Cold War. In a study of six similar military interventions, the United Nations was found to react in different manners, and this appeared related to the Cold War.⁴ There is strength in now developing a more consistent approach to conflicts in the world. It is reasonable to say that each conflict should be treated on its own merits but also in ways that are comparable to those of similar cases. Although this may sound like a legal approach to international order, it is also one that creates a positive momentum of its own. Of course, the United Nations is a political body, and legal rigor cannot always be expected. Nevertheless, to move in this direction would make policy formulation easier, decisions more credible, and implementation more acceptable. This may, however, also require breaking new ground in conflict resolution.

Table 2. U.N. Presence in Major Armed Conflicts, 1986-1991

<u>1986</u>	<u>1987</u>	<u>1988</u>	<u>1989</u>	<u>1990</u>	<u>1991</u>	<u>1986-1991</u>
Major Armed Conflicts (Total)						
38	40	40	37	37	36	55
U.N. Action (Percent of Total)						
26	30	33	30	32	39	35

Note: "U.N. action" refers primarily to resolutions and statements by the Security Council or instructions to the secretary-general from the General Assembly. Source: Wallensteen 1992, pp.15.

As Table 2 makes clear, there were in 1991 a considerable number of conflicts the United Nations was not engaged in. Among those are found internal conflicts over government, i.e. *civil wars*, where the United Nations traditionally has been barred from action. Gradually, this barrier has been broken. The United Nations is becoming involved in negotiations over government in Afghanistan; in electoral processes in Namibia, Angola, and Cambodia; in observing violence in South Africa; and in bringing order to Somalia. Most of these actions have been at the invitation or with the consent of powerful groups in the countries concerned. Although they were not consulted, many groups in Somalia favored U.N. presence in their country. These actions have significantly enlarged the U.N. agenda, without moving the organization into enforcement rather than peace-building and peace-keeping. New ground is being broken, but consistency means that some criteria for involvement has to be set up. Perhaps one criterion stemming from these experiences as well as drawing on theory and research is the one of *enhancing democracy as a form of conflict resolution*. As the number of dictatorial regimes still is great, such a criterion might not gain a general adherence, but it still deserves discussion. The convention on human rights may provide a starting point. Furthermore, as new democracies (founded in a conflict resolution process and thus following war) will be weak, such a criterion needs to be supplemented with non-intrusive international support for democratic development.

Even more delicate are the conflicts over the state as such, i.e. where groups desire to break out and form their own state - *state-formation conflicts*. The United Nations has favored decolonization, a process of independence largely confined within the boundaries drawn up by colonial powers. There was little difficulty in recognizing the new states emerging from the British, French, or Soviet empires. It has been more difficult to handle cases where there is no agreement between the parties on the new borders, e.g. the ex-Yugoslav case. The United Nations, as well as most of the international community, has preferred to accept earlier administrative lines as the international boundaries,

pending agreement among the parties. Again we see that the consent of the parties is important but also that the United Nations itself is an organization of states, which may have a shared interest in the preservation of present borders. Movements desiring to break out of existing states and which have not been commonly seen as decolonization movements have had the greatest difficulties in becoming internationally accepted. This has meant that there are a considerable number of state-formation conflicts that have not been available for U.N. efforts (e.g. the Tamil, Punjab, Kashmir, Mindanao issues). The question is whether the attention to the Kurdish population in Iraq is a humanitarian issue or also an approach to settle a state-formation conflict by *building international safeguards for autonomy within a state*. This would be breaking new ground, as it implies a shift in the perception of sovereignty. [5](#)

Another change may be that *major weapon systems are no longer available as before*. Large wars require large shipments of weapons, spare parts, and fuel, as well as support services (bases), etc. Only minor weapons can be produced during the course of a conflict. During the Cold War, such shipments were predictable if a country/actor was clearly within one bloc. This is no longer so. Any actor planning to initiate a major war will have to do this under reduced predictability: It is no longer self-evident that the required flow of weaponry is going to come in, that loans will be available, or that support will be provided. Furthermore, it will be increasingly more difficult to hide such deliveries. As deliveries will be detected, there is a chance for action. The actor planning action, in other words, will have to accumulate considerable stockpiles before launching a war. But this again provides the world with an indicator of something brewing. The chances of monitoring arms transfers have thus increased, and that remains a crucial element in restoring predictability: It provides a way of developing an early warning system.

If we combine these observations, a proposal to recreate predictability can be made. This means that a U.N.-sponsored, but autonomous, early warning system focusing on arms transfers, particularly in cases with known conflicts, would be

helpful. Such a monitoring agency would have to observe not only transfers but also production of major arms. *The ideal body would be one resembling the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) plus the Special Commission on Iraq*, giving it global monitoring and interventionary rights in defined fields of conventional arms transfers and arms production. Part of this would then (involve alerting) IAEA (or better a non-governmental agency, a *Nuclear Watch* of sorts) to monitor the hiring of nuclear scientists in countries with near-nuclear capability, political ambitions, and little transparency.

The ways in which conflicts were managed during the Cold War are no longer legitimate, and thus there is a need to develop new forms.

The uneasiness of the early 1990s may have another root as well. During the Cold War, unsatisfactory solutions could be accepted as ways of preventing a nuclear war: The dangers of escalation were often imminent. This led to solutions that later renewed the problems. For instance, some countries were divided along parallels or artificial borders, and dictatorial regimes were accepted as preferable to regimes supported by the opponent. The examples are too many to require exemplification. (It is) sufficient to point to the division of Germany and Korea and the support for Ceausescu, Pinochet, Mengistu, and Husak. Such solutions are no longer legitimate, as the threat of nuclear war is no longer, in most cases, a credible one. Instead, the ending of the Cold War has been a time for *democratization* as the legitimate form of conflict resolution, as we just noted. However, *the principles of democracy (building on individual rights) sometimes contradict principles of self-determination (building on collective rights)*, creating a problem the Cold War era never addressed. It is left to the present to find solutions. A minority belonging to one ethnic group may fear the suppression of others and thus may want to create a state of its own. But that may in turn involve the rights of other groups, being minorities in the areas designated for such a state. The minority problems repeats itself. Such problems existed during the Cold War: The division of Cyprus is one case, the crisis over Palestine

another, the Kurdish issue a third, the division of Pakistan from Bangladesh (with problems still unsolved after more than 20 years) a fourth, etc.

The conflict over Bosnia and Herzegovina is a case where the solution, by the mediators, is sought in *a canton-like arrangement* of the country. Similarly, decentralized solutions may be contemplated for Somalia and for the Palestinian conflicts. It then means drawing lines between communities and peoples. The question is how thick the lines have to be. If they are too thick, this solution could have some of the negative qualities of partitions, by forcing people out of areas they have previously lived in. Ethnic cleansing could not only be legitimized but also stimulated. However, under certain conditions, it might provide a more humane solution.

The canton solution is often modeled after Switzerland. Although there are federal states in the world, few of them have been created to end a full-scale war. The cases mentioned, and in particular Bosnia and Herzegovina, may be the first deliberate application of it as a tool for conflict resolution. The original canton model emerged historically and organically, and Switzerland was formed as a federation of units that already had independence, identity, and government. The modern proposals refer to cases that are very different. A primary danger is that *the solution may be perceived as imposed from the outside*. This means that neither of the parties may "really" like it and may in the future try to overturn it. Also, the weaker side may feel this more acutely than the stronger party. For instance, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, one side may agree to this solution as it preserves the idea of Bosnia and Herzegovina being one country, when the world is not willing to assist the underdog more thoroughly. It may feel that later the authority of the central state can be expanded. For the other side, this may be a solution to get territory and recognition, escape international condemnation, and then return to the question later. The historical record suggests that peace agreements concluded under duress are less durable.⁶ Entering an agreement with negative expectations could be dangerous for the future.

The positive side of the proposed agreement is that the issue that today is a war may become a question of division of power between the center and the constituent cantons/provinces. It seems, however, that canton-solutions require many preconditions to work. *Only if combined with free trade, free personal mobility, freedom of residence, freedom of religion, demilitarization, and international guarantees for autonomy and for the preservation of borders* is a solution likely to be found. This means, at the same time, making the agreement positively attractive to parties and giving them a vision of how such a state could operate. Then efforts are made to *preserve existing states, meet demands for self-determination, and enhance human rights*. The Cold War period did not manage to solve the equation; perhaps the post-Cold War period can. Certainly the necessity is there.

There are new issues after the Cold War: the ecological problematique and a potential new polarization.

The *ecological issue* has normally not been linked to the armed conflict problematique. There has been considerable conflict and conflict behavior domestically as well as transnationally over such issues as transportation of nuclear waste, chemical weapons, and other military-related ecological issues. The Cold War has left a legacy in ecological destruction, particularly in the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact-member states. This has also been the case after major hot wars (the Pacific as well as Northern Africa and the Baltic Sea having locations full of World War II remnants). The responsibility should rest with the combatants to clean up after the battle. In addition, ecological damage, resulting from developmental uses of resources, appears increasingly to give rise to local conflict, occasionally leading to armed struggle. This is a new issue, which only recently has begun to draw attention. Examples come from diverse situations, notably between India and Bangladesh over the Ganges, local landowners in Bougainville fighting a mining company, as well as the government of Papua New Guinea and tribes in Sarawak opposing logging, etc. These are

early indications that continued depletion of nonrenewable resources may give rise to conflict in the future, possibly on a global scale. Thus, *preventive conflict resolution would have to incorporate managing the global environment* in a just and equitable way.

The Cold War was a confrontation largely between East and West. The former foes are now closely collaborating. It reasonable to predict that this will remain the case for a considerable time to come, as both the United States and Russia are likely to give priority to domestic development. Thus, a basis exists for the U.N. Security Council to act on issues where these two powers do not want to involve themselves directly. Both may prefer, even in cases deemed more vital to them, to take initiatives via the U.N. *The role of the United Nations is likely to remain high.* However, this requires that the U.N. also have the support of other actors and, in particular, the other members of the Security Council. Some members are temporary, which raises the question of representation in the Security Council: Should not all members be elected, and thus receive a mandate from other members, not only from their own domestic constituency? This is a constitutional issue with many possible solutions, even biased ones in favor of major powers.

One Security Council member is a permanent one and needs considerable thought: *China.* The policies of the People's Republic have to be watched carefully. On several important issues, China has presented a different perspective from the other permanent members, and it has abstained from voting affirmatively. As we have seen above, China's economy is growing at a rapid pace. Its domestic policies remain authoritarian. China is pursuing military modernization and has considerable regional influence. This creates a dilemma. On one hand, an efficient Security Council requires (open or tacit) support from China; on the other hand, China's own policies are contrary to some of the conflict resolution principles that are now emerging (e.g. democratization, ethnic autonomy). There is a danger of a new polarization involving the West (or now the North) on one end and China on the opposite end of the spectrum. This

potential polarization could play itself out in the very region where most economic progress now is occurring. It would impact the world at large.

The problem is a familiar one from the Cold War: Is it detente or confrontation that will have the most favorable long-term impact for global cooperation as well as democratic growth? *The lessons from the Cold War do not provide a clear-cut answer*, as there were repeated periods of detente and confrontation. The fall of the Soviet Communist state followed a period of confrontation, clearly straining a regime at the same time fighting a protracted war. But the fall began during a period of detente, as only detente would give a chance for reformers to initiate peaceful transformation. To prevent future polarization between the North, controlling the largest resources and the most wealth, and China, possibly representing a Southern critique of the present world order, a policy needs to be devised now. It is an issue emerging from the Cold War. It requires a broad spectrum of actions, some of which may be contained in an understanding of how the Cold War ended, and some devised on other grounds.

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Working Session: Burma/Myanmar

Facilitator: Dayle Spencer

Paper Author: Mya Maung

Panelist: Josef Silverstein

Rapporteur: Zunetta Liddell [1](#)

Conflict in Burma [2](#)

by Mya Maung

The historical roots of Burma's intra-national conflict lie in the nature and functioning of its traditional plural society and authoritarian polity. The traditional Burmese society under the dominance of the central kingdoms of the Burmese (the majority ethnic group called Bamah or Myanmah) was a Buddhist nation state with a common religion and culture among the main ethnic groups of Burmese, Mons, Shans, and Arakanese. The political history of ancient Burma, however, was a saga of continuous power struggles at the Burmese kingdominated center and wars between the Burmese kingdoms and the kingdoms of ethnic minorities, leaving deep wounds of fear and mistrust among them. Ancient Burma was also marred by wars between the Burmese kingdoms and foreign

British rule over Burma lasted nearly a century, beginning in the 19th century, bringing to a temporary end the warridden plural society and ethnophobia among the ethnic groups. It created the colonial plural society and dual economy of Burma dominated by Europeans and foreign orientals, Indians, and Chinese. In colonial Burma, the Karens, the Kayars, the Kachins, and a host of other ethnic tribes came into prominence by virtue of absorbing Christianity, adding a religious dimension to the intra-national conflict of independent Burma. The alienation of the Burmese society and economy under the uncontrolled capitalist economic system of British Burma led to the nationalist movements by the

leaders of major ethnic groups against the British and Indians. It also left an immense xenophobia among nationalist Burmese leaders.

With the gaining of independence from the British in 1948, Burma's legacy of power struggles at the center and the dormant ethnophobia of traditional Burma resurfaced and erupted into civil wars. On the eve of independence in 1947, the legendary liberator of Burma from British rule, Gen. Aung San (who is the father of the present opposition leader to the military regime under house arrest, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi), along with the prominent political leaders of his Cabinet, was assassinated.

U Nu succeeded the political leadership and was elected prime minister of the Union of Burma. Under the civilian government of Prime Minister U Nu, Burma was torn asunder by power struggles among the civilian political leaders and civil wars with the Burma Communist Party and the revolt of ethnic minority groups, especially the Karens whose army nearly captured the capital of Rangoon in 1949. This civil strife, and later minority revolts, led to the demise of the U Nu civilian government and the rise of a new rival leader, Gen. Ne Win who deposed the democratically elected prime minister, U Nu, by staging a military coup in 1962. The rise of Gen. Ne Win and military elites to power and prominence on the Burmese political scene was due to the organizational efficiency of the Burmese army and gradual accumulation of wealth and economic power by various military enterprises. For the next 26 years and to the present, the Burmese military "robber barons" have transformed Burma into a reclusive totalitarian nightmare state of ruthless oppression and atrocious human rights violations.

Both the civilian and military leadership of Burma attempted to rule the country by invoking the mythical Burmese Buddhist kingdoms in terms of race, religion, and xenophobia. The result is the resurrection of the traditional plural society and authoritarian polity marred by more than four decades of political and ethnic insurgency. Under the democratically elected civilian government, however, freedom was not annihilated as it was under the military dictatorship. Under the

gross economic mismanagement of the military command economy by Gen. Ne Win and his incompetent commanders, the resource-rich and relatively prosperous Burma became one of the least-developed countries by 1987. This led to the political uprising of impoverished masses led by college students in 1988.

In September 1988, the Burmese generals led by Gen. Saw Maung staged a fake military coup to sustain the military dictatorship, killing thousands of demonstrators against the 26-year military rule of Gen. Ne Win. After establishing themselves as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), the junta has governed Burma in defiance of the legitimate basis of authority to govern - the will of the people as stipulated in Article 21 of the U.N. Declaration of Fundamental Human Rights. This will was expressed in a multiparty election in May 1990, after subduing all prominent opposition leaders, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, who has been under house arrest since July 1989. The main opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD) of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, won the election by a landslide. The mandate of the election was immediately nullified by the junta. The SLORC continues to govern Burma by force, subjugating winners of the election and committing human rights violations. The main force of political opposition in central Burma is the winner of 1991 Nobel Peace Prize, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. The rest of the opposition groups include some 3,000 dissident students stranded along the Thai border, the exiled government of Sein Win, the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB), the Karen National Union (KNU), and the Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB), an umbrella coalition organization of the Burmese political rebels and ethnic minority insurgents.

The main question asked is, "Do the United Nations and the outside world help sustain the military rule in Burma?" This question is raised with the objective of showing that there is a basic contradiction between the professed ideals and real actions of major democratic institutions (individual governments and intergovernmental organizations) to support human rights and democracy

movements in Burma. The actions of external organizations underscore the fact that in the real setting of international political economy, the economic interest of nations tends to supersede concern over human rights abuses. Burma's international and intra-national conflicts are largely rooted in economic factors such as the politics of rice, teak, gems, oil, and opium, more so than in racial, cultural, or religious factors.

The main conflict in Burma today is between illegitimate military power-holders and the people of Burma in general. The source of the Burmese military junta's claim to legitimacy to govern Burma against the wish and will of its people comes from continued international and economic support. Military rule over Burma is sustained by external organizations and countries that strengthen the Burmese generals' stranglehold of power. Some of them give official aid, including China, Japan, and even some U.N. agencies. Others support the regime by trading, investing, and selling arms (China is the largest supplier of arms and military technology) to the SLORC.

Ironically, the major source of the junta's claim to legitimacy comes from the United Nations itself. The United Nations has in fact allowed Burma to continue its membership. It has sponsored official visits and contacts with the SLORC, accepted the change of name from Burma to Myanmar, and approved the application for the least-developed country status. Up to the present, some of its affiliated agencies - the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the International Labor Organization (ILO), the International Development Association (IDA), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), and the World Health Organization (WHO) - have been funding certain SLORC projects. These activities amount to a de facto recognition of the Burmese military regime as the legitimate government of Burma.

Activities of the private corporate world have had similar effects. Next to Thai companies that had secured the majority of logging and fishing rights, U.S. corporations, represented by Unocal, Texaco, Amoco, and Pepsi-Cola, are the

largest direct investors in Myanmar. Multinational corporations of European Community countries have also invested heavily in Burma. The former communist states of Eastern Europe and the geopolitically more important neighboring Asian countries (China, Japan, Thailand, and ASEAN members) follow similar policies of recognizing and dealing with the Burmese military regime.

Since the election, the United States, the United Nations, the European Community, and a host of international human rights organizations have repeatedly rebuked the Burmese generals but have been unable to persuade them to release Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and transfer power to the winners of election. These empty gestures of rebukes and resolutions have so far not been effective in creating incentives for the Burmese generals to give up power and stop their continued human rights abuses in Burma. The case in point is the SLORC's defiance of the latest (Dec. 4, 1992) U.N. General Assembly Resolutions' call for the unconditional release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the extension of full cooperation to the U.N. rapporteur, Professor Yozo Yokota, to meet with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other detainees.

Since 1989, after the SLORC launched ostensible measures of economic reforms in the name of legalization of border trade and open-door economy, there has been a ceaseless flow of direct investments and capital into Burma from the private corporate world. With the external funds obtained, the military junta has been able to sustain its stranglehold on power by purchasing arms from around the world. The present international economic support of the SLORC replicates the massive foreign aid given to the Gen. Ne Win's regime in the mid-1970s up to 1988. The Burma AID Group, sponsored by the U.S. government, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and a host of nations, poured billions of aid into Burma when the military regime ostensibly relaxed economic controls and introduced nominal economic reforms. This helped sustain the military grip on power and political repression for another decade and a half.

Based upon the foregoing analysis, it is fair to conclude that as long as the external flow of capital and arms into Burma continues, the military strangle-hold of power and people will persist. For individual governments and intergovernmental organizations, it is recommended that they should assist and work closely with private refugee support organizations that are active and effective in relieving the plight of hundreds of thousands of refugees from central Burma along the eastern and northwestern borders. The main recommendation for U.N. agencies is to halt their funding of SLORC's development projects. For individual governments, an arms and economic embargo should be imposed on Burma until the military rulers transfer power to the legitimate winners of the May 1990 multiparty election.

Session Discussion

by Zunetta Liddell, Rapporteur

The 20 or so participants in the Burma working session included the secretary-general of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and representatives of the governments of neighboring countries and of ethnic nationality groups who have been involved in the conflict for more than 40 years. Also participating were U.N. personnel, humanitarian and refugee nongovernmental organizations, academics, Burmese opposition activists, and other concerned individuals who are working toward a negotiated settlement of the Burmese civil war and a transition to democratic government with full regard to human rights. Burma's State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) did not send a representative to the Consultation. Conclusions reached by participants include:

One cause of the 40-year civil war is prolonged constitutional conflict concerning minority rights. A second, more recent cause is the refusal of the military government to transfer power to those elected in the 1990 general election. The self-perception of the military concerning their past and future role in the country also contributes to the conflict.

Unlike current disputes in many other countries, ethnic nationality groups in Burma are firmly committed to a democratic federal union and do not want to see the disintegration of the state. They are working with the Burma political opposition on the constitution to guarantee such a federation.

The actions supposedly designed to encourage the transition to democracy have, so far, been entirely cosmetic. In fact, these moves are actually designed to ensure an army-dominated government. (The National Convention is an example.) Efforts to influence the direction of the writing of the constitution will most likely prove ineffective. It is debatable whether regional models of government can be applied. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is a key player in any settlement, and all calls for negotiation must include her. Her followers include some members of the army. These people need to be approached in suitable ways.

Meanwhile, the SLORC military leadership remains largely inaccessible to outsiders. Their absence from the meeting was a further indication of their unwillingness to enter into dialogue. Efforts to involve them should be strengthened.

The military's seeming immunity to both internal and external pressure is the main obstacle to a resolution of the conflict. However, changes in internal policy since April 1992, which have improved the quality of life of some individuals, were only undertaken as a result of international pressure. The military are especially sensitive to media coverage.

The complete lack of any civil society inside Burma and the annihilation of the political opposition is a barrier in that internal pressure on the government is minimal. At the same time, the military cares little for the suffering of its own people. The government spends 50 percent of the country's Gross National Product on arms, while health care and education are sorely neglected. The arms trade and opium production, which enables the purchase of arms, are also major barriers. China is the country's main supplier of arms.

Neighboring countries, particularly ASEAN members, are key to opening up doors to negotiation. Thailand's acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize laureates' visit to the Burma border recently signals a movement within ASEAN that should be encouraged. One barrier preventing these countries from playing a role in the resolution of Burma's problems may be a fear of the financial burden it would entail in rebuilding Burma. Western governments and international organizations back this process.

Resolution must be seen as a process and one that will take a great deal of effort and commitment. The SLORC should be offered "sticks" and "carrots" to try to beat or tempt the SLORC into discussion, and neighboring countries should be encouraged to take leading roles similar to the one that Indonesia played in the Cambodian settlement.

There are many other actions that could be taken to help settle the conflict. For instance, the International Negotiation Network should express its support of a negotiated settlement of the civil war. The plight of the more than 300,000 refugees in Bangladesh and Thailand should be given maximum publicity that focuses on the urgent need for effective international monitoring of their return to Burma.

The international community should maintain its interest in the Burmese situation, and humanitarian and human rights workers in Burma and Thailand should be nominated for awards. Publicity should be given to the work of the Kachin ethnic nationality for their drug eradication program, which has resulted in a 75 percent reduction in opium planting in the areas they control (a program achieved with no external assistance or aid).

Representatives of the united opposition should be encouraged to visit ASEAN members and other neighboring countries to discuss the situation in Burma before the July 1993 meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers. Also, the U.N. secretary-general should appoint a special envoy to sound out ways of negotiating an end to the civil war in Burma. However, the envoy should first visit neighboring countries. The role of U.N. development agencies in Burma needs to

be assessed in light of increasing agreement on the importance of aid conditionality and to ensure consistency with the messages coming from the U.N. Commission on Human Rights and the General Assembly. Clear conditions should be clarified and emphasized before any major development programs are agreed upon. And donor countries and potential donor countries should be encouraged to re-form a Burma aid group and adopt these same conditions. There should be an international arms embargo on Burma. The U.S. government and the European Community, which already have an embargo, should encourage the main arms suppliers to Burma (especially China, North Korea, Pakistan, and Singapore) to follow suit. Also, opposition groups should continue to be empowered and otherwise assisted through recognition, training programs, international exposure, and other measures. Models of peaceful and successful transition from a military government need to be assessed in terms of their applicability to the Burma case with a view to finding and preparing for a process which might work there.

Working Session: The Caucasus

Facilitator: Vamik Volkan

Paper Author: Paul Henze

Panelists: Yuri Urbanovitch and George Hewitt

Rapporteur: Margery Farrar [1](#)

Conflict in the Caucasus

by Paul Henze

Taken as a whole, the Caucasus has been favored by nature as much as any comparable region in the world. As throughout the ex-communist world, history has come alive again in the Caucasus in ways that are difficult for those who have not experienced communism to understand. Since the region is among the oldest settled regions on earth and populated by peoples speaking languages related to no others in the world, it has a great deal of history that extends far back into ancient times. During the Soviet period, all history was suppressed or

forced into a rigid, dogmatic framework that left most Caucasian peoples feeling cheated of their past but deeply concerned about their identity and their roots. Each ethnic group has its own version of its origin and its past, and these more often than not, conflict with neighbors' versions. There is, thus, a great deal of argumentation about history. Current problems are too often debated in terms of ancient texts, archaeology, and even legends and myths. Intriguing and entertaining as such argumentation may be, it tends to exacerbate and obfuscate conflicts rather than facilitate settlement of them.

Depending on the criteria used for classifying peoples and languages, as many as 50 ethnic groups, each with its own distinctive language or dialect, can be catalogued in the Caucasus, which includes Georgia, Abkhazia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.



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The history of the Caucasus during the last two or three centuries is as much a colonial experience as the history of India or Africa. Outsiders steeped in Russian history often forget this. The Russian advance into the Caucasus began in the 17th century but did not proceed very rapidly until the end of the 18th century. Then it accelerated with great speed and considerable drama. By the end of the first quarter of the 19th century, the Russian Empire's boundaries with Turkey and Iran had been firmly established where they remained, with only slight changes, until the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 and the newly independent Transcaucasian republics inherited them. The predominantly Muslim North Caucasus was not subdued until the 1860s. Many of its peoples never reconciled themselves to Russian domination. They display many of the attitudes and behavior patterns characteristic of ex-colonial Asians and Africans. The ethnic complexity of the Caucasus makes areas such as the Balkans or Afghanistan look simple in comparison. Ethnic awareness and language are, with few exceptions, inextricably linked. Depending on criteria used for classifying

ethnicity and languages, as many as 50 ethnic groups, each with its own distinctive language or dialect, can be catalogued in the Caucasus.

The most numerous of the indigenous nationalities are the Azeris, the Armenians, the Georgians, and the Chechens. The Azeris are Turks and speak a language close to the Turkish of Anatolia. The Armenians are an Indo-European people. The Georgians and the Chechens are peoples unique to the Caucasus, often termed Paleocaucasians. There are perhaps as many as two dozen other Paleocaucasian ethnic groups in the North Caucasus. These include the Abkhaz and several Circassian subgroups, the Chechens' cousins the Ingush, and the Avars, Lezgins, and several others in Dagestan, which is the most ethnically complex of all Caucasian territories.

Turks came into the Caucasus for the most part during the first millennium of our era and in addition to the Azeris include four North Caucasian ethnic groups: the Karachai, the Balkars, the Nogais, and the Kumyks. There are smaller Turkic groups as well, such as the Meskhetian Turks of Georgia, who were deported (along with several North Caucasian peoples) at the end of World War II but were not allowed to return when the others were restored to their native territories at the end of the 1950s.

The Ossetes, who occupy the center of the North Caucasus, speak an Iranian language. The Kalmyks, who occupy a large territory in the steppes north of the mountains, are Mongols. There are other, smaller, Iranian-related groups. Sizable groups of Greeks have lived in the Caucasus since ancient times. Finally, there are Kurds, Assyrians, several kinds of Jews, and last but not least, Slavs. In the North Caucasus, out of a total population approaching 6 million, perhaps 20 percent are now Slavs.

Ethnic consciousness is strong throughout the Caucasus, and a high degree of adherence to native languages, even where Russian is widely spoken as a second language, is common. Without intending to do so, the Soviet system encouraged ethnic cohesiveness. The collapse of the system has further encouraged it, in some instances to the point of chauvinism. Ethnic groups and

their leaders, uncertain of their status and apprehensive about their future and their relations with neighbors, have fallen back on ethnic solidarity to counter their sense of insecurity.

Religion is, as a rule, a component of ethnicity in the Caucasus, but it is almost always secondary. While, for example, Christians and Muslims feel a high degree of affinity to other ethnic groups of the same faith, adherence to a common religion will not necessarily reduce feelings of hostility and tension if conflict is caused by territorial disputes or exacerbated by economic rivalry. Historically, Russia exploited Georgian and Armenian adherence to Christianity to cast herself in the role of protector of all Christians, but resentment among Georgians of Moscow's domination of the Georgian Orthodox Church runs deep. Among Armenians religion operates in a more complex fashion but no longer necessarily inclines Armenians toward Russia. While Azeris are perhaps two-thirds Shi'a, religious tension in Azerbaijan has not become a serious problem. North Caucasian Muslims are almost all Sunni. In general, Islamic feelings and habits in the North Caucasus are strongest in the east and become less intense toward the west. This reflects the fact that the eastern Caucasus was converted by Arabs who invaded in the first two centuries of Islam. The peoples who lived north of the mountains in the center and west adhered to ancient forms of Christianity often mixed with more ancient beliefs until the 18th, and in some cases, the 19th centuries.

Religion has been both misunderstood and misrepresented (sometimes willfully by Caucasians themselves) as the primary cause of current conflict. The Abkhaz, for example, repeatedly characterized in the Western press as Muslims speaking a Turkic language, are for the most part not Muslims at all, and their language has no relationship to Turkish. Most Muslim Abkhaz emigrated (or were expelled by the Russians) to the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century, along with perhaps 2 million other Muslim Circassians, Chechens, and others. New North Caucasian leaders (e.g. Dudaev, the Chechen president) have exploited the concept of Islamic solidarity as a cover for intervention in Abkhazia that appears to have had

other motivations. Religion is not a factor in the Abkhaz situation. Neither is religion, per se, a primary cause of Azeri-Armenian hostility, which has led to massacres by both sides and fuels the seemingly endless war over Nagorno-Karabakh. The hostility is generated to a greater extent by ethnic and economic animosities and territorial disputes rooted in the history of the past 200 years. Economically, Soviet colonialism was highly exploitative, for priorities applied to infrastructure expansion and agricultural and industrial development were invariably those of the center. As the momentum went out of the system, stagnation and degeneration set in. Because the region is basically well-endowed by nature, and because population pressure is not serious, danger of starvation and severe privation is less acute in the Caucasus. Everywhere, however, there has been a severe decline in the standard and quality of life. Some colonial areas (such as the former Belgian Congo - now Zaire - or Indonesia) were launched into independence with little preparation by the metropolitan power. Most (such as India), however, went through a substantial period of tutelage in self-administration. Transfer of power - independence - involved more elation than shock and even in areas where disorder followed, experienced administrators and political leaders were able to maintain control and continue orderly governmental and economic processes. European colonial empires did not collapse; they were disbanded. In contrast, there was almost no preparation for independence in the ex-Soviet Union. Local party and government officials had been conditioned to obey and implement orders from the center and to think in terms of central priorities. Populations developed habits of thinking of their own needs as largely illicit - which they were, from Moscow's point of view. Under Soviet socialism, everything belonged to everybody, so public facilities in actuality belonged to nobody. Common property could be misappropriated, stolen, neglected.

In comparison to regions with similar geographic features and resources, the Caucasus is not overpopulated. However, overpopulation is a relative concept. And the Soviet system prevented people from developing their skills and

servicing their own needs. At the same time it provided relatively few opportunities for migration under attractive conditions. Several factors have been involved, including forced collectivization of almost all agricultural activity. State agricultural enterprises employed large numbers of workers irrationally and industry even more so. Because the state-managed distribution and supply system failed to meet the needs of the population, illegal private trade - and even manufacturing - networks developed. These were usually dominated by regional or ethnic "mafias," a term used in the ex-Soviet Union to cover almost all interest groups operating outside the framework of official controls. These provided, and continue to provide, employment for otherwise jobless young men. Nevertheless, even during the period of firm Soviet control, there was a great surplus of labor, some of which was siphoned off to seasonal employment in Russia.

As for the Russian factor, in all three now-independent Transcaucasian republics, responsible people maintain that the Soviet secret police and intelligence agency (KGB) and the communist party, on orders from Moscow, deliberately exacerbated conflicts within and between them during the final years of Soviet power. While this perception may be exaggerated, there is evidence to support it in some cases, and the result was to burden each of these countries with deteriorated situations difficult for inexperienced and often insecure leaders to deal with. Some Armenians gave priority to an attempt to absorb Nagorno-Karabakh and started a war against Azerbaijan. The Azeris had difficulty getting a government capable of defining their national interests and setting priorities for consolidating independence. The democratically elected and liberal leadership that finally came to power in Azerbaijan in June 1992 had no alternative but to give highest priority to regaining territory lost to Armenia and counter a potential threat against Nakhichevan. Georgia became independent with secessionist movements already asserting themselves with external encouragement in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Azeris accuse Moscow of tilting toward Armenia, and Georgians accuse Moscow of still encouraging secessionists.

The primary conclusion that can be drawn from this continuing welter of charges of interference and irresponsibility by Russia(ns) is that President Boris Yeltsin's government has not articulated or been able to enforce a clear and comprehensive Caucasus policy. It is not surprising that disengagement of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan from the former Soviet Union has left much unfinished business with the Russian Federation that remains to be accomplished. Each of these governments is currently working on new treaties and agreements. There is a tendency to postpone some difficult issues, however, which may not be unwise.

A clear Russian policy is even more urgent in the North Caucasus, for the collapse of the Soviet Union left the North Caucasus within the Russian Federation, though geographically and politically the Caucasus as a whole constitutes a rather clearly defined region. The structure of the Russian Federation is being redefined, with a new constitution likely to be put to referendum during 1993. The new constitution, whatever its provisions, is not likely to settle many ethnic and regional demands for self-determination, real autonomy, or independence. The situation in the North Caucasus has been additionally exacerbated by the existence of a Confederation of North Caucasian Peoples (not states), which was formed in 1991 with Chechens and Kabardans among its most enthusiastic members. It has claimed membership of 15 peoples, but the manner in which these peoples' representatives have been chosen is unclear. A coherent North Caucasian federation, within or outside the framework of the Russian Federation or the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), would offer the prospect of mitigating the problems of the region that are going to continue to bedevil Russia as long as she stumbles on along traditional divide-and-rule lines. Political effervescence and open conflict are likely to continue to characterize the region, for leaders of some ethnic groups aim to separate from existing political entities and set up separate administrations.

Chto Delat'? What is to be done? It is important to recognize a few simple general principles as a starting point. First, there is no general solution for the

problems of the Caucasus. The complexity of the region is such that each situation has to be dealt with in its own context. Active external intervention in any form - fact-finding, conflict resolution, mediation, observers, peacekeeping forces - can be undertaken only with the consent and some degree of support of the powers that exercise sovereignty and/or parties in conflict.

Also, Russia must be at least minimally supportive of efforts undertaken in the Caucasus. And solution of conflicts, desirable as it may be, is likely to be an unrealistic goal. Mitigation, reduction of intensity, cessation of active hostilities, are likely to be the best result that can be sought.

Finally, care must be taken that external intervention does not have the unintended effect of prolonging, exacerbating, or intensifying conflicts or reducing prospects for mitigation. Well-meaning external efforts at conflict resolution are all too often exploited by parties in conflict merely to propagandize their cause. While Caucasians talk in terms of democracy, human rights, and free-markets, these concepts are still inadequately understood and often exploited as slogans to attract outside support or discredit rivals. Traditional habits and attitudes were never entirely superseded by Soviet practices. Some were adapted and some distorted, but they remain as a substratum. Outsiders coming into these societies to do good must be mindful of underlying layers of consciousness, of conditioned reflexes, of deep-seated fears, both articulated and inherent, which are likely to persist for a long time. They will be well-advised to read history, literature, and ethnography relating to the Caucasus to deepen their perceptions and give Caucasians some feeling of assurance that they understand the context in which they live. While a sizable number of Caucasians of all ethnic groups expends their energy in economic activity ranging from open trade to smuggling of drugs and arms, and many cooperate across ethnic lines, others who occupy themselves with politics are more often than not oblivious to economic considerations. While some conflicts in the Caucasus have been exacerbated by some of the economic factors discussed above, most of the ethnic-based conflicts are not economically motivated. Most of the ethnic leaders (both those

in power and those in opposition) are neglectful of economic considerations. As a result, economic reform has been lagging in most of the Caucasus. This lag and ethnic tension constitute a vicious circle: Ethnic tension discourages economic reform, and lack of economic reform encourages ethnic tension.

If economic rejuvenation and development were given higher priority, many ethnic conflicts would probably be reduced in intensity. A good example is the Georgian autonomous republic of Ajaria. If religion and ethnic particularism were inherently a cause of conflict, this region, with its Muslim-oriented population (closely related to the population of Northeastern Turkey) ought to be an area of serious tension. Instead, it is one of Georgia's most peaceful regions as well as an area that has made great strides toward economic recovery and prosperity.

Session Discussion

by Margery Farrar, Rapporteur

Approximately 40 participants attended the Caucasus session. They included at least one official or semi-official representative from each side of the two main conflicts discussed. Also attending were a former ambassador under the Carter administration, representatives from the United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), and citizens groups. Scholars who specialize in the Caucasus and specialists in diplomacy and conflict resolution rounded out participation.

Some participants concentrated on general strategies that could be applied to the Caucasus as a whole. However, most focused either on the Georgia/Abkhazia conflict or on the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

During the discussion, group members made the following points:

The conflict in the South Caucasus is a "latent disease" that may have begun prior to creation of the Soviet Union. Because the Soviets neglected to treat even the symptoms of the conflict, the breakup of the Soviet Union and the instability created by the resulting power vacuum caused the conflict to race out of control.

The conflicts in that region are a complication of the "communist malady," particularly given the Soviet Union's divide-and-rule policies. This is true of the Caucasus as a whole.

The stronger Armenian military position immediately following the Soviet Union's disintegration contributed to the conflict's severity. And, although the current Armenian government does not support it, a 1989 resolution by the Armenian Parliament that annexed Nagorno-Karabakh has not been withdrawn. This border conflict contributes to the wider conflict.

The border conflict has a number of causes. One cause is the disintegration of the Soviet empire and the arbitrary administrative borders imposed by the Soviets on disputed territories. Another is Azerbaijani's discriminatory treatment against Armenians, treatment that was designed to drive the Armenians out of Nagorno-Karabakh. Third, historic animosities were encouraged by pre-U.S.S.R. Czarist, Turkish, and Soviet policies. The failure of the Azerbaijani government and the international community to respond helpfully to early, peaceful demands by Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh for an end to repression (or to respond constructively to increasing levels of conflict) also contributed to the problem. Finally, the ready availability of arms to both parties has made the situation worse.

Also, other groups and individuals must bear responsibility for the part they've played in the conflicts. For instance, Georgian intellectuals failed to counteract increasing nationalistic influences in Georgia. Historians and linguists, in particular, assisted in efforts to discriminate against Georgia's minorities. Also, the international community recognized Georgia and accepted it into the United Nations prior to the holding of free elections and the demonstration of a positive human rights record toward minorities. This was a mistake.

The Georgia/Abkhazia conflict was caused by a combination of Stalin's subjugation of Abkhazia to Georgia, the rapid, uncontrolled disintegration of the communist empire, and Georgia's decision to respond with troops, tanks, and bombers when Abkhazia put forth negotiation proposals for post-Soviet relations.

Conflict in the Caucasus may be exacerbated by religious differences. Historical memories and fears of group extinction among many of the Caucasian peoples also contribute. These kinds of memories and fears tend to create psychologies of victimhood, and such states of mind make people less inclined to resist violent conflict because people feel unable to trust anyone other than their own ethnic group or clan. In any case, demands always become greater if solutions are not found early.

As for barriers to resolution, Russia's current lack of clarity in its policy toward the Transcaucasus (South Caucasus) presents a barrier to the stability of any negotiated resolution in that area. Also, any attempt to raise the status of Nagorno-Karabakh before a cease-fire is established will be a barrier to the negotiation process. Azerbaijan's lack of trust in cease-fire arrangements due to the violation of previous ones is also a problem, particularly since Armenia broke the most recent cease-fire agreement almost immediately after its signing. And the continued taking of hostages in Nagorno-Karabakh - which runs contrary to the Geneva Convention and is resulting in terrible consequences for women, children, and the elderly - could prevent the conflict from ever coming to an end. The failure by Georgia to withdraw or "relocate" Georgian troops from Abkhazia is and will continue to be another barrier to resolution. Attempting to go back to the document of Sept. 3, 1992, which the leader of Abkhazia was forced to sign, would be a barrier to resolution. Another barrier was erected when the remarks of a Georgian general were televised. The general said Georgia would sacrifice 100,000 Georgians, if necessary, to kill all 97,000 ethnic Abkhazians. A second public statement made by one of Georgia's other top generals also poses a problem. This general said Abkhazia would not even be allowed the status of autonomy it had enjoyed under the Soviet Union. In light of these and other public statements by officials, only the complete withdrawal of Georgian troops from Abkhazia will create enough trust for Abkhazia to begin negotiations.

"Soviet-style brainwashing and propaganda" are barriers to resolving the conflict.

The lack of a cease-fire will be a barrier to resolution, in that there will be no chance for negotiations and a peaceful settlement.

Concerning paths to resolution, it is important to develop a framework of central principles, agreed upon by the three presidents of the Transcaucasian states, that would establish a basis for creative and reliable negotiation. The inviolability of borders must be established, and Russia must be encouraged to offer a better definition of its presently unclear policy toward the Transcaucasus. Working delegations should be formed to define the interests, but not the positions, of each state. On that basis the contents of comprehensive agreements can be considered. The creation of a good psychological climate that will promote negotiations and reliable, stable agreements is also necessary.

Serious mediation by the international community is needed. The international community needs to find a new way to guarantee the security of the area to substitute for the former, if limited, guarantees offered by the Soviet Union, and to safeguard that guarantee.

Resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict involves two stages. First, it requires an immediate and unconditional cease-fire under international supervision, which can be implemented by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Second, peaceful negotiations within the framework of the CSCE, where all the legal questions can be discussed, and where Azerbaijan and Karabakh can discuss a compromise concerning the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, is desirable. Any decision satisfactory to Karabakh is expected to be acceptable to Armenia, and Armenia will most likely allow the CSCE to utilize the U.N. Security Council at the cease-fire stage. (While the CSCE has a mechanism for monitors, it lacks one for peacekeeping forces.) Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), in combination with governmental organizations, could play an important part by providing mediation assistance. Governmental organizations might help develop terms, while NGOs help carry

them out. International law also offers some possibilities for resolving the conflict, particularly regarding territorial boundaries.

Peaceful diplomatic and political means should be used to arrive at a resolution to the conflict, and an immediate cease-fire is the most important goal. Because Azerbaijanis distrust cease-fire agreements with Armenia due to past violations, the cease-fire mechanism should include cease-fire and disarmament of all regular and irregular troops (Armenian and Azerbaijani), the withdrawal of all armed troops from the conflict areas, (both Armenian and Azerbaijani), and the deployment of international observers from the CSCE to monitor the cease-fire and hostilities. A completely demilitarized zone around Karabakh should be established, and it is necessary for the Armenian and Azerbaijani communities to sit down together to negotiate the status of Karabakh. An international conference that would clarify the recognition of international borders on the one hand, and of minority and human rights on the other, might offer possibilities for resolution.

There are some encouraging signs on the horizon. For one, the Azerbaijani government has offered assurances that it will enforce the recently issued Azerbaijani law on the protection of national and religious minorities for the benefit of all minorities living in Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani government may now be willing to negotiate with the Armenian community on cultural autonomy, which gives Armenians who are citizens of Azerbaijan the right to retain their language, culture, religion, and political, economic, and social rights. Such autonomy would also allow Armenians to maintain relationships with Armenians in Armenia and to have full representation in the parliament and government of Azerbaijan. Also, the Azerbaijanis say they would support any efforts by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and The Carter Center to mediate between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Another positive sign is that formal talks organized by the CSCE are scheduled for Feb. 22 in Rome. Five states are expected to take part including the United States, Russia, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.

As for future efforts, a meeting of the three presidents of Transcaucasia arranged by and involving President Carter might prove helpful. The purpose of such a meeting would be to sign documents that would allow negotiations to begin without preconditions. A commitment to continue the negotiations regardless of future provocation should also be a condition agreed upon by the three presidents at that meeting. There should be a cease-fire during the meeting and during subsequent negotiations. Representatives concerned with the status of Nagorno-Karabakh should be present at the negotiations, and this issue should be singled out and discussed in the first round. The Russian government should be asked to increase its control over arms production and arms transfers. And Armenia should halt arms transfers to Nagorno-Karabakh through the Lachin humanitarian corridor. Also, Azerbaijan should withdraw its troops and weapons from Nagorno-Karabakh. International monitoring must be imposed in the area. In reference to confidence-building measures, the more than 40,000 Georgians dislocated by Abkhazian troop takeovers should be allowed to return to their homes with their rights restored. Similarly, Abkhazians dislocated by the Georgian takeover of Sukhumi should be allowed to return to their homes. Georgian troops should withdraw from areas where they surround Abkhazians, and U.N. observers should be introduced. A cease-fire, negotiations, and free elections are all needed to resolve the conflict.

The Abkhazian side should come to the table for negotiations. Since Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze has invited the Carters to visit Georgia, and since the Abkhazians don't place a great deal of trust in U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, perhaps President Carter could personally contribute to the solution of this conflict. To create a climate of trust on the Abkhazian side, the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) could take part in such a meeting. Also, an NGO team that could explore ways of bringing about negotiations might be useful. The team could be composed of representatives from The Carter Center, the UNPO, and leaders of the Abkhazian and Georgian communities in Turkey.

The Carter Center might also consider helping to arrange the UNPO's involvement in the U.N. and CSCE missions to Abkhazia. The UNPO could potentially act as a mediator for Abkhazia. Another possibility is the creation of an exploratory fact-finding and negotiation team composed of leaders of the Abkhazian and Georgian communities in Turkey, representatives of The Carter Center, and representatives of the UNPO. Perhaps a team of nongovernmental representatives could be more effective than governmental organizations in solving the conflict.

In terms of more positive roles toward resolution of these and other conflicts to be played by intergovernmental organizations, the United Nations needs to move back toward the spirit of its charter. The United Nations should balance its protection of territorial integrity and other interests of nations with two other major principles of its charter: the protection of the interests of peoples and the protection of human rights. For instance, protection of borders established in the colonial context when people are being subjected to genocide is not justified from a moral point of view. Taking into account the current tendency of the United Nations to make the protection of states absolute, rather than to balance it with the protection of peoples and the protection of human rights, the UNPO should take greater responsibility for safeguarding these rights.

Concerning the entire Caucasus as well as the Kurdish people of the region, guarantees to ethnic groups that they will be allowed opportunities to keep their cultures alive and to exercise genuine autonomy will go a long way toward resolving many of the problems in the area. Immediate, effective action for humanitarian relief throughout the area is needed so that when peace is finally achieved, many more women, children, and older people throughout the Caucasus will be alive to enjoy it.

Everyone should encourage their leaders to honor the Geneva Convention and their protocols so as to reduce suffering among the women, children, elderly, and prisoners who always suffer the most in these conflicts. Also, reduction of suffering now will pave the way for the peacekeeping process to follow.

Working Session: Haiti

Facilitator: Bill Spencer

Paper Author: Robert Pastor

Panelist: Michel-Rolph Trouillot

Rapporteur: Steven Horblitt [1](#)

Conflict in Haiti

by Robert Pastor

Violent changes of government in Haiti and most of Latin America have been the rule, not the exception, for much of the past 200 years. Haiti, in particular, has been plagued by a long history of brutal dictators that culminated with the rule of Papa Doc and Baby Doc Duvalier. When the latter fled Haiti in February 1986, the people hoped for democracy, but their hopes were continually frustrated until Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide won two-thirds of the vote for president in December 1990. On Sept. 30, 1991, this freely elected government was overthrown. For Haitians, the central issue is how to restore a viable democracy. For the international community, and especially for the Organization of American States (OAS), the issue is whether they are prepared to take the steps necessary to restore democracy in Haiti.

Two events made the coup against President Aristide exceptional. First, his election had been the first one in Haiti's history that had been observed and verified by international observers as free and fair and had been accepted by all of Haiti's political parties as such. Secondly, the coup was the first in the hemisphere that occurred after the foreign ministers of the OAS had adopted the "Santiago Commitment to Democracy." That resolution, passed unanimously at an OAS General Assembly in Chile in June 1991, declared democracy's defense and consolidation as the hemisphere's goal, and it instructed the OAS secretary-general to convene a special session of the General Assembly in the event of a coup against a democratic government.

On the day of the coup, the OAS Permanent Council met, and passed a resolution that supported the Aristide government and condemned the coup. On

Oct. 3, 1991, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs met and demanded the full restoration of President Aristide but also recommended that all states isolate the de facto regime diplomatically, economically, and financially. A group of foreign ministers was then sent to inform the military regime that it held power illegally. The OAS mission was rebuffed by the military regime, and the foreign ministers returned to Washington to adopt another resolution. This time, the OAS urged states to freeze the assets of the Haitian state and impose a trade embargo, except for humanitarian aid.

On Oct. 17, 1991, the OAS secretary-general appointed Agusto Ramirez-Ocampo to mediate, and four months later, on Feb. 23, 1992, President Aristide and some of the leaders of the Haitian Senate and Chamber of Deputies signed the "Protocol of Washington" that acknowledged the need to restore President Aristide but set no timetable for accomplishing that. The protocol affirmed the parties' respect for the constitution and the separation of powers between the president and the Assembly. President Aristide and Congressional leaders also agreed to abstain from inciting violence, proclaim a general amnesty ("except for common law criminals"), accept a new prime minister (presumably Rene Theodore), accept an OAS civilian mission, and oppose any intervention by foreign military.

The protocol was unfortunately ambiguous on who would get amnesty, when President Aristide would return, and what would happen to the army during the transition and after his return. Within days, each side condemned parts of the protocol, and it was never implemented.

On May 8, 1992, the de facto regime issued its own "tripartite agreement for the formation of a government of consensus," but that was condemned by supporters of President Aristide. Also, in May, U.S. President George Bush signed an executive order that repatriated Haitians without giving them a right to a fair hearing. Democratic presidential candidate Bill Clinton denounced the order and promised to reverse it if elected. On June 19, Marc Bazin, who had placed second to President Aristide in the presidential election and had denounced the

coup of September, was installed as prime minister, despite the objection of President Aristide.

In September 1992, the de facto regime agreed to accept a limited number of civilian observers (16) from the OAS, but it refused to allow them to leave Port-au-Prince, and it sent two of them, who spoke Creole, home. The rest were ineffective.

The OAS secretary-general asked former Jamaican Prime Minister Michael Manley to lead an invigorated mediation in Haiti, but Mr. Manley insisted on trying to gain sufficient support from key governments, especially the United States, before formally undertaking the mission. As prime minister one year before, he had proposed the possibility of a peacekeeping force. Venezuela, Caribbean nations, and Argentina indicated some support for the idea, but the Bush administration rejected it. On Dec. 3-4, 1992, Mr. Manley visited with former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to discuss these issues. Mr. Manley then followed up these conversations by urging several leading governments to support a renewed effort. Although it was hoped that the U.N. secretary-general would appoint an envoy who had worked with Mr. Manley so that the OAS and the United Nations would undertake a joint mission at a high-level, that did not occur.

Instead, on Dec. 11, 1992, the secretary-general appointed Dante Caputo, the former foreign minister of Argentina, as his envoy. The OAS secretary-general withdrew his support from Mr. Manley and decided to support that mission. In an initial round of discussions, Mr. Caputo received the support of both the Bush administration and President-elect Clinton and helped draft a framework proposal that was contained in a letter sent by President Aristide to the U.N. and OAS secretaries-general on Jan. 13, 1993. Based in part on the "Washington Protocol," President Aristide formally requested that the United Nations and OAS send a "substantial civilian-led international mission" to Haiti to protect the human rights of the people. If agreement was also reached on a new prime minister and

Mr. Caputo were to report "tangible progress" in the human rights situation, President Aristide wrote, he would request the gradual lifting of the embargo. Like the protocol, the Aristide letter was vague on some crucial points. There was no timetable for President Aristide's return and no indication of the size of the civilian presence or what would follow. The letter was silent on the issue of amnesty and quite general on virtually all of the points mentioned. The apparent purpose was to try to reach early agreement on a large civilian presence in the hope that this would change conditions in Haiti sufficiently to broach the more difficult issues. At the same time that the letter was sent, President-elect Clinton adopted the Bush policy of repatriating Haitians without a hearing, and made a new promise that he was committed to the return of democracy and Aristide to Haiti.

After a quick visit to Haiti, Mr. Caputo announced agreement on a large civilian mission, but by the time he returned to the United States, the military and the de facto regime denied that they had reached agreement. He returned again to Haiti on Feb. 2, and was met with an orchestrated and angry protest and subsequently a rejection by the de facto regime.

Thus, the coup in Haiti poses two general issues: that of internal democratization - a problem among Haitians about how to restore the constitutional regime of President Aristide and how to create the basis for a democratic and just government; and that of international responsibility for democracy - a problem for the inter-American and the wider international community about how to induce or coerce the de facto regime to accept an internationally recognized, democratic government. This, in turn, raises questions about the appropriate role for the OAS vs. the United Nations and for nongovernmental vs. intergovernmental organizations.

Session Discussion

by Steven Horblitt, Rapporteur

Session participants included a Haitian journalist, a personal representative of the secretary-general of the Organization of American States (OAS), academics and analysts of Haitian affairs, and human rights experts. Also adding their perspectives were a refugee affairs specialist, a representative of a "bottom up" development organization working with the civil society of Haiti, and Jim Wright, former speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives. Mr. Wright, along with several other participants, had officially observed the Dec. 16, 1990, national elections in Haiti. Although invited, the parties to the conflict - President Aristide, the Haitian military, and the de facto government of Prime Minister Marc Bazin - did not send representatives to the session. In all, 15 people participated in the session. These are their findings:

The conflict has two major causes. The coup did not take place in a political vacuum but was the result of a breakdown in a consensus that had allowed the election of December 1990 to go forward. Lack of democratic institutions and a tradition of democratic governance was the second major cause.

Barriers to resolution are posed by two factors as well. They include fear and distrust of one another by the parties to the conflict and the failure of the international community to generate a sustained mediation process that focused on the reconciliation of interests.

The conflict must be resolved by Haitians, but the international community can and should help. The challenge is to build institutions of democratic governance and tolerance, and a spirit of forgiveness and trust must be fostered. A negotiated solution through mediation and conciliation is possible, but an honest broker with moral authority is required.

Comprehensive reform of the military, separation of the police and military function, and incentives to the military to encourage them to reinforce the democratic process are also keys to a settlement. This process must include a disarmament (gun control) element that reduces violence from whatever source as a method of resolving political disputes. Also, the introduction of an international civilian mission to Haiti to reduce violations of human rights and

violence from whatever source is an important step in building the confidence and calmer atmosphere necessary for negotiations.

In addition, resources and technical cooperation are needed to promote economic recovery and equity. Democratization must be undergirded by an economic foundation that enhances opportunity and improvement in the quality of life. Also, reform of the judiciary and establishment of institutions to administer and promote justice are crucial to popular legitimacy in Haiti and a settlement. Resources and technical assistance will be needed for this, too. The judicial process must have credibility and dignity.

The Haitian situation is on the frontier of new international efforts to assist in the promotion and consolidation of democracy and protection of human rights.

Mediation and a U.N.-OAS effort to gain a negotiated settlement to Haiti's conflict is essential, but this should be reinforced by other efforts on the part of nongovernmental actors of great prestige.

Finally, nongovernmental organizations can, if invited by the United Nations and the OAS, help sensitize and train members of the international civilian mission in matters such as human rights observation, Haitian culture, language, and a methodology that emphasizes conciliation as opposed to confrontation in human rights advocacy.

Working Session: [1](#) Kosovo and Macedonia

Facilitator: Bill Ury

Paper Authors: Jan Øberg and James Pettifer

Panelists: Vladimir Milcin and Veton Surroi

Rapporteur: Dennis Sandole [2](#)

Conflict in Kosovo [3](#)

by Jan Øberg

The present state of economic, social, and political affairs in Kosovo merits wide, urgent, and carefully considered international attention and immediate humanitarian aid. It is a fragile calm we see today in Kosovo. There is still a

political time and space for preventive diplomacy. The conflict is potentially very powerful and destructive and will not go away. It will explode if nothing is soon done.

It cannot be overemphasized that everything relates to everything else in the former Yugoslavia and that the Kosovo issue, although requiring specific solutions, must be seen in the context of all of former Yugoslavia.

The actions of the international community vis-a-vis other conflicts in former Yugoslavia - including an international military action - will unavoidably have immediate implications for the situation in Kosovo and impede peace-making.

The relevant issue is not who is to blame for what but, simply, that something be done to provide for basic need satisfaction and a nonviolent shift in Kosovo's relationship with Serbia.

If Serbia wants Serbs to live in Kosovo and the presence of Kosovo in Serbia, it must develop a policy that is acceptable to the Kosovo Albanians. If the Kosovo Albanians insist on having their own independent state, this state must be based on principles, ideas, and practices that are acceptable to Serbia. Whatever these two parties can agree on, it must be acceptable to other direct actors in this conflict, namely the Albanians in Macedonia, the Macedonian government, and Albania.

Although the conflicts over Kosovo and Macedonia have received international attention since Yugoslavia was dissolved, both territories have long conflict histories that predated communism.



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Albanian goals and strategies are exclusively nonviolent. However, there is also a belief - or hope - that the international community might intervene, even militarily, to support Kosovo's secession from Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).

There exists a serious interest in exploring new concepts of what it means to become a state. With some creative thinking and the help of third parties, it will not be impossible to find common ground for peaceful coexistence that is acceptable to both the Serbian and the Kosovo Albanian side. The international community bears responsibility for not stimulating or using military actions but, instead, helping identify peaceful solutions with peaceful means before it is too late.

There are many conflict-mitigation ideas that may be applicable to the situation. These proposals offer parties to the conflict an opportunity to examine constructive, future-oriented options rather than sticking to (self-) destructive thoughts derived from injustices of the past. The conflict-mitigation proposals include:

- utilizing various kinds of international commissions such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE);
- normalizing social life and preventing violence;
- ensuring the presence of humanitarian organizations;
- adopting a human rights watch;
- using all U.N. peacekeeping resources except its military component;
- setting up a trusteeship leading to a new kind of state at an agreed-upon point in time; and
- considering the use of a condominium and simpler, more immediate agreements.

Other proposals include:

- holding local dialogues parallel to the meetings in Geneva;
- dividing Kosovo;
- remembering that in the former Yugoslavia, everything relates to everything else;
- taking a multitrack approach to preventing violence and promoting peacekeeping, peace-making, and peace-building;
- admitting that all types of forceful intervention on the local and international level are counterproductive; and
- emphasizing the win/win option of concentrating on shared long-term interests over the lose/lose option of continuing to stay locked in mutually exclusive corners.

Conflict in Macedonia and Kosovo

by James Pettifer

The conflicts over Kosovo and Macedonia have come to international attention since the end of Yugoslavia, but both territories have long histories of conflict predating communism. Macedonia has known conflict since the First Balkan War in 1911-12 and Kosovo since the serious outbreaks of violence there in 1945, 1981, and 1989. Both territories have a common border and many shared ethnic

groups. It is the view of most international observers that their fates will be intrinsically linked in the current process of remaking the Balkans.

At the moment, the conflict principally affects the geographic areas of the old autonomous region of Kosovo and the ex-socialist republic of Macedonia in ex-Yugoslavia, but in the past the Macedonian question, as it was known, has involved Greece, Bulgaria, Albania, and Turkey. Serbia has a major role in the Kosovo conflict. International attention has been focused on these issues as the possible catalyst for a new Balkan war, following the pattern of pre-World War I conflicts.

Parties to the conflict include the current governments of Albania, Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria, and the leaders of the Kosovo Albanians (Ibrahim Rugova), the Kosovo Serbs (the militia leader, Arkan, and Milan Panic), the head of state of the as-yet internationally unrecognized "Macedonia" (Kiro Gligorov), and the leaders of the different ethnic minorities in "Macedonia." The Albanian minority, led by Ismail Halili, is the largest, and Turkish, Vlach, Pomak, and Serb minorities also live in the territory.

The main barriers to resolution are numerous, starting with the relationship of both territories to the wider war in the Balkans, the very serious effects of the U.N.'s economic sanctions on surrounding territories, and the great increase in nationalistic and chauvinist feelings among almost all people in the region. Other barriers include entrenched ethnic differences, economic problems that are a product of 50 years of communism, and strategic interests of adjacent regional powers such as Turkey and Greece.

Session Discussion

by Dennis Sandole, Rapporteur

Approximately 60 people attended this session. Participants included the president of Kosovo, Ibrahim Rugova, representatives from Macedonia and Kosovo, diplomats, and others. During the discussion, participants raised the following points:

In Macedonia, issues of both governance and ethnicity are at play. Governance and ethnicity are also main causes of the conflict in Kosovo.

The numerous parties to the conflict in Macedonia include Slavs vs. Albanians, Macedonia vs. Serbia, Macedonia vs. Greece, Macedonia vs. Albania, Serbia vs. Turkey, and Turkey vs. Greece. In Kosovo, there are Albanians vs. Serbs in Kosovo, Kosovar Albanians vs. Serbs elsewhere in Serbia (the Belgrade government), Serbia vs. Albania, and Serbia vs. Turkey.

Major causes of the conflict in Macedonia include Greek action to increase troop strength on borders with Macedonia and Bulgaria, the name "Macedonia," violation of Albanian human rights and international nonrecognition of Macedonia. In Kosovo, causes include:

- Serbian ethnic cleansing of Albanians in some parts of Kosovo;
- forcible elimination of Albanians from jobs, schools, and politics;
- the violation of Albanian human rights;
- the state of emergency in Kosovo;
- Serbian colonial rule in Kosovo;
- the existence of warfare 150 kilometers to the north; and
- the election of Arkan (the Serb militia leader in Kosovo).

In general, there are also issues of Serbian monopoly of violence, Serbian aggression and atrocities, nonrecognition of Milan Panic by Europeans, and the Kosovar Albanian boycott of the December 1992 elections in Serbia.

Numerous barriers to resolving the conflicts in Macedonia and Kosovo exist.

They include:

- banning Serbia from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and other international fora,
- lack of appropriate (e.g., democratic) institutions for resolving problems,
- segregation of the Albanian community in Kosovo, and
- the selection of Lord David Carrington and Lord David Owen (both for the European Economic Community) and former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance (for the United Nations) to try to solve the problems underlying the conflicts in former Yugoslavia.

The "institutional lag" in Europe, which makes it impossible for Europe to catch up with developments in the former Yugoslavia, is also a barrier, as is the fact

that the United Nation's presence has only succeeded in facilitating "sanctions-busting." Attempting to apply U.S. standards to the Balkans is also a barrier, as are the human costs of being violently oppressed.

There is much disagreement about possible paths to conflict resolution. Concerning Kosovo, many believe it is necessary to employ a multilevel, multiactor, and multirepublic framework. According to this perspective, all problems throughout the former Yugoslavia are interconnected and, therefore, must be dealt with and the aspirations of all the peoples in the former Yugoslavia must be integrated. Others believe that transitional models should be developed. For instance, a Scandinavian model of peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace building may be applicable to the Balkans. In any case, there must be a democratic mechanism to facilitate problem solving.

As for other specific solutions, there is also disagreement on whether Kosovo should be made into a demilitarized area with open borders or institutionalized as a political unit. But there is strong support for an integrated consortium of inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and others that could participate in bringing peace to the area.

It must be recognized that not all Serbs are "the enemy." The United Nations should send troops to Kosovo, otherwise Serbia may decide to wipe out the Albanian community, and/or Albanians may decide to revolt, both of which could lead to a wider Balkan war and worse. Also, the United Nations' peacekeeping effort should take on a nonmilitary character: The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) should send more observers and should play an ombudsman role, and the international community should put more pressure on Serbia.

Macedonia represents an historical challenge to which there must be an adequate response, and there are ways to achieve this. The main problem is not the name - "Macedonia" - but the social ills in that region. The interests of all parties must be ensured. The United Nations should mediate with Albania, Greece, and other entities regarding official recognition of Macedonia.

Recognition of Macedonia is important in order to level out the playing field. The United Nations and the CSCE should send (more) missions to the area, and the role of the United Nations' on-the-ground activities should be re-examined.

There should be a substantial increase in economic aid to the region, and an all-Balkan cooperation plan should be created.

In addition, other steps can be taken. In Kosovo, the issue of war crimes should be emphasized as a deterrent to further war crimes. The international community should recognize Kosovo's right to self-determination and should threaten to intervene as a way to facilitate that self-determination. There is a great need for a Balkan security area that would be guaranteed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Dialogue has to be initiated between Kosovar Albanians and Serbs. NGOs should increase their activities in the region, and journalists should increase coverage of the area. Sanctions should be lifted.

Concerning Macedonia, there is disagreement. Some believe that recognition is crucial for equality of partnership, and the rights of all must be guaranteed. These people believe Western states must act because if international recognition of Macedonia is not forthcoming, there will be another war. Others insist that recognition will not solve anything, and that the situation may be worsened by recognition.

Working Session: Zaire

Facilitator: Hal Saunders

Paper Author: Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja

Panelists: Tom Turner and Richard Joseph

Rapporteur: Alvin Wolfe [1](#)

Conflict in Zaire


by Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja

The political conflict in Zaire is basically a struggle for power between the Mobutu dictatorship, established through a military coup d'etat on Nov. 24, 1965, and a popularly based democracy movement that has been unrelenting in its quest for

radical change since April 24, 1990. This is the date that President Mobutu Sese Seko announced in an emotional speech to the nation that he had agreed to abandon one-party rule and to allow the country to move to a multiparty system. A national democracy conference was held between August 1991 and December 1992 in the tradition of the African palaver to take stock of what had gone wrong in the past and to chart a new course for the future. The conference established three institutions to manage a two-year (1992-94) transition to democratic governance: a High Council of the Republic, a provisional parliament; a largely ceremonial presidency with President Mobutu himself; and a transitional government headed by a prime minister elected by the conference.

The major source of the present conflict has to do with governance and resides in the very nature of the Mobutu regime. President Mobutu's Zaire is best described as a predatory state with a rapacious government elite or kleptocracy led by the greatest thief on the African continent. The thief and his associates extracted the bulk of their wealth from the mining industry, which is the mainstay of Zaire's export-oriented economy.

Basically, the political conflict in Zaire is a struggle between the Mobutu dictatorship, established in 1965 through a military coup, and a popular democracy movement that has pushed for radical change since 1990.



In spite of this overt corruption and other weaknesses, the Mobutu regime was strongly backed by the United States and its Western allies because of its usefulness as an ally in the East-West conflict. Mindful of the attention that he received from the West, President Mobutu took care to be accompanied on his trips abroad by one of the managing directors of mining corporations and/or by the governor of the Bank of Zaire, the country's central bank. These officials were expected to draw on the numerous accounts their organizations maintain in foreign banks for any cash that the Zairian dictator might need for lavish entertainment, expensive gifts for influential friends, and political corruption. In a

position paper on the Mobutu regime issued in 1990, the Catholic Bishops of Zaire denounced this practice of using state institutions as though they were President Mobutu's private bank accounts.

What President Mobutu did at the top was replicated at each and every level of the system where officials had access to public revenues. This privatization of the state was a major factor in the collapse of Zaire's economy, for the money so diverted to private use could not be made available for productive investment in the country. The bulk of its went to foreign bank accounts and real estate holdings abroad. What remained in the country was used for the most part in conspicuous consumption. Meanwhile, the physical infrastructure disintegrated thoroughly, the health and educational sectors deteriorated beyond recognition, and thousands of children now die each year from preventable and easily curable diseases such as malaria, measles, and dysentery.

The major barrier to conflict resolution is the unwillingness of President Mobutu and his entourage to accept democratic change. Having committed serious economic and political crimes, members of the Zairian kleptocracy are understandably worried about their fate in a democratic Zaire where they have to be made accountable for their mismanagement of the state. Even those who would welcome change prefer to keep their ill-gotten wealth and use it to further enrich themselves and ensure a more secure future for their children. Thus, there are individuals within the ranks of the democratic opposition to President Mobutu who, like Mobutu himself, are not so happy about relinquishing their economic power and social privileges. Like President Mobutu's close associates, they are willing to exploit ethnic and regional differences to frustrate the transition process and increase their chances of remaining influential players in national politics. Just as President Mobutu bowed to popular pressure at home and to new political realities abroad to abandon one-party rule, he can be made to stop obstructing the democratization process by a combination of internal and external pressures. Prominent individuals and influential nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have tried and failed to convince him to respect the other two institutions

of the transition and to abide by the July 30 comprehensive political compromise, according to which he must share power with the former. Monsignor Laurent Monswego, the Roman Catholic archbishop of Kisangani and president of both the National Conference and the High Council, has on many occasions attempted without success to mediate the conflict between President Mobutu and the democracy movement. To back him up, leaders of all Zairian-organized religions (Catholics, Protestants, Kimbanguists, and Muslims) have also attempted to play the role of mediators. All of these attempts have failed for the very simple reason that dictatorship and democracy cannot be reconciled. A dictator cannot become a democrat overnight.

The conclusion to be drawn from the Zairian experience is that rather than seeking compromise agreements that dictators will never honor, a Zaire-like situation requires that a dictator be pressured into stepping down. This is why it is incumbent on those external forces responsible for the very existence and survival of the Mobutu regime to help the Zairian people overthrow him. There cannot be a compromise with a dictator.

What can the international community do to help the cause of democracy in Zaire? First of all, everything should be done to force President Mobutu to either step down and leave the country or relinquish all control over the armed forces, the central bank, and public enterprises. For he is using his control over these institutions not only to obstruct the democratization process but also to further destroy the country's economic and social fabric. Should the current situation be allowed to deteriorate, Zaire will experience a catastrophic disintegration that will make Somalia and Liberia pale in comparison and will call for massive commitment of world resources in a repeat performance of the 1960-64 U.N. intervention in the Congo crisis.

Secondly, all countries should endorse and implement the European Parliament's resolution for a freeze of all assets held abroad by President Mobutu and members of his entourage. Such a freeze will make it more difficult for them to

move freely around the world and use their ill-gotten wealth to cause trouble in Zaire.

Finally, should President Mobutu persist in resisting change and in using his troops against unarmed civilians, the international community should intervene militarily, on humanitarian grounds, in order to avert a disaster and advance the cause of democracy and human rights in Africa. Such a step will not be necessary if the first two proposed measures - which are nonviolent and less costly - are implemented.

Session Discussion

by Alvin Wolfe, Rapporteur

Approximately 30 people attended the session. They included a U.S. assistant secretary of state for African affairs, a deputy assistant for African affairs in the U.S. Department of Defense, an ambassador to the United Nations from the Organization of African Unity (OAU), a member of the High Council of the Republic of Zaire, a member of the National Council of Nongovernmental Organizations of Zaire, and others. Participants' findings included the following: The most immediate cause of the conflict is the failure of President Mobutu to live up to the conditions apparently agreed upon during the National Democracy Conference of 1991-92, according to which power would be gradually transferred through a transitional government. It was also clear that the corrupt behavior of President Mobutu and his entourage has seriously undermined confidence in government at every level in Zaire. President Mobutu's coming to power decades ago and his continued tenure in power was and is due to support from the United States, Belgium, and France.

The problem in Zaire is not one of ethnic conflict. The appearance of ethnic conflict in Zaire has been generated by politicians and has not arisen spontaneously from the people. In fact, on several past occasions, politicians have attempted to stimulate ethnic differences to benefit their own causes only to

find that the ethnic groups in question have refused to participate. Units of the army have been used for such ends.

The breakdown in the Zairian economy, which functions at only 5 percent of its capacity, may be seen by some as a cause of the problem, but it is more likely a consequence of the predatory nature of the Mobutu regime. International interference is to blame for the continued existence of this dictatorial regime.

President Mobutu has apparently been a master of "divide and rule" so that the political opposition is continually subjected to techniques that weaken their solidarity. Some politicians in the opposition are seen as opportunists.

One possible barrier to early resolution of the conflict is the fact that the memory of the 1960s civil war is still very much alive. Therefore, President Mobutu's opposition is afraid to begin a process that might result in millions of additional deaths. President Mobutu is ruthless and would not flinch at killing hundreds of thousands of his own people just to keep himself in power. He has already destroyed the country's economy.

Another barrier to resolution is the lack of international television coverage of Zairian affairs, which may be due in part to the country's own internal electronic communication system falling to ruin. In any event, poor internal communication and poor communication between Zaire and the outside world are problems.

There are many actions that can and should be taken by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and individuals. First, it is vital that information be exchanged and distributed. Perhaps churches should find ways to broadcast programs or take advantage of other media outlets to reach people in the provinces. Other organizations such as the press and academia should make an effort to disseminate whatever they know to improve communications both internally and with the outside world. NGOs should help distribute publications in the provinces and publicize their own events.

Intervention by prestigious personalities at propitious moments also would be helpful. It is not known whether now is the right time for such intervention. Also,

the international community should work to recognize the transitional authorities established by the National Conference.

Organizations should pave the way for referenda and elections by working now to build confidence in such measures. Organizing pro-democracy committees in the provinces might help because there are apparently thousands of associations in the country that potentially could be politicized to join a democratic movement. Also, supportive links with emergent democracies should be enhanced.

Church leaders like Monsignor Monswego should visit the heads of other African states to ask their help in encouraging President Mobutu to accede to the conditions of the National Conference agreement by transferring power to democratic institutions. Also, support should be given to rebuilding governmental authority at the provincial and local levels. And attention should be devoted to the process of societal reconstruction to support the transition at the level of political institutions.

Governments also have a role to play in solving the conflict. The current U.S. administration should tell President Mobutu to step down, and the United States and other Western nations should block access of President Mobutu and his entourage (which some participants labeled the "Mobutu Mafia") to the funds that they have secreted away in foreign banks throughout the world. The United States and other governments should recognize the transitional authorities, since President Mobutu himself agreed to this kind of transfer at the National Conference. The United States and other governments should deny visas to President Mobutu and his agents. Finally, assistance is needed in restructuring the army and security forces toward their possible use in developing transport and communication infrastructures in the provinces. This development will be necessary for democratic processes to succeed.

Working Session: Early Warnings of Conflict

Facilitators: Vamik Volkan, Hal Saunders, and Bill Ury

Paper Author: Kumar Rupesinghe

Panelist: Louis Kriesberg [1](#)

Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy

by Kumar Rupesinghe

At the dawn of the 21st century, global security and the international system are undergoing major changes. We are slowly moving toward a situation where there are new perceptions about global governance and security. The danger of nuclear war still remains with us as does the threat to peace by the recurrence of interstate wars. But the most dramatic shift in thinking has been the awareness that conflicts, largely of an internal character, are not only growing in number but constitute a grave threat to peace and well-being in the world.

The international system is slowly defining a new agenda for peace where emphasis is being placed on preventive diplomacy. Boutros Boutros-Ghali in *An Agenda for Peace* defines preventive diplomacy as "action to prevent disputes arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts, and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur." Over the years, the United Nations in particular has grappled with these issues. Today, a greater emphasis is being placed on peacemaking. It is gradually being recognized that conflict prevention is cost-effective and that the global society should develop the capability to prevent conflicts.

In discussing early warning systems, we must make conceptual distinctions with regard to uses and interpretations of the concept. There seem to be several levels of activity in considering what is meant by an early warning system and considerable confusion as to who should be responsible for establishing such systems. An early warning system is closely linked with information:

- the potential for information storage and retrieval,
- the rapid communication of such information to national and international agencies, and
- strengthening the competence of, as well as, building new institutions capable of intervening in time.

Further, there are ambiguities with regard to the concept itself. The problem of prediction and forecasting is a crucial debate in social science.²

Although there today is a recognition that preventive diplomacy should be given the highest priority, the international system is still trying to evolve a policy orientation toward these goals. This paper argues that preventive diplomacy should be a major priority for action in the future. It will, however, require a major paradigm shift in the way we think of response to conflict. This paper argues that we need a coalition of forces to build such an agenda for preventive diplomacy. This coalition will consist of the United Nations, regional organizations, and nongovernmental organizations. The international community is in need of effective mechanisms by which issues of self-determination can be examined so that aggrieved parties do not feel forced to resort to violence and minorities can feel secure that the international community has effective instruments to protect their rights. One mechanism that needs to be explored is ensuring compliance with the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious, and Linguistic Minorities, adopted by the General Assembly in December 1992.

Another is reviving the dormant Internal Trusteeship System of the United Nations as a means of strengthening preventive diplomacy. The resuscitated system should provide a mechanism whereby early action could be considered when a minority is at risk or a state is experiencing a severe break-down of law and order.

Another possibility concerns the Decolonization Committee, which would receive reports on specific cases of claims for self-determination from a new High Commissioner for Self-Determination. This commissioner would:

- examine all claims,
- reject those that were evidently frivolous or unfounded,
- analyze the remainder based on criteria set by the General Assembly, and
- make recommendations to the General Assembly.

Still another mechanism that warrants consideration is the appointment of regional commissioners on national minorities, modeled on the commission

system of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Lastly, the establishment of an Independent Commission on Self-Determination composed of eminent persons and experts who would define the rights of peoples and minorities and develop criteria for claims for self-determination might be helpful.

Session Discussion

Compiled from several reports

More than 150 people attended the session. Discussion began with opening remarks from Kumar Rupesinghe and Louis Kriesberg. Later, working session participants were divided into three groups. One group focused on the role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), while a second group looked at the role of the United Nations and other intergovernmental organizations. The third group examined the role of national governments. Participants made the following points at the working session:

Early warning is a major strategic issue on the global agenda, since discussion is underway on how to prevent war as a means of settling disputes. In fact, the world is now moving toward a transformative order and undergoing a major paradigm shift in international relations. This means that international relations are now impacted by internal wars. Another paradigm shift is the concept of sovereignty, with the role of states being redefined. More importantly, the rights of people are being redefined and reasserted. Prevention of conflict escalation is an all-embracing concept in the conflict resolution process.

From examination of various processes, it is known that ideological and resource-based conflicts, governance and authority conflicts, and identity-based conflicts are all intermingled with one another. That is why there is so much talk of protracted social conflicts, which over time may take one particular form rather than another. Discussion on the forms of intervention appropriate for particular stages in the conflict process is necessary. In fact, the U.N. secretary-general's *An Agenda for Peace* sharply identified the interrelationship between peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace building.

There are three main elements of early warning and conflict prevention. They are: information gathering, communication, and action. Public will is necessary for early warning systems to succeed. To overcome limitations posed by sovereignty, policy-makers must recognize the variety of people involved in a particular conflict and the way in which many of them crosscut each other. Part of the problem is that there is little incentive for most actors to stop conflict at an early stage. Therefore, it's important to know what to do in the early stages of conflict escalation and how to mobilize the public will to carry out those actions.

There are several techniques that can be used at this stage. Old-fashioned deterrence is one. Warnings can be issued that say if certain actions are taken, there will be consequences of a harsh, coercive, or violent sort. Ways in which this type of deterrence could work in a nonprovocative fashion so that they do not appear to threaten the other side and lead to escalation must be considered more extensively than in the past. Secondly, unofficial intermediaries can be very useful in conveying information, and local organizations can be encouraged to explore the escalation. Also, the use of humanitarian assistance to bridge issues and bring people into contact on collaborative confidence-building methods is currently being discussed by policy-makers.

One of the major problems in early warning involves communication - getting information to the right people at the right time and in the right form. It has been proposed that a nongovernmental information service, which could be a collection, a coalition, or a consortium of NGOs, be established.

Also, much more attention must be paid to longer-term preventive measures. There are costs in trying and failing to prevent bad things from happening, so additional research on past approaches that have succeeded is needed. And people need to know they will receive credit for their roles in preventing escalation of conflict. Case studies of the successful interruption of conflict escalation should be given wide publicity.

It must be acknowledged that NGOs face some difficulties in participating in early warning. These include limits placed on NGOs' activities by incumbent

governments in sensitive situations, lack of clout and the insufficient attention paid to NGOs by the media, and lack of communication and coordination of efforts between NGOs and the United Nations. Other barriers to participation of NGOs in early warning include competition and disorder within NGOs themselves and a lack of coordination among various NGOs. Limited resources and lack of adequate information also pose problems. And there is a growing need for trust-building among NGOs for quality control that prevents the possibility of open-ended networks.

Effective early warning systems already exist in sectors that monitor matters such as refugee flows and food shortages. Perhaps they could be studied to determine the kinds of information that might be required at different levels of the early warning process. Too, social and economic dimensions must be considered in a broader context, taking into account the fundamental causes of conflict and nonmilitary threats to security. After all, the world is indeed affected by war-keeping, war-making, and war-building institutions.

Another important consideration concerning NGO participation in early warning is operational strategies. NGO staffs should be trained in early warning undertakings, just as parliamentary leaders should be sensitized to early warning strategies. Likewise, diplomats educated during the Cold War should be re-educated. Too, efforts to establish a system of social indicators are vital.

As for the role of the United Nations and other intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) in early warning, there is a need for stronger coordination and cooperation between the United Nations, IGOs, and NGOs. Problems posed by the possibility of information overload and "crying wolf" overreactions must be considered. Intergovernmental organizations must develop indicators that can warn of impending genocide and ethnic hostility, and more thought should be given to the evolution of an international human rights court of justice.

Europe's appointment of a high commissioner on national minorities could perhaps serve as a model for such a court. The European high commissioner, whose authority crosses borders, collects information on human rights violations

and has the power to intervene. How this experience can be applied to other regions is a question that bears consideration. One possibility is that the U.N. secretary-general could issue an annual report on the state of the world that includes this information.

The role of national governments in early warning is limited by the amount of political support in a country for early warning systems. Also, issues of sovereignty prevent individual countries from intervening diplomatically, even when intentions are honorable.

Early warning often requires a deep understanding of the causes of particular conflicts because long-festering problems often require long-range solutions. There is much room for development of regional approaches to acquiring this essential background knowledge. Also, there is a need to heighten the sensitivity of leaders in various countries in order to trigger their active involvement. A closer partnership between NGOs and governmental sectors is needed. And issues involving the availability of resources to sustain new democratic regimes are important. When these regimes fail, they give democracy a bad name.

It is true that many governments have structural limitations or problems that contribute to inconsistency and lack of consensus in policy-making. So it is important to consider new ways to influence governments, to first grab their attention. This may entail negotiating with a particular government's allies to raise the problem. The way to do this may be through informal channels, which are sometimes more effective than formal channels.

It may be that early warning systems already abound but are ignored. For instance, the escalation of human rights abuses is almost always an excellent early warning of a brewing conflict. (It would be helpful if American embassies submitted annual reports of human rights abuses). In any case, early warning is fairly useless without early action.

Working Session: Small Arms Transfers

Facilitator: Bill Spencer

Paper Author: Aaron Karp

Panelist: Michael Klare

Rapporteur: Jo Husbands [1](#)

The Covert Arms Trade and the Future of Intra-National Conflict

by Aaron Karp

One side effect of the end of the Cold War was to raise awareness of the dangers represented by the international trade in military equipment. Even as the international community begins to deal seriously with the arms trade, it is overlooking the most dangerous and anarchic of all aspects - the transfer of weapons to subnational groups.

Transfers of major weapon systems between states serve a wide range of functions. They satisfy economic and technical goals, symbolize bilateral commitments, enhance prestige, strengthen regional deterrence, and pressure adversaries. Use in war is the most significant but least likely purpose of these weapons systems. The orthodox trade in major weapons commands the attention of analysts, the press, and officials, yet it rarely impinges directly on peace and security. How many of the tens of thousands of jet fighters sold over the years ever fired a shot in anger? In most regions, the orthodox arms trade is more significant as a waste of resources than as a threat to neighboring countries.

Weapons supplied to breakaway groups tend to be rather prosaic by comparison, mostly small arms and other light weapons, and they are usually much cheaper. Yet these are the weapons most likely to be used in contemporary conflict. Often arranged at great political or personal risk, these arms deals are born of extreme ambition and dire necessity. They are mostly covert and rarely acknowledged. As ethnic, national, and regional conflict escalated in the late 1980s and early 1990s, transfers to subnational groups became the most dynamic aspect of the weapons trade. While the trade in major weapons declined for most of the past

decade, transfers to national insurgents, ethnic rebels, terrorist drug cartels, and other groups appear to have grown exponentially.

Most assessments of the arms trade simply ignore transfers to subnational groups. Insofar as arms trade scholars and policy-makers have dealt with this aspect of the problem, it has been treated as a miniature version of the traditional state-to-state process. In fact, the trade to subnational groups involves very different kinds of equipment, motives, and processes. Nor does it respond to most of the policy instruments currently under consideration to control the orthodox arms trade. The only commentators who consistently have demonstrated an insightful understanding of the covert trade are novelists. With imaginations freed of the constraints that blinded state-center scholars and policy-makers, fiction writers often have gotten to the heart of the problem. Joseph Conrad's *Arrow of Gold* (1919) is not remembered as one of his best works, but its description of arms smuggling in the Mediterranean can be applied with minimal alterations to dozens of contemporary situations. And this is only the most classic work in the genre.

To deal with the most serious arms trade threats of the future, we will first have to research the nature of the problem. A comprehensive understanding of the trade in arms to subnational groups is a long way off. This essay merely takes a first stab at reducing gaps in understanding by offering a few fundamental propositions.

The first given is that not all insurgencies are armed equally. Thus, a general understanding of the covert trade will be especially difficult to achieve. Above all, it is impossible to offer a reliable estimate of its size. Arms transfer statistics - the warp and woof of arms trade studies - are of little use.

Secondly, captured and stolen weapons are the most important sources of supply. For a typical subnational group lacking modern military industries, strong finances, or steady outside military support, the most reliable way to acquire weapons is to take them. The military history of most insurgencies begins with

carefully planned raids on government units and bases in order to steal equipment. Small arms continue to come indirectly from Uncle Sam.

Thirdly, private assistance also can help sustain insurgents, and altruism is one source of assistance that some groups have utilized with success. The emotional involvement of foreigners often creates opportunities for private contributions. Often, this can be encouraged by nothing more than planned protests and other media events designed to influence public opinion.

Fourthly, the so-called "irrelevance" of private arms dealers is a myth. Some private arms dealers have large capabilities that theoretically could be of great use to subnational groups.

Next, although it conjures up colorful images of the covert arms trade, the black market is surprisingly marginal to the success of insurgencies. But while the black market is not suited to shipping large quantities of major weapons, it is ideal for transferring weapons components and manufacturing technology. These items are least likely to attract the attention of customs authorities.

Lastly, there is no substitute for state sponsorship. While captured weapons can sustain a subnational group, they are usually insufficient for victory. In part this is because dependence on captured weapons often forces the sacrifice of military objectives to prevent arms from being taken, while governments merely have to cease fighting and retreat into their bastions. It also reflects the limitations of low-intensity guerrilla operations. Small unit actions and raids with small arms may be enough to bring an adversary to crisis, but its victory usually must be established through intensive combat in which large units fight with major weapon systems. Without state sponsorship, some insurgencies must struggle for survival, while others simply give up.

Critics of superpower arms control in the 1970s often argue that agreements like the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT-I) were of marginal importance because, while they placed controls on one aspect of the nuclear arms race like ICBMs, they did nothing to restrain more alarming aspects of the competition. We are witnessing a similar process today as the international community begins

efforts to control the arms trade. Focusing on ways to reduce traditional state-to-state transfers of advanced major weaponry, this momentum already has produced a few modest successes. But with the traditional arms trade already losing much of its salience, it is unlikely that international security will be improved much. Meanwhile, transfers to subnational groups, a far more destabilizing and deadly form of the arms trade, are growing at an alarming rate. Measures like the newly established U.N. arms transfer registration system and the transfer guidelines agreed upon by the five permanent Security Council members have little if any relevance to subnational groups. Their weapons come largely from covert, illegal, and captured sources beyond the scale of such agreements. More ambitious plans currently under consideration call for reductions in the economic value or sophistication of arms transfers.

Unfortunately these approaches are irrelevant to rebellious groups whose armed forces usually are not large by international standards and whose fanciest weapons are not very advanced or very costly compared to new surface-to-air missile systems or state-of-the-art tanks.

The main responsibility for controlling arms transfers to subnational actors belongs to supplier states. It is their policies more than anything else that determine when and what weapons insurgencies receive. It is imperative that all countries establish the tightest possible control over their own weapons to discourage illegal diversion. Export policies must be refined to minimize the likelihood that exports to insurgents will be licensed without through review. Strong reforms also are needed to extend the reach and strengthen enforcement of existing laws against black marketing.

The international community also has a responsibility to set standards that determine when transfers to subnational groups are permissible and when they must be stopped at all costs. The extent of this problem was seen in the debate over whether to permit arms transfers to Muslims in Bosnia, who needed them for self-defense. The question of whether or not to supply arms ultimately is a political question, a matter of determining the goals policy should pursue and

how best to pursue them. In resolving questions of means and ends, the United Nations can play an instrumental role regulating subnational arms transfers.

Session Discussion

by Jo Husbands, Rapporteur

About 15 people attended the session. A parliamentarian from Armenia and a representative from a Greek organization took part along with a journalist, several academics, and representatives from a number of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that deal with economic development, human rights, peace, and security. Because most of the participants were not experts on the problem of small arms transfers, a significant amount of time was spent in acquiring basic information about the scope and patterns of the trade. Their findings included the following:

One commonly held belief is that arms do not cause conflicts, but that the process of arming may exacerbate tensions or raise fears and can make the level of destruction greater if fighting breaks out. From this perspective, attempts to control small arms transfers make sense. But other people are skeptical of efforts to control the small arms trade and believe that in the kinds of conflicts under discussion, people will find the means to kill one another even if the trade is halted altogether. These people believe it is the presence of large, sophisticated weapons that increase the likelihood of greater destruction.

It is agreed, however, that the quantities of weapons that remain in a country after a conflict is settled can pose a serious threat to peace by leading to several different problems. For instance, the prevalence of arms may make it easier to resume fighting when ceasefires or peace accords are strained. Angola and Afghanistan are examples of places where this occurred. Too, certain kinds of weapons (in particular land mines) left behind after fighting ceases pose continuing threats to civilians and attempts to restore normal life. Afghanistan and Somalia are good examples. Another problem is that leftover arms frequently find their way out of a country once fighting stops and crop up later in other wars.

Weapons left behind by the United States in Vietnam have shown up later in the Middle East and Central America. Not long ago, the press reported that the Italian/U.N. plane shot down over the former Yugoslavia was struck by a Stinger missile originally sent by the United States to Pakistan for use by mujahideen rebels in Afghanistan.

Another problem is that the experience of fighting and the ready availability of weapons may create a "culture of violence," especially among teenagers and young men, which makes restoring peace and normal patterns of life difficult. Barriers to resolution of the problems posed by the small arms trade include the lack of national and international concern. There is little awareness in the U.S. policy community and abroad of the problems and dangers posed by the small arms trade. The profound skepticism with which efforts to control the small arms trade are regarded is also a problem. Most experts on the arms trade, who focus primarily on the transfer of sophisticated weapons, believe little can be done to control the transfer of small arms.

One barrier was stated earlier. That is, the difficulty many people have in accepting that arms control is a productive or even legitimate approach to limiting or resolving conflicts. A meaningful degree of arms control will only be achieved when the arms and the control are no longer needed, these people believe, and trying to combat the arms trade would most likely involve ineffective "technical fixes."

Other barriers to resolution include the degree to which this issue is tied to strongly held beliefs about sovereignty and the right to self-defense. There are no norms regarding this trade comparable to those that have evolved regarding weapons of mass destruction. Also, the lack of comprehensive knowledge about the scope and patterns of the trade is a problem. There are no reliable estimates of the size of the legal trade and certainly none for the black and gray markets. ("Gray market" refers to the sale of technology - light transport or computers, for example - that is sold for civilian use but actually is intended for military use. Such dual technology sales may be perfectly legal and documented, since the

buyer will disguise or the seller will "wink at" the true purpose.) Nor is there public data on the small arms trade similar to that on major weapons transfers produced by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Library of Congress, and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

The proliferation of defense technology and manufacturing capabilities throughout the world are also barriers to resolution. These arms are available from a wide variety of sources including many Third World countries. In addition to governments, there are many private dealers who supply less sophisticated weapons. Although much of the trade is legal and carried on openly, there are also significant black and gray markets. One important source of arms is theft; this is a serious problem in the former Soviet Union, both for its own conflicts and for weapons leaking out to other areas. Too, there is also considerable traffic in used weapons that are sold off or stolen after a conflict ends.

The variety of recipients for these arms also poses serious barriers to resolution. Buyers include nations, insurgent groups, "pariah states," and "narco-terrorists." This makes formulating strategies to control the trade difficult. And the ease with which small weapons can be acquired makes it difficult for the major powers (or concerned regional actors) to either limit supply in anticipation of a conflict or choke off supplies during a conflict as one way of forcing the parties toward a cease-fire.

Increasing international and national awareness of the problem can help. Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter has suggested a major international conference that would publicize the threat posed by the trade and raise consciousness about the need to find ways to control it. President Carter suggested that the U.N. Year of Human Rights should be followed by a "Year to Stop the Arms Race." The attention of eminent persons could increase awareness of the problem.

The issue should become a priority. Unfortunately, few governments consider small arms transfers a major policy problem, and very few organizations are devoted to the issue. Only land mines get any real attention, and efforts to

prevent their use and find better ways to clear them after conflicts are relatively recent.

Specific strategies to combat the problem of small arms transfers include the development of an international regime based on legal commitments and agreements to police it and the increase of efforts to delegitimize the trade. Exploring regional efforts, either of regional organizations or of less formal groupings of interested countries, might help. The nature of the problem - multiple sources and recipients, porous borders, both legal and illegal traffic, and ease of shipment for many of these weapons - means that regional cooperation will be essential to any hope of controlling the trade.

Tightening national controls, which are often weak, would help hinder the illegal trade. There is also a need for national policies to restrict the legal trade in these weapons. A large proportion of the weapons being traded came from the major powers who supplied them as covert assistance to one side or another in regional or national conflicts. Changing these patterns will take significant effort, even after the end of the Cold War.

Embargoes should be considered in specific cases. There is a need to carefully analyze each case since the effects of embargoes may be to give advantages to one party in a conflict (the Serbs in Bosnia, for example). Consideration must be given to the fact that denying arms to insurgent groups may leave the primary means to use force in the hands of a repressive government.

Making limits on arms imports/exports a condition of national or international financial assistance would help. Perhaps, as President Carter advocates, conditions should be imposed on financial assistance that tie it to a nation's military policies and spending. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, as well as some donor countries, are already beginning to examine a nation's level of military spending in evaluating the aid it will receive. In fact, Japan has been a leading advocate of conditionality regarding "excessive" military spending. But this is a relatively new issue for the wider lending and aid community.

Building disarmament and demobilization into cease-fire agreements and peace accords is also suggested. This has been done in a number of cases, and it is important to examine the lessons of success and failure offered by these cases. It is also important to provide incentives - land, seed, tools, and training - to induce fighters to surrender their weapons.

Seeking limits on specific types of weapons that are felt to be either especially dangerous or destabilizing is also necessary. As mentioned earlier, land mines are receiving considerable attention from human rights groups in particular. In the mid-1970s, U.S. law forbade the export of shoulder-fired rockets like the Stinger precisely because of the fear they would fall into terrorist hands.

Another possible path to resolution is to develop methods to train and restore civilian police forces. This is a sensitive subject for aid agencies since there have been abuses in the past. But simply turning soldiers into police without significant retraining is dangerous.

Careful thought needs to be given to how to deal with the culture of violence. Particularly, there is a need to find socially acceptable means for young men to channel and express their aggressiveness.

Developing strategies that are tied to the various stages of conflict is also important. For example, actions that might be taken in anticipation of a conflict when the signs of trouble first emerge differ from strategies called for in situations where fighting is already under-way. In any case, the rebuilding stage after a conflict ends should always include strategies to "mop up" the weapons used in order to reduce violence in that country and prevent the weapons from being sent to another conflict.

Alliances with new constituencies should be sought. Perhaps the U.S. military and the armed forces in other countries now undertaking peacemaking and peacekeeping missions would be sympathetic to the notion of limiting the export of weapons they might face on the battle-field some day.

A new term must be found to replace "small arms." For many people, this term connotes rifles and handguns. In fact, a much more sophisticated class of

weapons is most commonly used in civil wars. This weapons class includes guns, mortars, land mines, some small artillery, helicopters (especially those equipped for counter-insurgency), and light aircraft.

Appendices

International Negotiation Network Consultation

Feb. 17-19, 1993

Resolving Intra-National Conflicts:

A Strengthened Role for Intergovernmental Organizations

Participant Agenda

Wednesday, Feb. 17:

2-2:55 p.m.

Participant Registration/Check-In at The Carter Center

3-4:15 p.m.

Opening Session - Jimmy Carter and Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, Co-Chairmen

Opening Remarks - Dayle Spencer, INN Secretariat

Welcome Address - Jimmy Carter, Former U.S. President

Keynote Address - Jan Eliasson, Undersecretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations

4:15-4:45 p.m.

Break

4:45-5:45 p.m.

Panel Discussion - The Role of Intergovernmental Organizations in Intra-National Conflict

Moderator: Javier Pérez de Cuéllar

Panelists: ASEA - Dato' Ajit Singh, Secretary-General

CSCE - Nils Eliasson, Director

League of Arab States - Mahmoud Abul-Nasr, U.N. Ambassador

OAS - Jose Luis Restrepo, Special Adviser to the Secretary-General

OAU - Solomon Gomes, Special Political Affairs Officer

U.N. - Jan Eliasson, Undersecretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs

5:45-6:15 p.m.

Question-and-Answer Session

Thursday, Feb 18:

9-10:30 a.m.

Panel Discussion - Regional Perspectives on Conflict

Moderator: Ted Koppel

Panelists: Jimmy Carter, Former U.S. President

Olusegun Obasanjo, Former President of Nigeria

Lisbet Palme, Swedish National Committee for UNICEF

Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, Former Secretary-General, United Nations

Shridath Ramphal, Former Secretary-General of the Commonwealth of Nations

Brian Urquhart, Former Undersecretary-General for Peacekeeping, United Nations

Andrew Young, Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations

10:30-11 a.m.

Break

11 a.m.-Noon

Question-and-Answer Session

12:15 p.m.

Lunch

1:45-4:30 p.m.

Break-Out Sessions on Five Conflicts

Burma/Myanmar

The Caucasus

Haiti

Macedonia & Kosovo

Zaire

4:45-6 p.m.

General Session - Reports from Break-Out Groups

6 p.m.

Reception for All Participants

Friday, Feb. 19:

9-11:30 a.m.

Break-Out Sessions on Two Conflict Resolution Themes

Early Warnings of Conflict

Small Arms Transfer

11:45 a.m.-1p.m.

Closing General Session

Reports from Morning Break-Out Sessions

Closing Remarks from Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter

1-1:30 p.m.

Open Press Conference

INN Council Members

Oscar Arias Sánchez was elected president of Costa Rica in 1986. His administration is noted for its dedication to promoting peace and development in Central America. His efforts culminated in the signing of the Central American Peace Plan in 1987. He was awarded the 1987 Nobel Peace Prize for his achievements in the region's struggle for peace and used the monetary reward to create the Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress. Dr. Arias has served as the economic adviser to the president of Costa Rica, the vice president of the Costa Rican federal reserve bank, and the director of the Office for National Planning and Economic Policy. He was elected to Congress on the National Liberation Party ticket in 1978 and in 1981 became the general secretary of the National Liberation Party.

Jimmy Carter, chairman of the International Negotiation Network (INN) Council, has devoted much of his career to political and social service. After naval duty, he served as a Georgia state senator, governor of Georgia, and president of the United States, where he successfully negotiated the Panama Canal Treaties, the Camp David Accords, and the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty (SALT II). Throughout his political career and thereafter, he has advocated greater human rights protection, democratic reform, and peace negotiation throughout the world and has substantially advanced these causes through his work at The Carter Center. President Carter has received numerous awards and honorary degrees from around the world, including the Albert Schweitzer Prize for Humanitarianism in 1987, the Martin Luther King Jr. Nonviolent Peace Prize in 1979, and the International Institute for Human Rights gold medal in 1979. He has written several books, including *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President*, *The Blood of Abraham*, *Negotiation: The Alternative to Hostility*, and *Talking Peace: A Vision for the Next Generation*. President Carter also received, together with former U.S. President Ronald Reagan, the first Spark M. Matsunaga Medal for Peace from the U.S. Institute of Peace in January 1993.

Olusegun Obasanjo began his 30-year career of national and international public service in the Nigerian military. He was Nigeria's head of state and the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces from 1976-79. In 1979, he became the first African military ruler to voluntarily organize democratic elections and the orderly transfer of power to civilian government. As head of state of Nigeria, Gen. Obasanjo was actively involved in mediation efforts throughout Africa and was crucial in terminating Nigeria's civil war in 1970. He has served with numerous organizations addressing issues such as disarmament, sustainable development, and world peace. Among many other positions, he is currently a member of the InterAction Council of former heads of government, an organization that develops policy recommendations for current decision-makers. Additionally, he is a founder and chairman of the African Leadership Forum. Gen. Obasanjo is a chartered engineer and is retired from public office and the military. He has lived as a farmer in Ota, Nigeria, since his retirement.

Lisbet Palme, widow of Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme, has been the chairperson of the Swedish National Committee for the United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) since January 1987. In 1989, she became first vice chairperson of the UNICEF executive board and was elected chairperson of the executive board for 1990-91. Mrs. Palme chairs the Group of Eminent Women for Namibian and South African Refugee Women and Children. She is a member of the Swedish National Committee for the International Literacy Year and was a member of the Swedish delegation to the World Conference for Education for All. Since 1986, she has participated as a guest speaker in a number of international conferences concerned with issues of children, development, peace, and anti-apartheid.

Javier Pérez de Cuéllar assumed office as secretary-general of the United Nations in 1982. His second and final term of office ended in January 1992. Dr. Pérez de Cuéllar joined the Peruvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1940 and the diplomatic service in 1944. In 1962, he was promoted to the rank of ambassador. He has been ambassador of Peru to Switzerland, the Soviet Union, Poland, and

Venezuela. Dr. Pérez de Cuéllar was a member of the Peruvian delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations at its first session in 1946. Prior to his post as secretary-general, he served as permanent representative of Peru to the United Nations, president of the security council, special representative of the secretary-general in Cyprus, United Nations undersecretary-general for special political affairs, and the secretary-general's personal representative on the situation in Afghanistan.

Marie-Angélique Savané is a country support team leader with the United Nations Fund for Population Country Support (UNFPA) in Senegal. She previously served as special adviser to the United Nations high commissioner for refugees in Geneva as well as acting as an international consultant. She was president of the Association of African Women for Research and Development from 1977-88, a project leader for the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development in 1979, and coordinator of the study "Food Systems and Society in Africa" from 1984-88. Ms. Savané served as coordinator of a research program on the impact of socioeconomic changes on women in Africa, as editor-in-chief of *Famille et Développement*, and as a research assistant in a United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) study on education, employment, and migration in Senegal.

Shridath Surwudranath (Sonny) Ramphal was assistant attorney-general of the West Indies Federation. After Guyana gained independence in 1966, he became attorney-general, then minister of foreign affairs and of justice. In 1975, Dr. Ramphal was elected Commonwealth of Nations secretary-general and served three terms. During the 1980s, he served on each of five independent international commissions that considered global issues: the "Brandt" Independent Commission on International Development Issues; the "Palme" Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues; the "Brundtland" World Commission on Environment and Development; the Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues; and the South Commission. Currently, he is chairman of the West Indian Commission, first executive

president of the Willy Brandt International Foundation, and president of the World Conservation Union.

Desmond M. Tutu is the Anglican archbishop of Cape Town, South Africa; chancellor of the University of Western Cape, Cape Town; and president of the All Africa Conference of Churches. He has served as the dean of Johannesburg, the bishop of Lesotho, the general secretary of the South African Council of Churches, and the bishop of Johannesburg. Archbishop Tutu has been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, the Athena Prize, and the Albert Schweitzer Humanitarian Award and holds numerous honorary degrees. His publications include *Crying in the Wilderness*, *Hope and Suffering*, and *The Words of Desmond Tutu*.

Cyrus Robert Vance is a lawyer with Simpson Thatcher & Bartlett in New York. Mr. Vance served as a government official under numerous U.S. administrations, including a term as secretary of state for the Carter administration. He was most recently appointed United Nations special envoy of the secretary-general in the former Yugoslavia and is conducting the ongoing peace process for the region. He has been involved in numerous international peacekeeping activities in Cyprus, Korea, Vietnam, and other nations. His vast experience in the peacekeeping field earned him the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1969. He is a member of the American Bar Association and the Council on Foreign Relations, among other associations.

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Notes

Note 1: Peter Wallensteen is Dag Hammarskjöld Professor of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University. [Back.](#)

Note 2: A major armed conflict is defined as one that has caused at least 1,000 battle-related deaths. It involves the use of armed force between two parties, including at least the government of a state, where the incompatibility concerns government and/or territory. See Lindgren 1991, Heldt 1992. [Back.](#)

Note 3: Including the major armed conflicts. Heldt 1992, pp.3. [Back.](#)

Note 4: Amer 1992 studied U.N. Security Council and General Assembly reactions to six invasions from 1976-90: Afghanistan, Cambodia, Central African Empire, Cyprus, Granada, Panama and Uganda. Amer found the reactions to be the most severe in the first two cases compared to no reaction in the two African cases. [Back](#).

Note 5: There are precedents, e.g., the Åland Islands which were given autonomy in Finland through the efforts of the League of Nations in 1921. [Back](#).

Note 6: Nordquist 1992 studied 15 interstate peace agreements from border conflicts 1945-1979. For instance, agreement under duress lasted on average eight years, those without duress 19 years (as of 1991), pp.92. [Back](#).

Note 1: Dayle Spencer is fellow and director of the Conflict Resolution Program at The Carter Center of Emory University (INN Secretariat); Mya Maung is professor of finance at Boston College; Zunetta Liddell works at Burma Action Group in London; and Josef Silverstein is professor emeritus of political science at Rutgers University. [Back](#).

Note 2: The renaming of Burma as "Myanmar Naing-Ngan" (Union of Burma) by the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) in June 1989, although recognized by the United Nations, has yet to gain popular usage largely because it is rejected by many ethnic minority parties as the historic ethnic Burman name for their country. See *Article XIX Country Report: State of Fear (Censorship in Burma)* by Martin Smith, December 1991, p. 1. [Back](#).

Note 1: Vamik Volkan (INN Core Group) is director of the Center for the Study of Mind & Human Interaction at the University of Virginia; Paul Henze works at Rand Corp.; Yuri Urbanovitch also works at the Center for the Study of Mind & Human Interaction; George Hewitt is Reader in Caucasus Languages at London University; and Margery Farrar is a special assistant in U.S. Rep. Tom Lantos' (D-Calif.) office. [Back](#).

Note 1: Bill Spencer (INN Secretariat) is managing director of Pangaea; Robert Pastor (INN Core Group) is fellow and director of the Latin American and Caribbean Program at The Carter Center of Emory University; Michel-Rolph

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Note 1: Editor's note: When the INN attempted to find one person to write the working session paper for Kosovo and Macedonia, they ran into unexpected difficulty. None of the experts consulted on Kosovo felt qualified to write about Macedonia. The same was true of experts on Macedonia - they felt unqualified to write about Kosovo. The INN, therefore, commissioned brief papers from two writers - one on Kosovo and one on Macedonia. The INN hopes the two papers, taken together, will offer an overview of the issues in the region. [Back](#).

Note 2: Bill Ury (INN Secretariat) is associate director of Harvard University's Program on Negotiation; Jan Øberg is director of the Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research; James Pettifer is a member of the Royal Institute for International Affairs in London; Vladimir Milcin is executive director of the Open Society Fund of Macedonia; Veton Surroi works at BBC World Service, Albanian Section; and Dennis Sandole is associate professor of conflict resolution at George Mason University. [Back](#).

Note 3: This spelling (with a final "o" rather than an "a") is accepted as the English language name. Any perceived bias is unintended. [Back](#).

Note 1: Hal Saunders (INN Core Group) is director of International Affairs at the Charles F. Kettering Foundation; Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja is professor of African Studies at Howard University; Tom Turner is professor of political science at Wheeling Jesuit College; Richard Joseph is fellow and director of the African Governance Program at The Carter Center of Emory University; and Alvin Wolfe is Distinguished Service Professor of Anthropology at the University of South Florida. [Back](#).

Note 1: Please see the earlier footnotes for the affiliations of Vamik Volkan, Hal Saunders, Bill Ury, and Kumar Rupesinghe. Louis Kriesberg is director of the Program on the Analysis and Resolution of Conflicts at Syracuse University. [Back](#).

Note 2: Editor's note: For further discussion, see "The Quest for a Disaster Early Warning System" by the author, *Bulletin of Peace Proposal*, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1987; Also, *Early Warning and Conflict Resolution*, edited by K. Rupesinghe and M. Kuroda (St. Martin's Press, 1992). [Back](#).

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