The Observation of the 1997 Jamaican Elections


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ELECTION OBSERVATION DELEGATION
Dec. 15-19, 1997

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Foreword
by Jimmy Carter

When Rowlynn, Robert Pastor, and I visited Kingston on our way back from South America in January 1997, we were surprised to hear such strong, eloquent requests from opposition leaders for The Carter Center to observe Jamaica’s national elections. The Carter Center has always respected Jamaica’s long democratic tradition and has maintained very good relations with its leaders, three of whom have been members of the Center’s Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government—the late Michael Manley, Prime Minister P.J. Patterson, and Edward Seaga.

In response to an invitation by the Jamaican group Citizens Action for Free and Fair Elections in August, staff from the Center’s Latin American and Caribbean Program visited Jamaica for extensive discussions. They found that, although the Electoral Advisory Committee (EAC) was held in high regard, concerns were increasing about the effect of “gayton communities,” escalating violence, and intimidation on the electoral process.

Despite numerous requests to observe the elections, we decided to do so only after Jamaica’s Parliament amended the law to allow observers complete access to the electoral process and all the political parties assured us they would welcome our presence. When our 58-person delegation arrived, following three assessment missions, we were impressed and appreciative of Jamaicans’ warm welcome. We hope we reciprocated by showing our respect for their country and by contributing to its most peaceful elections in 30 years. We also hope the combined efforts of Jamaica’s civil society and the international community will serve as a model for addressing its “second-generation” problem of democratic consolidation. If democracies have problems that are difficult to untangle, the international community should be ready to help preserve and deepen those democracies in appropriate ways.

I would like to thank Gen. Colin Powell, who served as delegation co-leader, together with members of the Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government—former Costa Rican President Rodrigo Carazo, former Belizean Prime Minister George Price, and former Bolivian President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada. In addition, three Council members—former Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, former Costa Rican President Oscar Arias, and former Argentine President Raúl Alfonsín—served as representatives. Our delegation’s presence and prestige was enhanced by the participation of Evander Holyfield, world heavyweight boxing champion, and the Rev. Joseph Lowery, president of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and one of the world’s greatest human rights champions. I thank all delegates for their participation and dedication, particularly since we invited most with only a few weeks notice.

As always, I would like to recognize Robert Pastor, whose efforts and many trips to Jamaica contributed greatly to our missions’ success.
Preface and Acknowledgments

In the last decade, The Carter Center's Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government has observed 17 elections in 11 countries of the Americas. Our delegations generally have worked in countries with little or no experience in free and fair elections. Our observation of the Jamaican elections was decidedly different. Aside from the Council's 1992 U.S. election observation, Jamaica's were the first elections we observed in a country with an established democracy. However, during trips to Jamaica in January and September 1997, we were told that this democratic tradition was in danger due to increased electoral malpractice, violence, and the influence of undemocratic enclaves called "garrison communities."

Only after Jamaica's Electoral Advisory Committee (EAC) invited us to observe the electoral process on Nov. 12, 1997, did we decide to undertake the mission. Because of the support and dedication of our donors, delegates, staff, and volunteers, we mobilized a successful observation of Jamaica's national elections in less than 30 days.

The U.S. Agency for International Development generously supported our mission. Carole Tyson and Hugh Smith were very helpful in approving the grant expeditiously. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) also provided generous financial support for our delegation. CIDA also assigned nine very able Canadians to serve on the team.

On Nov. 26, Jamaican Prime Minister P.J. Patterson announced that the election would be held on Dec. 18. We could not have welcomed such an effective delegation in this short amount of time without the help of volunteers Lamont Dallas, Amy Jo Coffey, Emily Brenner, Alaina Browne, and Victor Alonso. Carter Center staff and interns who participated in and helped organize the delegation also played a crucial role.

After the election, I received numerous compliments from donors and delegates that our mission was one of the best in which they had participated. Ronald Gould, assistant chief electoral officer of Elections Canada and one of our delegates with the most extensive international election-monitoring experience wrote, "Most of all, I was impressed by the professional way in which The Carter Center team organized and managed the observer operations."

This superb organization was due in large part to the Center's Latin American and Caribbean Program (LACP) staff—Shelley McConnell, Becky

USAID Director Carole Tyson talks with Monsignor Richard Albert, founder of the nonprofit St. Patrick's Foundation. Dan Bellegarde of the U.S. Embassy sits to the right.
Castle, and Shannon Collinson. We owe thanks to all LACP interns, particularly John Lawley for his work on the briefing book and Lindsay Hodgson for her semester-long research on Jamaica and participation in the mission. Former intern Mickey Upadhyay returned briefly to write a superb draft of our Terms of Reference, and interns Chris Nee, Matt Lovell, and Kara Van Kirk were instrumental in helping compile this report. Other Carter Center staff, including Tom Crick, Matt Cirillo, Deanna Congleton, Rachel Fowler, and Kent Spicer brought diverse skills to our enterprise. Jason Carter and Curtis Kohlhaas arrived in Jamaica a week before the delegation, and their political and logistical expertise ensured our preparedness to deal with all contingencies. Laina Wilk of the Center’s Public Information Office handled editing and layout for this report.

I would like to recognize the outstanding work of Andrew Lfenthall and Gregory Martinez, office director and logistics coordinator respectively. They landed in Jamaica on Nov. 19, quickly set up an office, and became familiar with the rapidly changing landscape in short order. Mr. Lfenthall kept our Atlanta office abreast of political developments and wrote a draft of this report. Mr. Martinez coordinated the delegation’s logistics in just three weeks. Our mission would not have been possible without their diligence, intelligence, and diplomacy.

Our field office was supported by Office Coordinator Karin Laniaj. Lead drivers Arnold Harvey and William Harris and driver and office assistant Richard Thompson dedicated considerable time and effort to the mission.

Finally, I would like to express gratitude for the generous welcome we received from the Jamaican people. I want to thank those who were so cooperative and helpful to our effort, including EAC Chair William Chin See and other EAC members; Director of Elections Danville Walker and workers at the Electoral Office of Jamaica; the three candidates and their respective parties; Alfred Sangster and board members of Citizens Action for Free and Fair Elections; and Ombudsman for Political Matters Justice James Kerr. We benefited from their experience and hope that we contributed to a peaceful and fair election.
Key Terms and Abbreviations

**CAFÉ**

**Constituency**
Electoral districts. There are 60 constituencies in Jamaica. Each elects a representative to the House of Representatives, the elected body of Jamaica’s bicameral legislature. (The Senate is filled by appointment.)

**Constituted Authority**
A body created by Parliament to provide additional electoral oversight. The Constituted Authority may halt an election in a specific constituency on election day. In the post-election period, it may petition a special elections court to nullify results in a constituency under a prescribed set of guidelines.

**Corporate area**
Collectively, the 17 constituencies that make up the predominately urban areas within Kingston and surrounding areas.

**CURA**
Churches United for Redemptive Action. An ecumenical group of Christian churches that encourages community cooperation.

**EAC**
Electoral Advisory Committee. An advisory council to the EOJ. The EAC has seven voting members—two PNP representatives, two from the JLP, and three independent members, including the chair. The EOJ director serves on the EAC as a nonvoting member.

**EOJ**
Electoral Office of Jamaica. The administrative agency in charge of organizing elections. It is headed by the Director of Elections, Danville Walker, who also is chief electoral officer.

**The Gleaner**
A daily Jamaican newspaper.

**IMPACT**
A loosely organized Jamaican domestic observer group composed of business people.

**JCF**

**JDF**
Jamaican Defense Force.

**JLP**
Jamaica Labour Party.

**Indoor agent**
Party poll watcher. Each party is permitted one indoor agent per polling station.
NDM  National Democratic Movement.

The Observer  A daily Jamaican newspaper.

Outsider agent  Party poll watcher who is permitted outside of the polling station.

Parish  Non-electoral administrative unit. Jamaica has 14 parishes.

PNP  People's National Party.

Poll clerk  Electoral official who assists the PO with administering the election in a polling station.

Polling center  A place to vote. Voters from several polling divisions may vote at the same polling center.

Polling division  An administrative division of voters within a constituency.

Polling station  Location of a ballot box corresponding to as many as 250 electors within a polling division. Usually, a polling station is located in the polling division to which it belongs. Occasionally, a polling station will be moved to a nearby polling division in an effort to cluster polling stations to provide better security and simplify the task of distributing election materials.

PO  Presiding officer. Lead electoral officer who, with a poll clerk's assistance, administers elections within a polling station.

Private Sector of Jamaica  An association of Jamaican business leaders.

Region  Electoral administrative unit. Jamaica's 14 parishes are grouped into seven regions.

Regional supervisor  Electoral officer who manages a region. A region's ROs report to its regional supervisor.

RO  Returning officer. Electoral officer who manages one of Jamaica's 60 constituencies.

Statement of the Poll  Form used by POs and poll clerks to tally results on election night.
Executive Summary

1. Although Jamaica has had democratic universal suffrage for more than five decades, elections since 1980 have been marred by “political tribalism” and associated fraud and violence, particularly in “garrison communities.” By 1997, polls suggested that Jamaicans feared electoral violence, were uncertain about whether elections would be fair without distribution of new voter ID cards, and were less inclined to vote than in the past.

2. Jamaica’s 1997 elections were the first to be monitored by international observers. At the invitation of Jamaica’s Electoral Advisory Committee and with the welcome of leading members of civil society and all political parties, The Carter Center’s Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government observed Jamaica’s Dec. 18 parliamentary elections. Through three pre-election visits and a 58-person observer delegation on election day, the Center assessed election preparations, security measures, and the voting process. The mission extended to post-election observation of judicial appeals alleging electoral violations.

3. The Center’s delegation joined Jamaica’s ambassador for political matters in encouraging candidates from garrison communities to sign pledges of political tolerance and in hosting a televised affirmation of nonviolence by party leaders on the eve of the election. In many garrisons, only the dominant party fielded poll watchers. Still, far less violence occurred than in previous elections.

4. The Jamaican Constabulary Force (JCF) and Jamaican Defense Force coordinated a security plan and established an election-day command center.

Leaders of The Carter Center’s election observation delegation congregate outside a polling station in St. Andrew East Central. They are (L to R) Shirley McConnell, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, Louise Crosby, Esteraker Holyfield, Rosalyn Carter, Jimmy Carter, Colin Powell, Robert Pastor, Andrew Lilienthal, Jennifer McCoy, and Donna Congleor.
which fielded over 400 calls. The Carter Center posted a security specialist in that command center, who reported that the JCF tracked and responded to problems quickly. In one especially tense situation, security forces coordinated with Carter observers to defuse a confrontation. In the field, each security officer wore a vest displaying a unique number. These vests enabled the public to identify an officer by number in a misconduct report. In the few instances where there was evidence of misconduct, officers were promptly disciplined.

5. Administrative difficulties complicated but did not derail the election. Jamaica reformed its registration procedures but was unable to fully implement technological reforms in time for the December election. Parties identified five problems with the registration list. The Carter Center noted that the number of errors in the final list was small relative to the total number of registered voters, and no party could provide evidence of systematic political bias in the errors.

6. On election day, the Center’s 25 two-person observer teams were deployed to 52 of Jamaica’s 60 constituencies, visiting 1,098 polling stations (17 percent of the total). They conducted a systematic survey of voting procedures and observed vote counts. Despite some procedural shortcomings and transigent acts, the election adequately expressed the collective will of the Jamaican people with respect to selecting their leaders. However, the quality of elections in Garrettman was substantially poorer than in rural, suburban, and nongarrison urban neighborhoods and included serious acts of fraud and violence.

7. In the months following the vote, Carter Center staff observed appeals of two complaints filed to the Constituted Authority and seven petitions to Jamaica’s Supreme Court. Although at the end of March, the appeals had not all been resolved, it was encouraging to see that channels for seeking redress were available and being used to evaluate allegations of fraud or electoral misconduct.

8. Most of the difficulties with electoral administration and the registration list can be remedied, some simply by completing technological reforms already begun. However, ending political tribalism and opening polling stations to political pluralism will be more difficult. This report offers specific recommendations on how to improve Jamaica’s electoral system (see pages 46-50) and strengthens its democracy for the future.
Jamaica's democratic tradition began in 1944 with the granting of universal suffrage. Since then, the island nation, which became independent from the United Kingdom in 1962, has had 11 national elections, the latest on Dec. 18, 1997. These regular exercises in self-determination have resulted in a well-developed parliamentary democracy centered around a 60-member lower house elected in intervals of five years or less. The majority-winning party forms a government led by a prime minister. Also, the governor-general, who represents the British monarch, appoints the 21-seat Senate in which 13 seats normally go to the majority party and eight to the opposition.

One of the two major parties, the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) or the People's National Party (PNP) has won each past election, leading to a stable two-party system. Each party has been directed by seasoned leaders. Edward Seaga has represented the JLP in Parliament since the early 1960s and was elected prime minister in 1980 and again in 1983. The PNP returned to power in 1989 with Michael Manley as prime minister, but he resigned in 1992 for health reasons. P.J. Patterson then assumed power, leading the PNP to victory in 1993. Until 1997, no party had ever governed for more than two consecutive terms. Thus, although the parliamentary system awarded the governing...
party significant advantages, including control of both the legislative and executive branches and the right to call elections whenever the prime minister saw fit, neither party had been consigned to the position of permanent minority.

Because Jamaica’s political system is highly sophisticated and its democratic practices firmly established, political leaders recognized that certain problems threatened to erode the democratic culture and thus searched for remedies.

Because Jamaica’s political system is highly sophisticated and its democratic practices firmly established, political leaders recognized that certain problems threatened to erode the democratic culture and thus searched for remedies. In 1979, in response to numerous complaints about its influence on electoral administration, the government created the autonomous Electoral Office of Jamaica (E0J) to administer elections and the Electoral Advisory Committee (EAC) to advise the E0J. The EAC was composed of two representatives from each party and three independent members named by the governor-general. These two agencies modernized election procedures, mandating secure paper for ballots, ballots marked for each polling division, and “integrity lamps” (ultraviolet lights to detect indelible ink on voters’ fingers).

Though procedures improved, election security remained a seemingly intractable problem. Widespread violence marred the 1980 election, with about 800 people killed. Worse yet, such violence was becoming institutionalized through growth of “garrison communities,” a socio-economic and political phenomenon unique to Jamaica. Originally, government-sponsored housing developments allocated space along partisan lines. This led to the establishment of entire neighborhoods where one party dominated political life to all others’ exclusion. Both the PNP and JLP developed garrison areas, where party supporters sometimes used violence to prohibit rival party activity. Electoral returns overwhelmingly favored the dominant party, sometimes due to fraud and intimidation. Over time, garrison spread, numbering over a dozen in the corporate area by 1997. In some areas, they grew large enough
to provide a "safe seat" in Parliament for the party controlling them.

Although violence never reached the same level as in 1980, intimidation and violence marred subsequent elections. According to the General Elections 1993 Report of the Ombudsman for Political Matters, "Interference with the electoral process reached an unprecedented extent and brutality." At least 121 incidents occurred that aimed to affect the election, from murder to intimidation to ballot-box theft. The JLP charged that some security-force members had been complicit in fraudulent acts by direct action or neglect.

In July 1994, the EAC sent several recommendations to the Joint Select Committee on Constitutional and Electoral Reform, including continuous computerized registration. It also recommended purchasing computer technology that would permit cross-matching fingerprints to prevent individuals from voting more than once. The Committee accepted the recommendation, and in early 1995, the EAC issued a request for proposals. In July, seven companies visited Jamaica to demonstrate their biometric technology. A year later, the EAC selected TRW, a Cleveland-based global manufacturing firm that specializes in high technology and engineered products, to develop and implement a computerized registration system. The Jamaican government signed a contract with TRW on July 9, 1996. TRW's innovative program could digitize fingerprints and cross-match them to prevent multiple registration. For US$17.2 million, TRW promised to establish 67 fixed centers for voter registration and make Jamaica's electoral machinery the most technically advanced in the world. It was expected to be operational in time for the next national election.
Pre-election Period

The prospect of elections, which were constitutionally required by March 1998 but could be called at any time before that, would shape Jamaica's political landscape throughout 1997. As the year opened, Prime Minister P.J. Patterson instructed the director of elections to enumerate the population and draw up a new registration list using TRW's technology.

This anticipatory move came after former President Jimmy Carter's visit to Jamaica in January 1997. President and Mrs. Carter, Robert Pastor, and LACP staff included Jamaica as the last stop on a regional trip to discuss inter-American issues. They met with Council members Prime Minister Patterson and former Prime Minister and opposition leader Edward Seaga, as well as Bruce Golding, founder of the National Democratic Movement (NDM). The opposition leaders voiced strong support for having international observers in the upcoming election, which they felt would help assure a free and fair vote. The Carter Center team responded as it would not consider observing the election unless welcomed by all parties. Mr. Seaga said international observers would not be needed if the computerized system was fully and effectively installed but expressed doubt as to whether this would happen. If the system was flawed, he believed international observers would be essential.

The Carter Center urged party leaders to decide if they wanted an international presence, and it so, to invite the Center early.

The July 6, 1998, contract between Jamaica's government and TRW stipulated that TRW would equip and put on line 67 fixed registration centers with software and hardware capable of reading voters' fingerprints. These centers would complement a house-to-house enumeration drive that would electronically record each citizen's demographic information, ID fingerprints, and photograph. Once these records were entered into the data base, TRW would deliver a complete voters list with all voters' fingerprints cross-matched to expose multiple registrants. TRW then would produce an ID card for each eligible voter. The ID would include the voter's fingerprints and personal information encoded on a strip. By checking the fingerprints on the card against those of the person retrieving the card, election officials at the fixed centers could assure the cards were distributed to their rightful owners. Using data provided by TRW, the FOJ would generate a "black book" containing the photograph and demographic information for each potential voter. Those books would help identify people attempting to vote who had not yet received ID cards or who did not bring cards with them on election day.

The Carter Center team responded it would not consider observing the election unless welcomed by all parties.

TRW ran a pilot project in two constituencies and started equipping the fixed centers that would complement the house-to-house enumeration process scheduled to begin April 30. Aware of public criticism that the 1993 registration list contained numerous errors, the prime minister said he would not call elections until the director of elections assured him a new list was ready.

Meanwhile, concerns about possible electoral fraud and violence deepened. In May, a series of shootings in Tivoli Garden, a JLP garrison, underscored these fears. As the enumeration process took place during spring and summer, technical difficulties caused delays, leading to speculation about whether the list would be ready and whether its quality would be affected by time pressures.

To compound matters, the JLP split in 1995, leading to formation of the NDM, headed by Bruce
Golding. The EAC determined in May 1997 that as an accredited party, the NDP should be allowed to name party agents to observe the enumeration process. This slowed the process and raised uncertainty about the election's outcome. Accustomed to two-party politics, Jamaicans were unsure about the NDP's effects on a close race. An October 1997 poll conducted by the local newspaper The Gleaner showed the public favoring Patterson over Seaga by only 5.1 percent. With 10 percent of voters supporting the NDP, an eleventh-hour reconciliation between opposition leaders could potentially tilt the scales in the opposition's favor.

First Assessment Mission, Sept. 10-12, 1997

Amid growing anxiety, a group of distinguished Jamaican leaders formed Citizens Action for Free and Fair Elections (CAFFE), a civic group that would mount Jamaica's first domestic election-monitoring effort. Jamaicans were not yet certain whether international observation would also be beneficial. Opposition parties favored international observers as credible, nonpartisan, experienced professionals and feared that local observers would be partisan. According to press reports, JLP leader Edward Seaga said his party would not support local observers until a firm decision was made to invite international observers. He noted that in August, 26 separate calls from organizations, columnists, and media houses were made in favor of international observers, while there were only two negative responses and three without definitive positions.

The EAC had sent a recommendation to Parliament for legislation on election observers. Although the EAC unanimously supported domestic observers' access, it was divided on whether to permit access by international observers. Traditionally, the EAC made recommendations by consensus rather than majority rule. Thus, there was no clear indication whether the legislation should encompass international observers.

The governing PNP's support would be required to steer the EAC's proposed legislation through Parliament, but Prime Minister Patterson dismissed the opposition's demand for international observation. Minister of State in the Foreign Affairs Ministry Anthony Hylton distinguished between Jamaica, an established democracy, and other countries classified as "emerging democracies" or where democracy had broken down. He said international observation was appropriate only in the latter: "If foreign observers are required, it should be in the role of training and building the expertise of Jamaicans at home and abroad." He asked that
foreign participation be limited to technical consulting. Therefore, the only international observers this government intends to invite to observe elections in Jamaica are our Jamaican people and organizations overseas. Specifically, he invited the U.S.-based National Association of Jamaican and Supportive Organizations.

This compromise was not satisfactory to opposition parties, who wanted international observation and feared that Jamaicans living abroad might be partisan. However, it did create an opening for consultation between The Carter Center and CAFFE. On Aug. 28, CAFFE invited the Center to send a mission to Jamaica to "discuss ways of ensuring the most effective observation" of the election (see Appendices 3 and 4).

The delegation, led by Robert Pastor, met with the prime minister and government members, the commissioner of the Jamaican Constabulary Force (JCF), and representatives from the three political parties (PNP, JLP, and NIPM), the EQJ, the EAC, the private sector, CAFFE, the media, the U.S. government, and other government missions based in Kingston (see Appendix 7). Leading Jamaicans made a persuasive case that despite the country’s history of democracy, recent electoral problems endangered its democratic future. The growth and spread of garrison communities was of primary concern. Jamaicans also lamented their disillusionment and disaffected electorate, as signaled by increasing public disenchantment with every political party.

Opposition parties reiterated their request that The Carter Center and its Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government monitor Jamaica’s elections. The ruling PNP was more cautious, fearing the international community might misconstrue outside observation as implying that Jamaicans could not adequately administer their own affairs or that the country was politically unstable. These sentiments resonated in Jamaica’s post-colonial society, which relied on its public image as a stable democracy for tourism and investor confidence. In private conversations and a concluding press statement, the Center’s delegation explained the role of international observers, distinguishing election monitoring from election supervision, which could only be done by Jamaican institutions. Based on these clarifications and after lengthy discussions with party leaders and the prime minister, the PNP expressed cautious support for outside observers (see Appendix 8).

By the end of the Center’s first visit, one key prerequisite for observing had been met—all major parties said they would welcome a Carter Center observation. However, the Center still lacked an official invitation. This proved sticky, as Jamaica’s government had already gone on record saying it would not invite international observers. Dr. Pastor proposed resolving that problem by suggesting the
EAC as the appropriate body to issue an invitation. However, for the EAC to issue a satisfactory invitation, Parliament would need to change the electoral law to permit observers to enter polling stations. An amendment to the Representation of the People Act, Jamaica's electoral code, was necessary before the EAC could guarantee observers access to polling sites. Government representatives told Dr. Pastor that they would support the change in the law, and the PNP would welcome international observers.

Second Assessment Mission, Nov. 24-27, 1997

On Nov. 10, Jamaica's Parliament amended existing legislation to allow observers into polling stations. Two days later, in a historic decision marking the first time international observers had been invited to monitor elections in Jamaica, the EAC invited the Council/Carter Center to observe the upcoming vote (see Appendices 5 and 6).

The election date was not yet set, but press reports suggested it might fall before Christmas if the director of elections declared the registration list ready. Thus, the Center faced the daunting task of assembling an observation team in one month. It turned Andrew Lilienthal to set up and direct a field office and dispatched Gregory Martinez to organize logistics.

Government representatives told Dr. Pastor that they would support the change in the law, and the PNP would welcome international observers.

Ten days after accepting the mission, the Center sent to Jamaica a second pre-election delegation from Nov. 24-27. As in September, election security and the registration list topped parties' lists of concerns. It seemed unlikely that the full spectrum of fraud-prevention technology initially envisioned—including electronic ID verification at polling sites and electronic voting via fingerprint
scans—could be tested and installed before March 1998. Opposition parties insisted that without such technology and particularly without voter ID cards, the election remained vulnerable to manipulation. Simply put, it was questionable whether conditions would be sufficiently fair and secure to persuade opposition parties to field their candidates on nomination day or whether they would refuse to contest the election, as the INP had done in 1983.

To address these concerns, the Center included a security specialist and a registration list expert on its November pre-election delegation (see Appendix 7). This team visited several garrison communities and spoke with residents who said they were deeply concerned about violence and would welcome a Carter Center presence on election day. The three party leaders—Prime Minister Patterson, Mr. Seaga, and Mr. Golding—let it be known they saw garrisons as unfortunate, undemocratic enclaves with no place in an open, democratic Jamaica. This suggested acceptance of a norm, but whether political will existed to reduce garrison violence and begin dismantling garrison communities was questionable. Could party leaders condone these communities and effectively convey this condemnation to party cadre? Could each party be persuaded the others were sincere?

Contested constituencies—those in which a shift in a small number of votes could change the outcome—most concerned party leaders. Noting that 16 constituencies were won by 500 votes or less in the 1993 election, party leaders urged The Carter Center to focus on deterring fraud in constituencies where electoral irregularities or intimidation could alter results. The Center agreed to make contested areas the highest priority and asked parties to suggest where to field teams. The Center also felt it important for its election delegation to visit garrison communities to send a clear message that democracy requires openness everywhere.

Central to this conversation was the joint recognition that international observers use a strategy dependent on participation by party agents’ active participation. There would be too few international observers to visit every polling station or remain an entire day at a given site.

Based on experience in a dozen other countries, the Center called for its observers to visit numerous polling sites throughout election day. At each location, delegates would fill out a questionnaire assessing whether polling was proceeding according to the law. Party agents assigned to each polling site would provide key information for the surveys. At the end of the day, by compiling questionnaires from across the country, the Center’s delegation leaders could determine whether there was a systematic pattern of fraudulent incidents reported by election officials, party agents, citizens, or domestic observers. In this manner, a small number of trained observers could effectively detect fraud.

Party leaders ... saw garrisons as unfortunate, undemocratic enclaves with no place in an open, democratic Jamaica. This suggested acceptance of a norm, but whether political will existed to reduce ... violence and begin dismantling [them] was questionable.

Indoor agents from at least two parties would be the first line of defense against fraud. International observers would provide a professional, nonpartisan analysis of incidents the agents witnessed, exposing serious deficiencies and giving credit where due. For this reason, the Center asked all three parties to identify areas where, because of political polarization and violence, they could not field indoor agents. It encouraged parties to fill those vacancies and help plot a deployment plan to intensify Carter Center observation in “at-risk” sites. The Center also asked CAPPE to help.

Jamaica’s police commissioner briefed Center delegates on election security plans. Delegates were pleased to hear of the intent to increase police
forces and enlist JDF support during the campaign period and an election day. Establishment of an emergency hot line, incident command center, and quick-response teams in each parish illustrated the seriousness of security forces' preparations. In addition, the JCE commissioner invited the Center to designate a representative to work in the incident command center on election day. The Center accepted this invitation and asked the commissioner to provide additional protection for any party agents afraid of being hurt. The commissioner promised to do so.

Center. Center delegates spent considerable time at the EOI discussing the voters list and party objections and tried to reconcile differences. For over two weeks prior to the Center's November visit, the returning officers (ROs) and members of their staff had been sorting constituencies' preliminary registration lists, comparing each to daily record sheets filed during the enumeration period. They sought to determine whether any elector had been omitted from the list or displaced to another polling division or constituency. If found, discrepancies were noted on a correction request form. Director of Elections Daniel Walker assured the delegation that corrections were made where warranted.

The Center's team also met with NDM and JLP representatives, who believed the voters list would not be completed in time for a 1997 election. A preliminary list had been delivered to representatives in November, almost two months later than TRW and the EOI had promised. Opposition parties lacked manpower to review it in the two weeks the EOI allowed. As of Nov. 25, they had reviewed only a few constituencies.

By contrast, the EOI reported that the governing PNP had reviewed and submitted requests for corrections from most constituencies, comprising some 20,000 errors.

The list was not posted for citizen review until Dec. 9, meaning that the work of identifying errors could not be done by the entire electorate but instead was left to the understaffed parties and the EOI.

Together, the Center's delegation and opposition parties identified five categories of problems with the registration list:

1) People for whom there was an enumeration record but who did not appear on the list.
2) Misplaced voters who were on the list but in the wrong polling division or in the wrong constituency.
3) Typographical errors in names or demographic information.
4) Names appearing on the list for whom the parties had no record sheet.
5) Duplicate entries.

The parties could not specify the number that fell into each category. Significantly, no party could provide evidence that the errors in the voters list reflected political bias. The director of elections assured the Center's team that 90 percent of party-submitted corrections had been made during the EOI's review of the list. The team encouraged parties to continue working with the EOI to monitor corrections and help develop a process for doing so.

Significantly, no party could provide evidence that the errors in the voters list reflected political bias.

Opposition parties also criticized the EOI's failure to complete the technology promised as part of a revised electoral structure. According to the director of elections, the TRW computer system had computed only 218,000 fingerprint sets out of 1.2 million registered voters. Parties feared the incomplete cross-matching might mean some citizens had registered more than once. An analysis showed this concern was not warranted. Of the 218,000 cross-matches, it appeared that only 19 voters had intentionally tried to falsify information in an attempt to double register. This small number of intentional duplications in a large sample (18 percent of the
registered population) suggested that the new technology, albeit incomplete, may have deterred double-registration fraud.

On Nov. 26, with Kingston abuzz with anticipation, Prime Minister Patterson called a rally at Half Way Tree to announce that the long-awaited national elections would be held on Dec. 18. The director of elections had assured him the registration list was ready. The prime minister called on all parties to register candidates, and the campaign kicked into full gear. Assessing Jamaica’s readiness, the Center’s team felt that all parties were trying their utmost to be prepared for the election. The team identified shortcomings in the process, particularly due to technical delays, but also noted numerous safeguards to prevent electoral fraud (see Appendix 9).

Third Assessment Mission, Dec. 9-10, 1997

Joseph Lowery, president of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, led a third Carter Center delegation on Dec. 9-10. Robert Pastor and Jason Carter, grandson of Jimmy Carter and a Center staff member, accompanied Dr. Lowery. They sought to gain some agreement on nonviolence and to identify remaining concerns about the registration list.

Justice James Kerr, Jamaica’s ombudsman for political matters, invited the Center’s delegation and CAFFE to visit four constituencies and witness the candidates’ signing of a document on political tolerance and nonviolence. These constituencies—St. Catherine Central, Kingston Central, St. Andrew North Eastern, and St. Andrew West Rural—were expected to hold closely contested races and/or have problems with garrison communities. Witnesses to the signing included representatives from CAFFE, Churches United for Redemptive Action (CURA), and The Carter Center as well as party officials and members of the media and security forces (see Appendix 11).

At the signing ceremony in St. Catherine Central and Kingston Central, only three of six candidates were present. JLP candidates did not
participate in either constituency, and NDM candidates did not participate in St. Catherine Central. However, in St. Andrew North Eastern and St. Andrew West Rural, candidates from all three major parties and a candidate from a minor party signed the document. In a rare show of unity, they spoke eloquently of the need for a peaceful, open election. The Center’s delegation and the four candidates toured St. Andrew North Eastern, visiting its garrison areas, inspecting a public health clinic, and previewing several polling stations.

[In St. Andrew North Eastern and St. Andrew West Rural, candidates ... signed [an affirmation of nonviolence]. In a rare show of unity, they spoke eloquently of the need for a peaceful, open election.]

The Center then turned its attention to election procedures. After meeting with CAFFE Chair Alfred Sangster, EJO Director Danville Walker, EAC Chair William Chin See, and representatives of the three major parties, the Center learned that the parties had moved closer to accepting the official voters list. The JLP reported approximately 17,000 errors found in 54 of Jamaica’s 60 constituencies. This included approximately 11,000 voters not listed in the correct polling districts and 569 voters discovered misplaced outside their constituency (a more serious error since parliament members are elected by constituency). Although misplacement of any voter was regrettable, the parties agreed that 12,000 misplaced people constituted a small margin of error (1 percent of the country’s registered electorate). However, the NDM coordinator expressed concern that misplaced voters could be concentrated disproportionately in a few constituencies, which might affect the election.

Parties affirmed that all voters had the right to know if they were on the list and that many citizens harbored doubts about their electoral status. Carter Center delegates visited several post offices, verifying that the EJO had publicly posted the list on Dec. 9. The EJO had set up a hot line for citizens to inquire about any errors to the list they might detect. In its Dec. 9 post-office visits, the delegation saw the final voters list for polling divisions within each neighborhood. This was the first day that these lists were available for public examination.

At the delegation’s press conference, Dr. Pastor publicized the existence of the hot line and posted lists, urging Jamaicans to visit their post offices or call the hot line to determine if they appeared on the list. From Dec. 2-17, 6,114 people called the EJO. Out of those, only 818 were not on the list, and some of these may never have enumerated (see Appendix 10).

It was crucial that parties know where each voter was registered because in Jamaica, political parties, not the electoral administration, have largely been the ones who inform citizens where to vote on election day. Therefore, EJO Director Walker, Carter Center delegates, and opposition leaders agreed the EJO should supply parties with an alphabetized list of voters in high-priority constituencies, a request the EJO did not fulfill before election day.
The Election Campaign

hard on the heels of the prime minister's call for elections, candidates registered on Dec. 2 and hit the campaign trail. In past years, Nomination Day had been marked by violence. However, 1997 was substantially different. The campaign echoed the messages of peace and tolerance issued by the parties, the ombudsman for political matters, CAFFE, and The Carter Center. Center staff attended Nomination Day ceremonies in St. Andrew North Eastern and North Western and reported seeing supporters from all parties ringing bells and dancing together in the streets. Jamaicans commented they had not seen such camaraderie in decades. Only one outbreak of violence blighted the day, when gunmen in St. Andrew Eastern attacked a JLP motorcycle, causing 12 casualties.

Campaign rallies that Center staff attended were lively. Political speeches were peppered with reggae music, dancing, and singing. Both Mr. Seaga and Prime Minister Patterson reminded constituents of their past role in promoting Jamaican music. Candidates promised economic growth and improvements in health, care, housing, and education.

However, a Dec. 5 poll showed nearly one-third of the public believed the election would be violent. Still, it was evident from the campaign's start that no party wanted to be seen as a perpetrator of violent or illegal acts. The Center's pre-election delegations repeatedly raised the issue of retribution with all three party leaders, each of whom assured the Center that he too wanted a peaceful election. In one campaign speech, Prime Minister Patterson set the tone for the campaign by decrying acts of violence and urging his supporters not to be part of any wrongdoing, even when provoked.

Considerable progress had been made on election procedures, but parties remained concerned about how voters could establish their identities without the ID cards TRW had promised. By Dec. 1, only 50,000 of the 1.2 million cards had been processed for distribution. A poll revealed that three-quarters of the electorate thought the election would be fraudulent without these cards. To expedite production, on Dec. 2, the ECJ subcontracted the British firm De La Rue. By Dec. 9, the production total had reached 200,000 cards. By election day, 327,000 cards had been produced, but it was not known how many cards were delivered to voters. TRW and the ECJ tragedged charges as to whom to blame for failing to produce and deliver the cards. However, the cards' absence was not fatal to fair elections. The ECJ planned to distribute black books—compendiums of vital voter information, including photographs—to each polling station to prevent voter
Carter Center delegates Robert Pastor (center) and Shelley McConnell (far right) meet with election officials outside of an enumeration center in Boggs Hill, St. Catherine East Central.

Imposition. It also planned to apply indelible ink to voters' fingers to prevent double voting.

The Carter Center facilitated communication and cooperation between the E0J, the parties, and members of civil society, helping keep the election process on track in the face of fears about garrison violence and doubts about election procedures.

With barely a week left until the election, the parties remained hopeful. Through its three pre-election visits, The Carter Center facilitated communication and cooperation between the E0J, the parties, and members of civil society, helping keep the election process on track in the face of fears about garrison violence and doubts about election procedures. Although planned technical improvements were not finished in time for the December election, the three major parties were sufficiently satisfied with election conditions to register their candidates. Tension persisted, but the parties had found common ground in their message against violence and acceptance of the registration list as imperfect but workable.

This progress became endangered on Dec. 10, when the JLP announced it had discovered 250 ballots inside a box of registration lists that the E0J had delivered to JLP headquarters. Almost simultaneously to this announcement, Mr. Scragg alleged a PNP plot to ship unmarked ballots to no less than eight constituencies as part of a complex ballot-stuffing scheme.

Security officials verified the ballots found at JLP headquarters as genuine. The parties agreed a serious security breach had occurred at E0J headquarters and steps should be taken to recertify the remaining 1.5 million ballots. On Dec. 11, the director of elections asked the international accounting firm Coopers and Lybrand to audit the remaining ballots and advise on how to treat the remaining secured ballots. Originally scheduled for Dec. 12, voting by the military and police was delayed until Dec. 15, pending the audit's outcome.

The director of elections consulted with The Carter Center, CAFFE, and the EAC about further measures to recertify ballots. Parties favored authen-
The registration center of Jamaica’s Electoral Office attempted to implement new computer technology for the 1997 enumeration process.

tiating the remaining ballots. The proposal to stamp each ballot was viewed as time-consuming and easily duplicated. The director of elections decided the audit would be sufficient to determine if a problem existed. Dr. Pastor visited the audit facilities and urged the director of elections to communicate openly with parties about unfolding events and to accelerate the audit to pre-empt press rumors that the election might be postponed. The IEC authorized the ECI to put into service whatever personnel it might need to finish the audit in time to prepare logistics for a Dec. 18 election.

In the end, the audit results were not publicly released, but the director of elections personally assured the parties and the IEC that the 230 ballots already impounded were the only ones to go astray. He also expressed confidence in holding the election as scheduled. Mr. Seaga did not present any further evidence of a plot, and no additional ballots were found outside the ECI.

The military and police historically have voted prior to the general election so they can fulfill election-day duties. The military/police vote took place on Dec. 13. In light of the ballot scandal and other concerns, Jamaicans watched this dress rehearsal with a wary eye.

Some Carter Center staff observed the military vote, though the Center’s delegation had not yet reached its full complement. Voting proceeded without incident at the Up Park Camp Road center and three other locations around Jamaica. Center delegates reported orderly lines with agents from at least two parties at each poll and no significant problems.

This was not the case at many police voting stations, especially in the Kingston area. Some opened hours late. At the Half Way Tree police station, ballots did not arrive until shortly before noon, though polls had opened at 7 a.m. Some police officers complained their names were not on the voters list. According to the director of elections, these omissions occurred because the JCF had not supplied the ECI with an updated roster of officers. In the end, approximately 80 percent of officers voted, and those who did not were permitted to vote with civilians later that week.
The Election and the Council’s Observation

The Carter Center’s Council of Elders, Elected Heads of Government, and other representatives from 11 countries to monitor Jamaica’s national election. The team included election experts, former government officials, Caribbean experts, and business leaders. Council members included former Belizean Prime Minister George Price, former Costa Rican President Rodrigo Carazo, former Argentine President Carlos Menem, and former U.S. President Jimmy Carter.

Jimmy Carter makes opening remarks at a Carter Center press conference on Dec. 16. Some other Center delegations focus on including trained Robertinston, George Price, Rodrigo Carazo, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, Ex-angler Holyfield, and Joseph Lowery.

Challenges facing Jamaica, returned to join them. In pre-election talks, Jamaicans identified six challenges facing the country: the political instability, the lack of economic growth, the high levels of crime and violence, the lack of social services, the corruption in government, and the high levels of unemployment and poverty.

Preparations

Most Council/Carter Center delegates arrived in Kingston on Dec. 15 for two days of training. They received briefings on Jamaica’s political history, the electoral law, the campaign, voting procedures, and the role of the Carter Center in providing election monitoring and support.
procedures, the parties, and election issues. They
also reviewed their role as international observers.

Plenary sessions included:

1) A discussion of the EAC’s role with Chair
    William Chin See and EOJ Director Danville
    Walker.
2) A review of security measures and issues
    with JCP Commissioner Francis Forbes.
3) A briefing on troubled areas by noted
    pollster Don Anderson and former Director of
    Elections Noel Lee.

On Dec. 17, the delegation divided into 25
two-person teams and headed for assignments
around the country. Upon arrival in their respective
areas, delegates met with local electoral officials,
candidates, and security forces. They familiarized
themselves with the locations of polling centers,
election offices, and key security facilities. All teams
had cellular phones for quick communication with
the delegation headquarters.

In urban areas, the main challenge
was to deter violence and instill confi-
dence in voters to increase turnout. In
his pre-election statement on the
delegation’s behalf and in radio inter-
views, President Carter attempted to do
just that.

The delegation faced a related
problem of how to ensure security for its
own teams. During the Center’s Novem-
ber pre-election mission, several cars of
police and security forces and an ar-
more personnel carrier accompanied
Carter Center delegates into garrisons.
Residents expressed resentment over the
invasion and told delegates that on
election day, the team would not need
such heavy security and would be better
off without armed escort. They sug-
gested that instead, the Center observers
should be accompanied by someone
known in the community. Mr. Lahunta consulted
clergy leaders, and a dozen priests and nuns were
recruited to help. On election day, Center delegates
who were deployed to the most dangerous neighbor-
hoods in the corporate area were grateful for these
involved guides, who provided safe passage into the
garrisons as well as useful local information.

Affirmation of Nonviolence

As part of its strategy to create an environment
for a peaceful election, The Carter Center worked
to support the efforts of Justice James Kerr, Jamaica’s
ombudsman for political matters. Together, they
encouraged candidates from the three major parties
to sign a Declaration of Nonviolence and Political
Tolerance on Dec. 17, the day before the election.
This would send a clear message to the people of
Jamaica that the parties wanted a peaceful election.
President Carter, Gen. Powell, and other delegation
leaders pledged to witness the event. Mr. Seaga and
Mr. Golding were reluctant to sign because previous
nonviolence accords had been ineffective. They
feared signing yet another agreement would only
generate skepticism. Because they also understood
the importance of sending a credible, positive message on the eve of the vote, they agreed to attend a televised ceremony during which they would publicly affirm support for a peaceful election. At the event, Justice Kerr thanked opposition leaders for improving on the idea of a private signing ceremony: "A life-sized video will set new and higher standards than a silent document."

Mr. Golding recommended giving Justice Kerr more resources and machinery to enforce non-violence agreements. He promised that his party "will do everything possible to ensure the elections are peaceful." Mr. Seaga explained how his party intended to introduce an electronic electoral system to remove the subjective element from the democratic process. He thanked the observers and called on his people to "put their best feet forward."

Prime Minister Pattenden said, "I would like to thank the Carter observers for coming here, but I hope that the respect for the law will not arise because of their presence, but rather that their presence will confirm our people's respect for the law."

Then, Gen. Powell spoke. A son of Jamaican immigrants, he expressed appreciation for party leaders' historic message of peace, and he called on all Jamaicans "to come out and vote in the best tradition of Janitica." President Carter expressed his "confidence that tomorrow [election day] will be a great day for Jamaica." The ceremony was repeatedly broadcast its full over national television.

Before and after the ceremony, the delegation leaders met privately with the three party leaders to discuss election day. M. Golding observed that the Center's presence had played a positive role in minimizing the level of violence during the campaign. He predicted the Center would not only have a strong, positive impact on curtailing election-day violence, but it also might limit the number of post-election litigation cases. However, Mr. Golding voiced concern regarding the lack of safeguards in the electoral system, including:

1) Failure to complete fingerprint cross-matching.
2) The small number of distributed voter IDs.
3) Names that were enumerated but did not appear on the voters list.

4) Voters mistakenly placed in wrong polling divisions. He felt these issues strung overall efforts to ensure a peaceful election.

Mr. Seaga said that despite the JLP trailing the \textit{BNP} in some polls, he "felt quite comfortable that the JLP could garner 34 to 40 percent of the vote and emerge victorious." As evidence, he cited the 16 seats decided by less than 500 votes in the 1993 election and felt the groundswell of support in the trenches would turn the tide for the JLP in those races. Mr. Seaga voiced special concern over the EOF's failed attempts to implement planned technological reforms and its effects on election-day proceedings. Like Mr. Golding, Mr. Seaga lamented the incomplete fingerprintcroswatching, the lack of ID cards, and the shortcomings of the voters list.

He spoke adamantly about fully installing the \textit{TRW} technology and warned of potential failure of the JCFs and JDF's communication systems and the grave effect that might have on maintaining order on election day.

Prime Minister Patterson acknowledged that much time had been lost trying to install a computer system that he felt was too sophisticated. He remarked that there had been a change in the climate—"a return to old ways"—in the circles that many candidates showed for each other. He encouraged the Center's delegates to go wherever they wished on election day but warned not to be foolhardy.

That same afternoon, delegation leaders met with the director of elections and the JCF commissioner. They reviewed final preparations for the next day. The leaders visited the security command center and EOF operation headquarters. Then, they traveled to East Queen Street Baptist Church to participate in "a service of Prayer and Peace," sponsored by the ecumenical organization CURA. Joining by Alfed Songster, Danielle Walker, and William Chin See, delegation leaders spoke to Jamaicans' hope that the election would be a peaceful, joyous occasion.

**Election-day Observation**

Election officials had fallen far behind schedule and were forced to work through the night of Dec. 13 to finish distributing ballots, black books, and other supplies to polling sites. Although the EOF had informed The Carter Center that the critical black books would be distributed well in advance of the election, most were dispatched within one day of the vote and some on election morning. This created some serious problems, particularly in the Kingston area, where the EOF delivered the black books last. Polling officials in Kingston were least likely to know voters personally; therefore, voter-ID confirmation was essential. The armed forces lent crucial logistical
aid, appointing a high-level officer to work with the ECI in organizing distribution networks outside Kingston and transporting materials by truck and airplane to regional distribution points. The forces targeted the most distant points first, so that in election morning, several corporate area polling stations most severely lacked supplies. This "butter first" strategy made logistical sense but was politically risky since the corporate area was historically the most violent and contested sections where large-scale fraud and intimidation had occurred in past elections.

On election day, Center delegates observed the vote in 52 of 60 constituencies. Teams covered rural areas and all important cities, concentrating on constituencies deemed closely contested (see Appendix 14). Almost half of the delegation was assigned within a 90-minute drive of Kingston. With approximately 50 percent of the electorate voting in this potentially volatile area, the delegation wanted to show a strong presence.

Center observers arrived at polls by 6:30 a.m., a half-hour before the scheduled opening. In most areas, polls opened on time and with minimal confusion.

Kingston Office Director Andrew Lynamah discusses election procedures with poll workers on election day.

One-third of polls visited opened late, but these were concentrated in the Kingston area, where voting supplies were delivered late.

Nationally, 22 percent of stations visited were missing materials, most commonly the black bags used to identify voters. It was reported that the week before the elections, some constituencies around Kingston had significant shortages of trained-and-ready election personnel. Observers were disappointed but not surprised to find election officials absent in 3 percent of the polling sites they visited and ill-trained in another 3 percent. However, these figures were lower than they might have been if CAFFE had not stepped forward to fill personnel gaps.

Slowly, election officials rectified the problems, and almost all polling stations opened by noon.

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Carter Center delegation co-leader Gen. Colin Powell, a son of Jamaicans, talks with voters in Kingston on election day.

While waiting, Evander Holyfield reminded the press, "It is not how you start but how you finish." Delegates visited polling sites throughout the day to evaluate the voting process and political climate. After polls closed, they observed vote counts. Each team tallied results from their Election-day Checklist (see Appendix 12) and called them in to the Center's Kingston office.

In all, 25 teams visited 1,095 polling stations, constituting 17 percent of the total number of stations. At those, approximately 185,381 citizens (15 percent of the electorate) registered to vote. Parties were well-represented at polling stations. The PNP fielded indoor agents at 1,020 (92 percent) of stations visited, the JLP at 968 (88 percent), and the NDP at 601 (55 percent). CAFFE fielded volunteers at 43 percent of stations visited. About 7 percent had campaign propaganda visible or some sort of campaigning in progress. In only 3 percent, ballot secrecy was insufficiently protected.

In The Carter Center's sample of 185,381 registered voters, 1,117 people were denied the vote. Most of these (829) did not appear on polling stations' registration lists, though they may simply have come to incorrect polling sites. Another 218 admitted they had not been enumerated and so would not appear on any list. An additional 67 were denied the vote because polling officials did not believe they were who they claimed to be, a matter complicated by the absence of some black books and of photos in some black books. Importantly, there were only three cases where an identifiable elector whose name appeared on the list was nonetheless denied the vote.

Council member and delegate Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada stated in the Center's Dec. 19 debriefing that he felt "as if a number of different elections had taken place." The election could be broken down into four categories: rural, suburban, urban nongarrison, and urban garrison.

In rural areas, voting went quite smoothly. Two party agents were present at about 90 percent of polling stations visited. Many stations had received black books. At those where black books had not been received, it seemed to matter little, as party agents knew virtually every voter due to living in such small, tightly knit communities. Few incidents of violence or major irregularities were reported, and the atmosphere seemed respectful and calm. In St. Andrew West Rural, typical of most of rural-area reports, delegates Jennifer McCoy and President Sánchez de Lozada reported that 128 of 148 stations received black books. Two party agents
were seen in 95 percent of sites visited with no objection forms filed. In St. Catherine Eastern and East Central, the Rev. and Mrs. Joseph Lowery and Phil Wise reported that materials were present and polling stations had opened by 7:30 a.m. at every site visited. Three party agents stood at nearly every station, and the process was deemed "very positive."

In suburban areas, election day remained relatively calm with high party-agent representation at polling stations. However, as a result of missing black books, party agents raised objections to potential voters, thereby heightening tensions. At a few sites, delegates reported serious violations that could have affected the polling stations’ outcomes.

In urban non-garrison areas, voting was mixed. A number of serious incidents were reported that could have altered a few elections’ outcomes. In St. Andrew North Eastern, Council member Rodrigo Carazo and Becky Castle reported the presence of black books in all 58 polling stations visited and declared the voting process quite positive. However, during the closing and counting, they witnessed gunshots in the polling cluster where they had decided to observe the vote count. In Montego Bay, delegates Richard Joseph and Gary McMahon reported that, despite the theft of a ballot box, voting continued and order was maintained due to the high degree of cooperation between party officials and the ECJ. By contrast, in urban garrison areas, delegates observed flagrant violations. In St. Andrew South Western, at 70 percent of polling stations visited, only one party fielded indoor agents. There were numerous incidents of voting boxes being “voted out” early. In these cases, voters who had not yet voted were told that all ballots had been cast and were instructed to go home. In St. Andrew West Central, in one of the day’s worst-run elections, delegates Francisco Diaz and Jason Carter reported that a ballot box was moved without permission from a polling cluster in a JLP-dominated area to a polling station in a PNP stronghold. Consequently, the count shifted from a significant PNP majority to a sizable PNP majority.

Many urban garrison polling stations were ill-equipped with necessary supplies to administer a fair process. Council member George Price and Cedric Grant reported that 15 of the 38 stations they visited in St. Catherine South Central and Central lacked adequate materials. Furthermore, afternoon violence erupted, causing a polling station with no less than eight polling stations to close at 3:30 p.m. This severely disrupted voting in that cluster.

Although Carter Center delegates reported intimidation and harassment in only 24 stations (2 percent of their sample), these all took place in
Urban zones. In Clarendon Central, delegates reported that gunmen held up one polling station. At another station, an indoor agent was stabbed to death after leaving a station, which fueled rioting there. Elsewhere, delegates reported outdoor agents harassing voters and dissuading them from entering polling stations. In some parish areas, large groups of party supporters surrounded station entrances, yelling at voters to dissuade them from going inside. Security personnel could not control the crowds, a problem augmented by poor site selection of buildings, which had hardly confined spaces and no perimeter fences.

Security Forces

Both the JCF and JDF were prepared for the election. The JCF commissioner had studied past election-day problems related to the constabulary and designed strategies to combat them. Problems related to security forces in past elections ran the gamut—assault to protect polling stations; demonstration of overt, partisan behavior; and seizure of ballot boxes. Through a new model of command and control and increased attention to public safety, security forces were determined to do better in 1997.

Upon taking a call, officers made rapid decisions and were quickly dispatched to安全事故 areas. The Carter Center representative at the command center, Pasadena Police Chief Michael Berkow, reported that the JCF received over 400 election-related calls in the course of the day. Although many calls stemmed from rumor or misinformation, JCF officers responded expeditiously to those of merit. However, the command center was not without problems. At 3:30 p.m., rioting broke out in the area around Spanish Town. The JCF could not keep up with calls from there. At this point, the JCF's radio system did not function well, and officers frequently lost connection with the command center.

To deter police from participating in election-day malpractice, officers were specially designed vests, each displaying a unique number. This enabled the public to identify an officer by number in misconduct reports. Ten such reports were filed on election day. In each case, the command center immediately dispatched staff from the JCF's Office of Professional Responsibility to investigate. In five of the 10 investigations, charges could not be confirmed and were dropped. Two policemen were stripped of their badges and suspended immediately. Regarding the three remaining cases, two were referred to the director of Public Prosecution and
one to the Police Public Complaints Authority for review of evidence and a ruling.

The JCF also organized mediation teams in each parish. These roving forces worked with party liaisons to quell problems that threatened to erupt into larger issues. The Center encouraged the JCF commissioner to establish those teams and sent representatives to help. In one election-day incident, the JLP police liaison contacted the Center’s Kingston Office Director Mr. Liliethal regarding an inflammatory incident in Nannyville, a garrison community in St. Andrew South-Eastern. Mr. Liliethal arrived at the same time as the police to find a mob of PNP supporters surrounding the JLP candidate’s side. The mob was soon calmed; a woman was escorted away, and the delegate continued the events with the JLP liaison.

Thus, the potential problem was defused.

Poll security was a major concern. The JDF and JCF coordinated efforts to have a strong presence in most polling stations, especially in marginal constituencies with histories of violence. Of the 1,095 stations visited by Center delegates, only 23 sites (2 percent) were deemed to have inadequate security.

**Election Night and the Preliminary Vote Count**

When every voter who had gotten in line by 5 p.m. had cast his/her ballot, the polls closed, and ballots were counted at stations. The law requires the presiding officer (PO) to complete a Preliminary Count of the Polls recording candidates’ names, number of votes counted for each, number of rejected ballots, and total number of ballots for...
each, The separate Statement of the Poll recorded total votes cast for each party as well as the number of ballots issued, used, validated, and nullified. After completing this Statement, the RO must seal the poll book, the envelope containing the Statement, and packets containing ballots (separate packets were available for any unused, spoiled, rejected, or invalid ballots for each candidate) in a large envelope, which is placed in the ballot box and locked. The RO then güvens the ballot box and its key to the RO. Finally, ballot boxes are picked up and delivered to the counting centers where ROs conducted official counts for each constituency.

This closing and counting procedure went relatively smoothly across the country. By 8 p.m. on election night, the ECI announced preliminary results in 57 of the 60 constituencies. It appeared to be a landslide victory for the PNP, which had won 48 seats. The JLP had won nine. In the three other constituencies, the vote was too close to call, and boxes were sequestered at the centers until counting could resume the next morning. On Dec. 19, the ECI announced the PNP had won the remaining three seats, the final count; however, the ECI’s results in St. Andrew West Central were reversed. On March 5, 1998, Jamaica’s Elections Court ruled that a new election must be held in this constituency on March 26.

Final results from St. Andrew West Central’s new election showed that the PNP won 51 seats with 55.52 percent of the popular vote. The JLP won 9 seats with 43.77 percent. The BDM did not gain a seat, although it won 4.75 percent of the vote (see Appendix 15). Approximately 65 percent of registered voters cast ballots (774,978 of 1,182,294 people on the registration list).

At approximately 8:30 p.m. on election night, opposition leader Mr. Seaga appeared on television to concede defeat on behalf of the JLP. His remarks were conciliatory and gracious. He accepted his loss as the true will of the people but said the JLP would challenge irregularities through the Constitution. A five-member body established to rule on election complaints.

Later that evening, the two opposition leaders—Mr. Seaga and Mr. Golding—met with President Carter, Gen. Powell, and Dr. Parks. Both accepted their loss and focused attention on ways to prevent the kind of electoral abuse that had occurred in the past. Mr. Golding said the process had left a lot to be desired, and he hoped The Carter Center’s report would offer some recommendations on ways to improve it. He also hoped that electoral violations would be punished and penalties increased. Mr. Seaga said the new technology could obviate most problems related to the registration list and the voting of the entire process, and he ex-
pressed hope that the technology would be completed as soon as possible.

The next morning, all Center teams returned from their observation sites to share details of their findings. Afterward, delegation leaders held a press conference. President Carter congratulated Jamaica for holding an election that represented the people’s collective will. He felt heartened by the JLP’s and NDM’s statements like acceptance of the results and by the spirit of the people and their leaders to move forward to enhance Jamaica’s democracy. President Carter also commended security forces for their election-day work, as well as CAFFE for its important role in monitoring the election.

### Final Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th># of seats won</th>
<th>% of popular vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PNP</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>55.52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JLP</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>38.77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.75%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 65.47 percent of registered voters cast ballots, or 774,078 of 1,182,294 people on the registration list.

On the delegation’s behalf, President Carter identified several administrative problems during the election period and on election day, including:

1. Inadequate time for the public and the parties to review the registration list.
2. The small number of delivered ID cards.
3. Late printing and delivery of black books; some never arrived and others were missing photos and pages.
4. Sporadic use of black-light lamps to check inked fingers.
5. Inadequate information as to where to vote.
6. Ill-trained voting officials in a few areas.

Gen. Powell issued a strong call to politicians to disavow garrison communities as a first step toward dismantling them. He urged party leaders to issue a statement that such communities no longer were acceptable.
Post-election Observation

After the election, a small Carter Center delegation stayed in Jamaica for one month to determine final vote counts, monitor challenges before the Constitutional Authority and Jamaican Supreme Court, and listen to party concerns about the election.

The Final Count

Jamaica's Electoral Law stipulates that with party representatives in attendance, ROOs conduct official counts in constituency counting centers in the days following the election. These counts, not preliminary ones, determine the official winner. In the event that an ROO's count does not match a statement of the Poll's preliminary count, the ROO is empowered to conduct an inquiry. If at the inquiry's end, the ROO is satisfied with the investigation, the ROO forwards the results to the ECI for official announcement and refers any unresolved problems to the ECI for further investigation.

By Dec. 27, almost all investigations were completed, and final results were announced for all but one constituency—St. Andrew West Central. This constituency had a small margin of difference and several investigations stemming from major voting irregularities, delaying official results until Dec. 29. The inquiry's conclusion reversed the preliminary decision, declaring the JLP candidate as victor. However, on March 5, the Elections Court ruled this constituency's results and ruled that a new election be held there on March 26. The JLP candidate won with 5,505 votes, while the JLP candidate received 5,317 votes. Overall, 17 seats were won by 1,000 votes or less. Of these, nine seats were won by less than 500 votes.

Magisterial Recount

If a candidate questions the integrity of an ROO final count, the candidate can petition the regional magistrate judge to recount the ballots. Although this option was intended for very close races, a candidate who loses by thousands of votes is permitted to file for a recount. The magistrate judge usually grants a recount and sets a date for it. The ROO must then obtain the questioned constituency's ballots from the ECI and present them to the resident magistrate judge, who recounts the ballots in the presence of the candidate's lawyers.

Overall, 17 seats were won by 1,000 votes or less. Of these, nine seats were won by less than 500 votes.

Following Jamaica's 1997 national elections, magisterial recounts were requested in nine constituencies: Hanover Eastern, Trelawny Southern, St. Andrew West Central, St. Andrew West Rural, St. Thomas Eastern, Clarendon South Eastern, Clarendon Northern, St. Catherine Central, and St. Catherine North Eastern. As of Feb. 15, 1998, eight of the nine magisterial recounts had been completed, and some resulted in a change of the declared winner. In seven cases, the original victor gained votes. In seven cases, the loser also gained votes though not enough to win. Although the magisterial recounts did not alter any constituency's winner, it did impede installation of the Parliament, as five of the declared winners could not be sworn in due to existing recounts in their constituencies. With respect to the ninth request, for a magisterial recount in St. Andrew West Central, the Election Court voided the results before it was conducted. The table on page 40 illustrates the magisterial recounts from the eight relevant constituencies and the new election for the ninth.

The Constituency Authority was established in November 1997 to provide additional protection.
The Observation of the 1997 Jamaican Elections

Magisterial Recounts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituency</th>
<th>PNP 1</th>
<th>PNP 2</th>
<th>JLP 1</th>
<th>JLP 2</th>
<th>NDP 1</th>
<th>NDP 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clarendon South Eastern</td>
<td>7,226</td>
<td>7,296</td>
<td>+70</td>
<td>7,195</td>
<td>7,242</td>
<td>+47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarendon Northern</td>
<td>6,846</td>
<td>6,847</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>4,723</td>
<td>4,619</td>
<td>-104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Thomas Eastern</td>
<td>7,525</td>
<td>7,525</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6,014</td>
<td>6,016</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Andrew West Rural</td>
<td>6,710</td>
<td>6,802</td>
<td>+92</td>
<td>6,353</td>
<td>6,354</td>
<td>+11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanover Eastern</td>
<td>4,809</td>
<td>5,622</td>
<td>+813</td>
<td>3,683</td>
<td>4,230</td>
<td>+547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasary Southern</td>
<td>4,767</td>
<td>4,781</td>
<td>+14</td>
<td>4,605</td>
<td>4,621</td>
<td>+16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Catherine Central</td>
<td>2,066</td>
<td>2,250</td>
<td>+189</td>
<td>5,400</td>
<td>5,746</td>
<td>+346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Catherine North Eastern</td>
<td>4,750</td>
<td>4,751</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>4,712</td>
<td>4,721</td>
<td>+9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 = Original count, 2 = Results after magisterial recount
Magisterial Re却ount results confirmed by Information Systems Department, EIOJ

New Election in St. Andrew West Central

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituency</th>
<th>PNP 1</th>
<th>PNP 2</th>
<th>JLP 1</th>
<th>JLP 2</th>
<th>NDP 1</th>
<th>NDP 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>St. Andrew West Central*</td>
<td>8,496</td>
<td>5,505</td>
<td>2,865</td>
<td>8,649</td>
<td>5,317</td>
<td>7,315</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In St. Andrew West Central, a new election was held on March 26 with a significantly smaller turnout.

against fraud. This body is composed of three independent EAC members—William Chin See, Corrine McClarty, and Gerald Lalor—and two appointed officials—retired Supreme Court Justice O.D. Marsh and Privy Council member David Muirhead.

By law, with a four-fifths majority, the Constituted Authority can halt an election in a constituency on election day if there is a natural disaster or significant fraud or violence. It also may petition a special elections court composed of members from the Jamaican Supreme Court to void elections in certain polling divisions or throughout an entire constituency if it observes one of the following:

1) The number of ballots counted exceeds the number of people on the voters list.
2) Ballots are stolen or destroyed.
3) The PO acts under duress of any kind.
4) Voters are not on the list for that constituency.
5) Polls are affected by violence.

After receiving the petitions, the elections court has up to six months to render a decision, which must be carried out within 35 days.

After Dec. 18, parties had seven days to submit petitions to the Constituted Authority. Because of the Christmas holiday, this period was extended to...
The petitions allege that late delivery of supplies—including ballot boxes, ink, and ballots—to voting centers severely disrupted voting.

The petitions allege that late delivery of supplies—including ballot boxes, ink, and ballots—to voting centers severely disrupted voting. Also, wholesale erasure or missing black books at the centers left polling officials to hold votes without means to verify voters’ identities. The petitions point to a breach of Section 37 of the Representation of the People Act, which mandates any voter without an official ID card to provide a thumbprint before being allowed to vote. The petitions claim that thumbprints and oaths were taken in only a small number of cases.

Perpetual to individual constituencies, the petitions alleged that gangs of party supporters crowded around voting centers, intimidating supporters of other parties. They also claimed that gangs intimidated polling officials to abandon their posts in some cases and said outdoor agents generated misinformation campaigns. Other irregularities cited included stealing of ballot papers, polling officials knowingly signing faulty ballots, and polling officials refusing to allow certain people to vote.

After Mr. Lilienthal spoke with several petitioners and EOJ officials, no candidate had demon-
strated that his/her supporters were omitted from the list in a significantly greater number than supporters from other parties. In fact, one JLP candidate indicated that an informal survey taken of his constituency showed that only 20 percent of enumerated people omitted from the list acknowledged themselves as JLP supporters. This candidate thought the percentages of known JLP and PNP supporters omitted from the list were balanced and the remaining omissions did not have known party affiliations.

JLP lawyers and candidates admitted that proving political bias through calculated omission of names from the final voters list would be difficult. Omission of some names from the final list and the last-minute addition to the list on Nov. 27 of 10,000 to 11,000 names of people who registered at fixed centers but whose residences never were verified might have affected the election if the added voters were concentrated in one constituency and voted in a pattern dissimilar to the rest of the constituency. However, there is no reason to suppose that voters who registered at fixed centers voted in a different pattern than those who enumerated at home. By including those whose residence was not verified, the director of elections chose to be as inclusive as seemed prudent in facilitating complete national suffrage.

The EOI’s inability to publish prior to the election an alphabetized list with each voter’s name and corresponding polling division made it difficult for parties to determine in which polling division and constituency their supporters were supposed to vote. This may have hindered the “get-out-the-vote” drive. It is difficult to know how many citizens went to incorrect polling stations and decided not to vote even after being told the RO could direct them to the correct polling station. At the 1,098 stations that Carter Center delegates visited, 829 people who said they had enumerated were not on the list at the station where they went to vote. Some names may have been omitted. Others simply had gone to the wrong station. It is unclear how many opted to ask the RO the correct place to vote and then exercised suffrage.

Another major procedural shortcoming was the failure to print completed black books. On Dec. 3, upon printing a single-constituency test run, the EOI discovered it lacked adequate production capability to print black books for all 60 constitu-
helps flesh out points put forth in them. Affidavits are taken from witnesses, and factual material is gathered to support electoral malpractice charges. During the discovery stage, lawyers generally receive permission to re-examine ballot boxes, poll books, black books, the Statement of the Poll, and other documents associated with the station in question.

### Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Violation</th>
<th>Vanuatu Eastern</th>
<th>St. Andrew S. Eastern</th>
<th>St. Andrew W. Rural</th>
<th>Trinity S. Eastern</th>
<th>Caledonia Central</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stolen Ballot</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal Voters</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Agents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threatened</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence or intimidation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impairment</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enumeration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faulty Voters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lost</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Voting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final List Changed within 5 days of publication date</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changed Polling Site</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mailing Not Delivered</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malpractice by Poll Official</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

They cross-check records to determine if voters listed in the poll books actually voted. In addition, the director of elections must submit statements responding to allegations brought against the ECI. Together, the judge and representing lawyers determine a trial date.

Precedent for petitions exists. In the landmark case of *Buck v. King* (1980), Jamaica's Supreme Court nullified results of the 1976 election in
Hanover Eastern. This decision established general guidelines for ruling on election fairness. It decreed that an election may be ruled void if it is proved that an election officer manipulated results, the election was not substantially conducted in accordance with the law, or a scheme to defeat the majority will was preplanned and enacted on voting day. An election also may be voided in a constituency where the registration list was based on an enumeration process manipulated by an election official to defeat the majority will or where the election officer who prepared the list did not act in good faith. In the latter case, the extent of mischief and margin of victory should be taken into account in the ruling.

Although the petitions' outcomes are not yet known, their mere existence demonstrates that a process is in place for candidates and others to challenge an election result believed to be unfair.

In back v. King, Mr. Bock's lawyers proved that Hanover Eastern's RO and his staff strategically omitted JLP supporters from the voters list. The trial revealed that fictitious people were knowingly added to the list. Ballots were cast in those names, and there was a constituency-wide conspiracy to commit electoral fraud.

In the past, election petitions have taken years to come to trial, if they ever did. Witnesses have been reluctant to testify, and the process of bringing a petition to court has been slow and arduous. Jamaica's Supreme Court is required to hear petitions within six months of the election. As of late March 1998, petitions were still gathering evidence and awaiting court dates.

Although the petitions' outcomes are not yet known, their mere existence demonstrates that a process is in place for candidates and others to challenge an election result believed to be unfair.

The petitions testify to the nature of Jamaica's democracy as being deeply established, where conflicts are institutionalized and legal remedies available to those who demonstrate injustice.

Availability of new resolution mechanisms is due to Jamaica's recognition that prior systems were slow, unwieldy, and expensive. Even if evidence is insufficient to overturn any election result, the petitions help illuminate any shortcomings and may well expedite electoral reforms already underway.

Lingering Controversy

Many of the controversial issues that swirled in the forefront of the campaign remain unresolved, such as the question of missing ballots. Mr. Walker and preliminary findings show that no more than the original 250 ballots left the EOJ. However, no conclusive report has been issued. Meanwhile, the JLP has demanded immediate release of the auditors' final results. However, the auditors, Coopers and Lybrand, face a delicate situation. The firm found 1,700 missing ballot papers, which Mr. Walker claims were destroyed while testing the printing machines. Coopers and Lybrand cannot therefore count the original stock of ballot paper, and, by extension, cannot verify the 1.5 million pieces of paper representing the original ballot stock.

Also, cross-matching of voter fingerprints—the centerpiece of Jamaica's electoral reforms—has been stalled. The cross-matching technology remains plagued with problems, and according to Mr. Walker, it has not been determined "if the system as it is currently designed by TRW can work at all."

To rectify the problem of enumerated people being omitted from the voters' list, the EOJ resolved some technical glitches and printed the promised alphabetized voters list with corresponding polling divisions. In time for local elections in June 1998, the EOJ intends to distribute the list to parties and ROs so both sides can submit names of enumerated people they believe were omitted. The EOJ also is cross-checking each voting record with its corresponding computer file to ensure that vital voter information, including a photograph, has been entered. Any file missing information will be marked.
and later completed. On Jan. 26, the EOJ began a major advertising campaign, asking those with enumeration tickets but who were omitted from the list to call, verify their enumeration information with the EOJ, and bring their tickets to a local fixed center for processing. Enumerators will then visit their homes to re-enumerate them.

When picking up ID cards, voters were supposed to get their fingerprints scanned electronically to verify that they matched those on the card. The EOJ initiated a pilot electronic verification system at the fixed centers in Portland Western and St. Andrew South Eastern. However, the EOJ discontinued the pilot, as the system was fraught with difficulties. The EOJ did not attempt electronic verification in any other constituency.

It is not yet clear if voter ID cards will be issued in time for local elections slated to be held sometime before summer 1998. Major technical difficulties remain and as of late March, the EOJ and TRW have not resolved problems hindering the remaining cards’ production.

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Carter Center delegation co-leaders (L to R) George Price and Rodrigo Carazo discuss the election with delegate Tom Wicker.
Conclusion and Suggestions

On election night, Prime Minister Patterson interpreted the vote "as a clear signal ... that the country wants an end to political violence." He added, "I hope that tonight we are not only turning a page, but opening a brand new and exciting chapter in the annals of Jamaican politics." The Carter Center's delegation felt privileged to have been invited to observe Jamaica's electoral process and concluded that the 1997 election offers an opportunity for a positive turning point for Jamaican democracy. The Center was persuaded to observe by many Jamaicans who feared the spread of violence beyond the garrison communities and who felt that the Center's presence could make a difference. With strong JLP and NDM support for it to observe the election and the PNP's initial reluctance, the Center appreciated the prime minister's private and public comments during the campaign's final week saying he viewed the Center's presence as a positive deterrent of violence. Most of all, The Carter Center thanks the Jamaican people for the warm welcome they gave to its delegates all over the island.

The Carter Center thanks the Jamaican people for the warm welcome they gave to its delegates all over the island.

Because of this nationwide support, we at the Center feel obligated to be candid in our assessment of our role and the electoral process and to offer suggestions on how it could be improved.

Our verdict on the election is mixed; as the process was both delayed and pushed. Completion of the voters list, scheduled for the end of August, was severely delayed. Due to mounting pressure and speculation about the election date, Jamaica's government feared that postponing the election into the new year would cause more violence.

CAFFE's presence, the security forces' professional behavior, and all three parties' quick acceptance of the results marked ... signs of a good election. However, ... for Jamaica to truly turn a page, much work is required.

On Nov. 26—the day the election date was announced—we were criticized for minimizing complaints about the state of the voters list. The final registration list had not yet been published, so it was impossible to judge whether complaints about the list were justified. At the same time, it was obvious to our team that the election "train" was provably leaving the station, and we thought it useful for public debate to shift focus from the registration list to more urgent security problems.

It was encouraging that two-thirds of Jamaica's eligible voters cast ballots on election day, a sound figure by international standards but perhaps a little low by Jamaican standards. CAFFE's presence, the security forces' professional behavior, and all three parties' quick acceptance of the results marked other signs of a good election. However, we noted many problems with the electoral process and feel the Jamaican people deserve better in subsequent elections. For Jamaica to truly turn a page, much work is required.

The following suggestions address administrative and technological issues as well as the toughest challenge—garrison communities.
Administrative Improvements

Ironically, many, perhaps most, of the electoral irregularities were due to efforts to install a state-of-the-art registration/verification system. TRW and the EJG simply could not fulfill their promise on time. Some Jamaicans questioned whether this system can ever be successfully implemented in their country. Because the Jamaican government already has invested considerable time and resources, it would be a serious mistake to discard the entire system. Instead, we propose that the EJG complete work on the ID cards and voters list. In addition, a separate independent committee should be established to re-evaluate whether to proceed with more advanced technological elements such as card verification and electronic voting.

- **Issue #1: Voter ID Cards.** The failure to print and distribute ID cards increased the need for black books. However, the books were not printed early enough, lacked vital voter information, and were not distributed on time, creating one of the elections' biggest administrative problems. Of course, if everyone had a fraud-proof voter ID, no one would need a black book.

  **Recommendation #1:** The EJG should set a deadline for completing the printing and distribution of all voter ID cards. If the EJG cannot meet this timetable, it must offer a full explanation to the Jamaican people and should seek an alternative.

- **Issue #2: Fingerprint cross-matching.** Few Jamaicans understood that ID cards could not be fully printed or distributed due to software problems.

  **Recommendation #2:** The EJG should explain to the public whether they can complete the fingerprint cross-matching. If it can, it should set a deadline. If not, the EJG should explain why not. Duplications caused by human error or intentional fraud should be deleted, and those who committed fraud should be prosecuted.

- **Issue #3: Committee to oversee the process' completion.** Some Jamaicans expressed enthusiasm about the proposed technology; others were skeptical.

  **Recommendation #3:** To assess the feasibility of installing fingerprint verification and electronic voting, an independent group should be established, supported by bipartisan consensus, to review and recommend implementation measures and a completion deadline to the EAC.

- **Issues #4 and #5: Delimitation of polling divisions and the registration list.** Our observers encountered polling divisions voting within the same polling center that were assigned widely divergent numbers. For instance, the polling center at Phillippe Baptist Church in St. Catherine Central contained 19 polling stations with identification numbers that ranged from 36 to 106. This numbering system created confusion, and many people did not know where to vote. In two cases, a PO assumed responsibility for more than one station, although in one instance, party agents protested vehemently. The agents accused the PO of working for a candidate, almost provoking a riot. Electoral administration was further complicated by the fact that the number of registered voters at each station ranged from 35 to 417. Changing the polling stations' organization and numbering systems could improve election administration and reduce confusion.

  **Recommendation #4:** The EJG should renumber all polling divisions using serial numbers that bear some relation to the gap. The first number in the series should indicate the constituency; the second number should indicate the polling center, and the third number should indicate the polling division. For example, number 01-072-035 would indicate that the polling division is in the first constituency, at the 12th polling center, and is the 35th polling division.

  It should be possible to distribute registered voters fairly evenly across the polling stations at a polling center, thereby distributing the burden of election administration more evenly among the polling officers present. For example, if a polling center serves 10 polling divisions, and fewer than 2,500 voters are registered in that center, then registered voters should be distributed so no more than 10 polling stations exist (i.e., up to 250 voters per polling division). If there are 1,000 registered voters...
voters, two more polling stations should be added, using the valid number of the last polling division at that center plus an identifying letter of the alphabet (01-012-035 "B", 01-012-035 "C", and so forth).

Recommendation #5: The ECJ should institute a process for updating the registration list and giving voters adequate opportunity to know where they are supposed to vote. This could be done at fixed voting centers, but whatever the location, it needs to be done. A continuously updated system could reduce the burden at election time, but it must be available to the parties and the people at least one full month prior to an election to ensure confidence in the process.

Issues #6 and #7: Party agents. Our observers saw evidence of voter intimidation by outdoor agents. We question whether such agents are needed at all, except perhaps as substitutes for indoor agents in the event that one must leave. These were the first elections we have monitored where party agents were not clearly identified with credentials. In some cases, the unidentified agents seemed to be directing the POs. In many cases, they would not inform Center observers as to which party they represented.

Recommendation #6: Outdoor agents should be reclassified as alternate agents, with the job of substituting for indoor agents who need to leave. If a party agent tries to influence a voter, the PO should be able to dismiss the agent. Police officers should arrest outdoor agents who don’t keep the legally specified distance from polling stations.

Recommendation #7: Indoor and outdoor agents should be clearly identified by party. The ECJ should require all agents and require that they be sworn.

Recommendation #8: Relying on the PO as the only person allowed to enter objections into the poll book—a poll station’s official log—hinders party agents’ ability to serve as watchdogs. The electoral law should allow party agents an alternative way to enter objections and to create a more open, transparent environment at polls.

Issue #9: Electoral Advisory Committee (EAC). The EAC was established to remove the conduct of elections from the government. Since its formation, much debate has ensued about institutionalizing the EAC. The time to do so is now. Also, the EAC’s three independent members currently serve on the Constituted Authority, along with two appointed members, which may be a conflict of interest.

Recommendation #9: Parliament should approve establishment of a permanent Election Commission (EC) to replace the EAC. All EC members would be independent but acceptable to the major parties. It would be important for this EC to remain in close contact with party representatives. Thus, a special Consultative Committee of party leaders should be formed to meet once a month with the EC to discuss upcoming issues and to provide a forum for parties to exchange views.

Recommendation #10: To ensure that the Constituted Authority acts independently and that no conflict of interest occurs, no EAC member or member of the proposed EC should be allowed to serve on the Constituted Authority.

Issue #11-15: Security during elections and dismantling garrison communities. Jamaica’s most difficult and important challenge is eliminating garrison communities and violence from its political process. Violence and one-party enclaves are antithetical to democracy. Garrisons have three main dimensions relating to:

1) The connection between social and economic problems.
2) Political patronage.
3) The connection between politics and violence.

For the purpose of this report, we will comment only on the third dimension. Although there was less violence in the 1997 election, evidence of fraud was still found in some garrisons.

On the eve of the election, the prime minister and two opposition leaders met in the presence of Justice James Kerr and the Carter Center delegation to pledge nonviolence. They acknowledged that
Junior communities were conscious to the body of police. The hard question is how to dismantle them.

**Recommendation #11:** Courts should prosecute anyone who committed fraud in the 1997 election and should describe each crime in detail to the public.

**Recommendation #12:** With parties, security forces should develop a plan to disarm junior communities and propose an enforcement mechanism.

**Recommendation #13:** Six months before the next parliamentary election, each party should prepare a plan with the security forces to ensure genuine political competition in every constituency and enable everyone to vote free of fear.

**Recommendation #14:** One month before the next election, each party should prepare a list of its agents for each polling division and identify any division its agents are afraid to cover. The EIOJ should act as a clearinghouse for this information and should provide the lists to security forces. The forces should then turn public support for agents in feared areas. Also, CAFFE representatives could serve as surrogates for proxy agents and POs who do not report for duty.

**Recommendation #15:** Despite security forces’ excellent work, more steps need to be taken to control crowds and ensure orderly lines. Consideration should be given to expanding the two-lowering zone from the current 100 meters to 200 meters.

**CAFFE**

CAFFE deserves much of the credit for focusing attention on electoral malpractice and encouraging Jamaicans to make the 1997 election better than previous ones. We would not have observed the process without the persuasiveness of CAFFE’s brand and the positive model that CAFFE inspired.

CAFFE established a grassroots organization, mobilizing nearly 2,000 volunteers. During the entire electoral process, we consulted often with CAFFE’s board. At times, we disagreed on strategy. For example, we thought it better to focus parties’ attention on correcting the registration list than on dismissing it or in criticizing electoral authorities for not fulfilling their promise for new technology. Those were honest differences in emphasis, but we never questioned CAFFE’s commitment to improving the process, and we hope that CAFFE will continue its involvement in election observing.

We suggest slightly different priorities for the future. If CAFFE has limited human resources, it should first send observers to polling divisions that have fewer than two party representatives. Also, CAFFE and the EIOJ should consider training CAFFE members as POs and should prepare them to fill party agents’ positions when the designated agents do not show.

While Jamaica has one of the richest democratic traditions in the developing world, its politics contain elements that could bring its democracy to its knees. Jamaica has much in common with other fragile democracies that have emerged in recent decades. A correct diagnosis and prescription for Jamaica’s body politic is thus of great importance, not only for Jamaica but for much of the world.

**Jamaica’s 1997 elections represent a curious juxtaposition of the most sophisticated democratic politics with the most primitive form of coercive and violent politics.**
tors, the Carter Center employed several techniques—
notably, a quick count and active consultations and
mediation among parties—to reduce the tempera-
ture and try to secure acceptance and respect for the
process and results. None of these tools were neces-
sary in Jamaica as the independent media and the
ECJ reported results as quickly as in an industrialized
democracy, and the leaders accepted them in
dignity, televised statements. This side of Jamaica
should serve as a model for democracies in develop-
ing countries around the world.

However, Jamaica has another side too. This
side has been poisoned by the relationship between
political leaders and armed thugs and by sophisti-
cated political operatives’ intimidation and illegal
manipulation of the electoral process. Fortunately,
Jamaica’s civil society is so well-developed that a
cross section of leaders came forward in 1997 to
recognize the dangers of this “dark side” of Jamaica.
Because of these leaders, The Carter Center became
involved, and by supporting their civil society, we
helped bring out the best in Jamaicans on election
day. We hope Jamaica’s democracy grows deeper
and richer as a result of the lessons learned from the
1997 election.
Endnotes

1 This report was made possible through support provided by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)/Jamaica under the terms of Grant No. 532-G-90-98-02010-00. Substantial additional funding was provided by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDAD). The opinions expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or CIDAD.

3 Comments from The Weekly Gleaner, Sept. 4-10, 1997.
4 Some questioned whether this was a representative sample, suggesting it might relate only to the two constituencies where the pilot project was run. However, The Carter Center confirmed it was a national sample. In post-election inquiries, TRW officials indicated that 255,958 fingerprints were cross-matched, with 15 cases of evident fraud.
5 "Poll from The Observer, Dec. 8, 1997.
8 EOJ memorandum to the EAC, Jan. 20, 1998.
11 Percentage of turnout in past elections (Source: EOJ).

55.2% 63.8% 63.9% 65.4% 72.3% 81.3% 78.2% 84.5% 86.1% 88.9% 77.6% 66.7%
(Note: Percentages have been rounded.)

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Background on the Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government

The Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government is a group of 10 current and former heads of government from throughout the Americas. The Council was established in November 1986 at a meeting chaired by former U.S. Presidents Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford on "Reinforcing Democracy in the Americas." At The Carter Center, it seeks to reinforce democracy throughout the Western Hemisphere, resolve conflicts, and advance economic cooperation.

The Council has been a pioneer in mediating and observing elections. Council members or their representatives have observed 17 elections in 18 countries, including Panama, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Guyana, Uruguay, the United States, Paraguay, Mexico, and Jamaica. They have also made efforts to resolve the debt crisis of the 1980s and to promote free trade in the 1990s.

The Carter Center's Latin American and Caribbean Program (LACP) administers the Council. Robert Parlar is LACP director, a Carter Center fellow, and Council executive secretary. Other LACP staff include Associate Director Shelley McConnell, Senior Research Associate Jennifer McCoy, Program Coordinator Becky Costa, and Program Assistant Shannon Callberg.

Council members gather at a 1997 Carter Center conference with U.S. Vice President Al Gore.
Council Members

Jimmy Carter, Council Chair, former President of the United States (1977-81)
George Price, Council Vice Chair, former Prime Minister of Belize (1981-84, 1989-93)

Rafael Caldera, President of Venezuela (1969-74, 1994-present)
Fernando Henrique Cardoso, President of Brazil (1993-present)
Leonel Fernández Reyna, President of the Dominican Republic (1996-present)
Carlos Saúl Menem, President of Argentina (1989-present)
P.J. Patterson, Prime Minister of Jamaica (1992-present)
Ernesto Pérez Balladares, President of Panama (1994-present)
A.N.R. Robinson, President of Trinidad and Tobago (1997-present)
Julio María Sanguinetti, President of Uruguay (1985-89, 1995-present)
Raúl Alfonsín, former President of Argentina (1981-89)
Nicholas Ardito-Barletta, former President of Panama (1984-85)
Oscar Arias Sánchez, former President of Costa Rica (1986-90)
Jean-Bertrand Aristide, former President of Haiti (1991-96)
Patricio Aylwin Azocar, former President of Chile (1990-94)
Fernando Belaúnde Terry, former President of Peru (1963-68, 1980-85)
Beliárico Betancur, former President of Colombia (1982-86)
Rodrigo Corral, former President of Costa Rica (1978-82)
Vinícius Cerqueira, former President of Guatemala (1986-90)
Joseph Clark, former Prime Minister of Canada (1979-82)
John Compton, former Prime Minister of St. Lucia (1987-96)
Gerald Ford, former President of the United States (1974-77)
Oswaldo Hurtado, former President of Ecuador (1981-84)
Luis Alberto Iaccarino, former President of Uruguay (1989-95)
Alfonso López Michelsen, former President of Colombia (1974-78)
Carlos Andrés Pérez, former President of Venezuela (1974-79, 1989-93)
Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, former President of Bolivia (1993-97)
Erskine Sandiford, former Prime Minister of Barbados (1987-94)
Edward Seaga, former Prime Minister of Jamaica (1980-88)
Pierre Trudeau, former Prime Minister of Canada (1968-79, 1980-84)
Appendix 3

CAFFE
Citizens Action For Free and Fair Elections
41 Halfway Tree Road, Kingston, JAMAICA

August 28, 1995

Dr. Robert Pastor
Executive Secretary,
Council of Freely Elected Heads of Governments,
Carter Center,
Atlanta GA, 30307

Dear Mr. Pastor,

Knowing of your experience and that of the Council of Freely Elected Heads of Governments in election observing, I am writing to inform you of the establishment of Citizens Action for Free and Fair Elections (CAFFE) in Jamaica. This group, chaired by Dr. Alfred Sangster, former President of the University of Technology, with vice chairpersons Colonel Trevor McMillan, former Commissioner of Police; Archbishop Emeritus Samuel Carter and myself, is non-partisan and non-sectarian. As such its Board of Directors includes leaders of Evangelical and Pentecostal churches as well as persons of integrity from many walks of Jamaican life. Its central mission is to help strengthen the Jamaican electoral process and Democracy.

In fulfillment of this mission we regard our primary and initial responsibility as recruiting local volunteer observers. At the same time, in the words of Archbishop Clarke’s invitation letter bringing us together in March, 1997 we have been “examining the possibility also of housing international observers.” In clarifying and evaluating the role
that such international observers may play in assisting free and fair elections, we invite you and would welcome an assessment mission of yourself and other experienced colleagues to discuss ways of ensuring the most effective observation. Were you to accept this invitation we would work with you to facilitate a schedule which would include meetings with the PNP, JLP, the NUSM, the Political Ombudsman, the IAC, the CAFFE and other personalities involved in the Jamaican electoral process.

As I explained to you on the telephone, this is a matter of utmost urgency and I would therefore ask that you let me know as soon as possible whether such an assessment mission is feasible and, if so, how soon we may expect you.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

Dr. Trevor MacRae

Vice-Chairman, CAFFE

Reader in Government & Politics, UWI

President, University and Allied Workers Union
Appendix 4

CARTER CENTER

September 5, 1997

Dr. Trevor Monroe
Chairman, Citizens Action for Free and Fair Elections
41 Halfway Tree Road
Kingston, Jamaica

Dear Dr. Monroe:

I want to thank you for your letter of 28 August and your invitation to lead an assessment mission to Jamaica to discuss ways to ensure the most effective observation of the upcoming elections.

After consulting with former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and other members of the Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government together with leaders from your country, I wish to respond by formally accepting the invitation you extended on behalf of the "Citizens Action for Free and Fair Elections" (CAFFE) to exchange views on the electoral situation in Jamaica, the experience of domestic and international observers in other countries in which we have worked, and the role that domestic and international observers could play in Jamaica.

Jamaica, of course, is a country with a very rich and long tradition of free elections, but that does not mean that observers have no role to play. On the contrary, there are many observer groups in consolidated democracies, like the League of Women Voters in the United States. The establishment of CAFFE in Jamaica is a positive sign of the desire by civic leaders to play an active role to ensure fair elections. It also confirms that democracy in all of our countries is a work in progress and can only be preserved by constant efforts. Therefore, we congratulate you on the establishment of CAFFE, and we look forward to a fruitful dialogue on the subject of election-monitoring.

I will lead a team to Kingston on September 10-11 for talks with your Board. We also hope to meet with leaders of the major political parties, the Electoral Advisory Council, the government, representatives of international organizations, and the media.

The purpose of our mission is: (1) to describe our experiences in observing and monitoring more than 20 elections in 15 countries in Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia; (2) to learn about the electoral situation in Jamaica; (3) to exchange views on the best ways to ensure the proper observation of these elections; and (4) to assess whether an international delegation by the Council of Freely Elected Heads of State is possible.

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Government, based at the Carter Center, could play a useful role in observing the elections in Jamaica. At the conclusion of my visit, I will make a public presentation. After returning to Atlanta, I will consult with our members and staff to determine whether we will field an international mission to observe the elections.

We look forward to meeting with you and your colleagues.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Dr. Robert Pastor
Executive Secretary
Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government
Appendix 5

ELECTORAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE
34 OLD HOPE ROAD, KINGSTON 5, JAMAICA.
TEL: 926-1239, 926-1310
FAX: 926-4037

November 12, 1997

Dr. Robert Pastor
Director
Latin America and Caribbean Program
The Council of Elected Heads of Government
The Carter Centre
One Carterhill
453 Freedom Parkway
Atlanta, Georgia 30307
USA

Dear Dr. Pastor:

The Electoral Advisory Committee of Jamaica is pleased to extend to your organization, an invitation to send a team of observers to monitor Jamaica’s upcoming general elections.

The Prime Minister of Jamaica has not yet announced a date but his most recent statements suggest that the elections could be called in a very short timeframe.

The Director of Elections will require all observers to conduct themselves according to the following terms and conditions:

1. To obtain his accreditation to permit access to polling stations and other electoral sites.
2. To provide to him a list of all persons in your mission seven (7) days after the announcement of nomination day.
3. To carry the prescribed identification issued by him and identify themselves to any constituted authority upon request.
4. Not to display or wear any partisan symbols, colours or banners.
5. To maintain strict impartiality in the conduct of their duties, and at no time express any bias or preference in relation to national authorities, parties, candidates, or with reference to any issues in contention in the election process.
6. To undertake their duties in an unobtrusive manner, and not interfere with the election process, polling day procedures, or the vote count.

[Signature]
7. Freedom of access to all polling stations and counting stations at all times provided that there are no more than four (4) observers in any polling station at any one time. The indoor agents of candidates are not included in this number of four (4) observers.

8. To have discretion to bring irregularities to the attention of the local election officials, but never giving instructions or countenancing display of the election officials.

9. To base all conclusions on well documented, factual, and verifiable evidence, and fill out a statistical survey form of polling stations visited.

10. To refrain from making any personal premature comments about their observations to the media or any other interested parties, and will limit any remarks to general information about the nature of their activities as observers.

11. To participate in post-election debriefings, by fax or telephone if necessary.

Observer status has also been accorded to the local organization, Citizens Action for Free and Fair Elections (CAFFE) and to the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) and I trust that there will be collaboration to ensure effective coverage.

Yours sincerely,

William K. Chin-Sia
Chairman

ELECTORAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE

WKCS/n
Appendix 6

THE CARTER CENTER

November 19, 1997

William M. Chin See
Chairman, Electoral Advisory Committee
34 Old Hope Road
Kingston 5, Jamaica

Dear Mr. Chin See:

We were very pleased to receive your invitation to the Carter Center/Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government to observe the upcoming national elections in Jamaica.

After our visit to Jamaica in September, we consulted with former President Carter and other Council members and concluded that an observation mission by the Carter Center might be helpful in supporting Jamaica’s strong tradition of democratic governance, provided that: (1) we were invited by the Electoral Advisory Committee; (2) we were welcomed by all the political parties; and (3) we could obtain adequate resources to undertake an effective monitoring mission. Your invitation and the passage of the electoral law by the parties permitting you to invite us satisfied the first two conditions, and we have received adequate pledges of resources to permit us to begin our mission.

It is therefore with great pleasure that I accept your invitation on behalf of the Carter Center. Given the apparent time constraints, I will be leading a delegation on Monday, November 24th, to Jamaica to establish a field office in Kingston and begin monitoring the process.

I can assure you that our delegation will scrupulously adhere to the terms of conduct outlined in your invitation. We insist that all of our members are absolutely impartial and undertake their duties with due respect for the people of Jamaica and their moment of choice. We will endeavor to send you a full list of names of our delegation as soon as feasible. We plan to consult with the other observer groups so as to ensure the most effective coverage of the election. We look forward to working with you and your colleagues,

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Dr. Robert A. Pastor
Director
Latin American and Caribbean Program

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Appendix 7

Carter Center

Pre-election Delegations to Jamaica

Jan. 25-26, 1997

Jimmy Carter
Rosalynn Carter
Robert Pastor, Director, Latin American and Caribbean Program (LACP),
The Carter Center
Becky Castle, Program Coordinator, LACP, The Carter Center

Sept. 10-13, 1997

Robert Pastor
Becky Castle
Shelley McConnell, Assistant Professor, Bard College

Nov. 21-26, 1997

Robert Pastor
Shelley McConnell, Associate Director, LACP, The Carter Center
Becky Castle
Ronald Hampton, President, National Black Police Association,
Washington, D.C.
Andrew Lillenthal, Kingston Office Director, The Carter Center
Gregory Martinez, Logistics Coordinator for Jamaican Elections,
The Carter Center
Harry Neufeld, Management Consultant and Election Specialist,
FRN Consulting Ltd.
Dennis Smith, former Chief Electoral Officer in Barbados (1971-91)

Dec. 9-10, 1997

Joseph Lowery, President, Southern Christian Leadership Conference
Robert Pastor
Jason Carter, The Carter Center
Andrew Lillenthal
Gregory Martinez

Dr. McConnell was subsequently hired as The Carter Center's LACP Associate Director. Therefore, after Oct. 1, she is referred to with her new title.
Appendix 8

Pre-election Statement
Sept. 12, 1997
The Carter Center, Kingston, Jamaica

Carter Center Team
Robert Pastor, Director, Latin American and Caribbean Program (LACP)
Shelley McConnell, Assistant Professor, Bard College
Becky Castle, Program Coordinator, LACP

Comments by Robert Pastor

We have concluded two very rewarding days of discussions on the electoral process in Jamaica with the prime minister and members of the government, including the commissioner of police; officials from Citizens Action for Free and Fair Elections (CAFFE), the Election Office, and the Electoral Advisory Committee (EAC); the leaders of the three political parties—the People’s National Party, the Jamaican Labour Party, and the National Democratic Movement; leaders from the private sector and the media; and representatives of the U.S. government and international organizations based in Kingston. We also had the opportunity to speak with citizens outside of Kingston and visit Catherine East Central Parish, where we met with election officials to learn how the enumeration process was conducted.

We were invited by CAFFE to learn about the Jamaican electoral process and to offer lessons from our experiences at The Carter Center in observing over 20 different electoral processes in 15 countries around the world. We also came because of our long-standing ties and interest in Jamaica. CAFFE was established, according to its president, Alfred Sangster, because of a “recognition that there has been a dangerous trend of electoral malpractice.” Rather than accept this deterioration, a group of eminent leaders representing a broad spectrum of civil society decided to stand up and work to improve the electoral process. CAFFE sought to be congratulated for stepping forward, and we were pleased to learn that other groups—like the Private Sector of Jamaica and IMPACT—have also decided to play active roles in ensuring that future elections improve on the past.

In all our meetings, we were told of growing concern about a series of problems in the electoral process including “garrison communities,” escalating violence, intimidation, the increasing proportion of uncommitted voters, declining public participation and confidence in the electoral process, pre-marked ballots, insecure boxes, uncertainty about the registration list, the role of the security forces, and the improper use of state resources. Most everyone with whom we met stressed the desirability of international observers and asked us to observe.

Jamaica has a long and rich tradition of democracy. There have been 12 elections since universal suffrage was instituted in 1944, and there have been numerous peaceful transfers of power. The government also has undertaken significant electoral reforms including the current effort to develop a new state-of-the-art computer registration list. We were encouraged to find that the EAC is held in high regard. Moreover, Jamaican leaders from all parties have been leaders in promoting democracy overseas, with several having joined us to monitor elections in other countries. Still, we noted considerable unease with the electoral process.
Let me summarize the many questions we received and offer our responses.

Q: Which international organizations monitor elections and why?
A: During the last decade, there has been a proliferation of international and nongovernmental organizations, which have developed election-monitoring capabilities, including the United Nations, the Organization of American States, The Carter Center, the National Democratic and Republican Institutes for International Affairs, the European Union, the Commonwealth, and many others. Each observes in different ways, but the important point is that the growing number and involvement of such organizations are reflections of a new and positive desire by the international community to nurture, reinforce, and protect democracy throughout the world.

Q: What are the criteria for deciding which elections to monitor? Do we accept every invitation?
A: At The Carter Center, we receive hundreds of invitations to monitor elections, but we accept a small number based on whether our involvement can help improve their electoral process, all parties welcome us, and we have the resources and staff to conduct effective missions.

Q: Are election observers only useful in countries that have had no experience with elections or are in the midst of crisis?
A: It is true that most of the elections we have monitored have been in countries with little or no experience in free elections, like Nicaragua or Paraguay, or are in crisis, like Haiti or Liberia. But we also have invited international observers to comment on the U.S. presidential elections in 1992, and their comments were extremely useful and important. In addition, we were invited by the president of Mexico to assess the implementation of Mexico’s electoral reforms in July 1997.

Q: Is it essential for the government to invite us?
A: An invitation is essential, but it does not need to come from the government. What is essential for international observers to do their job properly is that they have access to the polling divisions and to all stages of the electoral process and counting. That is only possible if the requisite electoral authorities—in the case of Jamaica, the EAC—issue an official invitation. It is also essential that we be welcomed by all the political parties. Why? Because our reputation as an impartial organization is critical to our ability to observe elections, and if one party views us as partial, there is no point in our going. That is another reason why we do not accept funding from the government of the country that we are observing.

Q: How much time would we need to prepare to observe elections?
A: To raise funds and organize an international mission takes time, and naturally, we would like as much time as possible. But as observers, we adapt to the timetable of the sovereign government.

Q: How many observers do we usually field?
A: That depends on the amount of resources we receive and the nature of the problems we face on the ground, but our teams have ranged in size from six to 60. Our preference would be a team of about 40.

Q: Is that large enough to observe the entire election?
A: Of course not. The principal line of defense for an election is poll watchers representing political parties. Domestic observer groups are a second important line of defense. The poll watchers tend to stay in specific polling divisions throughout election day, whereas international observers try to visit as many as
they can. By moving widely and randomly, however, we can construct a full picture of what is happening throughout the country.

Q: Do international observers supervise or judge elections? What do they do?
A: The Carter Center does not judge, certify, or supervise elections. Only the people of Jamaica and their electoral institutions can and should do that in this country. What we do is observe the entire electoral process from the beginning through the end. Based on pre-election visits, we develop a set of questions on a short survey form that our observers use on election day. That data is collected from selected sites throughout the country, and all the forms together permit us to detect any systematic pattern of fraud. The very presence of international observers, we have found, often encourages people to vote and to feel that their vote is secret and will count. Because a people know that the world is watching them, they often take their responsibilities more seriously, and thus, observers may indirectly deter fraud, intimidation, or electoral malpractice. In brief, if a war or a virulent political campaign often brings out the worst in a country, we find that an observed election often helps to bring out the best.

Q: Under what circumstances will The Carter Center and the Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government observe elections in Jamaica?
A: We would only consider observing elections under the following circumstances:

- First, Jamaican leaders and The Carter Center would have to conclude that our presence could be useful to improve the electoral process.
- Second, we would need to have access to all stages of the electoral process, and that means that we would need to be invited and accredited by the EAC. We would assure that our delegation would fully respect the electoral laws and codes of Jamaica.
- Third, we would need to be welcomed by all the political parties, and we would work with all of them by serving to be fair, impartial, and dedicated to the electoral process.
- Fourth, we would need to consult among Council members and assure adequate resources to field a good and effective team.

Q: What relationship would we have with local or other observer groups?
A: We would hope to develop good working relationships with CAFFE and other local observer groups and coordinate our efforts very closely with international observer groups. We have already advised CAFFE on our past experiences and have offered to provide more advice.

Let me conclude by saying that we deeply appreciate the candor and courtesy with which we have been greeted in Jamaica. From our conversations, I sense there are threads of an emerging consensus in Jamaica on the following points:

- Jamaica has a long democratic tradition, for which all Jamaicans should and do feel very proud, but there has also been an accretion of electoral problems that endanger that democracy, and this has occurred because of a negative competition that is akin to an arms race, in that each party takes defensive actions that are viewed as provocative by the other. The growth of “garrison communities,” which are undemocratic enclaves, are only one of many manifestations of this problem, which is getting worse. The addition of a third party in what may be a close election where the population is disenfranchised adds to the uncertainty.
Many Jamaicans are responding to these serious problems by organizing nonpartisan groups, like CAFFE, and by welcoming international observers.

These are positive developments, because only Jamaicans can solve their electoral problems. International observers are not a panacea, but they can help reinforce the democratic process in impartial ways.

Domestic and international observers will need to have full access to the electoral process in order to do their work, and that requires an invitation from the EAC. We have been told that the EAC would only issue such an invitation if it is given the appropriate authority by an amendment to the electoral code.

In our conversations with leaders of all three political parties and with the prime minister, we were pleased to learn that all would welcome us as international observers, and we made clear that we would work within the context of an active civil society with other domestic organizations, such as CAFFE, and international groups observing the process.

Finally, we wish to thank the government and the Jamaican people. Their interest and willingness to dialogue on such difficult issues represents eloquent testimony to their democratic tradition and to their desire to improve the democratic process in their country.
Appendix 9

Pre-election Statement
Nov. 26, 1997
The Carter Center/Council of Freely-Elected Heads of Government
Kingston, Jamaica

Comments by Robert Pastor

Last September, the Carter Center responded to an invitation from Citizens Action for Free and Fair Elections (CAFFE) to visit Jamaica to assess the state of the electoral process and consult on the roles that national and international observers could play. We indicated at our concluding press conference that we would consider monitoring the Jamaican elections if we were invited by the Electoral Advisory Committee (EAC) and if we were welcomed by all the political parties. Both conditions were met. We accepted with appreciation the honor of being invited on Nov. 12 by EAC Chair William Chin See. Beginning on Nov. 21, an eight-person delegation came to Jamaica to set up a Carter Center office and to make a pre-election assessment.

The members of the delegation were Robert Pastor, Shelley McConnell, Becky Castle, Dennis Smith, Harry Neufeld, Ronald Hampton, Andrew Lilienthal, and Gregory Martinez. Mr. Lilienthal will head our Kingston office as director of the Carter Center’s Jamaican Elections Observation Project. Mr. Martinez will be logistics coordinator.

The purpose of our mission was to assess the climate for elections; review the evaluations of the registration list; understand the security environment; and consult with all the parties, CAFFE, and others on a strategy for monitoring the elections.

We [the Carter Center delegation] discussed the preliminary registration list with each of the political parties and the director of elections and visited the data-entry center, card-production facility, and the center where the returning officers (ROs) and their assistants were helping to correct the list. The political parties each received a copy of the preliminary registration list on Nov. 14 and have until the end of tomorrow to submit their comments on the list to the director of elections. They are comparing the list to the daily record sheets issued to their scrutineers, as each citizen was enumerated at his/her home or a fixed center. The Elections Office of Jamaica (EOJ) has been engaged in the same exercise, and it has a complete set of daily record sheets from which to work as well as the considerable manpower and local knowledge of the ROs and their several assistants. Where discrepancies between the daily record sheet and the list have been found, the problem has been noted on a form requesting correction, and the original enumeration application has been consulted as a source document to determine what is the correct entry for the list. The director of elections assured us that corrections are being made where they are warranted.

The People’s National Party submitted comments on all of the constituencies, and the Jamaican Labour Party and National Democratic Movement each have submitted comments on 20 to 30 constituencies, with the balance expected by tomorrow. There are five main categories of problems:

■ People for whom there was a record of enumeration but who did not appear on the list (omissions).
■ People who are on the list but who appear in the wrong polling division or wrong constituency.
■ Typographical errors resulting in misspellings of names and demographic data.
No political party has provided evidence to us that the errors reflect a political bias, and significantly, the director of elections told us that the E0J has been making corrections on the list since it was given to the parties and that 90 percent of the corrections requested by the parties had already been made.

The final list has not been printed, so we cannot offer a definitive assessment at this time. There may be a few problems with it, but all the parties decided that there would not be a supplementary list. In other words, by design, they decided that electoral fraud should be avoided even at the cost of complete inclusion. Nonetheless, we applaud the willingness of Director of Elections Danielle Walker to invite party representatives to the E0J in these last days to review the list with them.

Some Jamaicans have been concerned that the failure to complete the fingerprint cross-matching process might permit duplicate entries by an individual using an alias and thereby permit multiple voting. We have a more positive perspective. The 210,000 cross-matches constitute a very significant sample (18 percent) of the registered population, and they turned up 365 duplicates. Of these, 286 were duplicates in demographic information that would have been caught without a fingerprint and might easily have been the result of an honest mistake. Only 19 of 210,000 were cases where the fingerprints were the same but the citizen had apparently fabricated demographic information in an attempt to double register. This trivial number suggests that the fingerprint-matching system successfully deterred multiple registration, and that may explain the reduced number of enumerated voters in certain "garrison constituencies," where registration lists might have been inflated in the past.

Many Jamaicans are disappointed that the new technology for fingerprint verification, registration, and electronic voting that has been purchased will not be used for this election. It does not appear that everyone will be able to have a new voter ID card, though the E0J is trying hard to get as many printed and distributed as possible. Much progress has been made, however, in terms of legislative reforms, notably in the rules for abating an election, governing police duties on election day, campaigning in and around polling stations, and establishing an appeals process on election-related crimes. There are also safeguards in place, including indelible ink and most important, the right of each party to appoint indoor agents in the polling stations who are there all day to deter fraud and file objections, should any incidents occur. Finally, the registration list appears to be, as Chair Chin See said to us, not a perfect list but nonetheless a good list and a better list than Jamaica has had in the past.

Last January, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and I [Robert Paxton] visited Jamaica and heard concerns about past electoral malpractices and election-related violence. In September, our Carter Center delegation heard similar concerns. It was discouraging to learn of the growth and spread of garrison communities but encouraging to hear of the emergence of nonpartisan groups, such as CAFFE, that came forward to try to stop the violence. Working with all Jamaicans, we hope that our involvement will raise confidence in the elections and diminish fear and violence. On this visit, we discussed the security issue in great depth with leaders of the three parties, the commissioner of police, the chief of staff of the Jamaican Defense Force (JDF), CAFFE, the EAC, the director of elections, and Ombudsman for Political Matters Justice James Kerr.

In conversations with us, Prime Minister Patterson, Mr. Seaga, and Mr. Golding all told us that garrison communities are unfortunate undemocratic enclaves that have no place in a democratic and open Jamaica. However, they urged us to concentrate instead on the contested constituencies where the swing of a relatively small number of votes as a result of intimidation might very well affect election results. We agree that the contested constituencies ought to be our highest priority, but we also intend to visit the
garrison communities to send a clear message that democracy requires openness everywhere. We hope that others will join us.

We were briefed by the commissioners of police on the security plan for the elections. We were encouraged to learn of the increase in police forces and the support provided by the JDF. The establishment of an emergency hot line, incident command room, and response teams in each parish all are encouraging developments that will help secure the election. The establishment of an Office of Professional Responsibility, a Police Media Center, which will be online, and other measures will hopefully raise the confidence of people toward the police. The commissioner invited us to designate a representative to be stationed in the command center on election day, and we accepted.

We visited several garrison communities and contested areas to talk to voters. The voters told us they would welcome our presence during the campaign and on election day, but many were deeply concerned about violence and said it would affect their intention to vote as it had in the past. Commissioner of Police Francis Forbes also told us of his efforts to work with political parties to reach understandings to end violence and intimidation in particular constituencies. We spoke about these ideas with CAFFE, the leaders of the three political parties, and the ombudsman for political matters, and we were very encouraged over the degree of consensus that seems to exist on the need for such understandings and, even more important, for follow-up steps. Everyone agrees that:

- Democracy requires an open political process where all parties and candidates are free to travel and campaign throughout their political constituencies.
- The police and other law-enforcing authorities need the help of the political parties and all the people to open up the undemocratic enclaves and ensure that Jamaican voters exercise their legitimate rights.
- Party leaders, the police, and the observers should work together to assure the public that all parties should be free to campaign in all areas and that party agents should be present in all polling divisions.

The time has come to translate these general agreements into specific steps to bring a peaceful election to Jamaica. We are hoping to bring a high-level team to visit these areas during the election campaign to demonstrate the support of the international community for open and peaceful elections.

We will field an international delegation of about 40 people. The prime minister told us that no part of the country is off limits to our delegation, and we intend to go to as many polling divisions as we can. Nonetheless, we are aware that our numbers are too small to permit us to be everywhere, and thus, we intend to coordinate our activities with CAFFE and other organizations and to remain in close contact with the police and all the political parties to ensure as wide a coverage as possible. We call on all the parties to make sure they have polling agents in every single polling division. They are the first line of defense, and the police commissioner assured us that they will be protected. We encourage the ombudsman for political matters to take the lead in encouraging all the political parties to live up to their ideals and the Code of Ethics.

We sense that Jamaica is poised for elections. Everyone expects the competition to be intense, and everyone wants it to be peaceful and the best election that the country has had in its recent history. We strongly believe that the downward spiral toward worsening violence can be stopped and reversed, and we are ready to work with CAFFE, all the political parties, the police, and the JDF to do what can be done to achieve a historic election free from fear.
Appendix 10

Pre-election Statement
The Carter Center/Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government
Kingston, Jamaica, Dec. 10, 1997

The following are excerpts of comments made about party leaders’ signing of the Declaration of Political Tolerance on Dec. 9-10.

Justice James Kerr, Jamaica’s Ombudsman for Political Matters

I think it will be more impressive if we get the leaders of the three parties to sign this declaration. I understand that sometime next week, we will have the honor of having Gen. Colin Powell and former U.S. President Jimmy Carter with us. I will be asking the leaders of the three parties if an occasion could be arranged to make this declaration witnessed by those honorable and famous gentlemen. I need not tell you of their position and esteem in this country. I think everyone holds both men in the highest esteem.

Robert Pastor, Director, Latin American and Caribbean Program, The Carter Center

The centerpiece of our delegation’s visit was the visit to the four constituencies at the invitation of Ombudsman for Political Matters Justice James Kerr, together with Citizens Action for Free and Fair Elections (CAFFE) President Alfred Sangster and CAFFE members, with whom we have worked very closely and have developed a very close relationship.

I delivered a letter to Electoral Advisory Committee (EAC) Chair William Chin See, with a copy to Director of Elections Danville Walker, saying it is our hope and intention that we will be able to field, next week, a team of 60 people. That will be led by former President Jimmy Carter, Gen. Colin Powell, the former president of Costa Rica, former president of Bolivia, and former prime minister of Belize, together with the Rev. Dr. Joseph Lowery and many other distinguished individuals from 11 other countries in the world. We hope to deploy these people in 25 teams throughout the country, with our first priority being to go to contested areas, most of which may be in or near the Kingston area, and second to go to areas that have been called “garrison communities.”

I think the leadership Justice Kerr has shown is a model for all of us, and we are very eager to be supportive. Tomorrow, I will be in Atlanta where I will meet with President Carter and speak with Gen. Powell about the invitation by Justice Kerr to witness party leaders affirming their support for nonviolence. I am confident that they will be supportive and that they will want to witness that event on Dec. 17, the day before the election. We will work alongside Justice Kerr and CAFFE to make sure that event will communicate the right message.

Yesterday, we met with Mr. Walker and Mr. Chin See, and we met with representatives of the three major political parties to discuss remaining concerns that they had about the registration list. I am pleased that there was agreement on a process to address some of these concerns. First, the parties requested an alphabetical list by constituency, and Mr. Walker will try to deliver on that as soon as possible. Each party agreed to work with us and the EOO to assess the final list. There are names that may be omitted or misplaced, but we hope the parties will identify these names so that the EOO can find whether they are in the computer and locate their correct polling division.
The people of Jamaica do not need to wait for the parties to put forth their names. The registration lists are available at post offices. We visited several post offices and saw the lists. If people do not see their names in the polling division in which they expected to be enumerated, they can phone the E9J. We did this today, and the response was very quick, within one minute, with regard to a person who had asked us to check on his name. Unfortunately, in that case, the person had not been enumerated and was not on the list. That will occur. I suspect most people are on a list in a different polling division, and they will be able to learn from the E9J not only their correct polling division, but more important, today, they can also learn the location of that division. If, perhaps, they are not on the list as they think, they will at least know that they are not on the list and will not be able to vote.

We had discussions with the police commissioner and with officials from the Jamaican Defense Force (JDF), together with CAFFE and the political parties, about questions related to past malpractices and concerns about security. It is our view that the first and most important line of defense, the first and most important way to secure ballots, is to ensure that polling agents from at least two parties are present at every polling division at the moment that the division opens in the morning to ensure that the ballot box is empty. We have asked parties to give us names of people and polling divisions where people are fearful, and the police commissioner said he would provide additional security. CAFFE also will try to provide substitute POs, if necessary.

The police commissioner told an excellent proposal, which we said we would support. He said that he has already turned to "liaison representatives" from each of the political parties for help at different moments of crisis, and he asked whether the local and international observers would be willing to join these "mediation teams" (this was the term he used) that could react quickly to assess what is happening. We said we would be very happy to be supportive. We hope our leadership team will be able to travel very widely in the country. Gen. Powell has visited Jamaica often, and I am sure that people would like him to travel all over the country.

In our conversations with the police commissioner and the JDF, they said that while there are still problems of political violence, they sense that a mood may be beginning to crystallize among the people that the political violence of the past should end. If by our presence we can contribute to that mood, a mood of openness, a mood of friendliness among the parties, and a mood of open contestation and open democracy, we would consider our presence and observation mission very successful.
Appendix 11

DECLARATION OF POLITICAL TOLERANCE
BY
PARTY CANDIDATES AND AGENTS

CONSTITUENCY: North East St. Andrew

In recognition that the most important element in our democracy is free and fair General Elections and that each elector of such elections has the inalienable right to vote for the candidate of his or her choice free of fear,

WE HEREBY PUBLICLY DECLARE:

1. Our condemnation of all forms of violence and intimidation.

2. Our call to supporters to refrain from any violence or intimidation or face expulsion from the party.

3. Our cooperation with the Police in the maintenance of law and order and in the prevention and investigation of crimes of violence and breaches of the Representation of the People’s Act.


5. Our hope and expectation that a new spirit of tolerance and respect will define the General Elections of 1997 as an end to rekindle the world’s respect for Jamaica’s Democracy.
AS PROOF OF OUR SINCERITY, WE AGREE TO TAKE THE FOLLOWING STEPS:

1. We will send instructions to our political supporters directing them to respect the polling agents of other parties.

2. We will seek to encourage all electors to vote in peace and with confidence that the final result will reflect their preferences.

Signed by the candidates in acknowledgment this 10 day of December, 1997, in the presence of

[Signatures]

Jennifer Robinson
P.M.I.

Donnea Edwards
N.D.M.

Deborah Smirk
T.L.P.

L. Campbell
N.L.P.
Appendix V2

Summary of Carter Center Observer Forms
JAMAICA, 19 DECEMBER 1997

Observer name: Carter Center
Constituencies visited: 52
Total # of polling stations visited: 3,199, 12.5%
Total number of registered voters: 195,381, 15.5%

1. Number of stations with indoor agents of PNP: 3,009 (92.5%), JP: 981 (30.8%)
2. Number of stations where CAFFE observers were present? 477 (14.3%)
3. Number where security was not stationed outside or not cooperating? 39 (2.4%)
4. Number where agents of at least 2 parties did not say ballot box was initially empty?
5. Number of stations where Indoor Agents/CAFFE reported:
   a) No problems: 683 (62.7%)
   b) Few insignificant problems: 192 (18.0%)
   c) Many significant problems: 10 (1.1%)

6. Number of stations encountering each of the following problems:
   a) Station opened late (time?): 307 (3.3%)
   b) Insufficient materials: 245 (2.2%)
   c) Security problems: 258 (2.5%)
   d) Ballot not secret: 311 (3.1%)
   e) Official biased/elected: 31 (0.3%) J) Harrassment/intimidation of voter: 34 (0.3%)

7. How many citizens were denied an opportunity to vote at all stations? total # 1117

   Reasons for denial (specify the number of voters affected)
   a) Name not on this station’s registration list, citizen never enumerated
   b) Name not on this station’s list, citizen has enumeration receipt
   (note: citizen may be listed at another station, or omitted)
   c) Name on this station’s list, but identity questioned (impostor)
   d) Name on list, identity verified, citizen rejected in any case (explain)

8. Number of polling stations where your overall evaluation was:
   a) Polling station functioned normally and without irregularity: 668 (6.0%)
   b) Some minor irregularities that will not affect result at this polling station: 323 (29.5%)
   c) Serious problems which could potentially distort result at this station: 60 (5.1%)

9. How many objections were filed in total (list cause on back)? 1 by PNP
   By?: 2 by JP
Appendix 13
Carter Center Closing And Counting Form
Jamaica: December 18, 1997

Fill out a checklist at your last station, then complete this form and attach.

Observer name/s: ___________________________ Time to complete close and count: ___ to ___
Constituency: ___________________________ Polling station code number: # __________

Of the Total Ballots
Number of ballots issued: # __________ Number of spoilt ballots: # __________
Number of unused ballots: # __________ Number of rejected ballots: # __________
Number of ballots cast: # __________ Number of valid ballots: # __________

A ballot is spoilt if it was damaged or marked and invalidated before being introduced into the ballot box. A ballot is rejected if it is found to be invalid after it has been introduced into the ballot box. Both spoilt and rejected ballots are to be placed in specially assigned envelopes.

Number of ballots to which an objection has been filed: # __________

A ballot to which there is an objection by a candidate, agent, or elector shall be ruled as valid or rejected by the P.O., and the objection shall be numbered and that number written on the back of the ballot paper and initialed by the P.O. One copy of the objection form will be pasted into the poll book and another given to the person making the objection.

1. Were indoor agents present throughout the day? PNP: Yes ___ No ___
   JLP: Yes ___ No ___
   NDM: Yes ___ No ___
   Other: Yes ___ No ___

2. How many objections were filed today? by the PNP # __________ JLP # __________ NDM # __________
   On the reverse of this form, describe the nature of each objection.

3. Were CAFFE observers present? Yes ___ No ___ All day? Yes ___ No ___

4. Did CAFFE note any major problems with the voting process? Yes ___ No ___
   On the reverse of this form, describe any problems noted by CAFFE

5. Check off any problems witnessed by or described to you and explain in detail on back:
   a) Station closed before serving line ___
   b) Ballot box not sealed when done ___
   c) Statement of Poll not signed by all ___
   d) Agents not given copy of statement ___
Valid votes for FNP: # _____ as percent of Total Valid Votes
Valid votes for JLP: # _____
Valid votes for NDM: # _____
Valid votes for Others: # _____

Use the Space Below to Explain in Detail any Objections or Problems Noted

---

After the Count
(it may not be possible to answer all of these questions)

Questions at the polling station:

1. Were indoor agents instructed by their parties to deliver their copy of the Statement of the Poll to:
   - Immediately?
   - Tomorrow?
   - ___
   - ___

Constituency party headquarters?
Constituency party headquarters?
Give a verbal telephone account only?
No instructions?

2. Were party agents instructed to accompany the ballot box after it left the polling station (theoretically headed for the constituency counting site)? Yes ___ No ___
   - ___
   - ___
   - ___
   - ___

Were they permitted to accompany the ballot box? Yes ___ No ___

---
Appendix 14

Constituencies Visited by Delegation on Election Day

Region 1 (7 constituencies visited): St. Thomas Western, St. Thomas Eastern, Portland Western, Portland Eastern, St. Mary South Eastern, St. Mary Central, St. Mary Western.

Region 2 (8 constituencies visited): Trelawny Northern, St. James East Central, St. James North Western, St. James West Central, Hanover Eastern, Hanover Western, Westmoreland Central, Westmoreland Western.

Region 3 (8 constituencies visited): Trelawny Southern, St. Elizabeth North Western, St. Elizabeth South Western, St. Elizabeth South Eastern, Manchester Southern, Manchester North Western, Manchester North Eastern, Manchester Central.


Region 5 (9 constituencies visited): St. Catherine North Western, St. Catherine South Western, St. Catherine Southern, St. Catherine Central, St. Catherine South Eastern, St. Catherine East Central, St. Catherine West Central, St. Catherine North Eastern, St. Catherine South Central.

Region 6 (7 constituencies visited): St. Andrew West Rural, St. Andrew West Central, St. Andrew East Central, St. Andrew North Eastern, St. Andrew North Central, St. Andrew North Western, St. Andrew East Rural.

Region 7 (4 constituencies visited): Kingston Central, St. Andrew Western, St. Andrew South Western, St. Andrew Southern.
<table>
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<th>Constituency</th>
<th>NCP</th>
<th>SDP</th>
<th>NOP</th>
<th>NP</th>
<th>RR</th>
<th>BJ</th>
<th>Total</th>
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Appendix 15

Note: Figures in brackets are significant at the 0.05 level of significance. Source: Election Office of Assam, Compiled by Telephone 533998
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<th>CONSTITUENCY</th>
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<th>IND</th>
<th>NDP</th>
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<th>IND 2</th>
<th>REJECTED BALLOTS</th>
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<th>% TURNOUT</th>
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<td>43.62%</td>
<td>4,781</td>
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<td>10.98%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Ann South East</td>
<td>2,759</td>
<td>23.96%</td>
<td>4,872</td>
<td>72.95%</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>2.22%</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0.27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Ann North East</td>
<td>7,062</td>
<td>41.44%</td>
<td>9,192</td>
<td>55.29%</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>3.02%</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>2.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Ann West</td>
<td>6,632</td>
<td>43.77%</td>
<td>6,822</td>
<td>55.29%</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>1.61%</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>0.42%</td>
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<tr>
<td>St. Ann South West</td>
<td>5,749</td>
<td>45.21%</td>
<td>6,361</td>
<td>50.04%</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>3.91%</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0.31%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clarendon North West</td>
<td>5,943</td>
<td>43.13%</td>
<td>7,777</td>
<td>57.85%</td>
<td>1,093</td>
<td>12.61%</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>0.62%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clarendon Northern</td>
<td>6,619</td>
<td>39.32%</td>
<td>6,847</td>
<td>55.29%</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>1.93%</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>0.49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarendon Central North West</td>
<td>5,194</td>
<td>45.88%</td>
<td>6,576</td>
<td>50.12%</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>3.36%</td>
<td>45</td>
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<td>Clarendon Central</td>
<td>4,535</td>
<td>38.05%</td>
<td>7,737</td>
<td>66.48%</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>2.46%</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>0.53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarendon South East</td>
<td>7,242</td>
<td>47.86%</td>
<td>7,206</td>
<td>48.32%</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>2.83%</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>0.87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarendon Central</td>
<td>3,308</td>
<td>18.97%</td>
<td>4,569</td>
<td>30.23%</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>3.43%</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>0.46%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Elections Office of Jamaica, Confirmed by Telephone 3/31/98
### OFFICIAL EAC RESULTS BY CONSTITUENCY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONSTITUENCY</th>
<th>JLP</th>
<th>IND</th>
<th>NP</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>REJECTED BALLOTS</th>
<th>TOTAL BALLOTS</th>
<th>TOTAL ELECTED</th>
<th>% TURN.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>REGIONS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Catherine South Western</td>
<td>3,733</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>7,775</td>
<td>46.4%</td>
<td>494 4.0%</td>
<td>9,090</td>
<td>5,792</td>
<td>64.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Catherine South West Central</td>
<td>7,122</td>
<td>44.0%</td>
<td>8,267</td>
<td>51.15%</td>
<td>432 6.0%</td>
<td>16,521</td>
<td>3,792</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Catherine Southern</td>
<td>4,971</td>
<td>31.7%</td>
<td>7,522</td>
<td>36.3%</td>
<td>720 5.6%</td>
<td>12,213</td>
<td>6,015</td>
<td>57.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Catherine Central</td>
<td>5,576</td>
<td>49.4%</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
<td>15,517 30.3%</td>
<td>23,307</td>
<td>12,835</td>
<td>55.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Catherine South Eastern</td>
<td>3,287</td>
<td>25.8%</td>
<td>4,819</td>
<td>35.2%</td>
<td>393 8.1%</td>
<td>8,419</td>
<td>4,755</td>
<td>56.3%</td>
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<td>St. Catherine East Central</td>
<td>6,976</td>
<td>27.6%</td>
<td>7,068</td>
<td>40.4%</td>
<td>630 5.7%</td>
<td>14,810</td>
<td>10,776</td>
<td>72.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Catherine West Central</td>
<td>3,598</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
<td>5,724</td>
<td>69.2%</td>
<td>499 4.3%</td>
<td>9,811</td>
<td>6,448</td>
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<tr>
<td>St. Catherine North Eastern</td>
<td>4,721</td>
<td>48.1%</td>
<td>4,751</td>
<td>49.1%</td>
<td>120 1.2%</td>
<td>9,592</td>
<td>7,231</td>
<td>75.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Catherine South Central</td>
<td>6,013</td>
<td>36.6%</td>
<td>8,720</td>
<td>49.8%</td>
<td>195 1.1%</td>
<td>15,928</td>
<td>9,243</td>
<td>57.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL: 11,713</strong></td>
<td>38,895</td>
<td></td>
<td>55,711</td>
<td>61.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>REGION 3</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Andrew West Rural</td>
<td>6,354</td>
<td>41.5%</td>
<td>6,802</td>
<td>44.3%</td>
<td>779 5.3%</td>
<td>14,035</td>
<td>9,963</td>
<td>71.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Andrew West Central</td>
<td>5,317</td>
<td>48.7%</td>
<td>5,565</td>
<td>39.8%</td>
<td>26 0.2%</td>
<td>11,108</td>
<td>6,094</td>
<td>55.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Andrew East Central</td>
<td>2,655</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
<td>7,811</td>
<td>71.0%</td>
<td>421 3.8%</td>
<td>10,987</td>
<td>6,699</td>
<td>60.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Andrew South Eastern</td>
<td>3,236</td>
<td>33.1%</td>
<td>5,897</td>
<td>58.2%</td>
<td>881 7.9%</td>
<td>7,014</td>
<td>3,872</td>
<td>55.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Andrew East Central</td>
<td>6,526</td>
<td>41.2%</td>
<td>5,512</td>
<td>35.3%</td>
<td>1,293 11.3%</td>
<td>13,331</td>
<td>7,878</td>
<td>59.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>St. Andrew North Eastern</td>
<td>4,779</td>
<td>49.5%</td>
<td>3,330</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
<td>1,459 15.3%</td>
<td>9,568</td>
<td>5,484</td>
<td>57.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Andrew North Central</td>
<td>4,508</td>
<td>47.2%</td>
<td>3,809</td>
<td>39.7%</td>
<td>735 14.5%</td>
<td>8,152</td>
<td>4,872</td>
<td>59.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Andrew West Northern</td>
<td>4,686</td>
<td>49.1%</td>
<td>3,810</td>
<td>39.9%</td>
<td>921 9.6%</td>
<td>8,417</td>
<td>5,312</td>
<td>63.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Andrew East Rural</td>
<td>5,819</td>
<td>37.9%</td>
<td>6,749</td>
<td>39.7%</td>
<td>1,036 6.0%</td>
<td>13,604</td>
<td>8,275</td>
<td>61.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL: 11,713</strong></td>
<td>38,895</td>
<td></td>
<td>55,711</td>
<td>61.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>REGION 3</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingston West</td>
<td>11,412</td>
<td>84.2%</td>
<td>2,075</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>33 0.3%</td>
<td>13,510</td>
<td>10,105</td>
<td>75.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kingston Central</td>
<td>4,464</td>
<td>39.6%</td>
<td>4,607</td>
<td>39.9%</td>
<td>76 0.2%</td>
<td>8,147</td>
<td>4,348</td>
<td>53.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingston Eastern &amp; Pt. Royal</td>
<td>1,134</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>8,098</td>
<td>81.8%</td>
<td>149 1.5%</td>
<td>8,341</td>
<td>5,071</td>
<td>61.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Andrew West</td>
<td>3,174</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
<td>9,822</td>
<td>70.0%</td>
<td>365 3.7%</td>
<td>9,361</td>
<td>4,922</td>
<td>53.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Andrew South Western</td>
<td>314 2.9%</td>
<td>15,001</td>
<td>92.5%</td>
<td>31 0.3%</td>
<td>15,336</td>
<td>8,516</td>
<td>55.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Andrew Eastern</td>
<td>1,207</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>16,008</td>
<td>90.5%</td>
<td>33 0.2%</td>
<td>16,148</td>
<td>9,080</td>
<td>56.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Number of Votes:** 29,611 | 46,779 | 29,752 | 560 | 51 | 7,012 | **167,540** | **57,634**

**Percentage Vote Received:** 38.73% | 55.53% | 43.53% | 0.11% | 0.01% | 0.04%

* As of March 2, 1998, the results of which are shown above. The results of which were not announced by the Election Commission. The results of which were not announced by the Election Commission. The results of which were not announced by the Election Commission. The results of which were not announced by the Election Commission.

Source: Elections Office of Jamaica, Compiled by Telegraph 3/12/98

*In early March, the Election Court ruled the results in St. Andrew West Central. A new election was held on March 26, 1998.*

*The results of the 1998 elections are subject to investigation.*

Source: Elections Office of Jamaica, Compiled by Telegraph 3/12/98
PRIME Minister PJ Patterson is maintain-
ing his government's position not to invite inter-
national observers to monitor the impending general elec-
tions, this decision has drawn the ire of his political oppo-
nents who are refusing to let the matter die.

In a statement broadcast "A National Crisis Now Threatens", the JLP said the government is fulfilling its pledge to ensure fair elections and to ensure every voter can cast their vote without fear of intimidation.

"We are committed to ensuring that every vote counts," the statement said.

Specifically, it accused the PNP of encouraging violence and placing obstacles in the way of fair elections.

Mr. Patterson said the government is duty-bound to protect the rights of all citizens and to ensure that the elections are conducted in a free and fair manner.

In a separate statement, the PNP said the government's actions are a clear attempt to prevent international observers from ensuring the integrity of the elections.

The party called for the international community to intervene and prevent the government from obstructing the electoral process.

Majority decision

NRM President Bruce Golding has also ruled out inviting international observers, saying "we cannot afford to have a foreign presence on our electoral playing field." He said the government's decision is based on the "best interest of the country and the people of Jamaica".

Golding said the government had considered the request from the opposition but concluded that the country could manage the elections without international input.

"We have the capacity and the need to manage the elections ourselves," he said.

No exact date

The government did not provide a specific date for the elections, but said they would be held "as soon as possible".

In response to questions about the government's decision, Prime Minister PJ Patterson said: "I cannot be held hostage by the opposition's demand for international observers."

Mr. Patterson said the government was committed to ensuring fair elections and that it would not be swayed by pressure from any quarter.

"We are not going to be intimidated by anyone," he said.

A spokesman for the PNP said the government's decision was a "breach of faith" and that the opposition would consider legal action.

The spokesman said: "This is a clear example of the government's lack of commitment to ensuring fair elections."

The statement added: "We will not be fooled by this government's promises and will take all necessary steps to ensure that our citizens have their voices heard."
Gov’t to clear way for observers

Government has indicated its intention to empower the Electoral Advisory Committee (EAC) to invite international observers.

Last Tuesday in Parliament, Prime Minister P.J. Patterson said he would approve the EAC’s recommendation to amend the existing legislation to widen the category of persons permitted to enter polling stations.

The Prime Minister insists that was the only recommendation that the EAC had presented. Existing legislation exclude international observers from Jamaica’s polling stations.

Mr. Patterson, under fire from the National Democratic Movement’s (NDM) President Bruce Golding that he has undermined the EAC by rejecting its recommendations to invite international observers, told the House that “the Government’s side is prepared to act” on that recommendation.

The international watchdog group, the Carter Center based in Atlanta, Georgia, has made it clear that it will not observe the elections unless the Electoral Advisory Committee (EAC) invites them.

Speaking at a news conference last Friday at the Wyndham Kingston Hotel, director of the Carter Center’s Latin American and Caribbean Programme, Dr. Robert Pastor, said that they would need to have access to all stages of the electoral process. That means that the Carter Center would need to be invited and accredited by the EAC.

“We would assure that our delegation would fully respect the electoral laws and codes of Jamaica,” Dr. Pastor declared.

Dr. Pastor said an invitation from the P.J. Patterson-led government is essential, but it does not have to come from them. He explained that what is essential for international groups to do their job proply is that they have access to the polling divisions and to all the stages of the electoral process and counting.

“And that is only possible if the requisite electoral authority - in the case of Jamaica, the EAC, issues an official invitation,” said Dr. Pastor.

The senior official from the Carter Center also said that in order for the Center to participate in Jamaica’s poll it would need to be welcomed all political parties.

“In our conversations with the leaders of all political parties and with the Prime Minister, we were pleased to learn that all would welcome us as international observers and we made it clear that we would work within the context of an active civil society with other domestic organizations such as CAFFE...” said Dr. Pastor.

Responding to questions from reporters, Dr. Pastor said when he was in the island in January he told political leaders here that it would take them six months to prepare for the election. However, he said the Carter Center would “adapt” to the timetable of the sovereign government. He said the Carter Center would field a team of people which could range from 6 to sixty.
A team of international observers is now in the island consulting with the major political par-
 ties, police and other interest groups to under-
 stand concerns they should contemplate as they pre-
 pare to monitor upcoming parliamentary elections.

Director of the Carter Center’s Latin American
and Caribbean Programmes, Dr. Robert Pasour, who
arrived on Monday nights, said they will be looking at
concerns relating to “garrisons” - constituencies and
what might be done to reduce possible intimidation
and violence during the polls.

The primary purpose of the visit, he said, is to set-
up an office in Jamaica which would allow the
observer team to start monitoring the electoral
process, including making an assessment of the vot-
ing list.

However, notwithstanding the limited time they
have to finalize arrangements, it is now clear that a mid-December date will be set for the polls,
the director said they will be prepared for such an
eventuality.

“We will adapt to the time established by the
Government,” said Dr. Pasour. He said members of
his team, some of whom arrived in the island last
Friday, were in the process of setting up the office
and “we will be prepared.”

However, in an interview with The Gleaner, Dr.
Pasour said a decision has not yet been made whether
the team will be monitoring the elections in selected
constituencies or universally.

The Carter Centre director, who heads an eight-
member delegation, said too that they were yet to
decide on the number of foreign personnel who will
be involved on election day. “It will depend on the
amount of resources that we can utilize. I think it’s
just too soon to give you an exact number,” he said.

After the elections, Dr. Pasour said, his team will
present a report, although they have not yet deter-
mined if it will be done in conjunction with other
foreign observer missions and the local group,
Citizens Action for Free and Fair Elections (CAFFE)
with which they will be co-ordinating activities.

“We are separate groups, but I think there is a
desire that we co-ordinate our activities so as to
ensure the widest possible coverage and the most
effective monitoring,” he said.

“At the end of the electoral process we always pre-
sent a report and it will be a comprehensive one,” he
said. However, Dr. Pasour said it was premature to
say how they will present the report and with whom
they will present it.

And what criteria will the team be using to deter-
mine if the elections are free and fair? “That’s the sim-
plest and most difficult question that international
observers are faced with,” and I have written almost
an entire book on that phase, ‘how do you define
it?’” said Dr. Pasour.

“The short definition is that the people of Jamaica
must feel that the election is free and fair,” he said.
“Obviously, it’s very important that the political
environment be open,” said Dr. Pasour. “For all the
parties to compete it’s important that there is a good
environment so that people who are registered can
vote. There are many criteria that go into that simple
phrase, ‘what constitutes free and fair elections’ and
we are going to be assessing that from now through
the election and perhaps beyond.”

The director leaves the island tomorrow, but said
a two members - Andrew Lilienthal, who will head
the Kingston office of the Carter Centre, and Gregory
Marinice, who will direct logistics for monitoring the
elections - will remain in Jamaica to complete setting
up the office.
Adequate safeguards built into system – Int’l observers

THE JAMAICA GLEANER - November 27, 1997

Reprinted with permission by The Jamaica Gleaner.
POLITICAL TOLERANCE: Jamaica Labour Party candidate for North East St Andrew, Delroy Chuck (standing left), shakes hands with his political opponent, Douglas Vio of the National Democratic Movement (right), while incum- bent MP Karlton Kirby Robertson (seated centre), looks on after the signing of a declaration of political tolerance at the Baptist Baptist Church yesterday morning. Carter Centre observers, James Carter (standing left), grandson of former U.S. President, Jimmy Carter, applauded as Dr Robert Flax, director, 2nd left, standing. Reverend Dr Joseph Lewrey, head of the Carter's third pre-election delegation and political ambassador, Justice James Kerr. Photo: Michael Gordon.
The Gleaner

The observers

THE HIGH-PROFILE leadership of the election observer mission being sent here by the Carter Centre in the USA should offer some comfort to the wary. As former US President Jimmy Carter himself says, their hope is that the international presence will deter violence or fraud.

The initial controversy over their coming was partly resolved by the emergence of CAFFE, the local observer group, which has developed to fill a vacuum of useful citizen action. Unlike the Carter group, which has declared its neutrality about the election outcome, CAFFE’s role can be a minefield which will test personal integrity as much as the credibility of the group.

Hence it would be wise if CAFFE refrains from utterances which may appear partisan and undermine its integrity. It seems to us that the combined monitoring of the electoral exercise should be truly that of observers rather than referees who actively regulate the run of play.

CAFFE will be aware of the history of the decline of electoral practice in Jamaica. The visitors would have done their homework and got ample briefing to be aware of the democratic traditions which need to be safeguarded.

They would have heard, we expect, that some semblance of the good old days resurfaced throughout the island with the camaraderie of Nomination Day; but that the blip from August Town was a reminder of potential violence.

The spurs of spirited campaigning, and even controversy over television advertising, remain part of the hype of the hustings. We think that all observers should let the campaign play out as war of words. As Winston Churchill once said: “To jaw-jaw is better than to war-war”. 
This man is watching you...

See story on Page 6

See Story Polls on Page 7

BOBBY FANTUS. Jimmy Carter's point man for his Jamaica elec-
tion observation mission.
'Criticism is unavoidable'
Pastor hopes int'l observers have positive impact
Instilling trust in Jamaican vote

The Carter Center is monitoring the election of a new legislature.

by Shirley Braving

Kingston, Jamaica

Although the last three years have brought President Jimmy Carter and former President Jomo Kenyatta, several steps toward a return to normalcy in this country, there is still a long way to go. The Carter Center, which has been monitoring the election of a new legislature, will assess the process and the outcome of the election.

The Carter Center, a United States-based nonprofit organization, is monitoring the election to ensure that it is free and fair. The center is working with local civil society organizations and election monitors to promote transparency and accountability in the electoral process.

The election is scheduled for March 1990, and the Carter Center is preparing to send a team of election monitors to the country to observe the process and ensure that it meets international standards of democracy.

The Carter Center is committed to promoting democratic institutions and processes around the world. We believe that strong, independent institutions and processes are essential for good governance and the protection of human rights. We are working to support these processes and institutions in Jamaica and other countries around the world.
By ELAIS BURGER
KINGSTON, Jamaica, Dec. 17 - Because elections here are notoriously ugly, Jamaicans were hard
ly surprised when the campaign
led up to Thursday's parliament
ary elections began with a bang
ning. As usual indelible fingerprints
of the country's two main political par
ts, the JLP and PNP, were on
ly 24 hours old, both parties were
being accused of using violence to
get their way. The government
told the election commission
that it was a euphemism for
violence; the opposition charged
that it was real.
A Presider of the election
commission warned that violence
would do nothing but delay the
process.
Jamaicans have


Elect On Violence Fades in
Jamaica

Gunmen appear to be shifting their attentions from politicians to
drug dealers.

J.L.P., and likely to break with that pattern, though four, a diminuted
carried on the last five years.

In a country that is known to be a
carried on the last five years.

In a country that is known to be

in the eyes of the general public,

in the eyes of the general public,

in the eyes of the general public,

in the eyes of the general public,

in the eyes of the general public,

in the eyes of the general public,

in the eyes of the general public,

in the eyes of the general public,
The mandate is ours

NO single political party could claim to have emerged from yesterday's general election with a mandate that is specifi-
cally its own.

Indeed, Mr P J Patterson's People's National Party has retained the government for a historic third term. And per-
bhale for immediate concerns of the new administration will be about how to fix the economy and to put the country back on a path to growth, the kind of losses that led to be
the focus of election campaign.

But the mandate that was given yesterday was broader, and for many people than any single leader or party can
attain, although, as is true for Mr Anthony, Mr Bruce and
Mr Golding and their respective parties in the past, but
more importantly, it was a mandate to every single
Independent MP in the House who, to various extent, was
by choice, didn't have a party and those who, for whatever
reason, may have been disfranchised. The clear mandate
was for us, Jamaicans, to fix our electoral process once and
for all, or watch our democracy crumble away.

The Observer publications have always been clear that no
one but ourselves can repair our democracy: our Euros
Center or Bob Perry's certainly not blocked this trend, as
even with the best will in the world, the Jamaican connec-
tions and all the charades at hand, definitely not General
Colin Powell. They, as observers in the process, may help,
but the job is ours.

We make these points not because yesterday's election
was the worse we have ever had. In fact, despite the prob-
lems, it was better than most. By the stan-
dards of some that have gone, we enjoyed a relatively peace-
ful affair.

But the point is that any flaw in our electoral process is
embarrassing a flaw in our democracy. And there are so many
flaws in the way we have conducted our politics, these flaws have
been the enabling vectors of interruption and negative
processes that have taken place, and which are well
documented in the so-called jargon communities, get naked. It
reflects participation and underlines the essential element
democracy — the right to choice.

The paradox of the situation is that Jamaicans, by and
large, believe deeply in democracy. Indeed, there are many
who publicly express that some of the worst electoral pol-
ished of the 1970s and 1980s were borne out of a fear the
Jamaican was heading towards an 'olde' ideology.

But if we are not careful, whatever the rights or wrong,
of the past, we may find that we have won the battle against
communism but in the process have lost the war for Demo-

We have done some of the right things recently in favour
democracy, but certainly not enough. The shamunas and
positions yesterday were a firm indication for us to get
ahead. The issue now is whether we understand this, but
whether we have the will to grasp the mandate.

Except for the views expressed in the column above, the
articles published on this page do not necessarily represent
the views or opinions of the Jamaica Observer.
At Polls in Jamaica, Kissing Cousin From America

By ELLA BROOKS

The New York Times
December 19, 1997

Former Prime Minister Portia Simpson Miller (left) and Gen. Colin Powell, second from left, at a polling place in western Jamaica. The opposition was particularly weakened in Jamaica, the Caribbean's tiny potluck.

Powell monitors the vote in the land of his parents.

Her husband, Gen. Colin Powell, who was called the "savior of the troops" by a fellow soldier, has been named as foreign minister of the United States. But his role in the election is likely to be limited, since he has not been involved in the campaign.

Her son, Gen. Robert Powell, who was called the "savior of the troops" by a fellow soldier, has been named as foreign minister of the United States. But his role in the election is likely to be limited, since he has not been involved in the campaign.

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Political Violence Takes Day Off For Jamaica Vote

Last Week's General Election Was Most Peaceful in Years

By George F. Kennan
The New York Times

KINGSTON, Jamaica, Dec. 21—In the Caribbean's oldest democracy, where voting and violence have been synonymous for decades, the recent parliamentary elections were the most peaceful in recent memory.

"The shooting death of a null writer on election day last Thursday, the half-dozen voting-related shootings here in the capital, the spraying of gunshots at one balloting site and a murder at another site were mild occurrences compared with those in previous Jamaican political contests.

"During the 1980 general election, for instance, more than 300 people were killed, mostly in violent outbreaks for control of political parties. But in this year's general election, as well as in the 1980 election, there was no violence of any kind.

"In celebrating the unprecedented third consecutive victory for the People's National Party, Prime Minister Edward Seaga and Seaga's party have been praised for their moderation in the debates. Although predictions for the election outcome have not been altered, several analysts say that the country's political climate is more moderate than in previous elections.

A number of polling stations were believed to be particularly tense, and some observers even saw a few instances of violence. But overall, the elections were considered peaceful and free of major incidents.

In general, the elections were praised for their peacefulness. Seaga and his party were credited with maintaining a calm and peaceful atmosphere throughout the campaign. The elections were considered a significant step forward for Jamaica's political system, as they were the first in which violence was not a major issue.

The elections were also praised for their high voter turnout. Despite some concerns about the accuracy of the voting rolls and the potential for voter fraud, the election results were considered valid and legitimate. The People's National Party, led by Prime Minister Seaga, won a decisive victory, securing a third consecutive term in office.

The elections were seen as a major step forward for Jamaica's political system, as they marked a significant reduction in violence and a more peaceful election process. The elections were considered a victory for democracy and a testament to the resilience of Jamaican society.
choice and mask the will of the people, President officials and others who are refection in these years, and their replacements are often inadequately trained or highly partisan." Some have likened the current atmosphere in Jamaica to that of Pakistan during the years when it was ruled by General Mohammed Zia.

Critics here said that in the end, voter turnout in this year's election was likely low by Jamaican standards. An estimated 60 percent of the island's registered voters cast ballots in the election, which marked Jamaica's first presidential election since 1955. The election was won by the People's National Party (PNP), which had been in power since 1989.

A preliminary count shows that the PNP, led by former Prime Minister Edward Seaga, received 55 percent of the popular vote, while the opposition Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) received 45 percent. The JLP is led by Andrew Holness, who was re-elected as Prime Minister.

The election was marred by allegations of electoral fraud and ballot tampering, which led to widespread protests and demonstrations. The election results were eventually upheld by the Supreme Court, which ruled that the election was valid.

Crime and the economy, which is in shambles with an unemployment rate of about 30 percent, were major issues during the campaign. Violence has increased in the island, fueled by a growing drug trade and the large number of patients from foreign countries seeking medical care.

The country's poor rely on party promises for such things as jobs, housing, and land. Restaurant owner Samor Kiwanus, who lives in the Montego Bay section of St. James, voted for the PNP because he believes the party's policies will help his businesses.

"I don't think there's a developer who will build unless there's something that's going to help the country," Kiwanus said. "I think the government is doing a lot to help the country, and I think the People's National Party is doing a good job."
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Founded in 1982 by Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter in partnership with Emory University, the nonprofit Center undertakes action-oriented programs in cooperation with world leaders and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). In this way, the Center has touched the lives of people in more than 65 countries.

The Center’s programs are directed by resident experts or fellows, some of whom teach at Emory University. They design and implement activities in cooperation with President and Mrs. Carter, networks of world leaders, other NGOs, and partners in the United States and abroad. Private donations from individuals, foundations, corporations, and others support the Center’s work.

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