The January 20, 1996 Palestinian Elections
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NDG and the Carter Center would like to thank the epitome of the election fraud that is the election fraud.
Chapter 1

Gaza Strip From 1993 to 1996

in the West Bank and Political Developments

The Palestinian election on March 1996...
The dual role of the judiciary in the United States is to interpret the Constitution and to provide a forum for resolving disputes. The Supreme Court, as the highest court in the land, has the power to review lower court decisions and to declare laws unconstitutional. This ensures that all laws are consistent with the principles of liberty and justice as defined by the Constitution. The court's decisions set legal precedents that guide the interpretation of laws in the future.

The court's power to interpret the Constitution allows it to play a significant role in shaping the development of law. By interpreting constitutional principles, the court can ensure that the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution are protected. This role is particularly important in a democracy, where the judiciary serves as a check on the power of the executive and legislative branches.

In addition to its constitutional role, the court also serves as a forum for resolving disputes between individuals and between individuals and the government. This role is essential in ensuring that justice is done and that people's rights are protected. The court's decisions in these cases set important precedents that guide the interpretation of laws in the future.

Overall, the dual role of the judiciary in the United States is one of the most important features of our legal system. It ensures that the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution are protected, and that justice is done in a fair and impartial manner.
August 29, Israel and the PLO signed the Early Empowerment Accords at the Gaza Strip’s Erez border crossing. This agreement transferred control to the Palestinians limited authority in the areas of education, tourism, health, social welfare and taxation, even in those parts of the West Bank not yet formally under PA control. It was intended to prepare the way for a redeployment of Israeli troops in the remainder of the West Bank, the introduction of Palestinian administration and the holding of Palestinian elections.

Palestinian Opposition to the DOP and the Cairo Accords

Despite the widespread euphoria that characterized the first several weeks following the signing of the DOP, discontent ensued, and critics of the DOP and the process grew more vocal. One line of Palestinian criticism focused on the terms of the DOP (and later agreements) and asserted that Arafat had settled for less than the Palestinians should have received. Palestinian detractors objected to the piecemeal redeployment of Israeli forces and insisted that all occupied territories be addressed as a unit. Indeed they disputed the concept of ‘redeployment’ itself rather than a ‘withdrawal’ of Israeli forces as such. Finally, critics charged that postponing resolution of issues such as the status of Jerusalem, settlements and the rights of Palestinian refugees, would pose a danger in the face of the ongoing construction of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and around Jerusalem.

After the signing of the May 4 agreement, several opposition groups, including leftists such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and Islamic groups such as the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) and Islamic Jihad, criticized the accords for having effectively allowed Israel to retain control in the areas of the West Bank and Gaza. These groups also remained opposed to the DOP in principle, as they refused to accept the legitimacy of Israel’s statehood. Moreover, the agreement maintained existing Israeli rules and military orders, and witheld major legislative, judicial and executive powers from the PA, be they based in Gaza Strip and Jericho. In particular, critics charged that the Joint Civil Affairs Committee and subcommittees undermined the powers of the Palestinian Authority and effectively reduced the PA’s role to that of a “subcontractor” implementing Israeli policy.

As the PA established its presence in Gaza Strip and Jericho, another overlapping school of criticism increasingly aimed at Arafat’s style of leadership. He was accused of failing to consult others on sentiment.

2 PFLP is a leftist political faction of the PLO headed by George Habash. Based in Damascus, PFLP views the Palestinian struggle for independence within the context of its broader objectives of promoting leftist ideology and pan-Arab nationalism. FPLP’s support in December 1995, according to a poll conducted by the Center for Palestine Research and Studies (CPRS), was 3.6 percent. CPRS is an independent policy research institute located in the West Bank city of Nablus. With the guidance and financial assistance from the Republican Institute (RI) in Washington D.C., CPRS has conducted political polling since September 1993. These polls have been one of the few reliable indicators of Palestinian popular sentiment.

3 DFLP is a leftist group that broke away from PFLP in 1969 after disagreements about the movement’s platform. A member of the PLO and based in Damascus, DFLP’s support borders around 2 percent, according to CPRS polls.

4 Hamas, a militant Muslim movement that emerged during the intifada, the Palestinian uprising of the late 1980s, was founded by members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Led by Sheikh Ahmad Yasen (who has been in an Israeli prison since the late 1980s), Hamas is not a member of the PLO. Its goal is the establishment of a Palestinian Islamic state. Hamas became popular among some Palestinians by developing a strong network that has provided social, educational and health services to Palestinians. Its military wing, the Izz Ad-Dean Al-Qasem Brigades, has claimed responsibility for terrorist attacks and bombings directed at Israelis since the signing of the DOP. CPRS polls placed Hamas’ public support in the pre-election period between 10 and 15 percent during 1993 to 1995.

5 A small Islamic militant movement that formed in the mid-1980s, Islamic Jihad became active in organizing Palestinian protests during the intifada. Islamic Jihad is infamous for planning suicide terrorist attacks against Israel in recent years. Unlike Hamas, Islamic Jihad lacks an extensive network of social institutions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. According to CPRS polls, support for Islamic Jihad was approximately 2 percent in December 1995.
Negotiations Leading to Oslo II

Political Developments: 1993–1996

The Palestinian-Israeli peace process entered a new phase in 1993 with the signing of the Oslo Accords, which marked a significant shift in the relationship between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA). The process was characterized by the involvement of international mediators and the participation of both parties in a series of negotiations aimed at achieving a lasting peace in the region.

In January 1995, the PLO and Israel signed the Declaration of Principles, which was a cornerstone of the peace process. This declaration paved the way for the establishment of the PA and the beginning of a transitional period of self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Oslo Accords were hailed as a historic achievement, marking a new era of cooperation and dialogue.

However, the peace process faced numerous challenges. Security issues, including the issue of Israeli settlements, remained at the forefront, and the pace of implementation of the agreements was slow. Despite these obstacles, the Oslo Accords were seen as an important step towards a comprehensive solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In conclusion, the Oslo Accords represented a significant milestone in the peace process. They laid the groundwork for future negotiations and set the stage for a more lasting and comprehensive peace agreement. The success of the Oslo Accords and their impact on the region continue to be the subject of ongoing debate and analysis.
The presentation of our findings and recommendations on the developments in the field of security and defense. The importance of maintaining a strong defense posture and the need for continuous improvement and adaptation to new threats and challenges. The role of international cooperation in enhancing our defense capabilities. The impact of technological advancements on our defense systems and strategies. The implications of our findings for policy and strategic planning. Acknowledging the contributions of our colleagues and partners in achieving these results. The next steps in implementing our recommendations and the ongoing efforts to enhance our defense capabilities.

Israel Redeployment from the West Bank

The analytical report on the geopolitical ramifications of the Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank. The historical context and the implications of this decision on regional dynamics. The economic and social consequences of the redeployment. The political implications and the reactions of neighboring territories. The ongoing challenges and the future outlook for the region. The role of international organizations and the global community in shaping the future of the West Bank and the Middle East region.
Elections 1996

Palestine

The Framework For the Elections

Chapter 2
The Framework for the Election

The G.O.P. and its affiliated groups in the conservative movement have been working to develop a comprehensive strategy for reclaiming power in the next presidential election. They have identified several key areas for focus, including campaign finance reform, voter ID laws, and immigration policies.

The Framework includes a series of proposals designed to strengthen the party's appeal to certain demographics. These proposals are intended to address the concerns of the base while also appealing to swing voters. The Framework also emphasizes the importance of effective messaging and communication strategies.

The G.O.P. has dedicated significant resources to the development of the Framework, and the party leadership is committed to implementing the proposals as soon as possible. The Framework is expected to play a central role in the party's efforts to win the next election.
population demographics, such as gender and education. This information helps in the identification of potential target audiences for the DCX project. In the case of the DCX project, the CEO of the company is interested in understanding the demographics of the population to better tailor the project to the needs of the target audience. The CEO believes that the demographics of the population can provide valuable insights into the potential success of the project.

To obtain this information, the CEO has decided to conduct a survey. The survey will be conducted online, and respondents will be asked to provide their demographic information. The survey will be available on the company's website, and respondents will be encouraged to complete it.

The CEO has also decided to hire a team of researchers to analyze the data collected from the survey. The researchers will be responsible for identifying patterns and trends in the demographic data, and they will provide recommendations to the CEO on how to best tailor the DCX project to the needs of the target audience.

In conclusion, the CEO believes that understanding the demographics of the population is crucial to the success of the DCX project. By conducting a survey and hiring a team of researchers, the CEO is confident that the project will be tailored to the needs of the target audience, and the team will provide valuable insights into the potential success of the project.
The Framework for the Elections

A. In general, the election process in Jerusalem was complex and challenging. The Palestinian Defense Council (PDCM), a group of Palestinian leaders, formed a committee of 92 members to coordinate the election process. The PDCM, in turn, appointed the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) to oversee the elections.

B. The CEC was tasked with preparing the electoral rolls, distributing voter cards, and ensuring that the election process was conducted fairly.

C. In Jerusalem, the CEC faced several challenges, including difficulties in accessing voting centers, and ensuring that the election process was conducted fairly.

D. In the end, the election process in Jerusalem was successful, with a high turnout of voters.

E. The results of the election process in Jerusalem were announced on January 20, and the new government was sworn in on January 30.
The Framework for the Election

30 Provincial Elections in the West Bank and Gaza
Conclusion

The Palestinian electoral framework evolved in a somewhat ad hoc manner, with changes made to the law as the elections progressed. Initially, the PA implemented a complex system of regional and local elections, which were later simplified. The PA also sought to establish a framework for the legislative elections, but this was never fully developed. The elections were marred by various issues, including the PA's inability to control elections in some areas, and the Israeli military's role in maintaining order.

The conclusion of the elections marked a significant milestone in the Palestinian struggle for self-determination. However, the elections also highlighted the challenges that lie ahead, including the need for a fully democratic and transparent electoral process. The PA must ensure that future elections are conducted in a manner that is freely and fairly conducted, allowing all eligible voters to participate. The international community must continue to monitor and support the Palestinian elections to ensure that they are conducted in a manner that is consistent with international standards.
Chapter 3

The Campaign and Pre-
The Committee of Permanent Environments 99

Guidelines for the prevention and control of pollution

I. Introduction

The prevention and control of pollution in the environment is a fundamental aspect of environmental management. This section provides guidelines for preventing and controlling pollution in the environment. It covers the identification and control of pollution sources, the implementation of pollution prevention strategies, and the enforcement of pollution control measures.

II. Identification of Pollution Sources

Pollution sources can be identified through site visits, field observations, and data analysis. This step involves collecting information on the types and quantities of pollutants emitted, the processes and activities responsible for pollution, and the potential impacts on the environment.

III. Prevention Strategies

Prevention strategies aim to minimize or eliminate pollution before it is released into the environment. These strategies include source reduction, process improvements, and pollution prevention programs. Source reduction involves reducing the amount of pollutants generated at the source. Process improvements involve modifying existing processes to reduce pollution. Pollution prevention programs involve implementing pollution prevention measures at the source.

IV. Control Measures

Control measures are implemented to prevent or control pollution that is already present in the environment. These measures include emission controls, pollution reduction programs, and enforcement actions. Emission controls involve regulating the release of pollutants into the environment. Pollution reduction programs involve implementing pollution reduction measures at the source. Enforcement actions involve taking legal action against polluters who violate pollution control regulations.

V. Environmental Impact Assessment

Environmental impact assessment (EIA) is a systematic process of evaluating the environmental effects of a proposed project or activity. EIA helps to identify and evaluate potential environmental impacts, determine the level of mitigation required, and ensure that the project or activity meets environmental standards.

VI. Conclusion

Preventing and controlling pollution in the environment is essential for ensuring healthy and sustainable ecosystems. By implementing effective pollution prevention and control strategies, we can protect the environment and ensure a healthy future for generations to come.
The campaign sloganEnvironment 42

Other than running on bread, some people choose to

The campaign slogan Environment 42

Other than running on bread, some people choose to

The campaign slogan Environment 42

Other than running on bread, some people choose to

The Campaign & Election Environment

P.S. Press of harlem goes through and production difficulty

Conclusions

Conclusion

The Campaign & Election Environment

51
Opening the gold in the West Bank and Gaza Strip

Preparatory meetings this week prepared the groundwork for the opening of the gold market in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which was announced last week by the Palestinian Authority. The opening of the gold market is part of the broader economic reform program initiated by the Palestinian Authority, which seeks to stimulate economic growth and create jobs in the region. The opening of the gold market is expected to provide a boost to the local economy and help attract investment from abroad.

The gold market in the West Bank and Gaza Strip will be opened in two phases, with the first phase expected to last for three months. During this phase, the gold market will be open from Monday to Friday, with transactions taking place from 8:00 am to 12:00 noon. The second phase, which is expected to begin in June, will allow for 24-hour trading.

The Palestinian Authority has stated that it will work closely with the private sector to ensure the success of the gold market opening. The Authority has also announced that it will provide training for gold dealers and traders to ensure that they are well-prepared for the new market.

In addition to the gold market, the Palestinian Authority has also announced plans to open a stock exchange in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The stock exchange is expected to provide a platform for local companies to raise capital and access international capital markets.

The opening of the gold market and the stock exchange are part of a broader effort by the Palestinian Authority to revitalize the economy and attract investment to the region. The Authority has faced a number of challenges in recent years, including political instability and the ongoing conflict with Israel.
65 Preliminary Elections in the West Bank and Gaza

The term “preliminary elections” refers to elections that are held to select candidates for a subsequent election. In the West Bank and Gaza, the preliminary elections were held in 1996 to select candidates for the Palestinian Authority Legislative Council. These elections were seen as a significant step towards self-rule and the establishment of a democratic government.

The elections were boycotted by the Palestinian National Authority, which was opposed to the idea of holding elections in the West Bank and Gaza. The elections were also criticized for being fraudulent and rigged in favor of the dominant political party.

Despite these criticisms, the elections were viewed as a significant step towards democracy and the establishment of a democratic government in the West Bank and Gaza. The results of the elections were seen as a source of hope for the Palestinian people, and they were viewed as a symbol of the struggle for self-determination and freedom.

In conclusion, the preliminary elections in the West Bank and Gaza were an important event in the history of the Palestinian people. They were seen as a significant step towards democracy and the establishment of a democratic government, but they were also met with resistance and criticism. Despite these challenges, the elections were viewed as a source of hope for the Palestinian people and a symbol of the struggle for self-determination and freedom.
The Role of Security Forces

The security forces play a crucial role in maintaining law and order during elections. They are responsible for ensuring that the polling process is peaceful and free from violence. The security forces are deployed at polling stations, roads, and other areas to prevent any form of disturbance or violence. They also play a vital role in protecting the rights of citizens to vote in a free and fair manner.

The security forces are trained to handle any situation that may arise during elections. They are equipped with the necessary tools and equipment to deal with any threats to the security of the election process. They also coordinate with other agencies, such as the police, to ensure that the election process is conducted smoothly.

The role of the security forces is crucial in ensuring the success of the election process. They are the first line of defense against any form of violence or disturbance. Their role is to maintain order and prevent any form of disruption to the election process.

In conclusion, the security forces play a vital role in ensuring the success of the election process. Their role is crucial in maintaining law and order and preventing any form of violence or disturbance. Their efforts are essential in ensuring that the election process is free and fair, and the rights of citizens to vote are protected.

Election Day 2022

68 Pakistan Elections in the West Bank and Gaza
Election Day 65

Next day, the budget was presented to the Congress. The President informed the Congress of his plan to introduce a comprehensive tax reform bill. The bill aimed to simplify the tax system and reduce the burden on middle-income earners.

The proposal was met with mixed reactions. Some members of Congress praised the President for his vision and commitment to fairness. Others expressed concern about the potential impact on small businesses and high-income individuals.

The next week, the President met with business leaders to discuss the implications of the tax reform. The meeting was productive, and many business leaders agreed that the reforms could lead to increased investment and job creation.

The President continued to push the agenda, making speeches and appearing on television to champion his vision. Despite the challenges, he remained optimistic about the potential benefits of the reforms.

The question of whether the tax reform would pass in Congress remained unanswered. The President knew that it would not be an easy task, but he was determined to see his plan through to the end.
Chapter 5

Election Results and

Aftermath
The election results and analysis are as follows:

Election Results and Analysis

The voting process in Pennsylvania, as in other states, involves

various elements that ensure the integrity and fairness of the

elections. These elements include voter registration, polling

stations, ballot counting, and audit processes. The results

provide insights into the preferences of the electorate and

are important for understanding the political landscape.

In the summary, the text discusses the voting patterns and

participation rates, highlighting key takeaways from the

election.

The election results show a strong turnout, with several

candidates securing a majority of the votes. This indicates

the popularity of certain policies or candidates among the

electorate.

Conclusions and Implications of Results

The analysis of the election results reveals several

important points. First, the high voter turnout suggests

a keen interest in the political process and a desire for

change.

Second, the distribution of votes across different regions

indicates regional variations in political affiliations.

Furthermore, the results can be used to evaluate the

performance of politicians and parties and to identify

potential areas for growth or improvement.

The implications of these results are significant, as they

affect policy decisions and the direction of the government.

Overall, the election results provide a clear picture of the

political climate and serve as a foundation for future

policy discussions and actions.
Release of Partial Results

The CIC's unprecedented release of partial results on January 21 before all polling stations had reported their results. The CIC's official website for the elections was flooded with millions of visitors during the release of partial results. The release of partial results was also criticized by some observers as potentially affecting the credibility of the final results.

Gaza Strip: Re-vote in Gaza North

In Gaza North, a re-vote was announced due to the high percentages of invalid ballots. This was a significant development in the region, as it indicated a lack of confidence in the initial voting process.

On Election Results and Aftermath 75

The official results were announced on January 24, with the Fatah party winning a majority of seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council. The results were generally accepted by most political parties, despite some minor disputes and challenges.

Additional Results:

- In Jerusalem, results showed a narrow victory for Fatah candidate Ahmed Al-Jabber.
- In Ramallah, results were also generally in favor of Fatah, with candidates such as Nasser Farhan and Jibril Rajoub leading.
- In Bethlehem, the results were also consistent with the national trend, with Fatah candidates leading.

The elections were seen as a test of the Palestinian Authority's ability to conduct fair and transparent elections. However, some observers raised concerns about the security situation and the impact of the Israeli occupation on the voting process.

Overall, the elections were considered a significant step towards strengthening the Palestinian Authority's legitimacy and the unity of the Palestinian people.
Education Results and Achievements
Comparison of Results to Other EFTEs

The following table presents a comparison of the results from the EFTEs tested with the other EFTEs. The data was collected using the same method and under similar conditions. The results show that the EFTEs tested performed similarly to the other EFTEs in terms of efficiency and effectiveness.

Table: Comparison of Results to Other EFTEs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EFTE</th>
<th>Efficiency</th>
<th>Effectiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EFTE1</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFTE2</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Fair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFTE3</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Poor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The efficiency and effectiveness ratings were based on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being the lowest and 5 being the highest.

Conclusion:

The EFTEs tested performed well in comparison to other EFTEs. Further research is needed to determine the long-term effectiveness and efficiency of these EFTEs.

References:

1. EFTE Manual
2. EFTE Case Studies
3. EFTE Research Papers

West Bank EFTE in Kuwait

The West Bank EFTE in Kuwait was tested and the results were recorded. The EFTE performed well and met the expected standards. The data collected during the test will be used to improve future EFTE designs.

Conclusion:

The West Bank EFTE performed well and met the expected standards. Further research is needed to determine the long-term effectiveness and efficiency of this EFTE.

References:

1. EFTE Manual
2. EFTE Case Studies
3. EFTE Research Papers
The ELECTION Appellate Court

The California Supreme Court is the final appellate court of the State of California. It is the highest state court in the state's judicial system and serves as a court of appeals for the state's intermediate appellate courts and as a trial court of last resort for cases involving significant or disputed issues of state law. The Court is composed of seven justices, who are appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate for terms of six years. The Court's jurisdiction includes all cases heard by lower courts, as well as cases appealed from lower courts, and it has the ultimate authority to interpret the state's constitution and laws. The Court meets in session four times a year, with oral arguments held in San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Diego, and Sacramento. The Court typically issues its decisions within six to twelve months after the arguments have been heard.
Election Results and Averages
In this module, we focus on the Palestinian Elections: Chapter 6.
Observing the Palestinian Elections

88 Palestinian Elections in the West Bank and Gaza
Observing the Palestinian Elections of 1996.

The Palestinian Elections were held on January 26, 1996, to elect the members of the Palestinian Authority. The election process was monitored by international observers from the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) and the European Union (EU), with the assistance of the UN. The elections were held under the supervision of the Palestinian National Authority and were deemed to be free and fair.

The elections were held in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. A total of 2.5 million registered voters participated in the election, with 66% of the eligible electorate casting their ballots. The election process was observed by a team of international observers, including representatives from the OIC and the EU, who monitored the process to ensure its fairness and transparency.

The election results were announced on January 26, 1996, with the Fatah party winning a majority of the seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council. The results were considered valid and recognized by the international community.

In conclusion, the Palestinian Elections of 1996 were a significant step towards the establishment of a democratic process in Palestine. The elections demonstrated the ability of the Palestinian people to participate in the political process and elect their representatives. The international community played a crucial role in ensuring the fairness and transparency of the election process.

References:
Elections in the West Bank and Gaza
Chapter 7

Reflections on the Palestinian Transition Toward Democracy

After its establishment in Jericho and the Gaza Strip in July 1994, the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority began assuming many of the traits of a single-party state. In an effort to assert the limited authority that was provided to it in the interim agreements with Israel, the PA began managing a monopoly of public resources, establishing a number of security forces and placing limits on freedom of the press. Yet, the strength of Palestinian civil society seemed to limit the extent of the PA’s influence in its early days on the ground in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. At the same time, political factions opposing the Oslo negotiating framework intermittently sought to discredit both the Oslo I and Oslo II agreements and rally public opposition to the peace process and the subsequent elections. In some cases, Palestinian opponents used violence in attempts to halt the progress of negotiations with the Israeli government.

The fact that peaceful elections were held fewer than two years after the establishment of the PA can be attributed to three main factors. First, the PA developed an electoral system and administered the process without major interference, so it came to be seen by Palestinians, even critics, as an authentically Palestinian process. The elections process, thus, constituted an important element in the growing framework of interaction, cooperation and coordination between Palestinians and Israelis. Second, the PA generally worked to make the elections as inclusive as possible. Although ultimately unsuccessful in convincing opposition political factions to participate in the elections, the PA went to some lengths to encourage their involvement or at least to discourage an active boycott. Lastly, the work and perseverance of Palestinian election administrators, who worked long hours responding to last-minute changes in the election’s administrative framework, played a major role in the election’s success.

Given the complexity of coordinating Israeli troop redeployment from Palestinian territories and organizing elections for the first time in an area of divided authority, the elections were a remarkable achievement. The vast majority of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were able to select their representatives peacefully in a process that was largely free from Palestinian-Israeli altercations or confrontations between supporters and critics of Oslo. Virtually every Palestinian who wanted to register was able to do so; the CEC vigorously sought to register all eligible voters, even after initial deadlines had passed. Although few parties formally participated in these elections and Fatah-affiliated candidates dominated the campaign, a wide range of candidates ran as independents, some of whom were loosely affiliated with nonparticipating parties. Familiar, tribal and regional affiliation formed much of the basis for the political competition that did take place. Finally, with nearly 73.5 percent of eligible voters participating, the elections enjoyed greater support from Palestinians than many had expected, providing a broad mandate for the elected Council and a demonstration of public commitment to the democratic process.

Election administrators succeeded in accomplishing the complicated tasks of registering voters, mapping constituencies,
appeals that were important to resolving lingering questions about the elections.

Given their awareness of the less-than-democratic nature of elections in neighboring Arab countries, Palestinians remained highly critical of their own evolving election process throughout the months leading up to the elections. Many Palestinians hoped that their poll would set a positive example in the region. Those expectations of conducting elections that would be administratively and politically more successful than those of their neighbors required a CEC committed to conducting a transparent process—an important component of which required the CEC to regularly furnish the public with adequate information regarding evolving practices and procedures. However, rather than responding to this need, the CEC appeared unprepared or unwilling to engage in an ongoing dialogue with the voting public. In future polling, where organized competition is likely to be greater, this combination of public skepticism and administrative detachment could undermine voter trust in the elections.

Recommendations for Future Elections

On the basis of the observations contained in this report, NDI and the Carter Center offer several recommendations for Palestinians to consider when organizing and conducting elections in the future. Many of these recommendations were discussed during a meeting between the head of NDI’s post-election observer program and the CEC Chairman Mohammed Shriayeh on February 24, 1996.

1. Public Information. Strengthen efforts at outreach and public relations that better inform the public about the elections and respond to doubts and rumors that can multiply and exaggerate concerns in an information vacuum. Additionally, in advance of future elections, the CEC should plan to meet regularly with a broad spectrum of political party leaders, candidates, journalists and civic activists and community leaders to discuss developments in election preparations and solicit their input in a way that allows them to assume ownership of the process and defend it to their respective constituencies.

2. Transparency. Rigorously enforce election provisions that allow candidates and their agents access to observe the voting and counting processes. This openness is vital to public confidence.
3. **Election Law.** Adhere more rigorously to the election law. If last-minute changes must be made, they should be made by the CEC consistent with the law, widely publicized and fully explained.

4. **Timetables.** Publish and maintain an accurate and realistic election calendar in order to facilitate election planning by both organizers and competitors. Adherence to both the election law and the timetable would send a message to the public that the integrity of the process itself is important and effectively managed.

5. **Voter Education for Illiterate Voters.** Organize programs to reach illiterate Palestinians with information on voting procedures and encourage them to ask a trusted companion to accompany them to the polling station.

6. **Polling Station Organization.** Exercise more stringent control over entry into the polling station, build in safeguards to protect the secrecy of the vote and make greater efforts to identify sufficiently large locations for polling stations.

7. **Security.** Clearly define and actively publicize the role of security forces in and around polling centers. Only authorized forces should be allowed near polling stations and they should be subordinate to the polling station commissions.

8. **Tabulation.** Reorganize the tabulation of polling station returns to guarantee efficient and accurate calculation of results. District- and central-level tabulation should take place in venues large enough to accommodate candidates and their agents, and checklists should be adopted to track those polling stations that have returned results. Only individuals authorized by the election law should be allowed to conduct the tabulation.

9. **Training Candidate Agents.** Establish training programs to ensure that all candidates and their agents understand the election law, the rights of agents within the polling station and procedures for pursuing complaints.

10. **Appeals.** Provide more information to candidates and parties about the appeals process. Highlight information regarding the process by which an appeal is submitted including the type and amount of documentation necessary for a successful appeal. The Election Appeals Court should consider more thoroughly cases presented before it in order to achieve more conclusive resolution of disputes.

11. **Publication of All Polling-Station Results.** Publish and widely disseminate complete results of the elections by each ballot box, including the number of votes that winning and losing candidates received, and voter turnout figures for each electoral district.
Epilogue

The January 1996 elections represent an important step in the Palestinian democratic transition, but by no means does the relative success of these elections automatically ensure the success of Palestinian democracy. Democracy requires not only competitive, multipartisan elections but also requires well-functioning democratic institutions and processes. These include: a legislature that represents the people and oversees the executive; a free, impartial and inquisitive press; an efficient and principled judiciary; and a system of checks and balances within society that comprise not only a separation of powers among different branches of government, but also between central and local governments; and finally informed citizens and public advocacy organizations that demand accountability from their institutions and leaders.

As of the end of 1996, the democratic promise embodied in the elections has been only partially fulfilled. Many Palestinian Legislative Council members have demonstrated a commitment to respond to constituent concerns by meeting with them in a number of “town hall” meetings to listen to and discuss community issues. Several PLC members have stated that their election provides them with a democratic mandate unprecedented in Palestinian and Arab politics. Though the PLC is numerically dominated by Fatah, PLC members on

18 The Peace Process, Performance of the Palestinian Authority, Performance of the Legislative Council, Results of Poll #24, Parliamentary Research Unit, Survey Research Branch, Center for Palestine Research and Studies, Nablus, West Bank, September 26 to October 17, 1996.
as many were unable to travel to jobs in Israel and East Jerusalem or transport basic goods into the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Widespread arrests, usually without charge, by the PA in an effort to crack down on militant groups opposed to the peace process were criticized by numerous Palestinian and international human rights organizations. Basic freedoms and rights associated with a democracy have not yet been formally guaranteed by law and in several cases have not been respected by the executive agencies in the PA. These trends have been reinforced by U.S. and Israeli government pressures to contain terrorism, seemingly at any cost. All of these factors threaten to disrupt the Palestinian transition to democracy.

Another complication emerged with the May election of a new Israeli government, headed by the Likud Party leader Benjamin Netanyahu who had campaigned against the Oslo Accords. Since its election, the new Israeli government has been less willing than the previous government to make compromises with the Palestinians and to implement portions of the Interim Agreement signed by the PLO and Israel in September 1995. Decisions to confiscate more land in the West Bank and Gaza Strip for Israeli settlements and to open to tourists a controversial archeological tunnel by the Dome of the Rock have been reaffirmed. Already complicated by confrontational rhetoric, Substantive dialogue and negotiations between the new Israeli government and the PLO were virtually non-existent throughout the summer and fall of 1996. Palestinian popular frustration mounted during the summer and eventually exploded at the end of September in three days of clashes throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip between Palestinian demonstrators and police, and Israeli military and police forces.

The political environment in the West Bank and Gaza Strip remains uncertain, and the successful consolidation of democratic norms will ultimately depend in large part on the role that the PLC will play during the next few years. The election of the PLC partially established the institutional basis for accountable governance within the PA. However, PLC members continue to face two major challenges. First, most members campaigned on issues they have no formal power to influence such as Palestinian statehood, the removal of Israeli settlements from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and Jerusalem as the capital of a future Palestinian state. Second, the PLC Executive Authority has obstructed the passing of legislation defining the powers and responsibilities of the PLC. Expectations are high but the capacity of the Council to meet them is extremely low. The success of the peace process launched with the 1993 DOP will depend in large measure on the degree to which the autonomous governing authority is seen by Palestinians as responsive to their needs.

By not moving quickly and decisively to define the powers and responsibilities of the Council, the PA's Executive Authority is weakening a potentially important mediating force within Palestinian society. The PLC could perhaps serve the important role of tempering Palestinian frustrations regarding larger peace process issues if it had the power to genuinely debate and legislate on policy questions that affect Palestinians on a daily basis such as housing, education and health care. While frustrations over the larger questions of statehood, Jerusalem and settlements would undoubtedly persist, the PLC would offer the public some sense of progress and responsiveness on issues that also matter to the daily lives of Palestinians.

New and important relationships have been established between the Palestinian public and decision-makers in the 1996 Palestinian elections. However, the new PLC members lack support from the Palestinian public and recognition of their pivotal role in the Palestinian transition to democratic governance from the international community. The development of democracy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip rests in large part in the hands of those who were elected to represent the people in the Palestinian Legislative Council. Without the authority to respond to the needs and concerns of the Palestinian public, the PLC's ability to fulfill its representative function will be dangerously constrained.
Appendix A

First Statement

NDI/The Carter Center
Pre-election Monitoring Program
1996 Palestinian Elections
November 16, 1995

The first pre-election delegation of the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) and The Carter Center has concluded a week-long mission to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This pre-election mission is part of a comprehensive international election monitoring program designed to demonstrate international support for democracy and the electoral process in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and to assess the electoral process in relation to Palestinian law and international norms.

The delegation includes Szumir Macozuma, South African Member of Parliament and Chairman of the Election Committee of the African National Congress; Matyas Elekes, Hungarian Member of Parliament and Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee; Karen Shepherd, former Member of the U.S. House of Representatives; and Claudio Grossman, a native of Chile, Vice President of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and Dean of the Washington College of Law at the American University in Washington, DC.

Representatives of NDI and The Carter Center accompanied the delegation. NDI and The Carter Center are coordinating their international monitoring program with the International Monitoring Program of the European Union and other national and international governmental organizations involved in monitoring the elections. The NDI/Carter Center international monitoring program draws on the resources and experience of the Institute’s work in the West Bank and Gaza Strip since February 1994 in civic and voter education, women's participation, and domestic election monitoring.

The delegation met with representatives of the Palestinian Authority, representatives of political parties and groups, civic leaders, leaders of women's organizations, educators, journalists, diplomats, domestic and other international election monitors, and representatives of the government of Israel. The team met with the caretaker chairman of the Central Election Commission and members of the former Commission on Elections, coordinators of the election offices in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, district election officers for Gaza City, Gaza North, Gaza-Middle, Khan Yunis, Rafah, Nablus, Ramallah, Hebron and Jerusalem, and teachers involved in voter registration process. The delegation observed registration canvassing in Deir Al Balah, Nuseirat, Shabara and the Sweidi section of Rafah camp in the Gaza Strip, East Al-Joura and Jabal Al-Rahma in Hebron District, and Al-Izariya and in Jerusalem District.

Mirroring a universal trend, the Interim Agreement and the Palestinian election law call for international observation of the Palestinian elections. In the past 10 years, the National Democratic Institute, often in cooperation with The Carter Center, has organized international monitoring programs for more than 50 elections in every part of the world, including Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe, the former Soviet Union and the Middle East.

Findings of the Delegation

We have witnessed a rich process of discussion and dialogue among all sectors of Palestinian society. We are heartened by the enthusiasm we witnessed for registration and for the election process. We are greatly impressed with the commitment and resourcefulness of all the election officials, including teachers who are responsible for the voter registration canvas. There are strong aspirations for democracy throughout Palestinian society. We note that even parties that are skeptical about the elections have nevertheless encouraged Palestinians to participate in voter registration. Recognizing the right of political participation, we are confident that all political groups, even those that will not choose to participate, will respect the rights of each individual Palestinian to make a choice. We value, too, that Israel has committed itself to facilitate democratic elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

These first Palestinian elections, like transition elections everywhere, create new opportunities to raise democratic awareness, involve larger parts of the public to participate in public affairs, lay the foundation for genuinely democratic institutions and satisfy international requirements for the democratic establishment of authority. We congratulate Palestinians for approaching the elections in this spirit. We offer the support of the international community to
be opportunities opened for the development of Palestinian democracy.

1. **Registration**

   **Canvass of Voters.** The registration of voters that begins the Palestinian election process is generally well-organized and enthusiastically accepted by Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The voter registration canvas began on November 12. While there were a few technical and administrative difficulties at the beginning of the canvass (e.g., a lack of identity cards for teachers conducting the canvassing, shortages of some registration materials, some confusion about transportation arrangements for teachers, and a shortage of canvassers to begin registration of the Palestinians of Jerusalem) election officials seem to be adequately addressing these problems. Our impressions are that canvassers are committed to completing the canvass fairly and thoroughly and that eligible voters generally want to register. This positive beginning of registration is encouraging.

   **Voter Awareness.** We have observed a high level of awareness of the voter registration process, even though the local media have not covered registration canvassing as a significant story. The official voter education campaign of the Central Election Commission (CEC) in newspaper advertisements, through posters and on the broadcast media was evident, although we noted that some television spots were delayed.

   **General Support for Registration Process.** The extremely important registration process seems to have begun well. No one with whom we spoke questioned the legitimacy of the registration process, and Palestinians everywhere we went greeted registration with great enthusiasm. Various concerns were raised about the Interim Agreement, the election system and specific provisions of the election law. None of the parties raising these issues, however, considered them sufficient to question the legitimacy or fairness of the registration process.

   **Identification Documents for Eligible Residents.** The Interim Agreement guarantees that residents without proper identification documents who meet certain criteria can obtain such documents that will allow them to register and vote. Because the canvass is set to end on December 2, the procedure for obtaining identification documents for such individuals should be clarified and explained to the canvassers and the public immediately. Palestinian election officials have told us that radio and newspaper announcements will address this issue in the near future.

2. **Timing of Elections**

   Concern was expressed to us as to whether holding elections as soon as January 1996 will allow enough time for proper preparations, including time to complete registration lists and make administrative preparations or time for parties and candidates to communicate their messages. Key sectors of Palestinian society believe, however, that it is critically important to hold early elections. These sectors trust that the political maturity of Palestinian society will allow for expeditious and effective resolution of election-related issues and complaints.

   A maximum effort by all will be required for successful elections to take place in January. Urgent resolution of important technical and organizational issues must occur as soon as possible, including:

   - The election law should be approved and measures should be adopted to promote public awareness of its provisions, such as broad distribution of the law or of information about its key provisions.
   - Deadlines and procedures for filing as candidates should be established and made public.
   - The process for filing appeals of problems with regard to voter and candidate registration should be defined and explained.
   - The procedure for obtaining identification documents for individuals without identification documents should be clarified and explained to the canvassers and the public.
   - Specific procedures to ensure fair access to broadcast media during the campaign should be established.
   - Procedures for providing access to accredited domestic and international election monitors, in accordance with the election law and the Interim Agreement, to all aspects of the electoral process, including election day should be clarified.
   - The Central Election Commission should be formed.
We understand that the final election law will make technical changes to address these issues and that the Palestinian Authority will promulgate the new law in the coming days. It is important that the law be announced and the CEC be formed in the very near future.

3. FACILITATION OF ELECTORAL PROCESS

We were impressed by the spirit of cooperation between the Palestinian and Israeli sides. Because of the complexity of the election, a maximum effort should be undertaken by all relevant actors. In that respect it is crucial to ensure that member of the Israeli administration and military on the ground are properly informed for the election to proceed smoothly. We expect that these measures will further facilitate the transfer of election materials from Jericho to Gaza at the Erez checkpoint and the issuance of necessary travel permits to qualified Palestinian election officials, in accordance with the terms and spirit of the Interim Agreement.

4. ROLE OF DOMESTIC MONITORS

We believe that international monitoring cannot be successful in the absence of domestic election monitoring, and we recognize that nongovernmental organizations have a fundamental role to play in the election process. We are impressed with the efforts of the Palestinian Domestic Monitoring Committee to organize a comprehensive, independent national monitoring coalition, in accordance with the Interim Agreement and the Palestinian electoral law. We note the Interim Agreement's commitment to freedom of movement of accredited domestic election monitors and expect that this commitment will be fully respected.

5. ROLE OF WOMEN

Palestinians from diverse sectors of society also commented on the key role of women in the building of democratic institutions. We hope that election officials, election monitors, candidates and parties will take into account the particular concerns of women and that these elections will provide greater opportunities for women to participate in the public affairs of their society. We note with satisfaction that the CEC has made a concerted effort to recruit women for all polling station commissions and that the CEC voter education materials feature women and seek to address their concerns.

Appendix B

Second Statement

NDI/Carter Center
Pre-election Monitoring Program
1996 Palestinian Elections
December 16, 1995

An international delegation organized jointly by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) and The Carter Center has concluded a second pre-election mission to review the Palestinian electoral process in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. After an intense week of observation and analysis, the delegation is encouraged by the emerging focus of the political discussion on democratic procedures that has occurred in recent days among groups across the political spectrum. Despite a substantially compressed timetable, the registration process seems to have gone rather well, and the prospects for an election without violence or disruption have improved over the last month. The peace process has permitted elections; in turn, it now appears that free elections could strengthen the peace process.

The delegation includes Ambassador Harry Barnes and Dr. Robert Pastor from The Carter Center; Dr. Alex Grigorievs, former member of the Latvian Parliament; Dr. Mohamed Guessous, leader of the Socialist Union of Popular Forces in Morocco; and Thomas O. Melia, Senior Associate at NDI. The delegation held meetings with Yasser Arafat and officials of the Palestinian Authority (PA); leaders of virtually all political parties and groups; journalists and human rights activists; civic leaders, domestic observers, candidates and election officials; and Israelis.

Throughout the pre-election period, NDI and Carter Center representatives based in the West Bank and Gaza Strip will continue to monitor preparations for the elections, voter and candidate registration, the campaign, political environment, media coverage of the elections, the role of security forces and voter education efforts. At the time of the elections, NDI and The Carter Center will organize a multinational delegation of election and regional experts, elected officials, and political party leaders, led by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter.
The delegation was encouraged to hear Palestinian leaders, including those from Islamist groups, describe the elections as the basis of political legitimacy and the key to long-term stability. These leaders told us that they want the elections to proceed without disruption or violence, whether they eventually choose to participate or not. Chairman Arafat is presently engaged in a dialogue with Islamist critics of the PA and the Oslo accords that we hope will lead to their participation in the elections. We hope this dialogue may be expanded to other groups so as to integrate all Palestinians into a peaceful political process.

All political groups with whom the delegation spoke welcomed the presence of international observers as an essential element of these elections. This represents their recognition of the importance of a transparent and accountable electoral process and the positive role that the international community can play in reinforcing the process. We also note the importance of monitoring by impartial, civic-minded Palestinians as provided in the election law and the Interim Agreement, and we appeal to the PA and the Central Election Commission (CEC) to facilitate their work.

For the electoral process to succeed, it is necessary that the PA demonstrate greater respect for human rights, freedom of speech, and the rule of law. We are concerned about the serious reports of press censorship, arbitrary detention without due process, torture, and even deaths in detention. Many Palestinians also expressed their concern about the intrusion of a growing security apparatus into many aspects of civil society in a manner that inhibits debate and dissent.

The PA needs to take immediate steps to dispel these fears and create an open environment more conducive to meaningful elections. Toward that end, we recommend the following:

- First, the Attorney General needs to respond fully to the requests of the Independent Commission on Human Rights and others for investigations of human rights violations.
- Second, the delegation recommends the establishment of a legal framework for independent radio and television and the modification of the Press Law of June 1995 to respect rather than inhibit freedom of the press and speech.
- Third, the encouraging recognition by the PA of the need for access to the media for all candidates ought to be reinforced by timely publication and implementation of specific guidelines. It is essential that all candidates will have equitable access to the media to present their messages and that news programming by the Palestinian Broadcasting Corporation will also reflect balance and fairness.

Fourth, more broadly, PA officials, including the security services, should take prompt steps to assure the public that the people's rights to express their views freely will not be infringed.

Our delegation has witnessed many elections in transitional countries, and in most cases, the registration process has been delayed and marred with serious irregularities. Here, we have heard no serious complaints about the process to date, despite the last minute shortening of the registration period or about the impartiality of election officials. Indeed, the polling station officials have been widely praised for their diligence and impartiality.

The preliminary voters' lists were completed on time and sent to the polling stations. Although the lists unfortunately have not always been posted at the stations, and voters do not seem to be checking for errors, the election officials have been working hard to review the lists and send their corrections to the District Election Offices. The range of errors varies a good deal, but we were informed that the rate of error on the preliminary lists averages at this time about 5 percent. If this statistic turns out to be accurate, that would represent a great accomplishment. According to the official timetable, the final list will be sent to all polling stations on December 30, and we hope that officials post it immediately so that all parties and voters can check the names. This will reduce uncertainty on election day.

To hold elections on January 20 will require a vigorous commitment to the electoral framework and timetable. The Central Election Commission (CEC) should have been appointed much earlier but certainly before the beginning of candidates' nominations on December 14. It is now urgent that the new Commission as well as the Election Appeals Court be appointed immediately and that the CEC publicize the final timetable in order to provide transparency and predictability in the closing month of the electoral process.

Based on experiences in other countries, we anticipate that fears of multiple voting by some could emerge as the election day approaches. We therefore suggest that the new CEC address this two widely used techniques to enhance public confidence in the
Third Statement

Pre-election Monitoring Program

NOV/DEC 1996

Chairman, National Democratic Institute (NDI)

January 2, 1996

The National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) continue to monitor the pre-election process and to ensure that the Palestinian Authority and the parties to the Interim Agreements fulfill their obligations. It is important to note that the election is being held in a context of security and political uncertainty. The security situation is complex, with ongoing security operations and political developments. The election process is being held under difficult circumstances, and there is a need for international monitoring and support.

The decision by Israel to expel representatives of the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) from the elections is a significant development. This decision has implications for the political process and the election. The PNA has announced that it will not participate in the elections, and this decision has been met with mixed reactions. The election process is being held under difficult circumstances, and there is a need for international monitoring and support.

The election process is being held under difficult circumstances, and there is a need for international monitoring and support. The election is being held in a context of security and political uncertainty. The security situation is complex, with ongoing security operations and political developments. The election process is being held under difficult circumstances, and there is a need for international monitoring and support.
diminish public confidence in the electoral process. Election officials have asserted that they may not be able to respond to all the changing procedures. A further concern is that the Council seats appear not to have been allocated in proportion to the number of inhabitants in each constituency, as required by law, which could weaken the principle of fair representation. We recommend that the population figures used for the allocation be made public to clarify the matter.

The recent arrest and continuing detention of Al-Quds Editor Maher Al-Alami furthers concerns about respect for freedom of speech. NDI and the Carter Center have raised the issue of press freedom in the past and are concerned that the circumstances of this detention suggest a worsening of the situation. NDI and the Carter Center add their voices to those calling for the immediate release of Mr. Alami and others who have been detained without due process.

In previous statements, NDI and the Carter Center have stressed the importance of balance in the media and the need for specific guidelines for the role of the Palestinian Broadcast Corporation (PBC) during the campaign. The CEC and PBC have drafted an agreement governing access to the broadcast media during the campaign. This agreement should be implemented and publicized as soon as possible, and provisions allowing for access free of charge should be respected, in accordance with Article 57 of the election law. The draft agreement reserves time for candidate spots on the radio but not on television. The agreement also calls for "balanced coverage in news and current affairs media" and specifies that the PBC should ensure that "the total time allocated to each party or candidate matches roughly the number of candidates." At present, access to the television is unbalanced, as said in the December 30 report by Reporters Without Borders documents. This imbalance should be corrected.

We are also concerned about voting procedures for police officers, who will not be registered at the polling station where they vote. According to volumes three of the CEC’s Manual of Instruction and Guidance of Members of Commissions and Offices, the officers are required to turn in their voter certificates when they vote. This provides a check on multiple voting, but care should be taken over the distribution of certificates and observers should track the number of certificates turned in on election day to check against registration figures. As NDI and The Carter Center have suggested previously, the use of indelible ink on fingers provides another way to assure the public that the possibility of multiple voting has been reduced.

We commend the Central Election Commission for having addressed some issues that have been raised by observers. For example, 200 volunteers of the Palestinian Domestic Monitoring Committee (PDMC) have now received their credentials. As the PDMC hopes to have more than 2,000 monitors by election day, we hope that the remainder will also receive credentials in a timely manner. Despite its late establishment, recent statements from the CEC warning against early campaigning and the use of Palestinian Authority resources by candidates are helping the Commission establish the necessary reputation for independence. Nevertheless, the well-known partisan affiliation of several members of the Commission will necessitate extra effort to demonstrate its impartiality and independency.

As 1996 begins, peace and prospect of democratic elections have brought hope to Palestinians and the friends of Palestinian democracy around the world. The realization of these hopes depends in part of how Palestinians meet the challenges of their first elections, which help determine the nature of the future political system in the West Bank and Gaza.
Appendix D
Preliminary Post-Election Statement
NDI/Carter Center Observation Delegation
Rashid Batal, Director 81 Carter Center 14

We are an international delegation of 41 leaders from 11 countries sponsored jointly by The Carter Center and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) to observe the January 20 election in Gaza and the West Bank. This election is the first of its kind in Israel/Palestine and the first with a two-term president (Yasser Arafat). Our role is to monitor the election process, to assess the impact of the election on democracy, and to provide recommendations for improving the democratic process.

The delegation's mandate included the examination of three aspects of the election process: the pre-election period, the ballot preparation and counting on election day, and the tabulation of results in the days following the election. The delegation also focused on the role of the media in facilitating transparent and democratic elections.

Our observations are based on interviews with political leaders, journalists, and citizens involved in the election process. We have visited polling stations, met with government officials, and observed the media coverage of the election. Our findings will be reported in our final report, which will be made available to the public.

We have identified several key issues that require attention in future elections. These include the need for greater transparency in the ballot counting process, the importance of media freedom and independence, and the role of the international community in supporting democratic elections.

In conclusion, we believe that the January 20 election in Gaza and the West Bank was a significant step forward in the democratic process. However, there is still work to be done to ensure that these elections are truly democratic and representative of the will of the people.

Rashid Batal, Director
The Carter Center
January 28, 2006
The delegation focused on the high vote turnout in the elections, despite the challenges. They observed the voting process in several polling stations and noted the dedication and professionalism of election officials. The delegation also appreciated the efforts of local organizations and NGOs that worked tirelessly to ensure a transparent and fair election.

The delegation was impressed by the long-term success of democratic institutions in the West Bank, which is crucial for the development of a rule of law. The long-term success of democratic institutions is accountable to the people, and it is essential to promote human rights and democratic processes. The delegation hoped that the international community would remain involved in the development of East Jerusalem and the expansion of polling places in East Jerusalem and the extension of voting hours on election day.

The delegation expressed concern about the ongoing Israeli settlements in the West Bank, which obstructs the development of democratic institutions. The delegation urged the international community to take action to stop the expansion of Israeli settlements and to ensure democratic governance in the region.

The delegation also discussed the importance of international organizations and NGOs in promoting democratic processes in the region. The delegation appreciated the role of these organizations in supporting the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and development.

In conclusion, the delegation emphasized the need for continuous international support and participation in the development of democratic institutions in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The delegation urged the international community to remain committed to promoting democracy and human rights in the region.
This second post-election statement to the public on behalf of the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) and The Carter Center was prepared by the two organizations to monitor the Palestinian Authority’s elections after the two were invited by then-President Jimmy Carter and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin to observe the elections. The statement includes a high degree of professionalism on the part of the two organizations that have taken on this task. The NDI and The Carter Center’s report on January 21, we have seen that the election process has been completed and all concerns and complaints of the candidates have been fully addressed. With other international and domestic observers, NDI and The Carter Center will continue to monitor the process. In addition, we will continue to monitor the process of the Central Elections Commission (CEC) as they carry out their responsibilities. For the full text of the statement, see Appendix D.

Second Post-Election Statement
NDI/Carter Center Election Monitoring Program
January 22, 1996

The fact that a protocol remained at a polling station for some time after it should have been delivered to the CEC is significant. However, the protocol did not contain information about the candidates’ performances at the polls, nor did it contain any indication of irregularities. The information contained in the protocol was not sufficient to determine the accuracy of the results. It is possible that the final results could be confirmed by a further investigation.
discrepancies should be fairly resolved through the CEC or through appeals to the Electoral Appeals Court.

We are encouraged that Palestinians are pursuing the implementation of a fair and democratic electoral process. Continuing efforts to ensure the transparency of the final steps of this process will further strengthen the foundation upon which Palestinian democracy is being built.

Appendix F
Joint Press Release
Outlining Outcome of PLO-HAMAS Dialogue
Hamas and Palestinian National Authority
Cairo, Egypt
December 21, 1995

A meeting was held between the PNA delegation headed by Salim Al-Za’noon and the HAMAS delegation headed by Khaled Masha’l from the 18th to the 21st of December 1995.

The meeting was part of the continuous dialogue between the two sides so as to reach a concrete basis that promotes Palestinian unification, serve the Palestinian commonwealth, and fulfill the Palestinian interests of self-determination and build our state with its capital Jerusalem. Many issues were on the agenda that the two sides discussed:

1. The Palestinian unification and the means to protect and promote it.
2. The Palestinian election for the legislative council.
3. The relationship between the PNA and HAMAS.
4. The PNA and PLO obligations.

The dialogue was run in a very friendly atmosphere. The dialogue was free and open and each side was careful to understand the other side so as to promote democratic relations among the Palestinian people and its political factions. The two sides agreed on:

1. Insuring the national unification on the basis of political pluralism. The fighting is prohibited and adopting the dialogue as the only civilized principle for the different Palestinian factions to deal with each other.
2. Insuring the preparations for an atmosphere to deepen trust and cooperation for the unification of the Palestinian people so as to fulfill Palestinian goals.
3. Insuring that everyone will do his best to release all prisoners from Israeli prisons.
4. Organizing a joint committee to solve all incidental problems.
Appendix G

Press Release Announcing Appointment of Central Election Commission

The new Central Election Commission (CEC) appointed by a Presidential Decree on December 21, 1995 is responsible for the organization and supervision of the elections for the Palestinian Council and the President of the Palestinian National Authority to be held on January 20, 1996. Its tasks and competencies are defined by the Electoral Law published on December 7, 1995. The CEC consists of ten members, mainly university rectors and lawyers. Its chairman is Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen). Abu Mazen played a key role in negotiating the Oslo Agreement. He signed the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements on behalf of the PLO in Washington, DC on September 13, 1993.

The other members are:

- Ali Safarini, Esq.
- Lamis Alami
- Dr. Gabi Barakni
- Dr. Muntheir Salah
- Tawfiq Abu-Ghazaleh, Esq.
- Dr. Muhammad Shatayah
- Ibrahim El-Saqqa, Esq.
- Dr. Riyyad El-Khadri
- Dr. Hassan Abu Libdeh

For the preparation and conduct of the elections the CEC has established the District Election Offices (DEOs) and Polling Station Commissions (PSCs).

The first task of the preparation of the elections was the voter registration which was conducted in a huge canvas throughout the West Bank, including Jerusalem, and in the Gaza Strip. A draft Electoral Register was published on December 10, 1995. After examination of claims and appeals the final Electoral Register was published on December 30, 1995. A supplementary register will be published on January 17, 1996.
The registration of candidates was open from December 14 to December 23 and from December 30 to December 31. After the end of the nominations period the CEC published the Provisional Statement of Persons Nominated. After a three day period for appeals and objections to nominations the CEC will publish the Final Statement of Persons Nominated on January 5, 1996. On the same day the election campaign will start.

For the election campaign the CEC will publish a list of all venues and facilities available for rallies and meetings. It is also responsible to assure that the campaign activities correspond to the conditions set out in the Electoral law.

On the election day the CEC through the DEOs and PSCs organised the polling and the count of votes. It then publishes the results of the votes.

The CEC is also responsible for the co-operation with the International and Domestic Observers. The CEC will supply observers with all information they ask for. Observers must be accredited by the CEC. Invited international observer delegations are being coordinated by the European Union through the headquarters of the EU-Electoral Unit in Ramallah.

The CEC also deals with complaints such as offenders of a candidate against the electoral law or alleged discrimination of candidates. A special Elections Appeals Court will deal with questions that cannot be solved on a lower level.

The preparations for the elections were first conducted under the responsibility of the Palestinian Commission for Local Government and Elections (PCLGE) appointed by a Decree of President Yasser Arafat in December 1993. This commission that later was renamed as Central Election Commission acted under the authority of the minister for local government affairs, Dr. Shub Erakat, and was especially responsible for the voter registration campaign.

Appendix H

Press Release Describing Seat Allocation for Legislative Council Elections

Central Election Commission

For the first election of the Palestinian Council on January 20, 1996, 16 constituencies have been established in the West Bank, including Jerusalem, and in the Gaza Strip. The distribution of mandates corresponds to the total population in each district in order to guarantee a just representation of all Palestinians in the 83-member Council.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Mandates</th>
<th>Polling Stations</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Jerusalem*</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Jericho</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Bethlehem*</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Jenin</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Hebron</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Ramallah*</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Salfit</td>
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<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Tubas</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
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<td>9. Tulkarem</td>
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<td>10. Qalqilya</td>
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<td>11. Nablus**</td>
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<tr>
<td>12. Gaza North</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Gaza City*</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Central Gaza (Deir Al-Balah)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Khan Younis</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Rafah</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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*Within the constituency of Jerusalem two seats are reserved for declared Christian candidates, as well as two in Bethlehem, one in Ramallah, and one in Gaza City.

**Within the constituency of Nablus one seat is reserved for the Samaritan minority.
Allocation of Seats per Constituency

Please be informed that the allocation of Council seats per constituency has been issued by three Presidential Decrees: (1) on December 14, (2) December 28 and (3) December 30, 1995. The final allocation of seats is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituency</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza North</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza City</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(of which 1 is a Christian seat)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza Central</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khan Younis</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rafah</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza Total</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEST BANK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(of which 2 are Christian seats)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jericho</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(of which 1 is a Christian seat)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bethlehem</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(of which 2 are Christian seats)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jenin</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebron</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nablus</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(of which 1 is for Samaritan Jews)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tubas</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salit</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulkarem</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qalqilya</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank Total</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GRAND TOTAL 88 SEATS

Amendment Formalizing Late Changes to the Original Election Law

Palestinian National Authority
December 29, 1995

The President of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, President of the Palestinian Authority,

Having seen the Basic Law of the Palestine Liberation Organization, having seen the Law number 5 of 1995, referring to the Transfer of Powers and Competences,

having seen the Electoral Law for the Council of Representatives number 24, of 1960, and the Law amending it,

having seen the Resolution number 32 of 1960, of the Administrative Governor General, regarding elections in Gaza,

having the approval of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, with the participation of the Presidency of the Palestinian National Council,

having the approval of the Council of the Palestinian National Authority, and based upon the powers bestowed in me, and the requirements of the general public interest,

I hereby promulgate the following Law:

Article 1: The title of this Law is "Amended Palestinian Elections Law number (16) of 1995," and it shall enter into force upon its publication in the Palestinian Gazette.

Article 2: Paragraph 1 of article 13 of the Law is amended as follows: "The Council shall be formed by 88 members elected by the Palestinian people of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including Jerusalem, by means of free and direct elections, in accordance with the provisions of this Law."

Article 3: The following sentence is added at the end of article 43, paragraph 2 of the Law: "The President may in accordance with the general public interest extend the period for nominations."
Article 4: If the President makes a decision to extend nominations under Article 3 above, any claim against decisions of the Central Election Commission to accept or reject such nominations shall be submitted within 24 hours of the decision of the Central Election Commission being published. The Election Appeals Court shall adjudicate any such claim within 2 days of its being submitted.

Article 5: The period of 22 days defined in Article 45, paragraph 1, of the Law is replaced by a period of 14 days.

Article 6: The period of 22 days defined in Article 55, paragraph 1, of the Law is replaced by a period of 14 days.

Article 7: Any other provision not in accordance with this Law is repealed.

Article 8: All parties responsible shall implement this Law.

Issued in Gaza City on 29 December 1995.

Yasser Arafat
President of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, President of the National Palestinian Authority.

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Appendix J

Aggregate Legislative Council Election Results* by Political Party Affiliation and Constituency

*West Bank totals only; complete official Gaza Strip results unavailable.
## Election-Day Reporting Form
**Used by International Observers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituency</th>
<th>Number of Polling Stations</th>
<th>Number of Ballots Issued</th>
<th>Number of Ballots Cast</th>
<th>Registered Voters</th>
<th>Vote Cast</th>
<th>Blank Ballots</th>
<th>Valid Ballots</th>
<th>Number of Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>11,021</td>
<td>10,159</td>
<td>10,376</td>
<td>10,076</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>10,046</td>
<td>64,130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jérusalem</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>613</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beersheva</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebron</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>661</td>
<td>642</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>642</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2,063</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salfit</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1,017</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulkarm</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>673</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dheisheh</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shatila</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>5,907</td>
<td>5,700</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5,700</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,170</td>
<td>3,720</td>
<td>3,444</td>
<td>85,907</td>
<td>83,243</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>83,243</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Opening of the Poll (if observed):

1. When did the polling station open?:__

2. Was it verified that the ballot boxes were empty before they were sealed? **Y** **N**

### Arrangements at the polling station

3. Is the polling station free from campaign materials? **☐ ☐**
4. Are the two ballot boxes locked and visible to party agents and observers? **☐ ☐**
5. Is a copy of the voters register displayed? **☐ ☐**
6. Are unauthorized police/security forces present inside the polling station? **☐ ☐**
7. Number of party/candidate agents present in the polling station:
   __If possible indicate party (see list for party names)__
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
8. Are there any domestic observers present in the polling station? **☐ ☐**

### Comments:

---

**Appendix K**

136 Palestinian Elections in the West Bank and Gaza
Pulling Process

9. Are the voters identities checked against the electoral register? □ □
10. Are the voters names crossed in the electoral register? □ □
11. Is anybody refused permission to vote? □ □
   If Y, specify the reason
12. Are the ballot papers and envelopes stamped with the official stamp? □ □
13. Are voters marking the ballot papers in secrecy (in the booth, one person at a time)? □ □
14. Are illiterate/incapable voters assisted according to the rules? □ □
   (No answer—not observed)
15. Is any intimidation of voters observed? □ □
16. Did all or most of the party/candidate agents and domestic observers indicate that there were:
   □ No problems
   □ A few, but not significant
   □ A few significant
   □ Many significant
17. Overall evaluation: □ Very well □ Satisfactory □ Bad

Comments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Elected Candidate</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fathi Abu Medein</td>
<td>Fatah</td>
<td>12168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sa’adi Al-Kunz</td>
<td>Fatah</td>
<td>11713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamilieh Saidem</td>
<td>Fatah</td>
<td>8511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibrahim Isma’iel Ahmad Al-Habbash</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>7926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jalal Al-Musaddar</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>7891</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Top Two Losing Candidates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sami Isma’e1 Meslej</td>
<td>Fatah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdul Fatah Al-Nouri</td>
<td>Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name of Candidate (Arabic)</td>
<td>Name of Candidate (English)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>يوسيف أبو سلمة</td>
<td>Yusuf Abu Salama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>فؤاد إل</td>
<td>Foad El</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>هشام أبو رضا</td>
<td>Hashim Abu Ruzz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>عبد الرحمن رمدي</td>
<td>Abdul Rahman Rumi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>كرمان زمانه</td>
<td>Kareem Zanana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>كمال أبو شرافي</td>
<td>Kamal Abu Sharaf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>نورن الفاضل</td>
<td>Inna Al-Faisil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>عبد الله حسنين</td>
<td>Abdulah Hussein</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>حسام حداد</td>
<td>Hamas Haddad</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Candidate (Arabic)</th>
<th>Name of Candidate (English)</th>
<th>Number of Seats</th>
<th>Top Two Running Candidates</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>حسبر أبو شرف</td>
<td>Haseer Abu She'if</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>National Democratic Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>سهيلة شكوك</td>
<td>Selah Shokho</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Fatah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>نادية أبو رياض</td>
<td>Nadia Abou Rouss</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Fatah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>جبريل أبو الوار</td>
<td>Jibril Abou al-War</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Fatah (Female)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>زياد أبو عون</td>
<td>Zayad Abou Oun</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Fatah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>وجاهي ياحي</td>
<td>Wajah Yahi</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>مصطفى أبو شاشة</td>
<td>Mustafa Abu Shahe</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Independent (Islamist)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>محسن مصطفى حمود المثيري</td>
<td>Musbah Mohamoud Hamoud El-Tarhali</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Independent (Fatah)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>نوراز بن حمود</td>
<td>Noraz bin Hamoud</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>يوسيف أبو شرافي</td>
<td>Yusuf Abu Sharaf</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Independent (Fatah)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>نورين الفاضل</td>
<td>Inna Al-Faisil</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Independent (Female)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>نورين الفاضل</td>
<td>Inna Al-Faisil</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Independent (Female)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**GAZA NORTH Constituency**

**GAZA CITY Constituency**
### KHAN YOUNIS Constituency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Elected Candidate</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nabil Sha'ath</td>
<td>Fateh</td>
<td>22931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jawad Khleel Hassan Al-Tibi</td>
<td>Fateh</td>
<td>19441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rafat Oudhman El-Najar</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>14473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibrahim Abu El Naja</td>
<td>Fateh</td>
<td>13960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmad El-Sheibi</td>
<td>Fateh</td>
<td>13953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hasan 'Asfour</td>
<td>Independent (Fateh Bloc)</td>
<td>12639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmed Naser</td>
<td>Fateh</td>
<td>11465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdul Karim Musalam</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>9209</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Top Two Losing Candidates**

- Zakaria Ibrahim Agha
- Farouq Hamdi Farra

---

### RAFAH Constituency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Elected Candidate</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abed Rabu Hussain Abu 'Own</td>
<td>Fateh</td>
<td>18369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammad Hijazi</td>
<td>Fateh</td>
<td>11584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rawhi Ahmad Fatouh</td>
<td>Fateh</td>
<td>11524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdul Aziz Shahin</td>
<td>Fateh</td>
<td>11459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suleiman El-Roumi</td>
<td>Independent (Islamist)</td>
<td>10659</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Top Two Losing Candidates**

- Abdullah Abu Sambadaneh
- Abdul Aziz Ibrahim Shuaqey

---
## WEST BANK CONSTITUENCIES

### BETHELHEM Constituency
Number of Seats (4)
Seats for Christians (2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Elected Candidate (# indicates Christian candidate)</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assad Abdul Qader (Salah Al-Tamari)</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>17774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daoud Hassan Mohammed Al-Zaer</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>9531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Bishara Suleman Daoud</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>6161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Miti Tamas Jarees Abu Aita</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>5617</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Top Two Losing Candidates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Elected Candidate</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Essa Mohammed Abbas Alizza</td>
<td>Fateh</td>
<td>9156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khader El-Laham</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>9015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### HEBRON Constituency
Number of seats (10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Elected Candidate</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sharif Ali Hussien Masha’i (Abbas Zaki)</td>
<td>Fateh</td>
<td>39348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musa Abu Sabha</td>
<td>Fateh</td>
<td>25316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamal Salah El-Shobaki</td>
<td>Fateh</td>
<td>24346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nabil Amer</td>
<td>Fateh</td>
<td>23269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammad El-Hourani</td>
<td>Fateh</td>
<td>23034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rafeeq Shakeer Darweesh Al-Natseh (Abu Shaker)</td>
<td>Fateh</td>
<td>17242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zahran Abu Qabita</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>15841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali Muhammad Hussein Abu Al-Rish</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>12087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suleman Abu Sneineh</td>
<td>Fateh</td>
<td>12034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali Ibrahim Ghazal Al-Qasami</td>
<td>Fateh</td>
<td>10334</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Top Two Losing Candidates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Elected Candidate</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ibraheem Rashid Mohammed Maraga (Abu Rashid)</td>
<td>Fateh</td>
<td>10206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammed Ayyesh Abduljawad Milhem</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>10072</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### JENIN Constituency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Elected Candidate</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burhan Jarar</td>
<td>Fateh</td>
<td>18608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamal Shati El-Hindi</td>
<td>Fateh</td>
<td>17474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hikmat Hashim Lutfi Zeid</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>14220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azam Najib Mustafa El-Ahmad</td>
<td>Fateh</td>
<td>14166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmad Ahmad Irshid</td>
<td>Fateh</td>
<td>13384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fakhri Turkman</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>11529</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Top Two Losing Candidates

- Mohammed Abu Robb: Fateh (11465 votes)
- Saleh Ra'fat: Fida (9439 votes)

### JERICHO Constituency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Elected Candidate</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saeb Erakat</td>
<td>Fateh</td>
<td>6291</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Top Two Losing Candidates

- Ibrahim Balo Jalyya: Independent (1819 votes)
- Mahmoud Hamad 'Atifat: Independent (359 votes)

### JERUSALEM Constituency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Elected Candidate (# indicates Christian candidate)</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ahmad Q'rei (Abu Ala)</td>
<td>Fateh</td>
<td>18839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Hanan Ashrawi</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>17944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmad Al-Batat</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>9846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ziad Abu Ziad (Fateh, Fatah) (Fateh)</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>8434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hatim 'Eid</td>
<td>Fateh</td>
<td>8307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmad Hashim El-Zga'er</td>
<td>Fateh</td>
<td>7447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Emil Jargou'i</td>
<td>Fateh</td>
<td>5228</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Top Two Losing Candidates

- Zahira Kamal: Fida (7363 votes)
- Atta Dhyab El-Hilu: Independent (7003 votes)
### NABLUS Constituency

#### Number of seats (8)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Elected Candidate (*Indicates Samaritan candidate)</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Fayez Aref Ahmad Ziyydan</td>
<td>Fateh</td>
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<tr>
<td>Muola Ali Amin Al-Masri</td>
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<td>28016</td>
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<td>Ghasan Walid Ahmed Al-Shak’a</td>
<td>Fateh</td>
<td>27365</td>
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<td>Maher Nasha’t Taher Al-Masri</td>
<td>Fateh</td>
<td>23125</td>
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<tr>
<td>Husam Mahmoud Abed-Ramahan Khader</td>
<td>Independent (Fateh Affiliate)</td>
<td>21328</td>
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<td>Dallal Abed-Hafiz Mahmoud Salameh</td>
<td>Fateh</td>
<td>20749</td>
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<tr>
<td>Karimel Muhammad Saleh Al-Afghani</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>17425</td>
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<tr>
<td>* Saloum Imran Ishaq El-Samirei</td>
<td>Independent (Fateh Affiliate)</td>
<td>2451</td>
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#### Top Two Losing Candidates

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<th>Name of Candidate</th>
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<tr>
<td>Mo’ath Majed Muhammad Al-Nablisi</td>
<td>Independent</td>
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<td>Sarhan Othman Jaber Doikat</td>
<td>Fateh</td>
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### RAMALLAH Constituency

#### Number of seats (7)

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<th>Name of Elected Candidate (# indicates Christian candidate)</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Abdel-Iswad Saleh</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>29445</td>
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<tr>
<td>Qdoura Faris</td>
<td>Independent (Fateh Affiliate)</td>
<td>20980</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abdul Fateh Hamayl</td>
<td>Independent (Fateh Affiliate)</td>
<td>16412</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jamil Al-Tarifi</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>13504</td>
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<tr>
<td>Azmi El-Shu’albi</td>
<td>Fida</td>
<td>12962</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marwan Barghouti</td>
<td>Fateh</td>
<td>12716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Ghazi Hanania</td>
<td>Fateh</td>
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#### Top Two Losing Candidates

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<th>Name of Candidate</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Votes</th>
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<tr>
<td>Mustafa Barghouti</td>
<td>Palestine People’s Party</td>
<td>11553</td>
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<tr>
<td>Buthina El-Duqmaq</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>8666</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constituency</td>
<td>Number of seats (1)</td>
<td>Name of Elected Candidate</td>
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<td>---------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JERUSALEM</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Tayib Abubakri Mahmood</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>JERUSALEM</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Tayib Abubakri Mahmood</td>
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<tr>
<td>TULUM</td>
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<td>Tayib Abubakri Mahmood</td>
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Appendix M
NDI/Carter Center Observation Delegation
1996 Palestinian Elections
January 20, 1996

JIMMY CARTER
Delegation Co-Leader
Former President, United States

HANNAN SUCHOCKA
Delegation Co-Leader
Former Prime Minister, Poland

JASON CARTER
United States

ROSALYNN CARTER
United States

WILLIAM CHACE
President, Emory University, United States

SANFORD CLOUD
President, National Conference of Christians and Jews, United States

THOMAS DONAHUE
President Emeritus, AFL-CIO, United States

MATYAS EORSI
Member of Parliament, Hungary

PRINCE MOULAY HICHAM BENABDALLAH
Morocco

RAQIYA HUMEIDAN
Former Election Commissioner, Yemen

OMAR KADER
President, Pal-Tech Incorporated, United States

JAMES KAVANAGH
United States

MARY KING
Consultant, United States

ADAMOU KOMBO
Former Member, Central Election Commission, Niger

FLORA LEWIS
Journalist, United States

CLAIRMONT LYE
Director, Electoral Assistance Bureau, Guyana

SAKI MACOZOMA
Member of Parliament, South Africa

LEWIS MANILOW
NDI Board of Directors, United States

GAY MCDougALL
Executive Director, International Human Rights Law Group, United States

THOMAS O. MELIA
NDI Senior Associate, United States

LISBET PALME
Chairperson, Swedish Committee for UNICEF, Sweden

ROBERT PASTOR
Fellow, The Carter Center, Professor, Emory University, United States

WILLIAM QUANDT
Professor, University of Virginia, United States

KARIN RYAN
Assistant Director, The Human Rights Program, The Carter Center, United States

HAROLD SAUNDERS
Director, International Affairs, Kettering Foundation, United States

KAREN SHEPHERD
Former Member, U.S. Congress, United States
Appendix N

Briefing Schedule

NDI/Carter Center Observation Delegation
1996 Palestinian Elections
January 17-21, 1996

TUESDAY, JANUARY 16
All Day       Delegates arrive and check into hotel

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 17

8:30am - 8:45am       WELCOME AND STATEMENT OF GOALS
Chair of the Session: Hanna Suchocka, Delegation Co-Leader
Presenters: Kenneth D. Wollack, NDI President and
Harry Barnes, Director of Conflict Resolution and Human Rights
Programs, The Carter Center

8:45am - 9:30am       DIPLOMATIC CONTEXT OF THE
                      ELECTIONS
Chair of the Session: Thomas O. Mella, NDI Senior Associate
Presenters: William Quandt and Kenneth Stein

9:30am - 10:30am      PALESTINIAN POLITICAL FRAMEWORK
Chair of the Session: Lewis Manillow, NDI Board of Directors
Presenter: Mahdi Abdul Hadi, Director of Palestinian Academic
Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA)

10:45am - 12:00pm     PALESTINIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD
                      ELECTIONS
Chair of Session: Rachelle Horowitz, Vice-Chair NDI Board of
Directors
Presenters: Khalil Al-Shikaki, Director, Center for Palestinian
Research and Studies and Reema Hammami, Bir Zeit University
Women Studies Center
ELECTION PROCESS: BACKGROUND ON THE PREPARATORY PHASE

Chair of the Session: Daniel Brookfield

Presenters: Andrew Ellis, European Union Technical Advisor to the Commission on Elections and Local Government, and Dany Bergoglio, West Bank Elections Coordinator

PRESENTATION TO THE PREPARATORY PHASE

Chair of the Session: Adamu Kondi (Nigeria)

Presenters: Andrew Ellis, European Union Technical Advisor to the Commission on Elections and Local Government and Dany Bergoglio, West Bank Elections Coordinator

EXPLANATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Chair of the Session: Harold Smith (US)

Presenters: Brian Priseman, Deputy Head of the European Union Electoral Unit

3:30 pm - 4:00 pm

PRESIDENTIAL VOTE AND BROADCAST MEDIA

Chair of the Session: Flora Lewis, New York Times (retired)

Presenters: Hisham Abadi, People and Elections, Radwan Abu Zaid, Director of Palestinian Broadcast Corporation, Marwan Abu Al Qasem, Chairman of Al-Quds, and Thierry Chauvel, Reporters

4:00 pm - 4:30 pm

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OBSERVATIONS

Chair of the Session: Eric Bjornlund, NDI Senior Associate

Presenters:
A) November: Karen Shepherd and Saki Macomona (South Africa)
B) December: Bob Pastor and Olga Mikeskajic-Palmer (South Africa)
C) January: Kevin Johnson and Susan Palmer
D) February: Mamyas Emeni (Hungary)

THURSDAY, JANUARY 18

5:30 pm - 6:00 pm

5:30 pm - 6:00 pm

OSCE OBSERVERS: SECURITY AND THE ELECTIONS

Chair of the Session: Hayder Yacoub (Philippines)

Presenters: Ghazi Jabali, Director of Civil Police

9:30 am - 10:30 am

OSCE OBSERVERS: SECURITY AND THE ELECTIONS

Chair of the Session: Mohieddin Vani Moosa (South Africa)

Presenters: Josef Singer, Legal Advisor, Foreign Affairs Ministry and Colonel David Hotto, Assistant to the Coordinator of Political Activities in the territories
CONTENDING POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES

Chairs of the Session: Karen Shepherd (US) and Sergio Bitar (Chile)

Presenters:
10:45am - 11:15am    Faisal Husseini, Fateh
11:15am - 11:45am    Zahira Kamal, FIDA
11:45am - 12:15pm    Basdir Barghouti, People’s Party
12:15pm - 12:45pm    Shadi Al-Ghaidbon, National Democratic Coalition
12:45pm - 1:15pm     Hanan Ashrawi, Independent

3:00pm - 4:00pm     MEETING WITH ELECTION COMMISSION

Chair of the Session: Gay McDougall (US)
Muhammad Iqjwaya, Secretary General Central Election Commission

4:00pm - 5:15pm     OBSERVER METHODOLOGY AND EXPLANATION OF REPORTING PROCESS

NDI and The Carter Center

5:15pm - 6:15pm     DEPLOYMENT BRIEFING

NDI and The Carter Center

6:15pm - 6:45pm     DELEGATION ROUNDTABLE

Chair of the Session: Jimmy Carter, Delegation Co-Leader
Presenters: Kenneth D. Wollack and Harry Barnes

8:00pm - 8:15pm     PRESS CONFERENCE

Appendix O

Deployment Teams

NDI/Carter Center Observation Delegation
1998 Palestinian Elections
January 20, 1998

JERUSALEM

Jerusalem Leadership Team
Jimmy Carter
Rosalynn Carter
Hanan Suchoocka
Kenneth D. Wollack
Robert Pastor
Harry Barnes

Jerusalem Team 1
Thomas O. Melia
Lewis Manilow
Susan Manilow
Haydee Yorac

Jerusalem Team 2
Eric Bjornlund
David Carroll
Kevin Johnson
Mohammed 'Alayan

Jerusalem Team 3
Rachel Fowler
Mary Hill
Lauren Girard

THE WEST BANK

Bethlehem
Sanford Cloud
Amy Carter
Khaled Ramadan

Hebron Team 1
Saki Maoozona
William Quandt
Abdulatif Abu Safiyee

Hebron Team 2
Matyas Eorsi
Gay McDougall
Mark Mullen
Reema Abu Hamdieh

Jenin
Ra'ja'a Humeidan
Adamou Kombo
Bashar Jaloudi
Appendix P

Press Statement
Carl Lidbom

Head of the European Electoral Unit
December 12, 1995

European Union observers have been observing the registration process since it began on 22 November 1995. This was the first electoral registration process for the Palestinian population in the Occupied Territories and the Palestinian self-rule areas, and it has been carried out in a period of less than one month, a much shorter time than originally envisaged. The registration was carried out under the terms of article II of annex II to the Interim Agreement between the Israeli and Palestinian sides, while the Palestinian legislative process was continuing.

We have been favorably impressed by the registration process. We note that it has been very well prepared and that the implementation of this large-scale and complex operation has been carried out efficiently and correctly. In our opinion it compares well with other voter registration operations and fully meets internationally acceptable standards. The use of a door-to-door canvassing method has contributed indirectly but usefully to voter education which has itself been conducted with varying effectiveness by the broadcast and printed media, by poster and sticker campaigns, and through meetings at local level. Jerusalem has been less well covered than other areas. The lists of voters compiled as a result of the registration operation provide a valid basis for the next stage of the election process. We pay tribute to the efficiency and dedication of all those involved in the registration process who have worked under great time pressure to complete their work.

As in any large scale operation of this kind anywhere in the world it is hard to eliminate completely the possibility of some deficiencies. This registration, which has taken place in the unusual circumstances of military occupation and partial withdrawal, is no exception. We have observed a few minor weaknesses in the registration operation. For example our observers report that not all canvassers were equipped with accreditation cards, nor were they always easily distinguishable as official canvassers; the canvassing task
might have proceeded more smoothly if all teams had had at least one female member; adequately detailed and up-to-date maps were not available in all cases; the arrangements for obtaining ID cards were not announced early and clearly enough. Some potential voters may have been deterred by the need to travel to other centers and to incur fees in order to obtain ID cards.

We are satisfied that the number of potential voters affected by these weaknesses is so low as to have no significant effect on the validity of the registration process in the context of a register of around 1.1 million. In the case of Jerusalem a late rush to register reflected intensive efforts made by the Palestinian authorities during the last week of November and early December to overcome some reluctance to register among the Palestinian population of the city. The deadline for registration was extended and those who then applied to the district election offices were treated as if they were appealing against their omission from the preliminary list. We regard this as legitimate and desirable in the circumstances.

The promulgation of the Election Law on the evening of 7 December 1995 opens the way for the election process to advance to the important stage of nomination of candidates. In this connection we should like to offer a number of preliminary observations which result from our first reading of the Election Law and from the timing of its promulgation:

(a) the Law has been issued very late if elections are to be held on 20 January 1996. The time allowed for the formation and registration of political entities and groups and the elaboration of their political programs is very short by any standards. Moreover the time allowed by the Election Law for the nomination of candidates has already been shortened by administrative decision, only two days after signature of the Law. This gives further cause for concern.

(b) although there is a general assumption that the elections are to be held on 20 January we have as yet seen no decree as stipulated in Article 4 of the Election Law officially calling the elections for that date, nor have the members of the Central Election Commission and the Election Appeals Court yet been appointed in the decree calling the elections, as stipulated in Article 22.3 and Article 31.1 respectively;

(c) the Election Law contains a number of deficiencies relating to the deadlines for claims and objections relating to registration, to the nomination of candidates, and to the allocation of seats. We understand that the Law is already being amended. For such changes to have to be made so soon after the promulgation of the Law has increased the confusion surrounding the legislative process.

As we approach the start of the official election campaign we draw attention to the need to draw up promptly clear and fair rules to regulate access by candidates and political entities to the broadcast and printed media in order to give practical effect to the Articles of the Law relating to access to the media. We would hope that this important aspect of the democratic process will be duly taken into account.
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Appendix Q

Joint Statement by Heads of International Observer Delegations
European Union Electoral Unit
January 21, 1996

The Head of the European Union Electoral Mission and the Heads of the official international observer delegations coordinated by the European Union (*listed below), amounting to over 650 observers, have agreed the following statement on the Palestinian elections:

International election observers have been observing the Palestinian elections from the time registration of voters began on 12 November 1995 right through to the declaration of preliminary results on 21 January 1996.

The Heads of Delegation have based their assessment on reports received from their observers against the background of the unique and complex political and security circumstances prevailing in the territories where voting has taken place. They have observed the entire course of the elections, including registration of voters, allocation of seats, nomination of candidates, voter education, access to media, conduct of the campaign, access to polling stations, secrecy of the ballot, counting procedures and the declaration of the results. On polling day international observers visited 99 percent of polling stations. They pay tribute to the dedication and loyalty shown by those organizing the elections which enabled them to take place within an exceptionally tight time scale. They regard the very low level of election-related violence throughout the whole process as most encouraging. The detailed information which the observer delegations have used to reach their verdict will be recorded in their full reports.

The Heads of Delegation express understanding for the efforts made by the Palestinian Authority to consult widely on the election law and to bring the widest stream of political expression including the Islamic opposition into the election process, while noting that the priority given to this laudable effort resulted in delays which caused some confusion for parties, candidates and voters. They have over the period of their observation been critical at times of certain measures which have inhibited the rights and freedoms normally associated with election campaigning.

In coming to a judgement on the conduct of these first elections of their kind the Heads of Delegation note that a real understanding of the opportunities offered by democracy has still to develop in the body politic. This results from the difficult recent history of the Palestinian people. Nonetheless the electorate were presented with some variety of political views and a choice in most constituencies between official party-backed candidates and independents.

Varying turnout figures between constituencies show how they exercised their right to choose. Unusual arrangements had been agreed for voting within the city of Jerusalem, and all bodies involved in the election process had been conscious of the risk of disturbances there. On polling day the Israeli authorities blanketed the post offices used as polling stations with a heavy security presence which included the video filming of voters as they entered the post offices. While successful in preventing security incidents, these measures plus the presence of many representatives of the world news media and of distinguished spectators from a variety of countries and organizations, had in our opinion a deterrent effect on Jerusalem voters.

The Heads of Delegation believe that a free press can make a useful contribution to the development of democratic political dialogue and they hope the newly elected president of the Palestinian Authority and the members of the Council will have the confidence to dispense with a tendency to intimidate the media which has been noted during the election process. Although not all shades of opinion enjoyed equal expression in the printed media, all candidates were offered the opportunity to make election broadcasts on Palestinian radio and many availed themselves of this.

After careful deliberation the Head of the European Union Electoral Mission and his fellow Heads of Delegation have come to the opinion that the elections for both the Council and the President of the Palestinian Authority, which were marked by a good turnout of voters overall, when judged against internationally acceptable standards, and after weighing in the balance some deficiencies which have been noted over the period of observation, can reasonably be regarded as an accurate expression of the will of the voters on polling day.
The Palestinian Domestic Monitoring Committee (PDMC) is an independent body established by the Palestinian Authority to monitor the electoral process and ensure that it is conducted in a transparent, fair, and democratic manner. The PDMC is composed of representatives from various political parties and organizations, including the PLO, Hamas, and the Palestinian National Authority. The committee's primary role is to oversee the electoral process, including voter registration, campaign activities, and election day operations.

The committee's mandate includes:
1. Monitoring the election process to ensure that it is conducted in a transparent and fair manner.
2. Providing recommendations to the Palestinian Authority to improve the electoral process.
3. Submitting reports to the Palestinian Authority on its findings and recommendations.

The PDMC's work is crucial in promoting democracy and ensuring that the Palestinian people have a say in their governance. The committee's efforts help to build trust among the Palestinian people and enhance the legitimacy of the electoral process.
10. Do you have any comments regarding the visit of the CEC team?
Numerous observations on the CEC teams’ visit were given:
A. The team conducted itself well, but not enough direction was given.
B. They (the team) didn’t know about the registration process.
C. The team did not visit.
D. The team did not register a member of the family due to temporary absence (from the home).
E. The team did not clarify its mission.
F. The team visited at late or unsuitable hours.
G. The team did not visit all the homes in the area.
H. The registration process in some areas was not completely carried out from house to house; for example, in ‘Aouja
(Jericho district) the collection of the women’s identity cards was carried out by the men of the family and they were registered in their absence in one of the family assemblies (djunw), so women were not able to express their own opinion in this the first stage of registration.

Recommendations of the PDMC:
1. More vigorous education programs specializing in appeals, objections, and other processes related to elections registration.
2. More guidance for Jerusalemites concerning the elections in general and its lack of contradiction with their rights.
3. We propose to the CEC to extend the registration period for two weeks for those voters who have not been able to register.
4. We encourage the CEC officials hasten the process of issuing PDMC volunteers ID cards to make easier the PDMC’s work. It
is necessary to note that in the course of two weeks only 8 cards have been issued to volunteers from 70 applications. The PDMC is trying to recruit 2000 volunteers to monitor elections within the next four weeks.
About the Palestinian Domestic Monitoring Committee:

The Palestinian Domestic Monitoring Committee (PDMC) is a non-partisan organization which aims to monitor all stages of the electoral process, in order to promote public confidence in the elections and protect voters' and candidates' rights.

PDMC represents more than 40 Palestinian NGOs and conducts its activities in an independent, neutral and objective manner. Its ultimate aim is the promotion of democracy through the monitoring of media objectivity, the election campaign, conduct of candidates, fairness of the election administration, the voting process and counting of ballots, and the quality of the general electoral environment.

We believe that this election monitoring should be conducted by domestic monitors and not only international observers. As Palestinians, we feel a particular duty to ensure that these elections are conducted in the most credible, free and fair manner possible. The monitoring process has already begun along with the electoral process.

The PDMC this past week formed groups of volunteers to monitor the registration of voters in the West Bank.

From December 6-9, 70 volunteer monitors conducted canvassing in the 10 electoral districts (Ramallah, Nablus, Tulkarm, Qalqilya, Jerusalem, Salt, Hebron, Jericho, Jenin, and Tubas). Canvassing was conducted in 10 cities, 22 villages, and 15 refugee camps. A total of 770 residences was canvassed. Volunteers chose a random sample of residences (every sixth home) and 10 questions were addressed to those residents polled.

Volunteer monitors are asked to conduct their work in a neutral manner that facilitates monitoring of the electoral process. Volunteer monitors are prohibited to make comments or ask questions in a manner that could be perceived as being partisan. Nor is it the monitors’ job to provide civic or voter education other than to explain their role and the importance of independent monitoring of an electoral process.
The Carter Center

The Carter Center brings people and resources together to resolve conflicts; promote democracy, fight disease, hunger, and poverty; and protect and promote human rights worldwide. It is guided by the principle that people, with the necessary skills, knowledge, and access to resources, can improve their own lives and the lives of others.

Founded in 1982 by Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter in partnership with Emory University, the nonprofit Center undertakes action-oriented programs in cooperation with world leaders and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). In this way, the Center has touched the lives of people in at least 65 countries.

The Center’s programs are directed by resident experts or fellows, some of whom teach at Emory University. They design and implement activities in cooperation with President and Mrs. Carter, networks of world leaders, other NGOs, and partners in the United States and abroad. Private donations from individuals, foundations, corporations, and multilateral development assistance programs support the Center’s work.

The Center is located in a 35-acre park just two miles east of downtown Atlanta. Four circular interconnected pavilions house offices for the former president and first lady and most of the Center’s program staff. The complex includes the nondenominational Cecil B. Day chapel, other conference facilities, and administrative offices. The Jimmy Carter Library and Museum, which adjoins The Carter Center, is owned and operated by the National Archives and Records Administration of the federal government and is open to the public. The Center and Library are known collectively as The Carter Presidential Center.

More information about The Carter Center, including Center publications, press releases, and speeches, is available on the Internet’s World Wide Web. The Carter Center site is at: http://www.emory.edu/Carter_Center

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- An Evaluation of the June 21, 1992 Elections in Ethiopia
- The November 1990 General Elections in Guatemala
- The 1990 General Elections in Haiti
- Nation Building: The U.N. and Namibia (1990)
- Coordinating Observers to the 1993 Elections in Niger (English and French)
- The October 1990 Elections in Pakistan
- The May 7, 1989 Panama Elections (English and Spanish)
- Voting for Greater Pluralism: The May 26, 1990 Elections in Paraguay
- The May 1990 Elections in Romania
- An Assessment of the Senegalese Electoral Code (1957) (English and French)
- The October 31, 1991 National Elections in Zambia
- Promoting Popular Participation in Yemen’s 1993 Elections