OBSERVING THE
1999 PUBLIC CONSULTATION PROCESS
IN EAST TIMOR

FINAL REPORT

JUNE 2000
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Carter Center East Timor Mission Leader Charles Costello, standing at map, discusses deployment plans with observers and staff at The Carter Center office in Dili.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABRI</td>
<td>Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASDT</td>
<td>Association of Timorese Social Democrats</td>
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<td>CNRT</td>
<td>National Council of Timorese Resistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Falintil</td>
<td>Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor</td>
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<td>Fretilin</td>
<td>Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<td>INTERFET</td>
<td>U.N.-sponsored International Force for East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kopassus</td>
<td>Indonesian Special Forces Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTOs</td>
<td>Carter Center Long-Term Observers</td>
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<td>MPR</td>
<td>Indonesia’s People’s Consultative Assembly</td>
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<td>Polri</td>
<td>Indonesia Police Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>STOs</td>
<td>Carter Center Short-Term Observers</td>
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<tr>
<td>TNI</td>
<td>Indonesia National Armed Forces (from April 1999)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDT</td>
<td>Timorese Democratic Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAMET</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in East Timor</td>
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<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Authority for East Timor</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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Aug. 30, 1999, was an extraordinary day for the people of East Timor. After a long history of colonization and external domination, they finally were able to cast free ballots to determine their territory’s future. In the face of continuing violent repression designed to subvert the balloting, the Timorese voted overwhelmingly for independence. Their vote, however, came at a very high price.

After the results of the United Nations-sponsored “public consultation” were announced, East Timorese pro-integration militia—supported by the Indonesian military—embarked on a full-scale, deliberate campaign of violence. Hundreds of lives were lost, and families were forced to flee into the mountains to neighboring West Timor and other areas of Indonesia.

While their homes, schools, and workplaces were looted and burned, East Timorese refugees in West Timor continued to suffer from harassment and intimidation by the militia. The depth of the destruction in East Timor shocked the world community and cast a dark cloud over the consultation process.

There are several important lessons that the international community can learn from this terrible experience. The most critical relates to the security arrangement for the public consultation stipulated in the May 5 Agreement. Allowing the Indonesian military to retain complete responsibility for security during the public consultation process was a serious flaw that opened the door to subsequent problems. In retrospect, the international community should have included a provision that allowed a multinational force to have joint responsibility for security or take responsibility, according to defined criteria, if the government of Indonesia proved unable or unwilling to fulfill its obligation to maintain security.

Some people have questioned why so much attention and resources have been diverted to such a small territory. Although, technically, the United Nations treated the public consultation as part of the decolonization process from Portugal, the precedent of East Timor has broader applicability. It stands for the proposition that the international community will not allow wholesale, gross violations of human rights and denial of self-determination for a forcibly occupied people to be justified by a dominant power’s claims of national sovereignty.

The experience in East Timor raises issues for those who work to protect human rights and support the right to self-determination in the decolonization process. Perhaps foremost among them is whether the entire exercise was worth the Timorese people’s loss and suffering.

East Timor’s vote for independence came at a great cost. The extensive post-consultation destruction was shocking and overwhelming. Consequently, East Timor now faces the formidable task of rebuilding both its physical infrastructure and social fabric. Although reconstruction is slow, important progress is being made. Homes, schools, and government buildings are being rebuilt. Communities are reuniting.

East Timor’s transition offers an unprecedented opportunity to design and build a democratic society. Timorese political and civil society leaders have expressed their commitment to creating an independent state grounded firmly on democratic values. The international community should assist the Timorese in reaching this goal.

But, again, the question: Was it all worth it? Time and again came the same response from the Timorese: “They have been killing us for decades, so this was nothing new, and it was what we expected from them. But now we are free, and it is worth the sacrifice.” We must respect that courage.

Francis J. Carter
The May 1998 departure of Indonesian President Suharto, following a 32-year dictatorship, raised hopes of independence for East Timor, where some 200,000 people had died since Indonesia’s 1975 invasion of the Portuguese colony. In January 1999, Suharto’s successor, Bucharuddin Jusuf (B.J.) Habibie, in an effort to appease the East Timorese and international community, suggested that a vote would be held on autonomy with or independence from Indonesia. Details of this referendum were set forward in the May 5 Agreement, signed by Indonesia, Portugal, and the United Nations.

The Carter Center’s involvement in East Timor began in June 1999. President Carter, leading an international observer mission for Indonesia’s parliamentary elections, met with East Timorese leader José Alexandre “Xanana” Gusmao, then under house arrest, serving a 20-year sentence for subversion. Responding to Gusmao’s request for international observers to monitor East Timor’s ballot, and with President Habibie’s support and official U.N. approval, The Carter Center opened an office in East Timor’s capital of Dili on July 4.

By mid-July, the Center had deployed eight long-term observers to East Timor. The purpose of the Center's mission was to help ensure that the public consultation process was conducted fairly and transparently. Special attention would be paid to the security climate, given the history of repression, intimidation, and violence in the territory. The methodology used was regular fact finding throughout East Timor on necessary preconditions for a free and fair ballot and the release of a series of weekly public reports.

The Center was concerned less with the actual vote, which the United Nations would administer, than with monitoring and casting world attention on the political climate and any human rights violations prior to balloting. As President Carter said in the July 8 press statement announcing the observer mission, “True democracy requires that people be allowed to cast their votes freely and without intimidation or coercion.”

All information in the Center’s weekly reports was gathered through direct observation or reliable eyewitness accounts. These reports provided information to the United Nations, other policy-makers, and the press about human rights abuses in East Timor and Indonesia’s failure to uphold the May 5 Agreement. Carter Center observers also were among those who publicly cited Indonesia for actively supporting, arming, and directing the armed pro-integration militias that led a campaign of fear and violence throughout East Timor.

Based on this first-hand reporting, President Carter in
early August urged President Habibie to halt the militia activity in East Timor. In a public statement, President Carter said, “Some top representatives of the government of Indonesia have consistently failed to fulfill their main obligations with respect to public order and security, and in many cases, have actively sought to undermine the popular consultation process.”

In late August, Carter Center long-term observers were joined by nine short-term observers and Carter Center staff members with experience managing election observation missions. The full observer team continued to report on pre-balloting conditions, especially the high level of intimidation and harassment perpetrated predominately by Indonesia-backed, pro-integration militias.

For the Aug. 30 ballot, a 15-person Carter Center observation team monitored the vote, in which nearly 99 percent of East Timor’s 450,000 registered voters went to the polls. Many of the voters, including old men and women, walked miles the previous day, putting aside their personal fears to cast their ballots. On polling day, Carter Center delegates visited seven of East Timor’s 13 districts and observed voting in 27 subdistricts and 43 of the 700 polling stations across the territory.

At a Sept. 1 press conference, the Center delivered a statement that both applauded the massive voter turnout and urged Indonesia to prevent new violence in the days before and after the announcement of results. The statement noted that the public consultation process, while marred by pre-ballot violence, was well administered by the United Nations and allowed the people of East Timor to exercise their right to self-determination at the polls.

The United Nations announced the results on Sept. 4, which revealed that 78.5 percent of East Timorese voters had rejected autonomy. Within hours of the announcement, the pro-integration militias began a burning, looting, murdering, and raping rampage. Some 400,000 people, or half of East Timor’s population, were displaced, either fleeing to the hills or across the border into West Timor, as their homes and most public buildings were torched. President Carter said in a statement, “The failure by the Indonesian government to take strong, swift action to stop the escalating violence of these lightly armed militias is inexplicable.”
The three remaining Carter Center personnel and local staff were forced to evacuate Dili the following day after attacks against some of them by armed pro-integration militia members and Indonesian policemen. Two days later, the Center’s staff residence and office was looted, and then burned to the ground by militia and the Indonesian military (TNI) troops.

The violence, which resulted in the deaths of perhaps hundreds, did not stop until the U.N.-sponsored, Australian-led International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) was deployed Sept. 20. Security conditions improved greatly thereafter, yet an estimated 170,000 Timorese refugees remained through December in camps in West Timor and elsewhere in Indonesia. Here, they suffered disease, hunger, and continued intimidation and violence from the pro-integration militias and Indonesian military.

After their evacuation, Carter Center observers continued to collect information and release weekly public reports from several locations in Indonesia and Darwin, Australia. The Center re-established an office in Dili in late October to complete its observation work and prepare for a December assessment mission to identify specific areas in which the Center or others might assist East Timor during its transition to full independence.

The Carter Center’s experience in East Timor raises many important questions for the institution and other organizations, including the United Nations, to consider as other regions around the world struggle for their independence. For instance, was the United Nations correct to pursue East Timor’s public consultation, knowing that violence was present and likely to increase? What steps should the United Nations or others take to ensure that governments meet their obligations in similar situations in the future and what if those governments refuse to comply? What role should international observers and other outsiders play?

In all, The Carter Center’s observation mission produced 11 weekly public reports from July 4 through Oct. 6, 1999, an equal number of internal confidential reports provided to U.N., U.S., and Indonesia officials, and five press releases. These documents detailed several major findings, including:

- The results of the popular consultation reflect the will of East Timor’s people and demonstrate the overwhelming preference for independence from Indonesia.
- The United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) administered the vote in an unbiased, transparent, and professional manner.
- TNI created, supported, directed, funded, and armed pro-integration militias in an attempt to influence the outcome of the popular consultation through violence and intimidation.
- The Indonesian government, TNI, and the militias bear primary responsibility for the fear and violence that prevailed during the public consultation process.
- The Indonesian police failed to maintain law and order and in many cases actively colluded with violent pro-integration groups.
- The TNI, police, and local government officials actively campaigned and provided resources in support of the integration option.
- International observers, UNAMET staff, foreign diplomats, and international journalists were threatened and intimidated by TNI soldiers, police, and militia members before and after the vote.
- Refugees faced harassment, intimidation, and violence in Indonesia-ruled West Timor and other parts of Indonesia after they fled or were forced out of East Timor.

A more comprehensive account of these findings appears later in this report, following a brief historical overview of East Timor and a detailed description of the methodology used by Carter Center observers throughout the public consultation process. This report concludes with an assessment of post-ballot needs and opportunities as East Timor makes its transition to full independence.
The history of East Timor – roughly one half of a small island off the northern coast of Australia with some 800,000 people – is full of dominance and repression by outside forces. From 1512, when Portuguese sailors first reached the island, until 1975, East Timor was ruled as a Portuguese colony, prized for its sandalwood, coffee, and value as a trading route post in the Orient, with a brief period of Japanese occupation during World War II. The past quarter century, Indonesia ruled the territory after its armed forces forcibly invaded, and in 1976, annexed East Timor as its 27th province.

During the 19th and 20th centuries, the Portuguese and Dutch, who had colonized many of the neighboring islands, struggled for control of Timor, until in 1914 they signed an agreement to partition the island to its present day borders. During World War II, Japan ignored Portugal’s neutrality and overran the island, killing thousands of Timorese. After a four-year war to end Dutch colonial control, the independent state of Indonesia was born, and the western half of Timor became part of the new nation in 1949.

Meanwhile, East Timor remained a Portuguese colony, despite decades of agitation for independence. In 1974, the region’s colonial governor allowed citizens to organize their own political parties, which only strengthened East Timorese desires for self-rule. In late 1975, Portugal’s authoritarian government was overthrown, and three weeks later East Timor began to de-colonize.

Local nascent political associations played an important role in shaping East Timor’s future. The most prominent ones were the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) and the Association of Timorese Social Democrats (ASDT), which was renamed the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin). UDT favored a continued association with Portugal and sought a more progressive style of autonomy, whereas ASDT members voiced fiercely pro-independence aspirations. The Timorese Popular Democratic Association, Apodeti, established with support of the Indonesian government, favored the integration of East Timor into Indonesia.

Strong relations between ASDT and UDT from January to May 1975 deteriorated until fighting eventually broke out in August between the two groups. Fretilin won this brief conflict in late September and declared East Timor’s independence from Portugal on Nov. 28, but self-rule was short-lived.
OBSERVING THE 1999 PUBLIC CONSULTATION PROCESS IN EAST TIMOR

On Dec. 7, Indonesia invaded in a full-scale military effort to overtake Dili. Tens of thousands of people were killed over the next six months, most of them directly by the Indonesian military. Indonesian troops numbered 15,000 to 20,000 against the vastly under-manned and out-gunned military wing of Fretilin, the Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor (Falintil), which still inflicted high casualties on Indonesian soldiers.

By the end of the 1980s, more than 200,000 people had died from disease, famine, and continued Indonesian attacks. While numbers vary, some sources claim that as much as one-third of East Timor’s population was killed and a larger number displaced from their homes. Nevertheless, East Timorese forces continued to wage guerilla attacks, mainly from the island’s steep interior mountains, and resisted acceptance of Indonesian rule.

In 1981, the United Nations issued a resolution calling for the independence of East Timor, and beginning in 1982, successive U.N. Secretaries-General held regular talks with Indonesia and Portugal to resolve the territory’s status. However, while human rights groups around the world continued to monitor and report on the situation, East Timor remained a relatively minor issue in interna-

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tional affairs until two events in the 1990s captured world attention.

The first was the Santa Cruz massacre of Nov. 12, 1991, when Indonesian troops shot mourners at a funeral in Dili, killing some 250 unarmed civilians. Investigations into this incident and increased U.N. activity placed East Timor more prominently on the international arena. The second event was the awarding of the 1996 Nobel Peace Prize to two East Timorese – pro-independence supporters Bishop Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, the Catholic leader in Dili, and Jose Ramos-Horta, a staunch activist in exile.

The Asian economic crisis that began in 1997 struck Indonesia particularly hard, adding instability to a nation that faced at least seven localized insurrections. In May 1998, President Suharto relinquished his 32-year grip on power amid a crumbling economy, student protests, and urban riots. His departure prompted appeals for a new and more flexible attitude toward East Timor, whose unique history, use of the Portuguese language, and mainly Catholic rather than Muslim religious faith differentiated it from the other Indonesian territories calling for self-rule.

The East Timorese diaspora, long fractured by partisan disagreements and jealousies, anticipated the changes in Jakarta and came together in Portugal in 1998 to form the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT). The CNRT elected a slate of individuals who intended to rejoin resistance fighters inside East Timor to govern their homeland. They chose Gusmao, the Fretilin guerilla leader captured and imprisoned by Indonesia in 1992, as president, and Ramos-Horta, in exile since 1975, as vice president.

In January 1999, Suharto’s successor and long-term associate B.J. Habibie offered East Timor a vote on accepting autonomy within Indonesia or rejecting it as a prelude to independence. Under the May 5 Agreement, Indonesia pledged to provide security in East Timor during a non-binding public consultation voting process to be administered by the United Nations. The offer also led to an upsurge in violence, as pro-integration, and to a lesser extent, pro-independence factions, launched attacks aimed at swaying the results of the public consultation.
1999 CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

January 27  Habibie offers East Timor possibility of autonomy or independence
February 24  Pro-integration militia attack Catholic parish in Liquica, 25 people killed
April 17  Pro-integration militias go on a rampage in Dili, 20 people killed
21  Pro-integration and pro-independence leaders sign pact to end violence
May 5  Indonesia, Portugal, and U.N. sign Agreement on the Public Consultation
16  Pro-Indonesia militia attacks A tara village, southwest of Dili, 15 killed
June 8  President Carter visits East Timorese leader Xanana Gusmao in prison
July 4  Carter Center opens office in Dili, begins public reporting initiative
16  Voting registration begins inside and outside East Timor
August 8  Voter registration ends; initial polling day delayed over security concerns
14  Two-week campaigning period begins; murders, house burnings follow
30  Polling day: Nearly 99 percent of registered voters cast ballots
September 4  U.N. announces results: 78.5 percent of East Timorese vote for independence; Indonesia-backed militias begin campaign of terror
6  Militias kill 39 people in Bacau; Bishop Carlos Belo flees territory; Carter Center staff forced to evacuate the day before
20  INTERFET peacekeeping troops arrive to stabilize East Timor
October 19  MPR passes decree that recognizes results of the Aug. 30 ballot
22  Gusmao returns to East Timor after seven years in an Indonesian prison
25  U.N. establishes 11,000-staff UNTAET to administer territory
30  All remaining Indonesian soldiers depart East Timor
December 1  Jose Ramos-Horta returns to East Timor after 24 years in exile
12  Gusmao meets pro-integration militia leaders to discuss reconciliation
MAY 5 AGREEMENT

In New York on May 5, 1999, representatives of the governments of Indonesia and Portugal and U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan signed an agreement that created the legal framework for the popular consultation process. The May 5 Agreement on Modalities for the Popular Consultation initially set the date for the ballot, both inside and outside East Timor, for Aug. 8, 1999. Due to poor security in the territory, Annan was forced twice to delay the ballot until it was eventually held Aug. 30.

Under the terms of the agreement and its appendices, the public consultation was not technically a referendum on independence but rather a vote for or against autonomy, the results of which would need to be ratified by Indonesia’s People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) before becoming final. The question put before the voters read as follows:

ACCEPT: Do you accept the proposed special autonomy for East Timor within the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia?

OR

REJECT: Do you reject the proposed special autonomy for East Timor, leading to East Timor’s separation from Indonesia?

The May 5 Agreement stipulated that the Indonesian authorities would be responsible for “ensuring a secure environment for a free and fair popular consultation process and will be responsible for the security of the United Nations personnel.” The U.N. security guards that were deployed to East Timor and the international civil police corps sent to advise the Indonesian police during the operational phase of the popular consultation were forbidden from carrying firearms.
The Carter Center and other observers noted serious flaws in the May 5 Agreement. For one, Indonesia was granted complete control of security in the very territory it had forcibly occupied. The Indonesian government also was required to remain neutral in its actions with respect to the ballot questions.

However, not only did Indonesia fail to provide adequate security, elements within the Indonesian security forces, perhaps at the highest levels, actively backed the pro-integration militias in their efforts to make the independence option fail. This security arrangement also prevented the earlier deployment of international peacekeepers who might have saved lives before and immediately after the vote.

A second major flaw in the agreement came in providing the MPR with the final authority on ratifying East Timor’s independence, rather than establishing a referendum from the outset. Given Indonesia’s concern over allowing any part of the country to break away, there was no guarantee it would honor the ballot’s results.

This clause contributed to the intimidation and violence committed by pro-integration militias, which operated under the assumption that a close vote tally would give the MPR a pretext for denying independence. Ultimately, the MPR, under considerable pressure from other countries and international financial institutions, did honor the results, which were overwhelmingly in favor of independence.

The CNRT privately concurred with the May 5 Agreement, in spite of its flaws, considering it the best attainable at the time and desperately wanting the popular vote. Having lived through the previous three decades of authoritarian rule, and not knowing what Indonesia’s upcoming elections might bring, the CNRT and other East Timorese eagerly sought the opportunity to vote even under the conditions they were granted.

The Role of the United Nations

On June 11, the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) was established to supervise the registration, campaigning, voting, and counting activities. Among its many responsibilities, UNAMET disseminated and explained the content of the May 5 Agreement, provided educational materials to vot-
ers, and conducted voter registration inside and outside East Timor. UNAMET also proposed a code of conduct for the campaign, administered balloting at approximately 700 polling stations in 200 polling centers, transported and counted the ballots after the vote, and determined and announced the results.

UNAMET adopted a unique procedure for counting the votes. To minimize acts of retribution by pro-integration or pro-independence supporters against voters in a given village or polling district, all ballots were mixed together and then counted at UNAMET headquarters in Dili. In addition, only one overall vote tally was recorded and announced for the public consultation rather than several tallies for each level of the process (i.e., polling station, center, district, state, national), as is the case in most elections around the world.

This procedure required UNAMET officials to seal and store the cast but uncounted ballots overnight and transport them via truck or helicopter back to Dili the day after the vote. This created opportunities for disruption of the vote. In one instance, pro-integration militias in Gleno, a town some 20 miles southwest of Dili, attacked a UNAMET convoy carrying ballot boxes back to Dili. Two local East Timorese working for UNAMET were killed in the clash.

**Indonesian Military and Police**

In April 1999, the Indonesian military changed its name from A BRI (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia) to TNI to signal a split from the national police, Polri. TNI, like A BRI before it, however, remained strongly committed to protecting the unity of the country and keeping East Timor from breaking away.

TNI’s generals, led by Indonesian Armed Forces Commander General Wiranto, feared a “domino effect,” in which a vote for independence in East Timor would set in motion similar movements across Indonesia’s many contentious islands. After President Suharto’s fall, the generals wanted to show that they remained firmly in control; they were determined not to relinquish a small territory where many of them had served for years and seen fellow officers and soldiers injured and killed. In addition, the Indonesian military and police officers living in East Timor wanted to remain in the territory, where they wielded power and influence.

Polri, which, since the founding of the Republic of Indonesia had been a component of A BRI, now became a separate entity from the military. This separation enabled TNI to claim, as stated in the May 5 Agreement, that “the police [are] solely responsible for the maintenance of law and order” in East Timor, thereby freeing the military to carry out its campaign in support of integration. At the same time, TNI was able to disclaim responsibility for public security. It also created considerable apprehension in Polri, which was reluctant to contradict or challenge the powerful TNI.

While Carter Center observers noted that the police asserted their authority for establishing security in some instances, they also observed that the police responded tardily or remained passive in other instances. When violence broke out, the police frequently stood by without acting or, in many cases, actively assisted the perpetrators of the violent acts. In its Weekly Report No. 4, covering Aug. 2-8, The Carter Center stated, “The Indonesian police have consistently failed to take the steps necessary to maintain law and order, and in some cases have colluded with pro-integration militias.”

The Carter Center also stressed in its reports how the Indonesian government and TNI violated the May 5 Agreement, including:

- Active support and direction of the armed pro-integration militias, who were creating a climate of fear and intimidation.
- Active campaigning for the integration option, including providing resources and support to pro-integration groups.
- Threats of bloodshed and war if the autonomy option
was rejected.
✓ Harassment of observers and local East Timorese staff.

**PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS**

As part of its strategy to integrate East Timor into Indonesia, the TNI established, trained, and supported armed pro-integration militias to threaten and intimidate pro-independence leaders and supporters. Militias were not new to East Timor; they existed during the Portuguese colonial period, fighting for East Timorese independence. One group formed as early as 1975 and other later groups were established as pro-Indonesian forces by President Suharto’s son-in-law, General Prabowo Subianto, when he was a local commander in the early 1980s.

Around the time of the announcement to hold a public consultation, a rapid growth in pro-Jakarta militias began. While militia membership represented a relatively small percentage of East Timor’s overall population, a core of 15 militia groups, and perhaps an equal number of smaller factions, built strong networks with wide spheres of influence and significant local power.

The militias tended to be based in Dili and in the districts along East Timor’s western border, yet few areas were spared from their wrath. To bolster their numbers, the militia leaders recruited members from ordinary peasants, including older men and boys. Militia leaders also forced pro-independence supporters, using intimidation and death threats, to join pro-integration militias and take part in their activities.

UNAMET and many observers accused the militias of killing, torture, disappearances, and sexual violence against pro-independence leaders and supporters, as well as harassment and violence against UNAMET officials, local staff, and international observers. Militia members also burned houses, drove thousands of East Timorese into the hills or across the border into West Timor, and threatened to start a civil war if integration failed.

**FALINTIL**

While TNI and pro-integration militias were responsible for the large majority of violence in East Timor before the ballot, and practically all of it afterwards, pro-independence supporters were also guilty of a certain number of beatings and killings. Pro-integration supporters claimed that Falintil, the military wing of Fretilin and later the CNRT, was directing a campaign to ensure independence that included threatening pro-integration supporters and immigrants from other islands to leave the territory.

Pro-independence gatherings sometimes turned violent. A campaign rally held in Dili in the days before the vote resulted in the deaths of two civilians who were killed by pro-independence supporters.

On April 21, TNI, Falintil, and pro-integration leaders agreed to end the violence in East Timor. Three accords, signed by pro-independence leaders Gusmao and Leandro Issac and by pro-integration leaders Joao Tavares and Domingo Soares, stipulated that all weapons would be handed over to the Indonesian police between June 20 and July 5.

On June 19, after repeated acts of TNI and militia violence, Gusmao said that TNI must close down its posts in East Timor and confine its soldiers to the barracks before he would hand over any weapons. Falintil held on to its weapons, yet agreed to a cantonment of its troops, who refrained from using their arms throughout the public consultation process.
Children stand among the remains of their home in the village of Memela, where pro-integration militias killed two people and burned 22 houses three days before the vote.
THE CARTER CENTER
OBSERVING THE 1999 PUBLIC CONSULTATION PROCESS IN EAST TIMOR

THE CARTER CENTER OBSERVER METHODOLOGY

The situation in East Timor required The Carter Center to develop an observation methodology unique to the circumstances of the public consultation process. To be effective in East Timor’s tense political climate, under insecure conditions, and in a small territory with a limited infrastructure, required an observation mission that began well before the ballot, was field-intensive, included a high frequency of reporting, and had an explicit link between elections and human rights.

**Early placement of observers:**
The Carter Center opened its office in Dili on July 4, nearly two weeks before the July 16-Aug. 6 registration process began. This date was chosen to report comprehensively on the entire consultation process, including the start of registration, rather than merely observing the vote on polling day.

Gathering all information through direct observations or by reliable eyewitness accounts, coupled with reporting throughout the entire consultation process, earned the Center a high level of respect as a reliable, neutral, and nonpartisan actor, and contributed to reports that received wide local and international attention.

The East Timor mission was unique for the Center partly because it involved volunteer observers traveling in the field for six weeks before the vote. While many election missions require a presence months ahead of the voting day to ensure a free and fair process, this presence generally includes Carter Center staff or partner organizations, or takes the form of a pre-election mission of limited duration. For East Timor, the observers benefited from their sustained presence in the field by gaining a better understanding of the immediate political situation on the ground and building trust with sources who provided key information that added impact to the real-time weekly reports.

**Field-intensive:** Each week the eight long-term observers broke into teams of two for fact-finding field trips across East Timor. During the week, the teams reported their preliminary findings back to the Dili headquarters, using satellite phones when standard telephones were unavailable or not functioning. Each weekend, the teams returned to Dili to compile and draft the weekly public reports. East Timor’s small size allowed four teams of observers to conduct extensive coverage across the entire territory (except for the small nearby island of Ateuro and the enclave of Oecussi in West Timor).

Many observers were proficient in Bahasa Indonesian (the language familiar to most East Timorese) and familiar...
with East Timorese political history, as well as possessed expertise on human rights and democratic elections. This enabled them to identify the most critical places to visit and people to meet with, as well as to know what questions to ask to elicit the most useful information. While East Timor's small size was an advantage, the mountainous terrain and poor roads meant that these teams were not able to reach full coverage to all areas.

**Frequent reporting:**

East Timor's turbulent history, along with the flaws in the May 5 Agreement that entrusted Indonesia with security, pointed to a high likelihood of violence and coercion in the run-up to the vote. On the other hand, Indonesia's heavy reliance on economic aid, especially in the aftermath of its financial collapse of 1997, made the government highly sensitive to international opinion. The Carter Center determined that a series of public statements from a neutral organization well respected for its human rights record would benefit the public consultation process. By establishing an early presence and reporting frequently, the Center helped draw attention to human rights abuses in East Timor and Indonesia's failure to uphold the May 5 Agreement. The first-hand reports enabled President Carter to make well-timed interventions when the public consultation process appeared to be in jeopardy. In mid-August, he urged President Habibie, first through private correspondence and then through a press statement that received wide international press coverage, to halt the militia activity in East Timor and ensure public order and security.

**Human rights and democracy link:** As part of its overall mission, The Carter Center seeks ways to incorporate human rights into all of its programs, including its economic development, conflict resolution, and democracy initiatives. The East Timor Public Consultation initiative presented the Center the opportunity to explore further the explicit linkages between human rights and democracy, and to address legitimate concerns that the human rights of voters before and on voting day would be violated.

The history of persistent and gross violations of human rights in East Timor, including torture, extrajudicial executions, and various forms of intimidation and harassment, raised serious questions whether the pre-electoral environment would be safe and conducive to genuinely democratic elections. A comprehensive, sustained, and explicit examination of human rights violations and intimidation in the run-up to the elections was required. The Carter Center determined that an intensive human rights fact-finding, documentation, and public reporting initiative was the best approach to assess and publicize pre-electoral conditions so that the United Nations and others could respond appropriately.

With this in mind, long-term observers with specific human rights experience, in addition to regional and election expertise, were chosen. Observer orientations included specific training on relevant human rights principles and information-gathering techniques. In addition, the observer teams developed a reporting format that in-
The Carter Center devised a system of observation that included a carefully planned selection of personnel, geographic coverage, scheduling, research strategy, and methods of influence throughout the public consultation process. This system is described below:

**PERSONNEL**

The Long-Term Observers (LTOs) included scholars and practitioners with language skills and experience in the region, plus field directors chosen for their expertise in organizing observation missions, including the Center's international delegations for elections earlier that year in Indonesia and Nigeria. A Carter Center diplomat-in-residence, seconded from the U.S. State Department for a year-long posting in Atlanta, and a Carter Center student intern joined the LTOs in late July to help manage the Dili office.

The Short-Term Observers (STOs) had similar backgrounds and language abilities, and included more senior scholars with longer experience in the region. Three Carter Center staff members arrived with the STOs in late August, bringing considerable understanding of the Center's operations and experience managing international observation missions. A local staff of interpreters, drivers, and office personnel provided critical skills and demonstrated a high level of performance at considerable personal risk.

**GEOGRAPHIC COVERAGE**

The LTOs deployed in teams of two each week to one of three regions: the western districts (Bobonaro and Ermera); the southwest region (Covalima, Same, and Ainaro); and the eastern region (Manatuto, Baucau, and Viqueque), which was large but typically had less militia activity. Liquica and Dili were covered from the Dili office. The Center decided not to cover Atauro, due to the difficulties in reaching the island and its relatively small population, or Oecussi in West Timor, due to the security risk associated with crossing the border, where militia activity was especially high.

Efforts were made to gather information about both areas from reliable sources. Each team in the field made coverage decisions based on observers' expertise and understanding of a specific area and on where militia activity or other incidents seemed the most significant. This system of coverage provided comprehensive reports that simultaneously gave a sense of the overall conditions in
OBSERVING THE 1999 PUBLIC CONSULTATION PROCESS IN EAST TIMOR

East Timor for any given week and noted specific incidents, such as heightened tensions or violence, that were peculiar to any one region of the territory.

**Schedule**

The Carter Center adhered to the following schedule of observation during the public consultation process and in the weeks after the vote:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>July 4 - 26</th>
<th>July 26 - Aug. 24</th>
<th>Aug. 24 - Sept. 1</th>
<th>Sept. 2 - 28</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase</td>
<td>Set-up</td>
<td>LTO Mission</td>
<td>STO Mission</td>
<td>Post-consultation period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>Open office, make contacts, begin comprehensive monitoring and fact-finding, and draft Public Reports 1-2.</td>
<td>Comprehensive monitoring and fact-finding to produce Public Reports 3-6, which provided recommendations for corrective actions, plus high profile attention to the problems identified.</td>
<td>Continue LTO work, monitor Aug. 30 balloting day activities, and produce Public Report 7.</td>
<td>Report from Dili, until all observers and local staff evacuated Sept. 5, then continue fact-finding from locations in Indonesia and Darwin, Australia. Produce Public Reports 8-11.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>2 field directors, local staff</td>
<td>10 LTOs, local staff</td>
<td>5 LTOs, 10 STOs, local staff</td>
<td>5 LTOs, local staff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Pre-ballot period**

Upon arrival, the LTOs received orientation briefings from several groups. These included UNAMET political, security, and electoral officers; the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); local organizations, such as the Justice and Peace Commission and the human rights NGO Yayasan Hak; Indonesia’s Commission for Peace and Stability; church leaders; and international media.

UNAMET officials and others provided additional briefings in the field to the LTOs, who visited all but one of East Timor’s 13 districts during the pre-ballot period.

The STOs arrived the last week of August, and all Carter Center observers met in Dili for comprehensive briefings, including techniques for monitoring the vote. These meetings complemented information provided to all observers in briefing books compiled at The Carter Center in Atlanta and sent out electronically via the Internet. The "electronic briefing books" provided mission-specific information and "links" on the World Wide Web to sites for the United Nations, U.S. and other governments, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that contained documents relevant to the public consultation process.

Within days of the STOs’ arrival, violence broke out during a campaign rally in Dili and at least two local people were killed. The Carter Center team called their contacts in the field and decided to carry out their initial deployment plans, wary of the potential for increased levels of violence. The STOs were paired with LTOs and deployed to several regions throughout the territory, where they received additional area-specific briefings and observed the final days of campaigning.

**Polling day**

For the Aug. 30 vote, 15 Carter Center observers visited seven of East Timor’s 13 districts and observed voting...
in 27 subdistricts and 43 of the 700 polling stations across the territory. The districts visited were Baucau, Bobonaro, Covalima, Kili, Lautem, Liquica, and Viqueque. The delegation felt the cross-section of polling stations visited was indicative of the territory as a whole, but noted in its statement on the vote that the sites visited were only a sample of the entire territory. To make a more accurate and comprehensive assessment, the observers included in the preliminary statement information gathered from several sources in the field before, during, and immediately after the vote.

The Carter Center’s observers were impressed by the relatively peaceful conditions on polling day compared to the pre-ballot period. However, serious acts of violence did occur. For instance, U N A M E T staff closed seven polling centers as a result of well-founded fears of intimidation. Carter Center observers also witnessed instances of pro-integration militia intimidating voters and saw individuals instruct people on how to cast their vote. In most of these cases, U N A M E T civilian police successfully intervened to persuade these people to desist from this type of disruption.

In many places, voters lined up hours before the 6:30 a.m. opening of the polls. In other locations, many voters arrived the previous night and waited for the polling stations to open the next day. Thousands of voters, including many elderly people, walked great distances to cast their votes.

Post-ballot period

The day after the vote, Carter Center observers remained in the field to watch the transport of ballot boxes by helicopter or truck back to Dili. The teams returned to Dili Aug. 31, encountering several checkpoints manned by pro-integration militia members that were established soon after voting had ended.

The observers debriefed and began drafting the preliminary statement (Weekly Report No. 7), which was finished in the early morning hours of Sept. 1 and faxed back to Atlanta. Here, it was edited and delivered to President Carter and senior-level staff for final comments. The final draft of the preliminary statement was sent back to Dili in time to be read and distributed at a press conference held later that morning.

All observers, except six LTOs, left Dili that afternoon when reports of heightened pro-integration militia activity raised concerns that staff would be unable to leave in the
coming days. The departing group was forced to charter a plane when their airline tickets to Jakarta were not honored. The six LTOs who remained watched the ballot counting process in Dili through the afternoon of Sept. 3, when three more observers left amid rising militia intimidation and violence.

Following UNAMET’s announcement Sept. 4 that East Timor had voted overwhelmingly for independence, the pro-integration militia began their burning and looting rampage across East Timor. All expatriate staff were evacuated Sept. 5 but continued to monitor and report from Darwin, Australia, and several locations within Indonesia.

Research Methods

The observation methodology for East Timor integrated a specific human rights component into the broader activity of observing elections. The linkage between human rights and elections has two dimensions: political participation as a human right and human rights violations that prevent a free and fair election. With this in mind, information-gathering methods included:

Interviews and discussions: Observers regularly met with a wide array of actors to gather first-hand information that focused predominantly on claims of human rights violations. To be comprehensive and fair to all parties, the observers would cross-check information gained against several sources. In addition to UNAMET, interviews were routinely conducted with Indonesian officials, pro-integration and pro-independence leaders and supporters, militia members, and Falintil representatives, as well as several other groups and individuals.

Witness statements: The observers recorded statements from hundreds of ordinary East Timorese who were not officially affiliated with any specific group. The observers first explained their roles and the degree of confidentiality that could be guaranteed and then invited witnesses to tell their stories. Observers asked open, nonleading questions to fill in details and asked all witnesses to repeat their accounts from the beginning to make sure it was understood correctly.

Chronologies: The Center’s observers found it useful, especially if there were multiple witnesses, to assemble a chronological description of events, where a person or group’s human rights were reportedly violated. By constructing chronologies that covered incidents that occurred over several hours or a series of incidents that took place over several days, the observers were able to present accurate, easily deciphered accounts that were incorporated into the weekly public reports.

Physical evidence: Wherever possible, observers took photographs of damaged buildings, scars or wounds on victims, and other evidence of security breaches and violations of human rights. Security risks and difficult terrain often made it impossible to document all such cases.

Review of secondary sources: The observers met frequently with the ICRC and local organizations, such as Yayasan Hak and the Justice and Peace Commission, which maintained lists of reported human rights violations cases, court documents, and witness statements. This documentation was useful for providing a background of the human rights conditions in a given area and for corroborating information gathered from other sources. It also allowed observers to avoid putting informants at greater risk by collecting information that was already documented.

Methods of Influence

The observers devised a multitier reporting system to maximize the effectiveness and credibility of its reports. Each Friday, the LTOs returned to Dili from the field and conducted an oral debriefing before writing up their findings in an agreed upon format that made crucial evidence easily accessible (see Appendices for examples of the Weekly Reports).

The field teams’ findings were combined to draft the public report, with all conclusions supported by evidence listed and kept in confidential internal reports. Copies of the internal reports were provided each week to the Indo-
The Carter Center observers gather information from members of a local human rights group as part of a comprehensive briefing in Dili.

In contrast, due to Indonesia’s vast size, observers for The Carter Center’s monitoring mission of the June 1999 Indonesian parliamentary elections were able to spend only two or three days in the field. For that mission, 100 delegates in 42 teams monitored some 300 polling stations in 26 of Indonesia’s 27 provinces.

Participation in voting as a human right: Provisions in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) include participation in periodic and genuine elections as a right in itself. A Article 21 of the UDHR states: “The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of the government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.” Other conventions support this position. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) commits parties to ensure women an equal right “to vote in all elections and public referenda and to be eligible for election to all publicly elected bodies.”

Rights relating to the broader political environment: Many of the rights laid out in the major human rights documents are prerequisites for a free and fair vote. The UDHR contains many of the basic human rights, including: the right to life, liberty and security of person (Article 3); freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile (Article 9); the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas (Article 19); and the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association (Article 20).

Some materials, such as the United Nation’s manual on human rights monitoring in Haiti, have included death threats as violations of the right to life and of the right to integrity, security, and liberty of the person. Death threats are actions or declarations that produce a well-founded fear of arbitrary execution. Such threats were widespread in the run-up to the referendum in East Timor. A Article 3 states that “law enforcement officials may use force only when strictly necessary and to the extent required for the performance of their duty.” Internal political instability or other special circumstances cannot be invoked to justify any departure from these basic principles.
To ensure secrecy and dispel fears of post-ballot retribution, the United Nations transported all ballot boxes by truck and helicopter back to Dili for a single count.
MAJOR FINDINGS

This section includes a synopsis of the major findings collected by The Carter Center, with specific examples provided where appropriate. A more comprehensive set of findings is in the Weekly Public Reports in the Appendices. For a complete set of findings, contact The Carter Center. To protect the safety of some of the Center’s sources, however, certain information remains confidential.

On a few occasions, Indonesian officials and pro-integration militia leaders challenged the evidence that the Center collected. However, other international observers, UNAMET, the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, international human rights organizations, Indonesian and East Timorese NGOs, and others have collected evidence that corroborates and supports The Carter Center’s findings listed below:

✔ The results of the popular consultation reflect the will of East Timor’s people and demonstrate the overwhelming preference for independence from Indonesia.

More than 78 percent of East Timor’s 450,000 registered voters chose to reject the autonomy option. This decisive result was achieved despite widespread violations of the May 5 Agreement that almost entirely favored the pro-integration side. Voters in all parts of East Timor were subjected to months of intimidation, threats, and violence aimed at forcing them to vote for integration. There were as many as 60,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in East Timor on Aug. 30, almost all of whom were forced from their homes by pro-integration militias and Indonesian security forces, yet nearly 99 percent of East Timor’s registered voters cast ballots.

In the months preceding the vote, Carter Center observers interviewed hundreds of potential voters throughout East Timor, and all of them stated that they would vote their conscience, regardless of the consequences. The popular consultation process was marred by violence, but it allowed for a legitimate act of self-determination, and the results represent the will of the East Timorese.

✔ UNAMET administered the vote in an unbiased, transparent, and professional manner.

Carter Center observers visited more than half of all registration and polling centers and interviewed hundreds of UNAMET staff during all phases of the consultation process. The large majority of UNAMET staff interviewed appeared well trained, equipped, professional, competent, and impartial in executing their duties. While a few
UNAMET staff members were privately in favor of the independence option, in light of the violence and mistreatment of pro-independence supporters, there was no indication that these opinions affected the conduct of the vote or the outcome of results.

The UNAMET leadership went to great lengths to ensure the participation of all sides in the consultation process and remained flexible and receptive to complaints throughout the process. Senior UNAMET officials responded in writing to criticisms and suggestions contained in many Carter Center Weekly Reports. Several major concessions, including the extension of the registration period, were made in response to concerns from the pro-integration side.

Immediately following the vote, the independent United Nations Electoral Commission, which included three prominent international jurists and electoral officials, held two days of public hearings on alleged violations of the electoral rules. At least one Carter Center observer was present throughout these hearings. The commission gave each complainant a full hearing and considered all evidence presented before determining that most of the allegations of bias were baseless and that the alleged violations were not sufficient to affect the outcome of the consultation.

- The Indonesian military (TNI) created, supported, directed, funded, and armed pro-integration militias in an attempt to influence the outcome of the popular consultation through violence and intimidation.

Abundant, first-hand evidence collected by Carter Center observers, the United Nations, and others shows a direct link between the Indonesian armed forces and pro-integration militia groups. On several occasions, TNI commanders, soldiers, militia leaders, and militiamen told Carter Center observers that the militias were TNI surrogates. In Baucau, the Dandim (district military commander) told Carter Center observers that the TNI fully supported members of Saka, an organization he described as “pro-integration Timorese” and “part military and part militia.” The commander of the Saka militia identified himself as a Kopassus (Indonesian Special Forces Command) officer and carried Kopassus business cards with his name and title.

TNI soldiers, militia members, and local government officials in many districts told Carter Center observers that the TNI and local governments worked with armed pro-
integration militias to provide security and promote the integration option. TNI’s deputy commander in East Timor told Carter Center staff that the TNI provided food, financial, and logistical support to pro-integration militias. Carter Center observers witnessed TNI soldiers and militia members conducting joint exercises in several locations in East Timor and heard eyewitness accounts of TNI and militia involvement in the arrest and subsequent disappearance of five internally displaced persons in Liquica.

Carter Center observers frequently visited militia posts during the registration and campaign periods and interviewed several militia members and leaders. Many militia posts displayed obvious signs of military assistance and direction, including the presence of military clothing and equipment, and some members wearing TNI uniforms. Observers witnessed the use of two-way radios in pro-integration militia posts in several locations, the use of which by civilian organizations is illegal in Indonesia. Carter Center observers also overheard transmissions on militia radios by individuals using military radio protocol, suggesting that the militias used the same radio network as the TNI.

Hundreds of Timorese citizens interviewed by Carter Center observers throughout the territory said that the TNI and militias collaborated to intimidate the local population. IDPs and others reported frequent joint TNI-militia activities in their areas, including patrols, attacks, intimidation, and disappearances.

As early as June, UNAMET Chief of Mission Ian Martin said his team had witnessed three separate groups of militias accompanied by and directed by TNI soldiers carrying out operations. This persistent and widespread intimidation made many fearful to talk to observers or journalists, forced some 60,000 people to flee their homes, and prevented many pro-independence campaign activities.

The Indonesian government, TNI, and the militias bear primary responsibility for the fear and violence that prevailed during the public consultation process.

In addition to failing to provide law and order in East Timor, the Indonesian government and TNI erroneously portrayed the violence as fighting between the pro-independence and pro-integration camps. The Carter Center attempted to investigate acts of violence and intimidation allegedly perpetrated by Falintil, the CRNT, and other pro-independence activists.

Upon investigation, the large majority of the accusations leveled against the independence side proved unfounded. While pro-independence supporters committed acts of violence in some cases, the violence that characterized the pre- and post-consultation periods was almost always organized, one-sided aggression carried out by the TNI and its militia surrogates against unarmed civilians.

The TNI and militias directed acts of intimidation, violence, and murder at UNAMET local staff, Timorese students, pro-independence activists, and other East Timorese suspected of pro-independence sympathies. Several East Timorese staff members working for UNAMET were murdered, and UNAMET local staff members were singled out for especially intense and persistent harassment and intimidation.
Carter Center observers documented several cases of UNAMET international and local staff being detained, interrogated, and threatened by TNI soldiers and militia members.

- The Indonesian police failed to maintain law and order and, in many cases, actively colluded with violent pro-integration groups.

On voting day, the Indonesian police cooperated with UNAMET civilian police at nearly all the observed polling stations to ensure a peaceful and orderly balloting process. The Carter Center noted this in its final report, but also noted that aside from this day, the Indonesian police consistently failed to take the necessary steps to prevent or curtail acts of violence, or adequately investigate criminal activity associated with the popular consultation.

During the initial registration period, the police demonstrated their ability to maintain security by providing well-organized protection for UNAMET operations. However, thereafter the police actively undermined the consultation process by failing to respond to the security needs of UNAMET or provide adequate protection to UNAMET local staff or ordinary citizens.

Carter Center observers witnessed and collected evidence of militia members perpetrating acts of violence in full view of heavily-armed police and military personnel who either stood by and watched or actively assisted the militias. Observers documented a number of cases in which militias attacked UNAMET registration posts, CNRT offices, or student activist headquarters in the presence of armed police officers. In each case, the Indonesian police failed to act or waited for up to two hours before intervening, even when serious injuries were reported.

Carter Center observers also investigated murders of pro-independence activists by militia members and gathered detailed testimony from many eyewitnesses. The identity of the killer or killers was often widely known in the communities in which the attacks took place, but the Indonesian police failed to make any arrests.

In several areas, Carter Center observers visited militia posts that were located immediately adjacent to or within a few hundred meters of police stations. The police refused, however, to take any action against militia members even when they openly displayed weapons, set up roadblocks, intimidated observers, or harassed local residents.

On Aug. 10, Indonesian police participated in a militia attack on the office of a student activist organization in Viqueque during which two students were murdered. A BRIMOB (mobile brigade) police officer shot and seriously wounded a U.N. civilian police officer in Liquica on Sept. 3 during a joint militia/police attack on a UNAMET convoy.

Indonesian police officers actively participated in a militia attack on Carter Center observers and local staff members in Dili on Sept. 5 and forced a large number of international journalists from their hotels at gunpoint on the same day. They then took them to the airport in Dili for a forced evacuation of East Timor.

- The TNI, police, and local government officials actively campaigned and provided resources in support of the integration option.

Senior TNI officials admitted to Carter Center observers that the TNI campaigned for “the autonomy package” by distributing rice and building roads for those people who said they would vote for integration, and by instructing people on the benefits of remaining part of Indonesia. TNI soldiers admitted in several instances that they provided resources, training, and support to pro-integration militias and worked together with the militias to promote the autonomy option.

Carter Center observers were present at several meetings in which senior local government officials and pro-integration militia members discussed and planned pro-integration campaign activities. The observers also witnessed or received credible reports of local Indonesian government officials and TNI providing militia members with large quantities of rice, T-shirts, weapons, money, and other commodities. On a number of occasions, local government officials working in their official capacity gave public speeches at pro-integration rallies.
International observers, U N A M E T staff, foreign diplomats, and international journalists were threatened and intimidated by T N I soldiers, police, and militia members before and after the vote.

The Carter Center was among the many groups harassed for its participation in the public consultation. Carter Center observers were threatened with death by the leader of the Saka militia in Baucau on several occasions in July and were violently evicted from a militia post in Dili on Aug. 5. Carter Center local staff members received numerous threats from militia members. Meanwhile, the Indonesian police consistently failed to adequately investigate threats made against staff members of international organizations involved in administering, observing, or reporting on the popular consultation.

Virtually all U.N. personnel, international observers, and journalists were forced by the Indonesian security forces to evacuate East Timor within 36 hours of the announcement of the ballot results. Heavily armed BRIMOB officers and militia members fired upon U N A M E T vehicles and a helicopter in Liquica district Sept. 3, resulting in one U N A M E T civilian police officer being seriously wounded by an automatic weapon.

On Sept. 5, T N I soldiers fired automatic weapons into the U N A M E T regional office in Baucau for more than an hour while staff lay on the floor. T N I soldiers then burned the office and more than 80 U N A M E T vehicles after forcing the staff to evacuate.

Refugees faced harassment, intimidation, and violence in Indonesia-ruled West Timor and other parts of Indonesia after they fled or were forced out of East Timor.

East Timorese refugees fleeing the post-ballot violence suffered at the hands of militia members, T N I soldiers, police officers, and local government officials. The large majority of those forced out of East Timor were confined in camps in West Timor, just over the border, where they were denied adequate food, water, and shelter, and subjected to intense harassment and intimidation by militia members and T N I soldiers.

Pro-independence leaders were hunted down, and Carter Center observers received numerous credible reports of individuals being removed from camps or murdered by militia and T N I soldiers. International journalists, U.N. agencies, and humanitarian organizations were almost completely excluded from West Timor by the Indonesian government.

Refugees who were transported or made their own way to other parts of Indonesia, including a number of Carter Center local staff members, were harassed and persecuted by militia, T N I, police, and local officials. In Bali, Sumatra, Sulawesi, and major cities on the island of Java, East Timorese refugees were forced to move from house to house for safety and were repeatedly threatened with death.

Carter Center observers who remained in Indonesia after Sept. 4 documented several cases of refugees being murdered by militia members on passenger boats leaving East Timor or West Timor. One case included approximately 35 young men killed Sept. 7 on the Dobon Solo ferry.

Photo opposite page: Pro-Indonesia militia activity displaced more than half of East Timor’s population, with many people fleeing into the hills or across the border into West Timor.
Consultation Aftermath and Opportunities

After the Sept. 4 announcement, the Indonesian government repeatedly claimed that TNI and the police were doing all in their power to contain the widespread violence that swept the territory. Indonesian officials blamed the destruction and population displacement on uncontrollable militias and “rogue elements” of the military. However, evidence collected by Carter Center observers and local staff suggests TNI commanders long had been planning the destruction and depopulation of East Timor.

Several months before the vote, militia members and TNI soldiers told Carter Center observers that they would destroy East Timor, drive out UNAMET, foreign press, and observers, and kill supporters of independence if voters rejected integration. Some militia members predicted the violence and destruction that eventually engulfed the territory in great detail during interviews with Carter Center observers in July. People in all parts of East Timor reported that soldiers and militia members repeatedly issued threats of bloodshed and destruction if integration were to be rejected.

The Carter Center and other observers reported these findings throughout the public consultation process. Despite the threats and actual violence that occurred, U.N. peacekeepers were not sent to East Timor during the consultation because Indonesia stipulated when offering to hold the vote that no armed outside forces would be permitted in the territory. However, this soon changed when it became clear that Indonesia was unable or unwilling to stop the destruction that erupted after Sept. 4.

Despite extremely heavy police and military presence throughout the territory, the Indonesian security forces took almost no action to prevent violence or to curtail the activities of armed pro-integration militia. Instead, TNI and police officers openly colluded with militia members and actively participated in heightened acts of violence, destruction, and looting that followed the vote. Only after the U.N.-sponsored INTERFET troops arrived in mid-Sept. did the violence end.

The United Nations and Indonesian government established separate independent inquiry teams to investigate the allegations of human rights violations committed in East Timor during the public consultation and in its aftermath. Their investigations, which included claims brought against TNI’s top generals, would be used to determine whether to conduct a war crimes tribunal. The Carter Center met with members of the two investigation teams and made available to them all evidence compiled during the Center’s five-month human rights fact-finding work in East Timor.

Democratic Assessment Trip

Following their evacuation from Dili, Carter Center observers continued to collect information and release weekly public reports from several locations in Indonesia and Darwin, Australia. In late October, after INTERFET had stabilized East Timor, The Carter Center re-established a temporary office in Dili to complete its observation work and prepare for a post-consultation assessment mission.

From Dec. 4-14, a five-person team traveled to East Timor and Darwin, Australia. The goal of the assessment mission was to analyze priorities for promoting democratic development and reconciliation in the territory and to identify specific areas in which The Carter Center and other groups might assist the East Timorese during their transition to full independence.

The assessment team met with a wide array of political actors, including Sergio Viera de Mello, the newly appointed head of the United Nations Transitional Authority for East Timor (UNTAET), whose 11,000-person staff would be responsible for administering the territory over
the next two to three years. The team also met with Gusmao, recently returned from seven years in prison, Ramos-Horta, recently returned after 24 years in exile, and members of East Timorese civil society. All of the individuals and groups met urged The Carter Center to play a continuing role in East Timor’s transition from war to peace to democracy and development.

The Carter Center team noted in its assessment report that the humanitarian effort being conducted by the United Nations and other international organizations to assist East Timor, which had been devastated by the post-ballot violence, was impressive and comprehensive. Nonetheless, considerable relief and physical reconstruction were still necessary, including food security and agricultural development, reconstruction of buildings and a reliable telecommunications systems, and adequate health care, education, and other basic provisions.

Based on this assessment, The Carter Center identified many post-consultation initiatives that it or others, working with UNTAET and the CNRT, might pursue, including the following:

- Promoting greater awareness of democratic values.
- Facilitating the broadest participation of society.
- Strengthening the capacity of local nongovernmental organizations.
- Empowering women and youth.
- Drafting a new constitution.
- Preparing for multiparty elections.
- Establishing the rule of law.
- Building free and independent local media.
- Ensuring justice and reconciliation.
- Safeguarding against future human rights abuse.
CONCLUSION

The struggle for independence in East Timor began decades, if not centuries, ago and cost thousands of lives and immeasurable suffering. The final outcome highlighted the courage and determination of the East Timorese people who overcame great fear and violence to voice their overwhelming preference for freedom. The results of the Aug. 30 public consultation, in which nearly 80 percent of the East Timorese citizens rejected an offer of autonomy, represent an indisputable mandate for independence from Indonesia.

Indonesian President B.J. Habibie must receive credit for agreeing to offer the possibility of independence, a prospect many people inside and outside East Timor doubted would ever happen. The United Nations also must receive its due credit for conducting the ballot in an unbiased, transparent, and professional manner in the face of considerable pressure and outright violence.

Especially praiseworthy was the CNRT leadership, both for the cantonment of Falintil troops and for keeping the pro-independence supporters largely from seeking retribution against the Indonesia-backed militias. Also noteworthy were the ordinary men and women of East Timor, many of whom served as local staff, often at great personal risk, for UNAMET and the international observer groups.

That the United Nations was willing to sign a clearly flawed agreement that gave Indonesia nearly carte blanche on security provisions in the territory raises a number of important questions. For instance, was the United Nations correct to pursue the public consultation knowing that violence was present and likely to increase? Should the United Nations have required a provision in the May 5 Agreement that would automatically trigger the sending of peacekeepers to East Timor if Indonesia did not fulfill its commitments? What if Indonesia refused to comply?

All of these questions beg the larger questions: What lessons should other dissatisfied regions around the world be permitted to form their own nation states? And, if similar processes are undertaken in the future, what should be the role, if any, of international observer groups?

The Carter Center ventured onto new ground for the institution when it opened its office in Dili in early July. While the Center had observed 26 elections in 19 countries, this was its first wide-scale, long-term public reporting initiative. Noting again that its mandate was to conduct fact-finding throughout East Timor about the necessary preconditions for a free and fair balloting, The Carter Center and its observers achieved positive results, including:

- Establishing an early presence and reporting regularly throughout and after the public consultation process.
- Making information available to all interested groups based on first-hand observations and reliable eyewitness accounts.
- Serving as a neutral, nonpartisan actor that the United Nations, the press, and others could seek for trusted evidence on human rights violations.
- Spotlighting the insecure conditions in East Timor before and after the vote through the media and President Carter's personal contacts and statements.

Looking back, perhaps The Carter Center and others might have done more to persuade the Indonesian government or the United Nations to stop the violence, both before and after the ballot. Whether and how this might have been accomplished are questions that the Center, the United Nations, and others should examine. For just as East Timor demonstrated that people are willing to fight and die to overcome great fear and considerable odds for independence, there are and will continue to be other similar cases for the international community to address now and in the future.

Looking forward, East Timor's transition to full inde-
Many challenges lie on the horizon for East Timor, including gaining full independence and consolidating democracy as the first new nation of the 21st century.

Independence represents a unique opportunity to build a culture of peace, democracy, and human rights. The next three years will be critical to ensure that the territory consolidates democracy and avoids the type of backsliding that many newly independent and emerging democratic nations have suffered.

East Timor will likely become the first new nation of the 21st century. While small in terms of population and economic clout, its history and location will make it an important actor among regional powers, as well as with the United Nations. A high level of world attention and donor dollars will be focused on East Timor over the next three years, and with it, the potential for external domination, internal corruption, and eventual neglect that has plagued other nations under similar conditions.

Yet, there also exists a real potential to get it right this time, as East Timor has the opportunity to build its government and civic institutions from the ground up. Furthermore, East Timor could provide an example of how to effectively promote democracy and human rights in a new nation. To do so, the international community must assist the local people in establishing a society based on participatory democracy and universal human rights, while at the same time providing the space for them to create their own vision of the new East Timor.
The Carter Center is grateful to the volunteer observers and staff members who conducted the East Timor project under difficult and sometimes life-threatening conditions. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the government of Portugal funded the project, and The Carter Center deeply appreciates their collaboration and support throughout the mission.

A large part of the credit for our work must go to the courageous people of East Timor, including those who assisted the Center as local staff members and those who provided personal interviews and information. They shared their time, input, and expertise under dangerous and stressful conditions. Many of our Timorese staff members continued to provide vital information to the Center from within East Timor and West Timor after the vote, while enduring terrible hardship and terror as displaced persons and refugees.

The Carter Center’s program would not have been possible without the dedication and commitment of local East Timorese staff members. These include: Immanuel Tilman, Joaquim Reis Martins Gusmao, Hermingardo A Ibo Ano Soares, Nicolau Tilman, Francisco Pinto, A delaide Rose Gomes, Antero Da Silva Soares, Cristina Saramento, Delfina Rangel, Marcos da Cunha, Justiniano Fernandes, Jose Alexio Da Silva, Delio A fonso Nunes, Filomena Gomes De A ndra, Felismina O dte Dos Santo, Joao Paolo Da Costa Rangel, and other local staff members who supported us.

The Center also would like to acknowledge the many individuals who put themselves at risk while assisting in the evacuation of staff members from Dili and West Timor after the public consultation. These include: Father Hilario of the Don Bosco Mission in Dili; Gary Gray and Victoria A lvarez of the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta; Scott Gilmore of the Canadian Embassy; and Capt. Mick Rookie of the Australian Army. Critical assistance was also provided by the UNAMET security section and civilian police, the staff of the Australian Consulate in Dili, and Jonathan Head and Humphry Hawksley of the BBC.

In addition, the Center commends the work of the UNAMET and other organizations involved in monitoring the ballot. UNAMET officials provided vital information and assistance, including Ian Martin, Geoffrey Robinson, Colin Stewart, Elodie Carnier-Aristide, Jeff Fischer, John Bevan, and many election officials working at the polling sites. UNAMET’s military liaison and civilian police officers also deserve praise for their assistance throughout the public consultation process and especially on ballot day.

Members of East Timorese and international human rights organizations, such as Yayasan H A K, the Justice and Peace Commission, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch also provided valuable insight and information. These especially included Anecito Lopez, Manuel A brantes, Lucia Withers, and Sydney Jones.

The Center would like to thank several individuals who managed the grants that made this initiative possible. Dennis Wendel, Dawn Empling, Terry Myers, and other USAID Mission Jakarta officials assisted in many aspects of the consultation process. Also vital to the project were Jim Lehman, Eileen Wickstrom, and Karma Lively of the Office of Transition Initiatives, and Bruce Spake and Erika Kirwen of Development Alternatives International, as well as several Portuguese government officials.

In addition, we commend The Carter Center’s in-country staff for an outstanding job coordinating the long- and short-term observer operations and organizing monitoring activities for the public consultation vote. These included co-directors of the Center’s International Observation Program in East Timor, Gillian Flies and Brent Preston, who established the Dili office and organized field operations. Carter Center Diplomat-in-residence Douglas Archard and student intern Vincent Barnes managed the Dili office in August, while long-term observers Sophie
Kahn and Fred Rawski re-opened the office in November and coordinated activities for the December assessment mission.

We also would like to acknowledge our volunteer observers individually for their time and efforts. These include long-term observers Annette Clear, Matthew Easton, Nancy Melissa Lutz, and John MacDougall, and short-term observers James Clad, Donald Emmerson, James Fox, Catherine Greene, David Hicks, and Andrea Molnar. In Atlanta, Center Democracy Program Director Charles Costello was responsible for directing the Center’s East Timor initiative, while Rachel Fowler and Kirk Wolcott, program coordinators in the Democracy and Conflict Resolution Program, respectively, co-managed the initiative. All three served as short-term observers.

Assisting them from Atlanta were Carter Center Director of Peace Programs Gordon Streeb, Public Information Senior Associate Director Deanna Congileo, Democracy Program Associate Director David Carroll, Democracy Program Administrative Assistant Tynesha Green, and Institutional Development Associate Director for Peace Programs Becky Castle. Public Information Communication Coordinators Natasha Singh and Nadara Wade assisted in distribution of the Weekly Public Reports.

Special thanks must be extended to The Carter Center’s student interns, who assisted on this initiative by organizing and attending meetings, providing regular updates and background information, and contributing to the production and distribution of briefing materials and reports. They include Saiko Uno and Aziza Ahmed of the Democracy Program, and Andre Borgerhoff and Holly Benner of the Conflict Resolution Program.

We also would like to recognize Indonesian experts Dwight King and Clarence Dias, who served as consultants to The Carter Center before and during the public consultation process, and as members of the Center’s post-consultation assessment trip. The Center is grateful, during that trip, for the assistance and information provided by several individuals and organizations. These include UNTAET Chief Sergio Vieira de Mello and other U.N. officials; Xanana Gusmao, Jose Ramos-Horta, and other CNRT members; INTERFET officers; and members of several local and international NGOs.

Finally, for this report, we would like to acknowledge Kirk Wolcott, who drafted several sections and managed final editing and revisions. Gillian Flies, Brent Preston, Annette Clear, Matt Easton, and Rachel Fowler also drafted and edited sections, while Charles Costello, David Carroll, Douglas Archard, Holly Benner, and Carter Center Publications Manager Pam Smith assisted in editing the report.
APPENDICES

A. Sample Ballot
B. Polling Day Checklists
C. Selected News Articles
D. Press Releases
E. Weekly Public Reports #1-12
Do you ACCEPT the proposed special autonomy for East Timor within the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia?
Apakah anda MENERIMA usul otonomi khusus untuk Timor Timur di dalam Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia?
Ita Boot SIMU proposta autonomia especial ba Timor Lorosae iha Estadu Unitariu Republika Indonezia nia iaran?
Aceita a autonomia especial proposta para Timor Leste integrada no Estado Unitário da República da Indonésia?

OR ATAU KA OU

Do you REJECT the proposed special autonomy for East Timor, leading to East Timor’s separation from Indonesia?
Apakah anda MENOLAK usul otonomi khusus Timor Timur, yang akan mengakibatkan berpisahnya Timor Timur dari Indonesia?
Ita Boot LA SIMU proposta autonomia especial ba Timor Lorosae, neba sei iori Timor Lorosae atu haketak an hosí Indonezia?
Rejeita a autonomia especial proposta para Timor Leste, levando à separação de Timor Leste da Indonésia?
**APPENDIX B**

**CARTER CENTER ELECTION CHECKLIST – Sheet #1**

**PRE-ELECTION REPORT**

**Observer Team**

Team # __________  UNAMET Region __________  District __________  Sub-District __________  Village __________

**Campaign Environment**:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reported by:</th>
<th>Domestic Observers</th>
<th>Int’l Observers</th>
<th>UNAMET Officials</th>
<th>CNRT/ Falintil</th>
<th>Pro-Integration</th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Church Officials</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Election Related Violence</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Violence or Unrest</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intimidation or Harassment</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of Government Resources</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote Buying</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Internally Displaced Persons:**

- Number and location?
- Health/food/shelter status?
- Registration difficulties?

**Specific Comments:**

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

**Overall Impressions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The voter registration exercise was credible and comprehensive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The campaign has been fair and peaceful</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cases of intimidation or harassment were reported</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cool-off period has been void of campaigning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraud and manipulation are anticipated on election day</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**IMPORTANT**: Please describe below your overall impressions of the campaign environment and the prospects for a fair vote. Include details of anything you saw or heard that appeared irregular or noteworthy. *The which action party is responsible for acts of intimidation, harassment, or violence. Please explain any “no” responses.*

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
CARTER CENTER ELECTION CHECKLIST – Sheet #2

VOTING DAY REPORT

Observer Team Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Team #</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Sub-District</th>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Polling Station #</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Polling Station Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voters on Register</th>
<th>Number Already Voted</th>
<th>Voters who are Waiting to Vote</th>
<th>Ballots Received</th>
<th>Polling Station Operating Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Are there sufficient:  
Yes  
No

UNAMET Staff?  
Ballots?  
Ballot Boxes?  
Election Forms/Materials?

Party Agents  
(list parties & number present)

Are the following Personnel Present in the Polling Station?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNAMET DEO’s</th>
<th>CivPols</th>
<th>Domestic Monitors</th>
<th>International Monitors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

List Organizations:

Others Present:

General Observations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party agents, domestic, and international monitors have access to polling station:</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secrecy of the ballot is ensured:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voters are checked for indelible ink:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All qualified voters are allowed to vote:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs were able to vote:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Following groups/individuals report:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domestic Monitors</th>
<th>Int’l Monitors</th>
<th>Falintil</th>
<th>Pro-Integration</th>
<th>UNAMET Officials</th>
<th>Police</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Intimidation: yes no  
Violence: yes no  
Disruption of vote: yes no  
Vote-buying: yes no

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Jimmy Carter holds talks with jailed East Timorese leader

Tuesday, June 08, 1999

Former US president Jimmy Carter Tuesday held talks with Xanana Gusmao at the jailed East Timorese rebel leader's prison house here and expressed support for the territory's August autonomy vote.

In a statement released after the hour-long meeting, Carter said he wanted to "show his support for the self-determination of the East Timorese people, whose annexation has never been recognized by the United Nations."

Gusmao, who is serving a 20-year prison sentence for subversion, was referred to in the statement as "the acknowledged leader of the East Timorese independence movement."

Gusmao said after the meeting at his East Jakarta detention house that Carter, who is in Indonesia as an election observer, was pleased with Monday's national polls.

"First Carter said he was very happy with the successful Indonesian elections," Gusmao told reporters.

"Secondly, he hopes that all the existing problems in East Timor could be overcome," he said.

Indonesia invaded the former Portuguese colony in 1975 and annexed it the following year in a move that was never recognized by the United Nations and most countries.

Australia was the only major country to recognize the annexation at the time, while the United States tempered its approval with a recommendation for an act of self-determination for East Timor.

Indonesia offered in January to let go of the eastern territory if the East Timorese rejected its offer of wide-ranging autonomy. East Timor will have UN-monitored polls to decide the autonomy offer August 8.

Gusmao said he did not know whether the Carter Institute or the National Democratic Institute, which both observed the Indonesian elections and are linked to the Democratic Party, would also send observers to the August vote.

"Because we know that Jimmy Carter is an international human rights figure, we just ask for supervision of the human rights and violence in East Timor," the rebel leader said.

Tension between pro- and anti-Indonesian groups has soared in East Timor since Jakarta made the autonomy offer.

Gusmao was moved from Jakarta's Cipinang jail to house arrest in February following a demand from UN Secretary General Kofi Annan.
Carter Assails Indonesia on Timor

By Keith Richburg
Washington Post Service

JAKARTA — Former President Jimmy Carter on Tuesday blasted Indonesian military and government officials for "supporting, directing and arming" East Timorese militias responsible for a violent reign of terror aimed at disrupting an independence vote for the territory scheduled for later this month.

In a statement released in Dili, the Timorese capital, by the Atlanta-based Carter Center, which is observing preparations for the Aug. 30 independence vote, the former U.S. president said, "Some top representatives of the government of Indonesia have failed to fulfill their main obligations with respect to public order and security."

He said observers in Timor had amassed a growing body of evidence that "Indonesian military and other government agencies are supporting, directing and arming pro-integration militias to create a climate of fear and violence." He also said the Indonesian police, now the main security force responsible for keeping the peace in East Timor, "in some cases have colluded with pro-integration militias."

Mr. Carter is the latest foreign observer, and among the most prominent, to criticize the government's handling of security in advance of the Timor vote. Western diplomats who regularly visit East Timor, as well as human rights groups and independence supporters, have regularly accused the Indonesian military and intelligence services of violence. They say the 18-month buildup of the military and police patrol system has been motivated by a desire to prevent an independence vote.

Despite the criticism, the top United Nations' officials involved in East Timor confidently predict that the referendum will be held on schedule. "There will be no delay of the ballot. I am convinced of that," said Janeshed Market, the UN's special representative for East Timor, on Wednesday.

Even if East Timor votes for independence, the decision must still be ratified by Indonesia's Parliament, which is not necessarily a mere formality. After June's elections, the most democratic here in four decades, the largest party in the new Parliament will be Megawati Sukarnoputri's Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle. Many top party officials, including Mrs. Megawati, are known to be opposed to Timorese independence, and they are angry that the incumbent president, B.J. Habibie, pushed through the referendum plan without consulting opposition parties or Parliament.

Mrs. Megawati this week paid a three-day visit to East Timor, where she urged a rally of several hundred people to reject independence. "You are like my children," she said. "Do not abandon your mother." Indonesia opposed to Timorese independence, particularly elements of the powerful military, fear that a vote for East Timor to separate could lead to an uprising of the nation, fueling secessionist insurgenсы in mineral-rich Irian Jaya, and in heavily Islamic Aceh province in the far west.

Mr. Habibie has denoted the military is pursuing a "two-track policy" on East Timor. Asked about it in a Washington Post interview this month, he said the armed forces commander, General Wiranto, "is reporting to the president."

"We have to acknowledge that the military and police are doing everything to do their job," Mr. Habibie said, "It is not being done on purpose by the military."

The violence and intimidation failed to prevent Timorese from registering in surprisingly large numbers for the referendum. At the close of registration, some 427,000 residents had registered to vote, out of a total population of around 800,000.

Violence for 3d Day in Ambon

Religious violence flared for a third day Wednesday in Indonesia's devastated eastern island of Ambon when police and soldiers shot at battling mobs of Muslims and Christians in Malaka province, the police and witnesses said, according to news agencies.

At least 23 people have been killed in rising in the area since Monday.

One person died and four were severely injured when sectarian fighting erupted Wednesday in Poka, a village near the strife-torn provincial capital, Ambon, said Imam Rachman, an Islamic official.

"All were shot by security officers," he said.

Major Zekiel Philip, a spokesman for the Malaka police force, confirmed the shootings but denied that officers had used live ammunition. "We were forced to shoot rubber bullets at the crowd," he said. "Some people were hit by live rounds but we have not yet determined whether they were fired by policemen or civilians."

Witnesses said another body was floating near a harbor-side marketplace in Ambon. Sporadic gunshots and bomb explosions echoed across Ambon neighborhoods, while abandoned houses were set ablaze Wednesday morning.

An orderly at Ambon's main hospital said doctors were treating at least 120 people wounded in street fighting that began Monday night. (AP, Reuters)
Violence escalates in East Timor

U.S. denounces a bloody attack outside a U.N. compound and blasts Indonesia’s slow reaction.

By Slobodan Lekevic
ASSOCIATED PRESS

Dili, Indonesia — Armed with homemade guns, rifles and machetes, hundreds of pro-Indonesia militiamen clashed with rock-throwing independence supporters Wednesday outside U.N. headquarters in East Timor. One teenager was stabbed and bludgeoned to death.

The violence came on the same day balloting from a historic referendum on the territory’s future were being counted.

The militiamen, some wearing red-and-white headbands, Indonesia’s national colors, fataly shot and mutilated a 19-year-old at the gates of the U.N. compound.

At least three others were injured in the militiamen’s biggest show of force yet, and the violence raised fears that the former Portuguese colony could slide back into lawlessness.

U.S. and U.N. officials strongly criticized Indonesia’s slow response to the violence.

Indonesian riot police, meanwhile, prevented the security building in Dili, where ballot counting began Wednesday. The U.N.-sponsored election Monday had asked the mostly Roman Catholic East Timorese whether they wanted to become independent or remain an autonomous region within mostly Muslim Indonesia.

Pro-independence activists say the large voter turnout Monday—98.6 percent—means a landslide victory for independence. The results of the ballot are expected next week.

A 16-person monitoring team from the Atlanta-based Carter Center issued a preliminary report praising the administration of Monday’s election and the overall peaceful atmosphere although some violence marred the balloting.

Former President Jimmy Carter urged the government of Indonesia to take effective action to prevent new violence. “Maintenance of public order and security remains the agreed responsibility of the Indonesian government and is essential to a successful conclusion of the public consultation process and peaceful resolution of the long-standing issue of the status of East Timor,” he said.

And said they would demand their own release.

Some of those vigilantes erected roadblocks Wednesday in western East Timor, trying to carve out a zone of control. Foreign observers have accused hard-line factions within Indonesia’s armed forces of arming and directing the militias.

Wednesday’s violence erupted around hundreds of vigilantes gathered at a FUNPAS rally in Dili. At the rally, militia leader Euroco Guerreiro called for “egalitarian peace and stability in East Timor.”

But a few hours later, dozens of paramilitary forces gathered to protest in front of the U.N. headquarters, claiming the United Nations Militiamen opposed to independence stage a show of force in Dili, the East Timor capital, as poll workers counted votes from a historic referendum on the province’s future.

East Timor has been a province of Indonesia since being invaded in 1975. After years of human rights abuses and international condemnation, Jakarta reversed policy in January and announced East Timor would be given the right of self-determination.

In recent weeks, leaders of several militias for continued Indonesian rule vowed not to recognize a defeat in the polls rigged the elections. Confronted by rock-throwing independence supporters, the vigilantes opened fire.

A taxi carrying journalists to the scene was fired on and militiamen smashed its rear window. Dark smoke billowed from a raging fire in a nearby shack they had set ablaze.

Militiamen tripped and surrounded an independence activist, shooting at him as he fell to the ground. They then struck him with rifles and slashed him with machetes, killing him. A nurse identified him as Jorge Francisco Bonaparte, 19.

The attackers then hurled rocks at journalists, sending some fleeing into the U.N. compound, where about 150 people sought safety.

Indonesian soldiers and policemen stood by without intervening. It took more than an hour for riot police to arrive and disperse the militias.

Unarmed U.N. police were overheard calling for assistance from Indonesian police. “There is absolutely no security here,” an officer shouted. The militiamen did not try to enter the U.N. compound.

Officials in Washington condemned the police response to the violence as inadequate. State Department spokesman Philip Reeker called for the arrest of those “terrorizing the populace and disrupting the U.N. process.”

Indonesia has rejected proposals to deploy international peacekeeping troops, claiming its security forces could control the situation. Police in Jakarta said 360 officers would be flown into East Timor today.

U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan called on Indonesian authorities to take “firm action.”

In New York, the U.N. Security Council met in an emergency session to discuss the situation.
For Immediate Release
Thursday, July 8, 1999

Contact: In Atlanta, Deanna Congileo
Phone: 404-420-5108
dcongileo@emory.edu

In Dili, Gillian Flies or Brent Preston
62-390 313 777

Carter Center Stations Observers In East Timor

Dili, East Timor...The Carter Center has dispatched observers to East Timor to monitor preparations for the "public consultation" vote on the future status of the territory scheduled for late August.

The Center has opened an office in Dili to base eight long-term observers, who will conduct fact-finding throughout East Timor about necessary preconditions for a free and fair balloting. They will be joined by additional observers to monitor events at the time of balloting. Staff also will remain in the weeks after balloting. Carter Center representatives have been welcomed by the United Nations, the Indonesian government, human rights groups, and other international monitors in East Timor.

"Our concern at this point is not as much about the voting itself, as it is about the political climate prior to the balloting," said President Carter. "True democracy requires that people be allowed to cast their votes freely and without intimidation or coercion. I look forward to staying engaged in the process through our representatives on the ground, all of whom are impartial about the questions before voters."

The current conflict in East Timor began in 1975 shortly after Indonesian troops occupied the territory following Portugal's withdrawal from the island. Although Indonesia annexed East Timor in 1976, the annexation by force was never recognized by the international community. Since then, both armed and peaceful resistance to the annexation have continued. Recently, reports of violence and intimidation have
threatened to compromise the "public consultation," a vote administered by the United Nations to express East Timorese preferences on autonomy within Indonesia or possible independence. Changes in the status of the territory would require later action by the Indonesian legislature.

The Carter Center plans to issue weekly public statements on its assessment of the consultation process, with special attention to conditions protecting physical security and freedom of expression and movement in East Timor.

The Carter Center has observed 26 elections in 19 countries, including the recent parliamentary elections in Indonesia. For more information on the Center, visit the World Wide Web at: www.cartercenter.org.

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Wednesday, Aug. 11, 1999

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CARTE CENTER URGES INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT TO HALT MILITIA ACTIVITY IN EAST TIMOR

Dili, East Timor.....Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter has urged President B.J. Habibie to take action to cease Indonesian military and police support for armed militias on East Timor that are intimidating citizens voting Aug. 30 on the status of the annexed territory. Campaigning for the pro-integration option by government officials in violation of the May 5 agreements between Portugal, Indonesia, and the United Nations is also occurring, he noted.

"Some top representatives of the Government of Indonesia have consistently failed to fulfill their main obligations with respect to public order and security, and in many cases, have actively sought to undermine the popular consultation process," Carter said.

President Carter cited mounting evidence by Carter Center observers in East Timor that the Indonesian military (TNI) and other government agencies are supporting, directing, and arming pro-integration militias to create a climate of fear and intimidation. Observers also have reported that the Indonesian police have consistently failed to take necessary steps to maintain law and order, and that both the military and police are actively campaigning for integration of East Timor into Indonesia.

The Aug. 30 "public consultation" is being administered by the United Nations to allow East Timorese an opportunity to express their preferences for greater autonomy for the territory within Indonesia or possible independence. Changes in the status of the territory would require subsequent action by the Indonesian legislature. Indonesia annexed East Timor by force in 1976 following Portugal's withdrawal from the territory.

"Our observers received numerous reports throughout July and early August about Indonesian military support for the pro-integration militias, and visits to militia sites have confirmed these claims," said Charles Costello, director of the Carter Center's Democracy Program. "Government involvement in militia activity clearly violates the May 5 agreement, which lays out ground rules to ensure a free and fair balloting for the populace."
He said The Carter Center continues to be seriously concerned about the existence of pro-integration militias, which have not been disarmed, as promised. Pro-independence guerrilla forces of Falintil generally have not initiated clashes since May. "The complicity of Indonesian military in sustaining these militia groups violates the clear wishes of the majority of the East Timorese, who are committed to holding a fair, peaceful, and impartial public consultation," Costello said.

****Weekly reports from The Carter Center observer team in East Timor are available on the World Wide Web at www.cartercenter.org.
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Wednesday, Sept. 1, 1999

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CARTER CENTER APPLAUDS MASSIVE VOTER TURNOUT IN EAST TIMOR BALLOTING, URGES INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT TO PREVENT NEW VIOLENCE

Dili, East Timor.....Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter has praised the very high voter turnout in the public consultation held Aug. 30 across East Timor to determine the future status of that territory. He also cited positively the generally peaceful conduct of the U.N.-administered balloting, which contrasted with a pre-balloting period marred by intimidation and violence.

"A voter turnout of more than 95 percent under difficult circumstances and the peaceful and orderly conduct of the balloting appear to lay the foundation for a valid and legitimate expression of the wishes of the East Timorese people," said Carter from his home in Plains, Georgia. His remarks were based on a report issued today in Dili by a 15-person Carter Center observation delegation.

The balloting offered the nearly 450,000 eligible voters a choice between accepting wide-ranging autonomy within Indonesia or rejecting autonomy, thereby leading to separation from Indonesia and independence. A May 5

(MORE)
agreement in New York among Portugal, the former colonial power, Indonesia, which annexed the territory in 1976 after an armed takeover the previous year, and the United Nations led to the just-completed balloting. Voting results are expected to be made public by the U.N. secretary-general in about one week.

The Carter Center report praised U.N. staff, both international and local, and the Indonesian police for their efficiency and professionalism on balloting day. Meanwhile, the report highlighted the need for efforts by the parties to achieve reconciliation inside East Timor during the forthcoming transition, whichever option was favored by the voters. It also cited the threat of renewed violence overhanging the process, especially from uncontrolled armed militia activity.

President Carter urged the Government of Indonesia to take effective action to prevent new intimidation and violence, saying “maintenance of public order and security remains the agreed responsibility of the Indonesian government and is essential to a successful conclusion of the public consultation process and peaceful resolution of the longstanding issue of the status of East Timor.”

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Friday, Sept. 3, 1999

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CARTER CENTER DECRIES INACTION BY INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT TO MAINTAIN SECURITY IN EAST TIMOR

ATLANTA, GA.....Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter has called for the Indonesian government to move swiftly to maintain order in East Timor, where armed pro-integration militias are terrorizing the populace in the wake of last Monday's balloting.

“The failure by the Indonesian government to take strong, swift action to stop the escalating violence of these lightly armed militias is inexplicable,” he said. “Allowing this anarchy to continue violates Indonesia’s good faith pledge to uphold the results of the vote, whether it be for independence or autonomy within Indonesia. It also seriously jeopardizes the country’s good international standing.”

Carter’s comments were issued today on behalf of a Carter Center delegation that monitored the balloting in East Timor on Aug. 30. Observers who have remained in East Timor since the vote have reported that thousands of well-armed and newly reinforced police, with military forces to back them up, have been merely watching a new wave of attacks take place. The delegates said the incidents being reported in the news are one-sided aggression against defenseless people, not clashes between pro-integration and pro-independence groups as sometimes claimed by Indonesian civilian and military authorities.

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IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Wednesday, Oct. 6, 1999

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PRESIDENT CARTER CALLS ON INDONESIA TO ENSURE SAFE RETURN OF EAST TIMOR'S REFUGEES

Atlanta, GA.....Former U. S. President Jimmy Carter today expressed concern over the plight of East Timorese refugees in Indonesia. Hundreds of thousands of refugees remain in camps in western Timor, Alor, Flores, and Sulawesi, and thousands more are scattered throughout other parts of Indonesia. The Atlanta-based Carter Center has had an observation mission in East Timor since early July.

President Carter, who has closely monitored events in East Timor, urged the Indonesian government to take immediate steps to allow international humanitarian organizations to provide the necessary aid and protection to all refugees in Indonesia. Access is particularly critical in western Timor, where Indonesian-backed militias have been accused of executing refugees, holding them against their will in cramped and unsanitary conditions, and forcing men and boys to join the militia groups.

"I am deeply disturbed that many refugee camps in parts of Indonesia are effectively under the control of armed East Timorese militias who, in some instances, are being actively supported by the Indonesian military and police," President Carter said. "This situation has persisted for more than three weeks. It is now time for clear action on the part of the Indonesian government."

President Carter welcomed the recent agreement by the Indonesian government to provide access for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to the refugee camps and the early start of repatriation to East Timor. However, he stressed that steps taken by the Indonesian government to remedy the situation must include the disarming of militia members and the ending of military and police collusion with the militias.
To date, militia and military activity has severely limited the ability of both domestic and international organizations to provide aid in western Timor. Some refugee camps remain largely off limits to international organizations, despite assurances of free access from Indonesian President B. J. Habibie and Foreign Minister Ali Alatas. Carter Center observers also have received reports of intimidation directed at Timorese refugees, students, and residents elsewhere in Indonesia, and of refugees being prevented from leaving Indonesia.

Carter Center staff and observers, who were forced to evacuate the East Timorese capital of Dili shortly after the September 4 announcement of an overwhelming vote for independence, will return this week for an initial assessment trip and plan to resume operations in East Timor in the coming weeks. Since September 4, The Carter Center has maintained staff working from other locations in Indonesia and Darwin, Australia. Observers continue to gather reports about the refugee situation in Indonesia and the return of refugees to East Timor.

In recent days, a number of senior Indonesian officials have made public statements suggesting that Timorese refugees will be permanently resettled or "transmigrated" to other parts of Indonesia, and transmigration plans reportedly have been implemented in Sulawesi and some parts of western Timor. No such resettlement programs should begin until officials from the UNHCR can verify with individual refugees whether they wish to return to East Timor or resettle elsewhere in Indonesia.

"Any refugees who wish to return to East Timor should be allowed to do so at once with the assurance of adequate security and protection," President Carter said. "During this process, the government of Indonesia must ensure that all Timorese residents or refugees, no matter where they are located in Indonesia, are protected by the police and local government."

The presence of the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET), which has resulted in vastly improved security conditions and allowed for the provision of humanitarian relief, will enable many refugees to return quickly to Dili. In the meantime, however, responsibility for the safety and care of the refugees rests ultimately with the Indonesian government. President Carter urged Indonesia to take swift and effective action to ensure the safe return of the remaining refugees to East Timor.

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Large Turnout for Registration despite Continuing Security Concerns

(Background: Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and The Carter Center are closely monitoring the public consultation process on autonomy in East Timor. The Center opened an office with two observers in Dili on July 4. They will be joined next week by eight long-term observers, who will travel throughout East Timor to assess preparations for the vote, the security environment, and the fairness of the campaign, while remaining strictly neutral and nonpartisan. The following is the first of a series of weekly reports to be issued by The Carter Center observer mission before and after the consultation).

Dili, East Timor.....The past week saw a significant decrease in the level of intimidation and violence directed at personnel of the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) who are supervising the upcoming popular consultation. However, the security situation for the people of East Timor does not seem to have improved significantly.

Initial reports on voter registration, which began on July 16, indicate potential voters flooded registration centers all across East Timor during the first few days of voter registration. The Carter Center is greatly encouraged by the opening of registration and the high turnout so far. Clearly, the large majority of the people of East Timor are committed to participating in a peaceful, fair and democratic consultation.

However, this commitment is being severely tested by an atmosphere of violence, intimidation, and insecurity that continues to pervade most areas of East Timor. Information gathered in direct interviews during field visits by Carter Center observers and from other independent reports from all parts of East Timor, indicate that pro-integration militias in many areas are threatening to harm or kill those who do not vote for autonomy. Similar reports indicate that the militias also are largely responsible for creating tens of thousands of internally displaced persons and preventing them from returning to their homes to participate in the consultation.

This report is based on field visits to Liquica and Ermera districts during the past several days, including observation of the opening of registration, and on meetings in Jakarta and Dili with senior Indonesian Government, military, and police officials; members of the Indonesian Government Task Force for the Implementation of the Popular Consultation; the Commission for Peace and Stability; Timorese non-governmental organizations; UNAMET officials; representatives of international organizations; diplomats; members of pro-autonomy groups (which favor integration into Indonesia); and members of pro-independence groups.

The Carter Center is particularly concerned about the following problems, which must be addressed to ensure that conditions established by the May 5 New York Agreements for the popular consultation are met:
Intimidation of Voters. While all sides must accept some responsibility for the hostile climate that now prevails, our interviews and other independent reports indicate that responsibility for the large majority of incidents of intimidation and violence lies with pro-integration militias. These groups are subjecting potential voters to an intense and systematic campaign of intimidation in an attempt to influence the outcome of the consultation. Individuals interviewed by The Carter Center observers spoke uniformly about widespread harassment and intimidation by the militia, and described similar incidents of militia visiting people at their homes at night and threatening violence after the poll if autonomy is rejected. Similar reports from other independent groups indicate such incidents are occurring throughout East Timor. According to paragraph 1 of the Security Agreement, the appropriate Indonesian security forces are responsible for ensuring a secure environment devoid of violence and intimidation. In addition, paragraph 4 provides that the Indonesian police are solely responsible for the maintenance of law and order during the consultation process. Unfortunately, there is little evidence that the Indonesian Police have been successful in improving the security situation. For the conditions of the New York Agreements to be fulfilled, the activities of violent militia groups must be curtailed.

Internally Displaced Persons. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has documented the existence of more than 32,000 internally displaced persons in East Timor, most of whom report having been driven from their homes in the past six months by pro-integration militias as a direct result of their presumed political beliefs. It appears little is being done to facilitate their safe return to their homes. Some militia leaders have openly stated that they will not permit internally displaced persons to return home until after the completion of the consultation.

For internally displaced persons to be able to participate in the consultation as provided in the New York Agreements, it is essential that adequate security conditions exist for all of them to return to their homes immediately and to ensure that no others are driven from their home by violence and intimidation.

Active Campaign for Autonomy. According to many credible observers, elements of the Indonesian Government and military continue to campaign for the autonomy option in violation of the New York Agreements. One senior army leader in Dili admitted that the military is actively promoting the autonomy package and distributing food and services to people to encourage votes for autonomy.

Such practices are in violation of paragraph 1 of the Security Agreement, which establishes that the absolute neutrality of the Indonesian armed forces and the Indonesian police is essential. Similarly, the “Agreement on Modalities for the Popular Consultation” provides that officials of the Indonesian Government will not participate in the campaign in support for either option. It is imperative that all sides abide by these commitments.

Need for Redeployment. Although senior military commanders indicated to Carter Center observers that all military forces in East Timor will be confined to their barracks in advance of the consultation, no timetable for this redeployment has been established and military units continue to operate throughout the territory. To improve the current climate of fear, a timetable for completion of the redeployment of the Indonesia military should be established and implemented.
Registration Continues to Run Smoothly, Security Issues Remain Key Concern

(Background: Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and The Carter Center are closely monitoring the public consultation process on autonomy in East Timor through neutral, nonpartisan observers assessing preparations for the vote, the security environment, and the fairness of the campaign. Following is the second in a series of weekly reports to be issued by The Carter Center observer mission before and after the consultation).

Dili, East Timor... During the past week, registration for the public consultation in East Timor continued with strong turnout of potential voters, and few reported incidents of violence. UNAMET operations are in full swing, but no date has been set for the consultation vote. While registration and other UNAMET activities are now proceeding well, The Carter Center is concerned that an atmosphere of fear and intimidation continues to prevail in many parts of East Timor.

The Center is particularly concerned about persistent reports of Indonesian military involvement in the activities of pro-integration militia groups. In direct interviews with local residents, self-proclaimed members and commanders of armed pro-integration groups, Indonesian soldiers and senior military personnel in Baucau district, Carter Center observers were told that one Timorese pro-integration group known as Saka is being armed, trained, equipped, directed and paid by the Indonesian military.

This report is based on field visits to Baucau and Manatuto districts during the past several days, and on meetings in Dili with senior Indonesian Government, military, and police officials; members of the Indonesian Government Task Force for the Implementation of the Popular Consultation; the Commission for Peace and Stability; Timorese nongovernmental organizations; UNAMET officials; representatives of international organizations; diplomats; and members of groups which favor integration into Indonesia as well as pro-independence groups.

The Carter Center is very encouraged by the following developments in East Timor and believes that the continuation of such conditions will further enhance the opportunity for the fair conduct of the consultation.

- **Voter Registration**: Large numbers of people are registering at centers across East Timor. Carter Center observers witnessed long lines at all registration centers visited. Numerous interviews with potential voters indicate that the majority are satisfied with the conduct of registration and remain committed to participating in a peaceful, fair, and democratic consultation. Carter Center observers received no complaints about the identification requirements for registration, but many people are unaware of the availability of a UNAMET Affidavit of Birth for those who do not have the required identification. With the notable exception of internally displaced persons, it appears that the large majority of eligible voters will have the opportunity to register for the upcoming consultation.

- **The Pre-Consultation Role of UNAMET**: UNAMET has nearly completed deployment of its personnel
The mission was fully ready for registration to begin and registration is proceeding smoothly. The UN deployed rapidly for this mission. Indonesian police have provided good security for UNAMET personnel during the registration period.

The Center continues to have serious concern, however, about continuing intimidation of the East Timorese, violations of the New York agreements and the issue of redeployment of the Indonesian military. These concerns were noted in our weekly report released July 20, 1999. To date, these issues have not been adequately addressed.

The Carter Center remains particularly concerned about reports of Indonesian military support of armed pro-integration groups and the plight of internally displaced persons. Both of these issues must be addressed to ensure conditions established by the May 5 New York Agreements for the popular consultation are met.

Military Support of Pro-Integration Groups. The Carter Center has received numerous reports of Indonesian military (TNI) involvement in the activities of militias over the past several weeks, but until now has been unable to independently confirm a direct link between armed pro-integration groups and the military. Carter Center observers recently visited a number of camps in several districts that local residents claim are militia posts, and in several cases observers found evidence of Indonesian military involvement in these camps. Carter Center observers have now identified at least one group in Baucau district known as Pusaka or Saka that is being armed, trained, equipped, directed, and its members paid by the military. The existence of this group and its ties to the Indonesian military have been confirmed through interviews with local residents, members of Saka, and local senior military personnel.

Harassment and Intimidation Continues. Local residents in several different areas in Baucau complained of harassment and intimidation by pro-integration groups. Residents identified Saka and Rajawali as militia groups that work in cooperation with the TNI, and say armed members visit them at night, threatening violence and bloodshed after the vote if autonomy is rejected. Members of the militia groups who were interviewed described Saka and Rajawali as Timorese military groups that fight for autonomy and reported that they work with local TNI units to provide security and promote the autonomy option.

Internally Displaced Persons. Poor security conditions continue to prevent tens of thousands of internally displaced persons in East Timor from returning to their homes. For internally displaced persons to be able to participate in the consultation as provided in the New York Agreements, adequate security conditions must exist for them to return to their homes immediately and to ensure that no others are driven from their homes by intimidation or violence.

Note: Paragraph 4 of the Security Agreement states that the Indonesian police are solely responsible for the maintenance of law and order during the consultation process. Paragraph 1 of the same agreement states that the Indonesian police and military must be absolutely neutral throughout the consultation process. It is essential that all support for Timorese groups of any description by the military cease at once and that all security functions are handed over to the police.

Post-Consultation Security. Many of those interviewed by Carter Center observers fear that UNAMET will leave East Timor immediately after the vote, and are concerned about their safety. It is important, therefore, that UNAMET clearly explains the role the UN will play in East Timor after the consultation.
Observing the 1999 Public Consultation Process in East Timor

The Carter Center Weekly Report on East Timor, No. 3

July 26-August 1, 1999

Background: Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and The Carter Center are closely monitoring the public consultation process on autonomy in East Timor. The Carter Center opened an office in Dili on July 4. An additional eight observers have now joined the team and have begun raveling throughout East Timor to assess preparations for the vote, the security environment, and the fairness of the campaign, while remaining strictly neutral and nonpartisan. The following is the third in a series of weekly reports to be issued by The Carter Center observer mission before and after the consultation.

Turnout for voter registration remains strong as the end of the registration period approaches. The people of East Timor have shown great enthusiasm for participation in the consultation process with a large proportion of the eligible voters having already registered. Carter Center observers have noted an encouraging improvement in the security situation in some areas and the Indonesian police seem to be taking positive steps to create a peaceful climate for the campaign period and ballot day. However, many concerns remain, including ongoing harassment and intimidation of potential voters in many areas, the continued existence of tens of thousands of internally displaced persons and threats of widespread violence after the vote.

The Center is particularly concerned by clear evidence collected by its observers of Indonesian military and government support of armed pro-integration groups and continued involvement in pro-integration campaigning in violation of the New York agreements that govern the consultation process. There has also been a marked deterioration in the security situation in Dili over the past week, including at least two reported killings by pro-integration militias. In one incident, members of the Aitarak militia fired automatic weapons within a few hundred meters of the Carter Center office.

This report is based on field visits to Manatuto, Liquica, Ermera, Aileu and Dili districts during the past week, and on meetings in Dili with Indonesian government, military, and police officials; members of the Indonesian Government Task Force for the Implementation of the Popular Consultation; the Commission for Peace and Stability; Timorese non-governmental organizations; UNAMET officials; representatives of international organizations; diplomats; and members of pro-autonomy groups (which favor integration into Indonesia) and pro-independence groups.

☑ Voter Registration: The Carter Center is encouraged by the strong turnout for voter registration to date. UNAMET reports that more than half of the estimated population of eligible voters had registered by the tenth day of the registration exercise, and turnout continues to be strong at many registration centers visited by Carter Center observers. The use of UNAMET Affidavit of Birth forms seems to have ensured that those who do not have the required identification are still able to register. UNAMET has also taken steps to ensure that internally displaced persons (IDPs) are able to register and vote. Because eligible voters must vote at the same location where they have registered, the identification, and registration, of IDPs and voting by IDPs still represents a significant challenge. Much needs to be done to ensure that IDPs are able to fully and freely participate in the consultation.

☑ The Role of UNAMET: The presence of UNAMET personnel continues to have a positive impact on the
security situation in many parts of East Timor, and most potential voters interviewed by Carter Center observers express satisfaction with the performance of District Electoral Officers (DEOs) and UN Civilian Police. UNAMET has also taken a number of steps to ensure that overcrowding at some registration centers does not prevent potential voters from registering. However, the Center is still concerned that not enough has been done to ensure that the people of East Timor clearly understand all phases of the consultation process. Many registrants expressed surprise and concern when informed that the voter list will be publicly displayed prior to the vote, and few understand that most DEOs will be withdrawn from voting centers immediately after the vote.

The Role of the Police: The Carter Center is encouraged by steps taken by the Indonesian police to increase their presence in East Timor and to assume responsibility for creating a peaceful and orderly pre-consultation environment. The police continue to provide good security for UNAMET activities and to cooperate fully with UNAMET personnel in most districts. However, most police personnel appear to remain close to their bases or to UNAMET offices, and few seem to have been deployed to less accessible areas. Carter Center observers have collected evidence of police officers collaborating with pro-integration groups and many incidents of politically-motivated violence or intimidation remain uninvestigated. The Security Agreement calls for the Indonesian police to maintain law and order and order throughout East Timor, not just to provide security for UNAMET personnel.

The Role of the Military and Local Government: Indonesian government officials have informed The Carter Center that the Indonesian military (TNI) has withdrawn a number of troops from East Timor, but there is no evidence that the military has followed through on public commitments to re-deploy and confine the remaining soldiers to their barracks. First-hand observation in a number of different districts has confirmed that the TNI is still widely dispersed throughout East Timor and there is a permanent TNI presence in many villages and towns. Carter Center observers have compiled additional evidence of TNI support for and cooperation with armed pro-integration groups, as well as close cooperation between pro-integration groups and local government officials. TNI soldiers and officers, leaders of armed pro-integration groups and local government officials in a number of districts have told Carter Center observers that they are working together to provide security and to “socialize” the autonomy plan. Many residents in these areas have said that the pro-integration groups supported and directed by the military and local government are militias, and that militia members routinely harass and intimidate the local population.

The May 5 agreements that govern the popular consultation assign sole responsibility for maintaining law and order to the police, call for the strict neutrality of the military, forbid the use of government resources for campaign activities and do not allow campaigning for either option before the official campaign period.

Harassment and Intimidation: Local residents in all districts visited by Carter Center observers complain of persistent harassment and intimidation. The Center has received a few reports of pro-independence groups perpetrating violent acts or intimidating potential voters, but Indonesian government and military leaders have confirmed that FALINTIL is respecting the cease-fire and does not represent an immediate threat to the TNI or the people of East Timor. Primary responsibility for the creation of a general climate of fear and intimidation in East Timor rests with pro-integration militias. While the overall security situation has improved in some areas, Carter Center observers have collected much evidence that intimidation tactics in many parts of East Timor have simply become more subtle and difficult to detect. Militia groups now maintain a lower profile, operate primarily at night and concentrate their activities in less accessible areas,
but their threats and messages of intimidation remain largely unchanged.

**Internally Displaced Persons.** Poor security conditions continue to prevent tens of thousands of IDPs from returning to their homes. Estimates of the number of IDPs in East Timor range from more than 35,000 by the UNHCR to more than 60,000 by church-based organizations. The Carter Center is encouraged by the fact that both the Indonesian government and UNAMET recognize the seriousness of the IDP problem, and by reports from at least one international humanitarian organization that some IDPs have started to return home. However, Carter Center observers have failed to find evidence of large numbers of IDPs returning to their homes, and have received credible reports of several hundred new IDPs arriving in Ermera district from Liquica and Bobonaro over the past week.

UNAMET regulations state that all voters must cast their ballots at the station at which they register. It is essential that steps are taken to ensure that all IDPs are able to participate freely in the consultation process and to vote, regardless of whether or not they return to their homes prior to polling day. The Indonesian police also have a responsibility to ensure that no others are driven from their homes by intimidation or violence.

**Security Concerns for Later Stages of the Consultation:** Supporters of both independence and autonomy have told Carter Center observers that they fear an increase in violence during the campaign period and after the vote. Some pro-integration militia members have told Carter Center observers that they will engage in violent acts if the autonomy option is rejected. At the same time, non-Timorese civil servants and transmigrants have begun sending their families outside East Timor for fear of retribution from independence supporters.

The Security Agreement stipulates that the Indonesian police are responsible for maintaining law and order in East Timor before and after the consultation. Positive steps by the Indonesian police to prevent violence and intimidation during the campaign period and specific public commitments to remain after the vote by both the police and UNAMET might reassure the people of East Timor that the post-consultation period will be peaceful.
Carter Center Weekly Report on East Timor, No. 4

August 2-8, 1999

Background: Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and The Carter Center are closely monitoring the public consultation process on autonomy in East Timor. Ten Carter Center observers have been traveling throughout East Timor since July 4 to assess preparations for the vote, the security environment, and the fairness of the campaign, while remaining strictly neutral and nonpartisan. The following is the fourth in a series of weekly reports to be issued by The Carter Center observer mission before and after the consultation.

Previous Carter Center reports noted a slight but encouraging improvement in the security situation in East Timor amid signs that the Indonesian police might take an active role in curtailing widespread harassment and intimidation of potential voters. Unfortunately, the past week has been marked by deteriorating security conditions, heightened pro-integration militia activity, and increased threats of violence and bloodshed if the autonomy option is rejected.

Top representatives of the Government of Indonesia have failed to fulfill their main obligations under the May 5 Agreements and in many cases have actively sought to undermine the popular consultation process. Carter Center observers have collected first-hand evidence of the following violations:

- The Indonesian military (TNI) and government are actively supporting and directing armed pro-integration militias who are creating a climate of fear and intimidation.

- The Indonesian police have consistently failed to take the steps necessary to maintain law and order, and in some cases have colluded with pro-integration militias.

- The Indonesian government and TNI are actively campaigning for the autonomy option and providing resources and support to pro-autonomy groups.

- The TNI has failed to fulfill its commitment to redeploy its troops and is maintaining posts in villages throughout East Timor.

- TNI and pro-integration militia members are threatening bloodshed and war if the autonomy option is rejected.

- Militia members have attacked several UNAMET registration centers with impunity, and both TNI and militia members have intimidated and threatened UNAMET local staff.

- Militia members and TNI personnel have threatened and intimidated Carter Center observers and local staff.

- Continued insecurity has prevented the return of up to 60,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their homes and threatens their ability to freely participate in the consultation process.
The Carter Center believes that it is within the power of the Indonesian government to create the conditions necessary for a free, open, and democratic consultation in East Timor. However, failure to immediately redeploy TNI troops, bring pro-integration militias under control, and establish law and order in East Timor may jeopardize the entire consultation process.

This report is based on interviews with police, military, local government and church officials, local residents, internally displaced persons, militia members, and others in Bobonaro, Liquica, Ermera, Dili, Baucau, Lautem, Manatuto, and Cova Lima districts during the past week, and on meetings in Dili with Indonesian government, military, and police officials; members of the Indonesian Government Task Force for the Implementation of the Popular Consultation; the Commission for Peace and Stability; Timorese nongovernmental organizations; UNAMET officials; representatives of international organizations; diplomats; and members of pro-autonomy groups (which favor integration into Indonesia), and pro-independence groups.

The Role of the Military: Carter Center observers continue to collect direct evidence of TNI support for and cooperation with armed pro-integration militias throughout East Timor. During the past week, Carter Center observers documented several cases of TNI soldiers and militia members detaining, interrogating, and threatening UNAMET local staff members and witnessed TNI personnel communicating with militia groups using two-way radios in a number of districts (the use of two-way radios by civilian organizations is illegal in Indonesia).

According to reports of international organizations, interviews by Carter Center observers, and the eyewitness account of a man who escaped, TNI soldiers also were implicated in the abduction and disappearance of five internally displaced persons in the Liquicia district. TNI personnel continue to tell Carter Center observers that they are providing security and “socializing,” or promoting the autonomy option, often in cooperation with armed pro-autonomy groups. There has been no evidence of redeployment of TNI troops, despite continued assurances from the Indonesian government that TNI soldiers will be withdrawn from the villages.

The May 5 agreements that govern the popular consultation assign sole responsibility for maintaining law and order to the police, call for the strict neutrality of the military, forbid the use of government resources for campaign activities and call for the redeployment of TNI forces in the territory.

The Role of the Police: The Indonesian police have consistently failed to fulfill their obligation under the May 5 Agreements to maintain law and order in East Timor. Pro-integration militias continue to perpetrate acts of violence and intimidation with impunity in many parts of the territory, including Dili, and several militia leaders have openly admitted to Carter Center observers that they direct their followers to commit illegal acts. In some areas the police are still providing good security for UNAMET operations, but in others the police have failed to adequately protect UNAMET personnel and have done virtually nothing to ensure the security of ordinary citizens.

Police officers took no action to protect UNAMET local staff as they were beaten by militia members in Bobonaro on August 5. No arrests have been made in that case or in the case of the killing of a pro-independence youth in Dili on August 1, despite the fact that the killing took place in front of several witnesses and that the identity of the killer is widely known. There is also clear evidence of police collusion with pro-integration militia groups. Carter Center observers witnessed police officers communicating with militia groups using two-way radios in several districts and collected evidence of a militia leader who is also a serving police officer.
Threats and Intimidation: Local residents in all districts visited by Carter Center observers complain of persistent harassment and intimidation by pro-integration militias and TNI soldiers. Local government officials in a number of districts have openly threatened a “return to war” if the autonomy option is rejected, and militia leaders have told Carter Center observers that they regularly make similar threats. Local residents in several areas have told Carter Center observers that TNI soldiers and militia members regularly threaten to kill anyone who votes to reject autonomy. UNAMET local staff members also have been detained, interrogated, and threatened by TNI soldiers and beaten by militia members over the past week. UNAMET local staff have been the target of an intense intimidation campaign in many areas and have been repeatedly threatened with death after UNAMET leaves East Timor. Carter Center observers and local staff have also been threatened and intimidated by militia leaders and TNI officers in a number of areas. Shots have been fired within a few hundred meters of the Carter Center office in Dili on six different occasions over the past week.

Internally Displaced Persons: The internally displaced persons situation in East Timor remains largely unchanged, with between forty and sixty thousand people still prevented from returning to their homes by insecurity and threats of further violence. Carter Center observers visited internally displaced persons in a number of districts over the past week, with many complaining of continued threats, harassment and attacks from TNI soldiers and militia members. Carter Center observers witnessed internally displaced persons living under extremely poor conditions in some areas. In one case, internally displaced persons said that they had to resort to drinking from irrigation ditches because local militias had cut off their piped water supply.

Voter Registration: Registration was scheduled to close on August 4. After a two-day extension, the voter registration closed on August 6 (registration was extended until August 8 for sites outside of East Timor). The total number of individuals registered far exceeds original UNAMET estimates, and it appears that a very high percentage of eligible voters registered, despite persistent harassment and insecurity. UNAMET preliminary registration figures show 433,576 individuals have registered within East Timor and 12,680 have registered outside East Timor for a total of 446,256. The Carter Center is particularly encouraged by indications that the large majority of internally displaced persons were able to register and intend to vote.

The Role of UNAMET: UNAMET has successfully completed the voter registration exercise under difficult conditions, and DEOs and other UNAMET staff continued to exhibit a high level of professionalism and competence at registration sites visited by Carter Center observers. The Center is encouraged by UNAMET plans to conduct grass-roots voter education programs over the coming weeks. The Center is concerned, however, that UNAMET continues to operate in many areas under conditions that are clearly not conducive to a free and open democratic process. Intimidation of and attacks on UNAMET local staff are particularly worrying. It is essential that the UN and Indonesian police provide adequate protection for all UNAMET staff, especially the thousands of Timorese employees who have been put at risk by virtue of their employment.
**Carter Center Weekly Report on East Timor, No. 5**

*August 9-16, 1999*

**Background:** Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and The Carter Center are closely monitoring the popular consultation process on autonomy in East Timor. Ten Carter Center observers have been traveling throughout East Timor since July 4 to assess preparations for the vote, the security environment, and the fairness of the campaign, while remaining strictly neutral and nonpartisan. The following is the fifth in a series of weekly reports to be issued by The Carter Center observer mission before and after the consultation.

The popular consultation moved into a new phase this week, with the end of the registration process and the beginning of the political campaign period, which is scheduled to run through August 27. As the campaign period begins, The Carter Center notes no significant improvements in the security situation in East Timor or fulfillment by the Government of Indonesia (GOI) of its security obligations under the May 5 New York agreements. Indonesian Army, police, and civil officials have failed to intervene against or have actively participated in attacks on pro-independence supporters' activities.

The Carter Center does note the recently announced change in military command in Dili. Further, the U.N. Secretary-General's Special Envoy Jamsheed Marker has issued a statement concerning Indonesian military support for pro-integration militias, assuring that measures are being taken to correct the situation.

Nevertheless, of particular concern to The Carter Center observers during the past week were the following developments:

- **Intimidation,** including explicit death threats, of U.N. AMET personnel, which has continued in several districts. In one location, U.N. AMET CIVPOLs officials were assaulted while attempting to protect students who were being attacked by pro-integration militia.

- **Harassment** of pro-independence elements, particularly students and National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT) political party workers, which has increased sharply in some locations.

- **A substantial increase** in the number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), with thousands of new IDPs in Viqueque, where an August 11 attack resulted in two deaths, and a worsening of conditions of IDPs in Suai and Same.

Carter Center observers also collected further information that reinforces our previous reports. This includes continued examples of the Indonesian military (TNI) supporting and directing armed pro-integration militias and the police watching passively as militia attacked pro-independence groups, although in at least one case police protected the opening of a CNRT office.

New evidence also shows a strengthening of existing militias and a spread across East Timor of more aggressive pro-integration militias. GOI officials continue to actively campaign for the integration option, and to provide food, other resources, and support to pro-integration groups. Carter Center observers also have seen an unevenly balanced distribution of campaign opportunities in some districts.
Meanwhile, there has been no perceptible movement toward the concentration of TNI troops into district centers, nor has there been any reduction in TNI troops in East Timor. In fact, according to one authoritative report, troop strength is being reinforced.

To date, we have seen little demonstration of GOI behavior designed to create the necessary conditions for a free, open, and democratic consultation in East Timor. There remains widespread concern that continued insecurity could jeopardize the consultation process.

This report is based on interviews with the Commission for Peace and Stability, police, military, local government and church officials, local residents, internally displaced persons, students, and militia members. It also includes interviews with Indonesian Government civilian, military, and police officials; Timorese non-governmental organizations; U N A M E T officials; diplomats; and representatives of international organizations. Additional interviews were conducted with diplomats, members of pro-integration groups (which favor the autonomy option for East Timor), members of pro-independence groups, and others. All interviews were held in Bobonaro, Dili, Baucau, Lautem, Viqueque, Ainaro, Manufahi and Covalima districts during the past week.

Physical Attacks and Intimidation: The Aug. 11 attack on the newly-opened student office in Viqueque was the most serious act of intimidation since April. Two persons were killed and at least three wounded in the attack. Two international journalists had to take shelter for 45 minutes while firing continued. Some residents fled 10 miles to Ossu.

Meanwhile, security forces and pro-integration militias continued to threaten and intimidate others across East Timor. Center observers in Baucau noted the unusual presence of Aitarak militia in that district. Two Indonesian air force fighter aircraft swooped low Aug. 12 over the church in the town of Suai (simulating a bombing attack). On Aug. 13, in Dili's old market area, TNI soldiers and Aitarak militia reportedly fired scores of rounds into the air. Residents considered the firing as intimidation on the eve of the campaign period.

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs): Numbers of IDPs increased significantly this week. A reported 5,000 persons fled the Viqueque attack. Their flight is the largest such movement since April. Some of them who had taken refuge in Ossu sub-district told Carter Center observers that militia members threatened with death all young men over age 15. In Suai, some 700 new IDPs joined others at the church. They told Carter Center observers that pro-integration militia threats had caused them to leave villages elsewhere in Covalima district. In Ritabou, Bobonaro, 62 new IDPs fled in fear.

In Covalima, church officials reported that fear of militia on the roads prevented food convoys from reaching IDPs. In Covalima and Manufahi, church officials said supplies of food, water, and medicine were exhausted.

Political Campaign: Preparations for the campaign period proceeded through the week. On Aug. 8, the two sides agreed on a code of conduct and the two symbols (pro-independence and pro-integration) to be used. While the symbols contain some similar elements, no one with whom Carter Center observers have spoken has expressed concern that this would lead to confusion. Plans for campaigning in the districts vary widely. In Bobonaro, pro-integration groups have been allocated three days each for exclusive campaigning, while the pro-independence C N R T will have only three days in total. In contrast, in Baucau, the pro-integration party and the pro-independence party have agreed.
to share campaign days but in separate locations.

The Role of the Police: Failure of the Indonesian police to live up to their obligations under the May 5 New York agreements continues. Police units have not assumed responsibility for protecting the population, nor do they appear seriously to be investigating politically-related incidents reported to them. Police units failed to take action to protect pro-independence groups and foreign journalists during the Aug. 11 attack in Viqueque. The police should be commended, however, for successfully providing security at the Aug. 13 opening of the CNRT office in Suai.

The Role of the Military: Deployment of TNI units across East Timor down to small hamlet-based units has not changed. Repeated promises from government sources that such units will be “cantoned” at the district level have not been met. Carter Center personnel have observed TNI trucks filled with armed soldiers on full alert, apparently on patrol. Furthermore, a senior international observer reported that TNI personnel from West Timor have reinforced locally-based troops. Meanwhile, intimidation by the Indonesian military also continued, including TNI soldiers participating in an Aug. 11 attack on pro-independence activists in Viqueque.

The Role of UNAMET: UNAMET’s successful coordination of the approval of a campaign code of conduct and polling symbols is a mark of the respect which most parties accord it. In the two districts for which we have evidence, UNAMET and The Commission for Peace and Stability (KPS) have played supportive roles in getting the parties together to plan for the campaign. Still, UNAMET’s ability to function during the rest of the consultation will remain dependent on the perceived security of its local staff, many of whom are being put at risk by their employment. Thus it remains essential that UN and Indonesian authorities allocate increased attention to the matter.
OBSERVING THE 1999 PUBLIC CONSULTATION PROCESS IN EAST TIMOR

Carter Center Weekly Report on East Timor, No. 6
August 16-22, 1999

(Background: Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and The Carter Center are closely monitoring the popular consultation process on autonomy in East Timor. Ten Carter Center observers have been traveling throughout East Timor since July 4 to assess preparations for the vote, the security environment, and the fairness of the campaign, while remaining strictly neutral and nonpartisan. The following is the sixth in a series of weekly reports to be issued by The Carter Center observer mission before and after the consultation.)

The first full week in the campaign phase of the East Timor Popular Consultation was completed but marred by escalating violence, especially in the western districts. While there was some positive signs that the Indonesian police had begun to establish security, there also were accounts of violence that again implicated the Indonesian military in support of pro-integration militia forces. This ongoing violence is particularly troubling as the campaign phase, which began August 14, has less than one week remaining ahead of the August 30 vote.

The Campaign Process:
In many areas, pro-integration and pro-independence organizations were working closely with UNAMET to address potential obstacles in the campaign process. For instance, in Ermera, pro-integration and pro-independence leaders have signed a memorandum of reconciliation in which they promise to conduct a safe, orderly campaign. Although many of the campaign rallies have run smoothly in some districts, militia attacks and intimidation keep many citizens from participating in others. Carter Center observers in several districts have collected evidence that pro-integration militias have threatened and assaulted those who have participated in pro-independence rallies.

Over the last week, pro-integration rallies held parades and convoys throughout East Timor. Pro-integration stickers, posters, and banners have been placed on vehicles and public spaces. Some pro-integration organizations distribute rice and building materials to villages as part of their campaign strategy to win support from the rural Timorese poor. In many areas, pro-integration organizations such as the East Timor Popular Front (BRTT), the Unified Forum for Justice and Democracy (FPDK), and Pasukan Pejuang Integrasi (PPI), have organized under the party umbrella, UNIF.

CNRT, the political arm of the pro-independence resistance, has opened several new offices, including those in Los Palos, Baucau, and Covalima. Efforts by CNRT to open offices in other districts continue to be met with resistance. In Bobonaro, the district government continues to refuse the establishment of a CNRT branch in that district. After the disturbances in Maliana on August 18, part of the CNRT leadership in Bobonaro has sought refuge in the district police headquarters. Existing CNRT offices and the offices of student groups which have common pro-independence aims have been attacked in several areas during the past week. On August 19, the CNRT office in Manatuto was attacked by pro-integration militias. In Suai, the day after the CNRT held a large procession on August 18, militia members threw a hand grenade (which did not explode), attacked internally displaced persons (IDPs) and upset market stands, church officials told a Center observer.

Indonesian Police:
There were some signs that the Indonesian police (POLRI) have begun to assert the authority for establishing security that the May 5 New York Agreements assign to them. In village Libaloa, Liquica district, for example,
police established a post that enabled a group of IDPs to return to their homes. Further, in Bobonaro on August 19, police reportedly attempted to intervene when pro-integration supporters attacked a student office. Nonetheless, police responded tardily or remained passive in several instances. In Suai, for example, police only intervened after pro-integration militias had destroyed market property, damaged an UNAMET vehicle, beaten IDPs, wrecked a church office, and the Church priest and nuns physically put themselves between the attackers and the IDPs.

Physical Attacks and Intimidation:
Militia-led attacks and intimidation continued in some districts escalated this week, most noticeably in Bobonaro and Suai. An August 18 militia attack on student groups in Bobonaro district left several injured. Center observers also interviewed two men who were beaten by Dadurus Merah Putih (DMP) militia members on the day before the attack. On August 19 in Suai armed Laksaur and Mahidi militias attacked a group of 2,400 IDPs gathered on church grounds.

Accounts of violence once again implicated the Indonesian military (TNI) in the support of militia activity. Apparent attempts to intimidate UNAMET foreign and local staff continued in Bobonaro and Suai and in some cases became more violent. There were first time reports of attacks against UNAMET staff this week in Lautem. Carter Center observers found no evidence to substantiate pro-integration allegations of attacks and intimidation by the pro-independence CNRT and student organizations.

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs):
The plight of IDPs continued to worsen in some places. In Viqueque, UNAMET officials reported that 1200-1500 people were still in Ossu or the surrounding mountains. Dewan Solidaritas Mahasiswa students reported that food and medicine were critically low for the 50-80 persons whom they had registered. In Suai, the numbers of those sheltering at the Catholic church increased substantially for the second consecutive week, to about 2,500. Following the disturbances of August 19, the leader of the Laksaur militia, who is a government official, forcibly stopped the supply of water to the IDPs, whose condition became even more critical. The district chief, UNAMET sources report, would not give permission for the planned relief convoy on August 20. A delegation of U.S. Senators Harkin and Reed and Congressman James McGovern went to Suai on August 21, talked with the refugees and discussed their conditions with local officials. As of August 22, the water supply has been resumed.

Observers:
The number of consultation process observer groups, both domestic and foreign, continued to build, with some 2,000 have been accredited by UNAMET to date. A spokesman for the pro-integration organization, FPDK, said he planned to bring in 400 persons from outside East Timor, but UNAMET says no action was taken to seek accreditation. Still, 23 new groups, who will be coordinated by the Indonesian Government's East Timor Task Force, are expected to arrive soon.

Falintil:
On August 20, Falintil held simultaneous ceremonies in its three cantonments to celebrate its 24th anniversary. The celebration went smoothly, without violent incident, and attracted thousands of supporters. Many pro-independence supporters also explained that these celebrations conveniently drew thousands of youths from the towns, thereby minimizing contact between opposing parties and decreasing likelihood of clashes during the campaign period. Falintil’s non-confrontational posture remains unchanged. While the pro-integration side told
us that Falintil members were responsible for provoking attacks in Bobonaro, Suai and Viqueque. Carter Center observers who were in these areas during or after the incidents, however, found no credible evidence to support these accusations. At the Region 2/3, however, Carter Center observers saw about 150 Falintil members armed with modern rifles and others using two-way radios (both are illegal in Indonesia).

**Post-Ballot Period:**

Post-ballot arrangements as provided by the May 5 Agreements are assuming more importance. A political leader reported that a meeting was planned in Jakarta among Timorese political leaders, GOI officials, and UNAMET on August 22 that is expected to lead toward establishment of an advisory commission. The Agreements call for an advisory council to be named after the ballot and before the result is announced. Political leaders report also their increased communications with members of opposing parties, militias, and Falintil.

This report is based on field visits to Covalima, Ainaro, Bobonaro, Ermera, Liquica, Manatuto, Baucau, Viqueque, and Dili districts, and on meetings with Indonesian civil, military and police officials, East Timorese pro-integration (favoring continued links with Indonesia) and pro-independence political leaders and supporters, militia members, Falintil representatives, UNAMET officials, representatives of Timorese and international non-governmental organizations, diplomats and journalists.
Carter Center Report on East Timor, No. 7

Preliminary Statement
Assessment of the East Timor Public Consultation Process
September 1, 1999

The popular consultation on the future of East Timor, held Aug. 30, 1999, was marred by numerous instances of intimidation and violence prior to the vote. Nevertheless, on balloting day eligible voters turned out in impressively large numbers - more than 95 percent according to preliminary reports - to express their opinion in a well-administered and largely peaceful exercise. At the same time, however, violence or the threat of violence overhangs a process of which the consultation was only an early part.

Consistent with its mandate, the Center has taken a strictly neutral and non-partisan approach toward the substantive questions involved in the act of popular consultation organized by UNAMET and held on August 30. The Center's long-term observers produced six weekly reports documenting their findings during the registration and campaign phases. Nine short-term observers joined them after August 24 to monitor even more closely the final campaign period leading up to the popular consultation.*

SPECIFIC FINDINGS

Peaceful Conduct on Ballot Day
The Carter Center's observers were impressed by peaceful conditions and the lack of violence either witnessed directly or reliably reported to them at the majority of polling stations visited on the day of the popular consultation in East Timor.

This finding has specific significance for the sub-districts of Dili, Los Palos, and Maliana, where security conditions in recent days had deteriorated and violent acts had been widely anticipated by UNAMET.

In Suai, reconciliation organized by local priests and presided over by Bishop Belo diffused hostilities between opposing factions in the district of Covalima. This could provide a model for other areas of East Timor.

High Voter Turnout
Preliminary reports state that voter turnout across East Timor was more than 95 percent of nearly 450,000 registered voters. This extremely high level of participation occurred even in the context of serious pre-electoral intimidation, harassment, and violence (including murders) reported by The Carter Center in earlier public statements and attributable primarily, but not exclusively, to pro-integration militia.

In many places, voters lined up hours before the 6:30 a.m. opening of the polls. In other locations, many voters arrived the previous night and waited for the polling stations to open the next day. Thousands of voters, including many elderly people, walked great distances to cast their vote.

UNAMET Administration of the Ballot
In general, Carter Center observers reported that UNAMET staff did an excellent job in administering the ballot. With a few exceptions, polling stations opened on time, with all electoral materials present in sufficient
quantity. UNAMET staff, with very few exceptions, ensured the secrecy of the vote, with voters being processed in an orderly, efficient, and timely manner.

Of particular note, the Indonesian police cooperated with UNAMET civilian police at nearly all the observed polling stations to ensure a peaceful and orderly balloting process.

UNAMET’s East Timor local staff appeared well-organized and dedicated. Their conduct in circumstances of considerable risk and tension remained highly professional.

**Incidents of Violence**

Even before the registration period, and through campaigning, the popular consultation process was marred by unacceptable levels of violence and threats of violence, which included killings, injuries, house burnings, and intimidation.

While the reality of balloting day fortunately did not match earlier fears, serious acts of violence did take place. The Center’s observers found that armed militias favoring the pro-integration position were more responsible for these abuses than supporters of independence. Nonetheless, abuses unquestionably occurred on both sides.

Of great concern was the murder of a local UNAMET staff member in the Ermera region, immediately after the closing of the ballot. In several instances, The Carter Center’s observers witnessed UNAMET local staff banding together to travel out of the polling area after receiving threats to their safety.

Apart from tension and violence on polling day itself, casualties and violence occurred during the four days leading up to the ballot, including the following:

- **In Dili on August 26**, fighting erupted between pro-integration and pro-independence supporters. At least five people from both sides died as a result, some of whom were killed by pro-independence elements.

- **In Los Palos on August 27**, a prominent supporter of the National Timorese Resistance Council (CNRT) was murdered. The Center’s observers received credible reports that the killing was the work of pro-autonomy elements: possibly even including the government district chief. Local CNRT leaders fled the town, and by midday on the 30th they had not returned to vote.

- **In Memo, just outside the town of Maliana**, pro-integration militia killed two men and burned down at least 22 houses on August 27. Arsonists also burned down houses in Ailco, Dili, and Liquica during the week leading up to the ballot.

**Intimidation and Harassment**

On polling day itself, UNAMET staff felt obliged to close seven polling centers as a result of well-founded fear of intimidation. In none of these cases, however, did the affected polling stations remain closed for more than two-and-a-half hours.

In some areas Carter Center observers directly witnessed instances of pro-integration militia intimidating voters. In others, they saw individuals instruct people how to cast their vote. In most of these cases, UNAMET civilian police (and on occasion, the Indonesian police as well) successfully intervened to persuade
these people to desist from this type of disruption.

Several occasions amounted to improper influence. In Liquica, for example, the start of a funeral procession organized to mourn a pro-autonomy supporter killed during the previous day coincided with balloting underway in an adjacent building. The presence in the procession of at least 40-50 militia members was intimidating to voters waiting nearby.

In another example, a villager in the Tapo area rang a village alarm bell after being threatened by pro-integration militia members. As a result, at least 300 voters fled the area. The polling station closed for nearly half an hour. UNAMET officials later reported that most of those who fled later returned to the polling station.

Technical Irregularities

In some polling stations throughout East Timor, Carter Center observers witnessed various problems involving the control of enthusiastic crowds waiting to vote, especially during the early morning hours. UNAMET officials generally requested help from the Indonesian police to control the crowds - a step that appeared to violate UNAMET rules requiring police and others to remain at least 100 meters from polling station perimeters at all times. (In The Carter Center's view, however, the beneficial cooperation between UNAMET and local police outweighed any negative impact of the police intrusion.)

In a few areas, UNAMET did not have equipment necessary to check voters for indelible ink. In one station, UNAMET officials told Carter Center observers that nine duplicate ballots had been cast - a result of clerical errors by local staff.

In the village of Maliubu, Carter Center observers on two occasions witnessed UNAMET local staff guiding elderly voters into the polling booth and doing the voting for them. When made aware of this serious violation, UNAMET election officials repeatedly instructed local staff to cease such activity.

POST-BALLOT RECONCILIATION EFFORTS

While gratified by the absence of major disruption to the August 30 vote, The Carter Center takes the view that the just-concluded act of popular consultation must be seen within a larger context of political transition in East Timor. Democracy, let alone reconciliation, does not arise from one credible act of electoral participation. The basic task is reconciliation: contending groups, long at loggerheads, must seek new and peaceful ways to achieve democratic governance.

Despite underlying tension and a climate of fear, UNAMET and the Indonesian police achieved a considerable degree of security for the electoral exercise conducted August 30. The next steps, however, and whatever the result of the voting may be, point toward a more demanding period - one in which old adversaries must begin to accommodate themselves to a new and hitherto untried environment - one in which the Indonesian government, the international community, and local political forces must construct an orderly transition process.

Up to now, the performance of the various consultative mechanisms has been mixed. In some areas, district-level Commissions for Peace and Stability (known as Sub-KPS) created to reach accord on local codes of conduct and other confidence-building measures have exceeded expectations. In Baucau, for example, the Sub-KPS achieved a distinct improvement in relations between contending forces. In other districts, however, the KPS has been almost entirely absent.
What is clear is that future reconciliation remains a matter that the East Timorese must achieve among themselves. Outsiders cannot dictate the result. In particular, the encouraging degree of cooperation achieved with the Indonesian police force in many localities on polling day points to new opportunities to try to consolidate on-the-ground security in East Timor.

CONCLUSION

As we reflect on the importance and largely peaceful conduct of the August 30 ballot, we cannot ignore the violence and intimidation that permeated the pre-ballot period and then resumed in some areas immediately after the polls closed. Such acts are unacceptable and must cease. Not to do so amounts to a betrayal of the courage displayed by the East Timorese people on August 30th and fails to fulfill the obligations agreed to by all parties.

* End Note: Carter Center personnel visited all but one of East Timor’s 13 districts during the pre-ballot period. On polling day, the 15 Carter Center election observers, comprising seven teams, visited seven of East Timor’s 13 districts, 27 sub-districts, 43 polling stations of the 700 stations located within those centers. The districts visited by Carter Center observers included Baucau, Bobonaro, Covalima, Dili, Lautem, Liquica, and Viqueque. While the delegation believes that the cross-section of polling centers visited was indicative of the territory as a whole, it is important to acknowledge that the sites visited are only a sample of centers in the territory.

In both Dili and the regions, observers met with representatives of Indonesian civilian, military, and police officials; East Timorese pro-integration and pro-independence political leaders and supporters; militia members; Falintil representatives; UNAMET officials; representatives of Timorese and international non-governmental organizations; diplomats; and journalists.
The Carter Center has been forced by militia attacks in East Timor to evacuate its remaining three international staff members from the territory. Their reports from Jakarta of the events they witnessed just prior to leaving the East Timor capital of Dili conclusively show complicity of Indonesian forces, both police and military, with the armed gangs terrorizing and displacing the local East Timorese populace. This includes militias’ efforts to drive international observers, journalists, and U.N. staff out of East Timor.

This violent situation is not chaotic, but rather appears to follow a plan, since Indonesian forces openly tolerate or even support assaults and killing of unarmed civilians by the militias. The Indonesian government has repeatedly pledged to take steps to stop the violence and has sufficient forces in East Timor to do so, but no action to stop the rampaging militias is evident in Dili or elsewhere in East Timor. At the very least, insubordination of military forces in the territory to higher command officials is occurring. Immediate changes in command and public issuance of orders to the military to use force to stop the militias are required.

If the U.N. ambassadorial delegation determines that the Indonesian government is not prepared to reverse this situation immediately, every step should be taken to get President B.J. Habibie to agree to the introduction of armed international peacekeeping forces.

Carter Center observers, now stationed in Jakarta, have confirmed the following incidents through direct observation or reliable reports from eyewitnesses in East Timor:

- Since the vote results were announced on Saturday, armed pro-integration militia members have erected roadblocks throughout Dili and control the streets of the capital at all hours of the day. Militia members are: terrorizing and murdering unarmed civilians; intimidating, threatening, and attacking international personnel; burning houses; and displacing large numbers of people. Carter Center observers have on numerous occasions witnessed militia members perpetrating acts of violence in full view of heavily-armed police and military personnel who either stand by and watch or actively assist the militias.

- On Monday afternoon, Sept. 6, in Dili, reports were received that thousands of internally displaced persons were being taken from their places of refuge in Dili by police and loaded on trucks headed for West Timor.

- Over the weekend, militia members attacked and burned the offices of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the residence of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Bishop Carlos Belo, and other places of refuge, forcing thousands of internally displaced people sheltered in those places to flee.

- Carter Center observers contacted officials at one Catholic mission in Dili that was sheltering several thousand internally displaced persons. They said armed militia had removed all young men from the compound on Monday evening. Their current whereabouts and condition is unknown.
Carter Center observers were attacked by militia at the port of Dili as they attempted to evacuate the Carter Center's local East Timorese staff on Sunday. After being pursued through the city by armed militia and by Indonesian police, the Center's international observers were evacuated to Jakarta with the help of the Australian consulate and the U.S. Embassy. Carter Center local staff are still scattered in Dili and unaccounted for.

International press and observers were forced at gunpoint by Indonesian police to evacuate their hotels and residences on Sunday and Monday and driven to the airport. A small number of international journalists refused to leave and some are now taking refuge at UNAMET headquarters.

There has been almost constant automatic weapon fire around and over UNAMET headquarters since Saturday evening. On Sunday night several thousand internally displaced persons sheltered in a school adjacent to UNAMET headquarters were forced to flee into the U.N. compound after automatic weapons with tracer bullets were fired over their heads. An estimated 2,000 people have now taken refuge in the U.N. compound.

UNAMET has been forced to evacuate all of their regional offices and on Monday evacuated a large number of international staff from UNAMET headquarters in Dili. U.N. vehicles carrying evacuees to the airport on Monday were fired upon.
Carter Center Report on East Timor, No. 9

September 13, 1999

Indonesian Armed Forces Continue Campaign of Murder, Violence, and Massive Forced Deportation in East Timor as Militias Terrorize Refugees in West Timor

The Carter Center is encouraged by the decision of the Indonesian government to allow the deployment of an international peacekeeping force in East Timor. However, the Indonesian military and police, with the assistance of their militia surrogates, continue to murder and terrorize the people of East Timor, destroying buildings and infrastructure and forcibly expelling tens of thousands of unarmed civilians from the territory. The city of Dili, the capital of East Timor, has been almost completely destroyed over the past week, and reports from other parts of the territory indicate widespread destruction, looting, and murder. It is clear that the Indonesian armed forces are executing a deliberate, planned campaign under the direction of senior military commanders to destroy and forcibly depopulate East Timor.

In West Timor armed pro-integration militias are now operating with official support, openly terrorizing the more than 100,000 East Timorese refugees who have been forced over the border. Those displaced by the violence, both in East Timor and West Timor, now face the threat of malnutrition and disease as domestic and international humanitarian efforts are hampered by militia and military activity and Indonesian government efforts to block access to refugee camps.

Carter Center staff and observers, forced at gunpoint to evacuate Dili Sept. 5 and now reporting from several locations throughout Indonesia, have confirmed the following through eyewitness accounts from reliable sources:

- Refugees fleeing East Timor have been subject to extreme intimidation and acts of violence. The Carter Center has confirmed that pro-integration militia members murdered approximately 35 young men traveling on the Dobon Solo ferry from Dili to Kupang on Tuesday, Sept. 7, and dumped their bodies overboard.

- In the attack at Bishop Belo’s compound last week, militiamen hacked to death with machetes some 40 refugees in the courtyard while TNI soldiers fired into the bishop’s residence from the street. A military ambulance later came and removed all but two of the bodies.

- In an Indonesian television interview, Rui Lopez, a militia leader, admitted that Indonesian civilian police and military officials in Suai, East Timor, held a meeting before announcement of balloting results and were given instructions to attack UNAMET offices, burn the town of Suai, and drive the population into West Timor.

- There are now more than 100,000 refugees from East Timor in West Timor and on the islands of Flores and Alor, and estimates of the total number of people displaced from the territory range from 120,000 to 200,000 (nearly one-fourth of the entire population). Refugees have been transported by Indonesian military ships and aircraft to a number of locations within Indonesia, including Irian Jaya, Ambon, Sulawesi, Surabaya, and Bali, some of which are thousands of kilometers from East Timor.
Pro-integration militias are now active throughout West Timor, particularly in the towns of Atambua and Kupang. Eyewitnesses report that militia members have entered refugee camps with lists of names of supporters of independence, and that a number of individuals have been removed from camps or executed in the camps by militiamen. Militia members armed with automatic weapons also have been seen stopping and searching vehicles in central Kupang and driving looted UNAMET vehicles in and out of the provincial police headquarters.

The Indonesian military and police have prevented international aid workers, journalists, and observers from visiting refugee camps in West Timor and from interviewing Timorese refugees.

Eyewitnesses report that the Indonesian military and police have joined in the looting and destruction of Dili. Indonesian soldiers and police officers have frequently sold looted food and other basic necessities to refugees under their control at exorbitant prices.

It is now apparent that militia violence has been targeted at political, social, and religious leaders, and a number of priests and nuns have been murdered during militia and military attacks on churches sheltering those seeking refuge from the violence.
Indonesian Security Forces Persecute East Timorese Refugees in Java and Bali.

The carefully planned campaign of violence and terror carried out by the Indonesian security forces and their militia surrogates in East Timor and in West Timor over the past several weeks has spread throughout Indonesia. Carter Center observers have gathered first-hand evidence of systematic efforts by the Indonesian military, police, local government officials, members of Timorese pro-autonomy groups, and armed militias to harass and terrorize refugees from East Timor who have taken refuge in Bali and several cities on the island of Java, including the Indonesian capital of Jakarta.

Reports from East Timor indicate that the Indonesian security forces and paramilitary militias continue to loot, burn, and destroy houses and infrastructure throughout the territory, including areas outside Dili. The capital city of Dili was already laid waste by these activities. A steady stream of refugees continued to cross the border into West Timor over the past week, and armed militias control refugee camps in Atambua, Kupang, and on the island of Alor, frustrating the efforts of both domestic and international relief agencies.

Carter Center staff and observers, forced at gunpoint by militia and Indonesian police to evacuate Dili on Sept. 5 and now reporting from various locations in Indonesia and Darwin, Australia, have confirmed the following through eyewitness accounts from reliable sources:

- Indonesian police officers and militiamen murdered at least one refugee from East Timor who was travelling Sept. 13 by sea from Kupang to Bali. A group of armed police officers wearing the t-shirts of Kontingen Lorosai (the special police contingent sent to East Timor to oversee security for the consultation) dragged two Timorese refugees from their room on the passenger ferry “Anu” and beat them severely before taking one of the refugees away. A self-proclaimed member of the Aitarak militia entered the room a short time later and boasted to the wife of the missing man, “I wouldn’t bother looking for your husband because I killed him myself.”

- Refugees from East Timor continue to be harassed, intimidated, and forced to flee from places in which they have sought refuge in the cities of Denpasar, Surabaya, Malang, Solo, Yogyakarta, and Jakarta. Indonesian military and police, with the assistance of local government officials, members of the FPDK (a pro-autonomy umbrella organization), and suspected militia members, have ordered churches, hotels, boarding houses, and neighborhood residents to report the presence of Timorese refugees and have threatened those people who shelter refugees.

- Prominent Indonesian officials have made public statements designed to arouse public sentiments against East Timorese refugees and residents in Java. Several hundred Timorese refugees and students have been driven out of Yogyakarta and other Javanese cities over the past several days, and many have sought shelter in Jakarta.
In Bali, Indonesian police and military officials have visited places where refugees are sheltering and threatened that a “sweeping operation” is underway to arrest and drive refugees out of their places of refuge. Indonesian soldiers and FPDK members also have approached and threatened Timorese residents in neighborhoods with a high concentration of refugees, barring access to banks, shops, and telephone bureaus. Soldiers, FPDK members, and militiamen have even carried out open acts of intimidation in popular tourist areas such as Kuta and central Denspar.
Refugees from East Timor Face Continuing Campaign of Terror and Intimidation Throughout Indonesia

The Indonesian security forces and their pro-integration militia surrogates are continuing their relentless campaign of intimidation, terror, and forced relocation of East Timorese refugees, more than three weeks after the announcement of the results of the popular consultation. Timorese refugees face ongoing intimidation and violence in East and west Timor, Java, Bali, Irian Jaya, Flores, and Alor, and are now being driven from their places of refuge or held in militia-controlled camps in Sumatra and Sulawesi. Refugees continue to flee or be forced out of East Timor, despite the presence of the multinational force in Dili. A large number of refugees from Liquica District arrived in Atambua, west Timor several days ago.

Reports of atrocities continue to emerge from East Timor as security in the territory slowly improves. The Carter Center has received a growing number of credible accounts of killings, abductions and disappearances committed by the Indonesian military, police and pro-Indonesian militias throughout East Timor, as well as descriptions of refugees being singled out and killed in west Timor.

Carter Center staff and observers, reporting from various locations in Indonesia and Darwin, Australia, have confirmed the following through eyewitness accounts from reliable sources:

- The condition of many East Timorese refugees in camps in west Timor is deteriorating as continued militia and military activity prevents international aid organizations from providing adequate assistance. Eyewitnesses report that refugee camps near Atambua and Kupang remain under the effective control of the militias, with a heavy military and police presence. Pro-independence refugees are being held in camps with virtually no sanitation, fresh water or access to the food that the Indonesian government is providing to pro-autonomy refugees. International staff members of aid organizations continue to be virtually barred from the entire Atambua area, where more than 100,000 refugees are thought to be sheltering, despite public assurances from President Habibie that groups such as the UNHCR and UNICEF would be given full access to all refugee camps in west Timor.

- The Indonesian military and members of pro-integration militias are reported to be forcing East Timorese refugees and local residents to join militia groups in the Atambua area of west Timor. This forced recruitment is occurring in an environment in which armed militias continue to operate with impunity in the refugee camps, interrogating, beating and abducting refugees and searching out pro-independence activists whose names appear on militia blacklists.

- Armed members of the Aitarak militia are now in control of three camps housing more than 3,600 East Timorese refugees in Ujung Pandang on the island of Sulawesi. Refugees arriving in Sulawesi have been met at the dock by officials of the Indonesian Transmigration Department and some have been immediately moved to transmigration schemes where the Indonesian government says they are now permanently resettled. The local government and militias have barred both domestic and international organizations from interviewing or assisting refugees in Sulawesi, and it is unclear if those sent to transmigration sites are willing participants in the resettlement scheme.
Timorese refugees, students and local residents in Bali, Java, and Sumatra face continued harassment and intimidation by Indonesian security forces, local government officials, and suspected militia members. A large number of Timorese residents in Sumatra have been forced to flee to Jakarta to escape ongoing intimidation, and many refugees in Jakarta, Denpasar, and other Indonesian cities are forced to move frequently from house to house to avoid repeated visits and threats from soldiers and police.

The Carter Center has received a number of credible reports of killings and other atrocities committed by the Indonesian security forces and pro-integration militias over the past few days. These reports describe the abduction, disappearance or murder of suspected supporters of independence, priests, nuns and unarmed civilians in both East and west Timor.
Members of a Carter Center assessment team recently completed a mission to East Timor to prepare a democratic governance needs assessment study in support of the transition to a democratic and independent East Timor. The seven person team included human rights and democratic development experts, academics, Carter Center staff members and members for the Center’s observation mission to East Timor that monitored and reported on the popular consultation process from July to October this year. The team met with representatives of Timorese non-governmental organizations, women’s groups, students, media workers, church representatives, members of the National Council for Timorese Resistance (CNRT) and members of the UNTAET, as well as CNRT President Xanana Gusmao CNRT vice-president and Nobel Laureate Jose Ramos Horta and UNTAET Special Representative of the Secretary General, Sergio Vieira de Mella.

Preliminary observations of the mission indicate that:

The security situation throughout East Timor has improved greatly and INTERFET peacekeepers have firm control of all parts of the territory. The threat of militia violence within East Timor has virtually disappeared.

In addition to the need to rebuild from scratch all governance structures, East Timor faces a looming health crisis and humanitarian concerns remain very high. The large majority of the Timorese population does not have adequate shelter, and diarrheal diseases have increased with the arrival of the rainy season and a continuing shortage of medical supplies. A serious outbreak of tuberculosis threatens the lives of thousands of people as poor road conditions and a lack of adequate transportation hinder the work of international and local aid agencies that are struggling to reach remote areas with food and medical assistance.

Though the team did not visit Indonesian Western Timor, all credible reports indicate that more than 150,000 East Timorese refugees remain in Indonesia, with many living under extremely poor conditions in militia and military-controlled camps. UN and international aid agencies feel the need to employ armed military guards to visit many camps due to constant harassment, threats and intimidation by armed militia. The flow of returning refugees has slowed to almost nothing in recent weeks, despite assurances from the Indonesian government and military that militias would be disarmed and refugees would allow to return home unhindered.

Relations between UNTAET and CNRT have improved markedly in recent weeks, with effective cooperation and coordination at the national level. UNTAET has made progress in bringing personnel and resources to Dili, but the creation of a transitional administrative structure outside the capital has only just begun.

The leadership of the CNRT and UNTAET have stated their commitment to a participatory and reconciliatory transition process, and CNRT in particular has expressed its support for the creation of a democratic, pluralist, state in East Timor.
Timorese non-government organizations are eager to play a prominent role in the transition process and to reactivate their networks of activists that existed before the destruction and depopulation experienced in September. Many NGO leaders feel marginalized by the overwhelming presence of international organizations and NGOs, but coordination of between national and international groups has improved in recent weeks. While the NGO presence is heavy in Dili, many rural areas have yet to receive outside humanitarian assistance or support for their reconstruction efforts.

International assistance in the area of democratic governance has to date been directed at activities with political and intellectual elites in Dili and Darwin, Australia. This is understandable, given the great disruption experienced over the last three months and the lack of adequate transportation and communication infrastructure in the territory: but many Timorese NGOs fear that fundamentally important decisions might be made in the near future without the effective participation of the Timorese people.

The Carter Center opened an office in Dili in early July after being invited by then President of Indonesia, B.J. Habibie, to observe the popular consultation of the future status of East Timor. Carter Center staff and observers were forced to evacuate the territory September 5 by armed militia and Indonesian police but continued to report on the situation in the territory and the plight of the Timorese refugees from several locations in Indonesia and Darwin, Australia. The Center reopened an office with field staff in Dili in November.

The Carter Center released a series of weekly reports on the consultation process from early July until the end of September. A comprehensive final report on the Center's monitoring program for the popular consultation process will be released in the near future. All Carter Center reports and statements on East Timor are available on its home page on the World Wide Web at www.cartercenter.org under “On-Line Reports.”
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The Center is located in a 35-acre park, two miles east of downtown Atlanta. Four circular pavilions house offices for the former president and first lady and most of the Center’s program staff. The complex includes the Ivan Allen III Pavilion and the nondenominational Cecil B. Day Chapel, other conference facilities, and administrative offices. Adjoining the Center is The Jimmy Carter Library and Museum, a repository for the records of the Carter administration. It is operated by the National Archives and Records Administration of the federal government and open to the public. The Center and the Library and Museum are known collectively as The Carter Presidential Center.

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