Mr. President:

This book contains a full range of materials for your first round of reading in preparation for the Camp David meetings. I have included a fair amount of detail, knowing you will have to deal with that at some point. At the outset, however, I want to highlight an important idea that runs through all these papers on how to proceed.

I believe it will be important at the beginning of the Camp David meetings to allow as much as 2-3 days to talk on a broader scale about the issues before getting into detailed negotiations on them. I think it will take that much time to give each party a chance to say what he needs to say and to begin drawing him out.

The schedule lends itself to this approach very well because it will be necessary to allow a quiet time from early Friday afternoon through sundown Saturday for the Moslem and Jewish sabbaths. You could aim, therefore, at that point to bring the first rounds of talks to focus on the key issues that need to be resolved, to summarize possible approaches that have been raised, and to ask the two sides to reflect during the sabbath recess. Sunday, you could begin to introduce our ideas for narrowing gaps where necessary.

This book contains material for both segments of the talks. It presents a broad perspective for dealing with the issues in the first two days. It also presents specific language that we might like to see emerge from the post-sabbath negotiations.

We will now turn to producing more detailed checklists for each of your meetings, and we will begin to game plan how to handle our relationships with the two delegations during the meetings. It will be important for us to have some time to talk this through with you several days before the meetings.

Cyrus Vance
TO: The President  
FROM: Cyrus R. Vance  
SUBJECT: Study Papers for the Camp David Talks

The purpose of this book is to provide an initial set of papers to stimulate thinking on the substance, conduct, and arrangements for the Camp David talks. We stand ready to discuss the meetings with you. I have asked Ambassadors Siltz and Lewis to be available when you return to Washington. We will have more detailed suggestions for each meeting when you return for your final preparations.

In this book are the following:

-- Tab 1: Overview paper. This discusses our objectives, a basic perspective for the talks, ways of handling the key issues, the conduct of the meetings, and possible outcomes.

-- Tab 2: A scenario paper suggesting, session by session and day by day, how you might handle the meetings to engage the two leaders and to try to move the discussion to a conclusion.

-- Tab 3: Model documents that might come out of Camp David. Obviously these are provided at this stage only to give us something concrete to react to and think about.

-- Tab 4: A paper on the conduct of the meetings and the interaction of the personalities involved.

-- Tab 5: A public affairs strategy for positioning ourselves on the key issues so as to build support for our position.
-- Tab 6: A paper on dealing with the international environment to be more receptive to the outcome of the talks.

-- Tab 7: A paper on possible outcomes of the meetings and fall-back options.

-- Tab 8: For reference, the Nine Points you showed Sadat and Begin last winter.
TO: The President
FROM: Cyrus R. Vance
SUBJECT: An Overview of the Camp David Talks

Our Objectives

Our main objective at Camp David is to break the present impasse at the highest political level so that ministerial-level negotiations can proceed toward detailed agreements. Our objective is not to achieve a detailed agreement.

The present impasse has these elements:

-- Sadat is not yet able to demonstrate that his initiative has produced decisive gains for the Arabs—especially the Palestinians—and not just for Egypt. His position of leadership in the Arab world, perhaps his support in Egypt, and essential Arab financial support are at stake. At the same time, he wants to make peace with Israel and turn his energies to Egyptian development.

-- Begin cannot bring himself to be the Israeli leader who gave up once and for all time Israel’s chance to control all the historic “land of Israel”. Many Israelis who oppose Begin and would give part of that land to the Arabs would support him in keeping part of it for security. At the same time, Begin does not want to be the Israeli leader who lost an historic opportunity for peace with the one Arab neighbor that represents a real threat to Israel’s existence.
SECRET

In this context, our broad aim is to produce an understanding in some form that would:

1. provide a basis for negotiations on the West Bank/Gaza that promise the Palestinians genuine movement toward self-determination that they could not achieve any other way;

2. permit a serious effort to draw Jordan into West Bank/Gaza negotiations with at least Saudi, Gulf, and Moroccan support;

3. allow the Sinai negotiations to go forward.

The pivotal issue in the talks will be Israel's need to know whether they can get an agreement on the Sinai and what price they must pay for it in concessions on the West Bank. You will want to clarify with Sadat in your opening session that the prospect of an agreement there will be the major incentive for Israel. The more precise he can be about a final, if phased, agreement there the more he can seek in the West Bank/Gaza in return.

The other side of this issue is that Israel will want to know whether Sadat is prepared to assume responsibility for negotiating an agreement on the West Bank/Gaza if Jordan will not join the negotiations. Before making concessions on key issues, Begin will want to know not only that he can get a Sinai agreement but whether he can reach agreement on the West Bank/Gaza. He may want to hold his concessions to get Jordan into the negotiations.

Achieving our broad aims will require both Begin and Sadat to make hard political choices:

-- Your task with Sadat will be to persuade him to settle for less than a clearcut Israeli commitment now to the 1967 borders in the West Bank with only minor modifications, while at the same time not appearing to back away from positions we have previously taken. Sadat will still need enough to say to Arab colleagues that he won an Israeli commitment to withdraw.
With Begin, you will confront the central problem of Israel's refusal to commit itself to the principle of withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza. Unless he can be persuaded to recommend his government's approval of moving off this position, there is little chance of sustained progress through negotiations. The flexibility lies in the opportunity to negotiate final borders, phasing, and the relationship of withdrawal to new security arrangements which could involve Israeli troops.

A decision that will have to be made during the talks is where our position will come down between the two. There will probably be no way to avoid one side's leaving Camp David feeling it has had to make major concessions. The questions are whether and how to avoid both feeling that way.

More specifically, at Camp David we will have three concrete objectives:

1. To talk the parties toward a common view of the shape of an understanding. This can take quite a while. There is little point in drafting during this period because drafters will reach an early impasse until basic issues are settled.

2. To translate understandings reached at the political level at some point into documents which can provide guidance for negotiators and lead to follow-on negotiations. Now, the respective guidelines for the negotiators leave them too far apart. Previous statements--like the one at Ismailia--have produced more talks but no progress on the key issues. Hopefully, the Camp David talks can narrow the distance between them so that ministerial-level talks can concentrate on practical ways of implementing agreement.

3. In form, we should think in terms of documents to meet two needs:

-- A broad statement on objectives, principles, and procedures. We should get away from the terminology of a "Declaration of Principles" and put behind us present drafts. The purpose of this statement will be to lay out a course of negotiations and principles to govern them that will be convincing to moderate Arabs. A logical format could be a signed joint statement at the end of the meetings.
SECRET

-- An "instruction" to the Foreign and Defense Ministers for their later negotiations that is concrete enough to be used to persuade King Hussein to join the negotiations. Or we could call it "guidance." Sadat may be happy to settle for a statement of principles, but we need some additional document to work with. This would essentially consist of a revised version of the Nine Points which you showed Sadat and Begin last winter.

Drafts of possible documents are at TAB 3. The individual paragraphs of a draft Joint Statement appear below under the discussion of each issue. The Nine Points paper is at TAB 8 for reference.

Establishing the U.S. Position

It is essential at the outset of these meetings to recognize that a major objective of both Sadat and Begin will be to draw the U.S. to its side. In each case, that may almost be more important than the substance of the issues. Sadat's objective is to establish that the U.S. is a "full partner"; by that, he has meant a partner with the Arabs in pressing Israel to accept the principle of withdrawal. Begin will be seeking to demonstrate that it is Sadat's inflexibility that is to blame for any failure in the talks and that he has not jeopardized Israel's American connection.

At some point in your early contacts, therefore, it will be important to establish the following position: The U.S. has both a global and a regional interest of its own in a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. We believe that interest is shared by Egypt, Israel, and other moderate Arab governments. Our role at the outset of these talks will be to help each side to understand the other's position. Our role is not to take sides (although this point will have to be made delicately so as to give each side the feeling that we understand its point of view and have a particular relationship). Our role will be to help them find common ground. If it is necessary to help overcome obstacles, we will put forward ideas of our own. But our objective is to make these talks and follow-on negotiations succeed because we believe this is the only way to maintain control in the peace process which will keep at arms length the Soviets and other radical forces.
We will be developing this point in more detail on papers for your individual meetings later on. But I felt it important at this stage to flag the importance of your establishing an independent and leading U.S. position in your initial contacts.

A Perspective on the Talks: A Basic Approach

These are Heads of Government meetings. As such, they will focus on the fundamental political problems involved in achieving an Arab-Israeli settlement, beginning with Egyptian-Israeli negotiations. They should not in the first instance try to find verbal formulae that cover up problems; they should focus in simple terms on trying to resolve those fundamental political problems, the most difficult of which involve the future of the West Bank and Gaza.

You will want to talk as one politician to another. While appealing to their sense of history and calling on their statesmanship, you will also have to cultivate sensitivity to the political constraints under which each one speaks. It will be useful for you to try to move away from the familiar jargon and to try to put the problems that must be solved in a new light.

I find the following perspective helpful as a starting point in giving a fresh definition to the problems that must be solved:

-- We do not want to jeopardize in any way Resolution 242 because it is the only agreed basis for a peace settlement.

-- At the same time, we must recognize that we in 1978 live in a different world from the days of 1967 when 242 was written. Israelis and Palestinian Arabs have interacted across open borders for eleven years. There is a Palestinian nationalist movement strong beyond anything foreseen then. Sadat has visited Jerusalem and offered full peace and normal relations. The 1973 war demonstrated both Israel's vulnerability and Arab economic and, to a lesser extent, military power.

-- The problem at Camp David is to find ways to apply the principles of 242 like withdrawal and security in the 1978 world.
This perspective suggests that, in preparing for the talks, we concentrate on ways of introducing and discussing the issues that will encourage as fresh a look at the issues as possible and will lead in the direction we want. The leaders at the Summit may have an opportunity to find new solutions if they can be led to talk about what they really need in conditions of 1978 to satisfy their national requirements and political constituencies. Talking at that level may produce insights that are made impossible in negotiations at lower levels where negotiators confine themselves to building from existing formulations.

The essence of our job, therefore, is twofold:

-- to find new ways of posing the old issues so that the discussion can focus on solving the problems as we now see them without getting tangled up in the language that has been used since 1967 to avoid facing the real issues;

-- to suggest how these new perspectives can lead to the specific understandings that are necessary to move the negotiations toward agreement.

If we are to realize fully the potential of these meetings, we must start by changing our mind-set toward the issues to be negotiated. The issues discussed below are presented in this light to see how this approach would work. The alternative—which seems far less promising—is to start discussing formulations for something like a Declaration of Principles.

Translating This Perspective into Agreement

If we are to work from this perspective, we must be able to do two things: (a) we must be able to define the issues in a new perspective and to present them in a sequence that offers the best chance of reaching a new level of understanding. (b) We must be able to crystallize the discussion into some form of agreement, actual or potential.

In reviewing the issues, you will find two clusters: (a) There are those which deal with a general perspective on which a large measure of agreement between Sadat and Begin will be found. This will be true on the issues of peace, the importance of 242 (though not its interpretation), and the principle of security (though not its details). (b) There are the issues which go to the heart of the problem—security, withdrawal, and sovereignty. These
should be discussed together, and this may be the point at which it is desirable, after a brief talk with Sadat and Begin alone, to bring some of the ministers into the talks. They can give precision to the discussion which Sadat and Begin cannot.

The scenario paper at TAB 2 suggests in more detail how the issues can be raised in each meeting. The purpose here is simply to establish a perspective on them.

1. Peace.

Presentation. Both Begin and Sadat agree that full peace is the objective and that full peace involves normal relations. Since both men are enthusiastic about the potential for their nations in such a relationship, it might be useful to begin the conversations by having each man talk about what full peace would mean for his people and how full peace between Egypt and Israel might evolve. You could review how progress on this issue has evolved. There might be some talk about the economic, social, and political benefits of peace, as well as about how a peaceful relationship enhances security. This part of the discussion should probably be allowed to run as long as is necessary to assure that the two leaders understand and share each other's commitment to the objective. The aim of introducing this issue first is to personalize the shared commitment to the purpose of the talks.

Possible agreement might be found on a statement like the following:

1. Egypt and Israel share the objective of achieving peace and good neighborly relations in the Middle East. For such peace to endure, it must involve all the nations who have been principal parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict; it must provide security; and it must give those people who have been most deeply affected by the conflict a sense that they have been dealt with fairly in the peace agreement.

2. Peace is more than the juridical end of the state of belligerency. It should lead to
normal relations between nations. Progress toward that goal can accelerate movement toward a new era of reconciliation in the Middle East marked by cooperation in promoting economic development, in maintaining stability, and in assuring security.

2. Resolution 242

Presentation. The discussion could be introduced, with the perspective suggested on page 4 above, by under-scoring the importance of 242 as the only agreed basis for a settlement but by pointing out that our job is to apply its principles and fulfill its peace-and-security-for-withdrawal equation in the world of 1978. Looking at the problem this way would permit us to try to fulfill 242 by defining what we are going to do.

Possible agreement might be found in saying the following:

3. United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 are the only agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Negotiations are necessary to determine how best to apply and implement the principles of Resolution 242 and fulfill all of its objectives in the circumstances which exist today.

NOTE: It is at this point--perhaps after a general discussion of the next three issues--that you might consider broadening the group. The next three or four issues will need to be discussed as a package, and the imagination of Dayan and perhaps Weizman will be helpful in suggesting ways Israel might meet its security needs without holding large amounts of territory.


Presentation. Both men can also agree that Israel has particular security concerns, but perhaps the dis-cussion should be elevated at the beginning to discuss perceptions of the main threat to stability and security in the area. This should lead to agreement that both share concern over the threat of radicalism whether nurtured in the Middle East or encouraged by the Soviet
Union. In a discussion of this kind, you might establish that the two men have more in common than they may think about what is necessary to assure the future of their political systems. It could be established that, in a relationship of peace, Israel has common security interests with other moderate Arab states like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and maybe even Syria. You may also be able to establish that the real guarantee against terrorism is the collaboration of governments at peace with each other in suppressing terrorist movements.

This discussion would be to set the stage for coming down to what Begin and Sadat think their respective peoples need in practical terms for security in the Sinai and the West Bank. Sadat's six points might be mentioned, and he or one of his colleagues might be asked to expand them. The purpose would be to identify the specific threats Israel fears and exactly what measures could counter each of them. The security problem has two components: The threat of attack by conventional armed forces can be dealt with by early warning and zones with special limitations on armaments in them. The threat of guerrilla attack is best met by close cooperation between neighboring security forces—not necessarily by control of territory. You might also try to inject the security concerns of Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinians.

Possible agreement might be found on the following point:

4. Security is enhanced by a relationship of peace and by cooperation between nations which enjoy normal relations. Under the terms of peace treaties, the sovereign parties can agree to special security arrangements such as demilitarized zones, limited armaments areas, early warning stations, special security forces, liaison, agreed programs for monitoring, and other arrangements that they agree are useful.


Presentation. You might begin by asking each man to explain the feelings in his political constituency about the principle of withdrawal. Sadat might be led to acknowledge that the end of Israeli military government and of total Israeli control in the West Bank are aspects of "withdrawal."

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In the Sinai, "withdrawal" is the restoration of sovereignty. Hopefully, the earlier discussion of security would make it harder for Begin to argue that territory is needed for security. Access to the West Bank for Israelis could be allowed for in other ways.

You might try to establish, as discussed above, that we are no longer talking about withdrawal as a black and white proposition. In 1967, Resolution 242 spoke explicitly of "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces." Then, we envisioned a total Israeli pullback behind agreed borders. At that time, no one was talking about open borders. Today, we have Israeli military government and Israeli settlers in the West Bank, and thousands of Arabs work in Israel. Neither Begin nor Sadat is talking about total withdrawal in the conventional sense because everyone agrees that, in a relationship of full peace, there may be collaboration for clearly defined security purposes and economic and human interaction across borders. There may even be "special security forces," i.e., Israeli forces stationed with agreed locations and duties in the West Bank.

The concept of peace provides an opportunity to redefine what the principle of withdrawal means on the ground. Exactly what must be withdrawn? When Begin returns to the "narrow waist of Israel," there must be a discussion of exactly what he fears happening there and what Israel needs to counter the threat. If he can define specific positions Israel needs for security, perhaps minor border rectifications could cover them if Jordan and the West Bank were compensated by overland access to Gaza and free port facilities in Ashdod and Haifa.

It is also worth noting that modern history provides another example of how a "belligerent occupation" can end without a withdrawal of all military forces. In Germany, for example, the occupation of the Western Zones ended in 1954 with the Bonn Accords, but allied forces have remained. At Leeds Castle, the idea of "ending the occupation" seized everyone's interest. The only problem with the concept is that Begin objects to the word "occupation."

Possible agreement might be sought on the following points:
5. Resolution 242 in its preamble emphasizes the obligation of Member States in the United Nations to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter. Article 2, among other points, calls for the settlement of disputes by peaceful means and for Members to refrain from the threat or use of force. Egypt and Israel in their agreement signed September 4, 1975, agreed: "The Parties hereby undertake not to resort to the threat or use of force or military blockade against each other." They have both also stated that there shall be no more war between them. In a relationship of peace, in the spirit of Article 2, negotiations between Israel and any nation prepared to negotiate peace and security with it should be based on all the principles of Resolution 242, including the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every state in the area can live in security.

6. Israel is prepared to withdraw from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict in a relationship of peace, provided adequate security measures can be negotiated. In response to Egypt's offer of full peace, Israel has accordingly proposed the restoration of the exercise of full Egyptian sovereignty in the Sinai. In the West Bank and Gaza, Israel is prepared to withdraw its military government when a responsible Palestinian authority can be established, and to negotiate final borders and security arrangements that satisfy the aspirations of the Palestinians and meet Israel's security needs.

7. Egypt and Israel are prepared to participate in negotiations on resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. The solution must recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and enable the Palestinians to participate in the determination of their own future. To this end, they have agreed to invite Jordan and Palestinian representatives to join in negotiations on this issue on the basis of the approach outlined in the attached "Guidance for Negotiators."

* We are leaving open for the moment whether the "Guidance" should be mentioned here or be held separate.

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During these negotiations no new Israeli settlements will be established, and there will be no expansion of existing settlements. Israel and Egypt will consult with other interested parties on a just solution of the refugee problem.

5. Sovereignty.

Presentation. All parties are concerned not to have a radical Palestinian entity evolve on the West Bank and Gaza. Therefore, there is concern on all sides not simply to put sovereignty tomorrow in the hands of an unknown quantity. There is willingness in Jordan, Egypt, and Israel to see sovereignty in that area abridged by an association with Jordan.

No agreement seems possible, however, on the basis of Israel's asserting a claim to all of the West Bank/Gaza or on the basis of a fully independent Palestinian state. If it cannot be certain now where sovereignty will ultimately lie, there is reason to defer a final decision on that subject until farther along in a transitional period, provided there can be some agreement that the principle of withdrawal means that the Arab character of the territories should not be changed by unilateral Israeli action.

We must also keep in mind that sovereignty is divisible. The division of functions between the central government and the constituent elements of a federated state is common. If the locus of sovereignty is left undefined, the bundle of functions that constitute contemporary state government could be divided into spheres in which "supreme authority" would not necessarily be held by the same entity. Many of the trappings of "sovereignty" such as flag, ambassadors, control of frontiers could be enjoyed by an entity that was not fully supreme in all spheres and equal in its rights to other states. Although this might be inconsistent with the concept of "sovereign equality" of states, such a regime would theoretically be validated by UN Security Council action.

In that context, perhaps Begin could talk about what the people of Israel really want in relation to that territory and Sadat could be asked to discuss what the Arabs really need. If sovereignty can be thought of first simply as controlling influence or as something that can be partially ceded to a joint authority, then we might think of meeting the Palestinian need for national identity rather than thinking only of who is the supreme power.
Sadat will have particular difficulty with the Israeli position on settlements and the right to buy land. The Israelis say they should not be foreigners in their own "homeland," but the Arabs fear that open-ended Israeli settlement of the West Bank will lead to its incorporation into Israel. One possible solution would be for state-owned lands to be turned over to the self-governing authority, which would leave only privately owned land for Israelis to purchase on a non-discriminatory basis.

The areas of possible agreement on this subject are illustrated in the second paragraph above on withdrawal. The point is that, since the sovereignty question must remain open, it is necessary to establish a trustee-type authority for a transitional period.

6. The Palestinians.

Presentation. It may be that this subject will not need to be dealt with separately. It may have been well enough covered in discussion of the foregoing issues. In connection with the previous subject, perhaps this discussion could begin if it seems necessary by asking Sadat to define what the Arabs believe the Palestinian people really need. Many of the Palestinians say that their aspirations will not be realized unless they have an independent state of their own. Others in lesser numbers say that their initial needs are for the symbols of identity such as flag and passport. The operational question will be how to create an environment in which the PLO and Syria will at least acquiesce in an evolution of self-government.

The areas of possible agreement on how to proceed would be spelled out not in the Joint Statement itself but in the attached "Guidance for Negotiators" (also at TAB 3).

Three Other Issues: Sinai, Jerusalem, U.S. Guarantees

There are three other issues not dealt with in the above—the Sinai, Jerusalem, and U.S. guarantees. These are dealt with in paragraphs 7, 8, 9 of the draft Joint Statement at TAB 3.

Our objective on the Sinai would be mainly a commitment by the two parties to continue their negotiations. The key issue the Israelis will raise is how far Sadat will go on
the Sinai alone. Sadat will need to relate any agreement to a comprehensive peace, but my guess is that he will want to express any greater precision on this only in a verbal side understanding to which you would be party. In substance, if the Sinai agreement were phased over 3-5 years, there would be several ways of relating the initial signing-ratification-implemention stages to progress in negotiations on the West Bank/Gaza, Syrian and Lebanese fronts.

On Jerusalem, it would be easier to have no mention, but that will be impossible for Sadat, Hussein, and the Saudis. One approach would be to come out and acknowledge the problem—which would still be extremely difficult for Begin—and then consign it to the negotiations on the West Bank and Gaza. I have looked for other ways of handling this but so far see no alternative.

On U.S. guarantees, our standard position should hold initially—that we will consider U.S. involvement if that is the crucial difference. We should think very hard, however, before we get ourselves into some kind of basing situation, even though we may be partially engaged already.

Alternative Approaches: Moving from Talking to Drafting

The approach described above is based on a strategy of moving through the issues conversationally one at a time, starting with those where agreement is likely so as to build a sense of cooperation and commitment to the objective of reaching agreement and then moving to the more difficult complex of issues. The disadvantage of this approach is that neither may concede anything on the difficult issues until he sees what the other side is conceding. This can probably be dealt with by coming back to the difficult issues on the second round.

The alternative may not arise until it is necessary to begin making decisions after an initial round of conversation. At some point if the meeting is to produce concrete results it will be necessary (a) to return to the difficult issues for more intensive talk and (b) to begin drafting. At that point there will be a choice between trying to work issue-by-issue and putting forward a draft of some sort so the parties can see all the issues at one time.

This can be the subject of further discussion. At this point, I simply want to flag the issue.

In any case, we see a first target point as trying to reach a clear statement of the issues by Friday afternoon so the break for the Israeli Sabbath can be a period of reflection for both sides.
The U.S. Role

A draft scenario is at TAB 2 which sketches out how the talks might be structured over six days.

The underlying concept is that you would take and retain the initiative over the course of the talks and seek to move them sequentially from discussion of that group of issues where common interests and objectives can be identified (the nature of peaceful relations, the centrality of Resolution 242, shared strategic perceptions) to the areas of fundamental difference (withdrawal, security and the trade-offs between them, sovereignty, Palestinian-related issues).

The U.S. role in the first three days would be to help break conventional ways of looking at the problem and to stretch minds to develop new concepts. During this phase, we would be mainly one of the discussants. It would be important to refrain from introducing U.S. suggestions because this much time will be needed to let them feel each other out and determine how far they will move on their own.

— You would start with bilateral talks the first morning (Wednesday, September 6) with Begin and Sadat to outline your thoughts on how the talks might proceed, to signal in a general way where we hope each will re-examine his conventional approach, and to suggest the idea of a joint statement at the end of the talks.

— The balance of the first day and at least the morning of the second (Thursday, September 7) would consist of private talks among the three principals except for working lunches at which you would summarize for other members of the delegations the highlights of the private talks.

— When these talks begin to get into the details of security and related issues (by Thursday afternoon or Friday morning) it will probably be desirable to bring in two or three senior advisors from each delegation. Until that point is reached Secretary Vance could hold talks with the other Foreign Ministers and their aides on questions of general interest (e.g., Africa, the Soviet role in the area) to help the process of building a sense of shared strategic interest between Egyptians and Israelis.
By Friday afternoon, you may have reached a point where it will be time to try to reduce areas of agreement and difference to writing. Sadat may wish to observe some of the Moslem sabbath Friday afternoon, and Begin will not be able to do any work from sundown Friday to sundown Saturday. You could ask the two to reflect over the Sabbath. Meanwhile, you could suggest that we begin to put something on paper. It would be preferable to have one drafter for the group rather than to encourage the two sides to produce separate drafts, which only create conditions of confrontation. The attached scenario envisages that the U.S. side do this over Saturday in the form of a discussion paper, which could become the draft of a final joint statement and which could be discussed, in the first instance, in a trilateral meeting of the three principals and one or two advisors on Sunday. You would, of course, have the option on Sunday of talking for one session first to see whether Saturday’s reflection had produced new ideas before offering our discussion paper.

What happens at the end will depend on the measure of agreement. It may well be that our effort to define common ground will not be accepted by one side or both. We would need at that point to define the different points of view and begin to indicate in bilateral talks with Begin and Sadat what we considered a reasonable formulation on each issue. In this way, we would have positioned ourselves so as to define an agreement that we could support without ever having put forward an “American plan.”

Likely Outcomes

In order to prepare ourselves for the opportunities and problems we may face at the end of the Camp David meetings, it seems worthwhile to try to define in more detail the kinds of outcome we might anticipate:

-- Best from our viewpoint would be both sides ready to sign a document like the joint statement at TAB 3, but that seems an unlikely outcome.

-- Even if Begin and Sadat were to agree, it is more likely that at least Begin and perhaps Sadat as well would need to take the
document home for Cabinet-level action, and in Israel even Knesset endorsement. Therefore, perhaps the best we could hope for would be Begin's readiness to recommend approval to the Cabinet.

--- An additional factor in the above might be Israel's conditioning its agreement on Jordan's readiness to join the negotiations. Israel might want to use any concessions it makes for the dual purpose of getting a Sinai agreement and assuring negotiating partners on the West Bank/Gaza.

--- We might have a variant on the above in which Sadat would be ready to sign but Begin either would not agree at all or would agree but need Cabinet action.

--- At that point, we would either get Cabinet approval after some debate in Israel or the equivalent of a turndown.

--- Finally, of course, there is the possibility that our paper would be rejected by both sides.

In all likelihood, we need to prepare for a situation where you have developed a statement of common ground but it cannot be accepted on the spot. In that situation, you might seek agreement to your releasing a text, saying it has been negotiated but cannot be signed until it had been approved in capitals.

Options for Follow-On Talks

One of our objectives is to build the base for follow-on talks.

The experience since the summits in Jerusalem and Ismailia—the Cairo Conference and the Political and Military Committees—has taught three lessons:

--- No negotiating track can work until key issues can be dealt with at the highest political level. That is why the Camp David talks are being held.
-- The Weizman-Gamasy-Sadat talks, while apparently useful in discussing the general shape of an Egyptian-Israeli agreement on the Sinai, were highly imprecise and as far as we can tell reduced not one word to treaty draft. This also exposes one man like Weizman to excessive political criticism.

-- One personality like Kamel can derail a whole negotiating track.

If the Camp David talks produce follow-on negotiations, it might be useful to promote the ideas of (a) a negotiating team and (b) an objective of drafting an agreement.

If Camp David Produces No Agreement

If Camp David leaves substantial disagreement on major issues, we will have to consider options in four areas:

1. How to present the U.S. position. There probably will not be agreement at Camp David on all the elements of a Joint Statement such as the model at Tab 3. This will raise not only the question of what kind of joint statement there will be, if any, but also the questions of whether the U.S. can report publicly on the issues, how the U.S. position should be stated in relation to the Egyptian and Israeli positions, and how the U.S. statement will affect debate in Israel, the U.S., the Arab world, and other key nations. As to the question of what kind of joint statement there might be, there is the possibility of a Shanghai-type communique which has provided the basis for a subsequent relationship without total agreement. The problem here is that we are somewhat beyond that stage in the Egyptian-Israeli relationship.

2. Procedurally, we will have to face the choice among doing nothing for a while to allow pressures to build, returning to quiet mediation, moving to the UN or to Geneva.

SECRET
3. To what extent should we assess blame?

4. Should we turn soon to fall-back options? In the Sinai, there is the Dayan/Begin idea of partial permanent agreements. In the West Bank and Gaza, Israel could collaborate with prominent local figures to implement the self-rule plan unilaterally. Other possibilities include the "magnanimous gesture."

A fuller discussion of these issues is at TAB 7.

The Conduct of the Meetings

Much attention will have to be given to the physical arrangements and to the conduct of the meetings themselves. A paper on a number of aspects of this problem is at TAB 4. Some of these have been discussed above. Such questions as the following arise and are presented illustratively:

-- Begin will rest in New York after arrival; Sadat wants to go straight to Camp David for overnight rest. How should you greet each? When should he go to Camp David? (We are leaning toward suggesting that both come in late September 5, that I greet them at Andrews, and that you greet them at Camp David.)

-- What is the proper sequence for introducing these issues: peace, withdrawal, security arrangements, sovereignty, Palestinian voice in determining future, Jerusalem, Sinai?

-- When should drafting begin, assuming some sort of paper is desired? How long is it necessary to let them grapple with the problems themselves?

-- How and when should we put forward our views?

-- How can we sustain the confidence of Sadat and Begin when we put forward U.S. ideas, either in conversation or in writing? Our ideas will be a shock for both in one respect or another.

-- When is the right moment to hint at what inducements the U.S. might offer—e.g., security or other guarantees?

-- How do we avoid appearing to collude with one side or the other?
-- When should Sadat accept our position, assuming he is able and Begin must seek Cabinet approval?

-- How far should we press Egypt to discuss details of a West Bank/Gaza agreement?

-- What is the best mix of meetings in terms of tete-a-tetes among the three leaders, slightly broadened meetings to include 2 or 3 key advisors, working groups to do drafting?

-- What use do we put the delegations to during tete-a-tetes among the leaders? How do we use Dayan to manipulate Begin toward greater flexibility and how do we neutralize Kamel's cautious influence?

-- How do we manage the social side of things? Meals together? Entertainment in evenings?

We will continue to work on these issues and can discuss them when you return.

**Building Support for Our Position**

Although we do not know yet exactly what might come out of these meetings, we need to begin now developing a strategy for winning domestic and international support for the process we are engaged in.

This work has already begun in our briefings of the press and Congress and in the letters the you have sent to major foreign leaders around the world. In the days right before the Camp David sessions, key Congressional figures as well as the press should probably be brought up to date with our thinking about how the meetings will be conducted and what our objectives are. One purpose in those briefings will be to moderate expectations to a realistic level as well as to put ourselves on the right side of the key issues. Meanwhile, we will have to follow-up your letters with a further briefing before Camp David. We will have to give special attention to key Middle East states.

At **TAB 5** is a paper on a public affairs strategy for positioning ourselves on the key issues so as to build public support for our position.

At **TAB 6** is a paper on special considerations in building international support and particularly in dealing with Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon.
A SCENARIO FOR CAMP DAVID

The basic problem we face is to construct a scenario for the Camp David talks that will, at best, begin to alter the Israeli and Egyptian mindsets about the nature of a Middle East peace settlement and how it is arrived at; and that, at a minimum, will permit an American position on the key issues to crystallize by the end of the talks which will be broadly judged in American opinion as fair, reasonable and the logical conclusion to a serious effort to break the negotiating impasse.

The mindset problem is fundamental and can be summarized as follows:

-- Israel sees the retention of control over the West Bank and Gaza as essential to its security (and in Begin's eyes, an historical right). Israel is prepared to negotiate "on the basis of Resolution 242" a new status for the people of these territories and to discuss the final status or sovereignty of the territories after five years; meanwhile, retaining the right of Israelis to settle there and not giving up its claim to sovereignty.

-- Egypt maintains that Resolution 242 imposes "obligations" on the parties which they must agree at the outset to "implement" -- the Arabs to give Israel recognition and peace with security, and Israel to give back to the Arabs the territories occupied in 1967. In addition, Egypt maintains that the Palestinians must make the final decision about the ultimate political status of these territories in accordance with the principle of self-determination; and that meanwhile no Israeli should be permitted to settle there. If agreement can be reached that these mutual obligations are the starting point, Egypt is prepared to agree that negotiations should be held, and to urge Jordan and the Palestinians to join such negotiations, to reach agreement on an interim regime, the terms and phasing of Israeli withdrawal over five years, minor border modifications, far-reaching security arrangements, and a final status for the territories linked to Jordan.

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To alter these mindsets will require: (a) bringing Begin to think in terms of separating security from sovereignty and total control over territory, and (b) bringing Sadat to recognize that agreement on the precise nature of a territorial settlement can only arise from a process of change in attitudes and relationships on the ground during a five-year transitional period.

A scenario designed to achieve this objective should begin by seeking to get both Begin and Sadat to think in terms of their common interests, and should defer until later in the Camp David talks addressing the fundamental differences over territory which have dominated the approach of both sides up to now. In this way, they may perhaps be brought to address their differences with new perspectives and new insights into each other's political imperatives. Such a scenario might unfold as follows:

**Tuesday, September 5**

Sadat and Begin arrive separately at Camp David. Secretary Vance will have met each at Andrews. President meets each upon arrival, escorts him to his quarters, has brief non-substantive discussion and suggests a bilateral meeting with each the next morning to discuss how the talks might be organized as well as their expectations and concerns.

**Wednesday, September 6**

Morning for bilateral talks. With both Begin and Sadat, the President would begin by seeking to build a common recognition of the unique opportunity these talks offer, the responsibility to history the three of them share, and the need to grasp the nettle now. He could emphasize that the negotiations have reached a stage where only heads of government can break the impasse, and therefore each side must try to understand the other's political problems.

The President could also give them a strategic overview of current U.S. global concerns and responsibilities, and convey a sense of his personal determination to help resolve the Middle East conflict and why this is important to our overall strategic position. In this context, he could emphasize their shared interest, together with other like-minded Middle East states, in a stable Middle East and a strong United States.
Next the President would outline how he envisages the talks proceeding—in effect, the agenda for the next several days. He would suggest an issue-oriented sequence of discussions, beginning with the mutual obligations and benefits of peace and how the peace settlement should be rooted in Resolution 242 and then moving to that complex of issues relating to security-withdrawal-sovereignty-Palestinians. At the same time, the President should afford an opportunity for them to raise other possible bases for negotiation. This would provide an opportunity with Begin to stress that the principles of 242 must be reaffirmed but that how they are carried out offers a wide scope for negotiation. With Sadat, he would stress our commitment to 242 while seeking to bring Sadat to see that how it is carried out must take into account the changes that have occurred in the area since 1967. The President would suggest that the first day's discussions be limited to peace-related issues, and the global security context, and that they move in the second day to the complex of questions involved withdrawal, security, and the role of the Palestinians.

In the initial bilateral, both Sadat and Begin will probe for an indication of the U.S. role—Sadat for precision on when and how we plan to put our ideas forward and what they will say; Begin for assurances that we will not preempt the talks with a U.S. proposal. The President will need to be generally reassuring on both scores, without getting specific about our ideas, which should be held in reserve until both sides have had ample opportunity to engage each other over the first three days at least.

Since each side will have as an objective capturing the U.S., the President with sympathy for each side's interests will have to establish the independence of the U.S. position. Each will want a sense of special relationship with us; we will want to be close to each without being in either’s pocket. We will have to develop a definition of our role that does not set up mutually contradictory expectations.

With Sadat, the President could impress upon him that Begin will be looking for a precise indication of what Sadat requires to resume the Sinai negotiations and that this is an asset to Sadat in seeking a more forthcoming Israeli position on Palestinian-related issues.

Finally, the President could sound out both Begin and Sadat on the idea that we should strive for an agreed joint statement to be issued at the end of the Camp David talks.
Initial trilateral meeting. This could be a brief break-the-ice meeting to be followed by a lunch at which all three delegations would be present.

Lunch. The President could summarize how we envisage proceeding over the next several days, based upon his bilateral talks in the morning with Begin and Sadat.

Afternoon. Trilateral meeting of the three principals to discuss the broad peace-related and global security questions. However the President divides the time among these three meetings, they should be long enough so that the President has a good feeling on that first day for the dynamics of the three working together.

Thursday, September 7

Morning. Trilateral meeting of the three principals to explore withdrawal, security and Palestinian issues. Depending on how detailed the morning talks become, the President could suggest resuming in the afternoon with several principal advisors on each side. That will become necessary to inject some precision into the talks because neither Begin nor Sadat will be prepared to go beyond general points.

Lunch. Delegation lunch where President could summarize morning session.

Afternoon. Enlarged talks continue on withdrawal, security and Palestinian issues.

There probably should be a set of bilateral meetings— even if brief— in the evening, in order to better assess the progress and future course of the negotiations. The alternative would be to establish a practice of bilateral meetings each morning. Of course, we will have other ways of assessing the feelings of the delegation through Secretary Vance.

Friday, September 8

Morning. Trilateral meeting of three principals to review areas of agreement and disagreement on each issue and to have preliminary discussion of what might be included in a joint statement.

Lunch. Delegation lunch to summarize morning meeting.
At this point, it might be desirable for the President to suggest a recess Friday afternoon and Saturday for the Sabbath, and to say that he and his advisors will seek to reduce to writing for Sunday the areas of agreement and disagreement, with a view to producing a discussion paper that could become the draft of a joint statement.

Saturday, September 9

Recess and work time for each delegation. Quiet bilateral contacts would be possible.

Sunday, September 10

Morning. Trilateral meeting of three principals plus one or two advisors to review draft U.S. discussion paper. This could be a relatively short meeting, after which Sadat and Begin will presumably want to caucus with their delegations.

Lunch. Separate delegation lunches to prepare for afternoon meeting.

Afternoon. Meeting of principals plus advisors to go over U.S. discussion paper.

Monday, September 11

By this time, it will presumably be clear where the principal disagreements lie, and we will need to reach decisions about what formulations we can support. The President should at this stage have bilateral meetings with Begin and Sadat to begin to focus with them on what we consider to be positions and formulations we could support on each issue.

An Underlying Issue

One other issue will underlie the above discussions. This is the relationship between negotiations on the Sinai and negotiations on the West Bank. The discussions of general principles will be difficult in themselves, but whatever concessions are made may hinge on what Sadat is prepared to do in the Sinai and how firm a possibility there seems to be of real negotiations on the West Bank. This should be introduced in your first discussion with Sadat.
Daily Schedules

In an effort to see what the daily pattern of meetings might be, we asked Ambassadors Lewis and Eilts for their understandings of Begin's and Sadat's normal daily pattern. Our initial reading is this:

**Begin**

- Rises: 0530
- Begins work: 0800
- Eats lunch: 1230/1300
- Rests: From lunch until 1600
- Dinner: 1900
- Retires: 2300

**Sadat**

- 0900
- 1030/1100
- 1500
- 1600 to 1800
- 1900 or 2000
- 2400 or 0100

This suggests that a daily pattern might work along the following lines:

- **0900 - 1030** Time for bilateral with Begin
- **1030 - 1130** Time for bilateral with Sadat
- **1130 - 1330** Trilaterals
- **1330 - 1530** Lunch with talk over coffee
- **1530 - 1800** Rest or individual and staff time
- **1800 - 1930** Time for further talks
- **Evening** Dinner and movie.
DRAFT JOINT STATEMENT
A Declaration at Camp David

Anwar al-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel met with Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America, at Camp David from September 5 to __, 1978, and have agreed on the following joint statement of objectives, principles, and procedures:

1. Egypt and Israel share the objective of achieving peace and good neighborly relations in the Middle East. For such peace to endure, it must involve all the nations who have been principal parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict; it must provide security; and it must give those people who have been most deeply affected by the conflict a sense that they have been dealt with fairly in the peace agreement.

2. Peace is more than the juridical end of the state of belligerency. It should lead to normal relations between nations. Progress toward that goal can accelerate movement toward a new era of reconciliation in the Middle East marked by cooperation in promoting economic development, in maintaining stability, and in assuring security.

3. United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 are the only agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Negotiations are necessary to determine how best to apply and implement the principles of Resolution 242 and fulfill all of its objectives in the circumstances which exist today.

4. Security is enhanced by a relationship of peace and by cooperation between nations which enjoy normal relations. Under the terms of peace treaties, the sovereign parties can agree to special security arrangements such as demilitarized zones, limited armaments areas, early warning stations, special security forces, liaison, agreed programs for monitoring, and other arrangements that they agree are useful.
5. Resolution 242 in its preamble emphasizes the obligation of Member States in the United Nations to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter. Article 2, among other points, calls for the settlement of disputes by peaceful means and for Members to refrain from the threat or use of force. Egypt and Israel in their agreement signed September 4, 1975, agreed: "The Parties hereby undertake not to resort to the threat or use of force or military blockade against each other." They have both also stated that there shall be no more war between them. In a relationship of peace, in the spirit of Article 2, negotiations between Israel and any nation prepared to negotiate peace and security with it should be based on all the principles of Resolution 242, including the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every state in the area can live in security.

6. Israel is prepared to withdraw from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict in a relationship of peace, provided adequate security measures can be negotiated. In response to Egypt's offer of full peace, Israel has accordingly proposed the restoration of the exercise of full Egyptian sovereignty in the Sinai. In the West Bank and Gaza, Israel is prepared to withdraw its military government when a responsible Palestinian authority can be established, and to negotiate final borders and security arrangements that satisfy the aspirations of the Palestinians and meet Israel's security needs.

7. Egypt and Israel are prepared to participate in negotiations on resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. The solution must recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and enable the Palestinians to participate in the determination of their own future. To this end, they have agreed to invite Jordan and Palestinian representatives to join in negotiations on this issue on the basis of the approach outlined in the attached "Guidance for Negotiators."

* We are leaving open for the moment whether the "Guidance" should be mentioned here or be held separate.
During these negotiations no new Israeli settlements will be established, and there will be no expansion of existing settlements. Israel and Egypt will consult with other interested parties on a just solution of the refugee problem.

8. Jerusalem, the city of peace, must not again be divided by the instruments of war. It is a city holy to Christian, Jew, and Muslim, and all must have free access to it. For peace to endure, each community in Jerusalem must be able to express freely its cultural and religious values in an acceptable political framework. An agreement on relationships in Jerusalem should be reached in the negotiations dealing with the West Bank and Gaza.

9. Negotiations on the Sinai will continue at the ministerial level with the objective of reaching an early agreement which would become one of the agreements necessary for conclusion of an overall settlement in the Middle East. The Presidents of Egypt and of the United States have undertaken to discuss with the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and with other Arab Governments the beginning of negotiations to establish an interim regime in the West Bank and Gaza.

10. In response to a request from the parties and in consultation with other appropriate governments, the United States, in accordance with its constitutional processes, would be prepared to consider adding its own guarantee to those provided for in any peace agreement.

President Carter has expressed his profound respect for the spirit of peace in which these historic talks have been conducted. President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin have expressed their deep gratitude to President Carter for his leadership in the talks, and they have committed themselves to each other to pursue negotiations for a comprehensive peace in the Middle East in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and with the principles stated above and agreed in these meetings at Camp David.

Anwar al-Sadat

Menachem Begin

Witnessed:

Jimmy Carter
GUIDANCE FOR NEGOTIATORS

1. Within the framework of the Joint Statement signed at Camp David, the Governments of Egypt and Israel agree that an essential part of a comprehensive peace settlement shall be a just resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. To that end, the two Governments have agreed on the following:

(a) They will invite the Government of Jordan to join in negotiating an agreement on the West Bank and Gaza which will recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and enable them to participate in the determination of their own future through negotiations in which Egypt, Jordan, Israel, and representatives of the Palestinian people would participate.

(b) They will consult on organizing talks with other interested parties on a just solution of the refugee problem.

2. In addition, they will instruct their negotiators to begin with the concept that agreements on the West Bank and Gaza would be reached in three stages:

(a) Egypt and Israel hereby agree that, in order to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority, there should be a transitional period not exceeding five years. They further agree that the Israeli military government and occupation should be abolished at the outset of the transitional period and that a government shall be freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing military government. This transitional arrangement should derive its authority from an agreement concluded among Israel, Jordan, and Egypt. The establishment of the new regime should give due consideration both to the principle of self-government by the inhabitants of these territories and to the legitimate security concerns of all the parties. The Government of Jordan will be invited to join the negotiations on the basis of this agreement.
(b) Egypt, Israel, and Jordan should meet to negotiate an agreement to end Israel's military government in the West Bank and Gaza and to establish the elected interim government there. This agreement would define the authorities of the interim government. It would include arrangements for assuring external security and public order; it will also include arrangements for withdrawal of Israeli armed forces to designated areas and will define their duties. Egypt and Israel propose that, to assist in ensuring security during this period, Jordan and Egypt would assign officials to share responsibility with the security forces of the local authority in the West Bank and Gaza, respectively, and to maintain continuing liaison with the designated Israeli authority on internal security matters to ensure that no hostile threats or acts against Israel or its citizens originate from the West Bank or Gaza. The numbers, equipment and responsibilities of such Egyptian and Jordanian officials would be defined by mutual agreement among the negotiating parties. In addition, by mutual agreement, United Nations forces might also be introduced during the transitional period.

(c) When the Palestinian Arab Government in the West Bank and Gaza is inaugurated, the transitional period would begin. Within two years after the beginning of the transitional period, Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the interim government in the West Bank and Gaza would undertake negotiations for a peace treaty which would settle the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbors on the basis of all of the principles of UN Security Council Resolution 242, including the mutual obligations of peace, the necessity for security arrangements for all parties concerned following the transitional period, the withdrawal of Israeli forces, a just settlement of the refugee problem, and the establishment of secure and recognized boundaries. The boundaries established may incorporate agreed modifications in the temporary armistice lines which existed between 1949 and 1967. The peace treaty will define the rights of the citizens of each of the parties to do business,
to work, to live, and to carry on other transactions in each other's territory. The peace treaty shall provide for an expression of consent to its terms by the people concerned.

3. During the transitional period in the West Bank and Gaza, the negotiating parties would constitute a continuing committee to reach agreements applicable during that period on the following:

(a) issues involving interpretation of the agreement or issues unforeseen during the negotiation of the agreement, if not resolvable by the governing council;

(b) the possible introduction or augmentation of a security presence by the United Nations, Jordan or Egypt;

(c) the return of agreed numbers of persons displaced from the West Bank in 1967 and of Palestinian refugees;

(d) issues relating to Jewish settlements on the West Bank.

4. In all of the negotiations described above, the negotiating parties should explore possibilities for regional economic development in the context of both transitional arrangements and final peace treaties, with the objective of contributing to the atmosphere of peace, cooperation and friendship which is their common goal.
Considerations for Conducting the Summit Meetings

I. Approaching the Political Personalities

-- Both Begin and Sadat have evidenced similar personal and national objectives throughout their familiar transformation from underground fighter to political leader. Despite their often vituperative comments, each should be able to recognize the other as a politician basically capable of change, compromise, and commitment. At points of resistance, the President may remind them that they already share objectives in common. The Summit meetings are a means of discovering those points of similarity. The objective is to minimize their real differences and maximize their apparent similarities.

-- Begin desires a secure Jewish homeland. He has manifested some capacity for restraint and a capacity to place national interests over personal and party politics. Whenever Begin reminisces about his past or falters on a decision, he should be reminded: "Being a great statesman is a painful, lonely role. I, too, have left behind me old friends and old politics." The objective is to allow him to recognize that the President has empathy for his present feelings of pain, loneliness, and the awesome responsibility of his office.

-- Begin is a highly autocratic leader who is inflexible concerning three core beliefs: (1) principle and legal form must govern human behavior; (2) a secure Jewish homeland offers the only solution to Jewish persecution; (3) only those who fight survive. However, Begin is able to compromise if he is convinced that his short-term tactical maneuver will serve his long-term goals. Sadat will attempt to question Begin's core beliefs, especially the one concerning the West Bank. Any polemical discussion of "occupied or liberated territories" could be counterproductive. The objective should be to minimize Begin's inflexibility which is basically a conceptual inflexibility relating to a fixed concept rather than a rigid personality.

-- Sadat believes in his and Egypt's preeminence in the Arab world. His basic motivations are nationalistic rather than pan-Arab. He, like Begin, wishes to go down in history as having improved the economic and social well-being of his people. The President could remind both Sadat and Begin that
they are great leaders who should be able to transcend their basic differences. The objective is to create a new bond of unity between them so that they feel accountable to each other and to the President. In effect, the President would be creating a new political reality which would reinforce both men's sense of specialness and historical destiny, allowing them to feel free to negotiate their differences without undue concern for normal political constraints (i.e. advisors, constituency).

-- Sadat has been able to mobilize a degree of flexibility, patience, and perception, not evident in his early career. He views himself as a grand strategist; and he, too, will make tactical concessions in order to obtain long-range goals. Sadat will continuously resort to the position that his trip to Jerusalem requires no further concessions from him. The President could remind him that his trip was a milestone but, at this point in the negotiations, additional steps are required.

-- Sadat's special view of himself combining a nationalistic and religious fervor has allowed him to make dramatic initiatives, often overriding his advisers' objections. He is often impulsive and unpredictable, but clearly in full control of his emotions. In private conversation, help Begin to appreciate that Sadat is a leader who, like himself, has overridden tremendous opposition to initiate peace.

-- Sadat personalizes his international relationships and sometimes overestimates his ability to influence other Arab leaders. Avoid Begin's challenge to Sadat's view of himself as an Arab world leader. He is extremely sensitive on this point, and in any discussions of Arab politics the political reality should be addressed very carefully.

-- Sadat's unwillingness to concentrate on details allows him to avoid power struggles over administrative matters. But this often leads to misunderstandings and objections within his own bureaucracy. It is therefore necessary to review carefully each issue as it is discussed and to try to reduce agreements to writing.

-- Sadat has a strong need to be informed. Several of the major diplomatic errors have occurred when he was provided information at variance with that given others.
Once trust is established, he can excuse fluctuations as political necessities. But if he feels manipulated, he may terminate the relationship. Any perceived discrepancy in information or procedure should be immediately clarified with Sadat. We should try to prevent Begin from capitalizing on Sadat's misunderstanding. The objective is the development and maintenance of a trust relationship with Sadat.

II. How to Mediate Between the Two Leaders

-- Both men are master manipulators, utilizing basically two different personality styles in order to achieve power and control. Begin concentrates on tactics and details, whereas Sadat focuses on the grand strategy, often employing broad dramatic gestures. In each case, this allows them to avoid making hard decisions. The intermediary trying to bring Sadat the conceptualist and Begin the Talmudic scholar together will have to move each man away from his preferred political (and psychological) style.

-- In dealing with Begin, avoid entering into word definitions. Allow him to make his basic point without interference and then point him to the intended objective. Begin's concentration on detail is basically an evasive, controlling technique which can be overcome by summarizing succinctly his point of view and then redirecting him back to the mainstream of the discussions.

In contrast, Sadat will need more guidance, direction, and limit-setting. Left alone, he may get involved in ambiguities and generalities. The President can take advantage of this style by summarizing Sadat's basic intent in such a way that it appears that there are greater points of agreement with Begin than would otherwise be the case.

-- Both men are extrememly concerned about their respective physical conditions (i.e. previous heart attacks). They realize that time is not on their side, and they would like to see an acceptable resolution within their lifetime.
PUBLIC AFFAIRS STRATEGY

The purpose of this discussion paper is to lay out the key issues to be faced in our public affairs strategy surrounding the Camp David summit. While maintaining a low public profile before and during the summit, we recognize that these issues have already begun to emerge in the media and will be the center of the inevitable public debate in the weeks ahead. Therefore, we must begin to position ourselves by casting moves and words to emphasize our strong points. By pinpointing the issues, and translating our established assets into public themes for addressing them, we lay the groundwork now for undercutting the critics.

The first main issue is the American role in the negotiations. The issue is best posed through a number of questions:

--How can the United States both be "middle man" and "full partner" in the negotiations?
--Is not the President risking the prestige of his office and the credibility of the United States as honest-broker through an ill-prepared and hastily-arranged summit?
--Is not the summit simply a political gimmick awakening expectations which cannot be fulfilled?
--Is not the summit a disguised platform for putting forward the American blueprint for solving the
conflict?

The public themes for answering these questions should incorporate the following elements of strength in our position:

--- Direct negotiations, advocated by the President and supported by the Congress, are resuming. We have consistently held that such negotiations offer the best prospect for agreement, and both parties have agreed to meet with the President at the highest level.

--- Negotiations begun between Sadat and Begin at Ismailia, and continued through Ambassador Atherton and then with Secretary Vance and the foreign ministers at Leeds Castle, as well as the Secretary's recent visit to the area, have laid the basis for the summit. Common elements, as well as remaining differences, have been clearly defined during these 8 months of fitful negotiations. The habit of negotiations has been established.

--- From the outset in Jerusalem last November President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin agreed to seek the framework for a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East conflict. Now they have agreed to meet with President Carter, against the backdrop of 8 months of lower-level preparation, because they realize that agreement must come at the highest level if negotiations are to go forward.

--- Regarding expectations, none of the three leaders
sees the meeting as settling the details of a settlement. Our aim is to achieve guidelines which will permit their negotiators to go forward and form the framework for bringing in other parties to the conflict.

--President Carter will be a "full partner" in the sense that the United States, like the parties themselves, as well as the whole international community, has a vital interest in achieving peace in the Middle East. This role is the natural outgrowth of the push of this Administration from the outset for a settlement which will bring full peace to the Middle East, not just the end of belligerency.

--The President had to weigh the risk of exaggerated expectations from a summit against the risks of not moving to grasp the opportunity presented by direct negotiations at the highest level after 8 months of intermittent negotiations. The United States, like Israel, has compelling interest in achieving this peace, since only such a peace will allow us to pursue our national interests in both maintaining the security of Israel and having good close relations with key Arab governments. This peace is the best guarantee of maintaining moderate Arab governments and of avoiding superpower conflict in the Middle East.
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--As a full partner, the President remains a middleman with the trust of both parties. In that role, he will help talk the parties through their problems to new solutions.

--Our role is not to put forward a blueprint or pre-cooked plan. Ideas he may put forward come out of the negotiations themselves, and will be aimed at developing new common ground between the parties themselves.

The second issue, directly related to the first, is the substance of the American position at Camp David. Here the problem is how to achieve a public perception of balance--in the United States, in Israel, in the Arab world--about our suggestions. In particular, we must present our positions on security for Israel and withdrawal-sovereignty so as to counter charges of collusion with one side or the other in the negotiations. Questions which pose this issue are the following:

--Is not President Carter colluding with President Sadat to force on Prime Minister Begin Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza without adequate security against establishment of a hostile Palestinian State?

--Is not President Carter colluding with Prime Minister Begin to force President Sadat to accept territorial compromise on the West Bank and no Palestinian self-determination?
Beyond this collusion issue lie more general questions about the substance of our position:

--By putting forward suggestions which amount to an overall U.S. position, is not the President substituting in effect for negotiations between the parties?

--What security guarantees for Israel can the United States offer, including those from the Arabs, which will substitute for territory?

--Rather than the all-or-nothing approach of seeking a comprehensive settlement, should not the U.S. be pushing for a partial Israeli-Egyptian settlement along lines suggested by Begin?

The public themes in addressing the collusion issue and more general criticism of our position should include the following elements, some of them stated previously, others newly advanced to reflect our efforts to break the impasse:

--United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 remains the basis for the negotiations. United States policy is squarely directed toward its implementation. We are not asking one-sided compromises, but we are seeking practical guidelines for carrying out the peace-for-territory formula at the heart of 242.

--Each side has maintained its own interpretation of
242. Today, 11 years after the enactment of the resolution, new circumstances also shape the concerns and interests of the parties in its implementation. For negotiations to go forward, the leaders must find a common understanding on how to implement the principles of 242 in present-day circumstances.

--One new circumstance is the rise of Palestinian nationalism, an issue not confronted in Resolution 242. Yet, today all sides agree that this issue must be settled if a just and lasting peace is to be negotiated.

--Another new circumstance is the relationship between withdrawal and sovereignty. While Egypt continues to insist that Israel withdraw from territories occupied in 1967, it recognizes the need for Israeli security arrangements in the West Bank, to the point of negotiating an Israeli security presence there. So total withdrawal, in the strict military sense of the term, is no longer the central issue.

--That issue is how to meet Israel's need for security in the West Bank, while fulfilling the Palestinians' aspiration to identity and applying the principle of withdrawal in 242.

--The United States remains deeply committed to maintaining the security and well-being of Israel. Military and economic aid at high levels continues. A militarily
strong Israel, however, can only have real security if it is at peace with the Arab neighbors. Security is possible without sovereignty over occupied territory. --At Camp David we do not seek to negotiate final borders. The need, rather, is to find new and imaginative ways to give Israel that security while agreeing to withdrawal from the territory. President Carter first suggested in his press conference of March 1977 that this might be done by having security lines and agreed security measures separate from the territorial boundaries of Israel. --

--This sovereignty-withdrawal issue cannot be divorced from the question of Palestinian self-determination. We believe agreement might be reached on a transitional period which would both safeguard Israeli security interests and bring forward a moderate Palestinian leadership on the West Bank and Gaza.

--This transitional period, with its built-in safeguards and evolution of self-government, will provide time for new relationships to emerge between these territories and Israel, Egypt and Jordan. During/period, a way must be worked out to submit the ultimate solution for the territory to the people there for ratification.

--The American ideas draw upon both the Egyptian proposal -- for instance, withdrawal and security measures for Israel--and the Israeli proposal for an
interim solution. In seeking common ground, they do not substitute for negotiations, but seek to get agreement on a framework for continuing negotiations which will bring in Jordan and Palestinian representatives.

Basic to these ideas is that the end result is to be full peace incorporated in peace treaties, which President Sadat has indicated he is ready to provide. They call for compromise from each side—withdrawal for the Israelis, and security arrangements for the Arab side which allow for border modifications and modified self-determination for the Palestinians.

Should Israel desire, the United States is prepared to provide its own security guarantees and defense arrangements, but we recognize these cannot substitute for peace arrangements on the ground between the parties.

If a partial settlement between Israel and Egypt becomes feasible at the summit, it must be seen as a further step in the negotiating process toward a comprehensive settlement. By agreeing on concrete moves in the Sinai, while negotiations continue on the larger framework for a settlement, the two sides build confidence in their willingness and ability to move forward in the peace process.
My judgment is that public expectations about a summit of this magnitude are bound to build, no matter what cautionary words we use about its likely results. At a minimum, therefore, we should emphasize the risks we saw in not moving, while stressing our basic aim of keeping the negotiations alive. Any concrete result which comes out of the summit should be portrayed in that light. Whatever happens, the Administration should come away from Camp David prepared to go public with the themes listed above for spelling out the United States' ideas for reaching a settlement.
Checklist of Actions with Major Arab Countries and Others Concerned

Saudi Arabia

Maintaining Saudi support for Camp David should be a prime objective—both to maintain some moderate Arab support for Sadat and to lay the groundwork for asking the Saudis after Camp David to support Jordan's joining the negotiations if there is a basis for doing so. The Saudis will be under pressure from Syria and Iraq to back off of Fahd's August 11 statement. They probably will not be ready to go beyond that statement and take an active hand in helping us muster other Arab backing, but firm adherence to the August 11 statement will in itself be useful to us in getting the support of others. At the end of Camp David, we should consult with the Egyptians on how to enlist Saudi support immediately for the results.

Possible Actions

-- A second letter from the President to Khalid, or a letter from the Secretary to Fahd, about the end of August. Purpose would be to try to assure realistic expectations.

-- Continuing close dialogue with the Saudis through Ambassador West, but without committing ourselves on substance in any detailed way.

-- Judge from these contacts and the reaction of the moderates whether it would be useful to seek Saudi support for approaches to others in support of Camp David.

-- Immediately after Camp David, another Presidential message to Khalid and perhaps Atherton to the area.

Jordan

Essentially we want to keep Hussein in a positive frame of mind about the Camp David meeting and to clear the way for him to join the negotiations if Camp David brings Egyptian-Israeli agreement on a broad set of principles.
Possible Actions

-- An invitation to Hussein to visit the U.S. Present recommendation is for early October. This may be a bit later than ideal, but it could also allow time for Egyptians and Saudis to talk with him.

-- A letter from the President to Hussein about the end of August outlining in more detail what we hope to achieve at Camp David.

-- Keep Hussein closely informed, through our Charge, of our thinking on Camp David and seek his more active support.

-- Immediately after Camp David, another Presidential message to Hussein and perhaps  Atherton to the area. The purpose would be to build toward serious talk during his visit on Jordan's joining the negotiations.

-- Offer possible military and economic aid inducements (we are studying the various options) to Hussein in connection with our talks following Camp David.

Syria

Syria has, as expected, reacted negatively to the Camp David summit. We want, however, to keep the Syrians informed and thereby to keep the door open for them eventually to join the negotiations at a later stage. Our actions vis-a-vis Syria would therefore be aimed in the immediate future more toward maintaining good U.S.-Syrian relations than toward bringing about an early change in Syrian policy, probably an unrealistic goal.

Possible Actions

-- Keep alive in all briefings and public comments that might get back to the Syrians the objective of a comprehensive peace.
-- A letter from the President to Assad to be delivered by Ambassador Seelye when he presents his credentials later this month which would discuss bilateral relations and the Camp David summit.

-- Provide briefings to Foreign Minister Khaddam on Camp David, stressing our continuing commitment to a comprehensive settlement.

-- Continuation of the Administration's strong effort to restore the full figure for aid to Syria.

-- Continue the dialogue with Syria on Lebanon and seek to remove Syrian suspicions of our position.

-- Try to mention Syria in what comes out of Camp David.

-- Send an early Presidential message to Assad after Camp David.

Lebanon

The Lebanese Government, weak, divided and engaged in a struggle for its very existence, will not be able to take a position on Camp David (support for Camp David would bring down Syria's wrath upon Sarkis). Our objective should be simply to keep the Government of Lebanon generally informed of our thinking and of steps we propose to take after Camp David, through briefings by our Ambassador.

Other Middle Eastern States

There are also a number of other countries in the Middle East whose support will be valuable and with which we want to keep in close touch. These are:

- Iran: the Shah is close to Israel, Jordan, and Egypt and could play a role in persuading Jordan to join negotiations.

- The Persian Gulf States: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, Oman are important for their financial support for Egypt.
- Yemen Arab Republic

- Tunisia: potentially part of a moderate Arab coalition.

- Algeria: will not support our approach now but we want to stay close since we will want at least neutrality if the day comes when we are trying to get Syria into the talks.

- Morocco: eager to build a moderate Arab coalition in support of Sadat; close to the Palestinians; relations with some Israelis.

Possible Actions

-- Seek a statement of support for Sadat's acceptance of the President's Camp David initiative (from all except Algeria).

-- Give our Ambassadors instructions to brief Heads of Government/Foreign Ministers shortly before the Summit to create realistic expectations and begin to influence post-Summit reaction.

States Outside the Middle East

There are quite a number of states outside the Middle East whose sympathy and/or support we want to cultivate. There are, principally, our NATO allies and the EC-9, and our major friends in Asia, Africa and Latin America. These were the addressees of the President's initial letter.

Possible Actions

-- Seek a statement of support for Camp David from those states deemed most likely to respond positively to a request from us.

-- Keep all informed of our general thinking through
instructions to our Ambassadors so as to provide a realistic base for expectations about the outcome and build bases for support of our position afterward.

-- EC-9 Ministerial meeting in mid-September may want to make bilateral approaches or a statement.
FALL-BACK OPTIONS
SHOULD CAMP DAVID PRODUCE A DEADLOCK

This paper presents a very brief summary of the fall-back options available to us should the Camp David talks produce a deadlock. We will be developing it further before the Summit.

One thing should be clear from the outset—the causes of the deadlock, as perceived by key audiences, will determine to a large degree the ability of the U.S. to continue to play a credible role in negotiations under any fall-back formula.

We can foresee four major types of deadlock:

1) Israel accepts a U.S. proposal but Egypt rejects it.

2) Both sides reject a U.S. proposal, the withdrawal language of which has been watered down to appeal to Israel.

3) Both sides reject a U.S. proposal that has fairly clear language on withdrawal.

4) Egypt accepts a U.S. proposal, but Israel rejects it.

In the first two cases, the prospects that Egypt and key moderate Arab states will be willing to continue to take their lead from the U.S. will be highly problematical. The third case is unlikely if Sadat is negotiating seriously and, should it occur, it might be assumed that Sadat is hoping to be "coaxed" for appearances sake and can be brought around before the process begins to unravel. The fourth case seems the most likely outcome at Camp David. In this case, the dual challenge in any follow-on action will be to assure domestic support in the U.S. The key to both of these lies in the reasonableness of our position and in the method by which we present it, as well as in the particular course we choose to follow following the Summit.
The following procedural options are worthy of consideration:

1. **Do nothing for a period of time.**

   If (a) lack of agreement clearly derives from Israel’s inability to accept the principle of West Bank withdrawal and (b) our proposal appears reasonable in other respects, the Begin government could come under intense political pressure following Camp David to revise its position or be removed. If the issue were sufficiently clearly defined, the U.S. could refrain from pointing an accusatory finger, and this would help the process in Israel.

   The timing, however, makes this course risky. With the UNGA convening shortly after the Summit ends, the pressure on Sadat from some Arab quarters to admit the failure of his initiative will be great. We will be in the position of asking Sadat (and the Saudis) to resist these pressures without being able to guarantee that either the Israeli position or the personalities will change. If our proposal has been received well by the key Arab states, this will help, but it may not be sufficient.

2. **Return to quiet mediation.**

   This would probably be the Israeli preference, as it would constitute a return to "business as usual" with essential positions still intact. This course would also receive the support of the American public, although there would be no great expectations of success and there would be concern about the consequences on the Arab side.

   It is highly unlikely, however, that Sadat will agree to this. If he were personally willing, it is doubtful if he could retain Saudi support for a return to the pre-summit approach. Most importantly, with the UNGA convening, it is likely that any quiet mediation efforts would be drowned out by the din from New York. If nothing else, the UNGA provides Sadat’s Arab critics with the ideal vehicle to force Egypt to choose between Arab solidarity and the maintenance of an atmosphere conducive to further negotiations.

Because of the timing, the UN cannot be avoided completely. The question is whether any virtue can be made of the necessity. If, after a period of our "doing nothing", Israel seems ready to move on one or more major outstanding issues and is able to make its willingness credible, New York could provide a venue in which explorations could proceed. Even this possibility is complicated, however, by the probability that Kamel would be the Egyptian involved.

Moving into a United Nations format per se would probably lead to a renewed polarization of the issues, with Egypt sorely tempted to seize the occasion to rejoin the Arab consensus, risking the isolation of the U.S. from even the moderate Arab states. (NOTE: Since this is an option well within the ability of Egypt to pursue unilaterally, we will have to plan our strategy for the UN very carefully and with a view to the peace process, whatever our own preferences.)

4. Resume road to Geneva.

This is the road we left last November, but returning to it could be a sobering experience. Our very success in bringing the parties to discuss the core issues has laid bare the Israeli positions on West Bank withdrawal and on Palestinian self-determination. In the absence of some give in Israel's position on these issues, therefore, Geneva can be expected to be even harder to reconstruct than was the case a year ago.

Substantive Fall-Back Options

Partial Agreements

Sadat will come under intensive pressure to reject any "permanent partial agreement" that appears to be a rejection of the concept of a comprehensive agreement. In order to avoid a complete stalemate, however, he might be brought to consider an agreement containing the following elements:

-- Return of enough of the Sinai to make the deal palatable in purely Egyptian terms to Sadat's armed forces, i.e., Israeli withdrawal at least to the el-Arish-Ras Muhammad line.
-- An Israeli commitment to resolve the final status of the West Bank and Gaza by the end of a five-year period.

-- An Israeli commitment to introduce self-rule for the West Bank and Gaza along the lines of the current Israeli proposal as modified by the U.S. to enhance the authority of the governing council.

In return for this, Sadat might be willing to:

-- formally end the state of belligerency, and

-- give concrete expression to normalization of relations by allowing Israeli flagships to transit the Suez Canal.

Of crucial importance in such a deal will be the question of whether a meaningful West Bank leadership (for example, the incumbent mayors) will be willing to assume responsibilities under a modified self-rule plan. This implies, in turn, that it will be sufficiently attractive to those leaders that they will have an inducement either to seek PLO acquiescence or to defy the PLO if it opposes the scheme. For this reason, the plan as it now stands must be modified and the initiative for the modification must be seen to come from a party other than Israel.

The argument will be made that such an agreement will be insufficient to induce Jordan to enter negotiations. It should be noted, however, that, if self-rule is to be attractive enough to entice the West Bank leaders to participate, it must include the removal of all vestiges of Israeli participation in the administration of the territory. In that case, the West Bankers will undoubtedly turn to Amman for assistance in running the various departments. Jordan would therefore become a partner to the process in practical terms, without having to take on the burdens of negotiators.

"Magnanimous Gestures"

It is difficult to imagine any gesture that Israel would realistically make that -- in and of itself --
would be sufficient to keep Sadat on his current course should Camp David end in a deadlock. Should it threaten to deprive Sadat of his public relations advantage in this country, however, it could make him more amenable to acceptance of a partial agreement containing the elements listed above.
1. A self-rule arrangement would be established for a transitional five-year period.

2. Authority for this interim arrangement will derive from agreement among Israel, Jordan, and Egypt. The agreement will be negotiated among representatives of these states and of the Palestinians (from the West Bank and Gaza).

3. The agreement will provide for self-rule by an authority freely elected by the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. The agreement would define the responsibilities of that authority.

4. Neither Israel nor Jordan will assert their claims to sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza during the five-year period.

5. Israeli forces would withdraw to limited and specified encampments.

6. During the five-year period, in order to implement UN Resolution 242 negotiations will be conducted and agreement will be reached among the West Bank/Gaza authority, Israel, Jordan, and Egypt on Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967, on secure and recognized final boundaries, including possible modifications in
the 1967 lines, on the security arrangements which will accompany Israel's final withdrawal, and on the long-term relationship of the West Bank and Gaza to Israel and Jordan.

7. The agreement negotiated by the parties would come into effect by expressed consent of the governed to the substance of the agreement.

8. During the interim period the negotiating parties will constitute a continuing committee to reach agreements on:
   a. Issues arising under the agreement regarding the conduct of the interim regime, not resolvable by the West Bank/Gaza authority;
   b. The introduction of UN or Jordanian military presence on the West Bank and Gaza;
   c. Provision for an economically practicable level of resettlement in the West Bank and Gaza of Palestinian refugees;
   d. Reciprocal rights of residents in Israel and the territories for Palestinian Arabs and Israelis, and for land purchases with Israeli citizens and West Bank/Gaza residents entitled to buy land either in the West Bank/Gaza or in Israel.
9. A regional economic development plan would be launched, including Jordan, the West Bank/Gaza authority, Israel and Egypt.