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The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict:
Historical and Prospective Intervention Analyses

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July 2003
September will mark the 25th anniversary of the Camp David Peace Accords. That historic moment remains the high-water mark for diplomacy in the Middle East.

To this day, not one element of that agreement has been violated; Egypt and Israel remain at peace. September also will mark the 10th anniversary of the Oslo Peace Accords, which provided the first real opportunity to resolve perhaps the most difficult of the remaining elements required for regional peace and stability: an agreement between Israel and its Palestinian neighbors. Current attempts to advance a Road Map for peace, created through the combined efforts of the United States, the United Nations, the European Union, and Russia, now occupy our attention, as diplomacy continues to compete with violence in the latest campaign to move toward a lasting peace in the region.

Looking for ways to contribute to the resolution of intractable conflicts is a focus of attention for the Carter Center’s International Council for Conflict Resolution (ICCR), a body composed of leading ex-politicians, diplomats, and academics as well as technical experts in the field of conflict resolution. In October 2002 a small group that brought together ICCR members with leading regional experts met at The Carter Center in Atlanta to discuss the ongoing conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. The purpose was to examine the situation using a comparative analysis of other violent struggles, seeking to identify common threads of thought that could inform policy-makers engaged in peacemaking efforts in the Middle East. This comparative analysis, always recognizing the specific concerns unique to the area, proved to be a fruitful point of departure for what turned out to be a remarkable two days of intense discussion among the participants.

While some concepts are limited in their application to specific conflicts, others prove to be more universally applicable. Lessons learned in one environment may be useful in addressing similar issues in a totally different environment. In this report, we strive to distill the most important elements that emerged from two days of discussions into a brief and useful document that may provide insights on how to advance discussions regarding the final settlement of the Israel-Palestine conflict once that stage is reached.

I would like to express my appreciation to those participants: Professor Mari Fitzduff from INCORE in Belfast; Joseph Montville, formerly director of the Program on Preventive Diplomacy, Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington; Professor William Zartman from the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University; Dr. Bruce Jones from the Center on International Cooperation, New York University, formerly chef de cabinet to the U.N. special coordinator for Middle East negotiations; Professor William Quandt from the University of Virginia, formerly a member of the National Security Council staff during my administration; and John Marks, president, and Susan Collin Marks, executive vice president, of Search for Common Ground in Jerusalem. Their contributions to this program were inspiring, and their continued cooperation with, and interest in, our activities have been most gratifying.

The Carter Center’s Conflict Resolution Program hosted this event as the first in what will be a series of small group symposia on intractable wars. Program staff continually monitor the world’s conflicts, large and small alike, in an effort to maintain their readiness to engage in direct mediation when called upon by the parties involved, either on their own or by providing support to me. I am grateful for their work, with the assistance of members of the ICCR, in holding this symposium and assembling this report.
As we enter 2003, the Israeli-Palestinian context is defined by a series of interrelated phenomena: a continuing loss of Israeli and Palestinian lives; political turbulence (and some convergence) in Israel; progress, after much debate, on the question of reform and Chairman Arafat’s leadership; a factional struggle for dominance of Palestinian popular politics; devastation of the Palestinian economy, and a lesser but still damaging corrosion of the Israeli economy; and public attitudes on both sides defined by the concept of “tactical hawks, strategic doves”—but with trends showing a worrying erosion of support for peaceful solutions. The international context is defined by growing consensus on substantive issues among international, Arab, and some U.S. officials; some remaining tactical and presentational differences within this group; a rise of anti-Semitic and anti-Arab attitudes; and uncertainty about the consequences of regime change in Iraq. The combination—alongside President Bush’s decision to publish the Road Map following the confirmation of the new Palestinian Cabinet—potentially represents a turning point.

Political Turbulence, Political Convergence in Israel

This report is being finalized some months after Israeli elections returned Likud Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to power with a strengthened Knesset presence. In the lead-up to elections, both Sharon and Amram Mitzna endured bitter leadership feuds within their parties, revealing significant cleavages with their parties and considerable similarities across the parties. Though both won their contests, neither was able to stop their rivals from influencing the selection of party candidates for parliamentary elections. Netanyahu’s support in Likud’s Central Committee enabled him to place several loyalists on the Likud list, creating a list considerably more rightist than Sharon’s public posture. Simultaneously, defeated Labor leader Ben-Eliezer used his influence to ousted key doves, such as party stalwart Yossi Beilin. Adding to the confusion, Likud has become embroiled in a scandal about reported extortion of cash for placement on party lists. Though the scandal temporarily weakened Likud’s prospective seat gains, it had little impact on the final polls.

The turbulence masked an important degree of convergence. The Labor Party leadership race, for example, began as a contest between Ben-Eliezer (who projected a tough-on-terrorism image) and Haim Ramon, from the dovish faction of the Labor Party. Mitzna came in as an alternative dovish candidate, albeit one who as a former senior Israel Defense Forces general was able to project a credible image on security. Notwithstanding Labor’s comparatively dovish stance on talks with the Palestinians, the result of interfactional politics within Labor was “a Labor list that even Sharon could lead.”

Similarly, to win the leadership of Likud, Sharon defeated former Prime Minister Netanyahu by staking out a position as a Likud moderate: tough on terrorism but willing to make political progress with the Palestinians. Sharon has presented a moderate face on such issues as a Palestinian state and a Road Map for creating it (on which, more below). A Palestinian terrorist attack during the election led to the odd spectacle of the Labor Party head criticizing Sharon for the lack of a tough response.

On the Palestinian issue, the main differences between Sharon and Mitzna, as articulated during the

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1 Yossi Verter, Ha’aretz, 11 December 2002.
campaign, related to (i) the size of an acceptable Palestinian state; (ii) the nature of its “attributes of sovereignty”; (iii) the timetable for achieving it; and (iv) the question of Palestinian sovereignty in East Jerusalem. Both Likud and Labor reject any compromise on the question of right of return. A further difference was Mitzna’s willingness to unilaterally withdraw from the territories if negotiations don’t achieve results, while Sharon has rejected unilateral separation. The substantive differences are significant but not insurmountable. During the election campaign, the difference on which most emphasis was placed was a tactical one: that Mitzna would begin discussions immediately, while Sharon continued to insist on a prior halt to violence.

After the elections, efforts to forge a coalition government revealed still further intersections and cleavages — but largely on domestic issues, particularly related to the level of state financial resources devoted to concerns of the religious parties. Mitzna early on rejected any possible coalition participation, and despite pressure within the party, stayed firm on the point. The coalition that resulted is a turbulent mix of religious, right-wing, and moderate parties that appear to have, collectively, a harder line on the Palestinian issue than Sharon has publicly taken. The presence in the Cabinet of two parties that espouse a very hard line on Palestinian issues may constrain Sharon’s room for maneuver.

Palestinian Reform?

Palestinian leadership politics, meanwhile, has been dominated by the elaborate shadow dance that led to recent changes to Arafat’s leadership. Privately, many Palestinian officials have long admitted to deep concerns about Arafat’s leadership. Publicly, all profess loyalty to Arafat, partially because he has controlled the purse strings and partially because the anti-Arafat agenda has been “Americanized”; to be anti-Arafat before President Bush’s June 24 speech was to be a courageous reformer; after June 24, “anti-Arafat” equals “American agent.” (See page 6.) Of senior officials, only Abu Mazen has consistently been willing to criticize Arafat on the use of violence and terrorism.

It was this willingness that generated both internal and external support for the campaign to appoint Abu Mazen as prime minister designate — in effect creating an alternative leadership structure alongside Arafat. As this report is being finalized, Abu Mazen (with U.S., U.N., E.U., and Egyptian support) has presented Arafat with a quasi-reformist Cabinet which incorporates such figures as Mohamed Dahlan and Salaam Fayyed, now put in charge of security and finances, respectively, which have traditionally been the two sources of Arafat’s power. A down-to-the-wire stand-off between Abu Mazen and Arafat over the composition of the Cabinet gave a first indication of the degree of difficulty Abu Mazen will face in trying to develop a new political direction for the Palestinians.

At the popular political level, political life continues to be dominated by competition between Fatah and Hamas for leadership of the Palestinian national movement. In the early phase of the Intifada, this competition had the ugly aspect of being defined by violent one-upmanship. In some Palestinian circles, Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon was seen as a victory for Hezbollah’s tactics, leading to their adoption by factions in Gaza and the West Bank. Fatah quickly got drawn into this dynamic. (Islamic Jihad is the leading proponent of these tactics but is less influential in Palestinian popular politics.) Recently, Fatah has begun talks with Hamas to forge a national consensus around limiting their fight with Israel to the territories east of the Green Line. However, these talks have not produced results, and Egyptian-brokered talks in Cairo are seen by some as actually having bolstered Hamas, rather than contained them, by raising their profile and perceived legitimacy in the Arab world. Within Fatah, there continues to be serious debate over both strategy and tactics, with some factions
emphasizing that to retain control over the Palestinian national movement and to keep alive the prospect of peace with Israel, there may ultimately have to be a forceful confrontation with Hamas. The ultimate outcome of this factional competition remains to be seen, but will be greatly influenced by movement toward a political process; in the absence of credible peace talks, Hamas retains a considerable tactical advantage over the moderate wing of Fatah. Even in the context of a renewal of dialogue, the strength gained by Hamas in the past two years will mean that they will pose a serious challenge to any new political direction taken by the incoming Cabinet, which will ultimately have to confront Hamas—a tough challenge indeed.

**Underlying Trends**

Among both Palestinians and Israelis, public attitudes are currently characterized by two aspects, characterized by one Israeli analyst as “tactical hawks, strategic doves.”

Israeli public attitudes are unsurprisingly heavily shaped by suicide bombings. Faced with continuing terrorist attacks in Israeli cities, a large majority of Israelis support tough measures to combat terrorism, including reoccupation of Palestinian areas and targeted assassinations (notwithstanding periodic American critique of both tactics). Of vital importance to understanding current dynamics is the fact that suicide bombings, especially the huge surge in bombings that occurred in March 2002, have convinced many Israelis who formerly believed otherwise that the Palestinians (or at least the Palestinian leadership) remain committed to the destruction of the state of Israel. This attitude is sometimes dismissed by non-Israelis, based on a belief that Palestinians by and large do not still seek a destruction of Israel. (See page 6.) However, whether or not it is true that Palestinian violence constitutes an existential threat to Israel, the fact is that this is widely believed by Israelis, and this belief constitutes a critically important reality. (To take just one instance: On the day the Arab League was endorsing the Saudi peace plan, which would involve recognition of Israel, Islamic Jihad detonated a massive bomb in Netanya, during the Passover Seder, killing more than 20 Israeli civilians—the suicide bombers spoke more persuasively than did the diplomats at the Arab League.) More basically, Israelis broadly share their government’s concern that if they negotiate and make concessions under pressure, while terrorist acts continue, this will simply lead to more support for terrorist tactics and more attacks on Israel, rather than any viable peace.

At the same time, however, polls consistently show that a majority of Israelis support an eventual peace deal involving the creation of a Palestinian state, based on a withdrawal of Israeli forces from the West Bank and Gaza and the removal of settlements. It is also true, however, that the majority for peace is less solid than it was a year ago, and there are important issues that remain unresolved in the Israeli public mind. The concept of a divided Jerusalem continues to polarize public opinion, with a majority opposed to accepting Palestinian sovereignty over East Jerusalem in the context of a peace settlement. Moreover, there is a worrying rise in discussion of more radical long-term options, like “transfer”—i.e. the forced movement of Palestinians from the West Bank to other parts of the Arab world, possibly Jordan.

Israeli voters are also increasingly preoccupied by the erosion of the Israeli economy, which has been badly hurt by two years of declining tourism, investor uncertainty, a weak shekel, recession, and rapidly rising unemployment. Businesses are being lost; the number of Israeli companies listed on NASDAQ has declined dramatically (far more than can be explained by NASDAQ’s overall decline). Senior Israeli officials have expressed fears of a growing “brain drain,” as Israeli entrepreneurs and young leaders look to the United States and other economies for their future.

The Palestinian population also has a “tactical hawks, strategic doves” aspect. Public opinion polling
continues to show a popular majority in favor of the Intifada in its current form, i.e. including terrorism. This number has grown steadily over the past two years, reflecting a population that is increasingly being radicalized by its perception of occupation and violence. The economic dimension is also acute: The Palestinian economy has been so devastated by Israeli closures that Palestinian living conditions are similar to those which prevailed before 1967. Yet it is not the economy, but Israel’s reoccupation of Palestinian areas that defines Palestinian resentment and anger. The fact that Prime Minister Sharon has accepted, in principle, the idea of a two-state solution is less persuasive than the fact that Israeli tanks have entered Beit Hanoun. Of major significance to Palestinian public opinion is continued land appropriation for settlement infrastructure, an ongoing activity that seems to many Palestinians to belie the Israeli government’s stated willingness ultimately to accept a Palestinian state.

Also worrying is a slow erosion of Palestinian support for a two-state solution. Palestinian violence is often depicted as aimed at the eradication of Israel. In recent history, this has not been the case. During the first 18 months of the Intifada, a solid majority supported an end of conflict once Israel withdrew to the 1967 borders and reconciliation with Israel in that context. The good news is that polling still shows a majority of Palestinians supporting a two-state solution. The bad news is that the scale of this majority is steadily slipping (from the 70s–80s in 2000, to the 50s today). This erosion leads some Palestinian analysts to conclude that time is running out for a peaceful solution. Other voices have started to propagate a shift away from a two-state stance, recognizing that demographic trends will soon result in a situation in which Palestinian claims could be achieved in a one-state solution. However, a return to a one-state approach has so far not attracted much support domestically and is well outside the bounds of what is acceptable internationally (to say nothing of within Israel).

The International Dimension

Just as in Israel political turbulence masks an important underlying convergence, so in the international arena, public tensions between the U.S. administration and their Arab and European allies divert attention from the development of a robust international consensus around many key dimensions of the Arab-Israeli conflict—or at least, its solution.

The consensus that has emerged was best articulated in a speech delivered by President Bush on June 24, 2002. The speech is widely acknowledged to have had two parts: a first segment that called for the removal of Arafat and a halt to terrorism; and a second segment that called for a two-state solution within a three-year timetable. Most Arab and European diplomats publicly endorsed the second half of the speech while privately agreeing with the first half (though believing that a public call to oust Arafat was counterproductive).

Issues on which an international consensus has emerged include the need for a two-state solution; regional recognition of Israel; a security package for Israel, as well as Palestinians; limitations on Palestinian sovereignty, particularly with respect to demilitarization; reform of the Palestinian institutions; and a solution for Palestinian refugees that is “agreed”—to use the Arab code for solutions not based on the right of return. The last point is controversial, but even the Saudi formula for peace was fairly explicit on the point (more explicit than the ultimate Arab League resolution), and among many international diplomats, it is understood that a solution will be based on no actual return to Israel.

Of course, there are important, sometimes sharp, differences between the U.S. administration and its allies. Many Arabs are uncomfortable espousing an anti-Arafat line, though they were willing to do so before the policy was adopted by the United States. (See, for example, President Mubarak’s several, harsh comments about Arafat in spring 2002.) Arabs and Europeans are more critical of Israeli military tactics...
than is the U.S. administration (in public; in private, there are frequent tensions between U.S. and Israeli officials). And while European (and some Arab) diplomats vigorously condemn terrorism against Israelis, they do not see the current conflict as having been launched by Palestinian terrorism (noting, for example, that dozens of Palestinians and Israelis had been killed during several weeks of street clashes and gun battles between security forces before the first terrorist attack occurred). In the U.S. administration, there is greater sympathy for the Israeli viewpoint that irrespective of how the Intifada started, Arafat’s decision in November 2000 to release from prison several Hamas activists constituted a deliberate decision on his part to use terrorism as a tool to gain political advantage—a move they refuse to reward.

Consensus and difference between the United States and its allies are increasingly managed through a tool established in late 2001, namely “the Quartet,” comprised of U.S., E.U., U.N., and Russian representatives. This body came into being around an initiative to orchestrate collective pressure on Arafat to renounce terrorism, resulting in a joint demarche. In the subsequent year, the Quartet has grown into a high-level body for the coordination of diplomatic positions, frequently consulting with Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. The Quartet developed a Road Map to implement Bush’s June 24 speech, spelling out steps designed to produce an end to terrorism, Palestinian reform, negotiations, and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The recent dispute between the United States and the other members about the timing of the introduction of the Road Map was tactical and presentational, rather than strategic—as have been most items of disagreement. Within the U.S. administration, the Quartet itself is controversial in some quarters, particularly because it is seen by some as representing a watering down of U.S.-Israeli coordination on the peace process. It is notable, however, that even its sharpest critics focus their differences on the membership of the Quartet and the tactics of negotiations, rather than the end goals espoused by the Quartet’s Road Map (themselves based on Bush’s vision).

At the international level, it would be remiss not to also mention an important, though fortunately still limited, phenomenon: a growth in anti-Semitic attitudes and a lesser, but notable, rise of anti-Arab/Muslim attitudes. Though European officials downplay the issue (correctly noting that policies have not changed and that firm action has been taken against those who have desecrated religious sites), there is reason to be worried about the growth of anti-Semitic, as well as anti-Arab, language and actions and, moreover, that anti-Semitic rhetoric has a growing role in the lexicon and media of even fairly moderate Arab states. A disturbing theme of anti-Arab sentiment can also be discerned in American and European public dialogue.

A Turning Point?

But if there is more consensus than difference in the international community; if both Likud and Labor acknowledge the need for a Palestinian state (albeit with limitations on its attributes of sovereignty), and a majority of Israelis agree; if a majority of Palestinians still support a two-state solution; and if key international diplomats and Arab leaders are prepared to support a solution based on no actual Palestinian refugee return to Israel (which remains the key to Israeli popular support for a deal); and if Bush remains committed to the Road Map—are we then at a place where we can envisage new progress in the peace process? Far from it, though perhaps not as far as many would imagine.

Far, for two reasons. First, because even where there is consensus about substance and end-states within the international community, there is a continuing divide over process, with the United States and Israel emphasizing security performance of the incoming Palestinian cabinet, and Arab and European diplomats emphasizing a parallel process
of reform coupled with political negotiations. Though seemingly tactical in aspect, this dispute remains a key difference between the United States and its partners and has hobbled the prospects for negotiations for almost two years. It may continue to do so in context of the implementation of the Road Map; indeed, in the post-9/11 environment, the issue is not tactical or procedural but strategic, as it is increasingly viewed by the United States through the lens of the broader war against terrorism.

Second, while there are some positive elements as outlined above, there are also worrying trends. The gradual erosion of the Palestinian majority for a two-state solution is certainly worrying. So, too, is the increased frequency with which one hears, in Israel, language that demonizes Arabs and propagates such concepts as forcible transfer of the Palestinians to Jordan. Moreover, there are growing tensions between Jewish and Arab Israelis. All of this poses what many see as the main threat to Israel: a demographic threat that arises from the fact of a growing Arab minority in Israel west of the Green Line and an Arab majority in the West Bank and Gaza. On the left, the demographic threat is taken as reason enough to spur a negotiated or unilateral evacuation from the territories. On the right, there is more focus on U.S.-led pressure to oust Arafat and induce democratic reform among the Palestinian institutions, combined with strong action against terrorism.

Among Palestinians, the continued expansion of settlements and continued building of settlement infrastructure seems to threaten the possibility of the eventual emergence of a viable Palestinian state, one of the stated goals of the Road Map.

There are also regional factors. It is too early yet to know fully the implications of the rapid U.S. victory in Iraq. Certainly, it can be argued that removing a regime that posed a military threat to Israel, and doing so in a way that demonstrated decisive U.S. will and force, diminishes the prospect of any Arab threat to Israel and thereby enhances the chances for peace. On the other hand, the destabilizing potential raised by Hezbollah’s presence in southern Lebanon remains, and it is possible under some scenarios that Hezbollah’s backers will find reasons to escalate tensions along Israel’s northern border, possibly using a now substantial reserve of medium-range missiles. This would, without doubt, provoke Israeli action in Syria and possibly Lebanon, which in turn could complicate the regional diplomatic situation. (Some Israeli strategists continue to view the risk of a “northern” war as far more worrying than the Palestinian conflict.)

Yet a resumption of political talks may not be as far away as many would imagine. Although Sharon is demonized in the Arab world and has a negative image in Europe, there are grounds for believing that he may take the initiative in his second term and move forward on the political front. He is under pressure to do so for economic reasons and will have to commit to some concrete steps if Bush does indeed re-engage. More negative viewpoints of Sharon’s likely attitudes are, of course, possible. But given that Sharon represents a broad political spectrum in Israel, the reality is that if there is to be political progress between Palestinians and Israelis in the current juncture, it is likely to happen on Sharon’s terms, if not necessarily his timetable.

Of course, there are still major differences between the maximal Sharon position and the minimum Palestinian position. However, new international discussions—for example, about the attributes of interim states, and even about an international transitional administration of an interim Palestinian state—may provide some useful ideas for bridging some of these gaps.

In the long term, a political package based on the international consensus spelled out above remains possible, even viable. But it also remains remarkably difficult in the absence of trust between Israelis and Palestinians, given the complex role played by third parties, and in the uncertainty of the effects of the war in Iraq. In either the short or long term, if progress is to be possible, it will require political
courage from the key state actors; full engagement from the U.S. administration, leading the Quartet and the moderate Arab states; and robust supporting efforts from civic actors. Here, international second track actors have a critical role to play (as they potentially do in creating more conducive conditions for political progress).

**Peace Process Dynamics**

While many view the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as not only a special case, but a hopeless one as well, it is important to realize that there are existing dynamics in this conflict that are common to other conflicts and thus open themselves to comparison and observation. Careful analysis of these dynamics can be of use to peacemakers who seek to encourage intelligent official and unofficial diplomacy in the pursuit of sustainable resolutions. Below are elements common to most peace processes, which can readily be applied to the Israeli-Palestinian case more specifically as peacemakers contemplate next steps to reinvigorate and support a viable peace process.

**Process Progression**

Peace processes begin when each side realizes it must include the opposing side in the solution. In reality, solutions are seldom win-lose or win-win; more often than not, they are lose-lose with each side making concessions to reach a deal. Thus, the main task of each side becomes to lose least on what it wants, which, in part, prolongs the nature of most peace processes. Parties will often take every opportunity possible to squeeze out of peace processes and avoid compromises, but that does not negate the necessity of coming to terms with what must be given up in order to reach a deal. To this end, it is important to realize that conflicts do not end but change, the goal being the conflict’s movement from violence into politics so that it becomes less destructive. In this process, however, victim needs must be addressed; peace versus justice issues can be very destabilizing in post-settlement stages.

Peace processes are usually phasal and deliver incrementally, with one step forward and perhaps two back. Evidence shows, however, that a step forward usually yields an additional agreement that will assist movement toward an eventual solution. Gains are not lost, but will accumulate. Often, finding the solution to a conflict is not the major obstacle to an agreement; in fact, there are usually many solutions to a conflict. However, getting leaders and constituents to pick up the solution together can be problematic—timing and relationships are key to this. The ground must be prepared for compromises to sustain a lasting peace, and this usually requires a lot of time.

**Spoilers**

Peace processes are often accompanied by violence, usually by those that feel they will lose if compromises are reached. Its cessation cannot be a prerequisite for peace talks, as this gives veto power to spoilers. Peace processes, instead, should include those who can destroy them through violence, though it may be necessary to circumvent them at times, bringing them in later to enhance sustainability.

Within the category of spoilers, there are dealers and zealots. Dealers often come on board with the right incentives; it may be necessary to bypass or contain zealots. Spoiler groups are usually best neutralized with the active involvement of other former, current, or potential spoilers, such as ex-militants and settlers.

**Delivering Compromise**

Leaders’ main job is to deliver their own people to the compromises that must be made in order to reach a solution. Leaders should also recognize each other's problems and help each other to sell the compromises, though they rarely do, as leaders usually
think the other side has the easier task. Thus, leaders often face pressure from within their own parties to resist making compromises.

One must realize that conflict is also functional and provides meaning and alternative meaning to those involved. This creates a need to find societal integration for both state and nonstate actors. However, there is usually no point in moral arguments; what are often needed are political incentives. This process is lengthy, however, particularly as followers often elect leaders that promise that they will not have to give up on their dreams.

**Groundwork**

According to comparative evidence, it is clear that Track 2 groups are often better able to deliver upon project goals when they have existing or eventual leverage with leaders and politicians. Track 2 work is often pre-political and helps leaders to sell necessary concessions by working to increase constituent understanding, acceptance, and absorption of those compromises, making this work circularly beneficial to both Track 1 and 2 actors. Thus, facilitating a link between Track 1 and 2 strengthens their respective activities.

It is important for leaders to identify and come to terms with issues that will require compromise, which in itself can be a difficult task. Upon identification, Track 2 groups can begin gentle, unofficial media work to gauge immediate constituent reactions and prospective movement on those issues, followed by activities that seek to create spaces and give rise to open discussions about coming to terms with what must be ceded to move peace processes forward. Unofficially working people through political options before leaders must sell them makes the politicians' jobs a bit easier and is often something that Track 1 groups cannot undertake in the immediate attentiveness to politics and negotiations.

**Ripeness**

Conflict evolution is characterized by problems of ripeness, a necessary but insufficient condition for negotiations to begin. Ripeness involves a perceived mutually hurting stalemate and a perceived way out of the conflict. If a conflict is not ripe for effective mediation, the mediator or potential mediator must work to ripen it. If ripening is not possible, the mediator must position himself for intervention later on. Peace processes begin when each side realizes that it must include the other in the solution, beginning at least some minimal level of dialogue.

Parties in conflict need help. In most cases, they are unable to prevail unilaterally but have a hard time recognizing it, as they are so deeply engrossed and committed to the conflict that it becomes overwhelmingly difficult to communicate, much less reach, a bilateral solution. But for the same reasons, parties do not welcome mediation. Mediators are often considered meddlers and have little leverage over the parties. They are at the mercy of the parties' felt need for a way out, which relates back to ripeness. If a mutually hurting stalemate pushes parties into a mediation process, it takes mutually enticing opportunities to pull them toward a positive conclusion.
Recommendations

In the following recommendations, no settlement proposals are put forth, but what is presented are recommendations that have both long- and short-term implications for the Israeli-Palestinian peace process specifically and the Track 1 and 2 actors involved therein. These recommendations relate primarily to the ultimate question of final status discussions. Many of the recommendations are inextricably linked both in nature and results. While official Track 1 diplomacy is the dominant stage on which the negotiations process will play out, the actors will not be performing in a vacuum. There are clearly voids that Track 2 actors can fill separately, in support of and/or in collaboration with Track 1—voids that must be filled to nurture a peace process and uphold a lasting peace. It should be noted that these recommendations came before the publication of the Road Map. Potential tactical approaches to its implementation were discussed only in general terms during the symposium.

Official and unofficial actors from the international community should seek to create forums and spaces that promote brainstorming and the exchange of ideas within and between Israeli and Palestinian communities with regard to peace and the means to achieve it. This not only raises the awareness of each other’s grievances but also allows for the formation of equal and strong networks in spaces where ideas are voiced without consequence. These sessions must be facilitated in a way that levels the playing field, allowing there to be some parity in the floating of ideas. These spaces could also be used to promote the reformation and/or removal of cultural and political barriers to negotiations and coexistence through informative debate and discussion of historically divisive issues.

Communities and leaders must be prepared for, and encouraged to make, the compromises that must be made in order to achieve peace. History teaches us that peacemakers come from the ranks of bold leaders. An essential part of their job is to prepare their constituencies for compromise. This can be a difficult task in the context of existing negotiations, which can move forward at a fast pace and at a high level with little time for constituency-building exercises. In this respect, unofficial actors can engage in work that contributes to filling this gap, preparing the ground before, during, and after compromises.

What must be present when Track 1 presents proposals is a propensity for the Israeli and Palestinian publics to respond positively, acknowledging positive gestures and supporting leaders to further negotiate issues to successful conclusions. In this context, it becomes extremely crucial for Arab states to assist the Palestinians in this process and for similar support for any bold Israeli leader from the United States. This makes it all the more important to convene Arab groups as well as Americans and Europeans to work through political options ahead of negotiations. This support would enable Palestinian leadership to pick up on positive Israeli gestures and proposals as well as pressure Israeli leadership to respect international momentum toward peace as well as consensus around actions mandated in peace initiatives. Additionally, Track 2 groups can and do engage in activities that, if properly exploited, can contribute to the type of constituency building that can ease the way for leaders to take bold steps for peace.

There is also a need for leaders and communities to face the hard truths of this conflict. The basic issues, such as borders, security, Jerusalem, refugee return and resettlement, and prisoner releases, are not going away and must be faced in the next round of peace efforts. Efforts must address the security of Israel and the finality of any agreement, making it clear to Palestinians and other Arabs that it is final. The agreement must end occupation and result in a Palestinian state. These are hard truths, and leaders must admit these facts to their publics, and communities must be prepared for them. This is
where Track 1 and 2 can move peace efforts forward in a parallel and collaborative direction, through ground preparation and the promotion of safe spaces where communities and leaders can work through political options before making official, binding decisions and declarations.

Efforts must be extended to assist moderate Israelis and Palestinians to enlist and increase the support of public opinion in order to mobilize a viable peace constituency. Tactically, it becomes important to identify and promote activities to assist more moderate Palestinians to regain the leadership of public opinion in favor of peace. Building the base for a viable solution is linked to realizing the possibility of a viable solution. This requires an extensive investment in time and effort. Without that investment, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other similar groups can continue to play the role of spoiler, seeking to build on their existing support in the broader Palestinian community.

There is also a generational shift occurring in Israel from which more moderate voices are emerging, advocating a political conceptualization of security as opposed to conceptions based only on military considerations. On the Palestinian side, there are many who are growing frustrated with current Palestinian leadership and are looking for ways to be heard so as to reform Palestinian leadership and governance in preparation for a coming peace with Israel. Creating more space for those who might seek to articulate alternative political options is desperately needed. Tapping into these new voices and engaging them on issues such as the nature of a final settlement between Israel and Palestine, constitutional issues for an emerging state, engaging in relationships with other countries, security issues, and functional interim measures for the transitional process to a final settlement are crucial to fostering a peace between Israelis and Palestinians. These kinds of discussions, if facilitated appropriately, would allow them to speak with some parity.

To this end, there is work to be done with and through the media. Track 2 groups are currently conducting significant polling that is making its way into political discussions. In creating an environment that is safe for political compromises, effective polling and media campaigns that touch base with Israeli and Palestinian communities can legitimize those compromises. While the extreme elements’ concerns need to be addressed in political negotiations, media campaigns and polling can help to marginalize them with the general public, which will aid in the creation of space for political leaders to address the compromises that will eventually need to be made. This marginalization might also give extremists the incentive they need to become more aligned with mainstream views or join discussions so as not to be precluded from a settlement.

Reconciliation should be prioritized within the Israeli and Palestinian communities as preparation for cross-cultural reconciliation, with a view toward peaceful coexistence. Historical and psychological aspects of ethnic conflict tend to defy traditional diplomatic attempts to resolve them. There is a need for activities that create and supplement an environment that fosters the notions of peace and healing in the face of existential fears and political circumstances that make reconciliation appear a bleak possibility. During a peace process, Track 1 actors are often not empowered or able to address the deeper aspects of conflict, such as historical memory, not out of spite or lack of concern, but because of the time-consuming nature of this work. It takes both time and commitment to achieve a deeper understanding not only of the history of the conflict, but also how that history affects the psyches of those living in conflict today.
Addressing grievances, including the senses of loss and injustice, is critical to bridging the differences that divide Israelis and Palestinians. It is critical to raise the awareness of this work’s importance to the political and diplomatic levels so that leaders can make conciliatory and symbolic gestures that might begin to address the anxieties of the Israeli and Palestinian peoples. As several notable Track 2 groups are currently undertaking this kind of work, official and unofficial support should be increased to enable them to expand and amplify their activities as appropriate.

Unofficial actors should develop and coordinate activities in order to aggressively support Road Map implementation. The Quartet Road Map is coming on the heels of President Bush’s June 2002 speech and is widely viewed as the newest vehicle to reinvigorate the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The Quartet, comprising representatives from the United States, the European Union, the United Nations, and Russia, would assume the responsibility of monitoring the Road Map’s implementation. Efforts to curb hesitation among Israeli and U.S. officials to aggressively pursue implementation need to be addressed. (In the case of the Israeli government, there are ongoing efforts to renegotiate the terms.) There is room in this process, however, for significant and supportive work by both Tracks. Indeed, it may well be advisable for Track 2 organizations, in order to act more effectively, to communicate in an ongoing effort to develop a Road Map of their activities. Clearly they will want to retain their independence of action, but effective communication can assist in ensuring that activities are targeted to effectively support Road Map implementation.

Excerpts from the Road Map follow, though this list is neither exhaustive nor exclusive and will likely undergo modification in the event that the Road Map is officially adopted and pursued.

Palestinian leadership issues unequivocal statement reiterating Israel’s right to exist in peace and security and calling for an immediate end to the armed Intifada and all acts of violence against Israelis everywhere.

- While issuing a statement of this nature is obviously necessary, such statements before have done little to curb spoiler violence. As the conflict exists now, Hamas is a leader of the national movement, and external groups are providing incentives to further violence. These spoilers must be accounted for in peace calculations and strategies developed to contain their tactics, possibly including them at later stages of the peace process. Further to spoilers, the Palestinian ground must also be prepared to accept Israel’s right to exist as well as to cease violence. Forums for discussion of political options and innovative ideas must be available, and new, moderate voices in leadership and the communities must be articulated and aired.

GOI dismantles settlement outposts erected since establishment of the present Israeli government and in contravention of current Israeli government guidelines.

- Though many settlers would abandon the settlements with the right incentives, others would persistently and violently hold steadfast to their homes. Leaders will need to sell this compromise not only to settlers, whose homes and communities have often been propagated by the Israeli government, but also to the Israeli public, who in the face of Palestinian violence might be reluctant to give up land the government has told them is theirs by birthright and sovereignty. Israeli and Palestinian leadership and communities must be prepared for possible violence and be able to work through it, possibly circumventing or containing Israeli settlers that would pose as...
spoilers to disrupt the implementation of this clause. Again, this would likely require reconciliation through forums and dialogue, as well as effective media campaigns and polling to ensure that moderate voices are heard.

*Independent Commission circulates draft Palestinian government reforms, based on strong parliamentary democracy, for public comment/debate.*

- The Palestinian community, after years of economic hardship and repression, will need an articulated propensity to contemplate and respond to sweeping governmental reforms. There is substantive and necessary pre-political, interim, and post-political work to be done in this area. This will include the creative development of a broader civil society, which will assist communities to work through political options and compromises. Educated debate and strong community discussions with appropriate media exposure could not only put pressure on Palestinian leaders to see reforms through, but also assist in the emergence of new leaders in an emerging Palestine. Equally important at this stage is international financial support, which has been considerable but must also be sustained.

*Palestinians hold free, open, and fair elections for PLC.*

- Creative space bolstered by effective media campaigns could provide the necessary venues for the Palestinian public to voice its concerns and assist in the emergence of Palestinian leaders whose views are more closely aligned to moderate Palestinians.

*Revival of multilateral talks (regional water, environmental, economic development, refugees, arms control issues).*

- Work on these issues through issue-based task forces should proceed at official levels, but there is room for considerable assistance from unofficial actors who can provide technical expertise of a nonpolitical nature. This can serve to prepare leaders, as well as domestic constituencies, for compromise.

*Arab state acceptance of normal relations with Israel and security for all the states of the region, consistent with Beirut Arab Summit.*

- There is a significant need for support on the ground on this issue. Reconciliation efforts must be undertaken. Though considerably time-consuming, there are immediate gestures of reconciliation that might crystallize the need for reconciliation among Arabs and Israelis, namely symbolic gestures such as Sadat’s 1977 trip to Jerusalem. This would obviously require considerable media exposure and international support. Parallel to immediate acts of reconciliation, forums and spaces for intra- and intercommunity dialogues would need to be created, so as to work through pending reconciliation.
The Carter Center at a Glance

**Overview:** The Carter Center was founded in 1982 by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and his wife, Rosalynn, in partnership with Emory University, to advance peace and health worldwide. A nongovernmental organization, the Center has helped to improve life for people in more than 65 countries by resolving conflicts; advancing democracy, human rights, and economic opportunity; preventing diseases; improving mental health care; and teaching farmers to increase crop production.

**Accomplishments:** The Center has observed 45 elections in 23 countries; helped farmers double or triple grain production in 15 African countries; mediated or worked to prevent civil and international conflicts worldwide; intervened to prevent unnecessary diseases in Latin America and Africa, including the near eradication of Guinea worm disease; and strived to diminish the stigma against mental illness.

**Budget:** $33.9 million 2001-2002 operating budget.

**Donations:** The Center is a 501 (c)(3) charitable organization, financed by private donations from individuals, foundations, corporations, and international development assistance agencies. Contributions by U.S. citizens and companies are tax-deductible as allowed by law.

**Facilities:** The nondenominational Cecil B. Day Chapel and other facilities are available for weddings, corporate retreats and meetings, and other special events. For information, (404) 420-5112.

**Internships:** The Center’s internship program has been rated one of America’s best by the Princeton Review.

**Location:** In a 35-acre park, about 1.5 miles east of downtown Atlanta. The Jimmy Carter Library and Museum, which adjoins the Center, is owned and operated by the National Archives and Records Administration and is open to the public. (404) 331-3942.

**Staff:** 150 employees, based primarily in Atlanta.
The Carter Center, in partnership with Emory University, is guided by a fundamental commitment to human rights and the alleviation of human suffering; it seeks to prevent and resolve conflicts, enhance freedom and democracy, and improve health.

While the program agenda may change, The Carter Center is guided by five principles:

- The Center emphasizes action and results. Based on careful research and analysis, it is prepared to take timely action on important and pressing issues.

- The Center does not duplicate the effective efforts of others.

- The Center addresses difficult problems and recognizes the possibility of failure as an acceptable risk.

- The Center is nonpartisan and acts as a neutral in dispute resolution activities.

- The Center believes that people can improve their lives when provided with the necessary skills, knowledge, and access to resources.

The Carter Center collaborates with other organizations, public or private, in carrying out its mission.