Observing the 1997 Special Elections Process in Liberia

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Members of the 42-person Carter Center delegation gather for a group dinner on July 21, 1997, two days after the Special Elections in Liberia.
Preface and Acknowledgments

The Carter Center has followed closely events in Liberia since the onset of civil war in December 1989, when Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia launched a rebellion against Samuel Doe's authoritarian regime. The tragic conflict that followed led to hundreds of thousands of deaths, refugees, and internally displaced.

Between 1991-96, President Carter and Center staff made numerous trips to the region to meet with leaders of the various interim governments and factions, members of Liberia's civil society, and others in attempts to forge a workable peace agreement. In 1992, the Center opened a field office in Monrovia to support President Carter's high-level involvement as well as grassroots efforts to promote community development and peacebuilding dialogue among Liberians.

In April, 1996, full-scale fighting broke out in Monrovia, forcing The Carter Center and other international organizations to abandon field operations. However, the renewed fighting also spurred another round of peace talks, which ultimately led to the August 1996 Abuya II agreement, which laid the foundation for a reconstructed transitional government and set new timetables for disarmament, demobilization, and Special Elections to reunite the country into a constitutional order.

In this hopeful context, The Carter Center initiated the 1997 Liberia Election Project with the aim of reinforcing the peace process and supporting successful elections. The Center reopened its Monrovia office in April 1997 and dispatched three pre-election missions. For the July 19 Special Elections, the Center sent a 40-member international observer delegation co-led by President Carter, former U.S. Sen. Paul Simon, and former President nicotine Soglo of Benin. Charles Taylor won the presidential election by a large margin, receiving more than 75 percent of the vote, in a process the Center and other international observers viewed as fair but far from perfect. In many ways, the elections reflected the legacy of the recent conflict including the realities of military and political power on the ground as well as Liberia's desire to secure peace.

Parallel to its observation activities, the Center implemented a set of human rights initiatives to support Liberian human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and reinforce the electoral process. Among these was a training workshop for Liberian human rights groups in June 1997. After the elections, the Center sent another mission to help Liberian human rights NGOs identify post-election priorities. In September, the Center organized a mission to explore possible areas of future assistance.

Support for the Liberia Project and this report was provided by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) through the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES). Throughout the process, the Center worked closely with IFES personnel and consultants and deeply appreciates their collaboration and tireless contribution to Liberia's transition. Denise Daupehals, Peter Williams, Chad Higgs, David Earl, and Deborah Barbee—the IFES team in Monrovia—made invaluable work in Liberia possible and demonstrated professionalism and good humor throughout a difficult process.

The Center also received important support from the government of the Federal Republic of Germany, which provided key funding to purchase election observation equipment and materials.

Several people who played important roles in this Project deserve special thanks. First and foremost, I want to acknowledge the contributions of Terence Lyons, a fellow at the Brookings Institution specializing in political transitions and African politics. Dr. Lyons took a five-month leave from the Brookings to serve in the Center's senior project advisor and Monrovia office director from April-August 1997. His role in managing the Monrovia office and field operations was instrumental.

I am also grateful to Rob Black, assistant
project advisor in the Monrovia office, and Kendall Daye, Monrovia logistics coordinator. They worked closely with Dr. Lyons to keep the Center’s Monrovia operations on course and were especially critical to the successful deployment of election observers. The Center benefited from excellent support provided by our in-county Liberia staff, including Gertrude Koroma, Z. Ramos Miller, and Curtis Majekodunnu. In addition, Carol Jeffrey assisted the Center in organizing and facilitating the May 1997 JECSM workshop. In Atlanta for most but not all of the project, Sara Tindall of the Center’s Conflict Resolution Program coordinated our operations and helped backtrack the Monrovia team. During the elections, several other Center staff played important roles in Atlanta and Monrovia, including Melinda Adams, Deanna Cangelosi, Carrie Kolbhaus, Greg Martinez, Tim Lynch, and Mike Meenan.

Many others contributed to the project. Susan Palmer of IFES has a deep knowledge of Liberia and was for many years the Center’s principal expert on the country. Chip Carter, Jason Carter, Shelley McConnell, and Sara Tindall served as pre-election medium-term observers and as election-day observers. Richard Wilkie, a research analyst for Beth Shapiro and Associates, designed the Center’s quantitative sample. Robert Pastor of the Center’s Latin American and Caribbean Program helped organize the delegation’s observation work and overall direction. Other Center staff who joined the observer delegation also deserve thanks, including Omer Adu-Sagna, David Carroll, Tom Crick, Erik Oliver, and Dana Trammell. Helena Nygren King, human rights consultant to the Center, played an important role in coordinating the Center’s human rights training programs and in conducting a post-election assessment.

I want to express sincere thanks to each Center delegate who sacrificed much time. Each accepted responsibilities under often harsh conditions without complaint, demonstrating serious commitment throughout the mission. The Carter Center is especially grateful to Marie Angélique Savane, former director of the Africa Division of the U.N. Population Fund, member of the Center’s International Negotiation Network (INN) and an important part of the Liberia delegation. In the years before the elections, Ms. Savane and Liberian Palace, in collaboration with former Director of the Center’s Conflict Resolution Program David Spencer, played strong roles in Carter Center/INN efforts to promote the peace process in Liberia, including a 1992 INN mission there.

Although they were not part of the Center’s most recent work, I want to thank the Center’s Monrovia office directors during 1992-93, Paul McDermott and John Langdon, and the local staff who assisted them including Fatu Mandeh, George Kameh, Jackson Wonke, and Kormass Taylor.

Dr. Lyons drafted the core of this report. David Carroll added several sections and managed final editing and revisions with help from Carter Center interns Charles Hall, Angie Eileen, and Adria Taylor. Other contributors include Mr. Block, Ms. Daye, Dr. McConnell, Ms. Nygren King, and Ms. Tindall. I reviewed the report as did several other Center staff, including Jason Carter, Tom Crick, Deanna Cangelosi, and Erik Oliver. Laina Wilk of the Center’s Public Information Office proofed the final text, coordinated its layout, and prepared it for publication.

To fully understand them, Liberia’s 1997 Special Elections must be placed in the context of the country’s long civil war and recent peace process. Although the elections had some serious problems, including overwhelming advantage enjoyed by Charles Taylor in terms of resources, access to media, and organization, they still marked a critical step forward toward consolidating peace. Still, many challenges lie ahead on the road to lasting peace, genuine democracy, and national reconciliation. The Carter Center remains committed to helping Liberia meet these challenges.
Executive Summary

On Dec. 24, 1999, Charles Taylor launched a rebellion against Samuel Doe's regime, igniting a civil conflict in Liberia that lasted nearly seven years. As a result, one-tenth of thewerwar population died, and hundreds of thousands of people became refugees and internally displaced. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) intervened with military force in August 1990 but was unable to end the war, as an array of armed factions fought for control of the country.

After countless peace initiatives and a serious eruption of fighting in the capital of Monrovia in April 1996, the latest of 13 peace agreements—Ahaji II—was signed in Abuja, Nigeria, in August 1997. This accord paved the way for a transitional government, disarmament, demobilization, and the 1997 Special Elections.

To implement demobilization and disarmament, ECOWAS was enlarged and made more effective. Demobilization was relatively successful in collecting arms but was less successful at breaking the armed factions' command and control structures. Several of the major faction leaders—including Charles Taylor, Ahaji Kromah, and George Peley—turned their militias into political parties. Various traditional political parties organized themselves into an Alliance of Political Parties, nominating Cletus Wearer as its presidential candidate. Splits in the Alliance, however, led several prominent politicians to withdraw and launch candidacies with other parties, including Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, Togbui-Eh Tiptoh, and Besco Matthews.

The Carter Center's involvement in Liberia dates from 1991. At the conclusion of the Yarmouths 1 summit in June 1991, the Center was publicly requested to help in the peace process and with eventual elections. In 1992, the Center opened an office in Monrovia to support its work there. However, fighting in April 1990 forced its closure. With Ahaji II's establishment in August 1996, the Center renewed efforts and began developing plans for its Liberia Election Project. In April 1997, the Center reopened its Monrovia office under the direction of Terrence Lyons, who served as senior project advisor.

In the pre-election period, the Center sent three missions in March, April, and June 1997. The March mission, led by the Center's Gordon Streets, assessed electoral preparations and explored how the Center could best support a credible election process. The team reported serious concerns about the lack of a level playing field, the need for an electoral code of conduct, and the need to establish effective, neutral electoral institutions to administer the elections.

The Center's April delegation noted that progress had been made, including the work of the newly established Independent Elections Commission (IECOM) but remained concerned about problems with the electoral preparations and timetable. Delegates thus recommended to postpone the election date beyond the scheduled May 30. They reported serious problems regarding access by political parties to the countryside and media and fears related to security. The mission raised the issue of post-election governance with various leaders, but some, most notably Charles Taylor, resisted even considering the suggestion.

After it became clear that it would be difficult to meet the schedule, ECOWAS organized a consultation with Liberia's political parties on May 21, 1997. This resulted in the release of a Special Elections Package (including election laws) and an agreement to postpone elections until July 19. Most observers believed that the abbreviated timetable favored Charles Taylor's National People's Party, the faction with the best organization and most resources. At ECOM's request, the Carter Center coordinated a workshop on the Special Elections Package on May 29-31, during which the Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC) was formed. IPAC sought to bring together the parties with ECOM to resolve issues and communicate electoral information.
As part of its parallel effort to promote and protect human rights throughout the electoral process, the Center conducted a human rights assessment mission in April, followed by an intensive training program for the Liberian human rights community on June 18-25, 1997.

Earlier that month, the Center deployed two medium-term observers to assess the campaign process and registration status. The Center’s final pre-election mission visited Liberia from June 26-28, led by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter. It focused on:

1) Voter registration.
2) Political party campaigning.
3) IECOM election management problems.

The delegation concluded that despite some obstacles, preparations seemed to be in place for an adequate but far-from-perfect election and that such an election probably was the only alternative to violence. After the mission, the Center deployed another set of medium-term observers to continue monitoring the registration process. The Center coordinated activities with IECOM, ROAMOG, the EU, IFES, UNOMIL, and other international observers to address common issues relating to logistics, communications, security, and information sharing.

For the July 19 elections, the Center organized a 40-member team of international election monitors. President Carter, former President Neciphor Soglo of Benin, and former U.S. Sen. Paul Simon co-led the mission.

Center Center delegates were deployed in 10 of Liberia’s 13 counties. On election day, they watched polling site openings, visited numerous sites over the course of the day, and observed vote counts at preassigned sites. At each site visited, monitors filled out process evaluation forms. The delegation observed the voting process at approximately 10 percent of all polling sites.

The Carter Center delegation also conducted a parallel vote tabulation, or “quick count,” for an independent data source on the results and to facilitate a possible role in calming fears or mediating any post-election disputes between parties or candidates. Despite some logistical difficulties, the Center’s quick count provided an important check on the official results and helped President Carter in his meetings with political party leaders during the days after the election. Early results indicated Charles Taylor and the NPP winning an overwhelming majority of the votes. Immediately after election day, President Carter and other delegates met with major political candidates, appealing for each to
accept the results. According to official results (released later), Taylor won the presidency with over 73 percent of the vote, followed by Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf with 9.6 percent. Taylor's NPP also dominated the House and the Senate (see Appendix I).

The Carter Center's July 21, 1997, Preliminary Statements concluded the election was peaceful. It applauded the high turnout, ECOMOG's vital role in providing security and keeping the process orderly, and the work of domestic observers and party agents. Delegates reported that the voting process at nearly every polling site voted "functioned normally" and/or with only "some minor irregularities." At the same time, they noted some problems, particularly with registration lists, access to media and resources, voter education, and complicated forms. The team stressed, however, that these problems were not sufficiently serious to have altered the people's opportunity to select their leaders.

The Carter Center understands that an election is not by itself sufficient to institutionalize democracy. A strong civil society, ongoing peace-building initiatives, and human rights, to name a few, also are needed. In the critical period following the election, the Center continued to help Liberians build on the encouraging progress represented by the election and on implementing the Abuja Accords. In early August, several weeks after the elections, the Center organized a mission to assess the challenges of promulgating human rights and democratic consolidation in the post-election environment and to identify priorities for doing so. Liberian human rights leaders expressed concern that the departure of the international community's "shield" would gradually give way to repression and human rights abuses.

In early September, the Center organized its final assessment mission, led by Gordon Strachan, to explore possible areas for the Carter Center to assist the Liberian government and civil society after the elections. The team reported progress but noted some early warning signs, specifically regarding promotions in the police force and the need to create a human rights commission without thorough consultation with the local human rights community.

Based on that trip and follow-up, the Center is exploring potential projects for agricultural extension, preparing a national economic development strategy, judicial training, human rights education, training for journalists and media technology, and training for the new human rights commission.

Overall, The Carter Center concluded that the 1997 Liberia Special Elections must be assessed in the context of the broader peace process. Given the recent years of conflict and pervasive fear that Charles Taylor would return to war if not elected, many Liberians made a calculated choice that they thought would promote peace and stability. The new order provides an opportunity for rival groups to play their roles as opposition parties within a legal framework rather than as defeated factions without rights. An assessment on whether these elections served as the beginning of a democratic era must wait until future elections in which voters are given a choice among viable candidates rather than between war and peace.

The international community must do all it can to encourage all parties and the new government to work together to promote genuine reconciliation and inclusiveness and to heal the wounds of the past. For democracy to take root, Liberia needs to promote a more effective system of checks and balances among institutions and to safeguard human rights and public accountability. The Carter Center intends to remain engaged in Liberia to assist in these and other tasks.
Background: From Civil War to Elections

Introduction

Liberia's unique political history is shaped by the post-colonial character of its relations with the United States and its settlement in the early 19th century by freed slaves from the southeastern United States. These former slaves and their descendants, known as Americans, ruled Liberia at the expense of indigenous Africans in the interior for virtually all of its history until April 12, 1980, when a group of commissioned officers led by Master Sgt. Samuel Doe seized power. Over time, Doe's regime increasingly relied on the military, dominated by his ethnic brethren, the Krahn. In 1985, an election was held in which the ballot count was marked by large-scale fraud. In the aftermath, a failed coup by Gen. Thomas Quaquaaka led to massive reprisals against his popular base among the Gio and Mende peoples in Nimba County in northeastern Liberia.

On Dec. 24, 1989, an armed incursion led by Charles Taylor, leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), entered Liberia from Côte d'Ivoire with the goal of overthrowing Doe's ineffective authoritarian government. The ensuing civil war generated such violent brutality that the state collapsed, and social structures were distorted beyond recognition. One-tenth of the prewar population of 2.5 million died; one-third became refugees, and nearly all of the rest were displaced at one time or another. Armed factions, composed in part of child soldiers, and warfare, motivated in part by an interest in looting, resulted in a brutal, complex conflict that was extremely difficult to manage.

In response to the destabilizing threat that the conflict created, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), led by Nigeria, created the ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring
Group (ECOMOG). This group intervened in August 1990 with military force to try to end the conflict. After nearly seven years of civil war and countless peace agreements, the latest of 13 peace agreements was signed in Abuja, Nigeria, in August 1996. This accord reconstituted a transitional government and set new timetables for implementing disarmament, demobilization, and presidential and legislative elections.

The Special Elections held on July 19, 1997, represent the culmination of a long and difficult process of political transition in Liberia from civil war to constitutional order. They were held as the final stage of the Abuja peace process and hence should be judged in part against the goals of the Abuja Accord to end the civil war. Based on assessments made during several pre-election visits, The Carter Center was keenly aware that the success or failure of these elections would have to be judged in relation to their ability to manage conflict.

The Special Elections held on July 19, 1997, represent the culmination of a long and difficult process of political transition in Liberia from civil war to constitutional order.

Although The Carter Center has worked on Liberia since 1991, this report focuses narrowly on its involvement in the 1997 Special Elections; including the observations and findings of its pre-election assessment mission, its field staff based in Monrovia, and its election monitors who observed the final days of the campaign, voting, and counting process. This report also summarizes the project’s parallel human rights component, including training of Liberian human rights groups and the Center’s post-election assessment mission.

Liberia’s Civil War and Regional Intervention

Liberia’s civil war began in December 1989, when Charles Taylor’s rebel NPFL crossed into Liberia from Côte d’Ivoire and moved rapidly through areas hostile to the Doe regime. Taylor had an initial base in northeastern Nimba and Bong Counties among the Gio and Mende peoples who had suffered under Doe’s Kenian regime. As the NPFL advanced, the United States provided more training and equipment, while the UN provided more troops against the civil population, pushing them closer to the NPFL. By July 1990, the NPFL reached Monrovia’s outskirts and threatened to capture the capital. With its back to the sea, the NPFL intensified resistance. Chaos in the capital, characterized by widespread looting and ethnic killings, convinced Liberia’s neighbors, led by Nigeria, to form ECOMOG.

Taylor rejected ECOWAS’ peace initiative, arguing that it favored President Doe. ECOMOG troops, dominated by the Nigerian contingent, landed in Monrovia’s port on Aug. 24, 1990. Taylor’s NPFL forces attacked the troops as they tried to move forward toward the city center the next day. On Aug. 30, ECOMOG sponsored talks in Breguil, the Cameroons, and selected Amos Sawyer to lead the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU). Taylor did not participate in the talks or in the IGNNU.

In early September, a breakout faction of the NPFL, led by Prince Yormie Johnson, killed Doe in a dispute that broke out at a meeting arranged by ECOMOG headquarters. ECOMOG began a military campaign that successfully drove Taylor away from Monrovia. In November, a cease-fire was signed in Bamako, Mali, creating an uneasy peace, with Monrovia governed by IGNNU and protected by ECOMOG and the rest of the country controlled by Taylor and what he called the National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly Government (NPRAG), based in the town of Gbarnga, Bong County.

The ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee held meetings in Lomé, Togo (February 1991),
and Yamehoussoukro, Côte d'Ivoire (five meetings between June and October 1993). Each meeting called for a cease-fire, demobilization, and transitional period culminating in elections, but none was implemented. The Yamoussoukro agreements failed to include the newly emerged factions, such as the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO, established by Krahn and Mandingos and former AFL members, with the backing of the Sierra Leone government).

Taylor used the talks to gain breathing space to rearm and relearn attacks designed to win control unilaterally. Ruling 95 percent of Liberia from his capital in Gbarnga, Taylor had established his own currency, banking system, and radio network and engaged in international trade in diamonds, gold, rubber, and timber. Revenues from this trade went to purchase weapons on the international arms market, which had been flooded with cheap weapons from Eastern Europe's recently dismantled armies.

Fighting between Taylor's forces and ULIMO detailed deployment of ECOMOG, and by August 1993, large-scale fighting between ULIMO and the NPFL set off a new round of displacement. Further attacks on ECOMOG troops demonstrated how the battlefield rather than the negotiating table controlled the conflict.

**Ruling 95 percent of Liberia ..., Taylor had established his own currency, banking system, and radio network and engaged in international trade.**

Convinced that the war's outcome would be determined by military force, Taylor launched Operation Octopus, a major offensive to seize Monrovia, in October 1992. The NPFL shelled Monrovia, nearly capturing the capital before ECOMOG forces fiercely counterattacked using heavy artillery and fighter-bombers in residential neighborhoods where NPFL forces were dug in.

ECOMOG fought with AFL and ULIMO units in open alliance, eventually forcing Taylor back toward Gbarnga.

ECOMOG had denied Taylor victory but had difficulty imposing a long-term political solution. The United Nations added a new set of actors to this increasingly complicated mix by appointing a Special Representative to Liberia, Trevor Gordon-Sumner, and establishing a small but symbolic UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) in September 1993. Taylor began to lose ground to the combined forces of ECOMOG and ULIMO. In addition, ECOMOG imposed economic sanctions and seized the port of Buchanan, denying Taylor access to markets for trading Liberian lumber, minerals, and rubber in exchange for guns and other materials.

U.N.-sponsored meetings in Geneva led to an agreement signed in Conotonu, Benin, in July 1993. This called for an encampment of warring factions under the supervision of ECOMOG and UNOMIL and a five-member Council of State comprised of the NPFL, ULIMO, and Sawyer's interim government. Elections were to be scheduled after seven months of transitional rule. Implementation stalled, due in part to the arrival of another new faction, the Liberia Peace Council (LPC, drawn from Krahn elements in the AFL and ULIMO and led by George Boley), which challenged the NPFL in southeastern Liberia. After many squabbles and delays, the Liberian National Transitional Government (LNTG) was finally sworn in on March 7, 1994, under David Kromah's leadership. ECOMOG was expanded and made joint Nigerian-dominated by the addition of some 1,500 troops fromTanzania and Uganda, a step intended to reassure Taylor, who refused to disarm ECOMOG. Despite these new actors from outside the immediate region, deployment was slow and confused and control ambigious. Disarmament never gained momentum, and soon, the East African forces came under attack and withdrew. Elections scheduled for September 1994 had to be canceled.

In addition to weary new factions forming, the ongoing rivalry between the Krahn and the Mandingos wings of ULIMO again erupted into
Warfare in late 1991, causing the organization to split into two factions (ULIMO-K, led by Alhaji Kromah, and ULIMO-J by Gen. Roosevelt Johnson). In July 1994, tensions within the NPFL erupted as a disaffected faction tried to take over the movement, and violence broke out around Gbarnga. Waves of fighting and displacement ensued while formation of the transitional government stalled. New negotiations (Akosombo, Ghana in September 1994 and Accra, Ghana in November 1994 and January 1995) resulted in a Transitional Council with seats for the faction leaders, including the new factions that had arisen since Cotonon.

**Waves of fighting and displacement ensued while formation of the transitional government stalled.**

The Abuja Accords: The Difficult Road to Peace

Decisions on the constitution and membership of the new Council of State had still to be made in Abuja by March 1995. Under pressure from an increasingly impatient ECOWAS, the first Abuja Accord was signed on Sept. 1, 1995. This Accord created a new seven-member Council of State that included top leaders of the rival factions and three civilians. Afterward, Taylor entered Monrovia to join the new government.

This Accord also called for disarmament by January 1996 and for elections by August 1996 but, as in the past, neither the United Nations nor ECOMOG implemented programs as quickly as promised. Violations of the cease-fire and attacks on humanitarian relief continued despite the Accord. In December 1995, Roosevelt Johnson and his ULIMO-J attacked ECOMOG troops near Tokormag, causing nearly 100 casualties and capturing large amounts of military equipment. Many analysts have suggested that a dispute between Johnson and Nigerian peacekeepers over control of local diamond mines partly motivated the fighting. ECOMOG began operations to isolate Johnson and supported efforts by Taylor and Kromah to marginalize their rival.

Violence reached new heights when a round of intense urban fighting broke out in Monrovia in April 1996. Taylor and his ally of the moment, Alhaji Kromah (ULIMO-K), dismissed Roosevelt Johnson (ULIMO-J) from the interim government and assaulted his largely Krahn militia. Taylor underestimated the fighting capacity of Johnson's small but well-armed force (drawn from ULIMO-J, AFL, and LPC), who were based up at the Barclay Training Center compound together with hostages. The battle "collapsed into a murderous fire," destroying not only the city but also the public's confidence that Liberia could hold an election anytime soon. The U.N. Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Office estimated that 50 percent of Monrovia's population left their homes for more secure areas. ECOMOG scored powerfully or unwilling to contain the violence. Some have alleged that elements of ECOMOG cooperated with the attack.

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Throughout the April 1996 crisis, losing was widespread. Child soldiers, who seemed emboldened by the thrill of shooting, undertook much of the fighting. According to the United Nations, "It can safely be stated that all humanitarian organizations, U.N. agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), UNOMIL, and government offices, as well as shops and other commercial establishments, were..."
systematically hunted by fighters of all factions." In response, nearly all international humanitarian workers evacuated the city.

Taylor's men targeted attacks toward many of the nascent institutions of civil society as well as the international community. The Justice and Peace Commission (JPC) of the National Catholic Secretary suffered particularly hard, losing every document, all its equipment, and its only vehicle. According to Anton Swyer, "The big three warlords... have decided they are going to crush whatever civilian opposition they can. Whatever they had not succeeded in bullying out of existence or shutting down through rigged courts they have just crushed."

The major Liberian factional leaders—Charles Taylor, Alhaji Kromah, George Boley, and Roosevelt Johnson—attended and signed a revised Abuja agreement, Abuja II.

In May, West African leaders organized a round of talks in Accra, Ghana, in an effort to end the fighting and restore the transitional government. The meeting established a new cease-fire and returned Johnson to his cabinet position. Following the Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit in Yaounde, at which a resolution calling for sanctions and a war crimes tribunal against factional leaders was endorsed, ECOWAS increased pressure on militia leaders.

West African foreign ministers from ECOWAS' Committee of Nine, mandated to manage the intervention, gathered for more talks in Abuja, Nigeria, in August 1996. Nigerian Gen. Sani Abacha, the new ECOWAS chair who replaced President Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, led the talks. The major Liberian factional leaders—Charles Taylor, Alhaji Kromah, George Boley, and Roosevelt Johnson—attended and signed a revised Abuja agreement, Abuja II. This accord constituted a factionally based Council of State to serve as the interim government for a short transition period, with disarmament beginning in September 1996 and elections in May 1997. One Western diplomat said, "Sani Abacha wants to get out of Liberia. To do that, he has to find a workable end-game strategy, which will have to involve elections." Following the Abuja meetings, a cease-fire was declared on Aug. 20, 1996, and Ruth Perry replaced Wilton Sankawulo as head of state.

Abuja II: Implementing a Peace Plan

To implement Abuja II’s critical disarmament and demobilization phase, ECOMOG increased its forces and demonstrated new leadership under Nigerian Maj. Gen. Victor Malu. Although disarmament began slowly in November 1996, it gained momentum toward the end of January 1997. The deadline for handing in weapons was extended for 10 days until Feb. 9. ECOMOG collected large quantities of weapons, and, for the first time in years, guns were not visible on the streets except in peacekeepers’ hands. While demobilization enjoyed relative success in collecting, it had less success in breaking factions’ command and control over fighters. Due to scarce resources and poor planning, the demobilization exercise was reduced to a 12-hour process. Ex-combatants simply turned in their weapons, were registered, and were left to go on their own.

As called for in both Abuja Accords, faction leaders resigned from the Council of State, and several transformed their militias into political parties. Taylor transformed his NPL into a political party, the National Patriotic Party (NPP). Similarly, Kromah turned his ULIMO-K into the All Liberian Coalition Party (ALCOP). George Boley became the standard-bearer for former President Doe’s former party, the National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)

In addition, several traditional political parties
began reorganizing. In January 1997, some came together in an Alliance of Political Parties, promising to provide Liberian voters a clear alternative to former factional leaders. The Alliance held a contentious convention that nominated Cletus Wororor of the Liberian Action Party (LAP) as its presidential candidate. However, allegations of vote buying led several prominent politicians, including Togba-Nah Tipoteh (Liberian People’s Party—LPP) and Baccus Matthews (United People’s Party—UPP), to withdraw. The Unity Party (UP) also left the Alliance, nominating Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf as its candidate. Johnson-Sirleaf was formerly a leader of the LAP and later an official with the U.N. Development Program in New York. As strains within the Alliance deepened, many prominent individuals deserted to Johnson-Sirleaf and the UP.

All told, 13 political parties qualified for the ballot (see Appendix B). Taylor’s NPP had an advantage; it could build on organizational structures developed and financial and capital resources seized during the war. As the major civilian leaders began to gravitate toward Johnson-Sirleaf, she appeared to be the leading contender to challenge Taylor. The other parties were identified either regionally or ethnically (the ALCOP never fully overcame its image as a Mandingo party and NDPL had a strong Krahn constituency) or were small civilian parties with only limited capacity to campaign in the countryside.
Carter Center Pre-election Assessments and Training Workshops

Background to The Carter Center’s Liberia Election Project

The Carter Center’s involvement in Liberia dates to March 1991, when all sides in the country’s civil war invoked former U.S. President Jimmy Carter to assist in the peace process and preparations for eventual elections. President Carter first visited the country in 1978 during his administration and has maintained an interest ever since.

After several months of exploratory contacts in 1991, the Center was publicly invited to play a role in the peace process and elections. The request came in a communiqué issued in June 1991 at the end of what became known as the Yamoussoukro I summit, attended by Charles Taylor, Amos Sawyer, and ECOWAS heads of state. The communiqué asked the Center to “begin the elections process in Liberia” and “cooperate with the Committee of Five (alternatively called the ECOWAS Mediation Committee) who will scrupulously oversee the cease-fire.” This invitation was echoed in subsequent ECOWAS meetings and made more explicit in the Yamoussoukro II and III communiqués and other agreements.

By 1994, President Carter and Carter Center staff had made several trips to the region, meeting with leaders of the interim governments, faction leaders, and members of civil society, and communicating with officials throughout West Africa. To bolster its various activities in support of peace and democratization, the Center established an office in Monrovia in 1992. This remained open until full-scale fighting broke out in April 1996, forcing its closing and evacuation of its director.

In addition to President Carter’s high-level involvement, the Center’s Monrovia office supported many programs between 1992-96, including the Liberian Network for Peace and Development (LNPD) and the Liberian Initiative for Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution (LIPCORE). The LNPD was formed in 1991 as a consortium of Liberian NGOs and civic groups working to promote community development and helping the population overcome the war’s ravages. LIPCORE emerged from a series of meetings organized by The Carter Center in 1994 and 1995. It sought to foster peacebuilding dialogues by bringing together prominent Liberians associated with faction leaders, the military, and others and by providing fora for open exchange of viewpoints and concerns. Also, the Center’s Atlanta-based staff organized the Mickey Leland Fellowship Program, which brought people associated with various Liberian NGOs to Atlanta for capacity-building and training, including working with several Atlanta civic organizations.

When full-scale fighting broke out in Liberia in April 1996, the Center closed its Monrovia office and temporarily suspended field projects. However, after the signing of Abobo II in August 1996, the Center renewed efforts to reinforce the peace process and began plans for a project to support the upcoming elections. The Liberia Project was conceived as a comprehensive observation mission to:

1) Support and reinforce Liberian groupsworking to institutionalize the electoral process.
2) Deterr fraud, prevent violence, and encourage acceptance of clean election results or peaceful challenges of disputed elections through legal means.
3) Encourage a credible pact or code of conduct for political parties and campaigns.
4) Encourage national dialogue to facilitate the transition,
5) Promote and protect human rights throughout the electoral process.

To support these objectives, the Center sent three pre-election assessment missions (in March, April, and June 1997) as well as a large international observer delegation. It opened another field office in April 1997 to support the missions and prepare for the elections. In May, the Center’s Monrovia office staff coordinated a workshop for the Liberian Independent Election Commission (IECOM) on new election laws and codes of conduct. Following a special April human rights assessment mission, it also organized a training workshop in June for Liberian human rights NGOs.

The Carter Center sent three pre-election assessment missions ... as well as a large international observer delegation. It opened another field office in April 1997 to support the missions and prepare for the elections.

In July, the Center sent a 40-person delegation to monitor the elections and assess the process. Afterward, it coordinated a democratic consolidation mission to explore possible areas of future assistance as well as a mission to help Liberian human rights NGOs identify priority areas of focus and concern in the post-election environment. Each activity will be described in sections that follow.

Prior to these efforts, The Carter Center, in collaboration with the World Bank, organized a workshop in Atlanta on Feb. 19-21, 1997, on the war-to-peace transition in Liberia and Guatemala. The workshop, which included government officials, opposition leaders, heads of civil society, representatives from the United Nations, ECOWAS, the donor community, and regional and international NGOs, focused on four topics:

1) Peace negotiations and demilitarization,
2) Social and economic reintegration of vulnerable groups,
3) Conflict transformation,
4) Restoring social capital and strengthening civil society.

The conference helped articulate concerns of Liberian civil society about delays in disarmament and issues related to the election process. Providing a forum in which to present their views, participants expressed caution about the upcoming elections, stressing they were not an end in themselves, and they could lead to renewed violence and loss of faith in the democratic process if they failed. Participants agreed that confidence-building measures were necessary, including steps on restoration of economic processes, demobilization, good governance, human rights, democratic institutions, and the empowerment of civil society and women.

March 4-8 Pre-election Assessment Mission: Defining a Role

The Carter Center’s first mission to Liberia, from March 4-8, 1997, assessed preparation for the presidential and legislative elections, which were then scheduled for May 30, and explored how the center could best support a credible electoral process that could form the basis for an enduring peace. Delegation members included Gordon Stokie, the center’s acting associate executive director and director of the Liberia Project; Terryn Lyons, election advisor and research associate at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C.; and Susan Palmier, assistant director for projects in the Carter Center’s Conflict Resolution Program.

The team met with potential presidential candidates, representatives of political parties, nominated members of IECOM, which was still in
formation, members of the ruling Council of State, and others to discuss preparations for national elections. All welcomed President Carter's interest in holding an international delegation to observe their elections. Based on information collected from a wide range of organizations and institutions during its five-day visit, the Carter Center delegation concluded that Liberia required the immediate and intensive engagement of the international community to consolidate the dual transition to peace and democracy. The team also decided that the Center should remain engaged and should reopen its Monrovia office to contribute to the transition and prepare for an election-monitoring delegation.

The team noted that several areas related to conflict resolution and the minimum requirements for credible elections needed more work. First, regarding conflict resolution, it recognized the critical importance of demobilization, defined as the breaking of command and control over fighters to reduce opportunities for a return to war. Team members called on the international community to vigorously support comprehensive programs for demobilization and careful monitoring.

Second, delegates noted the importance of a post-election power-sharing pact, stating that "political institutions created by elections following a period of conflict have a particular burden to be as inclusive as possible so that no group will feel it lacks a stake in the new order." The Center pledged to pursue opportunities to promote discussion toward such an agreement.

Third, the Center recommended provisions to marginalize the threat posed by " spoilers" who might refuse to accept election results and return to war. It urged neighboring states to cut economic links that allowed warring factions to obtain arms and other resources. It also encouraged the international community to implement effective sanctions on firms and individuals who benefited from and sustained such links and on any party that refused to accept election results and took up arms.

Regarding conflict management, delegates identified several issues that needed attention for elections to be credible. Foremost among these was the concern raised by a range of Liberian political leaders about the lack of a level playing field, particularly in terms of access to the media and media. Mission members recommended that parties work on an electoral code of conduct including rules to cover campaigning and provide for unimpeded access to all areas of the country.

Another major issue was the need to establish
effective, neutral institutions to administer the elections and adjudicate any disputes. At the time of the March mission, the lack of an independent elections commission severely constrained the process, and many Liberian actors expressed concern about the feasibility of moving the scheduled election date, May 30. The Center’s report said, “Sufficient time is necessary to hold public consensus among key constituencies such as political parties and civic organizations behind the decisions regarding the electoral system the Commission must adopt.” Despite these concerns, the Carter Center team chose not to recommend a delay, deciding instead that the Liberian elections commission should select the election date.

The next month, the Center reopened its Montevideo office, with Terrence Lyons as senior project advisor/Montevideo office director. Also, IECOM was inducted, and parties began selecting candidates and planning campaign strategies.

April 17-21 Pre-election Assessment Mission and Aftermath

The Carter Center conducted a second assessment mission from April 17-21, 1997. Ambassador Streich led the delegation, which included Andres Olendzki, senior researcher for the Centre for Conflict Resolution in South Africa, and Sue Tindall, project coordinator of the Carter Center’s Conflict Resolution Program. Delegates joined Dr. Lyons and Rob Black, assistant project advisor of the Center’s Montevideo office.

The mission met with a wide range of Liberian actors and issued a report that noted that IECOM had made progress but expressed concern about the lack of voter education and about delays in the Liberian government’s financial support for the elections commission. The report also noted the lack of transparency and consultation in the development of the so-called Special Elections Package, which was to include the laws and code of conduct governing the electoral process. Specifically, the Center’s report found that “important decisions regarding party lists, ballot design, and deadlines seemed to be made without an adequate period of public education and deliberation” and called for systematic discussions among political parties, civic organizations, and the commission regarding regulations to implement the election law and code.

[The Carter Center] expressed concern about the lack of voter education and about delays in the Liberian government’s financial support for the elections commission.

The mission remained concerned about continued constraints on political parties’ access to the countryside and media and had fears related to security. A lack of discussion on governance issues held particular significance. According to the report, “There was no indication that planning was moving forward on what sort of government would be constituted by the elections, how long the government would sit, what sort of internal security arrangements the country would need, and the like.”

The mission raised the issue of post-election governance with party leaders, but some, most notably Charles Taylor, rebuffed the idea and suggested that efforts to negotiate power-sharing were designed to recreate the ineffective interim governments of the past.

Based on these concerns, the April delegation explicitly recommended that the election be postponed. The report called for “creation of a transparent electoral process developed independently by IECOM, in consultation with relevant Liberian and international actors, with sufficient time to build an inclusive process and thereby complete the challenging tasks necessary for a credible election. Such a process will inevitably require a delay in holding elections beyond May 30.”
April-May 1997: Slow Progress and Postponement

After the Centre's April mission, IECOM showed indications that it could not meet the May 30 deadline. A critical problem slowing the process was the Council of State's inability or unwillingness to provide funds for IECOM to cover staff salaries. IECOM's funding became further complicated by rivalry and misunderstandings between ECOWAS and the international donor community, which was providing technical and financial support for the elections. On April 23, 1997, IECOM Chair G. Henry Andrews announced a suspension of deadlines for party conventions, party lists, and the start of the 30-day campaign period. Shortly after, on April 24-27, ECOWAS Special Envoy Chief Tom Ikimi visited Liberia to meet with political parties and IECOM to assess the situation and status of electoral preparations.

IECOM's slow progress in completing the Special Elections Package made it difficult for international donors to provide assistance and particularly technical advice to IECOM. Because IECOM would not provide electoral consultants from the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) or the European Community with the draft Special Elections Package, designing training materials or registration forms was impossible.

The lack of transparency regarding deliberations created a context in which rumors of favoritism toward one or another candidate flourished.

As the planned election date drew closer, it became clear that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to meet the schedule. Thus, officials held a flurry of meetings and consultations to hammer out final details of the Special Elections Package and to set a new election date. The process was marked and characterized by Liberian officials flying off to Abuja for consultations and ECOWAS leaders, such as Ikimi, holding meetings in Monrovia. The lack of transparency regarding deliberations created a context in which rumors of favoritism toward one or another candidate flourished. In particular, many Liberians believed Nigeria supported Charles Taylor and the United States backed Ellen Johnson Sirleaf. Nigeria seemed to fear that the West was trying to "steal" credit for the election and control the elec-

In light of problems and remaining hurdles, an increasing number of Liberian leaders spoke out on the need for credible elections, and many urged a postponement.
The parties, despite their earlier public demand for a postponement until October, agreed to accept a decision to postpone the election until July 19.

The parties further agreed to adopt a single ballot (with a single vote cast for the president and higher party's slate of legislative candidates), which they argued was more appropriate for proportional representation. They also called for counting at the polling sites rather than at a centralised counting centre, as envisioned in the draft Package. The parties had only a short time to review the Package, and some stated later that they did not fully understand all implications of the Abuya agreements. The July 19 date left only 35 days for preparations, a very small number given the state of planning and logistical challenges facing IEBCOM. Most observers believed that the abbreviated timetable favored the NPP, the party with the best organisation and most resources.

Workshops and Training: IEBCOM Elections Workshop and Human Rights Training for NGOs

IECOM Workshop on the Special Elections Package

Following the May summit and change in election day, a broad framework for the July elections was established. However, concerns and deliberations remained, and The Carter Center undertook several initiatives to try to ameliorate some of them. Two problems in particular were:

1. The need for consultations between IEBCOM and the parties.
2. The need for a stronger, more effective human rights community in the context of the transition.

The Carter Center anticipated the first need in the context of its Liberia Project, as it was linked to the Center's efforts to help institutionalise the electoral process and encourage agreement among parties on a code of conduct for responsible campaigning. The Center discussed the code of conduct with IEBCOM and the parties during both its March and April missions, and Montevideo-based staff pursued the issue through May. Although the Special Elections Package completed in May did include a formal Code of Conduct, it was developed with little consultation and therefore provided few opportunities for the Carter Center to influence content.

At IEBCOM's request, however, the Center did play a critical role in coordinating a workshop on the Package (including both the Special Elections Law and the Special Elections Code of Conduct). This workshop, which took place at IEBCOM headquarters on May 29-31, sought to:
IIPAC served as a forum for parties and IECOM to exchange information, but lack of time prevented it from becoming an effective mechanism for consensus building. Mainly, IIPAC was a channel through which IECOM could provide information to parties, which, because of their underdeveloped state, had limited ability to vigorously engage with IECOM.

June 18-25 Human Rights Training for Liberian NGOs

One focus of The Carter Center's Liberia Project was to strengthen the promotion and protection of human rights throughout the electoral process. Hence, the Center conducted an intensive training program for the Liberian human rights community at the St. Teresa's Convent in Monrovia on June 18-25, 1997. Sixty participants representing 12 human rights NGOs attended. Helena Nygren Krug, human rights consultant to The Carter Center, coordinated and facilitated the training, which included sessions conducted by Chris Mburu of the International Human Rights Law Group, Dodie McDow of the Fund for Peace in New York, a representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross, and two UNOMIL human rights officers. Several from Liberia's human rights community also

made presentations, including Archbishop Michael K. Francis, Ret. Woods of the JPC, Joanne Jarrett of Liberia's Association of Female Lawyers, and Benedict Stamchi of the Center for Law and Human Rights Education (CLHRE).

The agenda was tailored to meet groups' individual needs as determined through an assessment mission by Mr. Mbumu and Ms. Nygel Krug in April 1997. It was divided into three sections (see Appendix 1).

The first session, on human rights and democracy, included presentations on the roles of a constitution, elections, and civil society in a democracy, as well as problems of democracy in Africa. Human rights issues during elections were considered, specifically election-related rights such as freedom of assembly and association, freedom of expression, freedom of information, and the independence of the judiciary. Presentations also addressed issues specific to the upcoming elections, including voter education and proportional representation versus a single constituency system.

The second session focused on fact finding and documenting, reporting, and disseminating human rights. It covered concepts and techniques regarding principles that underlie human rights NGOs' operations, such as impartiality, neutrality, and independence. Participants learned how to verify facts, assess rights violations (e.g., visits to Liberia's legal obligations, distinguish human rights violations from acts of criminality, collect information, and approach moral issues and cultural and/or local sensibilities (e.g., concerning refugees, minors, and women).

This second portion also outlined human rights enforcement mechanisms at international, regional, and local levels. It detailed the U.N. human rights system and the mechanisms and procedures available under it, including how to file a case, provide information, lobby the United Nations, and link up with international NGOs. Specifically, participants discussed the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child and the status of the draft optional protocol on limiting age for recruitment to armed forces, which is directly applicable to Liberia's problem of child soldiers. Trainers presented the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights as an example of regional enforcement.

[Several] NGOs joined the domestic monitoring effort organized by the Liberian Election Observation Network.

The final part of the training, on the post-election period and institution building, addressed human rights and the media, judiciary, police, and military. Participants discussed human rights NGOs' role and how they could coordinate, network, raise funds, and obtain U.N. consultative status. The session highlighted the meaning of crimes against humanity and war crimes, the role of truth commissions and war crimes tribunals, and the status of the proposed establishment of a permanent International Criminal Court. It ended with a debate about the relationship of peace and justice.

Each participant received a briefing book containing international and regional human rights instruments applicable to Liberia, a training manual for fact finding, contact information for the U.N. human rights system and international NGOs, guidelines on human rights reporting, and other materials.

Several of these human rights NGOs had recently formed a coalition called the Center for Human Rights with a view to coordinating their activities during the election. In the run-up to the elections, however, the group split over organizational rivalities and what role to play in the elections. Thus, the JPC, headed by Kofi Woods, together with several other NGOs joined the domestic monitoring effort organized by the Liberian Election Observation Network (LEON). The CLHRE, led by Counsel for Benedict Stamchi, chose to observe the elections independently, claiming all domestic observers were American-supported and partisan.
June 26-28 Pre-election Assessment Mission:
Campaign and Registration

As agreed during the Abuja Summit in May, the campaign period officially began on June 16, 1997. Although several violent incidents occurred, candidates continued to campaign, and several held rallies in different parts of the country. Voter education was limited and further constrained because media were dominated by partisan leaders, most importantly Charles Taylor, who controlled the only radio station that could reach all of Liberia. These factors raised serious concerns among Liberians and foreign observers. Could and would voters receive sufficient neutral information to make informed choices?

Registration was scheduled to begin on June 24 and last until July 3. However, because of logistical difficulties and poor planning, it started slowly. The rainy season's onset made large areas of the south inaccessible by road, including almost all of Grand Kru, Maryland, Sinoe, Rivercess, and Grand Gedeh Counties, and large parts of upper and lower Lofa County.

In early June, The Carter Center deployed two medium-term observers, Chip Carter, the Carter’s son, and Sara Tindall of the Center’s Conflict Resolution Program, to assess the campaign process and assist in preparations for the July election observation mission. Mr. Carter and Ms. Tindall traveled throughout Liberia, reporting on the campaign, the status of registration and other electoral preparations, the presence of UNOMIL and other international observers, and logistical issues concerning road conditions and polling site accessibility.

The Center sent its final pre-election mission to Liberia on June 26-28, which included President Carter, Ambassador Street, and Dr. Lyons. This delegation held a series of meetings with IECOM officials, ECOMOG commanding Gen. Malu, the U.S. and Nigerian ambassadors, Nigerian Foreign Minister Ikimi, Archbishop Michael Francis, political party representatives, and officials from the United Nations, the European Union (EU), IFES, civic organizations, and others. Together, they focused on:

1) Voter registration.
2) Political party campaigning.
3) IECOM election management problems.

Voter Registration:
On June 30, the delegation observed registra-
Jimmy Carter meets with Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, presidential candidate of the Unity Party, prior to the July 19 Special Elections.

In Montserrado, Bomi, and Grand Cape Mount Counties and visited numerous registration sites between Montserrado and Sinjeh (50 miles to the northwest), including several displaced-persons camps. The team noted that ECOMOG forces were in charge of maintaining security and seemed to be trusted by all election officials, political parties, and citizens. Despite transportation problems and adverse weather conditions, ECOMOG, UNOMIL, the EU, and IECOM co-operated to deliver registration materials to an estimated 1.504 registration sites throughout the country.

Because of the unavoidable staggered delivery of materials, however, the team found that many sites began registration several days late. At most sites, people waited patiently in line. Registration officials meticulously followed written procedures, which included recording basic information of each registrant, painting indelible ink on registrants' thumbs, and issuing laminated registration cards.

Only one negative incident was reported; an ECOMOG soldier had to remove an individual who was encouraging people to vote for a particular party. Some alleged that registration cards were being bought and sold, but the scale and consequences of such activities remained unclear.

The team expressed concern about the absence of observers during the registration process. In general, the only observers present at sites the team visited were ECOMOG soldiers, who were assigned to provide order. Because of the compressed timetable, registration went forth with few voters having identification. The procedures therefore only allowed for people to give their personal data to registration officials. Registrants could be challenged once the lists were published, so observers could challenge them at registration sites. The absence of party or other local observers opened the possibility for noncitizens or underage individuals to register.

Since registration began slowly in many locations, officials considered extending it in some places. This made scrutiny of the registration process and lists even more difficult for parties and others who wanted to organize. Parties attributed their absence to ECOMOG's late announcement of procedures for obtaining credentials, including a $2 fee, which parties said they could not pay. ECOMOG subsequently abolished the fee, but by the time procedures were set and badges issued, registration was well under way.

Because of decisions by COWAS in February 1997, no provisions were made for refugees to vote in neighboring countries. This meant that some 600,000 Liberian refugees would be disenfranchised. There were reports of refugees temporarily crossing over to register. ECOMOG recorded that some 123,000 refugees returned in the previous three months, but it was not clear whether these registrations were permanent.
Campaign Activities

Presidential candidates and party officials with whom the team met fell into three categories:

1) Those with an extensive network of party offices throughout the country (the NPP).
2) Those working to establish such a network and attempting to campaign in all 13 counties (the UP and the UPP).
3) Those focusing on particular campaign incidents, suggesting they had already concluded the process was not fair (the Alliance, the NDCP, and the ALCOP)

The June assessment team heard reports of several problems during the campaign, including an incident that occurred on the first day. The UP and the NPP claimed in the same area, and NPPapur shiners attacked the UP convoy. ECOMOG soldiers moved in quickly, arresting and jailing the two insurgents. Other violent incidents marred two other parties’ events in Nsibisa County but did not halt the campaigning.

Members of the Alliance of Political Parties complained that a report of a plot to assassinate Charles Taylor led to unjustified arrests of Alliance supporters. The party contended that the report had deliberately been designed to disrupt its campaign. ECOMOG told The Carter Center’s assessment team the threat was real and one individual had been arrested.

Patties continued complaining to team members about the lack of a level playing field, arguing they could not match the resources and short-wave radio capacity of the NPP and Charles Taylor. Unfortunately, repeated promises by the EU and the United States earlier in the year to enhance the capacity of two local radio stations (assuring alternative FM and short-wave access throughout the country) still had not materialized. President Carter made several contacts to facilitate shipment of transmitters. In the end, the transmitters arrived in Liberia shortly before the election. Thus, they played only a small role in increasing access to the media during the campaign period.

Despite these complications, several party leaders felt the campaign process had a healing effect on the country. Those actively campaigning re-established a presence in areas that in recent years had seen only members of armed factions. Some sense of normalcy returned, and a message of hope resonated, particularly in displaced persons camps, where residents said they simply wanted to install an elected government so they could go home.

The Elections Commission

The Carter Center team reported the potentially serious problem of an apparent shortfall of donor commitments to ECOM to cover the full cost of registration and voting. The Elections Commission raised three specific concerns:

1) Renovation of office space for the 15 magistrates in the 13 counties had not started, making it difficult to begin field operations.
2) Communications equipment and supporting generators had not been installed, making it impossible for ECOM to call field offices.
3) No agreement had been reached on the amount and method of payment for registration personnel, who were threatening to walk off the job.

Disagreements over which organization(s) had committed to which payments not only impacted the working relationship among ECOM, the EU, and IFES but also took on a political dimension. ECOM expressed concern that such disputes were part of a deliberate plan to undermine its efforts to conduct elections on schedule. The EU and IFES rejected these assertions, but the atmosphere remained charged. President Carter arranged for a meeting between the EU and ECOM Chair Andrews, at which they agreed that U.N. and EU auditors would work at ECOM offices to expedite voucher payment and that the EU would take over direct payment of salaries to most registration personnel. Upon this agreement, the United States, the EU, and ECOMC arranged to ensure full funding.

Voter education presented another problem. Although ECOM’s civic education unit was responsible for educating voters, it had done little more
than put up posters. However, "Talking Drum Studios," with support from the NGO Search for Common Ground, conducted useful voter education programs, including street and radio skits.

The Carter Center team concluded that despite some obstacles, preparations seemed to exist for an adequate but far-from-perfect election. It also said such an election probably was the only alternative to continuing violence. At the visit's end, President Carter held a press conference to make the following points:

1) While registration had gotten off to a shaky start and contained some weaknesses, there still was time for eligible voters to register.
2) Voters should understand their ballot would be cast in secret, so they should ignore any propaganda to the contrary and vote their consciences.
3) The fact that any one party had more resources than others was not unprecedented and should not be presumed to give that party an insurmountable advantage.
4) Parties should respect each others' right to campaign anywhere without fear of intimidation.

Other Pre-election Observations and Activities

Mid-Term Observers and the Registration Process

Following the June assessment mission, the Carter Center deployed Shelley McConnell, political science professor at Bard College, and Jason Carter, the Carters' grandson, as medium-term observers to continue monitoring the registration process and exhibition process of confirming registration that immediately followed. Between 1-4-16, 1997, they visited 61 polling stations in six counties.

Dr. McConnell and Mr. Carter noted several minor problems regarding registration, including insufficient materials to register all interested voters in some areas, particularly Lofa County. A potentially more serious problem was the lack of pay for registration workers. A few registrars threatened to go on strike if not paid before election day.
While training of registrars had reportedly been hurried, the Center's observers said the workers seemed to understand the process, and the rate of rejected cards was remarkably low. They also were encouraged about the security conditions for registration, reporting that ECOMOG troops were present at each site visited. Registrars characterized ECOMOG soldiers as cooperative and faithfully performing their role in guarding sealed registration materials at night. The only security-related incident reported involved the stoning of a group of Mandingo refugees returning from Guinea to Nimba County. ECOMOG arrested those responsible and restored order.

Dr. McConnell and Mr. Carter noted that UNOMIL observers were deployed across the country and had visited most registration sites. The vast majority of registrars told them that IECOM officials occasionally, sometimes regularly, visited their sites. More often, a coordinator or the county magistrate visited the sites. All but one reported visits by UNOMIL observers, and a few reported visits by EU observers.

However, very few party agents were present for registration. Only the NPP was sufficiently organized and well-financed to mount a serious observation of the registration period that stretched from June 24 to July 9 (after a three-day extension in some areas). Other parties were either disorganized or completely unknown. Most of the party agents present (generally the NPP) reported satisfaction with the registration process, and very few prospective voters reported being challenged by party agents. Those who were rejected were usually disqualified for being underage. (Applicants' ages were verified by asking their years of birth or other questions concerning historic events with well-known dates).

While exact figures were unavailable, it was clear that a relatively large number of Liberians had registered to vote, including significant numbers of recently returned refugees. (Participation in the so-called "exclusion period," during which voters confirmed registration, however, was much lower). Despite these high figures, it should be noted that some voters were disenfranchised either because registration rolls were full or because the registration period ended before they could register. It is impossible to know how many people were affected, but some speculated that Lofa and Nimba Counties suffered the most from disenfranchisement; large numbers of refugees crossed the Guinea border to register there, leading to an unexpected demand for registration, which IECOM could not meet.

Overall, the medium-term observers' reports upheld President Carter's earlier positive assessment of the registration process. At the same time, they signaled in advance some minor problems that would complicate but not delay the July 19 elections.
Other Observations and Carter Center Activities

The Monrovia-based Carter Center staff participated in numerous workshops and meetings with other civic and international organizations. Rob Black participated in UNOMIL briefings for their medium-term observers and discussed conflict resolution in the context of elections. Terrence Lyons spoke at an election law workshop, which was held at the Liberian Supreme Court and was sponsored by the U.S. Department of Justice. He also briefed the election observer delegation sent by Friends of Liberia, a group composed largely of former Peace Corps volunteers, upon their arrival in Monrovia.

Black and Lyons also met and advised the Liberian domestic observer group, LEON. In coordination with the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), which organized training programs for LEON, Center staff assisted LEON in developing their election-deployment plan and submitting it to IECOM. This enabled IECOM to create a plan for transporting domestic observers, including those from LEON, before and after the election, which significantly improved domestic observers’ coverage of polling sites.

The IECOM Logistics Working Group, composed of representatives of ECOMOG, IECOM, the EU, IFES, and UNOMIL, played an important role in the elections. IFES staff and consultants helped draft election-training materials and other materials. They also bolstered the Group’s capacity to manage the deployment of election materials and the process of receiving ballot boxes and post-election results. Carter Center staff coordinated their activities with this Group and the other international observer groups by participating in weekly meetings with UNOMIL, the EU, Friends of Liberia, and ECOVAS to address common issues relating to logistics, communications, security, and information sharing.

The Center’s Monrovia staff made a series of trips to the countryside to establish contacts with UNOMIL field stations, assess conditions, and prepare for deploying the Center’s observation delegation to Bomi, Bong, Grand Bassa, Grand Cape Mount, Grand Gedeh, Grand Kru, Margibi, Montserrado, Nimba, and Sinoe Counties.
Carter Center Election Observation and Follow-up
July 19 Election Observation Mission

The Delegation

For the July 19, 1997, elections, The Carter Center organized a 40-member international team to observe the elections. President Carter co-led the delegation with Nicephore Soglo, former president of Benin, and Paul Simon, former U.S. senator (see International Observer Mission List, page 4). The mission’s principal purposes were to support and reinforce the electoral process, deter fraud, prevent violence, and encourage acceptance of clean results or peaceful challenges of disputed elections through legal means. As stated in its press release, The Carter Center was “neutral with regard to outcome but partial to the democratic process.” In this role, The Carter Center and other international observers hoped they would “help to ensure that the Liberian people can freely express their choice in a secret ballot.”

Voters stood in long lines for many hours to cast their ballots on July 19, 1997. Here, they wait in the morning at a polling site in Monrovia.
Carter Center observers deployed outside Monrovia faced bad roads and difficult conditions, such as this log bridge near Zorzor in Lofa County.

Prior to deployment, Center staff conducted extensive briefings sessions for delegates. Most arrived in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, on July 13, traveling together to Liberia on July 14. Ambassador Streeb and Dr. Lyons presented a briefing on July 14 in Abidjan before flying to Monrovia. In Liberia, the delegation had full days of briefings on July 15 and 16 at St. Teresa's Convent, including reports from UNOMIL, IFES, ECOMOG, the U.S. Embassy, other observer groups, and the major political parties. Briefings addressed logistics, security, and communications.

Based on its assessment missions and current reports from the its Monrovia office and the other major international organizations involved, The Carter Center issued a statement on July 18, the day before the election. "We have concluded that, despite important problems in the electoral process this country is poised to undertake a historic decision," the statement concluded. At a press conference that same day, President Carter joined Ambassador A.H.J.M. Speekenbrink, leader of the EU delegation, and Ambassador Paul Rapia, leader of the OAU delegation, in urging voters to make the most of their secret ballots. President Carter said, "We also hope that this election permits all Liberians to put a new leaf on and begin working together with each other in a new spirit of respect and tolerance. We look forward to seeing all of you at the polling stations tomorrow."

Deployment and Observation Methodology

In the months preceding the election, The Carter Center and the other international observer organizations, including the EU and the United Nations, made plans to share data about their observations on election day and the days following. In general, the groups cooperated well. This was true both of logistics planning, which improved markedly after the ECOM Logistics Weeki...
Liberians mark their ballots in voting booths, constructed out of cardboard boxes.

EU's and UNOMIL's communications networks.

In total, Carter Center delegates observed the process in 10 of Liberia's 13 counties (see Appendix E). Depending on each region's location and accessibility, they were deployed one to two days before election day. This allowed observers to spend at least one day in their areas prior to the elections and to meet with local officials, party representatives, U.N. election observers, and other observer groups. On election day, July 19, they watched polling sites open, visited many sites over the course of the day, and observed counts at pre-assigned sites.

Carter Center observers gathered both quantitative and qualitative data. Robert Pastor, director of The Carter Center's Latin American and Carib-


group's formation, and of coordinating press statements and delivering consistent messages to Liberia's public and political actors.

Logistical constraints and the need for security shaped all international observer groups' deployment plans. As noted above, several counties in the southeast were accessible only by helicopter. Consequently, deployment to these areas had to rely on the EU or UNOMIL for transportation, including the Center's teams deployed to Zwelethu (Grand Gedeh County) and Greenville (Sierra County), which traveled in EU helicopters and observed as EU vehicles. The rest of the Center's teams were deployed in vehicles to Voivorno, Zotor, Serekelelequara, Buchanan, Sinko, Tubuambu, Kakata, and Montserrado Counties. Where possible in the field, delegates communicated with the Monrovia office via high-frequency radio, often with the help of the

Nicolee Soglo (center in foreground) and Jimmy Carter (right in background) observe procedures for opening a Monrovia polling site.

The Listening and Communication Program (LACP), coordinated these efforts. Observers filled out a survey "checklist" at each polling site visited, as well as a special "closing-and-counting form" at sites where they observed the closing process (see Appendix G). The forms helped measure the process overall and allowed the team to assess whether problems were isolated or formed a pattern of irregularity. The Center's 40 delegates observed the voting process at approximately 10 percent of polling sites.

The delegation planned to conduct a parallel vote tabulation, or "quick count," to have an independent data source on election results and facilitate a possible role in calming fears or mediating disputes that could arise immediately after the election. However, in light of logistical constraints, the international observer organizations faced serious obstacles in designing and implementing a good quick count. Just prior to the election, some uncertainty existed as to whether any of the observer groups would conduct a parallel vote count whose results would be available to the Carter Center delegation. Given this doubt and the importance of having independent, timely data on election results, especially if President Carter and other delegation leaders had to mediate any disputes, the Center decided to collect its own data for a quick count. Thus, Carter Center observers gathered results from a sample of polling sites and reported them to the Center's Monrovia office.

Richard Wike, a statistical analyst with

Former First Lady Rosalynn Carter talks with voters waiting to cast their ballots at a polling site in Monrovia.
Beth Shapiro and Associates, and David Carroll, associate director of The Carter Center’s LACP, worked with Dr. Pasteur to design the sample for the Center’s quick count. The Center’s team exchanged information with EU and U.N. representatives to avoid duplicating observer deployment. The United Nations had stationed personnel throughout the country to conduct its own count and thus could provide the Center with detailed information about polling site accessibility. The logistical challenge of reaching many of the remote polling sites forced the Center to modify its sample, thereby decreasing the quick count’s reliability. The Center cooperated with the EU delegation to a limited extent in gathering data for the quick count but failed to reach an agreement with Friends of Liberia and Femmes-Afrique-Solidarité. Despite logistical and communication difficulties, the Center’s quick count provided an important check on official results and aided President Carter in his post-election meetings with party leaders.

In total, the Center’s quick count sampled 50 polling sites, including a small number of data sites contributed by cooperating organizations. Of the 50, roughly half were substitutes but were used because they were more accessible than the polling sites drawn in the original sample. In all cases, the substitutes were from areas that Liberia experts described as having similar demographic traits to those in the original sample.

Quick-count results were completed by early morning on July 20 and indicated the following vote distribution:

A Liberian casts his ballot as Gordon Streep, head of The Carter Center’s Liberia Project, looks on.
Political party agents and local observers watch as poll workers display and count ballots.

Candidate/Party    Percentage
Taylor/NPP         76
Johnson-Sirleaf/UP 9
Kromah/ALCOP       9

The other 10 parties shared the remaining 10 percent. Official results, which were reported only gradually over the next several days, were:

Candidate/Party    Percentage
Taylor/NPP         75.3
Johnson-Sirleaf/UP 9.6
Waterman/Alliance  2.6
Matthews/UP        2.5

The other eight parties all received less than 2 percent of the vote (see Appendix I for final official results).

Preliminary Assessment and Post-election Observations

Preliminary Assessment

On Sunday, July 20, Carter Center delegates returned to Monrovia for a debriefing and meeting with the leadership team. On Monday morning, the delegation reviewed the preliminary assessment developed from these reports. That afternoon, President Carter, Sen. Simon, Ambassador Speekenbrink, and Ambassador Rupta gave a final press conference. All concluded that the elections were credible and congratulated IECOM, ECOWAS, and the Liberian people for making them a success.

President Carter urged IECOM to release results as they became available rather than wait until they were final before making an official announcement. The IECOM chair first stated provisional results on July 20. As the Center's tabulation data began to come in and after IECOM
Registered voters applied indelible ink to their thumbs for identification. Here, a polling station worker applies blue ink to a Liberian woman's finger as she.register to vote.

Announced partial results several times, it became clear that Charles Taylor and the NRP would win an overwhelming majority of votes. IEOM's early returns from Montserrado County showed Taylor comfortably in the lead, even before his strongholds in Bong and Nimba Counties were counted.

The next day, President Carter and other Center delegates met with the major candidates to appeal for each to accept the results. Taylor suggested he would be magnanimous by reaching out to the opposition while committing his government to respect human rights. UP presidential candidate Ellen Johnson Sirleaf stated that she and her party would "challenge" the results and file a formal complaint through established procedures. Sirleaf emphasized the need to form "a strong and constructive opposition." George Boley and Alhaji Kromah, the presidential candidates of the NDPL and APLC, respectively, at first also rejected the election results, charging wide-sacle fraud. Other civilian parties conceded defeat.

The Carter Center's preliminary statement (see Appendix H) said, "In the face of tremendous challenges, the Liberian people have conducted a peaceful and orderly election, and turned out in very high numbers to vote, and the collection and reporting of returns should lead to an accurate count." The delegation was impressed by the high participation rate, the successful deployment of materials and staff despite the compressed time frame, and ECOMOG's vital role in providing security and in keeping the process orderly. The statement applauded the large number of domestic observers and party agents present at polling sites on election day.

The Center further noted that its observers visited more than 200 polling sites in 10 of Liberia's 13 counties. Also, in 98 percent of the stations observed, its delegates reported that the voting process "functioned normally" and/or with only "some minor irregularities."

The statement did recognize some problems with the registration list, which was not fully completed by election day, uneven access to media and resources needed to campaign; voter education; rules for determining valid ballots; and overly complicated processes for collecting, counting, and reporting results. While commending ECOMOG's role in providing security and logistical assistance, the Center said that "some ECOMOG troops were involved in the conduct of the elections. In the future, it is important that the military's exclusive role should be to provide security, leaving the conduct of the elections to civilian election administrators." However, it stressed that these problems were not sufficiently serious to have altered the people's opportunity to select their leaders and that
the election "represents a very important step forward for Liberia."

The statement concluded, "This election could provide a turning point for Liberia—between a bitter civil war and a hopeful future of prosperity and democracy. The positive future, however, will only come if all parties in Liberia demonstrate their commitment to the peaceful process of democracy-building, allay fears that some have of others, and rejuvenate a feeling of national pride and civic pride that will help their country advance. We hope that the spirit of election day will guide Liberians in the days ahead."

Post-election Observations

Over the next several days, Carter Center observers were posted at Robertsfield International Airport to observe the receiving and compiling of tally sheets. Carter Center delegates also observed the process in the IECOM counting room, where results were entered into the computer data base. In the early morning of July 24, two Center observers and one other international observer watched the final ballot boxes without tally sheets be counted at Robertsfield. These observers worked closely with IFES, the EU, and UNOMIL and reported that despite logistical and other problems, the counting process appeared to accurately record votes cast.

That same day, Carter Center representatives attended the program for the declaration of the presidential winner and on July 27, the official certifications of the president, vice president, senator, and representatives. Chip Carter, Jason Carter, and the Center's Monrovia office staff attended Charles Taylor's inauguration on Aug. 2.

According to official results, Taylor won the presidency with over 75 percent of the vote, followed by Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf with 9.6 percent. In the Senate, the NRP won 21 seats, the UP three, and the ALOCP two. In the House of Representatives, the NRP won 49 seats; the UP won seven, the ALOCP three, the Alliance two, the UP two, and the LJP one. Due to controversy over assignment of constituencies for the seats, the ALOCP and LJP initially refused to name their members of the legislature. Later, they did name their representatives.
Post-election Missions: Human Rights and Democratic Consolidation

Human Rights Assessment Mission, Aug. 5-8, 1997

As part of the Center’s efforts to assess the new challenges of promoting human rights and democratic consolidation in the post-election environment, Helena Nygren Krug led a mission to Liberia in early August. This mission sought to identify priorities for effective promotion and protection of human rights in light of the elections. Mission members held meetings with officials of the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Information, Liberian Bar Association, U.S. embassy, U.S. Agency for International Development, human rights community, and other key civil society groups.

The CLHRE reiterated its conclusion that the elections were free, fair, and transparent. However, the JPC maintained serious reservations about the process. That group and many of the political parties had called several times for a postponement, and even though the parties eventually agreed to go forward with the process, civil society had not been included in the decision. Overall, the JPC felt the elections were neither free nor transparent. It said they were not truly democratic, as choices were tampered with, either because of lack of adequate civic and voter education or direct interference by ECOWAS and election officers.

The human rights community and others expressed concern over the post-election environment, fearing that the departure of the international community’s shield would gradually give way to repression and human rights abuses. They were disappointed about President Taylor’s initial appointments, which they felt did not live up to his promise of creating an inclusive government. They were concerned about his vow to get tough on security and crime, execute armed robbers and highjackers, and strengthen traditional tribal communities. They also were concerned about statements by Minister of Information Joe Malilbah, who indicated a restrictive approach to freedom of the press.

One particularly important issue concerned President Taylor’s plans to create a human rights commission to investigate human rights abuses and a reconciliation commission to strengthen the cultural fabric of society and heal past wounds. Although...
pleased by President Taylor's stated aims to create these groups, many human rights NGOs argued it was important for the human rights commission to have a retrospective mandate to investigate abuses during the war. The Ministry of Justice, however, argued this would be illegal in light of provisions in the peace accords.

The Center consulted with human rights NGOs, identifying the following as priority concerns in light of the elections:

1) Ensuring that civic and human rights education could reach rural areas.
2) Ensuring that the human rights commission proposed by President Taylor was independent and able to function effectively, free of interference, and with a strong mandate to investigate alleged abuses and bring claims against the government.
3) Strengthening the judiciary through training, resources, and guarantee of tenure.
4) Ensuring that the newly established juvenile court starts functioning.
5) Reforming prisons, particularly maximum-security facilities where torture was alleged to be rampant.

Post-election Assessment Mission, Sept. 4-8, 1997

In early September, the Center organized its final assessment mission, led by Ambassador Streich and including Dr. Carroll and Dr. Lyons. The mission intended to survey the overall political situation, including early indications of the new government's direction and to explore areas of possible Carter Center assistance to the Liberian government and civil society in the wake of the elections. The team met with various government ministers (including Agriculture, Education, Information, Planning, and Rural Development); a senior presidential advisor; the Supreme Court chief justice; several political party leaders; representatives of human rights NGOs and the United Nations, the EU, and U.S. embassy; and others.

The team concluded that several areas looked promising for Carter Center projects. These included possible assistance in agricultural extension, preparing a national economic development strategy, judicial training, human rights education, training for journalists and media technology, and assistance and training for the planned human rights commission.

At the same time, the team noted a few early warning signs. Specifically causing concern were President Taylor's first promotions inside the police force and his apparent rush to pass legislation for the human rights commission without thorough consultation with the Liberian human rights community. Although Liberia remained quiet in September, the team recognized that sustainable conflict management would require building on the July 19 elections to create a government regarded by a broad range of Liberians as representative and responsive to their needs.

Given the role President Carter and The Carter Center have played over the last six years in promoting peace and facilitating elections in Liberia, the Center is uniquely positioned to help the country confront challenges it will face in the future.
Conclusion

Final Reflections on Liberia's July 19, 1997, Special Elections

The July 19 Special Elections represented an impressive demonstration of Liberians' desire for peace. Large numbers turned out to register, stood patiently in long lines to vote, and waited calmly for IECOM to announce official results. Relatively minor problems during the campaign and registration processes and on election day did not alter the overall results.

For elections to be fully meaningful, however, they must give voters a significant choice. In Liberia’s Special Elections, a number of voters told observers that they understood their choice as between Charles Taylor and war, clearly an unliveable range of options. Given the country’s recent history of conflict and the pervasive fear that Taylor would return to war if not elected, many Liberians made a calculated selection that they hoped would more likely promote peace and stability. One Liberian said, “He [Taylor] killed my father, but I’ll vote for him. He started all this, and he’s going to fix it.” While a significant number of voters identified with Taylor and his populist message and patronage, many seemed cautious, war-resistant, and determined to use their vote to oppose the powerful former factional leader.

The Special Elections ratified and institutionalized the political geography created by seven years of war. Taylor’s NPFL dominated much of the country from 1990. After the elections, his NPP controlled the government. The means by which his power gained legitimacy, however, is important. Taylor won greater international, regional, and local acceptance for his government through elections, not through a unilateral military victory, nor a negotiated agreement among factional elites and regional powers. To win, he converted his military organization into an effective mass-mobilizing political party, replacing guns with patronage and roadblocks with rallies. The speed of this conversion and the ineffective demobilization process, however, leaves doubt about the democratic character of Taylor’s organizational base.

The compressed timetable also had an effect on the Special Elections. Although the pressures that led to the short time frame were understandable, they contributed to the opposition’s relatively ineffective efforts to mobilize support. They also limited the effectiveness of the parties’ and IECOM’s voter education campaigns.

The electoral process allowed Liberians to play their role as voters, not as powerless victims within a military-occupied zone. Hence, the people won greater standing to assert their rights as citizens directly responsible for legitimizing Taylor’s power.

The July 19 Special Elections represented an impressive demonstration of Liberians’ desire for peace.

The new order provides an opportunity for rival groups to play their role as opposition parties within a legal framework rather than as defeated factions without rights. The elections and return to constitutional rule also places legal limits around the new regime’s power. However, the extent to which the new administration will follow constitutional constraints and pay attention to voters who brought them to power remains open. Liberia’s constitution concentrates power in the office of the presidency and gives the new government a six-year term in office before it must formally face voters again.

While an election following a period of conflict may simply reflect the realities of military power on the ground, the voting process at least allows people
to participate in the selection of their leaders. Taylor
could not be defeated, but he also could not rule
with broad political authority until voting took
place and the people had an opportunity to have a
voice.

In many ways, the elections resembled a
referendum on peace, with Taylor perceived by
many as the candidate most capable of preventing a
return to war. A new government dominated by a
single party will however raise concerns among
Liberians that the conflict ended not in a broad-
based government of reconciliation but with an
exclusive victory for a warring party. It is too early
to judge the Taylor administration, but warnings
from comparative post-conflict cases and from
Taylor’s past behavior suggest that constitutional
constraints on power and voters’ ability to hold their
leaders accountable are often not sufficient.

If these elections usher in an era of stability, the
Abuja peace process will have succeeded in estab-
lishing a formula to end Liberia’s civil war. Assess-
ment of whether the process served as the beginning
of a democratic period must wait until future elec-
tions.

It will be critically important for the interna-
tional community to do all it can to encourage all
parties and the new government to work together to
promote genuine reconciliation and inclusiveness
and to heal wounds of the past. Although the 1997
elections were not perfect, they do represent a very
important step forward for Liberia in the peace
process. For democracy to truly take root, Liberia
needs to promote more effective systems of checks
and balances among institutions, the safeguarding
of human rights, and public accountability. Also,
future elections must be held in a context where
voters can exercise their choice in an environment
of greater security. The Carter Center intends to
remain engaged in Liberia to assist in these and
other tasks.
Works Cited

3 AFR/1996, paragraph 17.
Appendices

A. List of Abbreviations
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C. IECOM Electoral Workshop Agenda: May 29-31, 1997
D. Carter Center Human Rights Training Agenda: June 18-25, 1997
E. Carter Center Deployment Plan: July 19, 1997
F. Map of Liberia
G. Carter Center Election Day “Checklist” and “Closing and Counting Form”
H. Carter Center Liberian Special Elections Preliminary Statement: July 21, 1997
I. Presidential Vote Results
J. Ballot Paper for Presidential Candidates
K. Selected News Articles
## List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFL</td>
<td>Armed Forces of Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALCOP</td>
<td>All Liberian Coalition Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLHRE</td>
<td>Center for Law and Human Rights Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOM</td>
<td>Independent Elections Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFES</td>
<td>International Foundation for Election Systems</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGNU</td>
<td>Interim Government of National Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFAC</td>
<td>IECOM Inter-Party Advisory Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>JPC</td>
<td>Justice and Peace Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAP</td>
<td>Liberian Action Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>LERON</td>
<td>Liberian Election Observation Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>LIPOCORE</td>
<td>Liberian Initiative for Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution</td>
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<td>LNP</td>
<td>Liberian Network for Peace and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>LVNG</td>
<td>Liberian National Transitional Government</td>
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<td>LPC</td>
<td>Liberia Peace Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>LPP</td>
<td>Liberian People's Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDI</td>
<td>National Democratic Institute for International Affairs</td>
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<td>NDPL</td>
<td>National Democratic Party of Liberia</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental Organization</td>
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<td>NPF</td>
<td>National Patriotic Front of Liberia</td>
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<td>NPP</td>
<td>National Patriotic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPRA/AG</td>
<td>National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly Government</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
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<td>ULMO</td>
<td>United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>UONOMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia</td>
</tr>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UP</td>
<td>United People's Party</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
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### Appendix B

#### Registration Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County Name</th>
<th>Total Voters</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grand Cape Mount</td>
<td>21,372</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bomi</td>
<td>15,015</td>
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<td>Rivercess</td>
<td>8,219</td>
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<td>Montserrat</td>
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<td>Sinne</td>
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<td>Grand Kru</td>
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<td>Maryland</td>
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<td>Grand Gedeh</td>
<td>15,463</td>
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<td>Lofa</td>
<td>69,999</td>
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<td>Bong</td>
<td>109,451</td>
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<td>Nimba</td>
<td>101,789</td>
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<td>Magbdi</td>
<td>37,074</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>751,430</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: RECOM

### List of Political Parties and Standard Bearers

**Progressive People's Party**
- Chaa Cheaapoo

**National Reformation Party**
- Martin M.N. Sheriff
- Zayiah J. Sahr Gbollie
- Dr. Harry Fumbi Morrison
- Ellen Johnson Sirleaf

**Liberian National Union**
- Alli Quurim Varmanor Kromah

**All Liberian Coalition Party**
- Charles Chantey Taylor

**National Patriotic Party**
- Cleaves Segbe Wruton

**Alliance of Political Parties**
- Henry Boma Edenballeh

**Reformation Alliance Party**
- George Toe Washington

**People's Democratic Party of Liberia**
- Gabriel Baccus Matthews

**United People's Party**
- George E. Suchie Boley Sr.

**National Democratic Party of Liberia**
- Togba-Nah Tipton

**Liberian People's Party**
- Togba-Nah Tipton
Appendix C

IECOM Electoral Workshop Agenda:
May 29-31, 1997

Objectives:

1) To present and understand the Electoral Package (Special Election Laws and Code of Conduct) and address stakeholders' relevant issues.
2) To foster a cordial relationship between the political parties and IECOM through a mechanism that promotes the airing of relevant issues and concerns.
3) To understand the Code of Conduct for Observers and the roles and responsibilities of election observers and party agents.

Agenda

May 29

Participants: IECOM, political party leaders, observers/monitors, donors, journalists, scholars

9 a.m. Welcome/introduction of workshop purpose; J. Tish Negbe, IECOM
9:10 a.m. Keynote address; G. Henry Andrews, Chair, IECOM
9:40 a.m. Workshop roles and rules; Carol Jeffrey, Facilitation Team
9:50 a.m. Presentation of Special Elections Laws; Gloria Scott, IECOM
11:15 a.m. Small-group brainstorming: issues needing further clarification in Electoral Package; Carol Jeffrey, Facilitation Team
1:30 p.m. Presentation of Code of Conduct for Political Parties and Code of Conduct for Observers; Isaac Sagay, IECOM
2:15 p.m. Presentation of observers’ role; Carlos Valenzuela, UNOMIL
3:15 p.m. Response to the issues by IECOM; IECOM Panel
4:30 p.m. Closing remarks; G. Henry Andrews, Chair, IECOM
May 30

Participants: IECOM, political party leaders

9 a.m. Welcome

9:15 a.m. IECOM responses to electoral law issues; G. Henry Andrews, Chair, IECOM, and Gloria Scott, IECOM

1:30 p.m. Presentation and discussion of relationship building between election commissions and political parties; Tony Edoh, ECOWAS, and K. Afari-Gyan, U.N. Development Program

3 p.m. IECOM/Political Parties Forum, development, including its purpose, structure, membership, agenda, schedule, rules; Gloria Scott, IECOM, and Carol Jeffrey, Facilitation Team

4:45 p.m. Closing remarks: G. Henry Andrews, Chair, IECOM

May 31

Participants: IECOM, observers/monitors, political party leaders

9 a.m. Welcome

9:15 a.m. Code of Conduct for Political Parties; Gloria Scott, IECOM

11 a.m. Review of Code of Conduct for Observers; C. Clinton-Johnston, Counselor of Law, IECOM

1:30 p.m. Presentation and discussion of party agents' role, rights, responsibilities, and procedures; Celestine Bango and Totty Iredia, ECOWAS observers

3 p.m. Response by IECOM; G. Henry Andrews, Chair, IECOM, and Gloria Scott, IECOM

4:30 p.m. Closing remarks: G. Henry Andrews, Chair, IECOM
Appendix D

Carter Center
Human Rights Training Agenda:
June 18-25, 1997

St. Teresa's Convent, Monrovia, Liberia

HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY

June 18
Conceptual framework to give participants a broad conceptual understanding and comprehensive background focusing on human rights in the context of democracy and elections:
1) Social contract theory of state
2) Human rights as a pivot point of democracy; international human rights movement; introduction to international, regional, and national human rights instruments
3) Role of the constitution
4) Role of elections in a democracy
5) Role of civil society in a democracy
6) Problems of democracy in Africa

June 19
Human rights issues during elections:
1) Freedom of assembly and association
2) Freedom of expression
3) Freedom of information
4) Independence of the judiciary
5) Rights most commonly assaulted during elections
6) Derogable and non-derogable rights
7) Experience of the 1985 Liberian elections; the Rev. Father Robert O. Tiko
8) Experience from other places in Africa (Gabon, Tanzania, Kenya, South Africa)
9) Exercise and discussion

June 20
Issues specific to the Liberian Special Elections, July 19, 1997:
1) Voter education and role of civil society; E.C.B. Jones and Carlos Valenzuela, UNOMIL
2) New and unfamiliar concepts peculiar to Liberia's Special Elections: proportional representation, and controlled constituency/single constituency; Terrence Lyons, The Carter Center
3) Discussion on how to most effectively convey meaning of concepts, including secrecy of the ballot, to Liberians
FACT-FINDING, DOCUMENTING, REPORTING, AND DISSEminating

June 20
Basic concepts and techniques
1) Impartiality, neutrality, independence as underlying principles of human rights nongovernmental organizations' (NGOs) operations
2) Verification of facts: primary and secondary sources
3) Assessing rights violated: Liberia's obligations at national, regional, and international levels
4) Human rights violations vs. acts of criminality
5) Formal/informal and legal/illegal methods of collecting information

June 21
6) Cultural and local sensibilities; dealing with vulnerable groups (refugees and returnees, internally displaced persons, unaccompanied minors, women as single heads of households)
7) Women and gender-specific violations; Juanita Garrett, Association of Female Lawyers in Liberia
8) Field investigations: techniques, lessons learned in field; Pascal Soto, UNOMIL human rights officer
9) Witness interviewing; Maurice Nyberg, UNOMIL human rights officer

Local, regional, and international human rights enforcement mechanisms; putting Liberia on the international human rights agenda
1) U.N. special rapporteurs (SRs) and the Commission on Human Rights: how to file a case with a SR, how to provide information, how to lobby the United Nations, how to link up with international organizations
2) U.N. treaty bodies such as the Committee on the Rights of the Child: how it operates, requirement of exhaustion of local remedies, role of NGO coordinator, NGO coalition as means to link up with the work; draft optional protocol on limiting age for recruitment to armed forces, as applies to problem of child soldiers in Liberia

June 23
1) African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights: rules of procedure, how it operates and functions, and role of human rights NGOs; Benedict Sarrich, Center for Law and Human Rights Education
2) Local remedies: those available in the Liberian courts; Wrefach Sayeh, Counselor of Law
3) Exercise and discussion on case studies and how to file claims in international, regional, and local systems
POST-ELECTION/INSTITUTION BUILDING

June 23
4) Human rights and the media; Dodie McDow, Fund for Peace
5) Discussion on salient areas in need of reform and projects needed in: a) the judiciary; Kofi Woods, Justice and Peace; b) the police and military; Brownie Samukai; c) human rights education and the media; Dodie McDow, Fund for Peace

June 24
Coordinating, networking, collaborating
1) Strengths of collaborating and remaining diverse within the coalition: dealing with governments and determining mandates; the Liberia Human Rights Center; Desmond Parker, UNOMIL
2) Experiences elsewhere (Goma, Zaire, Haiti)
3) Networking with other NGOs at the regional and international levels
4) International NGO coalitions: thematic areas
5) U.N. consultative status: how to apply criteria that govern consultative status with the U.N. Economic and Social Commission
6) Basic introduction to proposal writing, seeking funding for projects, and next steps

June 25
Relationship between peace and justice and meaning of each in cultural context, meaning of impunity, option of setting the past behind and forgiving offenses
1) Crimes against humanity: nature, substance, and definition; Geneva conventions and protocols; interstate conflict, claims against nonstate actors, role of children, and culpability issues; ICRC representative
2) Truth commissions and war crimes tribunal mechanisms including jurisdictional issues and comparative assessments of experiences in South Africa and Rwanda; Maurice Nyberg, UNOMIL
3) Status of proposed permanent International Criminal Court
4) Discussion on peace and justice in Liberia; Archbishop Michael K. Francis
5) Evaluation of training survey
6) Presentation of certificates of participation
7) International human rights instruments
10) Other relevant training materials: reports of SRs
## Appendix E

### Carter Center Deployment Plan

**July 19, 1997**

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<tr>
<th>Site</th>
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<td>Geoffrey Onegi-Obei</td>
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<td>John Schelp</td>
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## CARTER CENTER ELECTION DAY CHECKLIST
**LIBERIA: 19 JULY 1997**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observer name/s:</th>
<th>Time at the polling station:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>County:</td>
<td>District Polling Center:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of registered voters:</td>
<td>Number of ballots cast so far:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Average time it takes to vote: mins.</td>
<td>Number of people waiting in line:</td>
</tr>
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### 1. Which parties had representatives present? (list name/#)

### 2. Were domestic observers present? (list group/#)

### 3. Was ECOMOG present? Yes ___ No ___ 4. Liberian security (explain)? Yes ___ No ___

### 5. Were other international observers present? Yes ___ No ___

### 6. Did party representative/domestic observers indicate that there were:
- a) no problems
- b) a few, but not significant
- c) a few significant problems (explain on back)
- d) many significant problems (explain in back)

### 7. What is your overall evaluation of how voting was going at this polling station?
- a) Polling station functioned normally and without irregularity
- b) There were some minor irregularities that will not affect result at the polling station
- c) There were serious problems which could potentially distort result at the PS

### 8. Check off any problems you observed and explain in detail on the back of the form
- a) Station opened late
- b) Station closed/suspended
- c) Insufficient materials
- d) Security problems
- e) Ballot not secret
- f) Officials poorly trained
- g) Party representatives denied access
- h) Domestic observers denied access
- i) PS officials missing
- j) Campaigning/propaganda
- k) Unauthorized persons present
- l) Other (explain)

### 9. How many voters were denied an opportunity to vote thus far?

**Reasons specify number of voters affected:**
- a) Not on registration list
- b) Had no registration card
- c) Came to the wrong polling station
- d) Other

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CARTER CENTER CLOSING AND COUNTING FORM
LIBERIA: 19 JULY 1997

Observer name/s: ___________________ Time at the polling station: ________

County: ______________ District Polling Center: _______________ PS#: _________

Time PS closed: _________ Time counting began: _________ Time counting ended: _________

1. Which parties had representatives present? (list name/#)

2. Were domestic observers present? (list group/#)

3. Was ECOMOG present? Yes ___ No ___ 4. Liberian security(explain)? Yes ___ No ___

5. Were other international observers present? Yes ___ No ___

6. Did party representative/domestic observers indicate that there were:
   a) no problems
   b) a few, but not significant
   c) a few significant problems (explain on back)
   d) many significant problems (explain in back)

7. What is your overall evaluation of how counting was going at this polling station?
   a) Counting functioned normally and without irregularity
   b) There were some minor irregularities that will not affect result at polling station
   c) There were serious problems which could potentially distort result

8. Check off any problems you observed and explain in detail on the back of the form
   a) People in line at 4:00pm not allowed to vote: _______
   b) Station closed/suspended _______ g) Domestic observers denied access _______
   c) Insufficient materials _______ h) PS officials missing _______
   d) Security problems _______ i) Campaigning/propaganda _______
   e) Officials poorly trained _______ j) Unauthorized persons present _______
   f) Party reps denied access _______ k) Tally sheets not given to parties _______

# registered voters: _______ # votes cast: _______ # challenged votes: _______ # rejected ballots: _______

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Appendix H

FROM
THE
CARTER
CENTER

THE CARTER CENTER
LIBERIAN SPECIAL ELECTIONS
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
JULY 21, 1997

On behalf of my co-leaders former President Nicéphore Soglo of Benin and former U.S. Senator Paul Simon, and our entire delegation, I want to make this statement about the July 19 Special Elections in Liberia and the evolving electoral process we have observed.

The process leading to these elections has been long and difficult. In the face of tremendous challenges the Liberian people have conducted a peaceful and orderly election, and turned out in very high numbers to vote, and the collection and reporting of returns should lead to an accurate count.

The Carter Center has been involved in Liberia since 1991 and has conducted three pre-election assessment missions since March 1997. In our meetings with the representatives of the principal political parties before the election, we asked two questions: whether the overall election procedure evolved by ECOWAS was considered to be fair, and whether they would accept the results of the election if the count was accurate, and the election process was judged to be fair. Each of the Representatives answered affirmatively to both questions.

Our 40 person delegation was deployed several days before the election to 10 of Liberia’s 13 counties, and on election day, we observed the voting and counting processes in more than 10 percent of all the polling sites. Yesterday, the group reconvened in Monrovia for debriefings and to compile our report. This statement reflects our team’s assessment of the election.

Our delegation was impressed with several aspects of the election:

High participation – Although official figures are not available, it is clear that Liberians wanted to vote, and vote they did in great numbers. Many got up as early as 2 a.m. and waited patiently in long lines to demonstrate their determination to bring closure to seven years of war. While final results are not yet available, we estimate participation to be very high.

Preparations – Despite the compressed time for the electoral process, our delegates found that virtually all of the sites that they observed had adequate materials, and were staffed by
Workers from the Independent Elections Commission (IEC). They were aided by many key actors including ECOMOG, UNOMIL, the OAU, the EU, IFES, The Carter Center, and others.

Security — The role played by ECOMOG was vital in providing security and ensuring a climate of calm at the polls. Our delegates found that ECOMOG soldiers were present in all the polling centers they observed and were instrumental in keeping the process orderly. We were encouraged by the absence of intimidation by ECOMOG soldiers and by Liberians' perception of them as impartial. We also found the role played by the new Liberian Police Force in Monrovia to be encouraging.

Observers — We were pleasantly surprised by Liberians' appreciation of the role of the international community, especially of international observers. We were impressed by the dedication and effectiveness of the domestic observers from LEON, the Council of Churches, human rights groups, and others. Finally, we appreciated the cooperation and coordination we had with other international observer groups.

In the more than 200 polling stations which our delegates visited, we found that 73% had two or more party agents present to observe the process. In addition, domestic observers, primarily from LEON, were present at roughly 64% of the polling stations visited.

In addition, in about 93% of the stations we observed, party agents and domestic observers indicated to our observers that there were either "no problems," or "a few but not significant problems." Similarly, our delegates reported that the voting process "functioned normally" and/or with only "some minor irregularities" in 98% of the stations visited.

Some believe that an absolutely level playing field is essential for elections to be considered free and fair. Although desirable as a goal, in certain circumstances we think it is more important to address the questions of whether people have an adequate opportunity to know the candidates' positions; to be free to choose among the candidates; and to have their preferences translated fairly into results.

While Liberia's election appears so far to have addressed these key issues, we list below some problems with the process that are related to the compressed timetable, the logistical complications of the country, and the fact that the country is just emerging from a long civil war.

Registration -- The registration list was not fully completed by the time of the election. This information is critical to the normal conduct of any election in order to permit citizens and parties to ensure the accuracy of the list. Despite this problem, people seemed to know where to vote and did so with minimal confusion.

Unfair access and resources -- The unevenness of the candidates' access to the media and to resources for campaigns is regrettable. While we feel that the candidates were able to get their messages out to many people, it is important to make additional efforts to address this problem in the future.
Securing security and electoral management -- The role of ECOMOG in providing security and logistical assistance was vital. We believe that the election could not have been held in such an orderly way without ECOMOG’s security presence, and that Liberians sincerely appreciated their various efforts to assist. However, in addition to providing security, some ECOMOG troops were involved in the conduct of the elections. In the future, it is important that the military’s exclusive role should be to provide security, leaving the conduct of the elections to civilian election administrators.

Electoral process -- On the whole, our observers found that election day processes went well. However, we noted several problems in the process that we suggest be addressed in future elections. First, given the large numbers of illiterate voters and others needing assistance, measures should be developed for civic and voter education. This is essential to meaningful elections. We hope the newly elected administration will give a high priority to education.

Second, many of our delegates noted problems polling officials had in ruling on valid ballots. ECOM correctly, but belatedly, sent instructions to polling officials about ballots being valid if marks showed voters’ intent. But, this instruction was not received by all workers, and some who did receive it were confused.

Third, for collecting, counting, and reporting the official returns the processes were excessively complicated, and these were made worse by the compressed electoral calendar and inadequate registration information.

Overall, the election represents a very important step forward for Liberia, and its long-term prospects for lasting peace and democracy. Although we have noted several problems about the process, we feel that none were serious enough to have altered the people’s opportunity to select their leaders freely and fairly.

This election needs to be understood as an important step forward in the context of the peace process. It is also essential to understand that democracy is not established with a single good election. For the peace process to succeed, and for democracy to take root, it is essential that the government put in place a system to assure checks and balances among institutions, defense of human rights, and accountability to all the people. We were pleased at the invitation of so many Liberians that they would like the international community to continue to play an important role in reinforcing the democratic process.

This election could provide a turning point for Liberia – between a bitter civil war and a hopeful future of prosperity and democracy. The positive future, however, will only come if all parties in Liberia demonstrate their commitment to the peaceful process of democracy-building bylaying fears that some have of others, and rejuvenate a feeling of nationhood and civic pride that will help their country advance. We hope that the spirit of election day will guide Liberians in the days ahead.
## Presidential Vote Results
(by party)

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<td>Percent of Valid Votes Obtained</td>
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Source: IECOM
Americans Fleeing Liberia Tell of New Horrors There

BY HOWARD W. FRENCH

LUNGI, Sierra Leone, April 10 — Scores of Americans and citizens of other countries fleeing Liberia today were ferried through Sierra Leone's main airport here by United States troops after four days of intense fighting by rival militias in the neighboring country.

The shaken evacuees, arriving throughout the day in groups of 25 aboard lumbering American ME-53 helicopters, painted a picture of a country whose slide out of control in the space of an Easter weekend surpassed any of the horrors that many said they had seen in six years of a vicious civil war.

Many of the 200 or so evacuees who were flown out by helicopter today had spent several days in the relative security of the American Embassy compound in the Liberian capital, Monrovia, which was the staging ground for the evacuation.

Others, however, had made their way only as recently as this morning to the embassy by darting fearfully through gutted streets that had been reduced to shooting galleries by rival militia bands comprised of boys carrying automatic weapons.

"From Benson Street to Carey Street we made our way to Mantra Point this morning," said Nour Abou, a Lebanese woman describing the route she took out of the shelled downtown area to Monrovia's diplomatic enclave. "All along the way we kept getting stopped by one group after another of young boys, half-dressed, wearing anything, even bedroom slippers, shooting their guns off and looting."

"This was much worse than in 1990," she said, comparing the city's violence to the worst fighting she had seen, shortly after the start of the country's civil war.

By late today, 273 people had been evacuated from Monrovia, including 61 Americans, according to State Department officials in Washington, who estimated that there were 450 "Americans of all kinds" in Liberia. Officials said that this figure included Liberians who have been naturalized as American citizens.

Diplomats said that only about 110 Americans in Liberia had made it to the embassy compound and that none of those had chosen to stay behind for now in the hope that the country's crisis dies down.

Most of the Americans who did not get out are gathered in other locations in Liberia, including a pocket of Continued on Page A7, Column 1
Evacuees From Liberia Tell of Chaos and Horror

Continued from Page A1

about 80 people on the outskirts of Monrovia and on some smaller ones.

The embassy and military are in touch with all of them by radio or telephone, but the deckers is yet to be made on whether to get them, or how to get them, or whether it is

gain enough for them to make the

embassy. By tonight, it has not been

Glyn Davies, a State Department

spokesman, said in Washington on
day. "We must see some action come

from the chaos. Not even President

Raheloe, but we'll have to deal with

it. Maybe the factions will calm
down enough, otherwise, there

might be some Derekin.".

Among long-time residents of the
country, comparisons with fighting

in Iraq was made. A week-long

Evacuation was carried out as

what forces commanded by Charles

Taylor waged an offensive against

President K. Doe, then the dictator.

National guards, who declared

struggle of Monrovia dangerous.

Shamen Bray, an English evacuee

who fled with her husband and two

small boys, said. "This thing has

been going on for four days. It is

no worse than the past four days. It

has not reached the worst of the war.

Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of

people were killed in Mr. Taylor's

1990 assault on the capital, which

was notably barred by a Nigerian

regional peacekeeping force. This far

the situation in Monrovia remains

unchanged that no one, including the

American authorities, could predict the

evacuation. The government still

refuses to consider discussing the

situation.

In the departure area, a U.S.,

embassy second secretary who

declared to identity herself further said that

he was caught in a popular restaur-

anteur, El Menu, when the fight-

ning broke out. As he is fought, the

man said, he heard a few wastes and

children into a room in the hotel

above the bar to shelter them.

The United States, one of several facings involved in the

conflict, was asked to leave the place,

however, and forced everyone out. As

the United States tried to lead his way to-

ward Mombasa Port, he said, fighters forced Liberians and foreigners to

separate and began altering the

Liberians.

They were raping the women and

shooting all over the place," he said

The civilian was not the most
distracting thing of all, while we

watched the smoke from the hotel,

with people getting killed all around us, the little boys I was with

begging protection, they, too, were

soldiers." The fighting in Monrovia started ear-

ly on Saturday morning, when General

Doe's troops left the town to the

break out of the villa where they

had been encircled and made their

way toward the downtown area

where other armed rebel factions

are surrounded in the former Na-

tional Army barracks.
"I had been listening to the radio, and they were just barking all night," said John Langon, the relief director of the Carter Center of Emory University whose home and office are near General Johnson's headquarters. "Then at about 3:30 A.M. the shooting began."

Mr. Langon said that the shooting in his neighborhood was so heavy that it was not until around 11:30 that morning that he felt he could venture out of his villa for the first time and make his way toward town.

Like many foreigners, Mr. Langon left his Liberian staff behind, telling them that when the looters came to give them whatever they wanted.

"There were stray bullets flying everywhere," he said. "It was just like war zones coming down the street. When I finally got onto the main road to town I found about 10,000 people - Liberians - marching toward the Mamba Point area, carrying all kinds of baggage on their heads."

Others said that as the militiamen pursued their looting in neighborhoods like those that it seemed that the violence was limited by a tacit partitioning up of the city, where militiamen concentrated on ransacking homes and businesses, making off with whatever they could carry away before turning against each other.

This methodical looting gave many people time to escape their neighborhoods before full-blown combat between the militiamen broke out.

By the end of the day on Saturday, diplomats say, the Mamba Point area, a tiny spit of seaward land that houses the major foreign embassies, was packed with tens of thousands of displaced Liberians.

Today, an American Embassy office in the area, which is little more than a small open field, was the place of refuge for 10,000 to 15,000 people fleeing the violence.

People who made it out in the evacuation today said that the mood among displaced people in the Mamba Point area had calmed during the day after a desperate night during which the shooting of a military helicopter could be heard nearby.

A mood of calm spread among the refugees as reports circulated that General Johnson, a rural development minister and militia leader who was being sought on murder charges had agreed to surrender to regional peacekeepers as part of a truce agreement.

By evening today, however, hopes of a cease-fire were dashed when Mr. Johnson denied that he had reached any agreement in an interview with the BBC, and heavy fighting again resumed.

Earlier in the day, General Johnson forces reportedly released 40 insurgents it had taken from among the West African peacekeeping forces.

Diplomats said the renegade minister still held as many as 400 other hostages of various nationalities.

As night fell and the evacuation continued, United States military officials here said that one of the helicopters flying into Monrovia to pick up more evacuees had to abort its landing at the embassy compound as explosions were heard nearby and it appeared that the aircraft might come under hostile fire.
A MESSAGE TO LIBERIANS FROM
FORMER U.S. PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER

July 14, 1997

Sir,

I am writing to you today in the spirit of confidence and hope that we can together work to bring about a better future for Liberia. As a former president of the United States, I have a special interest in the future of Liberia.

I understand the challenges that Liberia faces today. The country is recovering from a devastating civil war and the world is watching with great concern. Liberia has a bright future if we work together to overcome these challenges.

I urge all Liberians to unite and work towards a stable and prosperous future. The government must be accountable to the people and work to address the needs of all citizens. The international community must continue to support Liberia and provide assistance to help the country rebuild.

Let us work together to create a brighter future for Liberia. We can do this by working hard, being honest, and respecting the rights of all people.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

Former President of the United States
Warlord's man-of-action image leads to landslide win in Liberia

By Tina Saman
The Associated Press

MONROVIA, Liberia—Seven years ago, fighters loyal to warlord Charles Taylor allied five of Samuel-Corneth's brothers as they tried to free Liberia's new civil war. When they went to vote for a president last Saturday, Corneth firmly pressed his inkily thumb onto the ballot paper that Taylor's picture.

So did Liberians, according to results that show Taylor headed for a landslide victory in this tortured land his fighters helped destroy. Despite his bloody past, Taylor benefited from a fractured opposition that undercuts his appeal.

Many Liberians view him as the man who had the guts to end the dictatorship of Sankoh Doe in 1990, and who has the instinct to prevent another war in a country founded by freed American slaves, in 1847.

That image, along with well-organized campaigns that Taylor had years to build, convinced him to give Tay lor 93% of the vote, according to results released Tuesday by the Independent Election Commission. A 60-member international team of election observers included former president Jimmy Carter.

Taylor's closest rival, former U.N. official Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, had 3.5% of the vote, with 76% of the vote counted. Johnson-Sirleaf, who spent the past 10 years in the United States, quit as the Africa director for the U.N. Development Program in May to return as a candidate. By then it was too late to win over a country that for seven years had known Tay lor as its most formidable leader.

Taylor, 49, was a favorite from the start but had been expected to face Johnson-Sirleaf, 56, in a runoff next month. Those who voted for him, however, and even some of those who didn't, say his towering of the 12 other contenders in the first round shouldn't have been a total surprise.

"Mr. Taylor had done his homework," said Daniel Quaicoe of the Center for Democratic Empowerment, a Monrovia-based group that seeks to promote democracy in Africa. "In the past seven years he had been able to impress upon people that he was their leader. When election time came, he had the means, the resources, the media to spread his propaganda. He had a better-organized machine."

Like many Liberians, Corneth, 33, welcomed Taylor's Christmas Eve 1989 incursion to oval Doe, who had served power 14 years earlier in a military coup and imposed a dictatorship that favored its Krahn tribe. Though Corneth and his brothers were Krahn, Doe was one of Africa's most brutal dictators andmany, even from his own ethnic group, desper ately wanted to see him go.

"We could not succeed through politics to get rid of Doe," said Corneth. "The best alternative was through some military uprising, which was what Taylor did."

His brothers died when Taylor's men, seeking revenge for Doe's abuses, rounded up Krahn in northern Liberia, tortured them and killed them as they tried to flee across the border to Sierra Leone shortly before the war began. Corneth escaped and lived off roots and relief aid.

"People believe that even though he's the man who started the war, he's the only man who can take care of them," said Francis Makan, one of Taylor's opponents who ended up voting for Johnson-Sirleaf.

While Taylor handed out t-shirts and promised jobs and security to the impoverished and war weary, Johnson-Sirleaf, with her Harvard MBA and high-profile "Western" career, was seen by many as a virtual foreigner with no understanding of the average Liberian's problems.

Johnson-Sirleaf won support from women, and intellectuals, but they represented a minority of the country's 751,000 registered voters, most votes were cast between the ages of 18 and 30, as were most of Taylor's fighters. "They saw security in Mr. Taylor, because he's the man who stood by them for so many years," Sarrooe said.
Liberia Gets Fair Vote, Courtesy of Neighbors

By DONALD G. MCELLIN, JR., MONROVIA, LIBERIA, July 21 — One of the lessons of the Liberian presidential election this weekend seems to be: If you want a free and fair election in Africa, make sure it’s run by a police state — somebody else’s.

The West African peacekeeping force that was virtually universal praise. Although the voting on Saturday was overseen by an American consulting firm, all the crucial roles were played by the 10,500 soldiers, most of whom came from countries like Nigeria and Ghana where leaders hold power by force, corruption is a part of doing business and dissent is frequently jailed.

In February, using unmistakable threats, the soldiers compelled Liberia’s rival militias to band in their weapons. They escorted presidential aspirants on the campaign trail and swore that any rocks thrown at candidates would be answered with bullets. On voting day, they not only kept the long lines at the polls orderly, but in some remote areas also marked ballots for illiterate voters who had never held a pencil.

That, naturally, has led to some protests from the losing candidates. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, but foreign election monitors say that senior soldiers they watched acted impartially and that polls observers from Mrs. Johnson-Sirleaf’s party said they were not upset.

Today, with about a third of the vote counted, Charles G. Taylor’s lead widened to 66 percent, with Mrs. Johnson-Sirleaf at 16 percent.

Mr. Taylor has not claimed victory, but his party warned its supporters "not to indulge in any forms of jubilation" before the final count is announced.

Former President Jimmy Carter and former Senator Paul Simon, both here as observers, said the Liberian election was run better than ones they had seen in Bonn, Croatia and Haiti.


"He’s one of the heroes of the election," Mr. O’Neill said. Referring to the West African peacekeeping force by its acronym, he added, "And Eocom is only as good as its command." Eocom is only as good as its commander.

In this case, that certainly seems true. In April 1998, when fighting between the militias destroyed most of this seaside city, the Eocom command, Gen. John Ingener, was widely blamed. He had become close to Mr. Taylor and his men were falling into the habit of petty corruption. Letters demanding that the soldiers leave were read over the airwaves. He also had fallen out with the European donors offering to help the country.

Then, after Mr. Taylor’s troops attacked another warlord’s headquarters and a Nigerian unit was decimated in the crossfire and pulled back, General Malu was replaced by General Malu, a longtime infantry commander who had trained in Britain and at Fort Benning, Ga., and helped found his country’s National War College.

Even putting aside what happened this week, it was an interesting choice. General Malu’s last assignment to Liberia, in 1993, had been leading assaults on Mr. Taylor’s forces.

When he arrived in Monrovia again last year, he said, "people were fractionizing with each faction, Everybody was a Yoruba — they were carrying arms openly. That was why the city was destroyed. I told them, ‘From the 4th of February, if you have arms, we’ll treat you like a common criminal.’ They didn’t believe me. But the first one I went after was a warlord, Alhaji Kromah. We arrested him in his home, took a statement and hanged him to the police.

“The United Nations Human Rights group questioned why we were arresting people, I explained politely that we were saving lives. You can’t protect someone’s human rights if they’re dead. And now, Liberia is more arms-free than Nigeria.”

General Malu has said he can get along with Mr. Taylor — although it is clear he does not consider him an ally.

One of the greatest worries of the people living in this country and the aid agencies pumping money into it is that Mr. Taylor, who has some
Some officers had once gone to Britain and even the F.B.I. Academy for training, he said, but had since worked for years not just without ties, but without even pens or hand-cuffs in a headquarters without tables, chairs, lights or water.

Asked if he was worried about the brutalized young men of Mr. Taylor’s militia joining a force that, before the war, didn’t even carry guns, he said: “We’re going to try to set up a department that doesn’t let them in.”

Underpinning all this is concern about how long the West African peacekeepers will stay. Nigeria has already spent $3.5 billion since 1990 and wants to pull out. General Malu acknowledged that today, while praising the United States for supplying helicopters, trucks, uniforms, boats, radios, tents, medical supplies and other goods, he also noted — in an unflattering comparison — how much political tension with the West African countries had shown.

“In Somalia, how many men did the United States lose before it decided to quit?” he asked. “Twenty-one? And not very many in Beirut. We’ve lost 500 men in combat here.”

Charles Taylor, left, took a wide lead yesterday in Liberia’s presidential election over Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf. Both candidates voted in Monrovia.

skilled technocrats in his planned Cabinet and is an acute businessman but still retains an encourager of young thugs, will fill top army and police posts with them. General Malu was adamant that that would not happen. “Absolutely not,” he said. “Charles Taylor is president of a country that we’ve managed to pull together. We have a mandate to restructure the armed forces, and the recruitment model has been drawn up — it runs across all the tribal groups. He won’t have any control.”

Officers, he said, will be trained outside Liberia, and he won’t quit the country until he’s happy with the army he’s been assigned to create. “Charles Taylor didn’t give me that assignment,” he added.

The United States is training the country’s police force. George Aylward, a former New York Police Department detective and chief in Middletown, Conn., said he had been allowed to choose his first 50 trainees from the remnants of the force predating the 1990 civil war.
The Atlanta Journal and Constitution
8/21/97

Long road to democracy in Liberia

Democracy will work in Liberia, but it's not quite working yet.

That was the message from Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, runner-up in last month's election in the West African country, during a visit with Atlanta's Liberian community this week.

Before the election, many had predicted Johnson-Sirleaf would force a runoff with Charles Taylor, a former warlord heavily involved in the nation's seven-year civil war. But when the votes were counted, Taylor had 75 percent to just under 10 percent for Johnson-Sirleaf.

After threatening to challenge the results, she eventually accepted the count. In the future, however, she said she hopes to see elections conducted on a more "level playing field."

Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter deserves praise for supporting the Liberian peace process, ending the civil war, and "drawing international attention to what might easily have been just a backwater African election with no notice," Johnson-Sirleaf said. She also credited Carter, an election monitor, with helping make sure the voting was free, though not, in her opinion, truly fair.

Liberia suffers from a 70 percent illiteracy rate, and much more education about the electoral process is needed, she said. She also faulted "shortcomings of the registration process" and "an element of intimidation."

"Many people indeed may have voted their fear," Johnson-Sirleaf said, pointing to wide speculation Taylor might restart the civil war if he lost.

But she called the election a "building block in a long process toward real democracy. And she said she was pleased that few voters questioned the idea that a woman could lead the country.

Since the election, Johnson-Sirleaf, who has worked the past five years as Africa director for the U.N. Development Program, said she has told Taylor she does not wish to be part of his government.

She said she does hope to work on community development projects and help rebuild refugees from the civil war. And she intends to keep a close eye on the new president.

"Mr. Taylor talks well. He's very articulate," Johnson-Sirleaf said. But she said she still doubts he can make the "miraculous change" necessary to transform himself from rebel leader to effective president.

Johnson-Sirleaf's trip here is one of several she is taking while winding up her U.N. duties before moving back to Liberia. She tells audience that not only Liberians living in the United States but all Americans should take an interest in her country: "Liberia has had a long-standing, good relationship with the United States, and much of Liberia's value system and culture comes from the United States — particularly the Southern United States."

If Taylor sticks by the Liberian Constitution, his first term of office will end in six years.

"God willing, life and health permitting," Johnson-Sirleaf will run again. "And hopefully, I'll be much more prepared that time," she said.

—Keith Graham
Electoral May Signal an End to Liberia's Seven Years of Upheaval

By James Rogers

The Washington Post

MONROVIA: Liberia's long civil war and political instability have finally ended, and the country is ready to move forward. After seven years of conflict, the new national assembly met for the first time yesterday, and the country's first president was sworn in today. Liberia's new government is expected to bring stability and prosperity to the country.

The election, considered a landmark event in Liberia's history, was held in October last year. The vote was seen as a turning point in the country's history, with the hope that it would bring an end to the long civil war. The new government is expected to bring stability and prosperity to the country.

One problem, however, is that the election results are being contested by the opposition. They claim that the election was rigged and that the results are not valid. The situation is tense, with demonstrations and protests breaking out in various parts of the country.

The new government is expected to address these concerns and work towards a peaceful resolution. The country is looking forward to a new chapter in its history, with the hope that it will bring stability and prosperity to the people.

In conclusion, the election in Liberia is seen as a significant milestone in the country's history. The new government is expected to bring stability and prosperity to the people, and the country is looking forward to a brighter future.

The Carter Center

July 28, 1997

Washington Post

Powell Tate, Inc.

JEC Daily Clip

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July 28
But within a month of (M.F.) arriving in May 1998, the former army boss was not popular as an officer who could enforce a crucial inter-ethnic peace effort on the ground. Mr. Nadowa, a West African officer, has scored the highest from 8000 to 10,000 votes in the bloodshed across Liberian history.

Also, the military's African and Western government:

Cooperating in a new troop operation, the most successful in the history of the Union, the West African soldiers have the support of the UN, African Union, and Western forces. Recently the operation has been extensive. Failed attempts to negotiate with the African soldiers have led to the failure of the operation. The UN has also been involved in the negotiations, with the aim of reaching a ceasefire in the region.

The United States, Britain, Germany, France, and other African countries have supported the UN's efforts in the region. The United Nations, the World Health Organization, and other international organizations have been involved in the negotiations, with the aim of reaching a ceasefire in the region.

The military's African and Western government:

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About The Carter Center

The Carter Center brings people and resources together to resolve conflicts; promote democracy; fight disease, hunger, and poverty; and protect and promote human rights worldwide. It is guided by the principle that people, with the necessary skills, knowledge, and access to resources, can improve their own lives and the lives of others.

Founded in 1982 by Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter in partnership with Emory University, the nonprofit Center undertakes action-oriented programs in cooperation with world leaders and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In this way, the Center has touched the lives of people in more than 65 countries.

The Center’s programs are directed by resident experts or fellows, some of whom teach at Emory University. They design and implement activities in cooperation with President and Mrs. Carter, networks of world leaders, other NGOs, and partners in the United States and abroad. Private donations from individuals, foundations, corporations, and multilateral development assistance programs support the Center’s work.

The Center is located in a 35-acre park just two miles east of downtown Atlanta. Four circular, interconnected pavilions house offices for the former president and first lady and most of the Center’s program staff. The complex includes the nondenominational Cecil B. Day Chapel, other conference facilities, and administrative offices. The Jimmy Carter Library and Museum, which adjoins The Carter Center, is owned and operated by the National Archives and Records Administration of the federal government and is open to the public. The Center and library facilities are known collectively as The Carter Presidential Center.

More information about The Carter Center, including Center publications, press releases, and speeches, is available on the World Wide Web at: http://www.emory.edu/CARTER_CENTER.