

Constitutional Referendum and Early Parliamentary Elections in Tunisia July 2022–January 2023

Final Report



THE
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Map of Tunisia



| Foreword

The July 2022 constitutional referendum and December 2022 parliamentary elections were both held in a tense and uncertain political atmosphere, reinforcing concerns about Tunisia's continued commitment to democracy. This environment resulted from President Kaïs Saïed's unilateral actions since July 25, 2021, when he declared an emergency under Article 80 of the 2014 constitution, suspended parliament, and effectively placed the country under one-man rule. The lack of a constitutional court left no mechanism to determine the legality of President Saïed's actions, allowing him to interpret and implement constitutional provisions as he saw fit. These actions and others by the president effectively rolled back Tunisia's extensive strides toward democracy since the 2011 Jasmine Revolution, including the adoption of the 2014 constitution by a democratically elected National Constituent Assembly, the creation of an independent election commission, and the establishment of a new legal framework governing democratic elections, and returned the once shining star of the Arab Spring into an authoritarian state.

The president justified his actions since July 25, 2021, as a response to the failure of parliament to address the social and economic issues that have plagued the country since the 2011 revolution. He demonized those who opposed his changes and targeted various state institutions and the media, undermining the structures that underpin a genuinely democratic state. Although it may be true that the parties and parliament failed to adequately address the aspirations of the Tunisian people, the solution is not unilateral action by one person.

Unlike the inclusive processes that followed the Jasmine Revolution and led to the 2014 constitution, the closely controlled process that produced the new constitution in 2022, and the elections later held under it, lacked broad-based participation and consensus.

Democratic standards mandate that drafting or amending a constitution—the fundamental legal document in any democracy—should be inclusive and transparent and involve genuine debate to reach as broad a consensus as possible among all stakeholders. Such a process typically takes a year or more. The lack of an inclusive, transparent process for drafting the new Tunisian constitution violated international standards and norms for creating and amending constitutions. In the absence of this process, the resulting document lacks the legitimacy and sound legal basis required to be a democratic constitution, regardless of its content.

With great concerns about the lack of inclusion and genuine participation in the drafting of the new constitution and about key provisions in the draft that weakened the parliament's ability to serve as a check on the powers of the executive branch, The Carter Center decided to deploy a small expert team to assess the constitutional referendum held in July 2022. Approximately 30% of registered voters—less than a third—cast a ballot in the July 2022 referendum. Political parties active in Tunisia since the 2011 revolution actively boycotted the referendum, and the resulting vote was overwhelmingly in favor of its passage. Nearly 95% (2,607,884 individuals) voted in favor of the constitutional amendments, and about 5% (148,723 individuals) voted against.

After the new constitution was approved, the first round of parliamentary elections was scheduled for December 2022. Although The Carter Center assessed that the process surrounding the referendum and the lead-up to the parliamentary elections was deeply flawed and lacked legitimacy, the Center nonetheless decided to deploy a full observation mission for the parliamentary elections. The decision was based on the recognition of the Center's long history in Tunisia, and the clear preferences of key Tunisian stakeholders, including domestic observer groups, other international organizations, and political parties, all of whom urged the Center to deploy a mission to assess and document the overall process and provide recommendations that could help support the country's imperiled democratic institutions.

The elections lacked a competitive campaign environment, as the major political parties that were involved in governing the country from 2012 to 2022 boycotted the parliamentary polls.

The elections lacked a competitive campaign environment, as the major political parties that were involved in governing the country from 2012 to 2022 boycotted the parliamentary polls. Turnout for the two rounds of voting was historically low, with a mere 11% voter participation, further undermining the overall legitimacy of the process and Tunisia's relatively new institutions. The Center did not conduct a comprehensive observation for the second round held on Jan. 29, deploying only long-term observers and the core team on election day.

The low turnout in the constitutional referendum and legislative elections underscores the deep disillusionment felt by the Tunisian people toward the country's prevailing political and economic conditions and calls into question the legitimacy of the newly elected parliament. The low

level of participation in both processes also signals a failure on the part of the president to achieve national unity through his recommended roadmap or to garner majority support for it from the Tunisian populace.¹

Among the core tenets of democracy are open discussion and compromise to reach as broad and inclusive a consensus as possible, especially on issues and laws regarding electoral systems.

Since the parliamentary elections, the president has used increasingly strong tactics to punish anyone who opposes his political agenda. Since February 2023, more than 30 people have been arrested, many of whom were detained for long periods on vague charges of "plotting against state security." As of this report's publication, many remain in detention, without access to adequate legal counsel. In this tense environment, civil society organizations and the media are under increasing pressure to self-censure to avoid political repercussions. The president says he intends to restore representative democracy, but his actions do not match his rhetoric.

Some members of the newly elected parliament have expressed a desire to implement a reform agenda, while others have indicated that they will wait for the president to set the agenda before taking any action. In public comments, President Saïed has emphasized the importance of parliamentary oversight and the accountability of its members, while also indicating that the parliament should act according to his plan. The speaker of the parliament initially made conflicting statements on how independent the institution will be. So far, he and the parliament are closely hewing to the president's wishes, and no real opposition bloc has emerged. Parliamentarians have made no progress on the regularization of constitutional bodies such as the Independent High Authority for Elections (ISIE) and the Independent High Authority for Audiovisual Communication (HAICA) or the formation of the constitutional court, nor do they appear to be priorities.

¹ The roadmap included holding an online national consultation, followed by a constitutional referendum on July 25, 2022. The draft constitution was to be crafted by a committee of experts chosen by the president based on the results of an online public consultation. Early parliamentary elections were proposed for Dec. 17, 2022, with a possible second round to be held in January 2023 under a new electoral system with a uninominal (one member per district) majority-based system, in two rounds of voting.

The flawed process the president has imposed for drafting the constitution and changing the electoral system, combined with the low voter turnout, reinforces the need for Tunisia's leaders, especially the president, to change course to address the country's complex economic and social issues. Most importantly, they must reject increasing authoritarianism and return the country to a constitutional democracy. Solutions should result from a genuinely inclusive national dialogue that includes the voices of all stakeholders and reflects the views of all Tunisians.

The Carter Center recommends that such a dialogue establish a roadmap to return the country to the democratic path it embarked on after the Jasmine Revolution. To reinstate the necessary system of checks and balances and re-establish the balance of power between the executive, parliamentary, and judiciary branches, the parliament should establish the constitutional court and appoint its members immediately. All decree-laws issued by the president since July 25, 2021, should be reviewed during the national dialogue for compliance with international standards and commitments, and,

based on the recommendations adopted by national dialogue participants, the relevant parliamentary committees should review the laws and amendments should be adopted accordingly. Legislation establishing the ISIE and the HAICA needs to be urgently passed to re-establish the independence of these bodies and remove any doubt about the legitimacy of future elections. New members should be appointed to these bodies to fill long-overdue vacancies and remove any perception of biases. A thorough review of the electoral system should be conducted to reach a national consensus, inclusive of political parties and civil society, on which system is best for the Tunisian people and would facilitate effective national policymaking to address the country's critical economic and social issues. The reform process that began after the establishment of the 2014 constitution should be continued and strengthened to include reform of the public administration and security sector, as well as revising restrictive legislation dating back to the Ben Ali era.

This reform process will require genuine dialogue and consensus among stakeholders, including the president.

I Executive Summary

The Carter Center deployed an expert election observation mission for the July 25, 2022, referendum and a comprehensive observer mission to assess the December 2022 elections. A mission

director, electoral/political analyst, legal analyst, and gender and participatory rights analyst, along with national experts, began their observation in Tunisia on July 13. The experts were accredited by

Ronald Borden



Short-term observers Marwah Alshaybani of Libya (left) and Emma Kaliya of Malawi (right) use the Center's ELMO technology to assess electoral processes in a polling station during the parliamentary elections.

the Independent High Authority for Elections (ISIE) and worked in accordance with the 2005 Declaration of Principles for International Observation.

Even though the Center believed the process leading up to the referendum and legislative elections was flawed and illegitimate, it made the decision to observe both processes, based on its long history of observing elections in Tunisia, conversations with stakeholders including domestic observer groups, other international organizations, and political parties, all of whom urged the Center to observe to document the process. Their concerns were that if no international observers were present, the chances of electoral fraud would increase, and the Center's reputation would lend credibility to the observation of national citizen observation groups. The Center also felt that it would be well placed to provide a thorough assessment not only of the electoral process but also of the illegitimate actions of the president that preceded the referendum and election. The Center also wanted to create a record of the electoral process and make recommendations for reform at a future time when democratic norms are restored.

Because of the mission's limited size and scope, the team was unable to assess the full electoral process for the July referendum and did not conduct a robust assessment of its voting, counting, and tabulation processes. Instead, observers focused on several key aspects of the electoral process, including the legal and electoral framework; the effectiveness and transparency of electoral preparations; the campaign environment, including freedom of the media; respect for core participatory rights; and the postelectoral environment, including electoral dispute resolution.

Turnout for the referendum was approximately 30% of all registered voters, with 94.6% voting in favor and 5.4% against. The Center did not issue any public statement after the referendum results were announced.

In advance of the 2022 parliamentary elections, The Carter Center expanded its mission. A core team of experts, based in Tunis, consisted of a multi-national staff, including a country representative/mission director, security expert and operations manager, legal analyst, electoral analyst, observer

coordinator, social media monitoring, and gender participatory rights experts. The Center's core team was complemented by the deployment of 14 long-term observers (LTOs) in late October to monitor preparations in Tunisia's 27 electoral constituencies. Several highly qualified national staff provided technical and operational support to the mission.

Turnout for the referendum was approximately 30% of all registered voters with 94.6% voting in favor and 5.4% against.

For the first round of the, parliamentary election, the Center deployed 60 short-term observers (STOs), who visited 308 unique polling stations and all in-country tabulation centers. The observers included representatives from 26 countries, including several from the Middle East and North Africa. The Center presented its preliminary findings on the parliamentary election at a press conference on Dec. 20, 2022.

The historically low voter turnout in the first round called into question the overall legitimacy of the election itself. Therefore, for the second round, held on Jan. 29, the Center did not conduct a comprehensive observation, deploying only LTOs and the core team on election day. The Center released a statement on Feb. 1, 2023, about the political situation and recommendations.

For both the referendum and parliamentary elections, the Center assessed the electoral processes against the national legal framework and the principles and obligations for democratic elections and referendums enshrined in regional and international instruments that Tunisia has ratified.

Legal Framework

President Kaïs Saïed issued decree-laws that significantly changed the legal framework for elections and referendums in the months leading up to these electoral processes. These changes negatively impacted the ability of voters and candidates to fully understand the legal changes to electoral processes and their implications.

Prior to 2022, Tunisia's legal framework for a referendum consisted of only five articles in the electoral law. This was recognized as inadequate. Presidential decrees amending the legal framework did not significantly improve it and left the ISIE with a limited and fragmented legal framework on which to base the organization of the July 2022 referendum.

The management of both the referendum and parliamentary elections posed a challenge for the ISIE because the legal framework for both electoral processes was announced by presidential decree too late to allow for a robust voter education campaign.

International best practices suggest that the criteria governing one's eligibility to participate in a referendum campaign should be set by law, not created *ad hoc* for a specific referendum. The amendment of the electoral law decreed by the president added several articles related to participation in the referendum campaign. Under the new law, the ISIE has the authority to determine who could campaign for or against the referendum. Those wishing to campaign announced their intention by filing a declaration with the ISIE, which subsequently issued a decision setting the conditions and procedures for participation in the referendum campaign.

The president amended the electoral law twice in 2022 by decree-law. On June 1, changes were made to the referendum framework, and in September—only three months before the election—the president made significant changes to the framework for the parliamentary elections. These changes included shifting the electoral system from a closed proportional list system to a majoritarian single-candidate district system with a second round if no candidate achieved an absolute majority in the first round. The September amendments also imposed new restrictions on the right to stand as a candidate in the parliamentary elections. It strengthened some existing conditions (e.g., requiring Tunisian nationality and proof of tax payment) and added new conditions (having residency in

the electoral district, a clean criminal record, and collecting 400 endorsements).

The amendments to the electoral law significantly affected the electoral process and did not provide stakeholders with sufficient time to clearly understand the new rules, particularly for voters and candidates who had to adjust to a new electoral system and new electoral districts.

Boundary Delimitation

New boundaries for the parliamentary elections were set by presidential decree, without any consultation with stakeholders, one month before the opening of the candidate nomination period on Sept. 15, 2022. Announcing the redistricting so close to an election reduced the time stakeholders had to properly prepare for the election and violated international good practices.

Of the 161 new single-member constituencies, 151 were located within Tunisia and 10 were assigned to overseas districts. According to international best practice, deviations in size from district to district should not exceed 10% in general and 15% in special circumstances to ensure equality of the vote.

According to official population figures from January 2022, Tunisia's total population was 11,859,238. Thus, ideally, there would be one deputy for every 78,538 inhabitants. If one considers the number of registered voters from the voters list for the referendum, each district should have approximately 59,000 voters. Under the newly drawn districts for the parliamentary elections, Carter Center analysis showed that 90 of the 151 in-country districts exceed the 10% deviation.

Election Management

The management of both the referendum and parliamentary elections posed a challenge for the ISIE because the legal framework for both electoral processes was announced by presidential decree too late to allow for a robust voter education campaign. Voters were not sufficiently educated about their choices or encouraged to participate. The referendum process was negatively affected by the late appointment by the president of a new ISIE board after the former board was dismissed by presidential decree.

The new ISIE board members' appointments raised questions as to their independence and neutrality. Political parties and civil society organizations (CSOs) criticized the president's exclusive authority to appoint ISIE members because it raised the perception that the new board was reacting to and executing the president's decisions rather than acting as an independent body, as designed in the constitution.

The delayed publication of the electoral law amendments impacted the ability of all stakeholders involved in the parliamentary elections to prepare. Despite this, the ISIE ensured that the election proceeded smoothly without significant irregularities in all constituencies within the country.

Throughout the referendum and electoral processes, the ISIE's communication with the public and stakeholders lacked clarity, including about procedures for deciding on referendum participants, the publication of the preliminary results of the referendum, and whether the newly amended electoral law allowed for political parties to engage in the parliamentary elections.

According to Carter Center LTO observations, the overall performance of the regional electoral offices was positive; their members understood the electoral process, and, in many cases, they had previous experience conducting elections.

Voter Registration

In Tunisia, the ISIE maintains the voter registry. It is mandated to keep a precise, transparent, complete, and updated voter registry. At the request of the ISIE, the president issued a decree amending the electoral law to allow for passive registration of all Tunisians 18 and older. After the passive registration was completed, a total of 9,278,541 citizens were registered, representing an increase of 26% (2,335,238). Overall, the final voter registry contained 4,682,642 women, accounting for 50.5% of the registered voters, and 4,595,899 men.

Voter Education

Unlike in previous elections, the ISIE did not coordinate or actively involve CSOs in voter education outreach efforts. Their lack of involvement reduced voter outreach. Voter education is an important step in the electoral process and was especially needed in

this context because of the new electoral system and newly assigned polling stations.

Candidate/Participant Registration Referendum

All political parties, associations, coalitions, and individuals who registered with the ISIE were eligible to participate in the referendum campaign. From a positive perspective, the ISIE announced that although boycotting the referendum was not an officially recognized position, people and political parties were free to express their views. The ISIE published the final list of registered participants in the referendum campaign on July 5. Out of a total of 148 participants, 141 registered to campaign in favor of the passage of the constitutional referendum and seven were against its passage.

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The draft constitution was published on June 30, less than one month before the referendum. On July 8, after criticism of some provisions and the imprecise or inaccurate use of language, the president issued amendments. As a result, the ISIE decided to extend its registration period to provide participants an opportunity to revise their positions. The late publication of the draft and the amendments left little time for a comprehensive voter education campaign, turning the referendum into more of a plebiscite on the president's popularity than an informed choice to adopt a new constitution.

Parliament

Candidates for parliament were newly required to collect endorsements from 400 registered voters (200 men and 200 women) in their constituencies. Of these, 25% needed to be under the age of 35. This

requirement proved to be difficult and discouraged many people—especially women, youth, and people with disabilities—from being candidates. Each signature also had to be verified at a municipal, delegation, or Independent Regional Authorities for Elections (IRIE) office. There were allegations that some candidates either paid voters to endorse their candidacy or used voters' information without their permission.

The ISIE announced the final list of 1,055 accepted candidates on Nov. 22, 2022. The vast majority of candidates (88.4% or 933) were men; only 11.6% of the candidates (122) were female; young people (ages 23-30) represented only 4% of the candidates. The uninominal electoral system—with only one member elected from each district—encouraged novices to the political and electoral environment to run in the parliamentary

elections, although many former members of parliament (MPs) or elected municipal officials also registered as candidates. A considerable number of candidates worked in the education sector as teachers, professors, or other positions; additionally, some candidates came from the business sector. Several candidates were affiliated with unions, especially the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT).

Campaign Referendum

All major parties that had been prominent in Tunisia since the 2011 Jasmine Revolution boycotted both the referendum and the parliamentary elections. Given the low levels of campaign financing and a lack of clarity on the ability of political parties to stump for candidates in the

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A Tunisian man drops off his ballot on election day. Tunisia's constitution guarantees the right to vote to all citizens 18 or older who are not subject to any electoral law restrictions.

parliamentary election, both campaigns were subdued. Electoral events failed to capture the interest of voters across the country, especially the parliamentary elections. Because of the late changes to the electoral system and the negative perception of political parties, most candidates ran without any party affiliation, which also reduced the campaign's overall visibility.

The referendum campaign began on July 5 and was quiet throughout the country, with low visibility until the final two days, when those boycotting the process held demonstrations in downtown Tunis. Supporters of the draft constitution did not organize large demonstrations, but instead relied on small public gatherings, posters, and billboards. Those in favor of the draft constitution urged people to vote yes as a show of support for the president and to avoid a return to the hard times before July 25, 2021. Those opposed to the draft focused on raising awareness of the perceived threats the draft constitution posed to the country, especially the return of one-man rule and the illegality of the president's actions since July 25, 2021.

ISIE campaign monitors observed several noteworthy irregularities during the campaign. However, according to reports from CSOs, these irregularities did not have a significant impact on the referendum results or hinder the voting rights of citizens.

Parliamentary Election

The parliamentary campaign did not generate voter interest and was largely absent in many constituencies. Instead of organizing large campaign events, most candidates opted to engage directly with voters through small gatherings at coffee shops and markets, distributing flyers to promote their candidacies. The lack of party involvement, low campaign spending limits, and the absence of public funding contributed to a low level of campaigning; this change was particularly striking when compared with previous electoral cycles.

Manipulative content was widespread in the messages analyzed by the Carter Center's social media monitors. This was followed by the dissemination of partial or misleading information and the promotion of conspiracy theories. A significant amount of manipulative information spread widely, indicating some level of coordination among

Facebook page networks sharing similar content within short timeframes.

Networks also relied on pages owned by legitimate individuals and pages sharing the same administrators to amplify their reach; imposter pages posing as media to deceive users; and pages with administrators located abroad. Such practices compromised the ability of voters to form independent or reasoned opinions, contrary to international standards.

The lack of party involvement, low campaign spending limits, and the absence of public funding contributed to a low level of campaigning; this change was particularly striking when compared with previous electoral cycles.

CSOs observed all aspects of the electoral process. Several observation organizations collaborated to share observation tasks and information.

Voting and Counting

The voting and counting process for the referendum and parliamentary elections were conducted without major issues, mostly because of the historic low turnout.

The Center did not conduct a comprehensive observation of voting and counting on referendum day and did not deploy short- or long-term observers. A total of 5,000 citizen observers and 124 international observers were accredited by the ISIE to assess the referendum. The number of citizen observers was much lower than in previous elections in Tunisia. Citizen observer groups attributed the decrease to the compressed timeframe for the referendum, the decree-laws amending the electoral code, and a lack of funding.

For the first round of the parliamentary elections, the Center deployed a full election observation mission with 60 short-term observers. Election day was very quiet. There were no queues in front of the polling stations, and voters were scarce, especially women and youth. Polling staff were present and followed regulations, and voters were able to cast a secret ballot. However, some staff were not

forthcoming in providing information to observers. The environment inside and outside polling centers was calm, without major irregularities observed or reported.

Due to the historically low turnout on Dec. 17—only 11% of registered voters—the Center determined not to conduct a full observation mission for the second round held on Jan. 29. The core team and LTOs conducted informal observation.

Election Disputes

Overall, considering the shortened deadlines, the court handled the election disputes in an orderly manner while still giving complainants the opportunity to be heard. However, tight deadlines proved challenging for appellants to gather the necessary evidence to present in court. The reduced time-frame also made it difficult for candidates to follow court procedures for submitting applications and notifying the opposing party.

| The Carter Center in Tunisia

The Carter Center opened its offices in Tunisia in March 2011, shortly after the ouster of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. The Center initially focused its activities on the 2011 elections for a National Constituent Assembly. The country's election management body, the ISIE, invited the Center to observe the polls and issued accreditation to our observer team, which was composed of five core team members, 10 long-term observers and 42

short-term observers. Former First Lady Rosalynn Carter and former Mauritius President Cassam Uteem co-led the delegation of STOs during the October elections.²

After the elections, the Carter Center remained in Tunisia to follow the constitutional drafting process and developments related to establishing institutional and legal frameworks for subsequent elections. The Center assessed these processes



The Carter Center election observation delegation assembles before their deployment. Since 2011, the Center has implemented a wide variety of programming in Tunisia.

² https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_reports/tunisia-final-oct2011.pdf

against Tunisia's national laws and international treaty obligations and issued frequent public recommendations throughout the drafting period from 2012 until the adoption of the 2014 constitution to help bring Tunisia's constitution and electoral legislation into greater alignment with its international obligations for civil and political rights.³

Elections were held in 2014 to choose the country's first post-revolution president and parliament under the new constitution. The Center again deployed an international observer mission, monitoring the parliamentary elections held in October and presidential elections held in November and December. Despite minor irregularities and down-to-the-wire preparations, the mission found that both the parliamentary and presidential elections were calm, orderly, and transparent.⁴

Two key Carter Center recommendations were adopted for the subsequent municipal elections: granting the right of suffrage for military and security forces in municipal elections to promote universal franchise and amending the electoral law to help promote women's representation through the candidate list nomination process, thus helping to support the constitution's aspirational goals for gender equity.

In the inter-election period, the Center strengthened its partnerships with CSOs, including programming to promote key electoral reforms. The Center and its partners issued joint recommendations on implementing legislation for the municipal elections, putting forward seven recommendations, of which three were adopted. Parliament also adopted other Carter Center recommendations, including a decentralization law, before the municipal elections.

In anticipation of the municipal elections, the Center provided technical assistance to domestic CSOs to professionalize their capacity to conduct long-term election observations through training on long-term election methodology and adult training techniques, providing technical assistance on the

use of ELMO, an open-source data gathering tool developed by the Center, and training on assessing election dispute resolution. The ELMO software allows observers to submit real-time evaluations of an electoral process to mission headquarters using checklists. The open-source software enables mission staff to consolidate and analyze observer reports and quickly generate assessments.

The Center's research before and after the municipal elections offered in-depth insight into the electoral behavior of women and youth. The Center formulated recommendations for all relevant stakeholders, releasing them in December 2018 to inform the ISIE's voter registration campaign in June 2019. These recommendations also were shared with political parties and CSOs. International and domestic CSOs were given copies of the recommendations to inform their future voter education programming.

Throughout the inter-electoral period, the Center continued to monitor the parliament's efforts to implement the 2014 constitution, issuing periodic statements regarding important constitutional and electoral issues, including the need to establish the high judicial council and the constitutional court. Carter Center statements and recommendations often were reflected in public discourse and parliamentary debate and helped to raise public awareness about the need to act.

The Center has continued to build the capacity of CSOs. In 2018, the Center held focus groups on youth and women's participation in politics in partnership with CSOs. The Center also strengthened CSOs' capacity and shared best practices for observing municipal elections. The Center fielded an international observation mission to observe Tunisia's early presidential and legislative elections in 2019⁵ and the referendum and legislative elections in 2022/2023.⁶ Currently, the Center is conducting projects on fact-checking, lawyer training on electoral observation, and women's participation in civic life.

3 https://www.cartercenter.org/news/publications/election_reports.html#tunisia

4 https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_reports/tunisia-final-rpt-2014-elections.pdf

5 <https://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/2020/tunisia-063020.html>; https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_reports/tunisia-2019-final-report.pdf

6 https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_reports/tunisia/tunisia-prelim-statement-121922.pdf

Election Observation Methodology

Carter Center observation missions are conducted in accordance with the 2005 Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and Code of Conduct that has been endorsed by more than 50 organizations. The Center assesses elections based on a country's national laws and international obligations for democratic elections.

The objectives of the Center's observation missions in Tunisia were to provide an impartial assessment of the overall quality of the electoral and referendum processes, promote an inclusive process for all Tunisians, and demonstrate support for the country's continued democratic transition and its newly established democratic institutions.

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Short-term observers from Sudan (left to right) Malaz Elfadil Abdalla Mohamed, Elmahdi Hassan Mohamed Adam, Sawsan Jomah Mussa Maslin, and Abd Elhameed Ahmed Mohammed, before they began their observations.

The Carter Center deployed an expert election observation mission for the July 25, 2022, referendum and a comprehensive observer mission to assess the December 2022 elections. A mission director, electoral/political analyst, legal analyst, and gender and participatory rights analyst, along with national experts, began their observation in Tunis on July 13. The experts were accredited by the ISIE and worked in accordance with the 2005 Declaration of Principles for International Observation.⁷

The objectives of the Center's observation missions in Tunisia were to provide an impartial assessment of the overall quality of the electoral and referendum processes, promote an inclusive process for all Tunisians, and demonstrate support for the country's continued democratic transition and its newly established democratic institutions.

Because of the mission's limited size and scope, the team was unable to assess the full process for the July referendum and did not conduct a robust assessment of its voting, counting, and tabulation processes. Instead, observers focused on several key aspects of the referendum, including the legal and electoral framework; the effectiveness and transparency of electoral preparations; the campaign environment, including freedom of the media; respect for core participatory rights; and the post-referendum environment, including dispute resolution.

In advance of the parliamentary elections, The Carter Center expanded its mission. A core team of experts, based in Tunis, consisted of a multinational staff, including a country representative/mission director, security expert and operations manager, legal analyst, electoral analyst, observer coordinator, social media monitoring expert, and a gender and participatory rights expert. The Center's core

team was complemented by the deployment of 14 long-term observers in late October to monitor preparations in Tunisia's 151 electoral constituencies. Several highly qualified national staff members provided technical and operational support to the mission.

Long-term observers were deployed in teams of two throughout the country on Oct. 29, after receiving three days of training covering the current electoral, legal, and political environment in Tunisia, their roles and responsibilities, reporting requirements, international democratic election standards, the role of human rights in election observation, and security awareness. Teams were deployed to Sousse, Gafsa, Sfax, Beja, Tunis, Hammamet, and Medenine. Traveling from these hub locations, LTOs covered an assigned area of responsibility that consisted of three to five governorates per team.⁸ All LTOs spoke either French or Arabic, and they were deployed with translators/interpreters to support their work.

LTOs submitted weekly written reports to the core team as well as specialized reports on campaign rallies and incident reports as needed. The Center's core team and long-term observers met with election administration officials and technical staff at both the central and regional levels, political parties, independent candidates, CSOs, and other key stakeholders in the electoral process to learn about electoral preparations and to follow its progress.

The team assessed Tunisia's electoral process vis-à-vis the country's national laws and international obligations and monitored political and electoral developments during the months leading up to the polls. The LTOs had a midterm briefing in Tunis on Nov. 23 before the start of the electoral campaign. During the briefing, they received updates on the legal, political, and electoral environment. They also shared their observations from their respective areas of responsibility.

The Carter Center launched a short-term observation mission to observe the first round of the parliamentary election. The short-term observer

⁷ <https://electionstandards.cartercenter.org/at-work/collaborative-efforts-towards-standards/>

⁸ LTO1 cover Tunis 1&2, Bizerte, Manouba, and Ariana; LTO2 cover Nabeul 1&2, Zaghouan, and Ben Arous; LTO3 cover Beja, Jendouba, and El Kef; LTO4 cover Sousse, Monastir, and Kairouan; LTO5 cover Sfax 1&2, Mahdia, and Sidi Bouzid; LTO6 cover Gafsa, Kasserine, Tozeur, and Kebili; LTO7 cover Medine, Gabes, and Tataouine.

delegation was composed of civil society activists, election officials, academic experts, electoral specialists, and others. STOs received training before their deployment on the electoral, political, and security dynamics in Tunisia, as well as the Carter Center's observation methodology, the observer code of conduct, electronic data collection tools, and security protocols. Observers utilized the Center's open-source ELMO software to gather polling station data in real time.

The Center deployed 60 observers who visited 308 unique polling stations as well as all in-country tabulation centers. The mission was co-led by David Carroll, director of the Center's Democracy Program, and Sarah Johnson, associate director of

the Democracy Program. The delegation included representatives from 26 countries, including several from the Middle East and North Africa. The Center presented its preliminary findings on the parliamentary election at a press conference on Dec. 20, 2022.⁹

Because of the historically low turnout in the first round of elections and questions this raised about the election's overall legitimacy, the Center decided to deploy only long-term observers and the core team to observe the second round of parliamentary elections on Jan. 29. The Center issued a statement on Feb. 1, 2023, about the political situation and recommendations.¹⁰

⁹ <https://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/2022/tunisia-121922.html>; https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_reports/tunisia/tunisia-prelim-statement-121922.pdf

¹⁰ <https://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/2023/tunisia-020123.html>

Political Background

On July 25, 2021, President Saïed invoked Article 80 of the 2014 constitution to grant himself the power to take emergency measures to address an “imminent danger threatening the nation’s institutions or the security or independence of the country.” The “imminent danger” that he identified was the Tunisian parliament. He subsequently fired the prime minister, suspended the activity of the

parliament, and lifted the legal immunity of its members.

He deepened the political crisis on Sept. 22 by issuing Decree-Law 117, in which he suspended all parts of the constitution except its introductory chapters on fundamental rights and freedoms. The decree centralized all executive, legislative, and judicial power under the president’s control with no



A poll worker assists a voter after casting his ballot.

Timeline of key recent political events in Tunisia

July 25, 2021: President Saïed invokes Article 80 of the constitution, suspending the parliament's activity and dismissing the head of the government.

Sept. 22, 2021: President Saïed issues Decree 117 related to exceptional measures.

Sept. 29, 2021: Najla Bouden is appointed prime minister.

Dec. 13, 2021: President Saïed announces his roadmap.

Jan. 15, 2022: Launch of the national online consultation.

Feb. 5, 2022: President Saïed dissolves the High Judicial Council (CSM).

March 30, 2022: President Saïed dissolves the parliament.

May 20, 2022: President Saïed appoints the members of the High National Advisory Committee for the New Republic.

June 30, 2022: The draft constitution is published in the official gazette and then republished in a modified version on July 8.

July 25, 2022: The referendum on the new constitution is held.

Sept. 13, 2022: Decree-Law 54 combating crimes related to information and communication systems is issued.

Sept. 15, 2022: Decree-Law 55 amending the electoral law is issued.

Dec. 17, 2022: The first round of the parliamentary elections is held.

Jan. 29, 2022: The second round is held.

checks or balances, including an explicit prohibition against judicial review of his decree-laws.

In December 2021, the president announced his roadmap for reform of the constitutional and political system. The roadmap included holding a constitutional referendum on July 25, 2022. The draft constitution was to be crafted by a committee of experts chosen by the president based on the

results of an online public consultation. Early parliamentary elections were proposed for Dec. 17, 2022, with a possible second round to be held in January 2023 under a new electoral system with a uninominal (one member per district) majority-based system, in two rounds of voting.

529,078 citizens in Tunisia and 5,837 citizens residing abroad participated in the consultation, representing 8% of eligible citizens.

All opposition parties condemned the roadmap and called for continued resistance to the president, declaring the process and anticipated referendum to be without legal foundation and illegitimate.

The first step in the roadmap, the online national consultation, began on Jan. 15, 2022, and lasted until March 20, 2022. During that time, only 529,078 citizens in Tunisia and 5,837 citizens residing abroad participated in the consultation, representing 8% of eligible citizens. Of the total participants, 366,210 were men, and 168,705 were women. The highest percentage of respondents fell in the 40-49 age group (25.6%), followed by 30-39 (22.7%), and over 60 (2.3%) (See Appendix B).

Opposition parties and most CSOs urged citizens to boycott the consultation, arguing that it was not a genuine consultation but rather more of a public opinion poll, with questions developed exclusively by the government and structured to garner preconceived responses. Although the president insisted the draft of the constitution would be based on the results of the national consultation, many questions related to issues generally addressed in legislation, not in a constitution. This was reflected in the categories of questions asked in the consultation: political and electoral affairs, economic affairs, social affairs, sustainable development, life quality, education, and culture. After the release of the consultation results, there were no public announcements or reports on how the results would be used or incorporated into the draft constitution.

The president declared on March 29 that any session of parliament was illegal based on his prior decree suspending its activities. On March 30, 2022, the president dissolved parliament after MPs

organized their first session since the suspension of their activities in July 2021. The online session, attended by 124 out of 217 MPs, voted to cancel the exceptional measures that the president had imposed since July 25, 2021, and to repeal all the decrees he issued since that time.¹¹

The 2022 draft constitution mirrors many of the fundamental freedoms and individual rights contained in the 2014 constitution.

The president described the virtual plenary session as a “failed coup attempt” and a “plot against the internal and external security of the State.” He decided to dissolve the parliament based on Article 72 of the constitution “to preserve the State and its institutions and, by the same token, to protect the Tunisian people.” He declared the plenary devoid of any legitimacy and instructed the minister of justice to open judicial investigations into the MPs who attended the session and to prosecute anyone involved for threatening the security of the state.

Article 72 states, “The President of the Republic is the Head of State and the symbol of its unity. He guarantees its independence and continuity and ensures respect of the Constitution.” There is nothing that explicitly gives the president the authority to dissolve parliament. Under the 2014 constitution, the president had the power to dissolve parliament under Article 89; however, it did not apply to this situation.¹² Several law professors criticized the president for applying articles of the constitution as he saw fit and ignoring others, using the document in an a la carte manner and relying on the fact that no constitutional court had been established to review his actions.

On May 20, the president issued a decree formally appointing the members of the High National Advisory Committee for the New Republic, who were mandated with producing a draft constitution by June 20. The president appointed Sadok Belaïd, a retired law school dean,

as its coordinator. Most deans of law and political sciences, who were supposed to compose the Legal Advisory Subcommittee, refused to participate on grounds of conflict of interest. All opposition parties rejected the committees and called for continued resistance to the president, declaring the process and referendum to be without legal foundation and illegitimate. Tunisia’s largest labor union, the UGTT, categorically rejected the presidential decree and said it would not participate unless all stakeholders were invited to participate.

The High National Advisory Committee for the New Republic submitted a draft constitution to the president by the June 20 deadline, which was publicly released on June 30. The president subsequently released an amended version on July 8, 2022, addressing criticism of some provisions, clarifying others, and fixing grammatical errors. The coordinator of the committee and several members of the Advisory Committee stated publicly that the version of the constitution released by the president was not the version they had submitted to him on June 20 and that it had been substantially changed.

The 2022 draft constitution mirrors many of the fundamental freedoms and individual rights contained in the 2014 constitution. It includes references to economic and social rights for children and the elderly, which were not mentioned in the earlier document. It also maintains provisions for strengthening women’s rights and calls for parity in elected bodies. However, the draft lacks adequate detail in some provisions and will require a potentially problematic amount of interpretation by the constitutional court, once created, before it can be implemented. In addition, the revised political system adopted in the 2022 constitution significantly weakens the authority of the parliament to be a check on the government and executive branches, which are placed solely in the president’s control.

The constitutional referendum took place on July 25, 2022, with most political parties boycotting. The turnout for the referendum was low, with 30.5% of registered voters participating, representing

¹¹ Of the 124 MPs present, 116 voted for the cancellation of special measures and decrees.

¹² Article 89 stipulates in Paragraph 4: “If, in the four-month period following the first designation of a person to form a government, the members of the Assembly of Representatives of the people fail to grant confidence in a government, the President of the Republic may dissolve the Assembly of the Representatives of the People and call for new legislative elections to be held within a minimum of 45 days and a maximum of 90 days.”

2,830,094 out of 9,278,541 people. The amendments passed with 94.6% approval. The referendum was seen primarily as a plebiscite on the president's actions since July 25. Given the short timeframe for publication of the draft constitution and the lack of voter education on its provisions, voters were not able to make an informed decision regarding its contents. Tunisian voters who participated in the referendum did so for several reasons, and not necessarily to answer the fundamental question posed.¹³

On Sept. 13, 2022, Decree-Law 54 was issued, combating crimes related to information and communication systems. It was criticized by many human rights activists who saw it as a threat to Tunisians' freedom of expression. Article 24 of the law includes severe penalties of imprisonment and a fine of 50,000 TND for anyone who publishes news or content containing personal data or false information with the aim of defaming or harming others, or inciting attacks on them. The penalty is doubled if the victim is a public official.

Several politicians and journalists were subsequently prosecuted under Decree-Law 54 (DL 54).¹⁴ The first arrests under the decree-law created an environment of mistrust and resulted in some CSOs' being slow to react to the situation and self-censorship by the media for fear of reprisals.

Several opposition parties and coalitions, such as the National Salvation Front centered around Ennahdha, announced a boycott of the

parliamentary elections immediately after the president released his roadmap. Others, such as The Free Destourian Party (PDL), Afek Tounes, and Attayar, decided to boycott after the electoral system was fundamentally changed by the amended election law. Of the major parties elected to the 2019 parliament, only the People's Movement announced it would participate in the elections.¹⁵

The UGTT made its position on the elections clear on Dec. 3, when its Secretary General Nouredine Taboubi said in the presence of representatives of several influential CSOs—including the Tunisian League for Human Rights (LTDH), the Bar Association, Democrat Women, the National Union of Tunisian Journalists (SNJT), and the Tunisian Forum of Economic and Social Rights (FTDES)—that the upcoming elections are “with no color and no taste, (based on) a non-consensual constitution, with a law that was not discussed, and it will open the door for more fragmentation.”

Later that month, UGTT launched a national dialogue initiative with the Bar Association, LTDH, and FTDES. The president rejected this initiative and announced that he would not participate. Three commissions were formed as part of the dialogue on political reform, economic reform, and social reform. They started their work on Jan. 27, 2023. Although it was announced that the three commissions have finished their work, the findings and recommendations have not been publicly released.

13 Sygma poll results after the referendum day presented on Watanya 1 showed that 23% voted “yes” to support KS, 17% to turn the page over the last decade, and 11% of those who voted “Yes” did so because they are against Ennahdha/Islamists/Ghannouchi.

14 People prosecuted under Decree-Law 54 include the lawyers and political activists Ayachi Hammami and Ghazi Chaouachi, former ISIE member Sami Ben Slama, political activist Chaima Issa, journalists Nizar Bahloul, Mohamed Boughalleb, and Monia Arfaoui, civil society activist Hamza Abidi, and student Ahmed Bahaeddine Hmada.

15 The National Salvation Front (NSF) is composed of several political parties (Ennahdha, Qalb Tounes, Karama Coalition, Al-Amal, Harak Tounes Al-Irada, Labor and Achievement Party) that decided to boycott the elections before the publication of the amendment of electoral law. Five political parties, Al-Joumhour, Workers Party, The Democratic Current (Attayar), Al Qotb, and Ettakatol declared that they will not participate in the upcoming legislative elections, constituting a new front of opposition to President Saïed. And Afek Tounes, announced on Sept. 22 their boycott for the legislative elections.

Legal Framework and Electoral System

Legal Framework Referendum

According to international standards and best practices, legal frameworks for elections and referendums

should be transparent and ensure democratic processes.¹⁶ By these standards, the legal framework for referendums in Tunisia contained in the 2014 electoral law was inadequate. The law consisted of only five articles, generally lacking the necessary

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Short-term observers Marwah Alshaybani (center-right) of Libya and Emma Kaliya (left) of Malawi, together with their observer assistant (center-left) and driver (right), pose in front of a polling center. The country's election management body, the High Independent Authority for Elections (ISIE), invited the Center to observe the polls and issued accreditation to the Center's observer delegation.

¹⁶ These include: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD); the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW); the Convention against Torture, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (CAT); the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR).

OSCE/ODIHR, Guidelines for Reviewing a Legal Framework for Elections, Page 4.

detail to ensure transparency and support democratic processes.¹⁷ Presidential decrees amending the legal framework did not significantly improve it, leaving the ISIE with a limited and fragmented legal framework for organizing the referendum.¹⁸

June Amendment of the ISIE Law

Impartial bodies must remain transparent, unbiased, and protected from political manipulation to organize elections successfully.¹⁹ Amendments to the ISIE law, made by presidential decree-law in advance of the electoral processes, significantly changed the appointment procedure, composition, and terms for the ISIE.²⁰ The amendments reduced the number of commissioners to seven and granted the president the exclusive authority to appoint them. These changes raised important questions about the independence and impartiality of the ISIE. (See the Election Administration section for more details.)

Amendment of the Electoral Law

According to international best practices, the legal framework for a referendum should have at least the rank of a statute and not be adopted *ad hoc* for a specific event.²¹ In this case, the 2022 constitutional referendum was governed mainly through the electoral law and the decree-law amending the electoral law. The amendments primarily introduced the automatic registration system for eligible voters and laid out the conditions to participate in the referendum campaign.²² These last-minute changes, together with the already inadequate legal framework governing the referendum process, resulted in a lack of harmony in the legal framework, especially with articles related to election dispute resolution (EDR). The lack of detail in the existing legal

framework meant that the ISIE had to issue regulations to fill in the gaps.

Best practice indicates that the draft constitution subject to the referendum must be published sufficiently in advance of a vote to allow citizens time to examine the text and decide how they will vote. In addition, an explanatory note that gives a balanced presentation, not only of the viewpoint of the executive and legislative authorities or persons putting forward the draft but also of the opposing side, should accompany the text.²³ According to Article 113 of the electoral law, the text subject to referendum should be published 60 days before the vote on the same date the president issues the decree calling the voter to the polls. However, the date was changed by presidential decree to allow the text to be published on June 30—only 24 days before the July 25 vote—and subsequently amended on July 8—just 17 days before the vote and five days *after* the referendum campaign began.

According to international standards and best practices, legal frameworks for elections and referendums should be transparent and ensure democratic processes. By these standards, the legal framework for referendums in Tunisia contained in the 2014 electoral law was inadequate.

These secondary amendments were made in response to criticism from CSOs, constitutional experts, and political parties regarding certain provisions in the draft constitution. These included concern that the president was granted the authority

¹⁷ See Articles 113-117 of the electoral law.

¹⁸ The referendum was governed by Presidential Order No. 117/2021, the Electoral Law No. 16/2014 as amended by Decree-Law No. 34/2022, the law No. 23/2012 on the Independent High Authority for Elections (ISIE) as amended by Decree-Law No. 22/2022, as well as Decree-Law No. 32/2022 containing exceptional rules for the referendum of July 25, 2022.

¹⁹ Venice Commission, Urgent Opinion on the constitutional and legislative framework on the referendum [...], Issued on May 27, 2022, Page 10. "Only transparency, impartiality and independence from political manipulation will ensure the proper administration of the electoral process, from the period preceding the elections until the end of the processing of the results."

²⁰ Decree-Law No. 22/2022

²¹ Revised Guidelines on the Holding of Referendums, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 124th online Plenary Session (Oct. 8-9, 2020), Page 11.

"Apart from rules on technical matters and detail (which may be included in regulations of the executive), rules of referendum law should have at least the rank of a statute and not be adopted *ad hoc* for a specific referendum."

²² Electoral Law 16/2014 as amended in June 2022, Articles 7 new and 116 new.

²³ Venice Commission Revised Guidelines on the Holding of Referendums adopted Oct. 8-9, 2020, 3.1. Freedom of voters to form an opinion, Page 9.

to select constitutional court judges from a pool of the most senior judges; a provision granting the state a prominent role in realizing the goals of true Islam; and the lack of a clear statement affirming the constitution's commitment to universal, free, direct, secret, fair, and transparent parliamentary elections. The amendments issued by the president addressed some of these issues, clarified others, and fixed grammatical errors in the draft.²⁴

Although the Tunisian Constitution guarantees the right to vote for all citizens who are 18 or older and who are not subject to any kind of restrictions specified in the electoral law, significant changes to the electoral law in the months leading up to the polls prevented voters and candidates from fully exercising this right.

The explanatory note was published on July 4, one day after the beginning of the referendum campaign. It did not present both sides of the issue, instead putting forward only arguments as to why the text should be adopted and urging voters to approve the draft constitution.²⁵ The ISIE, which has no authority to change the note's content, published it on its official website and social media accounts. Many interlocutors considered this a violation of the ISIE's neutrality, claiming that the explanatory note violated the electoral law because it contained a direct call to the Tunisian people to vote "yes."

It is worth noting that the legal framework for referendums sets neither turnout nor approval thresholds. Although it is not a requirement under

best practices, it is highly recommended, especially in a referendum with constitutional significance.²⁶

Parliamentary Elections

According to international best practices, an election's legal framework should be transparent and readily accessible to the public. It also should address all the components of an electoral system necessary to ensure democratic elections.²⁷ The fundamental elements of electoral law—particularly the electoral system itself, the composition of electoral commissions, and the delimitation of constituencies—should not be amended less than one year before an election.²⁸

Although the Tunisian Constitution guarantees the right to vote for all citizens who are 18 or older and who are not subject to any kind of restrictions specified in the electoral law, significant changes to the electoral law in the months leading up to the polls prevented voters and candidates from fully exercising this right. The latest electoral law amendments in September 2022 reinstated the general prohibition on military and security personnel voting in all elections—parliamentary, presidential, regional, and municipal—a restriction not in alignment with international standards.²⁹ As in previous elections, no measures were taken to facilitate the right of those in health care facilities, penitentiaries, and detention centers to vote. No mechanism exists in the law or regulations for implementing their rights, contrary to Tunisia's Constitution and international commitments.³⁰

The electoral law was amended twice in 2022 by decree-law. On June 1, changes were made to the referendum framework, and on Sept. 15—only three months before the election—significant changes were made to the framework for the parliamentary elections, including changing the electoral system

24 Presidential Order 607/2022

25 Decree-Law 32/2022 "Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 113 of the aforementioned Organic Law 16/2014 of May 26, 2014, the draft of the new Constitution of the Tunisian Republic subject of this referendum shall be published by Presidential Order, no later than June 30, 2022."

26 Venice Commission's guidelines on holding referendums, III,7 (b) "b. An approval quorum or a specific majority requirement is acceptable for referendums on matters of fundamental constitutional significance."

27 OSCE/ODIHR, Guidelines for Reviewing a Legal Framework for Elections, Page 4.

28 Venice Commission, Interpretive Declaration on the Stability of Electoral Law; CDL-AD (2005)043.

29 See ICCPR, Article 25: "Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity [...] to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections...." Also, General Comment 25, Para. 14: "The grounds for denying suffrage rights to citizens have to be objective and reasonable and must be prescribed by law."

30 Right to universal suffrage on the basis of equal treatment before the law: ICCPR, Article 25(b); African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, Article 3(3).

from a closed list system to majoritarian single-candidate districts, requiring a second round if no candidate gets an absolute majority in the first.

The September amendment also imposed new restrictions on the right to stand as a candidate in the parliamentary elections. It strengthened some existing conditions (e.g., Tunisian nationality, proof of payment of taxes) and added new conditions (residency in the electoral district, a clean criminal record, collecting 400 endorsements).

Another significant change was a provision allowing for the recall of members of parliament (MPs) through a petition if they are found to have breached the obligation of integrity or other parliamentary duties or made insufficient efforts to carry out their electoral program. Only one recall petition against the same MP can be made during their electoral mandate. The law does not provide any tangible assessment standard or criteria for recalling MPs, making the decision on the recall petition discretionary, arbitrary, and susceptible to misuse.

Following the submission of a recall petition signed by one-tenth of the registered voters in the concerned district, it is up to the ISIE to accept or reject it and inform the MP and the parliament of the decision. The ISIE's decision can be challenged in court by the MP or by those who submitted the recall petition. If the recall petition is approved, this triggers a by-election, in which the recalled MP can seek to be elected again.

Under the existing legal framework, the High Independent Authority for Audiovisual Communication (known by its French acronym HAICA) has specific jurisdiction over the monitoring of audio and visual media, even during election periods.³¹ The ISIE has jurisdiction over the monitoring of social and print media. According to Article 67 of the electoral law, the ISIE and HAICA must issue a joint decision regulating campaign activities in the media prior to any election. However, in advance of the parliamentary election, the ISIE and HAICA could not agree on the joint decision and instead issued two

separate decisions, each insisting that theirs took precedence.³²

This led to confusion for candidates and made the media reluctant to cover the electoral campaign. The HAICA filed an injunction in the administrative court declaring that legally it had the authority to regulate audio and visual media during the campaign. The court rejected the request, ruling that because both bodies had jurisdiction over media during the campaign and the HAICA had not stated any grounds for relief, there was no basis to grant the injunction.

There is nothing in the law that indicates what happens if a joint agreement is not reached. However, according to the HAICA, since it has specific jurisdiction over audio and visual media, legally, its decision should stand.

New Electoral System

The purpose of an electoral system is to translate the people's will into a representative government. International standards do not prescribe a specific electoral system.³³ However, such a fundamental aspect of the legal framework should be decided



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The team assessed Tunisia's electoral process vis-à-vis the country's national laws and international obligations and monitored political and electoral developments during the months leading up to the polls.

³¹ Chapter IV, Articles 42-46.

³² Decision 8-2018 as amended by Decision 31-2022 on determining the rules and requirements mass media need to comply with during the election and referendum campaign.

³³ U.N., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Article 25(b); United Nations Human Rights Council, General Comment 25, Para. 21.

after consultation and broad consensus among all stakeholders.

The newly adopted 2022 constitution made substantial changes to Tunisia's electoral system, providing for a bicameral system, with the parliament directly elected by citizens; and a National Council for Regions and Districts appointed by district and regional councils upon their election.³⁴ The September 2022 amendments to the electoral law established a new electoral system for electing the parliament, with 161 single-candidate electoral districts, 151 in-country, and 10 abroad. If no candidate achieves over 50% in the first round, the race is decided in a second round between the top two vote-getters two weeks after the announcement of final results.

For this election, the new boundaries were set without any consultation with stakeholders one month before the opening of the candidate nomination on Sept. 15, 2022.

In conclusion, while international standards do not prescribe a specific electoral system, they do emphasize the importance of consultation and broad consensus among all stakeholders, which did not occur during the process of adopting a new electoral system and subsequent amendments to the electoral law in Tunisia. The introduction of a bicameral system and the establishment of single-candidate electoral districts with a runoff mechanism in place reflect an effort to ensure that the people's will is effectively translated into a representative government. However, the true test of whether these changes meet international

standards for representative governance is in their implementation and the extent to which they enhance transparency, inclusivity, and the integrity of Tunisia's electoral process in practice. Monitoring and continuous evaluation will be crucial to ensure the system's adherence to these international benchmarks.

Boundary Delimitation

International and regional treaties state that democratic elections must comply with standards guaranteeing equal suffrage.³⁵ The drawing of electoral boundaries and the method of allocating votes should not distort the distribution of voters or discriminate against any group.³⁶ According to international standards, drawing electoral boundaries needs to take into account appropriate criteria such as the number of residents (including minors), and the number of registered voters in the constituency.³⁷

The last redistribution of boundaries in Tunisia took place more than 10 years ago. According to best practice, and to guarantee equal voting power, the distribution of seats should be reviewed at least every 10 years, preferably outside election periods. For this election, the new boundaries were set without any consultation with stakeholders one month before the opening of the candidate nomination on Sept. 15, 2022. The criteria used to create the new districts were never made public. Announcing the new redistricting so close to an election affects the amount of time stakeholders have to prepare for the election. Coupled with the lack of public information provided regarding this process, this creation of new electoral districts deviated from international good practices.³⁸

The new delimitation consists of 161 electoral districts, each of which has one or more

³⁴ The local and regional elections are expected to be set for late October or early November 2023.

³⁵ U.N., ICCPR, art.25; OAS, ACHR, art.23; CIS, Convention on Democratic Elections, art. 3(1)(a) U.N., UDHR, art. 21(3).

³⁶ Article 25 of the ICCPR General Comment 25, Para.21.

³⁷ The Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters of the Venice Commission (CDL-AD(2002)023rev, point I.2.2) provides that: "Equality in voting power, where the elections are not being held in one single constituency, requires constituency boundaries to be drawn in such a way that seats in the lower chambers representing the people are distributed equally among the constituencies, in accordance with a specific apportionment criterion, e.g. the number of residents in the constituency, the number of resident nationals (including minors), the number of registered electors, or possibly the number of people actually voting."

³⁸ The Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters of the Venice Commission (CDL-AD(2002)023rev, point II.2.B) provides that "The fundamental elements of electoral law, in particular the electoral system proper, membership of electoral commissions and the drawing of constituency boundaries, should not be open to amendment less than one year before an election, or should be written in the constitution or at a level higher than ordinary law."

administrative entities. Of the newly designed districts, 151 are in Tunisia and 10 represent out-of-country constituencies. According to international best practice, deviations in size from district to district should not exceed 10% in general and 15% in special circumstances to ensure equality of the vote.³⁹

According to the last official population estimate before the election from January 2022, Tunisia's total population was 11,859,238, which would make the ideal electoral quotient for one deputy approximately 78,538 inhabitants. Using the criteria of registered voters from the voter registry for the referendum, the electoral quotient for each district should be 59,037.⁴⁰

Under the newly drawn districts for the parliamentary elections, Carter Center analysis showed that 90 of the 151 in-country districts exceed the 10% deviation (See Appendix B). For example, in the governorate of Tunis, three districts are

under-represented and three over-represented.

The electoral district of La Marsa-Carthage has 127,167 inhabitants, and in the same region, the electoral district of Beb ElBhar-Sidi ElBachir has 55,732 inhabitants. A similar situation exists in the governorate of Tataouine, where the electoral district of Thahira has 14,630 inhabitants, and the electoral district of Kebili-Rejim Maatoug has 22,372 inhabitants.

The boundary delimitation for the 2022 election was not in line with international good practices, as the majority of districts do not respect the equality of the vote. In addition, the boundaries were set late in the process, not allowing stakeholders—especially voters and candidates—the time to understand the new demarcations. The parliament should review this delimitation and set new boundaries that respect equal suffrage. The process should be inclusive and transparent, with apportionment criteria that are made public.

³⁹ The Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters (CDL-AD (2002) 023rev, point 2.2.iv) says that the permissible departure from the norm should not be more than 10%, and should certainly not exceed 15% except in special circumstances (protection of a concentrated minority, sparsely populated administrative entity).

⁴⁰ According to the voter registry published by the ISIE, there were 8,914,662 registered voters in Tunisia's 151 in-country constituencies.

| Election Management

International state practice sources suggest that the impartiality of election management bodies should be ensured at all levels, from the national commission to the polling station.⁴¹ The electoral management body responsible for organizing the

elections should be impartial in performing its public function.⁴² Also, when scheduling elections, adequate time should be allowed to administer the electoral process successfully.⁴³ The ISIE is the Tunisian electoral management body in charge

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A poll worker hands a Tunisian woman her ballot on election day.

41 Venice Commission, Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters, Sec. II.3.1.b

42 AU, ACDEG, Art.17(1)

43 U.N., Human Rights and Elections, Para. 75.

of ensuring the regularity, integrity, and transparency of the electoral process and proclaiming the results.⁴⁴

While concerns arose about the appointment process of the ISIE board, casting doubt on its independence and impartiality, and the swift amendment of the electoral law left stakeholders with limited time to fully grasp the new rules, the ISIE administered the 2022 referendum and the 2022-2023 legislative elections effectively from a technical perspective, ensuring a relatively smooth process with minimal irregularities across all constituencies within the country. Although the ISIE took steps to improve its communication, further efforts could be made to increase transparency around its work.

ISIE Board Appointment

On May 9, 2022, the president appointed seven members to replace the former ISIE members elected by the parliament, according to a decree-law.⁴⁵ In addition, the president appointed the board president from among the members. The appointment of new ISIE board members by President Saïed negatively affected the referendum and parliamentary election processes, and created the perception that the board was no longer independent.⁴⁶ The new ISIE board has a four-year, nonrenewable mandate.

On June 13, 2022, ISIE board member Judge Habib Rebii resigned in reaction to a controversial presidential decision dismissing 57 judges for alleged

corruption.⁴⁷ In addition, after July 11, the ISIE board decided to send a request to the president seeking the revocation of the membership of Sami Ben Slama. The ISIE council announced that this seat was vacant after they determined that Ben Slama had missed three board meetings.⁴⁸

This left five ISIE members to organize the parliamentary election, which is the minimum number required for a quorum.⁴⁹ The president never replaced the two members. According to the new constitution, the number of ISIE members should be nine. The discrepancy between the decree-law and the 2022 constitution has not been addressed, and recently the ISIE president requested that the two members be replaced, which would bring the number up to seven, but not the constitutionally required nine.

The new appointment procedures for the ISIE called into question its independence and neutrality.⁵⁰ Political parties and CSOs criticized the fact that the president had exclusive authority to appoint ISIE members, as it creates the impression that the new ISIE board reflects and executes the president's decisions rather than operating with true independence.

ISIE Structure

The ISIE structure was established in 2014, creating its administrative, financial, and technical organization.⁵¹ The structure is made up of the board and the executive body. The executive body is composed of several departments established to implement

44 2014 Tunisian Constitution, Art. 126.

45 One judge with an experience of at least 10 years from three magistrates proposed by the Supreme Judicial Council, one judge from the administrative court with at least 10 years of experience from three magistrates proposed by the council of the administrative magistrature, one judge of the financial order, having experience of at least 10 years among three magistrates proposed by the council of the financial magistrature, and one engineer specializing in information systems and computer security, with effective experience of at least 10 years, among three engineers proposed by the National Center for Information Technology.

46 One judge with an experience of at least 10 years from three magistrates proposed by the Supreme Judicial Council, one judge from the administrative court with at least 10 years of experience from three magistrates proposed by the council of the administrative magistrature, one judge of the financial order, having experience of at least 10 years among three magistrates proposed by the council of the financial magistrature, and one engineer specializing in information systems and computer security, with effective experience of at least 10 years, among three engineers proposed by the National Center for Information Technology.

47 Presidential Decree 2022-516, dated June 1, 2022, dismissing 57 judges. Habib Rebii posted on his Facebook page that he had resigned from the ISIE board to support his fellow judges.

48 Sami Ben Slama rejected this decision and announced that he had never received notification of the board meeting that he missed as his ISIE email was blocked. On July 11, 2022, the ISIE board discussed his behavior and gave him a warning about his Facebook posts and comments, accusing him of non-adherence to the duty of professional discretion, non-conformity to professional confidentiality, and unfounded accusations made against the members of the ISIE board and against personnel of the executive administration.

49 Art.18 of Decree-Law 2022-22 of April 21, 2022

50 Venice Commission CDL-PI (2022) 026.

51 Decision 2014-6 of April 30, 2014

the ISIE board's decisions. Since establishing this structure, the ISIE has not published an organizational chart. In addition, the relationship between the ISIE board and the executive body, especially following the amendment of the ISIE law, is unclear. The lack of transparency from the ISIE concerning its internal structure hinders the ability of both national and international observers to analyze the effectiveness of ISIE work and the distribution of

The ISIE published the electoral calendar for the parliamentary elections within a very tight timeline due to the late amendments of the electoral law, specifically Decree-Law 55 issued by the president on Sept. 15, 2022.

responsibilities between the various departments.⁵²

On June 22, the ISIE reformed the IRIEs, reducing the number of members from four to three in the ISIE's subsidiary bodies and instituting a new selection process.⁵³ For the referendum, the ISIE created 33 IRIEs—27 in country and seven abroad. The number of IRIEs abroad was increased to 10 for the parliamentary elections, reflecting the number of districts. The ISIE had difficulties appointing IRIE members, as they received few applications.

For the parliamentary elections, after the candidate nomination process, the ISIE switched regional coordinators from one region to another because of a conflict of interest.⁵⁴ According to Carter Center long-term observer reports, the overall performance of the IRIEs was positive; members understood the electoral process and, in many cases, had previous experience with elections.⁵⁵

Electoral Calendar

The ISIE is responsible for establishing an electoral calendar that allows for adequate time to implement all phases of the electoral process after the president sets a date for an election.⁵⁶ For the first time in Tunisia, the president set the dates for the referendum and the first round of the parliamentary election on a Monday and Saturday instead of Sunday, when all prior elections had been held. The president chose the first two dates for their symbolic nature, as July 25 is National Republic Day and Dec. 17 is National Revolution and Youth Day.

The ISIE law clearly states that it is within the authority of the ISIE to set the electoral calendar, not the president.⁵⁷ However, for the referendum, the ISIE board indicated that they sent four draft calendars to the president and waited for his direction before setting the date. This contributed to the perception that they were not acting independently of the president.⁵⁸ The ISIE finally published the draft electoral calendar on June 3, 2022.⁵⁹

The electoral calendar for the referendum changed due to the amendments to the draft constitution issued by the president on July 8, 2022—after the submission deadline for campaign participants to announce their positions and just a few days before the start of the referendum campaign. The amendments put the ISIE in a challenging situation, as the calendar had to be revised and the deadline to submit positions for campaign participants extended.

The ISIE published the electoral calendar for the parliamentary elections within a very tight timeline due to the late amendments of the electoral law, specifically Decree-Law 55 issued by the president on Sept. 15, 2022. Although the ISIE president stated that Decree-Law 55 was issued after consultation with the ISIE, the ISIE never commented on

52 CHAHED's preliminary statement of the legislative elections' first round.

53 Each IRIE is composed of a president and two board members with legal and finance backgrounds.

54 Sousse regional coordinator switched with Mahdia regional coordinator because the brother of Sousse regional coordinator is a candidate there.

55 Observer report in the region of Gafsa, Kasserine, Tozeur, Kebili, and Tozeur and observer report in Nabeul, Zaghouan, and Ben Arous.

56 Art. 101 (New) of Organic Law No. 2014-16 dated May 26, 2014, on elections and referendums as amended and completed by Organic Law No. 2017-7 of Feb. 14, 2017, Decree-Law No. 2022-34 dated June 1, 2022, and Decree-Law No. 2022-55 of Sept. 15, 2022

57 See Art. 3 of the ISIE law.

58 <https://africanmanager.com/farouk-bouasker-le-conseil-de-lisie-na-adopte-aucun-calendrier-electoral/>

59 ISIE's decision No. 2022-13 of June 3, 2022, concerning the electoral calendar of the 2022 referendum.

the timing of the elections and whether they had been consulted.

The amendments to the electoral law significantly affected the electoral process and did not provide stakeholders with sufficient time to clearly understand the new rules, including voters and candidates confronted with a new electoral system and new electoral districts.⁶⁰

After the announcement of the final results of the first round of the parliamentary elections on Jan. 15, the ISIE set a date of Jan. 9, 2023, for the second round in the 131 constituencies in-country where no one had reached the 50% threshold.⁶¹ The ISIE announced the electoral calendar of the run-off on Jan. 15, allowing only 12 days for campaigning.⁶² This brief timeframe made it very difficult for candidates to organize their activities and conduct meaningful campaigns.

ISIE Communication

Effective communication by the ISIE with candidates, stakeholders, and CSOs has been an ongoing concern in all Tunisian elections observed by The Carter Center since 2011.⁶³ It has always been somewhat confusing and haphazard. At times, the ISIE withheld necessary information or took a defensive posture when challenged, rather than being transparent and open about how the process was unfolding. This was the case for both internal and external communication. Communication was unclear at times, and ISIE board members sometimes made contradictory statements.

In a positive step toward increasing transparency, the ISIE live-streamed its board meetings at the beginning of the referendum process. However, this practice was discontinued on June 22 for reasons that were never made public. Minutes of board meetings were published on the ISIE Facebook page;

however, they were sometimes published late and were never published on its official website.⁶⁴

Throughout the referendum and the parliamentary processes, the ISIE's communication was repeatedly unclear on several important issues, including the process for deciding who could campaign in the referendum, the publication of the preliminary results, and clarifications regarding new regulations regarding the participation of political parties in the parliamentary process after the publication of Decree-Law 55.

In summary, Tunisia's election administration raised concerns regarding the independence of the ISIE board's appointment process, the need for greater transparency in the ISIE's internal structure, the importance of safeguarding the ISIE's independent authority in setting electoral calendars, and the necessity for improved communication. Addressing these issues is crucial to enhancing the credibility and fairness of future elections in Tunisia and ensuring they align with international standards and uphold democratic values.

Voter Registration

Electoral registries must be updated regularly to ensure they are accurate before each referendum. When voters are not registered automatically, registration should be possible over a relatively long period of time.⁶⁵

Tunisia's approach to maintaining electoral registers has come under scrutiny, particularly in the aftermath of the 2011 electoral events. In order to align with international standards that demand accurate voter registration prior to each election, the ISIE has made consistent efforts to update these registers, a critical aspect in ensuring the precision of the voter list. Replacing voluntary registration with automatic registration has alleviated concerns

60 The electoral period of legislative elections starts 10 days after the publication of the new rules of electoral law.

61 ISIE decision No. 2023-3 dated Jan. 15, 2023, related to the proclamation of the final results of the first round of the 2022 legislative elections.

62 ISIE decision No. 2023-4 dated Jan. 15, 2023, related to the calendar of the second round of the 2022 legislative elections.

63 See TCC final reports for the presidential and legislative elections in 2014. https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_reports/tunisia-final-rpt-2014-elections.pdf and 2019 https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_reports/tunisia-2019-final-report.pdf.

64 The meeting minutes of Aug. 5 were published on Aug. 8; those of July 22, 23, and 26 were published on Aug. 5; the minutes from July 3 on July 11; the meeting minutes of July 1 on Aug. 3; and the minutes of June 27 on Aug. 2.

65 The right to transparency and access to information arises from the guarantee that the right to free expression includes the ability of everyone to seek and receive information and ideas. Revised Guidelines on the Holding of Referendums, Venice Commission, CDL-AD (2020)031

regarding the convenience of the registration process.

Referendum

In Tunisia, the electoral register is maintained by the ISIE, which is mandated to keep a precise, transparent, complete, and updated electoral register.⁶⁶ After the 2019 general elections, the voter registry contained 7,074,564 voters. That number increased by 80,000 to 7,154,564 after the ISIE voter registration campaign for the referendum was conducted, May 29-June 14. The ISIE deployed 700 fixed agents throughout the country and several mobile teams in public areas to register voters.

The ISIE expressed disappointment at the low number of eligible voters who voluntarily registered. It subsequently asked the president to amend the

electoral law to allow for passive voter registration of citizens who turned 18 before July 25 but had failed to register.⁶⁷ The ISIE implemented the passive registration beginning on June 15. Before adding new voters to the database, the ISIE checked the voters' identity using their national IDs and passports to avoid duplicate registration of voters. The ISIE also took advantage of the EVAX database that was created to track the vaccinations of citizens during the COVID-19 pandemic. After the passive registration was completed, 9,278,541 citizens were registered, representing an increase of 26% (2,335,238).

The ISIE put in place three mechanisms to allow citizens to verify and update their voter information and the location of their polling station. More than 3 million voters used the automated SMS system to check their information. According to

Ronald Borden



A voter dips her index finger in ink before voting in the parliamentary election. Ink stains are an effective method to confirm whether voters have already cast their ballots.

⁶⁶ Decree-Law 34 published on June 1, 2022, Art. 7

⁶⁷ Ibid. According to the ISIE executive director, the ISIE opted for automatic registration because in the 2019 election, it deployed its optimal resources throughout the manual registration process, yet it only reached some 1.455 million of its the target 2.5 million voters.

an amendment to the electoral law decreed by the president, voters were allowed to change the location of their polling station for the referendum to any polling station in the country. This was a recognition that the referendum was a national vote, not reliant on a voter's specific location. Additionally, the referendum took place during the holiday season when many Tunisians were away from home. During this time, a total of 228,427 voters changed their polling station through the automated system. Some CSOs who monitored the voter registration process criticized the ISIE for not taking the necessary IT security measures to protect the process of updating and changing polling stations.⁶⁸

Only 36 objections related to voter registration were filed with the IRIE, most concerning corrections of names in the voter lists. Of the 36 objections filed, 32 were accepted and four were rejected.⁶⁹ No appeals related to voter registration were filed with the courts. The final voter list was published on July 13, 2022.

The ISIE announced that an audit of the voter list was carried out by the Ministry of Interior, Court of Auditors, National Center for Information Technology, National Authority for Personal Data Protection, and ISIE staff members in charge of computer security. However, the report from the audit was never made public.⁷⁰

Parliamentary Elections

In advance of the December parliamentary elections, the ISIE updated the voter registry for the referendum on Sept. 21 by automatically registering eligible unregistered voters. Voters were registered across 4,870 polling centers and 11,713 polling stations, both at home and abroad. The total number of registered voters in Tunisia reached 8,989,287 voters, of whom 51% were women. Abroad, a total of 350,469 voters were registered, of

whom 38.6% were women. Upon the completion of the registration process, a total of 9,339,756 citizens were registered, of whom 50.5% were women.

The process of updating polling centers where voters could cast their votes started on Sept. 26. It was conducted at various locations, including IRIEs, municipalities, delegations, municipal districts, supermarkets, post offices, and the Sickness Insurance Fund (CNAM). The ISIE also set up additional channels for voters to verify their information in the voter register, as well as their newly assigned polling stations and districts.⁷¹

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Although the ISIE noted that the statistical data would be made available on its website, including the number of registered voters classified by gender and age (within the limits of personal data protection), these statistics were never published.

The IRIE made preliminary voter lists available to the public on Sept. 26-28. These lists were available on the ISIE website, as well as at the regional and delegation levels of the IRIE. The IRIE accepted challenges regarding the lists on Sept 29-30. The ISIE also prepared and made available challenge forms to be used for this purpose. On Sept. 29, the ISIE published the challenge forms to be used to delete the names of ineligible persons, correct voter-related data, or add the names of eligible persons to the preliminary voter lists.⁷²

⁶⁸ Joint statement published on July 22 from the seven CSOs about their first observation of the referendum process. <https://www.facebook.com/observing-coalition/>

⁶⁹ CHAHED, executive summary of the report on the monitoring of disputes for the July 25 referendum.

⁷⁰ During the meeting held on Feb. 7, 2023, INPDP's President Chawki Guaddes told The Carter Center that the INPDP refused to draft a report on the audit so that they do not affect voters' trust in the ISIE during the electoral period.

⁷¹ These channels included SMS, the website www.touensa.isie.tn and the call center 1814.

⁷² The conditions required to register on the electoral roll are having Tunisian nationality, having the age of majority (18 years), and enjoying civil and political rights, according to the text of the decision. Persons concerned by one of the disqualifying conditions set forth by the ISIE are prohibited from voting according to the ISIE.

The ISIE extended the deadline for voters to update their polling centers from Oct. 28 to Nov. 20, 2022.⁷³ It stated that this decision was made to ensure that citizens could exercise their right to vote. Citizens had the option to update their polling stations through ISIE staff available in delegations domestically and in diplomatic and consular missions abroad. They also could update their polling stations online via www.touenssa.isie.tn.

Given the numerous changes in the electoral legal framework—such as the electoral system, voter registration, and the shifting of voting centers—voter education and information were especially crucial for these elections.

To conclude, the maintenance of an up-to-date electoral registry has been a topic of discussion, particularly in the wake of Tunisia's 2011 electoral events. The ISIE has taken steps to ensure accurate voter registration, in line with international standards. One notable change has been the shift from voluntary to automatic registration, making the process more convenient for citizens. During the voter registration campaign for the referendum, the ISIE introduced passive registration for eligible voters who had not registered, resulting in a significant increase in the number of registered citizens. However, concerns were raised about IT security during the process of updating and changing polling stations. While only a limited number of objections were filed regarding voter registration, the audit report of the voter list was never made public, raising concerns about transparency. To improve future voter registration, it is essential to prioritize IT security, enhance transparency, and ensure that audit reports are accessible to the public, promoting trust in the electoral process.

Voter Education

The fulfillment of the international obligation of universal suffrage is partially dependent on effective voter education.⁷⁴ Given the numerous changes in the electoral legal framework—such as the electoral system, voter registration, and the shifting of voting centers—voter education and information were especially crucial for these elections. Many CSOs criticized the ISIE for not conducting an extensive voter education program regarding these changes. There were a few spots broadcast on national TV that included sign language, as well as on national radio. As part of the second phase of voter registration, the ISIE had 32 sensitization spots on television during prime time, especially on public channel Wataniya 2. It also utilized local radio to broadcast the information.

In the final week of September, the ISIE released a series of animated TV spots providing instructions on how to verify and update voter registration information, as well as the dates of parliamentary elections for both domestic and international constituencies. Some CSOs independently undertook voter education activities targeting youth, women, and people with disabilities to encourage them to vote.

The ISIE relied solely on television spots for voter education during the second round. However, they did not provide any voter education regarding the responsibilities of MPs, details about the new electoral system, or information about changes to electoral crimes.

The lack of CSO involvement in the ISIE education campaign made it harder to reach voters. Unlike in previous elections, the ISIE did not coordinate with CSOs or actively involve them in outreach efforts. Voter education would have been an important step in the electoral process, especially because of the new electoral system and polling places, and should be greatly expanded, with the support of Tunisian CSOs in the future.

⁷³ ISIE decision 2022-26

⁷⁴ ICCPR Article 25.

Campaign Participants and Candidate Registration

Referendum

Campaign Participants

In June, amendments to the electoral law added several articles related to participation in the referendum campaign.⁷⁵ These articles gave the ISIE the

authority to determine who could participate in the campaign and to set the criteria for participation.⁷⁶

One such criterion stipulated that those wishing to participate must announce their intentions by filing a declaration with the ISIE.⁷⁷ International best practices suggest that issues of participation in

Ron Borden



Sarah Johnson (left), The Carter Center, discusses her observations with Fadoua El Ouni (center), national legal analyst, and David Carroll (right), The Carter Center, on election day. The Carter Center assesses elections based on a country's national laws and international obligations.

⁷⁵ See Article 116 (new) of the electoral law.

⁷⁶ Decision 14/2022

⁷⁷ Article 3 of Decree-Law 22/2022 amending the ISIE law: "The Independent High Authority for Elections [...] is in charge of the following: [...] 6. to receive and decide on the candidacy files for the elections and the declarations of participation in the referendum campaign in accordance with the electoral legislation."

a referendum campaign and criteria should be set by law, not created *ad hoc* for a specific referendum.⁷⁸

In a more positive move, the ISIE decision broadened the scope of participation in the campaign beyond the limitation imposed by the electoral law

The most severe violation during the referendum campaign was a widespread and anonymous campaign for “yes,” which used the Tunisian flag and an excerpt of the president’s explanatory note as its background.

on parliamentary parties. This expansion included individuals, organizations, associations, and entities/bodies that were “active in public affairs and with the aim of enshrining the principle of citizenship and the values of democracy.”⁷⁹ (See the Election Administration section for more details on participants.)

Tunisia’s legal framework for referendums was inadequate before the president called for the constitutional referendum on July 25. After the presidential decree amending the electoral law, the framework remained fragmented due to the various decrees, orders, and decisions regulating the referendum. Despite changes to the legal framework, the measures did not address all the gaps in the law. For example, there were no clear limits for those eligible to challenge the results, no provision for a swift judicial review for those whose participation was rejected by the ISIE, and no regulation establishing limits on campaign spending. These issues should be addressed in the law or in regulations to meet international standards for transparent and inclusive referendums.

Campaign Regulations

Electoral and referendum campaigns need to be held and organized through a set of rules and guidelines

to create a level playing field for all actors. According to international standards, “Equality of opportunity must be guaranteed for the supporters and opponents of the proposal being voted on.”⁸⁰ This means that administrative authorities should strive to remain neutral, particularly concerning publicly owned media outlets and coverage, public funding for campaigns and candidates, bill posting and advertising, and the right to demonstrate on public thoroughfares.

Under the 2014 electoral law, campaign regulations applicable to elections also apply to referendums. For the referendum campaign, the ISIE left in place the 2019 general election campaign regulation, including a prohibition on placing campaign posters outside of official locations, the use of the national flag or logo on campaign materials, and the use of foreign media.⁸¹

Campaign Violations

The ISIE hired approximately 1,200 monitors—300 fewer than in 2019—as field agents, campaign and social media monitors, and operation room staff to keep track of various aspects of the campaign. These monitors recorded 180 violations in total: 95 committed by participants, 84 committed anonymously, and one by a nonparticipant. Campaign violation allegations also could be filed directly to the ISIE at the regional or central levels. However, the ISIE never made these violations public; nor did they clearly outline the procedure used to resolve them.

The most severe violation during the referendum campaign was a widespread and anonymous campaign for “yes,” which used the Tunisian flag and an excerpt of the president’s explanatory note as its background.⁸² The campaign went viral on social media and was used on billboards throughout the country and on posters posted outside designated spaces.

The ISIE issued a public announcement warning that the use of the Tunisian flag and the anonymity

78 II 3. (a) Venice Commission’s Guidelines on Holding Referendums, “[a]part from rules on technical matters and detail (which may be included in regulations of the executive), rules of referendum law should have at least the rank of a statute and not be adopted *ad hoc* for a specific referendum.”

79 Decision 14/2022. However, the law was not amended to allow these new participants to challenge the results.

80 According to the Venice Commission’s Revised Guidelines on the Holding of Referendums.

81 ISIE decision 22/2019 Articles 18 and 19; electoral law Articles 61, 62, and 66.

82 The use of the Tunisian flag in political campaigning is prohibited by Art. 61 of the electoral law.

of the campaign material were violations of the electoral law and asked the unknown sponsor(s) to take down the billboards and the posters, which were not placed in officially designated areas. The anonymous sponsor was not identified, and no one was ever charged with the violations. Many participants blamed the ISIE for not being more forceful in trying to prevent such abuses. This lack of enforcement also contributed to the overall lack of trust in the ISIE and the claims of bias in favor of the “yes” campaign.

The HAICA also reported instances of campaign materials appearing on foreign media channels, in violation of prohibitions against campaigning on foreign media.⁸³ The recorded violations concerned three campaign participants: Achaab Movement, Attayyar Al-Chaab, and The New Republic Movement.⁸⁴

Although it is not clearly stated in the law whether the president, as the proponent of the draft constitution, could campaign for the document, many stakeholders said that he abused his political position and media access to campaign for the referendum. This included campaigning on multiple occasions, including on voting day, when the president made a 15-minute statement after casting his vote. He praised the draft constitution and called on Tunisians to vote “yes,” which was broadcast live on the public television station Watayia 1. The HAICA fined the station 20,000 TND (US\$6,250) for violating the electoral silence period.⁸⁵ No action was taken by the ISIE against the president for this obvious violation.

Parliamentary Election

Candidate Registration

International and regional treaties protect the right and opportunity of every citizen to be elected.⁸⁶ The right to be elected may only be subject to objective

and reasonable restrictions. International standards state that the suspension or exclusion of participatory rights is prohibited unless the suspension/exclusion is established by law and is objective and reasonable.⁸⁷

Candidates and political parties are important stakeholders in the electoral process. The right to be elected is a recognized principle in both regional and international treaties. However, it is not an absolute right and may be limited on the basis of objective and reasonable criteria established by law. The electoral calendar itself should be publicized as part of civic information activities in the interests of transparency, as well as to ensure public understanding and confidence in the process.⁸⁸ The late changes in the electoral system, the late publication of the electoral calendar, and the late creation of electoral districts fundamentally challenged citizens’ rights to run for and be elected to public office.

The late publication of the fundamental elements of the electoral law, including the new electoral system and constituency delimitation, one month before the beginning of the nomination process affected stakeholders’ understanding of the rules and competitiveness in several constituencies in the country and in most constituencies abroad. The requirement to collect 400 notarized endorsements represented the biggest challenge, discouraging potential candidates and affecting the competitiveness in several constituencies.

The ISIE published the decision on the rules of candidacies for the parliamentary elections only 21 days before the opening of the process of candidate nominations.⁸⁹ The single-member constituencies with new boundary delimitations and independent candidates set for this election greatly impacted the candidate nomination process. Candidacy became individual, instead of list-based, and in smaller constituencies than before. This has eliminated the

⁸³ Article 66 of the electoral law: Candidates and candidate lists, as well as parties with regard to referendums, may, in the context of electoral campaigns and referendum campaigns, use national and electronic media. They are prohibited from using foreign media.

⁸⁴ ISIE reported these violations according to an internal report from the HAICA to the ISIE.

⁸⁵ [HAICA's Communication to National TV \(Link\)](#)

⁸⁶ U.N., ICCPR, Art. 25; AU, AfCHPR, Art. 13; Arab Charter on Human Rights, Art. 24; CIS, Convention on Democratic Elections, Art. 3; OSCE, Copenhagen Document Para.7.5

⁸⁷ U.N. (CCPR), General Comment 25, Para. 4

⁸⁸ U.N. (Center for Human Rights): Human Rights and Elections: A handbook on the Legal, Technical, and Human Rights Aspects of Elections, Para.75.

⁸⁹ On Sept. 26, 2022, the ISIE published decision No. 2022-25 on the rules and procedures for candidacy.

role of political parties in approving and nominating candidates and the need for candidates to be political party members.

While the new legislation opens the door to candidates with different profiles as well as newcomers who had not previously considered running for parliament, many of these candidates faced challenges that had to do with their lack of understanding of the rules with this tight timeline, as well as with conducting campaigns with no of public funding and no support from political parties, among other issues. This was especially the case for women and youth candidates. The ISIE tried to explain the new rules to candidates during a training day, but the session was insufficient, according to some candidates.⁹⁰

The gathering of 400 endorsements proved to be the most difficult step for potential candidates, who needed to convince 200 men and 200 women—25% of whom had to be under age 35—to endorse their candidacy and authenticate their signatures in the municipalities, delegations, or IRIE offices.

The ISIE initially allowed candidates to submit their applications during a period of eight days, from Oct. 17-24. The deadline was then extended for three days, to Oct. 27. The responsibility of receiving the applications and deciding on candidacy rested on the 37 IRIEs at home and abroad. A total of 1,427 candidates applied, of whom 85% (1,213) were men and 15% (214) were women. During the first week, the number of candidacies increased by about 100 per day, except for Oct. 24, the initial deadline set by the ISIE, which saw an increase of 358. During the additional three days, the IRIEs received only 178 candidacies, indicating that the extension was granted not only for new candidacies but also for those who needed to

complete missing documents in their applications, especially the newly required voter endorsements.

The gathering of 400 endorsements proved to be the most difficult step for potential candidates, who needed to convince 200 men and 200 women—25% of whom had to be under age 35—to endorse their candidacy and authenticate their signatures in the municipalities, delegations, or IRIE offices. This was especially difficult for women and overseas candidates. CSOs, the media, and even members of political parties alleged that some candidates paid voters to endorse their candidacy. Additionally, some candidates mentioned having difficulty obtaining their criminal records (Bulletin No. 3) and municipality tax documents on time, which were required for the candidacy application.⁹¹

The ISIE regulation also required all candidates to have a platform explaining their political, social, and economic vision, and to have those endorsing their candidacy sign that they had read and accepted the platform. This requirement was driven by the new provision in the electoral law that allows a candidate to be recalled if they do not take sufficient steps to fulfill their platform. The regulation required each candidate to submit a list of endorsers.⁹² This regulation was added by the ISIE, which complicated the application process.

The ISIE took a week to review and decide on the 1,427 potential candidates. On Nov. 3, the ISIE announced a preliminary list of 1,058 accepted candidates, of whom 936 were men and 122 were women. Most of the rejections were due to noncompliance with the requirements related to the endorsements. Out of the 161 districts, seven districts abroad had no candidates, and 10 districts, including three abroad and seven in-country, had only one candidate. Eight in-country districts had just two candidates. The highest number of candidacies was in the district of Kasserine North-Zouhour, which had 22 candidates. Following the challenge period, two candidates were added to the acceptance list, and five candidates withdrew.

90 All LTO reports agreed that there was a lack of understanding of the candidacy process by candidates and a lack of knowledge by the IRIE staff. They highlighted the need for further IRIE support to candidates.

91 During the Carter Center's meeting with him, one of the leaders of Popular Current said, "The mayor of Raoued Adnen Bouassida refused to deliver a document to the Popular Current candidate there proving that he paid the local taxes. Therefore, the candidate could not submit his candidacy, despite having collected more than 400 endorsements, since ISIE considers this document mandatory and could not be brought later."

92 Art. 7 of ISIE decision No. 2022-25 dated Sept. 26, 2022, related the candidacy rules and procedures for the 2022 legislative elections.

On Nov. 22, the ISIE announced the final list of 1,055 accepted candidates, of whom only 11.6% (122) were female, and 88.4% (933) were men. Candidates running in this election range in age from 23 to 77. Young candidates (age 23-30) represented only 4%. The uninominal electoral system convinced many novice candidates to run for the December parliamentary elections, despite their lack of experience in the political and electoral environment. However, many former elected parliamentary members and locally elected municipal officials ran in the election. A total of 23 former MPs from various political parties (the majority from Nidaa Tounes and Qalb Tounes) stood as candidates. Two MPs had been elected for two terms (in 2014 and 2019). There also were 71 members of municipalities, 25 of whom were mayors.⁹³ Members with political affiliations or close to political parties were less visible in this election.⁹⁴

Given the relative inexperience of some candidates, it was a challenge for the public to identify them. The uninominal electoral system, which has no link with political parties and the general environment, hindered public access to information about candidates running for the parliamentary election. The general consensus was that most candidates were from public administration, schools, and universities, making up more than 60% of the total. Only 14% of the candidates were lawyers, architects, or doctors. A new constitutional prohibition on combining parliamentary work with any other remunerative or nonremunerative professional activity led

to fewer candidacies by lawyers, doctors, and other independent professionals. A few candidates were either retired, students, or listed their occupation as unemployed.

The candidacy conditions established by Decree-Law 55 presented the greatest challenge in the registration process. The requirement of 400 authenticated endorsements, along with the tight timeline for potential candidates and voters to understand the new rules, undermined the competitiveness of the parliamentary elections. The electoral law should be amended to establish reasonable candidacy requirements. The ISIE also should consider additional efforts to explain the new rules and allow sufficient time for potential candidates to understand the process.

When elections are scheduled, the calendar for each phase of the process must allow adequate time for effective campaigning and public information efforts, for voters to inform themselves, and for the necessary administrative, legal, training, and logistic arrangements to be made.⁹⁵ The general environment for the campaign during the referendum and parliamentary elections was affected by the boycott by the major political parties and the disinterest of voters around the country, especially for the parliamentary elections. The late changes to the electoral system and the negative perception of political parties meant that most candidates ran without any party affiliation, which reduced the visibility of the electoral campaign.

⁹³ The Mandate of Municipalities members will end in May 2023.

⁹⁴ We found 18 members from Harakat Echaab, 27 from Nidaa Tounes, 10 from Ennahdha, seven from Qalb Tounes, and two from PDL.

⁹⁵ U.N. (Center for Human Rights): Human Rights and Elections: A Handbook on the Legal, Technical, and Human Rights Aspects of Elections, Para. 75

I The Campaign

Referendum Campaign

In a referendum or election campaign, equality of opportunity must be guaranteed for candidates, supporters, and opponents of the question or proposal under consideration. This requires that administrative authorities adopt a neutral stance during the referendum and election campaigns.⁹⁶ In addition, fundamental rights of free speech and assembly must be respected.

Campaign monitors noted some irregularities, including the use of public funds and resources to finance the “yes” campaign, the use of the Tunisian flag in electoral posters and billboards designed to influence support for the constitutional amendments, and the use of children for propaganda purposes and political advertising. An opposition party, Afek Tounes, claimed it was forbidden from organizing some planned activities.

The referendum campaign was marked by the absence of genuine debate about the draft either in the media or by citizens. The main political parties that had been represented in parliament and municipal assemblies boycotted the referendum. Only two parties, Harakat Echaab and Afek Tounes (in support and in opposition, respectively), campaigned for and encouraged their supporters to participate in the referendum.

The campaign was open to all political parties, associations, coalitions, and individuals who registered with the ISIE. The registration period lasted from June 21 through 28, after which the ISIE published a preliminary list of 161 accepted participants in the referendum campaign.⁹⁷ After the draft constitution was published on June 30, those interested had only two days, July 1 and 2, to notify the ISIE whether they would campaign for or against its passage. This deadline was extended by two days to allow potential participants time to analyze the draft.⁹⁸ The ISIE announced that although boycotting the referendum was not an officially recognized position, participants were free to express their views. On July 5, the ISIE published the final list of approved registrants. Out of a total of 148 applicants, 141 registered in favor and seven against.⁹⁹

After amendments to the draft constitution were published on July 8, the ISIE reopened the registration period to allow participants to change their position based on the amendments. On July 13, the ISIE announced 153 as the final number of registered participants. The list included 22 political parties, one coalition, one CSO network, 23 associations, and 106 individuals. Of the 153 participants, 146 were registered in favor of the amendments and seven were opposed. (See Annex C for a full list of participants)

⁹⁶ Venice Commission CDL-AD (2020)031

⁹⁷ ISIE meeting minutes of June 27, 2022.

⁹⁸ ISIE decision 2022-16 of July 1, 2022.

⁹⁹ However, the number of participants on the list decreased from the first list published by the ISIE, from 161 to 153. ISIE's meeting minutes dated June 27, 2022, included a list of eight participants who were rejected.

The referendum campaign began on July 5, with little visibility throughout the country except for the last two days, when those boycotting the referendum held demonstrations in downtown Tunis. Supporters of the draft constitution did not organize large demonstrations, instead relying on small public gatherings, posters, and billboards.

Those in favor of the constitution urged people to vote “yes” as a show of support for President Saïed and to avoid a return to the situation before July 25, 2021. Those opposed, such as Afek Tounes and the Soumoud Coalition, focused on raising awareness of the threats they perceived the draft constitution posed to the country, especially the return of one-man rule and the illegality of the president’s actions since July 25, 2021.

Afek Tounes was the only political party active and participating in the referendum campaign that displayed its referendum posters in all areas designated for this purpose. Most places dedicated to posters in each municipality went unused. Afek Tounes informed the Carter Center mission that in general, they did not face any restrictions on campaigning. However, there were a few instances where they were prevented from holding events in some towns and one rally in Sidi Bouzid, where the police would not allow them to set up a tent.¹⁰⁰ They distributed flyers and held debates and general meetings involving academics.

During the campaign, the ISIE deployed 1,200 campaign monitors, whose reports were not published. The ISIE board minutes from July 26 provide a summary of irregularities observed by the monitors, which does not specify who was responsible for the irregularities (whether political parties, associations, or individuals) and when they took place.

The most significant irregularities noted by the monitors were the use of public funds and resources to finance the campaign; electoral propaganda in public administration, institutions and private facilities that were not open to the public; and the use of the Tunisian flag or emblem in electoral posters

and billboards. The ISIE reported other types of irregularities involving speech that was labeled as incitement to hate, violence, and discrimination; injury to people’s honor and dignity; harm to their private lives; or speech compromising one’s personal data. In a few instances, children were used for propaganda purposes and political advertising. During the campaign, the ISIE did not routinely react to irregularities, except for those related to the use of the Tunisian flag.

The most significant irregularities noted by the monitors were the use of public funds and resources to finance the campaign; electoral propaganda in public administration, institutions and private facilities that were not open to the public; and the use of the Tunisian flag or emblem in electoral posters and billboards.

As mentioned above, during the last two days of the referendum campaign, opposition parties organized two demonstrations boycotting the referendum process. The first, on July 22, was organized by several political parties—Ettakatol, Attayer, Al Joumhouri, Al-Qotb, and Workers’ Party—and other organizations opposing the draft constitution. Violence broke out between the police and demonstrators.¹⁰¹ On the last day of the campaign, the National Salvation Front held a protest march against the referendum. They described the draft constitution as an “aberration” that risked plunging the country into an “absolute autocracy.” No violence or clashes with security forces were reported. These two demonstrations were the biggest during the referendum campaign.

Tunisia’s referendum campaign lacked citizen interest and major political parties’ participation. Only two parties engaged, with supporters quietly promoting the draft constitution while opponents

¹⁰⁰ Afek Tounes member Aziz Adhoum told The Carter Center that his party was prevented from holding public meetings in several towns, including Regueb and Sidi Bouzid.

¹⁰¹ The Ministry of the Interior issued a statement accusing the demonstrators of violence and stating that 20 police officers suffered minor injuries due to clashes with demonstrators. Demonstrators accused the police of violence and the use of tactics to provoke the demonstrators.

raised concerns. Irregularities included the use of public funds, hate speech, and misuse of the Tunisian flag. In future referendums, sufficient time should be allotted to educating the public about the text of any proposed constitutional amendments so voters can make an informed decision. In addition, the state should refrain from using public funds or official symbols, which could be perceived as designed to influence the voters' choice. According to international obligations, administrative authorities should adopt a neutral stance during referendums and election campaigns.

Parliamentary Elections, First Round

The parliamentary electoral campaign started on Friday, Nov. 25, providing candidates 22 days to campaign. Before holding campaign events, candidates were required to notify the relevant IRIE of the event 48 hours in advance. According to the ISIE, this requirement was intended to avoid the use of the same space or area by different parties or candidates and to facilitate control by the ISIE monitors.¹⁰² The notification could only be

presented in person through a legal representative of the candidate at the dedicated “unified window” at the IRIE regional offices. The “window” brought together representatives of the IRIE, municipality, police, and national guard, to facilitate all required procedures and/or permissions. Authorization by the municipality was only necessary when the campaign event was planned in a public space.

Some candidates, especially in rural areas, objected to the centralized system for giving an advantage to candidates living in proximity to the regional office and requested an online notification system via email. In some areas, the rules regarding the notification of campaign events were changed during the campaign. For example, initially, the IRIE in Kairouan insisted that candidates must personally visit the IRIE office to notify them about a planned campaign event. However, during the campaign, this provision was changed to allow notification at the delegation level and later by email.¹⁰³

During the campaign, this requirement was routinely violated, and the IRIE's differing interpretations of campaign event categories also caused

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Carter Center staff meet prior to election day.

¹⁰² ISIE decision about electoral campaign for the legislative election of Dec.17, 2022

¹⁰³ The delegations of Tunisia (mutamadiyah, plural mutamadiyat) are the second-level administrative divisions in Tunisia between the governorates and the sectors (imadas).

confusion regarding which types of campaign events required notification. In some IRIEs, it was unclear whether the requirement applied to all forms of voter contact, including the distribution of flyers and conduct of political cafes throughout the campaign. The ISIE should have established consistent criteria applicable across all IRIEs, considering that certain campaign activities occur on a continuous basis throughout a candidate's campaign, and it is unreasonable to require that candidates notify the IRIE on each occasion.

Before the start of the campaign, candidates affiliated with political parties who wanted to conduct activities using the party logo or platform were required to notify the ISIE by providing authorization from the legal representatives of the political party. Out of 1,055 candidates, only 61 notified the ISIE. These candidates belonged to six political parties, with 37 candidates from the People's Movement (Harakat Echaab). Many candidates preferred to run as independents, even when they had party authorization, as they felt that running without political party links would give them an advantage.¹⁰⁴

The campaign did not generate interest among voters. Most candidates tried to contact voters directly and held small gatherings in coffee shops and markets, where they distributed flyers, instead of hosting large campaign events.¹⁰⁵ The lack of party involvement, low campaign spending limits, and the absence of public funding also contributed to the low level of campaigning. Big billboards, prominent in previous elections, were not used because of the high costs and low campaign-finance ceilings. Some candidates took advantage of available public space to put up posters.

The uninominal electoral system encouraged many who were novices to the political and electoral environment to run for parliamentary seats. Other candidates were former MPs and elected municipal officials.¹⁰⁶ Candidate profiles revealed that many were teachers, professors, or worked in the education sector. Additionally, some businesspeople and

other professionals such as lawyers and doctors stood for office. Several candidates were affiliated with unions, especially the UGTT.

Tunisia's referendum campaign lacked citizen interest and major political parties' participation.

The first week of the electoral campaign was mostly calm. Candidates engaged in activities that were efficient and cost-effective. The Center's long-term observers noted small gatherings outside candidates' headquarters and in weekly markets. Candidates also engaged in door-to-door campaigning. Starting in the second week, candidates organized interactive talks in coffee shops and discussed voters' concerns about local issues. The observers reported volunteers wearing T-shirts with their respective candidates' photos. Candidate posters with names, photos, and campaign platforms were present but not as visible as in previous elections. Although the campaign intensified during the final week, in general, it remained more subdued than in previous parliamentary elections.

A review of candidate platforms revealed a focus on issues specific to each candidate's region, such as tourism, agriculture, and health care. Other topics included industrial development, cultural issues, international investment, youth employment, and public transportation. Many female candidates' platforms dealt with youth employment, and women's rights were mentioned in very few cases, mostly by women candidates. A few candidates talked about the rights of persons with disabilities.

There was a noticeable disparity between the regions in the number of campaign activities. For example, in Sfax 1, the average number of activities reported to IRIEs was 50 per day, while in Ariana it never exceeded 11 per day. There is no common strategy among IRIEs in the publication of the daily number of activities. According to LTO reports, 95% of candidates reported their activities to IRIEs,

¹⁰⁴ A candidate running for the first time in Sfax-West told the Center that running an independent candidate would give him a better chance to win.

¹⁰⁵ Events observed in Sfax and Mahdia included door-to-door campaigning, setting up of tents, holding political cafes, and distributing flyers, involving a maximum of 50 people. Candidates said they were trying to cover every locality of their constituency during the campaign period.

¹⁰⁶ Twenty-three former MPs from various political parties ran in the election; most were from Nidaa Tounes, Qalb Tounes, and Harakat Echaab.

and ISIE monitors were present at 62% of these events.¹⁰⁷

Observers noted that women were the most active candidates. However, outside the capital, they faced limitations due to social norms, which resulted in difficulties accessing cafes and engaging with male voters. Several women candidates reported that they were the target of smear campaigns online and faced insults and pressure to withdraw. Most women and young people were running for office for the first time and had limited resources. This put them at a disadvantage against male candidates, who often were wealthier, more seasoned in elections, or had held municipal positions. Center observers noted a low percentage of women attending campaign events and an even lower youth presence.¹⁰⁸

The Center deployed a full observation mission for the first round of the parliamentary elections. Its preliminary statement of findings, issued on Dec.

19, 2022, found that the elections lacked a competitive campaign environment. Ambiguity regarding campaign finance and a boycott by the major political parties that were involved in governing the country from 2012 to 2022 heavily impacted the campaign environment. Turnout for the two rounds of voting was historically low, further undermining overall legitimacy of the process. Given these dynamics, The Carter Center decided not to conduct a comprehensive observation for the second round held on Jan. 29, deploying only long-term observers and the core team on election day.

Parliamentary Elections, Second Round

The ISIE announced the results of the first round on Jan. 15: A total of 23 candidates (20 men and three women) secured more than 50% of the votes and were elected. A second round of polling took

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Polling station staff quietly await voters. Turnout in both rounds of the parliamentary elections was historically low.

107 Some IRIEs (Tunis 2, Ben Arous, Manouba, Bizerte, Nabeul 1, Nabeul 2, Jendouba, Kef, Gabès, Medenine, Tataouine, Kébili, Tozeur, Gafsa) didn't report on activities. Others (like Sousse, Zaghuan, and Sfax 2) published this information regularly, while other IRIEs (like Sidi Bouzid, Mahdia, and Kasserine) reported regularly before stopping in the last days of the campaign.

108 Many campaign activities observed by the Center did not include women or youth. Women represented 10% of the audience, and youth 15% on average. Some events were attended by women only—all of these were held by women candidates.

place on Jan. 29 between the two candidates who received the highest number of votes in 131 constituencies.¹⁰⁹ Of the 262 candidates who ran for the second round, 228 were men (87%) and 34 were women (13%). In terms of age distribution, 3.8% were under age 30; 38.9% were ages 30-34; 49.2% were ages 46-60; and 18% were over 60. Among the candidates, 65% were employed in the public and private sectors; 19% were professionals; 8% were unemployed; 2% (five) were students; and 6% were retired.¹¹⁰

The electoral campaign started on Jan. 16, the day after the announcement of the final results of the first round, giving candidates 12 days to campaign. This period was further shortened by the 48-hour notification requirement. In the field, several candidates reported the need for more flexibility. During a campaign, unforeseen and unexpected events frequently occur, requiring candidates to reschedule their activities. However, the 48-hour advance notice requirement did not allow them to do so.¹¹¹

Despite voters showing even less interest in the second round, candidates observed by the Center LTOs, most of whom were running for the first time, became more familiar and comfortable with the electoral process. In the Northwest, candidates campaigned more intensively than in the first round.¹¹² Candidates in the South focused their campaigns on their own clan or family connections. According to LTOs, “clannism”—with its built-in network of interests—characterized the electoral dynamics in the South.

Although the uninominal electoral system encouraged many who were political novices to run for parliamentary seats, the campaign was generally quiet and did not generate voter enthusiasm. No big gatherings took place. Most candidates relied

on the distribution of flyers and direct contact with voters at small gatherings. The obligation to notify IRIEs about campaign activities 48 hours in advance was restrictive and not applied consistently across all IRIEs, placing a burden on the candidates and the ISIE, which was unable to enforce it. The ISIE should establish rules for the campaign that are applied uniformly throughout the country, clearly explain the regulations to candidates before the campaign begins, and facilitate reporting requirements so they do not place an unequal burden on candidates in rural areas. The late publication of the electoral law and ISIE decisions made it difficult for stakeholders to understand the regulations.

Although the campaign intensified during the final week, in general, it remained more subdued than in previous parliamentary elections.

Campaign Financing

International best practices strive to protect the principle of equal opportunities among candidates, as it is one of the main safeguards for democratic elections. According to international best practice, electoral legislation should specifically provide for transparency of donations to candidates, standardized presentation of campaign accounts, reasonable limits on campaign expenditure, regular reporting mechanisms, and effective and dissuasive sanctions.¹¹³

The electoral law and the ISIE decision on campaign financing did not allow political parties to contribute directly or in kind to any candidate's campaign and eliminated public financing of campaigns.¹¹⁴ These changes directly affected women, youth, and minority candidates, as they

109 A decree-law set the date of Jan. 29, 2023, for the second round of legislative elections.

110 ISIE statistics about candidates in the second round were announced on Jan. 15, 2023.

111 Long-term observers noted differences in rules in various IRIEs. Notification was not necessary for flyer distribution in Nabeul 2 (according to the ISIE instruction). In Zaghouan, the IRIE required notification for all campaign activities. It was the same case in Sfax, where candidates did not need to notify IRIEs about the activities of flyer distribution and door-to-door campaigns.

112 For example, during the first-round campaign, Sofienne Trabelsi notified the IRIE of only one event, and Hatem Kalai campaigned only online; for the second round, both notified the IRIE of activities every day. Also, in Siliana governorate, Sami Kitouni did not campaign at all in the first round, because he did not have leave of absence from his work. Now that he was through to the second round, he had taken some of his annual leave and had scheduled campaign visits to all five delegations in his constituency.

113 Council of Europe (Committee of Ministers) Recommendations (2003)4, Article 3(b).

114 Decision 20-2014 as amended by Decision 30-2022 establishing the rules, procedures, and methods for financing the election campaign.

generally have fewer financial resources and rely on political party support and public financing. These changes had a direct impact on equal opportunity among candidates.

The electoral law and the ISIE decision on campaign financing did not allow political parties to contribute directly or in kind to any candidate's campaign and eliminated public financing of campaigns. These changes directly affected women, youth, and minority candidates, as they generally have fewer financial resources

The electoral law provides only two possible ways of funding a candidate's campaign: self-financing (including in-kind contributions) and private financing (including in-kind contributions) from individuals, limited to 20 times the official minimum monthly wage in the non-agricultural sectors.¹¹⁵ The overall cap for private financing per candidate is four-fifths of the constituency's overall spending limit.¹¹⁶ Foreign financing is expressly prohibited, with an exception for the financing of candidates running in electoral districts abroad.

The overall spending limit for each district is based on a population-based formula. The highest

ceiling is in the district of Ariana-Medina, which has an approximate population of 135,497 and a ceiling of 40,807 TND (US\$12,955), and the lowest is in the district of Remada-Dhiba, which has an approximate population of 14,630 and a ceiling of 4,600 TND (US\$1,460). During the runoff elections, the ISIE amended its decision on campaign financing, setting the same spending limit in the second round. The campaign finance system suffers from a lack of transparency, as no interim reports are required. There is no real-time assessment of funding and expenditures, which deprives voters of important information. In addition, the legal process is not done in a timely manner. Another issue arose during the 2022 elections because of the elimination of public financing, which had a direct impact on equal opportunity among candidates. This particularly disadvantaged candidates who lacked the financial means to fund their campaigns solely through personal resources, especially women and young candidates who typically do not have sufficient private funds. Candidates with personal or family wealth enjoyed an advantage. The Carter Center recommends reinstating public financing of campaigns and allowing political parties to make direct or in-kind financial contributions to any candidate's campaign, while still ensuring transparency of donations.

¹¹⁵ Starting Oct. 1, 2022, the minimum monthly wage in non-agricultural sectors is set at 459,264 TND (US\$143). This means that private funding is capped at 9,185,280 TND (US\$2,860) per individual.

¹¹⁶ Decree 806-2022, fixing the overall spending limit for the legislative election campaign of 2022.

I Social Media and Digital Rights

Freedom of expression and an independent media are essential to enable democratic debate, ensure accountability mechanisms, and provide voters with accurate information.¹¹⁷ Since 2012, the U.N. Human Rights Council and the U.N. General Assembly have repeatedly affirmed that the same rights people have offline must also be protected online.¹¹⁸ This includes the right to seek, receive, and impart information, as well as the right to form opinions free of manipulative interference enshrined in international standards and agreements that Tunisia has signed.¹¹⁹

Online and offline content in Tunisia is subject to a legal framework that unduly restricts those freedoms, and selective lawsuits are increasingly used against voices critical of the government. In addition, the prevalence of negative campaigning, derogatory speech, and manipulative content on Tunisian social media has heavily distorted the online space. Although the constitution guarantees

freedom of expression and opinion, a combination of laws and decrees that criminalize peaceful speech and provide for prison terms are actively used against dissenting voices, contrary to international obligations.¹²⁰

President Saïed further restricted freedom of expression under by Decree-Law 54-2022 (DL 54) on disinformation. It introduced disproportionate prison sentences of up to 10 years, depending on the person targeted by disinformation, for vaguely defined offenses. This contradicts international standards.¹²¹ Authorities have repeatedly targeted critical voices, arresting and prosecuting bloggers, activists, internet users, and journalists because of their social media posts and news articles, using the legal framework to curtail criticism rather than seek redress.¹²² Media outlets and journalists also face a host of other challenges, including lack of financial sustainability, reduced access to public information, and increased offline and online violence

117 International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights, Article 19; ICCPR, General Comment 34 on freedoms of opinion and expression; African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa; U.N. Human Rights Committee Resolution 39/6 on Safety of Journalists.

118 U.N. Human Rights Council resolutions 20/8, 26/13, 28/16 and 32/13, adopted July 5, 2012, June 26, 2014, March 26, 2015, and July 1, 2016, respectively, as well as resolutions 68/167, 69/166 and 71/199 adopted by consensus by the U.N. General Assembly respectively on Dec. 18, 2013; Dec. 18, 2014; and Dec. 19, 2016.

119 AU Guidelines on Access to Information and Elections in Africa; [ICCPR General Comment 25, para. 19](#): "Voters should be able to form opinions independently, free of violence or threat of violence, compulsion, inducement or manipulative interference of any kind."

120 It includes laws such as the Penal Code, the Telecommunications Code, the Military Justice Code, the 2015 Anti-Terrorism Law, and the Decree-Law 54-2022 on disinformation. Laws include provisions criminalizing offenses such as insults against the head of state; defamation; knowingly harming or disturbing others' comfort via public telecommunications networks; *insulting the flag or the army*; *publication of false information*. See U.N. General Comment 34, Articles 37 and 47; see also AU DPFEA, Principle 22.

121 U.N. General Comment 34, Articles 25 and 38; as well as the joint declaration on freedom of expression and "fake news," disinformation and propaganda by the U.N., OSCE, OAS and ACHPR, Section 2.a.

122 Many EOM interlocutors reported that the number of prosecutions and arrests over peaceful speech has increased since 2020. More than 10 cases have been filed against CSOs and media in 2021 and 2022, and a politician, a blogger, a lawyer, a journalist, and an activist were prosecuted under DL 54. On Nov. 29, journalist Khelifa Guessmi was sentenced to a one-year jail term under the 2015 Law on Anti-terrorism.

that undermines their ability to report effectively, including on electoral matters.¹²³ Limited access to official information has also impeded the work of fact-checking initiatives. Such trends tend to create a vacuum of verified information that enables the circulation of false, manipulative news.

With about 7.1 million users, Facebook is the preferred platform in Tunisia for information sharing.

Although Tunisia's election law includes provisions on online campaigning, it lacks precise definitions and does not fully encompass the nuances of social media. IRIEs and candidates have had different understandings and interpretations of legal provisions on the use of political ads online. Candidates were required to declare the social media accounts they intended to use for campaign purposes to the IRIEs, which would be monitored by the ISIE. However, the ISIE did not release the list of accounts it monitored.¹²⁴ The ISIE did not publish information on the violations it identified online or on the warnings or sanctions applied, undermining the transparency of the process.¹²⁵

Social Media Environment

Television is the preferred media for Tunisians to get daily news, followed by social media, messaging platforms, and the internet.¹²⁶ However, for local news about their communities, Tunisians mainly

rely on friends and family, followed by Facebook news pages, television, and radio.¹²⁷

As of January 2022, there were 8 million internet users in Tunisia, which represents two-thirds of the population.¹²⁸ Despite efforts to expand access, the digital landscape is divided.¹²⁹ Young, urban people, as well as Tunisians with higher incomes and education levels, are more likely to use the internet, social media, or smartphones. As of January 2022, 86% of Tunisians age 13 and above had access to social media.¹³⁰ Men represented the majority of social media users, accounting for 54%.¹³¹

With about 7.1 million users, Facebook is the preferred platform in Tunisia for information sharing. Political messages also are circulated on other platforms, including YouTube, Instagram, TikTok, and Twitter, but to a lesser extent. Legacy media, public administrations, and politicians have a well-established presence on Facebook.¹³² Media pages, as well as the Tunisian presidency page, are among the most popular sites, with several million followers.¹³³ Facebook public and private groups also are popular in Tunisia, ranging from a few hundred to hundreds of thousands of members. While some of these groups are political in nature, supporting or opposing political factions, others are not primarily political but are used at times to share political or campaign messages.

The online space is highly polarized and reflects the fragmented political landscape. False and misleading information is common and falls within a broad information disorder landscape, which includes false and misleading information,

123 According to the SNJT, 36 of the 232 assaults (15.5%) recorded against journalists between November 2021 and October 2022 were perpetrated by election officials, mostly by heads of polling centers.

124 Several IRIEs reported to The Carter Center that they also monitored candidates' social media pages, while other mentioned that the ISIE was in charge of it.

125 The ISIE social media monitoring unit (SMMU) monitored violations committed by candidates on their social media accounts, on online media, and online pages of TV and radio stations. Violations were referred to the IRIEs' legal teams for review, warnings, or sanctions. Legal provisions of the electoral law provide for jail terms or cancellation of elections.

126 [Afrobarometer](#) Round 8, Survey on Tunisia 2020, 61% of Tunisians get news from TV every day; 41.9% and 41.6% get it from social media (including WhatsApp) and internet every day.

127 Internews Media Consumption Habits Survey 202.

128 [Data Reportal 2022, Tunisia Report](#). The number of internet users almost doubled in 10 years.

129 A number of projects have been implemented by the authorities and the Tunisian Internet Agency, the state-run internet service provider, to reinforce the infrastructure and equip municipalities and educational facilities with fiber-optic cables and outdoor wi-fi service.

130 [Statista 2022, Tunisia Survey](#). The share of social media users in Tunisia in 2022 by demographic group.

131 [Statista 2022, Tunisia Survey](#). The share of social media users in Tunisia in 2022 by gender.

132 While the president did not have a personal public page, he was visible online through the Facebook page of the Tunisian presidency.

133 Media pages such as Atteessia TV, Mosaique FM [موسايك اف إم](#), Elhiwar Ettounsi, Jawahara FM, Nessma TV have regional audiences that go beyond Tunisian borders.

intimidation, harassment, defamation campaigns, derogatory speech, and manipulative content.¹³⁴ Ahead of the elections, three out of four Tunisians were concerned about the harmful effect of false and misleading information on the elections.¹³⁵ Media and digital literacy initiatives were limited, and voters were ill-equipped to assess the information they were exposed to.¹³⁶ International

best practices recommend that states promote digital and media literacy to develop resilience to disinformation.¹³⁷ In 2021, the U.N. Rapporteur for Freedom of Opinion and Expression added that “disinformation is not the cause but the consequences of societal crisis and the breakdown of trust in institutions,” and that strategies to address it were

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One of the 308 unique polling stations that Carter Center observers visited on election day.

¹³⁴ In a survey conducted in March and April 2022 in Tunisia, [BBC Media Action](#) identified that 96% of survey respondents reporting having encountered it at some point and 39% believing they encounter it daily. Mourakiboun and the Ofiya coalition conducted media and/or social media monitoring projects covering the referendum and the legislative elections to identify the prevalence of hate speech in Tunisia and information disorders. DRI, ATIDE, Mourakiboun, I Watch, WeYouth, and Salamant have led projects over the last years that covered information disorders.

¹³⁵ BBC Media Action survey, March-April 2022.

¹³⁶ In 2022, UNDP Tunisia released a toolkit for training of trainers on education to media and online information during elections.

¹³⁷ [Joint declaration on freedom of expression and elections in the digital age](#), by the U.N., OSCE, OAS and ACHPR, 2020, Section 1.b.v.: “States should make a concerted effort to promote digital media and information literacy, including in relation to elections.” [UN General Assembly Resolution 75/267](#), 2021: “Encourages all Member States to develop and implement policies, action plans and strategies related to the promotion of media and information literacy, and to increase awareness, capacity for prevention and resilience to disinformation and misinformation, as appropriate.”

“unlikely to succeed without more attention being paid to these underlying factors.”¹³⁸

Several independent fact-checking initiatives flagged inaccurate, misleading, or false content, including content related to the electoral process.¹³⁹ Additionally, several statements made by both the ISIE and President Saïed were flagged as false or contradictory. Journalists and CSOs increasingly identified the president’s rhetoric as divisive and fueling polarization. They also pointed out the use of online identity accounts, commonly known as “sock puppets,” which were used to disguise activities to artificially boost the number of likes on his speeches released on Facebook. While false or misleading information targeted politicians such as Abir Moussi and Rached Ghannouchi, as well as members of the government, no major piece of disinformation targeted election candidates. Despite the fact-checking initiatives’ focus on television and radio shows that targeted broader audiences, the reach of flagged pieces was limited compared with that of online manipulative posts that went viral.

Legal Framework

Online and offline content in Tunisia is subject to a legal framework that unduly restricts freedom of expression. Although the constitution guarantees

freedom of expression and opinion, a combination of laws from the Ben Ali era that criminalize peaceful speech and provide for prison terms are actively used against dissenting voices, contrary to Tunisia’s international obligations.¹⁴⁰

In addition, Decree-Law 54-2022 (DL 54) on cybercrime further curtailed freedom of expression.¹⁴¹ It introduced disproportionate prison sentences of up to 10 years, depending on the person targeted by disinformation, for vaguely defined offenses, such as the distribution of “false news.” This contradicts Tunisia’s international and regional commitments.¹⁴² It also provided authorities with wide powers to monitor people’s internet and telecommunications use and to collect personal data on vague grounds, such as to “help reveal the truth,” which is at odds with international standards on privacy and data protection.¹⁴³

Authorities have repeatedly targeted critical voices, arresting and prosecuting bloggers, activists, internet users, and journalists because of their social media posts and news articles, using the legal framework as a tool to curtail criticism rather than seek redress.¹⁴⁴ This included prosecutions of civilians before military courts.¹⁴⁵ Strategic lawsuits have resulted in prison sentences and fines, leading to self-censorship, which is a staggering setback from 2011.

138 [U.N. Report on Disinformation and freedom of expression and opinion](#), A/HRC/47/25, 2021.

139 This included, among others, false information on results and turnout, misleading pictures, false statements attributed to the head of the ISIE, and false information on a page impersonating the prime minister, on the name of the next president of the parliament, fact-checked in particular by Tunifact, Falso, Nawaat, and ICheck.

140 It includes laws such as the Penal Code, the Telecommunications Code, the Military Justice Code, the 2015 Anti-Terrorism Law, and the Decree-Law 54-2022 on cybercrime. Laws include provisions criminalizing offenses such as insults against the head of state; defamation; knowingly harming or disturbing others’ comfort via public telecommunications networks; insulting the flag or the army; publication of false information. [U.N. General Comment 34](#), Para. 38 states that “all public figures, including those exercising the highest political authority such as heads of state and government, are legitimately subject to criticism and political opposition,” see Para. 47 on defamation. See also AU Declaration of Principles of Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Africa ([AU DPFEA](#)), Principles 22.3 notes that “States shall amend criminal laws on defamation and libel in favor of civil sanctions which must themselves be necessary and proportionate,” and 23.3.

141 In September, [38 Tunisian and international CSOs](#) jointly demanded the immediate withdrawal of DL 54.

142 U.N. General Comment 34, para. 25 and 38 state that “a norm, to be characterized as a ‘law,’ must be formulated with sufficient precision to enable an individual to regulate his or her conduct accordingly,” and “laws should not provide for more severe penalties solely on the basis of the identity of the person that may have been impugned”; the AU DPFEA, Principle 22.2 notes that “states shall repeal laws that criminalize sedition, insult and publication of false news.” See also [the joint declaration on freedom of expression and “fake news,” disinformation and propaganda by the U.N., OSCE, OAS and ACHPR](#), Section 2.a.

143 ICCPR, Article 17.1: “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence,” [U.N. General Comment 16](#), Para. 8 states that “relevant legislation must specify in detail the precise circumstances in which such interferences may be permitted.”

144 According to [Amnesty International](#), judicial authorities have investigated or prosecuted at least 31 people, including journalists, lawyers, and members of Tunisia’s dissolved parliament, over their public criticism of the authorities since July 2021. The Center documented 10 cases of prosecution under DL 54 for freedom-of-speech offenses. Charges were brought by the minister of justice in most of the cases. Two prison sentences (one-year and 10-year) were pronounced against a journalist and a citizen under the Anti-Terrorism law in November and December, for not revealing the journalist’s sources, and for “insulting the President and committing an atrocious crime against the President of the Republic” in a Facebook post.

145 [Guidelines of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights](#) states that military courts should not “in any circumstances whatsoever have jurisdiction over civilians.”

Several incidents occurred that undermined media freedom during the elections. On Nov. 11, the minister of justice filed a complaint against a journalist from the online outlet Business News based on DL 54, after the publication of an article critical of the prime minister. The move was contrary to international standards.¹⁴⁶

In the lead-up to the first round of elections, the ISIE sent at least three warning letters to individuals and media outlets that had published news and posts critical of them, threatening to sue them under DL 54. After the first round, 29 CSOs jointly denounced the practices of the ISIE, which they claimed lessened freedom of opinion and expression. On Feb. 13, the director of Mosaïque FM, Tunisia's most popular radio station, was arrested and prosecuted for money laundering and illicit enrichment. His lawyer claimed that he was jailed for "having used the editorial line of the radio to undermine the head of State and the State symbols, and to poison the situation in the country."¹⁴⁷

Media outlets and journalists faced various other challenges, including financial unsustainability, reduced access to public information, and increased offline and online violence, which undermined their ability to report effectively on electoral matters.¹⁴⁸ Following the two rounds of elections, the National Syndicate of Tunisian Journalists (SNJT) issued statements condemning the increased challenges faced by journalists, particularly on election day, compared with 2019.¹⁴⁹ The most common issue reported was the lack of access to election-related information, including statistics on turnout. The limited access to official information also hindered the work of fact-checking initiatives,

creating a vacuum of verified information that allowed false, manipulative news to circulate, including on election day.¹⁵⁰

Candidates were required to declare to the IRIE the social media accounts they intended to use for campaigns, which were to be monitored by the ISIE.

Although the authorities initiated several efforts to provide civil servants with clarifications on how to provide access to information while ensuring data protection, data protection was mentioned several times as the main reason for not sharing information with Center observers and other organizations.¹⁵¹ Several interlocutors advocated for an update of the Personal Data Protection Law, and the independence of the Data Protection Authority (INPDP) was at times questioned. The role of the INPDP in enhancing data privacy during the electoral process was limited. This was due, in part, to its limited budget and staffing, which affected its ability to monitor data privacy practices. International best practices recommend establishing independent authorities with powers and resources to monitor data privacy practices.¹⁵²

The election law, which included provisions regarding the campaign that applied both online and offline, lacked precise definitions and did not fully encompass the nuances of social media. This led to confusion, with IRIEs and candidates having different understandings and interpretations of legal provisions on the use of political ads online. Although the election law did not explicitly prohibit

¹⁴⁶ See the U.N. Human Rights Committee noted in General Comment 34, para. 38 and 42: "The penalization of a media outlet, publishers or journalist solely for being critical of the government or the political social system espoused by the government can never be considered to be a necessary restriction of freedom of expression." See also Para. 12 of the [UNHCR Resolution 39/6 on safety of journalists](#).

¹⁴⁷ He was successively brought before the anti-terrorist and financial justice departments and jailed on Feb. 20.

¹⁴⁸ According to the SNJT, 36 of the 232 issues (15.5%) recorded against journalists between November 2021 and October 2022 were perpetrated by election officials, mostly by heads of polling centers.

¹⁴⁹ Between Dec. 10 and 20, the SNJT recorded 28 issues involving journalists, compared with 18 in 2019. Journalists were prohibited from working or not given information in 85% of the cases. Almost half of the issues involved heads of polling stations; three cases involved IRIE representatives; and four involved ISIE representatives.

¹⁵⁰ During the second round, contradictory posts and news articles circulated on the polling station President Saïed was registered in, and the reason why he was not observed voting. In the absence of reliable information, pages started circulating rumors that he was in the hospital.

¹⁵¹ On Oct. 4, the National Authority for Access to Information (INAI) and the Data Protection Authority (INPDP) launched a guide titled "Reconciling the right of access to information and the right to personal data protection" for civil servants. A few days after, the president of Mourakiboun held a press conference to point out the obstacles the organization was facing in accessing referendum-related information from the ISIE and the National Institute of Statistics. She stressed that the refusal of requests for access to information could not be justified by the protection of personal data.

¹⁵² [UNGA: Resolution 73/179 on the Right to Privacy in the Digital Age](#), para. 6.g.

the use of ads on social media, the ban on the use of foreign money to campaign was interpreted as a prohibition on social media ads by many candidates.¹⁵³

While disinformation was limited, harmful and dangerous speech was pervasive.

In compliance with the law, the ISIE established a social media monitoring unit (SMMU) consisting of 18 monitors to monitor online and social media.¹⁵⁴ Candidates were required to declare to the IRIE the social media accounts they intended to use for campaigns, which were to be monitored by the ISIE. However, the ISIE did not disclose the list of monitored accounts or provide information on its methodology, undermining the transparency of the process.¹⁵⁵

According to Carter Center observers, the IRIE reviewed the violations identified by the ISIE, and a limited number of them were referred for prosecution.¹⁵⁶ Some of the identified violations were dismissed, and some resulted in oral or written warnings to candidates. Many violations were offline violations captured through social media rather than online violations.¹⁵⁷ The ISIE did not publicly release information about the online violations captured; nor did it provide details on the warnings or sanctions applied. While not legally required to do so, releasing more extensive information may have helped to build public trust in the process

and hold online perpetrators of manipulation and harmful speech accountable.

In Tunisia, freedom of expression faces significant challenges due to a legal framework that restricts it. Authorities continue to enforce laws from the Ben Ali era that criminalize peaceful speech and provide for prison terms, contradicting Tunisia's constitutional guarantees and international obligations. The recent Decree-Law 54-2022 on cybercrime introduced disproportionate prison sentences and extensive monitoring powers, further curtailing freedom of expression and privacy. Dissenting voices, including bloggers, activists, and journalists, face arrests and prosecutions, leading to self-censorship. During elections, media freedom is undermined, and journalists struggle with financial sustainability and limited access to information. Transparency and accountability in handling online violations are lacking, eroding public trust in the system. The Center recommends repealing Decree-Law 54 and other restrictive legal provisions to restore freedom of expression. It further suggests a comprehensive review and amendment of the legal framework to safeguard both freedom of expression and opinion.

Social Media Monitoring Findings

While states have an obligation to create an environment that enables freedom of expression and opinion, including online environments, social media platforms also have a responsibility to uphold

¹⁵³ Tunisian dinars were not accepted by Meta to pay for political ads on its platforms.

¹⁵⁴ Electoral law, Article 71. The ISIE social media monitoring unit (SMMU) monitored violations committed by candidates on their social media accounts, on online media, and online pages of TV and radio stations. Violations could be referred to the prosecutor or to the IRIEs' legal teams for review, warnings, or sanctions. The law provided for jail terms or cancellation of votes. In the absence of a joint decision between the HAICA and the ISIE on media monitoring, the ISIE announced on Nov. 24 that it had created unit to monitor the campaign in the media. On Feb. 14, Imed Barboura, the ISIE's media advisor, declared that over 54% of the messages circulated in media and social media during the legislative campaigns carried hate speech. However, he did not provide further details on the definition of hate speech adopted by the authority.

¹⁵⁵ U.N. General Comment 34, Para. 19 notes that "States should proactively put in the public domain government information of public interest." See Also [ACHPR: Model Law on Access to Information for Africa](#), Art. 2(f). The ACHPR [Guidelines on access to information and elections in Africa](#), General Principle 4 adds that "all relevant electoral stakeholders are obliged to create, keep, organize, maintain and manage information about the electoral process in machine-readable formats and in a manner that facilitates the right of access to information."

¹⁵⁶ A majority of IRIEs shared information with LTOs about the violations they reviewed before the first round. From the information received, the highest number of violations identified on social media was in Nabeul 1; however, 24 of the 28 violations identified by the ISIE were dismissed by Nabeul 1 IRIE after review.

¹⁵⁷ Offline violations captured online included among others the use of administrative resources, use of the Tunisian flag, unannounced campaign activities, unannounced party affiliation, and use of children in the campaign. Violations perpetrated online included breaches of campaign silence, hate speech, unauthorized use of Facebook pages, and verbal violence.

human rights and facilitate the enjoyment of those rights.¹⁵⁸

According to social media monitoring conducted by The Carter Center, political narratives concerning the overall political situation in Tunisia overshadowed campaign messages, resulting in limited visibility for candidates' information online.¹⁵⁹ Political narratives were more numerous, and Facebook users showed more engagement with political narratives than with posts shared by parties supporting the elections or candidates.¹⁶⁰

While disinformation was limited, harmful and dangerous speech was pervasive. About 55% of the political and campaign messages analyzed displayed a negative tone; 55% shared discrediting narratives; and 52% contained accusations without proof, insults, dehumanizing rhetoric, shaming, or strong criticism.¹⁶¹ The Center identified manipulative content in 40% of political and campaign messages analyzed and networks of pages deliberately distorting online information. This prevented voters from forming opinions free of undue influence.¹⁶² The Center also identified instances of incitement to violence and hate speech targeting specific groups, which had the potential to impede their ability to participate in public life and was incompatible with democratic elections.¹⁶³

Online Campaign

During the first round, the Center's social media monitoring unit (SMMU) monitored a selection of 10 candidates from Nov. 25 to Dec. 17.¹⁶⁴ The most-used platform for campaigning was Facebook.

The 10 candidates had an uneven online presence, releasing from zero to more than 60 posts. The monitoring of the second round was based on the full list of public pages of the 262 candidates. The SMMU collected the 50 most engaged posts on a weekly basis Jan. 16-29.¹⁶⁵ In total, 27 candidates appeared in the monitoring, with some 10 pages forming 75% of the posts monitored, highlighting the uneven use of Facebook by candidates and the preeminence of a small number of pages.

The scale of candidates' followers also varied greatly, from a handful to more than 17,000, resulting in unequal engagement of Facebook users and uneven visibility of their online campaigns. While several candidates mentioned the absence of public funding as a reason to campaign online, some chose not to do so, at times because of the uneven use of Facebook throughout the country, the fading participation of youth (the most active group of voters online), the small size of constituencies that favored in-person campaigns, and the lack of engagement that the elections generated overall.

Messages shared by candidates focused on the campaign and were overwhelmingly neutral—93% and 94% during the two campaigns.¹⁶⁶ While a few posts criticized the political environment, the “decade of chaos,” or the economic situation, messages were mostly free from discreditation, derogatory speech, or manipulative content. Closer to the second round, the share of posts containing forms of emotional manipulation reached its maximum, at 16%. Only one in five posts analyzed mentioned candidates' platforms.¹⁶⁷ Most of the

158 U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights; U.N., AOS, AU, OSCE Joint Declaration on “Freedom of expression, fake news, disinformation and propaganda,” 2017.

159 The Carter Center's social media monitoring unit was led by an international technical analyst and four Tunisian analysts. The social media monitoring unit conducted monitoring and analysis from November 2022 through February 2023.

160 Political narratives analyzed by the Center generated 10-40 times more interactions than the messages released by the candidates and parties supporting the elections.

161 Out of 2,734 political, electoral, and campaign messages analyzed.

162 ICCPR, General Comment 25, Para. 19: “Voters should be able to form opinions independently, free of violence or threat of violence, compulsion, inducement or manipulative interference of any kind.”

163 “Violence or the threat of violence, intimidation or harassment, or incitement of such acts through hate speech and aggressive political rhetoric are incompatible with democratic elections.” [EU: Handbook for European Union Election Observation, Second Edition](#), p. 50.

164 For the first round, considering the high number of candidates and the unequal use of social media throughout the country, the SMMU selected a list of 10 candidates based on their established presence online through public Facebook page, their relevance, geographical and professional representation, and LTO reports: Abdelnasser Najeh, Abdelrazak Aouidat, Amira Charfeddine, Hatem Boubakri, Jamel Jouili, Mohamed Ali Bouaziz, Nabil Khenine, Syrine Mrabet, Walid Krichen, Zakia Kasraoui.

165 Some candidates did not rely on pages but on individual profiles to campaign online. CrowdTangle, the tool used to collect data from Facebook, did not allow the Center to collect data from individual profiles. Therefore, this analysis is based only on the candidates' public pages.

166 The SMMU analyzed 361 posts shared by candidates during the two campaigns.

167 Respectively, 15% and 37% during the first and second rounds.

posts reported on campaign events, candidates' media appearances, or campaign pictures and slogans, without providing insights on the platforms of candidates. The SMMU identified several violations of the official period of campaign silence on Facebook, which were in direct breach of the election law.

Ads could not be paid in Tunisian dinars on Meta's platforms. At the same time, transparency requirements of the platform required that the currency used to pay ads matched the currency of the country targeted.

In addition to candidates' pages and profiles, the SMMU observed that candidates relied on supporters' pages and local infotainment pages, as well as various public or private groups to share messages. While some pages or groups were directly linked to the candidates or had political affiliations in support of the July 25 process, others were not directly connected but were occasionally used to support candidates. At least one candidate was sanctioned for using a page that she did not declare to the ISIE for campaign purposes. However, the ISIE did not release the list of pages candidates declared they would use to campaign on Facebook, complicating the assessment of the use of such pages and groups by independent monitoring initiatives.

Only a limited number of candidates resorted to political ads on Facebook, which in most cases cost

less than US\$200.¹⁶⁸ According to Center observers, some candidates interpreted the prohibition on the use of foreign financing to campaign as a ban on political ads on Facebook.¹⁶⁹ Ads could not be paid in Tunisian dinars on Meta's platforms. At the same time, transparency requirements of the platform required that the currency used to pay ads matched the currency of the country targeted. This prevented political ads paid in foreign currency from running in Tunisia.¹⁷⁰ Requirements of the election law coupled with those of Meta did not provide for a conducive environment to run ads.¹⁷¹ The SMMU identified some ads run by contestants or political pages that were not categorized as "issues, elections, or politics" ads by the platform, but that nevertheless contained campaign messages that kept running. Several of these ads were without disclaimers, which is contrary to the platform standards.

Distortion of the Online Space

The SMMU monitored electoral keywords to assess the election-related information shared online, as well as political keywords to evaluate the prevalence of harmful speech or manipulative content.¹⁷² From Nov. 1 to Jan. 29, the SMMU also monitored the most engaging posts shared by parties supporting and boycotting the elections.¹⁷³

Besides the pages of politicians, parties, public figures, and media, supporter pages and shadow pages also had a notable influence on shaping the online discourse.¹⁷⁴ These pages actively promoted their agendas either in favor of or against Kais Saïed, Ennahdha, or Abir Moussi, largely resorting to discreditation, derogatory speech, and manipulative

168 The SMMU observed that some 5% of the candidates that qualified for the second round ran political ads on their Facebook pages identified by the Center.

169 Some candidates let Carter Center observers know that they published Facebook ads through agencies to bypass the ban on foreign financing. The disclaimer of several ads on Facebook indicated names of agencies as the entity that paid for the ad.

170 According to information on Meta Ad Library, the platform took down most of the political ads on Facebook because the currency and country targeted did not match.

171 "Governments, electoral management bodies and relevant oversight agencies must act swiftly to bring legal definitions of political advertising up to date, thereby grounding in law essential responsibilities on content, financing and placement of online political ads that correspond to online platforms, political activists, sponsors and other intermediaries." Transparency International: [Paying for Views: Solving Transparency and Accountability Risks in Online Political Advertising](#), p. 1

172 The SMMU collected respectively the 30 and 20 most engaging posts on a weekly basis and manually coded those gathering more than 50 interactions. For more information, see annexes.

173 The SMMU exported the 20 most engaging posts collectively shared by lists of parties on a weekly basis via CrowdTangle and manually coded the ones gathering more than 50 interactions for the parties boycotting the elections, and those gathering more than 30 interactions for the parties supporting the elections. Exceptionally, this limit was lowered to 30 due to the low engagement part of these posts generated, and in order to reach statistical relevance.

174 While supporters' pages had explicit political agendas, shadow pages did not clearly display their agenda, affiliation, or information on their administrator, which did not allow for transparency on the source of messages.

content, which distorted the online space.¹⁷⁵ They were among the most active and engaged pages and fueled divisive and polarizing rhetoric on Facebook. Some shadow pages, such as Tunisia FM, Carthage FM, and Chabaket Akhbar Tounes (Tunisia News Network), misleadingly presented themselves as media pages to deceive users.

Harmful and stigmatizing speech was rampant, with about 60% of the political and electoral messages analyzed sharing discrediting narratives or derogatory speech.¹⁷⁶ This led to a toxic level of polarization online, which prevented respectful debate and weakened the deliberative component of democracy during the election.¹⁷⁷ The SMMU monitored repeated instances of use of abusive and divisive terms such as “traitors, murderers, mercenaries, black decade, decade of chaos, terrorists, Zionist, freemason, agents (of the U.S. or France), and thieves.”¹⁷⁸

The Center also identified over a hundred instances of hate speech.¹⁷⁹ Most of them were based on ideological grounds using the term “El’khwajia.”¹⁸⁰ However, the SMMU also monitored some instances of hate speech based

on gender, race, and anti-Semitic terms, which are all protected categories, including in Facebook community standards. Hate speech instances were shared by politicians, public figures, and regular citizens. Although groups targeted were not at immediate risks of offline violence, it triggered continuous verbal violence online, engaging the audience on Facebook.¹⁸¹ While the ISIE monitored such narratives, it did not communicate about them during the electoral process, which perhaps would have helped raise awareness and hold perpetrators accountable.

The SMMU also identified threatening and inciting instances, such as posts calling to “beat and cut off” supporters of Ennahdha or threatening newly elected MPs if they joined a political party in the future.¹⁸² International best practices state that violence or the threat of violence, hate speech, and aggressive political rhetoric are not compatible with democratic elections. They call on states and online platforms to combat such instances, including by promoting tolerance, education, de-monetization, and counter-speech.¹⁸³

175 The Center monitoring results show that supporters’ pages and shadow pages formed 37%, 36%, and 80% of the negative content, respectively, shared about Kais Saïed, Ennahdha, and Abir Moussi. Supporters’ pages and shadow pages also shared 22% and 24%, respectively, of the electoral narratives discrediting the electoral process, followed by media pages at 17%.

176 Out of 2,373 posts analyzed by the SMMU, sharing political and electoral narratives, or shared by political parties, between Nov. 1 and Jan. 29. This excludes messages shared by candidates.

177 Toxic polarization is an analysis category used by V-Dem Institute to assess the level of democracy in a country. It “captures declining respect for legitimate opposition, pluralism, and counterarguments.” V-Dem Institute, Democracy Report 2022, [Autocratization Changing Nature?](#)

178 In addition, specific degrading terms are attached to supporters of the main Tunisian politicians: *Zakafounas* (supporters of Kais Saïed, referred to as “Zakafouna,” an old Arabic word he used once in a speech), *Ghananichs* (referring to Ghannouchi’s supporters), black crows (Ennahdha leaders and supporters), *Tajamouists* (referring to the followers of the Free Doustourian Party as followers of the Democratic Constitutional Rally party), and *Ba’arir* (followers of Abir Moussi).

179 When assessing hate speech instances, the SMMU referred to the [Rabat Plan of Action](#) and its six-part threshold test for hate speech, as well as the [Council of Europe Toolkit on combating hate speech during electoral processes](#). The Rabat Plan of Action suggests a high threshold for defining restrictions on freedom of expression or incitement to hatred, and for the application of Article 20 of the ICCPR.

180 *في جن او غلا* is a Tunisian dialect transformation describing a group of people, based on the word “Ikhwān” (brotherhood, as in Muslim brotherhood). The term refers to the Ennahdha Party since the party identified as the Tunisian chapter of the Muslim brotherhood, but it became a common stigmatizing term (or insult) against any individual with signs of Islamic practices (beard, praying, veil).

181 A meeting was held in December 2022 between Meta representatives and Tunisian CSOs to discuss misuse of Facebook during elections, including hate speech instances, to improve the reporting of harmful speech.

182 Posts called to beat and eradicate Ennahdha supporters, and, to a lesser extent, other categories including corrupt politicians and so-called “traitors.”

183 “States parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of persons on one color or ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any form, and undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination and, to this end, with due regard to the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the rights expressly set forth in article 5 of this Convention,” [U.N.: International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination](#), art. 4(a); “The Human Rights Council, (...) 15. Stresses the importance of combating advocacy of hatred on the Internet, which constitutes incitement to discrimination or violence, including by promoting tolerance, education and dialogue,” [UNHRC: Resolution 38/7 on the Promotion, Protection and Enjoyment of Human Rights on the Internet](#), para. 15. Regarding the responsibility of online platforms, the [UNHRC: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression](#), Para. 58.f states that: “In addition to the principles adopted in earlier reports and in keeping with the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, all companies in the ICT sector should: (...) (f) As part of an overall effort to address hate speech, develop tools that promote individual autonomy, security and free expression, and involve de-amplification, de-monetization, education, counter-speech, reporting and training as alternatives, when appropriate, to the banning of accounts and the removal of content.”

Harmful and stigmatizing speech was rampant, with about 60% of the political and electoral messages analyzed sharing discrediting narratives or derogatory speech.

Manipulative content was widespread in the messages analyzed by the SMMU.¹⁸⁴ Emotional manipulation was the most common, based on the use of emphatic and divisive terms rather than facts, followed by partial or misleading information and plot theories. Several pieces of information manipulation circulated widely, suggesting coordination between networks of pages sharing the same content in short time frames, at times changing the titles or pictures to avoid visual evidence of repetition.¹⁸⁵ Networks also relied on pages owned by legitimate individuals and pages sharing the same administrators to amplify their reach, imposter pages posing as media to deceive users, and pages with administrators located abroad.¹⁸⁶ Such practices compromised the ability of voters to form opinions free of manipulative interference.

The social media monitoring findings in Tunisia's elections highlight dominant political

narratives, pervasive negative speech, and widespread manipulative content. These issues led to a toxic online environment with polarization and hate speech. Candidates' uneven use of Facebook for campaigning resulted in unequal engagement and visibility. Violations of campaign silence rules occurred, and shadow pages promoted divisive rhetoric. Hate speech and incitement were prevalent, with insufficient accountability. Manipulative content compromised voters' ability to form unbiased opinions. Overall, these findings underscore the challenges in maintaining a healthy online discourse during the election period. The Center recommends that the legislature amend the electoral law to include clear provisions for social media in political campaigning. The ISIE should cooperate with social media platforms and CSOs to combat false information, while the Independent High Authority for Audiovisual Communication should collaborate with the ISIE to ensure fair and transparent social media use during elections in order to create an environment that enables freedom of expression and opinion in line with Tunisia's international obligations.

184 Manipulative content was captured in 45% of 2,373 political and electoral narratives analyzed.

185 Disinformation claiming that Abir Moussi received foreign funds during the 2019 elections; information and disinformation battle over the court appearance of Rached Ghannouchi on Nov. 10; discreditation and insults of Abir Moussi by pages with high number of followers; coordinated narratives shared by imposter media pages on the killing of a young contraband trader to discredit Kais Saïed.

186 For more information, see case studies in annexes.

Civil Society

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1948, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) emphasize the right of all citizens

to take part in the government of their country. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights further elaborates on the right to participate in public affairs, including the right to vote and

Ron Borden



A Tunisian man marks his ballot at a polling station bearing the logo of the Independent High Authority for Elections (ISIE).

stand for elections. These obligations extend to all member states of the U.N., underscoring the global commitment to ensuring that individuals can actively engage in the civic affairs of their respective countries, contributing to the principles of democracy, accountability, and human rights worldwide.

The Center communicated and met regularly with a range of Tunisian citizen observer groups to share analysis and information on observed irregularities before and after election day. Deployment and contact information for long-term observers and election-day deployment plans also were shared. Representatives of citizen observer groups were invited to brief the Carter Center's observers and leadership.

The election legislation specifies the prerequisites for both local and international election observation, and it generally aligns with international observation standards. Since the 2011 elections for the Constituent Assembly, numerous CSOs have committed to monitoring the electoral process to protect its integrity and report any issues. Despite a lack of support from the ISIE for voter education, many CSOs were active during the referendum and election, engaging with voters and observing and reporting on the process.

For the referendum, the ISIE failed to deliver observer accreditation badges on time, while for parliamentary elections, domestic observers reported no major difficulties with accreditation. The ISIE accredited a total of 5,000 domestic observers and 124 international observers for the referendum. For the parliamentary elections, the ISIE said there were 4,000 domestic observers and 460 accredited international observers.

CSOs observed all aspects of the electoral process, with several groups forming alliances to share tasks and information. These included the Tunisian Mediterranean Center (TU-MED), which deployed 104 observers for the first round and 153 for the second, focusing on gender-based observation in rural and border areas across eight constituencies (Jendouba, Siliana, Gafsa, Kasserine, Kebili, Touzeur, Medenine, and Tataouine).

The Mourakiboun network conducted sample-based observation for the referendum, deploying two shifts of 1,000 stationary observers each, 300 spare observers, 600 supervisors and mobile observers, and 100 long-term observers, the latter of whom were responsible for the coordination between electoral districts. In addition, Mourakiboun conducted a parallel vote tabulation to increase public confidence in the referendum results. For the first round of parliamentary elections, Mourakiboun deployed 500 stationary observers to assess the voting, sorting, and counting processes, as well as 342 supervisors who assessed the process at the delegation level and 100 long-term observers. For the second round, it deployed more than 800 observers across 131 constituencies. These observers covered 445 polling stations, with 445 fixed observers, 286 mobile observer coordinators, and 80 long-term observers.

ATIDE deployed 300 observers nationwide to observe the electoral campaign and 650 observers on election day, focusing on polling stations with the highest number of voters. For the second round, ATIDE deployed 400 observers across all 24 governorates, using fixed observation in pilot polling centers and periodic mobile observation in every polling center.

Youth Without Borders (JSF) deployed approximately 392 mobile observers for the first round and 325 observers for the second round, covering 12 governorates: Ariana, Ben Arous, Manouba, Bizerte, Jendouba, Beja, Nabeul, Sfax, Gabes, Sousse, and Medenine.

CHAHED Observatory had a regional coordinator in each governorate and deployed 1,050 observers to cover the electoral campaign and public administration, ensuring impartiality toward any candidate. For the second round, CHAHED Observatory deployed 541 observers across 131 constituencies.

The Tunisian Organization for the Defense of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (OTDDPH) deployed 120 mobile observers and 24 coordinators nationwide to assess the accessibility of the voting process for people with disabilities. For the

second round, they deployed 117 mobile observers, including over 20 people with disabilities.

Following election day, CHAHED Observatory,¹⁸⁷ JSF, Mourakiboun,¹⁸⁸ and TU-MED¹⁸⁹ reiterated their criticism of the unilateral amendment to the electoral law. They also criticized the new electoral system for excluding women and young candidates, which for both groups was exacerbated by the absence of public funding. Mourakiboun criticized the legal framework for disregarding crucial electoral standards. All mentioned the low-key nature of the campaign. CHAHED reported insufficient training of polling station workers and stated that observers were denied access to the counting operation. Mourakiboun announced that, according to its data, the turnout was 11% and asked the ISIE to publish the minutes of each polling station. IBSAR and OTDDPH emphasized that people with disabilities were virtually absent during the electoral campaign, and 42% of the observed polling stations and offices were ill-adapted and difficult to access.

After the second-round vote, citizen observer organizations criticized the lack of consultation with CSOs and journalists. Mourakiboun remarked that the ISIE's communication strategy was unclear, lacked openness, and neglected to provide information at polling places on election day. It accused polling station staff of withholding information

on voter turnout from observers and journalists. According to TU-MED, 70% of female candidates experienced pressure and harassment after being front-runners in the first round. One of the biggest challenges noted by OTTDP was that 50% of the polling places and stations were insufficiently equipped and challenging to access.

CSOs displayed commitment to observing the electoral process, actively engaging with voters, and providing valuable observations and press conferences summarizing their findings and reports.

CSOs displayed commitment to observing the electoral process, actively engaging with voters, and providing valuable observations and press conferences summarizing their findings and reports. They deployed a significant number of observers across the country, ensuring comprehensive coverage of the electoral proceedings. They formed a collaborative alliance and utilized various observation techniques, including parallel vote tabulation. However, the absence of substantial support for voter education from the ISIE created a notable challenge in ensuring an informed electorate, which is crucial for a truly fair and democratic electoral process.

187 CHAHED Observatory press briefing, Dec.18, 2022. <https://www.facebook.com/observatoire.chahed/posts/pfbid0P8Lj5yXjCB1BxsQzgGihBBvpKsWw5tMALAeuLsvBf26DVLNgsQH5nFeif2KWx5vl>

188 Mourakiboun press conference, Dec. 18, 2022. <https://www.facebook.com/Mourakiboun/videos/1144583122852772>

189 Wataniya 1 report on TU-MED press conference: <https://www.facebook.com/centreTU-MED/posts/pfbid0Xe5akEgpMFwsxjNGu44qLr9ToCQbnU8djiHly2Dg4gR1Q6ffTCb3ZUvi9LjS1fFFI>

| Gender and Participatory Rights

International and regional treaties widely recognize the right of women, youth, and persons with disabilities to participate in political and public

affairs, including the right to vote and be elected.¹⁹⁰ Equality and nondiscrimination are overarching international obligations necessary to guarantee the

Ronald Borden



A Tunisian woman takes part in voting on election day. The turnout of women, youth, and persons with disabilities on polling days – both in real terms and as a percentage – decreased continuously between the referendum, the first round, and the second round of parliamentary elections, indicating a dispiriting trend of disengagement.

¹⁹⁰ ICCPR, Article 25, UDHR, Article 21, AU ACHPR, Article 13, CEDAW, Article 7, CRPD, Article 29, Youth African Charter, Article 11.

enjoyment of these rights by individuals regardless of their race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, or birth or other status.¹⁹¹ Temporary measures creating preferential treatment or quotas are recommended to achieve gender equality and women's integration in politics.¹⁹²

Although they account for more than half of the population, women and youth, defined in Tunisian law as those under 35, remain underrepresented in governmental institutions. Persons with disabilities are rarely represented in government and have never been elected to parliament. All these groups and others such as Black Tunisians, the Amazigh community, non-Muslim citizens, LGBTIQ+ persons, citizens from poor/low-income neighborhoods, and remote or rural areas, face societal and institutional discrimination that hinders their political participation as voters, observers, election workers, and poll watchers.

Women's Political Participation

The 2022 constitution retains most of the provisions on women's rights from the 2014 constitution, including articles guaranteeing women equal rights with men and aspirational provisions encouraging the government to move toward equal representation and parity in elected bodies.¹⁹³ These provisions bring Tunisia in line with its international commitments and obligations, at least on paper.¹⁹⁴ However, in the observed referendum and election there were no concrete mechanisms in place to implement such provisions.

July 25 Referendum

Most CSOs that work on the rights of women and other marginalized populations boycotted the referendum process. The National Union of Tunisian Women (UNFT) was the only women-focused CSO

that actively campaigned for a "yes" vote. Out of the 105 individuals registered as campaign participants with the ISIE, 25 were women, all registered to campaign in favor of "yes." However, none of them conducted a visible campaign, and their motives for registering were never made clear.¹⁹⁵

Compared with the 2019 presidential elections, the number of women voters decreased by 641,341 votes.

Women accounted for 50.5% of registered voters for the referendum, and men 49.5%. The number of women represented an increase of 1,070,540 from the 2019 voter list, while the number of men increased by 1,097,395 voters. The voter turnout of 30.5% included 1,681,076 men and 1,149,018 women. Compared with the 2019 presidential elections, the number of women voters decreased by 641,341 votes.

No women served on the ISIE board, even though the law on common provisions for independent constitutional bodies states that "the principle of parity between women and men must be respected in the composition of the boards of the (constitutional) bodies. In case the president of the body is a woman, then the vice-president is a man and vice versa." As in prior elections in Tunisia, women were well represented in the electoral administration, especially as polling station staff, but underrepresented in leadership positions. Women represent 24.7% of elections officials at the IRIE level.¹⁹⁶

According to the findings of the Independent High Authority for Audiovisual Communication (HAICA) on media monitoring during the referendum campaign, gender equality was not respected by TV and radio stations that covered the campaign.

¹⁹¹ UDHR, Article 2, ICCPR, Articles 2 and 26, CEDAW, Articles 2, 3, and 4; CRPD, Articles 3 and 4.

¹⁹² CEDAW, Article 4, CEDAW General Recommendation No. 5: Temporary Special Measures.

¹⁹³ Article 23, 2022 constitution (Article 21, 2014 constitution)

¹⁹⁴ Tunisia signed the Convention on the Political Rights of Women in 1968, and in 1969 joined the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and fully adopted the provisions of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). In 2018, Tunisia signed the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (the Maputo Protocol).

¹⁹⁵ The Center attempted to contact several but either received no response or their contact information was out of date.

¹⁹⁶ ISIE official document on composition of IRIEs.

While men who campaigned in favor of the referendum received seven hours of campaign coverage on TV channels and 46 hours on the radio, women received 22 minutes on TV channels and three hours on the radio. As for those opposed to the referendum, men received four hours of campaign coverage on TV channels and 44 hours on radio, while women were allotted 20 minutes on TV channels and eight hours on radio.

The total number of women MPs in the national assembly amounts to 15.6%—24 out of 154 in-country seats.

Parliamentary Elections

The 2022 constitution mandates that “the state shall achieve parity between men and women in elected assemblies.” However, the majoritarian system adopted for the 2022 election does not lend itself to the horizontal and vertical parity measures that can be applied to a proportional list system.¹⁹⁷ Most political parties and almost all major women’s and human rights CSOs stated that one of the reasons for boycotting the election was the switch to a majoritarian system that guaranteed a drop in the parliamentary representation of women and youth.¹⁹⁸ Even those who supported the president and the July 25 process harshly criticized the new system for this reason.¹⁹⁹

In addition, the endorsement requirement and the absence of public funding were considered by almost all female candidates and aspirants, as well as the vast majority of CSOs met by the mission, as major hindrances for women to be able to run because they had lower incomes and/or were financial dependent on their husbands.

Only 212 women—14% of the total—submitted their candidacies for the parliamentary elections, and only 122—12% of the total—were accepted by the ISIE.²⁰⁰ This is the lowest percentage of women candidates since before the revolution.²⁰¹ There were no women candidates in 71 districts, tantamount to de facto reserved seats for men in nearly half of the parliament (47%).

While there were women competing in all governorates, they were less represented in southern districts compared with the northern and central areas.²⁰² For example, in Medenine, women made up less than 3% of candidates. The highest representation of women was found in Bizerte, Ben Arous, and Tunis, where women made up 23% of the candidates.

In 49 constituencies, a female candidate competed alone against one or more men. Most women were teachers, municipal civil servants, and CSO leaders, although their average level of education was higher than that of men. Most women were first-time candidates, whereas many men had some election experience or held elected positions as municipal councilors or mayors. This gap with men in terms of preparedness was mitigated partly by the fact that about half of the women had the

197 The election of the Constituent Assembly in 2011, as well as the 2014 and 2019 parliamentary elections, foresaw vertical parity with candidate lists alternating men and women. The 2018 municipal elections mandated vertical and horizontal parity, which ensured that men and women topped 50% of the lists. Reserved seats enable women or minorities’ representation in majoritarian systems. Feminist organizations proposed to designate even numbers of seats in all the districts, with half of them assigned to each gender, as in the election of the High Council of the Judiciary in 2016. This gender parity mechanism was not taken into consideration by the president.

198 In October, after the publication of the amendments of the electoral law were publicized within Decree-Law 55, Afek Tounes, Mashrou Tounes, Al Massar, and Al Raya al Wataniya announced their boycott of the elections, and cited among their reasons the fact that the new electoral system would undermine the representation of women and youth in parliament. All feminist and human rights CSOs that boycotted the referendum desisted from the election process, considering that it excluded women, youth, and persons with disabilities, while the majority of citizen observer groups repudiated the electoral law on these grounds.

199 Following the publication of the preliminary numbers of female candidacies by the ISIE, on Oct. 29, the president of the National Union of Tunisian Women, Radhia Jerbi, criticized the electoral law, which “undermined women’s rights” and failed to preserve the parity between men and women achieved of the previous legislation. After the closing of the candidate registration, the pro-Saïed party Tunisia Forward condemned the limited number of women and youth candidates, as this would affect the turnout.

200 Some 22.5% of men’s candidacies were rejected, compared with 42.5% of women’s candidacies.

201 In the 2019 elections, women accounted for 49% of the candidates on the lists thanks to the vertical parity obligation. They topped only 14.5% of lists, as there was no horizontal parity required.

202 In Médenine, Gabès, and Kasserine, women were absent from a majority of districts. In Sidi Bouzid, Tozeur, and el Kef, there was at least a woman competing in each of the districts.

opportunity to be trained by international CSOs.²⁰³ Many exchanged information, experience, and mutual support through informal networks. The majority of women candidates expressed support for the July 25 process and the president.

Three women were elected in the first round and 34 women reached the second round in 32 constituencies. In the second round, 21 women were elected. The total number of women MPs in the national assembly amounts to 15.6%—24 out of 154 in-country seats.²⁰⁴ This percentage exceeds the share of women candidates (12%) and is an indicator of women's capacity to win positions once given a chance to run, despite the unlevel playing field with men.²⁰⁵

Women's Participation as Voters

During the first round of the parliamentary elections, women represented 50.8% of registered voters, and 34% of the total turnout. In the second round, women's turnout fell to 32%, with almost 60,000 fewer women going to vote. The low turnout was attributed to women's lack of interest in politics, lack of awareness regarding the election, and lack of knowledge about the candidates. Some structural barriers also impacted rural women's participation, especially in remote areas, such as distance to polling stations and transportation costs, lack of time, and inadequate polling hours. These barriers were compounded by social roles and pressures exerted by men.²⁰⁶

Women's Participation in Election Administration and as Observers and Campaign Staff

Women made up 21% of IRIE board members; 10 out of the 27 IRIEs were chaired by a woman (37%), representing a twofold increase compared with the 2019 elections.²⁰⁷ Although women represented a minority of presidents of polling centers and polling stations, they were overrepresented as polling staff and ISIE campaign monitors for these elections.²⁰⁸

According to Carter Center LTOs, women's presence was extremely limited in most campaign activities, especially in rural areas. Often, campaign events took place in political cafes or weekly markets, which are considered in some regions as spaces for men. However, observers noted that young women were often represented in candidates' campaign staff. Women candidates tended to primarily use women and youth as campaign mobilizers, most often members of their families. Women were the most numerous citizen observers, particularly with youth and gender-focused organizations.²⁰⁹

Violence Against Women

Several women candidates from various governorates reported to the mission that they were the target of smear campaigns, derogatory comments, physical and verbal aggressions, and online harassment.²¹⁰ The citizen observer group TU-MED, which followed all the women candidates competing in the second round, reported that 27% of women faced online and offline incidents of violence.

Despite constitutional provisions, there were no mechanisms to promote women's participation in

203 Trainings in campaign conduct and strategy and public speaking and communication were provided before the start of the electoral campaign by the International Organization of Francophonie (OIF), the Arab Women Parliamentarians Network for Equality Ra'edat women in parliament network/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, and Action in the Mediterranean (AIM) to 60 women candidates from most governorates.

204 This rate is calculated on 154 seats, as seven seats were not open to election, due to the absence of candidates.

205 According to the database on women's representation in parliaments of Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU-Parline), <https://data.ipu.org/women-ranking?month=2&year=2023>, women represented 26.3% of MPs in the outgoing parliament, ranking Tunisia 88th of 187 countries. With 16.2% women in the next parliament, Tunisia would fall to 137th worldwide.

206 Automatic registration had a negative effect on some groups of women, as observed in the southern region, because they were assigned to polling stations far away from those of their male relatives and could not afford the journey.

207 Women's representation on IRIE boards followed a regional divide: Most of the IRIEs staffed entirely by men were in the center and southern regions, while the IRIEs chaired by women were mostly found in Great Tunis and the northern and coastal areas.

208 Carter Center observers noted that women made up at least 60% of the campaign monitors and in some governorates of the Great Tunis, they were up to 80% of this category of agents. This sharp increase in the proportion of women compared with 2019 was the result of high numbers of women applicants with university degrees that matched the job requirements, as no positive discrimination was put in place by the ISIE.

209 In Youth without Borders (JSF) and TU-MED, women made up to 70% of the observers deployed on the referendum and election days.

210 More than 40 women candidates reported instances to the mission over the whole period of elections. Most reported online abuse. In-person instances of violence include a threat by damaging the property of the candidate, physical assaults including being spit on, insults, and derogatory comments.

the 2022 elections. The percentage of women candidates was the lowest it had been in parliamentary elections in Tunisia since 2011. The Carter Center recommends adopting measures such as quotas or reserved seats to promote women candidates and ensure gender parity in elected assemblies, as constitutionally required within the context of the prevailing electoral system. To comply with the legislation ensuring gender parity at the executive level of independent constitutional bodies, the Center recommends including an equal number of men and women members on the ISIE board. Political parties can contribute to enhancing women's political participation by adopting internal regulations facilitating women's nomination to leadership positions and by encouraging candidacies from women and marginalized groups.

Youth Political Participation

Tunisians under age 35 represent 52.3% of the population.²¹¹ Challenges to youth participation include marginalization, mainly due to high unemployment rates, and a lack of interest in politics, reflecting strong disillusionment and distrust toward the political establishment.²¹² Young people are rarely found at higher levels of political party structures and decision-making positions, and their concerns are inadequately addressed in political platforms.

Young Tunisians were the main drivers of the 2011 revolution, but since then, the country has witnessed a steady decline in youth political participation. Tunisian youth have disengaged from voting, joining political parties, and running for office. Instead, they have shifted to informal participation in politics, contributing to the public debate through their work and leadership in CSOs and activism in the streets and online. The lack of economic and social progress over the past decade

and the absence of employment prospects have fueled a relentless emigration flow of young citizens in recent years.

July 25 Referendum

For the referendum, a total of 1,169,091 voters under age 25 registered, representing 12.6% of the total. Only 206,597 turned out to vote, representing 17.7% of voters from this age group and only 7.3% of total voters. In real terms, young voters' turnout decreased by 31,209 votes compared with the second round of the 2019 presidential election, confirming that the enthusiasm of young voters that had helped Kaïs Saïed be elected president had dwindled when it came to supporting the constitutional referendum. Notably, no youth-focused CSO registered to campaign for the referendum.

Dec. 17 and Jan. 29 Elections

Unlike in the 2014 and 2019 parliamentary elections and 2018 municipal polls held under the proportional list system, no measures were introduced to facilitate the candidacy of young citizens within the new majoritarian system.²¹³ The new electoral law's only provision promoting youth involvement was the obligation for candidates to collect at least 25% of endorsement signatures from voters under 35. Furthermore, the endorsement requirements to register as a candidate and the absence of public funding were significant barriers for younger citizens and/or first-time candidates to run for elections, as they have less financial autonomy and social leverage.²¹⁴

Only 148 (14%) of accepted candidates were ages 23-35, and only 40 (4%) were under 30, marking a record low level of youth candidacies. Young people ran in all governorates. According to observers, many of these candidates were unemployed, had university degrees or were studying, had a civil society background and were first-time candidates.

211 Youth under 24 make up more than 37%. <https://population.un.org/dataportal/home>

212 The unemployment rate of the population ages 15-24 reached 38.5% in the first quarter of 2022. According to the ERF forum Policy Portal, the share of unemployed people under 35 in 2019 was 85%. About 40% of the young unemployed had university degrees; and 75% were women. <https://theforum.erf.org/2019/05/07/unemployment-tunisia-high-among-women-youth/>

213 The 2014 and 2019 parliamentary elections foresaw a financial incentive to boost young candidacies, through the public funding reimbursement of 50% of the campaign expenditures if one candidate under 35 was included among the four top positions of the list. The municipal elections of 2018 stipulated the obligation for lists to include three candidates under 35.

214 All young and older candidates, youth-oriented CSOs, citizen observer groups and political parties met by The Carter Center viewed the absence of public funding as a major hindrance undermining the level playing field and affecting primarily young citizens' capacity to run.

Out of the 23 winners in the first round, one candidate under 35 was elected, and 23 advanced to the second round, of which 12 were elected. This number represents 8.5% of the total number of MPs, which is a step back compared with the previous parliament, where young candidates won 13% of the seats. However, Tunisia still has the highest youth parliamentary representation in the Middle East/North Africa region.²¹⁵

Youth Participation as Voters

The turnout of voters ages 18-25 in the first round was 5.8%, which was less than their participation in the referendum. In early January, the ISIE announced that it would focus on increasing young voters' participation in the second round by organizing debates between candidates in youth centers and launching a sensitization campaign involving youth CSOs. However, in the second round, the turnout of young voters fell even further, from 59,474 to 43,855, representing 4.9% of total voters.

Youth participation in the 2022 elections, as voters and candidates, significantly decreased compared with previous parliamentary elections. This can be attributed, in part, to the lack of legal mechanisms enhancing their participation. The Carter Center recommends that CSOs and political parties further encourage youth's political participation, especially through voter education and by creating opportunities for youth to play a substantive role within political party structures.

Persons With Disabilities

International standards regarding the participation of persons with disabilities require promoting their full and equal participation in political and public life, both directly and through their freely chosen representatives. This includes safeguarding the right and opportunity for individuals with disabilities to cast their votes and run for office. Key measures to achieve this goal include ensuring that voting procedures, facilities, and materials are suitable, accessible, and easy to comprehend

and use; preserving the right of individuals with disabilities to vote in secret during elections and public referendums without fear of intimidation; and enabling persons with disabilities to stand for election, effectively hold public office, and perform all governmental responsibilities at all levels, with the support of appropriate assistive and innovative technologies when necessary.²¹⁶

Societal discrimination and the state's failure to enforce laws that ensure access for persons with disabilities to government services, roads, schools, and other public spaces are major barriers to exercising the right to vote and participating in political and public affairs.

While the Tunisian legal framework provides for equal rights and nondiscrimination of persons with disabilities, limited progress has been made since 2011. The legislation is based on a medical approach rather than a rights-based approach. Moreover, many laws are not implemented, which prevents people with disabilities from exercising their rights on an equal basis with others. Societal discrimination and the state's failure to enforce laws that ensure access for persons with disabilities to government services, roads, schools, and other public spaces are major barriers to exercising the right to vote and participating in political and public affairs.

Political representation of people with disabilities in Tunisia remains tremendously limited, despite the advocacy work of disability-focused organizations that began with the advent of the revolution. In 2020, a person with disabilities was appointed as minister for the first time in Tunisia.²¹⁷ However, no one with a disability has ever been elected to national office, before or after 2011. As soon as measures supporting their candidacies were introduced, persons with disabilities were elected,

²¹⁵ The global percentage of MPs under 30 is 2.6% in 2023, according to the Inter-Parliamentary Union IPU-Parline database – <https://data.ipu.org/age-brackets-aggregate/>

²¹⁶ U.N.: Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Art. 29(a)

²¹⁷ Walid Zidi, who is visually impaired, was appointed minister of cultural affairs in the Hichem Mechichi government.

as evidenced in 2018 municipal elections. Out of 1,740 candidates with disabilities (3.2% of the total number of candidates), 144 were elected to municipal councils, including two mayors.²¹⁸

The main challenge observed on the day of the referendum was the inaccessibility of polling stations and centers, largely due to the absence of access ramps in voting centers and polling stations located on upper floors, as had been the case in previous elections.

The 2014 constitution established the state's obligation to protect the rights of persons with disabilities from any discrimination. Although the 2022 constitution replicated this commitment, it no longer mentioned persons with disabilities as rights holders and has dispossessed persons with disabilities of any active role.²¹⁹ They are passive beneficiaries of a general "protection from any discrimination" by the state, which does not consider the specific types of disabilities experienced by each individual.²²⁰

The electoral law includes provisions meant to ensure accessibility of polling stations and assistance from spouses, ascendants, or direct descendants for visually or physically impaired voters who hold a disability card.²²¹ However, as only a small percentage of voters with disabilities hold this document, high numbers are disenfranchised.²²² Persons with intellectual and psychosocial disabilities are allowed to vote.²²³

In 2022, for the first time in Tunisian history, persons with disabilities participated in the observation of a polling process during the referendum. Two CSOs focused on people with disabilities—the IBSAR Association for the Culture and Leisure of the Blind and Visually Impaired, and the Organization for the Defense of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (OTDDPH)—were part of the coalition of citizen observer groups. They deployed observers who focused on the accessibility of information for voters with disabilities during the campaign and their accessibility to the voting process on polling day.²²⁴

For the 2014, 2018, and 2019 elections, IBSAR cooperated with ISIE to produce Braille ballot devices for visually impaired voters, which were made available in all polling centers in Tunisia. However, during the short period between the distribution of the constitutional draft and the referendum, the Braille translation was not ready, and the text was not made available in audio format by ISIE, preventing visually impaired voters from making an informed choice.

The main challenge observed on the day of the referendum was the inaccessibility of polling stations and centers, largely due to the absence of access ramps in voting centers and polling stations located on upper floors, as had been the case in previous elections.

Parliamentary Elections

The 2022 electoral law did not include any provisions meant to facilitate the candidacy and representation of persons with disabilities. According to CSOs focused on people with

218 The mayor of Hezoua (Tozeur governorate) and the mayor of Sidi Aïich (Gafsa). The 2014 electoral law stipulates that candidate lists must include a person with disabilities among the 10 first candidates to have the public reimbursement of campaign expenditures (Article 49).

219 Article 48 of 2014 constitution: The State shall protect persons with disabilities against any form of discrimination. Every disabled citizen shall have the right to benefit, based on the nature of the disability, from all measures that will ensure their full integration into society, and the State shall take all necessary measures to achieve this.

220 Article 54 of 2022 constitution: The state protects persons with disabilities from any discrimination and takes all measures to ensure their full integration into society.

221 Articles 131 and 132 of the electoral law providing for the rights to vote of persons with disabilities remained the same in the 2014 electoral law and Decree-Law 55.

222 There were 438,000 disability card holders in 2018, according to the data of the Ministry of Social Affairs, while the World Health Organization estimates there are a million people with disabilities in Tunisia.

223 According to Article 6 of the election law, before the amendments of Decree-Law 55, persons prohibited as a result of "global dementia" were not registered in the voter register, but in the new Article 6, "persons prohibited" are not registered. The law does not mention or restrict the right to vote of individuals with intellectual or psychosocial disabilities and doesn't include provisions to assist their voting.

224 OTDDPH deployed 121 observers in 24 governorates. About 40% were observers with disabilities. Fifty IBSAR observers were accredited for their observation of the campaign.

disabilities, this lack of designation in the law reinforced the exclusion of voters with disabilities. The endorsement requirement and the lack of public financing were identified as particularly challenging for aspirants with disabilities.²²⁵ This contributed to a plunge in the number of candidates with disabilities compared with the 2019 elections.²²⁶ Only two candidates with disabilities managed to register, and neither reached the second round.²²⁷

IBSAR and OTDDPH deployed observers during the campaign and on election day. In both rounds, IBSAR was on site in 12 governorates to monitor the access of people with disabilities to political information and campaign activities. They also analyzed the inclusion of people with disabilities in candidates' messages and platforms and within the civic and voter education effort of ISIE and CSOs. OTDDPH monitored both election days in all the governorates.

Access to information and accessibility to the voting process were the main challenges for voters with disabilities, and they remained largely unaddressed, as in all previous elections monitored by the Center since the 2011 revolution. Before the first- and second-round campaign periods, IBSAR held seminars in several regions on the political and civil rights of persons with disabilities and the changes brought by the new constitution and electoral law. They produced Braille versions of these texts, which the ISIE made available in all its regional offices. A sign language interpreter was used in almost all ISIE press conferences during the election period. A video spot with subtitles and sign language interpretation explaining the voting process was circulated online through the ISIE Facebook page and website, although only during

the last week of the first-round campaign. Only part of the voter and election-related information provided by the ISIE and by contestants on their websites and Facebook pages were accessible in adapted formats.²²⁸ Despite a few exceptions, candidates' platforms and campaign messages ignored the concerns of people with disabilities, according to the mission and IBSAR's observation.²²⁹

As in previous elections, the accessibility of polling stations and the voting process for people with disabilities was deemed insufficient by citizen observer groups and The Carter Center. The people with disabilities-focused observation by OTDDPH in all the governorates showed that up to 50% of polling centers and polling stations observed were inaccessible or difficult to access on both rounds.²³⁰ About 75% of the polling stations observed by the Center were accessible. According to OTDDPH, a number of voters with disabilities were denied the right to vote with assistance because they did not have a disability card.²³¹ The limited turnout of voters with disabilities in the stations observed by OTDDPH diminished between the two rounds, from 6% to 5% of the overall turnout.

After the referendum, OTDDPH held a working session with the ISIE, which pledged to take several measures to include persons with disabilities in voter information, support consultation with people with disabilities organizations in drafting the electoral law, comply with the legal obligation to employ 2% of people with disabilities as a large public institution, provide more accessible polling stations, and use sign language in its press conferences. The ISIE signed a cooperation convention with OTDDPH on Nov. 1. However, despite the ISIE's commitment, persons with disabilities were rarely recruited as

225 Most often, the candidates transported the endorsers to the IRIE office agents or delegations, where their signatures were legalized and stamped.

226 In the 2019 parliamentary elections, 60 candidates ran on different lists. Two independent lists were composed exclusively of people with disabilities in two Sfax constituencies. None were elected.

227 Two other candidates with no visible disabilities registered but declined to publicize their disabilities to avoid being perceived by the electorate only through this characteristic.

228 PDF documents or images that are abundantly used on Facebook pages of ISIE, IRIEs, and candidates to communicate with voters are not compatible with voice-over technology. The ISIE website is inaccessible for visually impaired people, as documents published are not in HTML or Word.

229 IBSAR's observation prior to the first round found that 99% of candidates' campaign activities were inaccessible to people with visual impairments, and 80% to persons with motor disabilities. Also, there was a total absence of audio, tactile (Braille), sign language, or easy-to-read mediums in candidates' materials. Concerns of people with disabilities were disregarded in 93% of the platforms and messages scrutinized.

230 Stairs and locating polling stations on the upper floor inhibited access of persons with motor disabilities and elderly voters.

231 OTDDPH observed that, in the first and second round, a small percentage of voters with disabilities (2-3%) could not receive assistance to vote, and therefore did not, because they lacked official disability cards.

polling staff, and only a few IRIEs made efforts to encourage their candidacies.²³²

Other Marginalized Groups

Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) affirms the right of every citizen to vote and be elected without discrimination, emphasizing equal suffrage for all. Article 2 of the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious, and Linguistic Minorities, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, highlights the rights of persons belonging to minority groups, including their right to participate effectively in cultural, religious, social, economic, and public life, including elections.

For the July 25 referendum on the 2022 constitutional draft, there was a lack of accessible language explanations, making it difficult for illiterate voters to make informed choices. For Black Tunisians, discrimination and obstacles persisted, leading to the absence of Black candidates in the 2022 elections, with some instances of racist hate speech being sanctioned by the electoral commission. LGBTIQ+ citizens continue to be politically marginalized due to cultural and legal norms that have not evolved since the adoption of the 2014 or 2022 constitution, even though both constitutions state that all Tunisian citizens have equal rights, including the right to engage in the political process.

LGBTIQ+ Persons

In Tunisia, LGBTIQ+ rights have been a topic of public debate since the 2011 revolution. Several CSOs openly advocate for LGBTIQ+ and minority rights and have led public awareness campaigns.²³³ However, LGBTIQ+ persons are still affected by severe legislation. Article 230 of the penal code

criminalizes and punishes homosexual or same-sex activity with three years in prison. Other articles of the code also punish “obscene behavior” and “affront to public morality,” which are often used to target LGBTIQ+ persons.

This legal framework, combined with social norms and prevailing prejudice against sexual minorities, is a barrier for LGBTIQ+ persons to fully and freely exercise their rights to participate in political and civil life. Between 2009 and 2021, 691 persons were arrested for violating Article 230 of the criminal code. LGBTIQ+ persons also are targeted by death threats, hate speech, and insults based on their sexual orientation and gender identity, especially on social media. Several human rights defenders and LGBTIQ+ rights CSOs have reported to the Center that police harassment, detentions, and instances of social discrimination against LGBTIQ+ persons and activists have increased in the past three years.²³⁴

Political parties tend to avoid discussing LGBTIQ+ issues for fear of alienating voters during election campaigns, and no platform has ever mentioned LGBTIQ+ rights. The lack of representation of their interests and demands by candidates contributes to the abstention and disaffection of LGBTIQ+ voters in elections. Yet, political participation of LGBTIQ+ persons is significant through civil society activism, protests, and involvement in CSOs focusing on rights and freedoms.

Several LGBTIQ+ CSOs participated in the civic coalition boycotting the 2022 referendum.²³⁵ For the elections, these CSOs did not publicly call for the boycott, but they refused to participate in the process. Therefore, LGBTIQ+ rights CSOs remained detached from any voter information effort toward the community, unlike in 2019 elections.²³⁶ According to LGBTIQ+ rights activists,

232 A cooperation convention was signed by the OTDDPH with the ISIE on Nov. 1. The ISIE pledged to comply with the legal obligation for public administrations to employ 2% of persons with disabilities. Long-term observers noted that Tataouine and Medenine IRIEs facilitated the recruitment of people with disabilities after a workshop held on the rights to participation of persons with disabilities by IBSAR and other CSOs.

233 After the two-year COVID-19 pandemic, the 2022 edition of the Mawjoudin Queer Film Festival celebrating the LGBTIQ+ community was held in Tunisia. This first queer film festival in all North Africa started in 2018, organized by Mawjoudin (We Exist).

234 The LGBTIQ+ rights CSO Mawjoudin (We Exist) informed The Carter Center of the rising number of persons arrested, expelled from their homes, or harassed by their families in the past three years. The Tunisian Association of Democratic Women (ATFD), the Tunisian League for Human Rights (LTDH) and Lawyers Without Borders (ASF) reported to the Center that police harassment of LGBTIQ+ rights activists increased in 2021 in the context of anti-police protests, and that the community has continued to be targeted since then.

235 The Civil Coalition for Freedom, Dignity, Social Justice, and Equality formed on July 14, 2022.

236 In 2019, Mawjoudin (We Exist) held outreach and awareness initiatives on political participation and voting rights enjoyment of the LGBTIQ+ community.

candidates from the community were absent from the 2022 parliamentary elections. During the 2022 election campaign, candidates' messages and platforms did not refer to individual freedoms and LGBTIQ+ rights, and the annulment of Article 230 was not discussed, unlike in the public debate held during the 2019 elections²³⁷ Before the first round, one instance of homophobic insult was reported to the Carter Center's LTOs against a candidate who did not file a complaint.

LGBTIQ+ political and electoral rights are hindered by Article 230 of the penal code and the social norms and cultural prejudice that prevail in Tunisian society. The Center recommends that Article 230 be repealed and that political parties and CSOs increase their outreach to LGBTIQ+ citizens. The courts also should recognize that under the 2022 constitution, all citizens without exception are entitled to enjoy and exercise their fundamental political, electoral and civil rights.

Illiterate Persons

In 2021, approximately 2 million citizens—17% of Tunisia's population—were illiterate.²³⁸ Women in rural areas have higher illiteracy rates than others. There are no legal provisions for assistance to illiterate voters. During past elections, CSOs and citizen observer groups noted that illiterate citizens were susceptible to vote-buying and influence. They advocated for the use of regional dialects and easy-to-understand graphics in voter information, because the Arabic language used by the ISIE for voter information on radios or TVs was not always comprehensible to illiterate voters.

For the July 25 referendum, neither the ISIE nor registered CSOs held an explanatory campaign on the content of the 2022 constitutional draft in accessible language; nor did they provide an

easy-to-read version of the text during the 17-day referendum campaign. Consequently, illiterate voters, who make up a sizable percentage of the population, lacked easy reference tools to make an informed choice about the new constitution.

During the election campaign, easy-to-understand material on candidates was not available, which hindered illiterate voters' access to information and capacity to make informed choices.²³⁹ On election day, pictures of candidates were present on ballot papers. However, ISIE posters with easy-to-understand graphic information on the voting process, which were supposed to be present in all polling stations, were missing in many polling centers.²⁴⁰

Black Tunisians

Black Tunisians make up about 15% of the population, primarily residing in the southern regions. Historically, they have faced societal, economic, and administrative discrimination.²⁴¹ Members of this community have suffered severe violations of their human rights. In October 2018, Tunisia passed a law on racial discrimination, the first in the Arab world, thanks to the efforts of human rights defenders and anti-racism activists. The law condemns and punishes incitement to hatred, racist threats, apology of racism, or repeated and organized discrimination. Despite this groundbreaking law and the explicit legal prohibition against racist hatred in the statutes, activities, platforms, and statements of political parties, a party holding racist stances and targeting sub-Saharan migrants in its discourse was registered in 2018.²⁴²

In 2014, a Black Tunisian was elected to parliament for the first time. The MP was a human rights activist and member of Ennahdha; she was re-elected in 2019. During her second term, she was subjected to racist comments published by another

237 In the 2019 parliamentary and presidential elections, campaign topics relating to individual freedoms and the abolition of articles criminalizing homosexuality and obscene behavior were discussed and all presidential candidates' positions toward the abolition of Article 230 and equal inheritance rights for women and men were made public by the O3DT – Observatory of the Rights to be Different.

238 Tunisia's literacy rate for 2021 was 83%, a 3.7% increase from 2014. The adult women's literacy rate in 2021 was 77%, compared with 89% for adult men. (<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.LITR.ZS?locations=TN>).

239 IBSAR's observation of the campaign prior to the first and second round, based on the scrutiny of 250 campaign events and platforms.

240 OTDDPH observed that these posters were missing in most polling centers on referendum day and in 56% and 47% of the polling centers election days.

241 In some municipalities, they are still registered under a derogatory term associated to the condition of descendants of slaves in civil records. In a few southern cities, Black Tunisians live in segregated neighborhoods and are buried in separate cemeteries.

242 Article 4 of Decree-Law 2011-87 of Sept. 24, 2011, organizing political parties: It is forbidden for political parties to rely in their statutes, statements, programs, or activities on incitement to violence, hatred, intolerance and discrimination based on religion, category, sex or region.

member of parliament on his Facebook page. Although the 2019 parliamentary elections had several Black Tunisian candidates, including several young women, no candidate from the community ran for the 2022 elections. The MP elected in 2014 decided to boycott the 2022 election process, and candidates experiencing discrimination and prejudice faced major obstacles due to the absence of public funding and endorsement requirements.

Although the election law does not explicitly consider racist hate speech as a campaign violation, the ISIE sanctioned a candidate who had published comments denigrating the skin color of a rival, canceling the votes they had received in the election.²⁴³

Conclusion – Other Marginalized Groups

The electoral system's failure to ensure meaningful representation of women, youth, and people with disabilities and other marginalized groups in parliament contradicts constitutional obligations and reverses progress made in the past decade. While there was a slight increase in the presence and success of women and younger candidates in the second round of parliamentary elections, overall their representation in the newly elected parliament

decreased, reflecting a disengagement of these groups of voters.

The absence of measures to facilitate the participation of youth and people with disabilities has also resulted in extremely low numbers of contestants from these groups. Women and young citizens made up the majority of election workers and observers, but the lack of accessible polling stations and insufficient access to information continued to hinder the participation of voters with disabilities.

In the second round of parliamentary elections, women and younger candidates were present at higher rates. However, the representation of women and youth in the newly elected parliament has decreased, representing a setback for Tunisia. The turnout of women, youth, and persons with disabilities on polling days decreased continuously between the referendum, the first round, and the second round of parliamentary elections, both in real terms and as a percentage of the total, indicating further disengagement of these groups of voters. This coincides with a decline in the number of candidates from these groups. The new parliamentary representation, dominated by older men, mirrors its electorate: Most of those who turned out to vote were older men.

²⁴³ According to Article 56 of the electoral law amended by Decree 55, the promotion of hatred, violence, intolerance, or discrimination is prohibited and considered a violation of the campaign if based on religious, factional, family, or regional grounds. Tunisia has a strong legal framework against hate speech, which includes the 2018 Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination Act; however, the law doesn't cover explicitly online hate speech.

I Electoral Dispute Resolution

Referendum

According to international standards and democratic best practices, challenge and appeal procedures should be clearly regulated by law to avoid conflicts of jurisdiction. In addition, the right to file such appeals must be granted as widely as possible and open to every elector in the constituency and every participant.²⁴⁴ The guarantee of a timely remedy is integral to the principle of effective means of redress.²⁴⁵ The appeal body in referendum matters should be impartial and independent, given necessary decision-making powers to provide an effective remedy established by law and bound to apply the law with limited discretion.²⁴⁶

Three challenges were filed requesting the nullification of the referendum results, citing campaign violations and questioning the constitutionality of presidential decrees and orders on the referendum process. They were filed by: Al-Chaab Yourid Party, I Watch (on behalf of Nadine Sihili), and Afek Tounes Party. The administrative court dismissed two challenges on form/procedural grounds and rejected the third case on substantive grounds. In the I Watch case, the court found that because neither I Watch nor Sihili were registered participants in the campaign, neither had standing to file

a challenge. In the Afek Tounes challenge, the court found that the applicant did not correctly notify the correct party to the suit, i.e., the president and those who campaigned in favor of the constitution. In the Al-Chaab Yourid Party case, the court found that insufficient evidence was introduced to meet the legal standard that the alleged violations significantly affected the results. Only Afek Tounes appealed the dismissal to the general assembly of the administrative court, which dismissed their case on procedural grounds as they did not submit an electronic copy of the complaint to the court, as required by Article 146 of the electoral law.²⁴⁷

The administrative court conducted public hearings in a timely and orderly manner, lawyers were given the opportunity to present their cases fully, and the Carter Center legal team was allowed to attend the hearings and given copies of the decisions upon request.²⁴⁸ In a positive step and in compliance with a longstanding Carter Center recommendation, the administrative court published the rulings from the July 2022 referendum, the candidate registration disputes, and the challenges to the results from the first round of the parliamentary elections on their official website. Rulings from the second round are expected to be published online soon.

244 Venice Commission, Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters, CDL-AD (2002) 23.

245 ICCPR, Article 2(3).

246 II 4.3. (a) Revised Guidelines on the Holding of Referendums Venice Commission P12.

247 Electoral Law, Article 146 (new) “...The petition shall be justified and accompanied by a digital copy of it, a copy of the contested judgment and the minutes of notification of the appeal, otherwise the appeal shall be rejected...”

248 The Carter Center followed the electoral dispute resolution process closely; attended the submission of cases in the administrative court and the hearings; interviewed most of the applicants; and obtained copies of the judgments for further analysis.

International and regional treaties establish that everyone has the right to an effective resolution before a competent national tribunal for acts that violate their rights or freedoms.²⁴⁹ Due to the rushed nature of the referendum, the legal framework generally suffered from a lack of harmonization, notable gaps, and confusion. For example, in previous elections, the authority of the court to quickly review ISIE decisions at each step of the process was clear, in line with international best practices.²⁵⁰ However, for the referendum, those who wanted to participate in the referendum campaign were deprived of their right to get a quick decision from the court if the ISIE rejected their application, as there were no procedures for expediting. Instead, challenges to ISIE decisions went through the standard court procedure, which can take months or even years.²⁵¹

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Another example of the lack of harmonization in the legal framework was the failure to amend the provisions of the law that limited challenges to participating political parties, even though the ISIE regulation allowed for other participants in the referendum campaign, such as individuals and associations, thereby denying these participants an effective remedy.²⁵²

While the administrative court conducted hearings in a timely manner and promoted transparency by publishing rulings, the rushed nature of the referendum highlighted discrepancies in the legal framework, including the absence of expedited procedures for ISIE decisions and limitations on

challenge rights for non-political party participants, thus undermining the principle of an effective remedy as established by international and regional treaties.

Parliamentary Elections

During an election, appeal procedures—and especially the powers and responsibilities of the various bodies involved in them—should be clearly regulated by law to avoid any conflicts of jurisdiction. In addition, the right to file such appeals must be granted as widely as possible, open to every elector in the constituency, and every candidate running in the election.²⁵³ The guarantee of a timely remedy is integral to the principle of effective means of redress.²⁵⁴

The Carter Center observed the electoral dispute resolution processes associated with one's right to stand as a candidate and challenges to the electoral results. Despite the compressed timelines and some weekend hearings, the courts conducted proceedings in an organized and timely fashion, affording applicants the opportunity to present their cases. However, the tight deadlines posed challenges for appellants in gathering evidence and a lack of clear procedures made it difficult for candidates to navigate the submission and notification processes and to adhere to procedural requirements within the restricted timeframe. This resulted in many cases being dismissed on procedural grounds.

The electoral law gives candidates two days from the date of notification of the ISIE decision on candidacy to file a challenge. Challenges are filed with the competent regional circuits of the First Instance of the Administrative Court for in-country districts and the Circuits of First Instance of the Administrative Court in Tunis for districts abroad.²⁵⁵ The regional courts received 54 challenges and accepted four.

249 U.N., ICCPR, Art. 2(3); OAS, ACHR, art.25(1); CoE, Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Art. 13

250 Articles 16, 18, 27, 29, 46, and 47 of electoral law 16/2014 as amended Aug. 30, 2019.

251 U.N., ICCPR, Art. 2; AU, AfCHPR, Art. 7 AU, ACDEG, Art. 17 (2) "Establish and strengthen national mechanisms that redress election-related disputes in a timely manner."

252 Article 145 (new) of electoral law. Of the 153 participants registered to campaign in the referendum, only 22 were political parties.

253 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters, CDL-AD (2002) 23.

254 AU, AfCHPR, Article 7: "Every individual shall have the right to have his cause heard. This comprises: (a) the right to an appeal to competent national organs against acts violating his fundamental rights as recognized and guaranteed by conventions, laws, regulations and customs in force; (b) the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty by a competent court or tribunal; (c) the right to defense, including the right to be defended by counsel of his choice; (d) the right to be tried within a reasonable time by an impartial court or tribunal."

255 Article 27, electoral law as amended by Decree 55/2022.

First-instance decisions can be appealed in front of the appeal circuits of the administrative court in Tunisia within two days of notification of the first-instance decision. The appeal circuits received 15 appeals. Nine were dismissed on the substance, four were dismissed on form, and two candidates were reinstated.²⁵⁶

Article 145 of the electoral law provides that challenges to results can be filed with appeal circuits of the administrative court in Tunisia within three days from their publication, and a further appeal can be taken to the general assembly of the administrative court.²⁵⁷ The court received 56 challenges to first-round results, 20 of which were appealed in front of the general assembly of the administrative court. The court accepted the challenges of only three candidates and ordered the ISIE to change the results accordingly.²⁵⁸

The Center followed the submission of challenges and attended most of the hearings, many of which were held on the weekends because of the short deadlines. The courts heard challenges in an orderly and timely manner. Applicants were given the time to present their cases and arguments

against the decisions of the ISIE. Most cases were related to endorsement issues.

Overall, considering the shortened deadlines, the court handled the cases in an orderly and timely manner while still giving complainants the opportunity to be heard. However, the deadlines proved challenging for appellants to gather the necessary evidence to present in court. Such a reduced time-frame also made it difficult for candidates to follow court procedures for submitting applications and notifying the opposing party. Although the appeal procedures were clear and the right to a timely remedy was respected in spite of the shortened deadline, one's right to appeal the courts' decisions were not made available as widely as possible. The Center recommends publishing all electoral dispute judgments, once issued, on the relevant court's website and/or official Facebook page, to enable the public to assess the challenges, evidence, and court reasoning. Additionally, clear instructions on filing electoral challenges should be made available to prevent legitimate disputes from being dismissed due to procedural errors in the future.

256 Mohamed Hatem Hassine, Majel Bel Abbas – Feriana, IRIE Kasserine; and Mansour Essid, Jebiniana – El Aamra, IRIE Sfax 1.

257 Article 146 (new) of electoral law

258 Three rulings accepting the appeals and the amendment of election results, as indicated: 1) canceling the contested ISIE decision and amending the results in the Bizerte South electoral district by announcing that the appellant had obtained 732 votes and enabling him to stand in the runoff; 2) cancellation of the contested decision and obliging the ISIE to rearrange the candidates in the electoral district of Slimane; and 3) cancellation of the contested ISIE decision in part by annulling the votes obtained by the third defendant, and approving the results of the second defendant, and obliging the ISIE to rearrange the candidates in the electoral district of Madina Jadida – Ben Arous.

I Election Day

The voting process is the cornerstone of the obligation to provide the free expression of the will of the people through genuine, periodic elections.²⁵⁹ The quality of voting operations on election day is crucial to determining whether an election was

conducted according to democratic obligations. Holding elections by secret ballot is a core obligation under international law and a recognized means of ensuring that the will of the people is freely expressed.²⁶⁰

Ronald Borden



A poll worker assists a Tunisian man depositing his ballot.

259 ICCPR, Articles 2, 25(a) and 9.

260 U.N., ICCPR, Article 25; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 23.

Referendum

Due to its limited size and scope, The Carter Center did not comprehensively assess voting, counting, and tabulation processes during the July 25 referendum but instead focused on broader aspects of the electoral framework and environment. The team was accredited by the ISIE, but again, because of the team's limited size and scope, was unable to assess the electoral process comprehensively on the day of the referendum. Instead, observers focused on several crucial aspects of the Tunisian electoral process, including the legal and electoral framework, the effectiveness and transparency of electoral preparations, the campaign environment (including media freedom), respect for core participatory rights, and the post electoral environment (including electoral dispute resolution).

Throughout their observation, the team engaged with a wide range of stakeholders, including government representatives, members of the judiciary, electoral commission officials, political party representatives, CSOs, participants from both sides of the referendum campaign, women and youth groups, associations advocating for people with disabilities, independent analysts, national observer groups, journalists, and development partners.

The results of the July 25 referendum were announced at 10 p.m. on the same day in the media center. According to the ISIE, following a meeting of its board, the decision on the referendum was made, and Farouk Bouasker, president of the ISIE, disclosed the following statistics: A total of 2,830,094 individuals cast their votes out of 9,278,541 registered voters, resulting in a turnout of 30.5%. Among the votes cast, 2,607,884 were “yes,” constituting 94.6% of the total, while 148,723 votes were “no,” making up 5.4% of the total votes.

Tunisian CSOs monitoring the referendum on election day reported several key findings. According to the CSOs, no major irregularities were observed

during the day. Mourakiboun issued two statements, noting that electoral preparations proceeded without significant irregularities, but they raised concerns about the absence of representatives from referendum participants, with 87% being absent.²⁶¹

The voting process is the cornerstone of the obligation to provide the free expression of the will of the people through genuine, periodic elections.

ATIDE published three statements and identified the main irregularities as the ongoing campaign to influence voters around polling centers, the almost complete absence of representatives of referendum participants, and a limited presence of observers. They also highlighted restrictions placed on their observers, who had paper accreditation instead of badges from the ISIE.²⁶²

CHAHED, in three statements, initially raised concerns about their observers only having attestation without badges, rendering them unable to observe. They also observed citizens engaging in campaigning on the silent day. Additionally, CHAHED highlighted issues with electoral staff, particularly in terms of insufficient training, especially regarding the use of the ISIE smartphone application.²⁶³

Parliamentary Elections, First Round

The Center deployed short-term observers to assess the voting, counting, and tabulation processes during the first round of the parliamentary elections, held on Dec. 17. The process, which was calm overall, was marked by historically low voter turnout. Polling staff adhered to regulations, and minimal irregularities were reported. However, some polling staff did not readily share statistical information with observers or allow teams access to

261 [rbFChs5NUSHLWdcjmxYga8XVKwGui7wpiTPv1seT.pdf](https://www.facebook.com/mourakiboun.org/) (mourakiboun.org); [iAcEGFG8OdNwSJ20M9JyN3bEkTriemR9xS9iDpft.pdf](https://www.facebook.com/mourakiboun.org/) (mourakiboun.org)

262 <https://www.facebook.com/atideTunisie/posts/pfbid0CPRuw8Ltn7wzKbcKfa4WdSRHoTq2VBeiQUiKBGkXmLCoMnzR3JKeNuJAtiuscjdI>; <https://www.facebook.com/atideTunisie/posts/pfbid0TeZV4a5yBiCh8d4ewbwqoV4ZW913fd2cCim3HxyW9ES841sVLs7tp1sPusr5Cyc7I>; <https://www.facebook.com/atideTunisie/posts/pfbid02XNA7kbRCPqC6iY3sYTmeu2Ae3xLzDNDu5G35oPjaz1qWGBW51Mt6k2aWqSHXRoghI>

263 <https://www.facebook.com/observatoire.chahed/posts/pfbid02qZaASeL77ABcDFkNoxVWTY5wtTpgnabgfZYj7iKYsNh9uxRAAxwMe5DSGtbnSSHl>; <https://www.facebook.com/observatoire.chahed/posts/pfbid02Qk5EG3XeRmanVNJeMuTetyxhF6iw5mrr3SLk4aj4hAJAsnYjRoNSD6enDXgkHviql>; <https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=5682887265067653&set=pb.100064659340746.-2207520000>

polling stations. Closing and counting procedures were generally well implemented, with no interference, but delays were noted in recording counting information. Although it was a challenge for some observers to assess the tabulation process, it appeared to proceed smoothly with multiple checks and verification stages and no reported incidents. The Carter Center did not deploy a short-term observer delegation during the second round of the parliamentary election and did not comprehensively assess these processes. The ISIE did not make individual polling station results available online for cross-reference.

The Dec. 17 election day was unlike any other that Tunisians have experienced over the past decade. Contrary to the excitement that had surrounded the first election following the revolution, it was marked by an absence of voters. There were no queues observed in front of the polling stations, and the number of voters was notably low, particularly among women and youth. Turnout, originally announced on election day by the ISIE as

8% and later increased to 11% after all returns were processed, hit historic lows, both in Tunisia and internationally. Despite the lack of voter interest, polling staff were present and adhered to the regulations, ensuring that voters could cast their ballots in secrecy. However, some staff members were not forthcoming in providing information to observers as they had in previous electoral cycles observed by The Carter Center in Tunisia. Both inside and outside the polling centers, the environment was quiet and calm, and no significant irregularities were observed or reported.

Tunisian CSOs released their findings on election day, with ATIDE highlighting numerous difficulties in the electoral process and criticizing its lack of transparency, neutrality, and equality. They also questioned the increase in turnout without a clear explanation from the ISIE. Mourabikoun's election observation concluded that the process and legal framework did not meet participatory standards and substantially contradicted essential election principles and urged the rapid publication

Ronald Borden



Sarah Johnson (left), The Carter Center, and Fadoua El Ouni (right), national legal analyst, observe a polling station on election day.

of detailed results to verify their accuracy. The CHAHED Observatory criticized the ISIE's lack of transparency and cooperation with national observer groups, recommending greater openness to civil society, transparent result publication, and improved training for poll workers. They also called for structural reforms in the ISIE law to align it with constitutional provisions and ensure inclusivity in the voting system.

Opening and Polling

The timing for opening polling centers was fixed, as in previous elections, at 8 a.m. According to the Carter Center observers, 57% of the 26 observed polling centers did not open exactly at 8 a.m., but all of them opened within 15 minutes of the scheduled opening time. During the polling process, the Center observed 308 stations and did not witness any significant irregularities. However, in several polling stations, observers reported encountering obstacles in their observation efforts and were not allowed to freely move around the polling center to observe all aspects of the process. Additionally, some staff were hesitant to provide information requested by the Center's observers.

Carter Center observers reported a very low voter turnout in the polling stations, and at times, there were no voters present while observers were inside the polling stations. Of the polling centers visited by the Center, 67% were in urban areas and 33% were in rural areas. Out of the observed polling centers, 78% had male presiding officers, while 65.5% had female presiding officers. No incidents were reported either inside or outside the polling stations, and 75% of them were deemed accessible to individuals with physical disabilities. National observers were present in 42% of the polling stations visited.

Compared with previous elections monitored by The Carter Center in Tunisia, which had demonstrated a markedly positive trend—with observers consistently receiving essential information and facing fewer challenges across various regions—the collaboration between polling staff and observers during this election was confusing and inconsistent. In certain areas, observers could access the required information, but in others they encountered

obstacles, such as some polling staff being instructed not to share crucial information. Other than this, observers reported that polling station procedures were well implemented, and the overall environment was assessed as very good or reasonable in all polling stations observed. Voter understanding was rated as adequate in 88% of the polling stations observed. Nonetheless, certain voters, especially the elderly, faced challenges in understanding how to mark and fold the ballot.

The Center observed 308 stations and did not witness any significant irregularities. However, in several polling stations, observers reported encountering obstacles in their observation efforts and were not allowed to freely move around the polling center to observe all aspects of the process. Additionally, some staff were hesitant to provide information requested by the Center's observers.

Closing and Counting

The polling centers closed at 6 p.m. as scheduled, without any extension from the ISIE. The implementation of procedures during the closing and counting stages was evaluated as “very good” or “reasonable” in nearly all the 27 centers observed and the overall environment was assessed as “very good” or “reasonable” in all. National citizen observers were present during the closing and counting in only 18.5% of the polling stations, while candidate agents were present in 55.6% of stations. In 55% of cases, candidate agents had sufficient access to information, while national observers had access in only 18.5% of cases, and international observers in 37%. The Carter Center did not observe any interference during the counting process, and no official complaints were registered. However, some observers reported that filling in the information about the counting took longer than expected.

Tabulation

The Center observers were present in all 27 tabulation centers, which were in sports stadiums and other large event spaces. Candidate agents and national and international observers were kept at a distance from the tabulation process. In some centers, the observers faced challenges in accurately assessing the tabulation process due to the distance between the workspace and the observation area. Additionally, in some centers, observers were not allowed to approach the staff to ask questions. In other centers, regional coordinators explained all the electoral processes to the observers.

The process began with a military convoy collecting ballot boxes from the polling centers and delivering them to the tally center. The staff at the tally centers received the sensitive materials, such as minutes and ballots, and stored the other items. There were three stages of checking and verifying

the information, and if any discrepancies were found, the process was reviewed from the beginning.

The first staff member opened the envelope containing the minutes and checked for any discrepancies in the counting process and number of ballots.²⁶⁴ If there were no discrepancies, the results were sent to the “deliberation council” to confirm the accuracy of the results. The minutes were then copied and scanned for archival purposes. If there were issues with the matches, the “deliberation council” corrected the mistakes and sent the corrected information to the IRIE members for verification and certification. Afterward, the information was sent to the archive.

A staff member used an Excel spreadsheet to fill in all the information from the minutes for the different constituencies. The final step was to send the minutes to each staff member representing one of the constituencies in that center. The staff

Ronald Borden



A Carter Center observer takes notes at a polling station.

²⁶⁴ The number of ballots pulled out of the box equals the number of voters who have signed on the relevant voter lists. The number of ballots delivered to the polling station equals the number of ballots pulled out of the box, the spoiled ballots and the unused ballots. The number of ballots pulled out of the box equals the total number of votes obtained by all candidates, the number of blank ballots and the number of invalid papers.

member manually entered the information on a large whiteboard and then entered the results in an Excel sheet. They also used an automated/digital process through a special platform where they input the information from the minutes. There was a matching process between these two operations at the end of the process. The Carter Center observers did not report any incidents or irregularities during the process and assessed the overall environment as “very good” or “reasonable.”

Parliamentary Elections, Second Round

The Center did not conduct a full electoral mission observation for the second round, and as a result, did not deploy short-term observers. As such, the Center did not conduct a comprehensive assessment of the voting, counting, and tabulation processes.

National CSOs observing election day raised concerns about transparency because voter turnout rates were not disclosed to parties other than the ISIE, potentially affecting result credibility. Polling

The implementation of procedures during the closing and counting stages was evaluated as “very good” or “reasonable” in nearly all the 27 centers observed and the overall environment was assessed as “very good” or “reasonable” in all.

station staff initially provided turnout statistics, but after 11 a.m., staff in multiple locations refused to provide this information. Seal numbers were not disclosed in some polling stations. Despite a timely start and resource availability, some observers faced restrictions and witnessed voter influence attempts and electoral silence breaches. Among other issues reported: aggression against two observers from the CHAHED Observatory in one polling center; special security force intervention in another; allegations of money being paid in the vicinity of a polling center by two ISIE personnel; and the lack of signage and voter lists in some polling stations.

I Post-Election Developments

The arrests targeting opposition leaders following Tunisia's parliamentary election results had significant implications, not only impinging on the

fundamental freedoms and rights of those detained but also sending a chilling message to other critics of President Saïed. The arrests raised concerns about

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The Carter Center's mission objectives were to provide an impartial assessment of the overall quality of the elections, promote an inclusive process for all Tunisians, and demonstrate support for its democratic transition.

the shrinking space for political dissent and freedom of expression in the country. Furthermore, the lack of transparency in the charges against the detainees and the broader context of political turmoil raised questions about the state of democracy and the rule of law in Tunisia. These developments underscored the challenges facing Tunisia's democratic transition and the need for international attention.

Campaign of Arrests Targeting Opposition Leaders

The preliminary results of the parliamentary election were officially announced on Jan. 31, 2023. The following day, a campaign of arrests started, resulting in the detention of several prominent individuals, including trade unionists Anis Kaabi and Hattab Ben Othmen; judges Bechir Akremi and Taieb Rached; former ministers Lazhar Akremi, Ridha Belhaj, Nouredine Bhiri, Riadh Bettaieb Mohamed Ben Salem, and Riadh Mouakher; former MPs Issam Chebbi, Ahmed Mechergui, and Walid Jalled; political activists Khayam Turki, Jawhar Ben Mbarek, and Chaima Issa; the director general of Mosaïque FM Nouredine Boutar; the president of Ennahdha and former speaker of parliament, Rached Ghannouchi; and leader of the Free Destourian Party and former MP Abir Moussi. While some (Lazhar Akremi and Chaima Issa) were released on condition of not appearing in public places or limiting their movement to one governorate (Mohamed Ben Salem), most were still in detention seven months later.

While some of those arrested were charged with corruption, including Mouakher and Jalled, many others were accused vaguely of plotting a conspiracy against state security.²⁶⁵ The details of the charges have not been made public, and no specific evidence has been revealed. Some detainees were arrested after publicly opposing the president's political plans. The campaign of arrests drew condemnation from opposition parties and coalitions including the National Salvation Front (NSF), Afek Tounes, the coordination of democratic forces (Attayar,

Workers, Al-Qotb, and Ettakatol), Ennahdha, the international community, and CSOs. On May 24, Nouredine Boutar was released, followed by the release of Chaima Issa and Lazhar Akremi on July 13.

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On March 5, 2023, the NSF organized a rally in downtown Tunis, attended by a few hundred people, to support those who had been arrested and to call for the "release of all arrestees in the so-called case of conspiracy against state security" and the "downfall of the regime." Despite the refusal of the governor of Tunis, Kamel Fekih, to authorize the rally due to the charges against some NSF leaders related to conspiracy against state security, the protest proceeded peacefully. One day before, on March 4, 2023, the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT) organized an authorized peaceful protest march against the centralization of all power under the control of the president. The demonstrators, estimated between 8,000 and 10,000 people, chanted slogans about the preservation of democracy and denounced price increases.²⁶⁶

Members of the international community reacted strongly to the arrests and the attempt to ban peaceful demonstrations. Barbara Leaf, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs, stated that the U.S., as a friend of Tunisia, had an obligation to inform the country's leadership that it is not heading in the right direction and observed that Tunisia had moved away from the democratic path in recent times.²⁶⁷ In a statement published on April 4, 2023, The Carter Center raised alarm over the arrests and the government's refusal to permit peaceful protests, viewing these actions as a direct and increasing threat to democratic institutions

²⁶⁵ See Articles 68 and 72 of the criminal code.

²⁶⁶ Various slogans were raised in Arabic: "تافو سبيلوبلا، فلود تاييرح تاييرح" (Freedoms, Freedoms, the police state ended) (O Hached [UGTT founder]! O Hached! The government the country)، "داش ح اي داش ح اي"، "داش ح اي داش ح اي" (The police state ended, the police state ended, the police state ended).

²⁶⁷ Barbara Leaf gave an interview to Diwan FM on March 23. It is available on: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4ii6eqSTKuU>

in Tunisia.²⁶⁸ The European Parliament called on Tunisian authorities to “respect freedom of expression and association and workers’ rights, in line with Tunisia’s Constitution and international treaties.”²⁶⁹

On Aug. 28, 2023, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (AfCHPR) issued an order instructing the Tunisian government to grant detained political prisoners access to legal counsel and medical care, addressing concerns raised by the families of the detainees. The court expressed that the prisoners’ prolonged detention could lead to irreparable harm and imminent danger. It also mandated that the government provide clear reasons for the detentions and clarify the charges against them. The court emphasized the genuine threat faced by the detainees. The AfCHPR gave Tunisia 15 days from the date of notification to report on the measures taken to implement the order. As of late November 2023, the Tunisian government had not communicated its response to the court.

President’s Speech Against Sub-Saharan Migrants

On Feb. 21, 2023, President Saïed delivered an inflammatory speech against sub-Saharan migrants, claiming that their increasing number was part of a conspiracy dating back to 2011 aimed at changing Tunisia’s demographic composition. He further alleged that some individuals received significant funds to settle these migrants in Tunisia with the intention of altering the country’s Arabic and Muslim identity.²⁷⁰ Three days later, Moussa Faki Mahamet, the chairperson of the African Union Commission, strongly condemned the statement, reminding all countries, particularly African Union

member states, including Tunisia, to honor their obligations under international law and relevant AU instruments to treat all migrants with dignity.²⁷¹ The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) also issued a warning to Tunisian authorities to put an end to “racist hate speech,” in particular toward nationals of sub-Saharan Africa.²⁷²

Following the wave of condemnation sparked by his declaration, President Saïed denied all accusations of racism, stating that his speech had been deliberately misinterpreted by some journalists. To reassure the international community, he met with the president of Guinea-Bissau, in his capacity as president of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), on March 8. This meeting was preceded by an announcement from the Tunisian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Immigration, and Tunisians Abroad on the evening of March 5, regarding several decisions made by the Tunisian government concerning African residents in Tunisia.²⁷³

Dissolution of Municipal Councils

On March 8, 2023, the president issued a decree-law to dissolve the country’s municipal councils two months before the end of their mandate.²⁷⁴ The management of municipalities was turned over to the secretaries-general of the municipalities, under the supervision of centrally appointed governors.²⁷⁵ Five days before the swearing-in of parliament, the president issued two additional decree-laws, one amending the electoral law on municipal councils—changing the electoral system from a proportional list system to a majoritarian system—and the second establishing the legal

268 The Carter Center statement on April 4, 2023. <https://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/2023/tunisia-040423.html>

269 The European Parliament adopted a resolution on “Recent attacks against freedom of expression and association and trade unions” https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/RC-9-2023-0171_EN.html

270 President Kais Saïed’s speech about sub-Saharan migrants was held during a meeting of the National Security Council.

271 “The Chairperson of the African Union Commission strongly condemns the racial statements on fellow Africans in Tunisia,” https://au.int/sites/default/files/pressreleases/42632-pr-The_Chairperson_of_the_African_Union_Commission_strongly_condemns_the_racial_statements_on_fellow_Africans_in_Tunisia.pdf

272 «La Tunisie doit mettre fin au « discours de haine » contre les Subsahariens», <https://news.un.org/fr/story/2023/04/1133917>

273 Delivering one-year residence permits to students from African countries to facilitate their stay and enable them to renew their documents within reasonable time limits, extending the residence receipt from three months to six months and facilitating voluntary departures for those who wish to do so within an organized framework and after prior coordination with the embassies and diplomatic representations of African countries in Tunisia. Also, they will be exempted from paying late fees for expatriates who have overstayed their permits in the context of voluntary return.

274 Decree-Law 2023-9.

275 The secretary-general of the municipality is a public servant appointed by the minister of interior.

framework for the election of local councils and the structure of the regional and district councils.²⁷⁶

First Session of the ARP

The newly elected parliament's first session was held on March 13, 2023, and was attended by 153 members.²⁷⁷ The session was chaired by the oldest MP, Salah Mbarki, and the two youngest male and female members, Ghassan Yamoun and Syrine Bousandal. The parliament's initial task was to elect the speaker and two deputy speakers, one of whom had to be a woman, as per the president's decree. Brahim Bouderbala was elected speaker, with Sawssen Mabrouk and Anouar Marzouki as his deputies.²⁷⁸ Subsequently, a commission of 31 members was tasked with drafting procedural rules.

The first session of parliament was marked by a ban on private and foreign media coverage, limiting coverage to journalists from national public media institutions, including national TV and radio, as well as the Tunis Africa Press Agency, which drew criticism from private media and the international community. On March 15, the HAICA board issued a statement condemning the ban on journalists from private audiovisual media from covering the opening session. They emphasized that the right to information and access to information is guaranteed under the constitution and existing laws. HAICA noted that the ban on foreign and private media was a dangerous indicator for freedom of the press in Tunisia.

Since most MPs ran for election as independents, the major political groups in the assembly were not immediately known. Shortly after the establishment of the parliament, Sigma Conseil, a leading Tunisian polling firm, estimated that supporters of the president made up about 30% of MPs, while progressives constituted about 40%, and sympathizers with

political Islam held approximately 15-20% of the seats.²⁷⁹

On April 28, 2023, the parliament approved its new rules of procedure with 121 votes in favor, two against, and one abstention. Like the rules of the dissolved parliament, the new rules contain 172 articles. Notable provisions include forbidding MPs from seeking the services of assistants from among the employees of foreign organizations established in Tunisia or funded by them. Article 63 mentions the creation of a new electronic platform to receive the propositions of CSOs. In the final provisions, the rules grant to parliament the responsibilities of the National Council of Regions and Districts until the latter is established, which is not mentioned in the 2022 constitution. There is no definition of "opposition" in the rules.

On May 6, the speaker of parliament announced the creation of six parliamentary blocs. The Voice of the Republic, a party founded in August 2022, has the biggest bloc with 25 MPs. All blocs declared that they support the July 25 process led by the president. The absence of an independent opposition voice in the parliament discredits the institution. Although a few MPs told The Carter Center before the second round of the parliamentary elections that they planned to launch an initiative for legislative reforms, including the establishment of the constitutional court and the reform of Decree-Law 54, these MPs do not seem to enjoy any support from their colleagues.

The parliament ended its first session on July 31 without enacting laws on the procedures for the National Council of Regions and Districts or how it will interact with the parliament, the constitutional court, and the High Council of Education and Learning. It also failed to harmonize the law on ISIE with the 2022 constitution and adopt a new

276 Decree-Law 2023-10 and Decree-Law 2023-8, issued on March 8.

277 MP Wajdi Ghaoui was arrested at the beginning of a session at the headquarters of the Assembly of People's Representatives, pursuant to a warrant issued against him by the investigating judge at the Court of First Instance of Ben Arous. He was arrested due to a complaint for possession and use of forgery, related to the endorsements of his candidacy in the last legislative elections. Ghaoui confirmed that he was removed by security agents from the plenary hall during the opening session of the new parliament on March 13. The Center noted that he was absent during the announcement of the list of MPs.

278 Brahim Bouderbala was elected in the first round in the constituency of Radès-Mégrine (Governorate of Ben Arous). Sawssen Mabrouk was elected in the second round in the constituency of Médenine North (Governorate of Médenine). Anouar Marzouki was elected in the second round in the constituency of Nabeul (Governorate of Nabeul).

279 These figures were mentioned by Hassen Zargouni, director general of Sigma Conseil, on Wataniya 1: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5bgWTUd-EqI>

law on HAICA, whose members' mandate had expired. Currently, the seven-member board of the ISIE is unconstitutional since the 2022 constitution provides for nine members. The constitution also provides for the president of the constitutional court to assume the role of interim president if the position of president of the republic becomes vacant, with no other alternative mentioned.

Tunisia's political and economic trajectory has continued to deteriorate.

Negotiations with the IMF and EU

Prime Minister Najla Bouden's government started negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in February 2022. On Oct. 15, 2022, it was announced that the Tunisian authorities and IMF team reached a staff-level agreement on a loan of \$1.9 billion for a period of 48 months. The reforms that the Tunisian authorities were required to implement included containing expenditures in the public sector, enacting a law on state-owned enterprises, and strengthening governance and transparency in the public sector. The IMF's executive board was supposed to approve the final agreement on Dec. 19, 2022. However, the meeting was postponed, reportedly due to President Saïed's refusal to sign the agreement. Although the IMF's director of the MENA region and Central Asia declared on May 3, 2023, that the IMF was close to completing a financial arrangement that should allow Tunisia to secure the \$1.9 billion rescue package, President Saïed continued to denigrate the IMF and insisted that Tunisia accepts no "diktats" from foreigners.

President Saïed met with the European Commission president and the Dutch and Italian prime ministers on June 11. It has been reported that the EU is offering to make a loan of 900 million euros to support the Tunisian budget at a low interest rate of 2.5%. The loan agreement is contingent on Tunisia's reaching an agreement in principle with the IMF. The EU also will offer an immediate grant of 150 million euros to address the issue of irregular immigration through Tunisia to the EU. This is in addition to prior announcements of 300 million euros for energy development projects and 150 million euros for the development of high-speed internet in Tunisia linked to the EU through an underwater cable. A memorandum of understanding (MoU) for a "strategic and comprehensive partnership" on irregular migration, economic development, and renewable energy was signed between Tunisia and the EU on July 16. On Sept. 22, the European Commission announced that it would disburse 127 million euros to Tunisia, divided between budget support and border control funding, as part of their larger MoU. But Saïed said that Tunisia "rejects what the EU announced, not because of the small amount ... but because the proposal conflicts with the [MoU] signed in July."

Tunisia's political and economic trajectory has continued to deteriorate. A wave of arrests has emptied the political scene of major opposition leaders. Media outlets are intimidated, and political talk shows, which were popular on TV and radio, are rarely seen. The political party blocs in the newly elected parliament have clearly announced their support for Saïed's July 25 process, and the body's agenda reflects the president's wishes. It is moving very slowly to harmonize legislation with the 2022 constitution.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The July 25 process led by President Saïed severely damaged Tunisia's democratic transition. Indeed, the president's consolidation of power has led to a fundamental imbalance between the executive, parliamentary, and judiciary branches, and an increasingly tense political environment. The arrest of more than two dozen individuals since February 2023, many under vague charges of conspiracy against state security, exemplifies this, as does the self-censorship of civil society and the media to avoid similar repercussions.

At the same time, reform efforts have effectively been halted and in many cases, the progress that Tunisia has made in its democratic transition has been reversed. Parliamentarians have made little to no advancement to regularize constitutional bodies such as the ISIE or HAICA, or to appoint members and establish the constitutional court. Similarly, little meaningful progress has been made on

amending the electoral law, reviewing the boundary delimitation of electoral districts, or in harmonizing legislation with the 2022 constitution.

With the 2022/23 elections registering historically low turnout results, the Tunisian people have demonstrated they are both disillusioned and disappointed with the current economic, political, and social situation. The Carter Center urges Tunisia's leaders, especially the president, to reverse the country's authoritarian path and address these challenges. Solutions should result from a genuinely inclusive national dialogue process that includes the voices of all stakeholders, reflects the views of all Tunisians, and provides a roadmap to reinforce democratic institutions and return the country to a constitutional democracy. Until substantial efforts are undertaken, technical changes to laws and regulations will have little impact.

Ron Borden



Left: Carter Center staff members Sarah Johnson (left), Don Bisson (center), and David Carroll (right) address journalists at the Carter Center's press conference for the parliamentary elections. Right: Bisson responds to journalists' questions.

The Carter Center undertook extensive efforts following the elections to consult key stakeholders regarding its findings and lessons learned. Their views were taken into consideration in the finalization of this report. In the spirit of collaboration and support for Tunisia's return to an inclusive and participatory democracy, The Carter Center offers the following recommendations for consideration by key actors.

At the same time, reform efforts have effectively been halted and in many cases, the progress that Tunisia has made in its democratic transition has been reversed.

To the Assembly of the Representatives of the People / the Presidency of the Republic

- Immediately appoint members of the constitutional court, as mandated by the 2022 constitution.
- Review the boundary delimitation of electoral districts for any future parliamentary elections, taking into consideration the principle of equality of the vote and adhering to best practices in elections. All apportionment criteria should be publicly available and include details such as the number of residents and the number of voters, or a combination thereof. According to best practices, the new boundaries should be drawn up at least one year before the next election and after broad consultation and consensus among all stakeholders to ensure transparency and fairness in the electoral system.
- Amend the electoral law to provide clear assessment standards or criteria for recalling MPs, as outlined in Decree-Law 2022-55, to prevent arbitrary misuse of the process.
- Amend the electoral law to lift the prohibition on military and security personnel voting in all elections.
- Amend the electoral law to aid illiterate voters during elections and ensure that citizens in health care facilities, penitentiaries, and detention centers can exercise their right to vote.
- Amend the electoral law to establish reasonable candidacy conditions and consider the annulment or revision of the provisions related to endorsements as mentioned in Decree-Law 2022-55.
- Establish a legal framework to regulate the use of electoral advertising on the internet and campaigns on social media platforms, with explicit definitions of the terms used and a commitment to upholding human rights principles.
- Amend Decree-Law 2022-22 (April 21, 2022) and supplement certain provisions of the Organic Law No. 2012-23 (Dec. 20, 2012) concerning the Independent High Authority for Elections to return the authority to appoint ISIE members to the parliament (rather than the president) to ensure the independence and neutrality of the ISIE. To comply with the legislation ensuring gender parity at the executive level of independent constitutional bodies, include an equal number of men and women members on the ISIE board.
- To promote equal opportunities among candidates, reinstate public financing of campaigns and allow political parties to contribute financially directly or in-kind to any candidate, while still ensuring transparency of donations.
- Promote women candidates and ensure gender parity in the elected assemblies, as constitutionally required within the context of the electoral system in force. These measures can include quotas on lists and reserved seats.
- Repeal Decree-Law 2022-54 pertaining to the prevention of information systems-related crimes and review the existing legal framework to align it with international treaties and conventions.
- Immediately pass the necessary legislation to create the permanent audiovisual regulatory body (HAICA) and the constitutional court.
- Promote civic education, media, and digital literacy for all within the regular school curriculum and through training, including for civil servants.

- Strengthen national human rights institutions, guarantee their independence, and allocate the necessary financial and human resources.

To the Independent High Authority for Elections

- Establish a document that illustrates clear organizational structures for both regional and central administrations to promote transparency about internal procedures and allow observers to analyze their effectiveness.
- Adopt a clear and coherent communication plan and react in a timely way to anything that may affect the integrity of the electoral process. In line with international standards and to increase transparency in all aspects of the ISIE's work, it should post information about its campaign monitors' reports and detailed statistics on voters and polling results, as well as information on violations and sanctions, as soon as they become available. In line with best practices, the ISIE should publish the results down to the polling station level to allow independent actors to cross-check and verify the figures.
- Conduct regular audits of the voter register and publish its report to ensure transparency, and the integrity and protection of IT systems and the database.
- Consider voter education as an important step in the electoral period, include it in the electoral calendar, and allocate the necessary resources to implement a comprehensive campaign with the involvement of CSOs at local and national levels.
- Implement measures to facilitate the participation of women, youth, and people with disabilities, such as accessible polling stations and better access to information. The ISIE should comply with the 2005 law mandating the recruitment of 2% of people with disabilities in the staff of public organizations. Engage with social media platforms and CSOs to foster cooperation ahead of the elections to report false or misleading political information and to deter manipulative instances. Consider instituting a media and digital literacy awareness campaign on

disinformation during the electoral campaign in cooperation with stakeholders.

To Civil Society Organizations

- Further encourage the participation of women, youth, and persons with disabilities in political affairs by promoting awareness of their rights and the importance of their participation.
- Conduct increased voter education efforts to ensure the participation of women, youth, and persons with disabilities in elections.
- Advocate for the protection of fundamental freedoms in electoral processes and reform of electoral laws to comply with international standards and commitments.

To Political Parties

- Adopt internal regulations facilitating women's nomination to leadership positions and encourage candidacies from women and marginalized groups.
- Explicitly prohibit discrimination in all forms in their statutes, activities, platforms, and statements.
- Encourage greater participation of women, youth, and people with disabilities in political affairs.

To the Independent High Authority for Audiovisual Communication

- Collaborate with the ISIE to ensure that the use of social media during elections is fair, transparent, and in compliance with the law.

To the Judiciary

- Publish all electoral dispute judgments on the court's website and/or the official Facebook page so the public can assess the nature of the challenges, the evidence presented, and the reasoning of the court in reaching a decision.
- Publish clear instructions on filing electoral challenges to avoid dismissal of legitimate disputes in the future due to failure to comply with procedural requirements for filing challenges.

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Annex B

Population and Quotient Numbers

Region	Legislative Constituency	Number of Population (2022 Estimation)	Number of Registered - Referendum	Number of Registered - 1st Round Legislative	Number of Registered - 2nd Round Legislative	Seats	Number of Votes - 1st Round Legislative Election	1st Round Legislative Percentage of Participation	Number of Votes - 2nd Round Legislative Election	2nd Round Legislative Percentage of Participation
Tunis	La Marsa - Carthage	127,167	127,709	127,211	127,21		7.53	5.9	6.98	5.4
	La Goulette	59,790	27,670	28,570	No second round		2.00	No second round	No second round	
	El Kram	86,846	53,804	53,611	53,61		4.14	7.7	3.36	6.2
	Hai El Khadra - Menzeh	71,228	77,997	76,847	No second round		3.78	4.9	No second round	No second round
	El Medina - Bab Essouka	41,051	64,520	65,827	No second round		3.33	5.0	No second round	No second round
	Bab El Bhar - Sidi El Bachir	55,732	80,821	79,937	No second round		3.30	4.1	No second round	No second round
	El Omrane - Alomrane El Ala	89,883	67,676	67,107	67.10		5.02	7.4	5.08	7.5
	Etahrir - Bardo	91,811	100,143	100,337	100.33		7.43	7.4	6.97	6.9
	Essajoumi - Zouhour	69,660	60,393	59,411	59.41		4.23	7.1	3.88	6.9
	Hraira	115,274	65,430	61,478	61.47		5.29	6.5	5.12	8.3
	Sidi Houdine	128,240	63,573	64,077	64.07		4.85	7.5	5.36	8.3
	Kabourjo	85,864	52,180	52,027	52.02		5.32	10.2	5.51	10
	El Wardiya - Djebel El Joud	49,287	45,156	44,585	44.58		3.40	7.6	3.30	7.4
Ariana	Ariana Medina	122,341	135,497	136,611	No second round		7.45	5.4	No second round	No second round
	Soukra 1		42,804	43,427	43.42		3.91	9.0	3.46	2.5
	Soukra 2	152,279	29,290	29,456	No second round		166	5.8	No second round	No second round
	Raoued 1		27,376	28,247	No second round		2.08	7.3	No second round	No second round
	Raoued 2	138,205	35,358	35,727	No second round		216	6.0	No second round	No second round
	Kalaat Andalous - Sidi Thabet	55,026	34,174	34,296	34.29		4.04	11.7	No second round	No second round
	Cité Tadmoun	84,923	53,022	52,811	52.81		4.17	7	4.57	8.8
	Mnihla	116,653	73,053	72,327	72.32		4.58	6.3	4.68	6.4
	Ben Arous - Medina Jadida	96,224	86,790	86,831	86.83		7.08	8.1	5.57	6.4
	Mourouj - Bir Kasaa		69,640	71,482	No second round		2.90	4.0	No second round	No second round
Ben Arous	Mourouj - Farhat Hached	110,954	36,314	37,840	No second round		199	5.2	No second round	No second round
	Hamam Lili - Hamam Chot	81,034	57,120	57,597	57.59		5.63	9.7	5.23	9.0
	Boumhel Bassatine - Zahra	86,173	53,700	54,208	54.20		5.30	9.7	4.85	8.5
	Rades - Megrine	99,522	63,756	63,481	63.48		7.04	11	No second round	No second round
	Mhamdia	81,952	43,281	43,711	43.71		4.20	9.6	4.10	9
	Fouchana		48,328	49,011	49.01		4.38	8.9	No second round	No second round
	Montag	64,783	45,334	45,537	45.53		7.07	15.5	6.90	15.1
	Manouba	66,118	60,031	67,103	67.10		4.83	6	4.23	6.3
	Douar Hicher	92,731	59,318	61,246	No second round		4.53	7.4	No second round	No second round
	Oued Ellil	78,767	43,347	43,677	43.67		6.05	13.8	5.69	12.8
Manouba	Mornaguia - Borj Amri	68,470	28,116	42,051	42.05		6.69	15.9	5.37	12.7
	Jeddida - Tebourba - Betan	118,053	75,627	75,501	75.50		7.28	9.8	6.43	8.5
	Nabeul	83,731	75,817	81,278	81.27		9.98	12.3	10.36	12.4
	Dar Chaaben - Beni Khair	100,754	75,881	76,054	76.05		8.27	10.8	7.51	9.8
	Bouargoub - Beni Kalled	74,654	50,255	50,328	50.32		6.92	13.7	7.52	14.8
	Korba	75,454	47,237	47,656	47.65		7.22	15.1	6.15	12.9
	Menzel Temim	70,780	47,325	47,534	47.53		5.86	12.3	5.20	10.9
	Kelibia - Hammam Ghezaz	79,571	55,628	57,308	57.30		7.94	13.8	8.31	14.3
	Hacouria - Takelsa	67,493	47,308	47,584	47.58		6.52	13.7	6.10	12.8
	Silmen	63,303	35,714	36,101	36.10		7.77	21.5	7.62	21.1
Nabeul	Menzel Bouzeffar - Meda	70,780	46,081	46.18	46.18		5.60	12.1	6.38	13.8
	Grombaila	76,484	49,792	49,952	49.95		6.75	13.5	7.26	14.3
	Hammamet	105,820	102,205	106,288	106.28		9.77	9	9.25	8.7
	Zaghouan - Zriba	68,964	58,537	59,227	59.22		7.91	13.3	5.78	9.7
	Bir Mcharga - Fahs	75,786	52,956	52,951	52.95		7.98	15.0	7.69	14.5
	Nadhour - Saouef	45,642	33,152	33,141	33.14		7.48	22	9.40	28.3
	Binzet North	96,679	110,218	113,270	No second round		4.78	4.2	No second round	No second round
	Binzet South	63,933	56,329	66,031	66.03		3.67	5.9	3.22	4.8
	Sejnan - Joumine - Ghezala	89,623	66,344	65,911	65.91		11.60	17	12.97	19.6
	Mezel Jemil - Jarzouna	76,788	50,296	50,634	50.63		4.98	9.8	4.27	8.4
Bizert	Menzel Bourguiba - Tinja	92,525	61,861	61,751	61.75		6.45	10.4	5.17	8.3
	Mater - Outik	66,902	47,824	47,711	47.71		4.97	10.4	4.56	9.5
	Ghar Elmelh - El alla - Ras Jebel	111,753	76,184	76,927	76.92		7.03	9.1	5.88	7.6
	Beja North - Tibar - Teboursok	65,173	60,456	60,807	60.80		6.22	10.2	6.38	10
	Amoudun - Netfa	66,294	55,416	54,841	54.84		7.60	13.8	9.62	17.5
	Mejaz Elbea - Gbollet - Testour	95,213	68,966	68,472	68.47		6.44	9.4	8.09	11.7
	Jendouba	77,217	81,663	83,258	83.25		7.21	8.8	8.24	7
	Jendouba North - Fernana	85,120	85,920	84,710	No second round		7.46	8.8	No second round	No second round
	Tebarka - Ain Drahem	89,952	66,881	66,193	66.19		8.88	13.2	8.36	12
	Ghar Dima - Oued Miz	80,597	62,180	61,831	61.83		8.36	13.5	9.09	14.7
Jendouba	Bousalem - Baliet Bouaouen	73,968	58,249	56,444	56.44		8.34	14.7	7.20	12.7
	El Kef West - El Kef East	80,980	82,483	82,208	82.20		8.89	10.8	7.62	9.3
	Nebber - Tourref - Sakiet Sidi Youssef - Tajerouin - Kalat Senan	85,374	62,793	62,521	62.52		9.37	14.9	8.01	12.8
	Kalaa Kheba - Jerissa - Ksour - Dahmeni - Sers	81,030	60,876	60,231	60.23		9.61	15.9	8.83	14.6
	Sellana - Bargou	78,718	80,973	80,799	80.79		6.29	7.7	6.69	8.2
	Bouarada - Gualfour - Krib - Bourous - Laaroussa	80,088	57,109	56,884	56.88		6.79	11.9	8.11	14.2
	Makher - Rouhia - Kera	70,038	49,491	49,411	49.41		10.22	20.6	10.79	21.8
	Sousse Medina - Sousse Sidi Abdelhamid	93,903	88,531	89,431	89.43		6.47	7.3	6.31	7.5
	Sousse Riadh	74,924	60,018	59,811	59.81		4.32	7.2	4.18	
	Sousse Jaouhara	100,853	68,333	69,731	69.73		5.50	7	4.84	6.9

	Hammam Sousse - Akouda	87,429	74,248	77,351	77,351	5,354	6.94	5,124	6.64
	Kalaa Kebira - Sidi Bouali - Kondar	98,261	64,913	65,058	65,058	8,981	13.81	8,594	13.21
	Nefidha - Bouficha - Hergla	90,273	61,593	61,883	61,883	14,379	23.24	12,077	19.53
	Sidi Heni - Kalaa Seghira	58,281	34,284	34,523	No second round	3,854	11.11	No second round	No second round
	Msaken	103,158	64,846	64,983	64,983	6,033	9.22	4,781	7.31
Sousse	Zaoula - Kessiba - Thrayet	42,574	19,750	20,164	No second round	3,871	19.21	No second round	No second round
	Monastir 1		45,585	48,151	48,151	3,854	8.01	4,011	8.34
	Monastir 2	119,379	73,373	73,727	73,727	5,574	7.54	5,577	7.54
	Essahline-ElWardanine-bembia	90,402	55,324	55,634	55,634	9,693	17.44	9,263	16.63
	Zarmdine - Beni Hassen	47,565	29,903	30,194	30,194	8,301	27.41	7,304	24.11
	Jammel	71,554	44,533	44,474	44,474	6,451	14.51	5,853	13.11
	Moknine	97,644	61,902	61,973	61,973	8,572	13.83	8,112	13.03
	Teboulba - Belalata - Saiada - Lamta - Bouhjar	88,091	57,276	57,494	57,494	8,074	14.04	7,814	13.34
	Ksar Hellal - Kesibet Medyoune	93,210	62,135	62,371	62,371	7,924	12.71	7,644	12.31
Monastir	Mahdia	76,041	105,548	94,653	94,653	7,951	8.44	6,411	6.71
	Rajch - Ksour Essaf - Bradaa	66,050	35,377	48,393	48,393	7,881	16.11	7,777	16.01
	Chabba - Melloulech - Sidi Alouan	96,140	61,660	62,383	62,383	10,360	16.61	8,933	14.31
	Ouled Chamekh - Hbira - Chorbane	59,122	45,209	45,414	45,414	8,624	18.98	5,768	12.68
	Bou Merdes - Souassi	93,091	56,442	57,021	57,021	11,233	19.11	9,163	16.01
Mahdia	El Jem	56,025	33,408	33,471	33,471	5,364	16.03	4,741	14.11
	Sfax Medina	97,451	106,383	106,123	106,123	8,734	8.22	8,411	7.91
	Sfax West	112,997	87,269	88,470	88,470	8,821	9.91	7,611	8.41
	Sakiet Eziz	98,425	86,920	86,483	86,483	9,324	10.74	7,959	9.11
	Sakiet Edaier	124,422	93,113	93,262	93,262	7,114	7.63	6,844	7.34
	Sfax South	130,944	86,830	86,741	86,741	9,501	10.98	8,774	10.11
	Tina	76,937	35,732	36,263	36,263	4,498	12.41	4,393	12.11
	Agareb	44,082	30,163	30,174	30,174	4,451	14.71	3,914	12.91
	Jebenyana - El Aamra	85,021	59,422	59,334	59,334	6,861	11.51	5,781	9.71
	Hancha	53,118	34,488	34,531	34,531	6,681	19.33	5,363	15.53
	Menzel Chaker	39,253	25,393	25,621	25,621	6,811	26.61	6,214	24.21
	Bir Ali Ben Khalifa	54,293	39,728	39,734	39,734	6,498	16.33	4,584	11.54
	Kerkennah	16,395	13,404	14,958	14,958	3,374	22.54	3,003	20.04
Sfax	Sekhira - Gherba - Mahres	91,204	64,072	64,472	64,472	10,654	16.53	10,213	15.83
	Kairouan North	106,743	96,813	94,101	94,101	6,744	7.71	6,072	6.41
	Kairouan South	103,013	94,703	104,688	104,688	7,884	7.51	7,934	7.51
	Sébikha - Ouelati - Ain Jiloule	110,781	72,058	71,963	71,963	12,158	16.31	11,721	16.21
	Chébilka - Hafouz	76,505	53,373	53,123	53,123	10,113	19.04	10,453	19.64
	El Ala - Hajeb Layoun	65,931	47,163	47,038	47,038	10,813	21.03	11,038	23.44
	Nazr Allah - Menzel Mhiri - Cherarda	62,305	46,068	45,803	45,803	7,003	15.11	6,701	14.61
	Bou Hajla	75,054	45,994	46,211	46,211	8,191	17.71	7,571	16.31
Kairouan	Kasserine North - Zouhour	93,484	87,753	89,501	89,501	13,844	15.41	10,334	11.51
	Kasserine South - Hasi Frit	43,447	40,278	39,393	39,393	6,034	15.33	7,303	18.53
	Sébilla	80,133	52,828	52,813	52,813	11,414	21.62	10,281	19.41
	Majel Belabass - Ferryana	135,895	54,211	53,423	53,423	9,601	17.98	11,933	22.33
	Sébilla - Hidra - Fousana	72,795	54,373	54,150	54,150	11,873	21.93	14,281	26.31
Kasserine	Tela - Hidra - Fousana	94,015	61,353	61,024	61,024	12,603	20.63	11,211	18.31
	Sidi Bouzid West - Hichria	82,440	75,728	78,068	78,068	10,558	13.53	8,411	10.71
	Sidi Bouzid East - Souk Jedid	71,011	57,393	55,504	55,504	8,054	14.51	8,669	15.61
	Jelma - Sabalel Ouled Asker	64,557	45,398	45,411	45,411	8,552	18.83	7,354	16.31
	Bir Hfay - Sidi Ali Ben Oun	72,247	47,676	48,014	48,014	9,684	20.16	9,594	19.91
	Menzel Bouzayen - Meknassi - Mezouna	78,165	56,672	56,321	56,321	12,914	22.94	14,294	25.31
Sidi Bouzid	Regab - Essida - Ouled Hafouz	89,813	64,863	64,683	64,683	11,381	17.03	11,711	18.11
	Gabes Medina - Gabes West	82,650	81,544	81,544	81,544	5,384	6.11	4,851	5.71
	Gabes South	84,432	66,096	67,044	67,044	5,314	7.93	4,211	6.21
	Ghannouch - Matoula - Outhref - Menzel Habib	71,695	46,636	46,543	46,543	6,474	13.92	5,211	11.11
	Hamma - Hammam West	82,697	49,003	50,314	50,314	7,033	13.99	5,921	11.71
Gabes	Mareth - Dekhilet Toujen - Matmata - Matmata Jedida	84,016	59,633	59,762	59,762	7,034	11.74	7,562	12.62
	Mednine North	60,331	63,126	64,403	64,403	3,794	5.83	3,611	5.63
	Mednine South - Sidi Makhlouf	86,836	105,823	105,833	105,833	6,683	6.34	5,363	5.04
	Bni Khdech	25,278	20,018	19,983	No second round	1,471	7.31	No second round	No second round
	Ben Gardene	87,032	53,283	53,284	53,284	6,503	12.22	5,804	10.84
	Jarjiss	78,428	56,343	56,864	56,864	4,210	7.11	4,681	8.21
	Jerba Houmet Essouk	84,165	56,036	56,792	No second round	5,624	9.11	No second round	No second round
	Jerba Midoune - Jerba Ajim	98,000	60,203	61,699	61,699	4,371	7.04	3,971	6.44
	Tataouin North - Bni Mhir - Smar	80,463	65,114	65,884	65,884	4,854	7.33	3,911	5.93
	Tataouin South - Bir Lahmer - Ghomrasen	56,738	55,578	55,384	55,384	2,984	5.33	2,333	4.23
	Thehiba - Remada	14,630	9,110	9,133	9,133	1,941	21.22	2,154	23.64
Tataouin	Gafsa North - Sidi Aich - Elgass - Zanouch	78,511	56,863	57,053	57,053	7,083	12.44	6,874	11.74
	Gafsa South	109,748	94,323	94,573	94,573	8,383	8.81	7,453	7.81
	Om Laarayess - Sidi Boubakker - Rdaief - Metlaoui - Medhilla	107,768	89,263	88,633	88,633	15,243	17.11	14,013	15.81
Gafsa	Guetar - Belkhir - Snad	58,577	41,983	41,444	41,444	6,711	16.11	6,681	16.11
	Tozeur	51,155	38,693	38,807	38,807	6,374	16.44	6,133	15.83
	Deghech - Hammet Jerid - Tamaghza	36,766	26,370	26,322	26,322	6,574	24.98	5,333	20.23
Tozeur	Nafta - Hazoua	27,950	20,703	20,553	20,553	2,023	9.81	1,923	9.33
	Xebell North - Kebili South - Souk Lahad	96,981	80,693	80,954	80,954	7,401	9.14	7,804	9.34
	Douz North - Douz South	51,450	33,498	33,604	33,604	3,594	10.64	3,174	9.44
Kebili	Faouar - Rejim Matoug	22,373	13,363	14,013	14,013	3,344	23.81	4,381	31.31
					Total Registered	Total Votes	1st Round Average %	Total Votes	2nd Round Average %
		11,859,238	8,914,662	8,981,466	8,000,237	1,023,393	11.39	895,112	11.14
France 1	France - Consulate of Paris - Consulates of Pantin and Strasbourg	NA	NA	No Election	No Election	No Election	No Election	No Election	No Election
France 2	France - Consulates of Grenoble, Lyon and Toulouse	NA	NA	73,599	No second round	592	0.81	No second round	No second round
France 3	France - Consulates of Marseille, Nice and Toulon	NA	NA	31,308	No second round	753	2.41	No second round	No second round
Italy	Italy	NA	NA	50,124	No second round	683	1.33	No second round	No second round
Germany	Germany	NA	NA	No Election	No Election	No Election	No Election	No Election	No Election
The rest of the European countries	The rest of the European countries in which Tunisian diplomatic missions are present	NA	NA	No Election	No Election	No Election	No Election	No Election	No Election
Arab countries	Arab countries in which Tunisian diplomatic missions are present	NA	NA	No Election	No Election	No Election	No Election	No Election	No Election
Asia and Australia	All non-Arab countries of the Asian continent and the continent of Australia in which Tunisian diplomatic missions are present	NA	NA	No Election	No Election	No Election	No Election	No Election	No Election
Africa	All non-Arab African countries in the continent of Africa in which Tunisian diplomatic missions are present	NA	NA	No Election	No Election	No Election	No Election	No Election	No Election
The Americas	All countries of the American continent in which Tunisian diplomatic missions are present	NA	NA	No Election	No Election	No Election	No Election	No Election	No Election
Overall Total for all Constituencies National and Abroad		11,859,238	9,278,541	9,136,502	8,000,237	1,025,429	11.22%	895,112	11.19%

Annex C

Candidate Registration

Number of Candidates Registered by IRIE

IRIE*	Final candidates on Nov. 23, 2022
Ariana	21
Bizerte	39
Manouba	34
Tunis 1	22
Tunis 2	21
Ben Arous	39
Nabeul 1	40
Nabeul 2	28
Zaghuan	26
Beja	29
Jendouba	42
Kef	36
Siliana	25
Kairouan	64
Mahdia	59
Monastir	56
Sousse	50
Gafsa	47
Kasserine	74
Sfax 1	60
Sfax 2	46
Sidi Bouzid	71
Tozeur	20
Gabes	41
Kebili	14
Medenine	33
Tataouine	15
Italy	1
France 2	1
France 3	1
Total	1,055

*Note: An IRIE is a regional office of the Independent High Authority for Elections (ISIE).

Terms and Abbreviations

ACHPR	African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
AIM	Action in the Mediterranean
ARP	Assembly of Representatives of the People
CAT	Convention Against Torture, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CERD	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
CNAM	Sickness Insurance Fund
CRPD	Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
CSM	High Judicial Council
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
DL	Decree-Law
EDR	Election Dispute Resolution
ELMO	Carter Center's election monitoring software
FTDES	Tunisian Forum of Economic and Social Rights
HAICA	Independent High Authority for Audiovisual Communication
IBSAR	Association for Culture and Leisure of the Blind and Visually Impaired
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR	International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
INPDP	National Authority for the Protection of Personal Data
IRIEs	Independent regional authorities for elections

ISIE	Independent High Authority for Elections
JSF	Youth Without Borders
LTDH	Tunisian League for Human Rights
LTO	Long-term observer
MPs	Members of parliament
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NGO	Nongovernmental organization
OIF	International Organization of Francophonie
OTDDPH	Organization for the Defense of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
PDL	The Free Destourian Party
SMMU	Social media monitoring unit
SNJT	National Union of Tunisian Journalists
TND	Tunisian dinar
TU-MED	Tunisian Mediterranean Center
UGTT	General Union of Tunisian Workers
UNFT	National Union of Tunisian Women

Annex E

The Carter Center Delegation and Staff List

Atlanta Staff

Lance Alloway, Chief Development Officer, Peace Programs

Ron Borden, Contractor, Communications

Bronwen Boyd, Program Assistant, Democracy Program

Marcia Brown, Financial Analyst, Peace Programs

Patti Bunker, Chief Information Technology Officer, Information Technology

Jeremy Byrd, Financial Analyst, Peace Programs

David Carroll, Director, Democracy Program

Maria Cartaya, Associate Director Of Communications, Communications

Yohannes Dawd, Senior Associate Director, Finance

Soyia Ellison, Director of Storytelling, Communications

Daniel Grober, Program Assistant, Peace Programs—Democracy

Sarah Johnson, Associate Director, Democracy Program

Gary Lattimore, Lead Network Engineer, Information Technology

Travis Linger, Program Management Specialist, Peace Programs- Democracy

Ramiro Martinez, Director Program Finance, Finance—Peace Programs

Erika Perry, Program Assistant, Peace Programs—Democracy

Daniel Richardson, Program Associate, Peace Programs—Democracy

Wyatt Schierman, Program Associate, Peace Programs—Democracy

Nigel van der Woude, Intern, Peace Programs—Democracy

Akil Woolfolk, Network Consultant, Information Technology

Sairah Zaidi, Associate Director, Peace Programs—Democracy

Tunisia International Staff

Aliénor Benoist, France/Spain, Gender and Participatory Rights Analyst

Don Bisson, United States, Country Representative and Mission Director

Ahmed Farag, Egypt, Legal Analyst

Pawel Jurczak, Poland, Operations Manager

Baya Kara, Algeria, Electoral Analyst

Adeline Marquis, France, Social Media Analyst

Gent Ramadani, Norway/Albania, Observer Coordinator

Tunisia National Staff

Hamza Amor, National Political Analyst

Wajih Ayadhi, National Electoral Analyst

Khaoula Ben Abdelhafidh, Translator & Interpreter

Mariam Ben Aissa, Social Media Monitor

Khadija Chammaki, Observer
Coordinator Assistant
Abir Chniti, Finance/Administrative Officer
Fadoua El Ouni, National Legal Analyst
Amira Guebsi, National Operations Officer
Oussama Laajimi, Security Manager
Ines Mahdaoui, Social Media Monitor
Sarra Mejri, National Gender Analyst
Hanene Mekni, Translator
Aly Mhenni, Social Media Monitor
Mariem Zalfeni, Social Media Monitor

Long-Term Observers

Lucrezia Aresi, Italy
Marek Bazin, France
Jamal Boubouch, Morocco
Özcan Çetin, Turkey
Laura Erizi, Italy
Gillian Gloyer, United Kingdom
Sara Hteit, Lebanon
Aleš Jakubec, Czechia
Anitra Jankevica, Latvia
Koffi Léon Kouame, Ivory Coast
Mohamed Sabahy, Egypt
Giuliano Salis, Italy
Sara Samarah, Palestine/Jordan
Salma Sharif, Egypt

Short-Term Observers

Joelle Abou Farhat, Lebanon
John Achatz, United States
Raneem Al Habbal, Morocco
Ahmed Attalla Fouad Ali, Egypt
Nourredine Benissad, Algeria
Ana Claudia Santano, Brazil

Ayman Dandach Ali, Lebanon
Nay El Rahi, Lebanon
Malaz Elfadil Abdalla Moamed, Sudan
Abd Elhameed Ahmed Abd
Elhameed Mohammed, Sudan
Joudi Fatfat, Lebanon
Ian Goredema, Zimbabwe
Elmahdi Hassan Mohamed Adam, Sudan
Marwah Husayn Yunus Alshaybani, Libya
Sawsan Jomah Mussa Maslin, Sudan
Emma Kaliya, Malawi
Brianna Lennon, United States
Aifric Lynch Horne, Ireland
Rawad Mabruk Rajab Aljabiri, Libya
Fareed Mahmoud Mustafa Tuem Alah, Palestine
Andrew Makoni, Zimbabwe
Aye Moh Moh Khaing, Myanmar
Abdulmalik Mohammed Awn, Libya
Fatimah Mohammed Husayn Almurtheadhay, Libya
Majd Mohammed Mahmoud Quzmar, Palestine
Feras Monief Jum'ah Mansour, Palestine
Marcella Morris, United States
Abdellatif Mounir, Morocco
Abdallah Mouseddad, Morocco
Steven E. Nothern, United States
Cheick Oumar Doumbia, Mali
Ian Rebouças Batista, Brazil
Justin Roebuck, United States
Ragab Saad Taha Saad Elsoudany, Egypt
Maysoon Sayyed Ibrahim Qawasmeh, Jordan
Michela Sechi, Italy
Seema Shams, United States
Ali Slim Hussein, Lebanon
Moyassir Zegallai, Libya

Press Releases and Statements



NEWS RELEASE

Carter Center Launches Mission to Observe Tunisia's Legislative Elections

ATLANTA (Oct. 31, 2022) — The Carter Center has launched a mission to observe the process surrounding the Dec. 17 parliamentary elections in Tunisia.

The Center — which has monitored several legislative and political processes in Tunisia since the 2011 revolution, starting with the 2011 National Constituent Assembly elections — was invited and accredited to observe this year's elections by the High Independent Authority for Elections.

The long-term observation team is composed of a core team based in Tunis and 14 long-term observers, who have deployed in teams of two around the country this October to assess electoral preparations at the regional and local levels and to observe the campaign. The Center will cooperate and engage with key Tunisian stakeholders and other international and domestic citizen observer groups.

The mission will observe and examine key aspects of the electoral process, including the pre-electoral environment, voter registration, candidate registration, social media, campaigning, and campaign finance. The team also will follow the post-election process, including any legal challenges to the results.

The Center urges authorities to fully respect the fundamental rights of citizens and candidates guaranteed in the 2022 constitution and in international treaties and commitments agreed to by Tunisia during the electoral period. These include the right to vote and to run for office, and freedom of assembly, opinion, thought, expression, media, and publication, as provided in the Tunisian Constitution and in line with Tunisian commitments and international best practices for democratic elections.

The Carter Center will provide an independent assessment of the parliamentary electoral process and its compliance with the country's international commitments, national law, and standards for democratic elections. It will issue a preliminary statement on its findings shortly after election day and a final report at the end of the mission. All statements and reports will be available at www.cartercenter.org.

The Center's election observation missions are conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation, which provides guidelines for professional and impartial international election observation. The declaration was adopted at a ceremony held at the United Nations in 2005 and has been endorsed by more than 50 election observation groups.

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NEWS RELEASE

Carter Center launches mission to observe Tunisia's December 2022 Legislative Elections

ATLANTA (Nov. 1, 2022) — The Carter Center has launched an election observation mission to observe the process surrounding the December 17 parliamentary elections in Tunisia. The High Independent Authority for Elections (ISIE) has invited and accredited the Center to observe the national legislative elections this year. The Center has monitored several legislative and political processes during the country's democratic transition following the 2011 revolution, starting with its observation of the 2011 National Constituent Assembly elections.

The long-term observation team is composed of a core team based in Tunis and 14 long-term observers deployed in teams of two to seven locations around the country this October to assess electoral preparations on the regional and local levels and to observe the campaign. The Center will cooperate and engage with key Tunisian stakeholders and other international and domestic citizen observer groups.

The mission will observe and examine key aspects of the electoral process, including the pre-electoral environment, voter registration, candidate registration, campaigning, including the use of social media during the campaign and campaign finance. The team will also follow the post-election process, including any legal challenges to the results.

The Center urges the authorities to respect fully the fundamental rights of citizens and candidates guaranteed in the 2022 constitution and international treaties and commitments agreed to by Tunisia during the electoral period. These include the right to vote and to run for election, freedom of assembly, opinion, thought, expression, media, and publication as provided in the Tunisian Constitution and in line with Tunisian commitments and international best practices for democratic elections.¹

The Center will issue a preliminary statement on its findings shortly after election day and a final report at the end of the mission, the Center will provide an independent assessment of the parliamentary electoral process and its compliance with the country's international commitments,

¹ As stipulated in Articles 39, 40, and 58 of the Tunisian Constitution.

This includes General Comment 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights; and the Convention on The Political Rights of Women.

national law, and standards for democratic elections. All statements and reports will be available at www.cartercenter.org.

The Center's election observation missions are conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation, which provides guidelines for professional and impartial international election observation. The declaration was adopted at a ceremony held at the United Nations in 2005 and has been endorsed by more than 50 election observation groups.

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NEWS RELEASE

Historically Low Turnout in Tunisia's Parliamentary Election Confirms Need for Renewed Dialogue

TUNIS, TUNISIA (Dec. 19, 2022) — In a preliminary statement released today, The Carter Center called upon all Tunisian stakeholders to put aside their differences and engage in a truly inclusive and transparent national dialogue to reset the country's stalled democratic transition.

Just 8.8% of the country's eligible voters voted in the Dec. 17 parliamentary elections, an historically low turnout that reflects the Tunisian people's disillusionment with the current political and economic situation and that suggests that the presidential roadmap announced in December 2021 has not succeeded in uniting the country.

The Carter Center, which has been engaged in Tunisia since 2011, launched an election observation mission in June 2022 with a small core team of experts. The expert team assessed the July 25 referendum, and for the Dec. 17 parliamentary elections, the Center deployed more than 60 election observers who visited 308 polling stations across all 24 governorates.

The Center's observation mission found that while the election was technically well-administered, the process underlying the framework for the elections lacked legitimacy and fell short of international and regional standards and obligations.

When the president took control of all levers of power on July 25, 2021, he was responding to the widely shared sense that parliament had failed to address the social and economic issues that fomented the Jasmine Revolution in 2011. But unlike the inclusive processes that followed the revolution and led to the 2014 constitution, the closely controlled process that produced the new constitution lacked broad-based consensus. It was conducted in a compressed timeframe without the opportunity for public debate and was approved in a referendum with just 30.5% turnout.

The new electoral system under which the parliamentary elections were held was created by the president through decree laws. Many Tunisian citizen observer groups criticized the electoral law, noting it was not drafted in a participatory way involving key Tunisian stakeholders and created an electoral system that further hindered the participation of women and youth.

Because of the way both the constitution and the electoral law were drafted, many political parties, civil society organizations, and other groups called for a boycott of the elections. In addition, many Tunisians were not familiar with the candidates or the new electoral structures and may not have voted for that reason.

The flawed process leading up to the election and the low turnout on election day reinforce the need to embark on a different path to address the hopes and dreams of the Tunisian people

expressed during the revolution and fulfill their aspirations for a more inclusive democracy and economic prosperity.

The Center recommends that the president establish the constitutional court immediately and that Tunisian leaders engage in a broad-based, inclusive consultation that addresses the flaws in the 2022 constitution and the decree laws issued by the president since July 25, 2021.

Among the issues that should be addressed are:

- The need for a new electoral law and electoral system that will reestablish an independent electoral body and result in effective national policymaking.
- The establishment of policies that address issues such as corruption, security sector reform, and public administration.
- The reestablishment of the balance of power between the executive, parliamentary, and judiciary branches.
- Increased voter and civic education to engage the public in national dialogue consultations and reforms that will impact their daily lives.
- Steps to strengthen political parties and increase internal party democracy, resulting in more effective political party representation, including by women, youth, and marginalized populations.

Tunisia's path forward begins with leaders putting the country's needs ahead of their own and responding to the people's desire for economic development, responsive government, and genuine democracy.

Background

The Carter Center was accredited by The High Independent Authority for the Elections (known by its French acronym, the ISIE) to observe the elections and deployed more than 60 observers from 26 countries who visited 308 unique polling stations as well as the 27 tabulation centers on election day.

The Center deployed a core team in June 2022 and 14 long-term observers in mid-October. The objectives of its observation in Tunisia are to provide an impartial assessment of the overall quality of the electoral process, promote an inclusive process for all Tunisians, and demonstrate support for its democratic transition.

The Carter Center is assessing the electoral process against the Tunisian Constitution, the domestic electoral framework, and obligations and standards derived from regional and international treaties, interpretive bodies, and state practice. Its observation mission is conducted in accordance with the 2005 Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation.

The Center has had a presence in Tunisia since 2011. It observed the 2011 National Constituent Assembly elections, the 2014 and 2019 presidential and parliamentary elections, and the constitution-making process that resulted in the adoption of the 2014 constitution.



**Carter Center Preliminary Statement on Tunisia's 2022 Parliamentary
Elections
Dec. 19, 2022**

This statement is preliminary; a final report will be published four months after the end of the electoral process.

Tunisia's Dec. 17 parliamentary elections took place on the 12th anniversary of the spark that ignited the Arab Spring in 2011. The preliminary turnout results are historically low, 8.8 percent, reflecting the disillusionment of the Tunisian people with the current economic, political, and social situation. Tunisia now finds itself at a crossroads, not unlike what existed in 2011, when all Tunisians united and engaged in a true national dialogue to move the transition to democracy forward. The low turnout can also be read as a rejection of the roadmap outlined by the president in December 2021, which resulted in a flawed constitutional drafting process and referendum in which only 30 percent of the people voted.

The president understood the Tunisian people's disillusionment and disappointment in the fact that the last 12 years have failed to produce any tangible results in addressing the underlying causes of the revolution. Unfortunately, his approach to change has not been democratic, and the Tunisian people have now shown that they are not convinced that this is the way forward.

Election day itself proceeded calmly and without major irregularities, as have all elections in Tunisia since 2011. But work must be done to reset Tunisian democracy.

Tunisian leaders need to engage in an inclusive process to address the flaws in the 2022 constitution, the decrees amending the electoral law and the law on The High Independent Authority for the Elections (known by its French acronym, the ISIE) and renew the process of reform begun in 2011. The Carter Center recommends that the following issues be addressed:

- The need for a new electoral law and electoral system that will reestablish an independent electoral body and result in effective national policymaking.
- The establishment of policies that address issues such as corruption, security sector reform, and public administration.
- The re-establishment of the balance of power between the executive, parliamentary, and judiciary branches.
- Increased voter and civic education to engage the public in national dialogue consultations and reforms that will impact their daily lives.

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- Steps to strengthen political parties and increase internal party democracy, resulting in more effective political party representation, including by women, youth, and marginalized populations.

Political Background

The elections took place against the backdrop of the actions of President Kaïs Saïed on July 25, 2021, when he unconstitutionally invoked Article 80 of the Tunisian Constitution to grant himself the power to take emergency measures to address an “imminent danger threatening the nation’s institutions or the security or independence of the country,” citing an ineffective Tunisian parliament as the threat. He subsequently fired the prime minister, suspended the activity of the parliament, and lifted the legal immunity of its members. The lack of a constitutional court to determine the legality of his actions left those who opposed them with no legal or institutional mechanism to challenge him.

He deepened the political crisis on Sept. 22, 2021, by issuing Presidential Decree 117, which suspended all parts of the constitution except its introductory chapters on fundamental rights and freedoms; centralized all executive, parliamentary, and judicial power under the control of the president with no checks or balances — even explicitly prohibiting judicial review of his decree laws.

The president took advantage of the COVID-19 pandemic, which worsened the already precarious economic situation in the country; the ineffectiveness of subsequent parliaments to address the social and economic issues that fomented the 2011 Jasmine revolution; and the perception among many Tunisians that political parties and leaders — and the electoral system they created — failed to produce significant progress in their day-to-day lives.

In December 2021, the president announced his roadmap for reform, which included the drafting of a new constitution and holding a constitutional referendum on July 25, 2022. On March 30, 2022, the president dissolved parliament after MPs organized their first session since the suspension of their activities in July 2021. The session was attended by 124 deputies (of the 217 total) from the parliamentary groups of Ennahdha, Qalb Tounes, the al-Karama coalition, and Tahya Tounes, as well as independent deputies, with 116 of the 124 voting to abolish the exceptional measures and decrees issued by President Saïed since July 25, 2021.

Several Tunisian law professors criticized the president for applying articles of the constitution as he saw fit and ignoring others, using the constitution in an a la carte manner, relying on the fact that there was no constitutional court to review his actions. The president announced an initiative by the minister of justice to open judicial investigations into the MPs who attended the parliamentary session and to prosecute anyone involved for threatening the security of the state.

President Saïed initiated a constitutional reform process in January 2022, which featured a national consultation on potential constitutional changes. The consultation, which took place from Jan. 15, 2022, to March 20, 2022, was entirely online and failed to capture the interest of Tunisians. Only 534,465 citizens — of 8% of eligible citizens — participated. The consultation ostensibly allowed Tunisians to voice their opinion on what the new constitution should contain. Opposition parties and prominent civil society organizations urged citizens to boycott the consultation, arguing that

it was not a real consultation but rather a public opinion poll with questions developed by the government and structured to achieve certain results. Although the president insisted the draft of the constitution would be based on the results of the national consultation, many of the questions were about issues that are not normally addressed in a constitution. After the release of the consultation results, there was no public report on how they were incorporated into the draft constitution.

On May 20, 2022, the president announced the members of the High National Advisory Consultation Commission for a New Republic, who were mandated with producing a draft constitution by June 20. The Consultation Commission was made up of two advisory committees, one devoted to economic and social affairs, and the other to legal affairs. According to the president, the work of these subcommittees was to be based on the national e-consultation outcomes. No political party representative was named as a member of either committee, including those who expressed support for the president's actions since July 25, 2001. The president stressed that the national dialogue would be open to those who "embraced the corrective process" and would not involve those who are "devoid of patriotism, and ransack, starve and abuse the Tunisian people."

All opposition parties rejected the commission and called for continued resistance to the president, declaring the process and referendum to be without legal foundation and illegitimate. Many of those named to the commission refused to take up their positions, including the deans of the universities of law, legal, and political sciences and UGTT, the largest Tunisian labor union, who were to fill leading positions.

The commission submitted a draft constitution to the president by the June 20 deadline. The president publicly released the draft on June 30, less than one month before the vote on the constitutional referendum. The coordinator and several members of the commission announced that the draft text of the constitution released by the president differed substantially from the version they had submitted on June 20.

Unlike the inclusive national dialogue that took place during the 2011 Arab Spring, which led to the election of a National Constituent Assembly, and the in-depth legislative process that formed the basis for the 2014 constitution, the 2022 constitutional process was conducted in an extremely compressed timeframe and in an opaque and exclusionary manner. Constitutional articles that sparked intensive public debate in the constitution-making process from 2012-2014 were edited in less than a month by the 2022 commission and the president himself.

The lack of an inclusive, transparent process for drafting the new constitution violated international standards as well as norms for creating and amending constitutions, which indicate that constitutional changes should be made in accordance with provisions of the constitution itself, where possible, and certainly on the basis of the widest possible consensus.¹ The process that gave rise to the new constitution, regardless of its content, therefore lacked the legitimacy and sound legal basis required for a democratic constitution.

¹ See Venice Commission Urgent Opinion on the constitutional and legislative framework on the referendum, issued May 27, 2022.

In addition, given the lack of public debate, insufficient voter education, and truncated timeframe for producing the draft, it is unclear whether citizens understood what they were voting on in the referendum. According to international best practices for constitutional amendments, such a process should normally take a year or more and reflect a broad consensus of all stakeholders, including a country's political forces, before being put to a referendum.

Given the lack of an inclusive and consensus-based process during the constitution drafting process, it would have been especially important for the referendum to include a quorum for participation. However, no such quorum or minimum participation threshold was established. The referendum was held on July 25, 2022. Fewer than one-third of registered voters participated. The final turnout figure for the referendum was 2,830,094 total votes out of 9,278,541 registered voters, representing 30.5 percent; 94.6 percent (2,607,884) voted yes, and 5.4 percent (148,723) voted no.

The new constitution severely limits the authority of parliament and greatly increases the president's power. It eliminates provisions that allow for the president's impeachment, either for political or criminal reasons, unlike the 2014 constitution. Parliament cannot question the president's actions if he breaches the constitution. The government is now politically responsible to the president and accountable to both houses of parliament. The president directly appoints the prime minister without the parliament's approval, unlike under the 2014 constitution, where the party with the largest number of deputies nominated the prime minister. The president, rather than the prime minister, also appoints the members of the government. The president may, on her or his initiative or the proposal of the prime minister, dismiss the government or one of its members. In contrast, under the 2014 constitution, the government could be dismissed following a vote of no confidence in parliament, and the individual dismissal of members of the government was the responsibility of either the prime minister or the parliament.

The president chairs the cabinet, which was formerly the prerogative of the prime minister. In addition, the president oversees the executive functions and determines the policy of the state instead of the prime minister, limiting the role of the government to the execution of state policies set by the president. As in the 2014 constitution, parliament is obligated to prioritize consideration of legislation proposed by the president.

The constitution calls for a yet-to-be-created new legislative chamber, the National Council for Regions and Districts (NCRD). According to the constitution, the elected members of each regional council will elect three members to represent the region. Then members of regional councils in the same district elect one member to represent the entire district. The NCRD has jurisdiction over laws related to the state budget and to development plans that must be approved by an absolute majority of both chambers. The NCRD will have what seems to be a formal but largely ineffectual oversight on matters related to the implementation of the budget and development plans. The relations between the two chambers will be defined by law.

While the 2014 constitution devoted an entire chapter to local self-government, enshrining the concept of decentralization and elected municipal and regional councils, the 2022 constitution contains only one article on local government. It does not mention decentralization or principles such as financial autonomy, participatory local democracy, or self-governance. It foresees three levels of local authorities: municipal councils, regional (governorate) councils, and district

councils but gives no details on how these authorities will be elected, referring to the law to provide these details.

Legal Framework

According to international best practices, an election's legal framework should be transparent and readily accessible to the public. It should also address all the components of an electoral system necessary to ensure democratic elections.² The fundamental elements of electoral law, in particular the electoral system itself, as well as the composition of electoral commissions and the delimitation of constituencies should not be amended less than one year before an election.³

The constitution guarantees the right to vote to all citizens who are 18 or older and who are not subject to any kind of restrictions foreseen under the electoral law. The latest electoral law amendments in 2022 reinstated the general prohibition on military and security personnel voting in all elections — legislative, presidential, regional, and municipal — a restriction not in alignment with international standards.⁴ Citizens in health care facilities, penitentiaries, and detention centers were not able to exercise their right to vote, as no mechanism for doing so exists in the law, contrary to Tunisia's constitution and international commitments.⁵

The electoral law was amended twice in 2022 by decree law. On June 1, changes were made to the referendum framework, and on Sept. 15 — only three months before the election — major changes were made to the framework of the parliamentary elections, including changing the electoral system from a closed list system to majoritarian single-candidate districts, requiring a second round if no candidate gets an absolute majority in the first.

The September amendment also imposed new restrictions on the right to stand as a candidate in the parliamentary elections. It strengthened some of the existing conditions (e.g., Tunisian nationality, proof of payment of taxes), and added new conditions (e.g., residency in the electoral district, a clean criminal record, collecting 400 endorsements).

Another major change was a provision allowing members of parliament (MPs) to be recalled. The recall process can be launched through a petition if MPs are found to have breached the obligation of integrity or other parliamentary obligations or made insufficient efforts to carry out their electoral program. The electoral law prohibits the submission of more than one recall petition against the same MP during the same mandate. It also prohibits the initiation of the recall procedure during the first year or in the last six months of the legislative mandate. The law, however, does not preview any tangible assessment standard or criteria for recalling MPs, making the decision on the recall petition discretionary and arbitrary, and susceptible to misuse.

Following the submission of a recall petition signed by one-tenth of the registered voters in the concerned district, it is up to the ISIE to accept or reject it and inform the MP and the assembly of the decision. The ISIE's decision can be challenged in court by the concerned MP or those who

² OSCE/ODIHR, Guidelines for Reviewing a Legal Framework for Elections, page 4.

³ Venice Commission, Interpretive Declaration on the Stability of Electoral Law; CDL-AD (2005)043.

⁴ See ICCPR, Article 25: "Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity [...] to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections..." Also, General Comment 25, para. 14: "The grounds for denying suffrage rights to citizens have to be objective and reasonable and must be prescribed by law."

⁵ Right to universal suffrage on the basis of equal treatment before the law: ICCPR, Article 25(b); African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, Article 3(3).

submitted it. If the recall petition is approved, a recall election is held. If the MP is recalled, this triggers a by-election, in which the recalled MP can seek to be elected again.

Although campaign provisions for the 2022 parliamentary elections are still restrictive, candidates have been granted the possibility to use the same forms of advertising as presidential candidates.⁶ Article 52 of the electoral law states that electoral campaigning must respect the essential principles of equal opportunity for all candidates. Similarly, Article 3 of the law on the ISIE mandates that it guarantee equal treatment of voters, candidates, and all stakeholders.

According to Article 67 of the electoral law, the ISIE and High Independent Authority for Audiovisual Communication (known by its French acronym, HAICA) are mandated to issue a joint decision regulating campaign activities over audio and visual media. The ISIE and HAICA could not reach an agreement about the joint decision and instead issued separate decisions, each insisting that theirs took precedence.⁷ This led to confusion and made candidates and media reluctant to cover the electoral campaign. The HAICA filed an injunction in the administrative court declaring that legally it had the authority to regulate audio and visual media during the campaign. The court rejected the request, ruling that because both bodies had jurisdiction over media during the campaign and the HAICA had not stated any grounds for relief, there was no basis to grant the injunction.

Under the existing legal framework, the HAICA has specific jurisdiction over monitoring of audio and visual media even during election periods.⁸ The ISIE has jurisdiction over the monitoring of social and print media. There is nothing in the law that indicates what happens if joint agreement is not reached; however, according to the HAICA, since it has specific jurisdiction over audio and visual media, legally, its decision should prevail.

Electoral System

The purpose of an electoral system is to translate the people's will into a representative government. International standards do not prescribe a specific electoral system.⁹ However, such a fundamental aspect of the legal framework should be decided after consultation and broad consensus among all stakeholders.

The newly adopted 2022 constitution provided for a bicameral system, with the parliament directly elected by citizens in the Dec. 17 elections; and a National Council for Regions and Districts to be appointed by regional councils upon their election. The September 2022 amendments of the electoral law established a new electoral system for electing the parliament, with 161 single-candidate electoral districts, 151 in-country and 10 abroad. If no candidate achieves over 50 percent in the first round, the race is decided in a second round between the top two vote-getters two weeks after the announcement of final results.

⁶ Advertisement media allowed for candidates include fixed and mobile billboards, car wrapping, and online advertisement/sponsoring.

⁷ Decision 8-2018 as amended by Decision 31-2022 on determining the rules and requirements mass media need to comply with during the election and referendum campaign.

⁸ Chapter IV, articles 42 to 46.

⁹ U.N., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Article 25(b); United Nations Human Rights Council, General Comment 25, para. 21.

Boundary Delimitation

For this election, new boundaries were created for the 161 electoral districts. The new boundaries were set without any consultation with stakeholders one month before the opening of candidate nomination. The criteria used to create the new districts were never made public. According to international standards, an appropriate combination of criteria needs to be set, such as the number of residents in the constituency, the number of resident nationals (including minors), and the number of registered voters.¹⁰ Changing such a fundamental element so close to an election affects the amount of time stakeholders have to properly prepare for the election and violates international good practices.¹¹

According to international best practice, deviations in size from district to district should not exceed 10% in general and 15% in special circumstances to ensure equality of the vote.¹² Carter Center analysis showed that 90 of the 151 in-country districts exceed the 10% deviation.

In the governorate of Tunis, three districts are under-represented and three over-represented.¹³ The electoral district La Marsa-Carthage has 127,167 inhabitants, and in the same region, the electoral district Beb ElBhar-Sidi ElBachir has 55,732 inhabitants. A similar situation exists in the governorate of Tataouine, where the electoral district of Thehiba-Remada has 14,630 inhabitants, and the electoral district of Kebili-Rejim Maatoug has 22,372 inhabitants. Four governorates — Jendouba, El Kef, Siliana, and Gabes — were redistricted in a way that respects the principle of equality of the vote.

The boundary delimitation for this election is not in line with international good practices as the majority of districts do not respect the equality of the vote. In addition, the boundaries were set late in the process not allowing stakeholders, especially voters and candidates the time to understand the new demarcation.

Candidate Registration

Candidates and political parties are important stakeholders in the electoral process. The right to be elected is a recognized principle in both regional and international treaties. However, it is not an absolute right and may be limited on the basis of objective and reasonable criteria established by

¹⁰ The Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters of the Venice Commission (CDL-AD(2002)023rev, point I.2.2) provides that: “Equality in voting power, where the elections are not being held in one single constituency, requires constituency boundaries to be drawn in such a way that seats in the lower chambers representing the people are distributed equally among the constituencies, in accordance with a specific apportionment criterion, e.g. the number of residents in the constituency, the number of resident nationals (including minors), the number of registered electors, or possibly the number of people actually voting.”

¹¹ The Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters of the Venice Commission (CDL-AD(2002)023rev, point II.2.B) provides that “The fundamental elements of electoral law, in particular the electoral system proper, membership of electoral commissions and the drawing of constituency boundaries, should not be open to amendment less than one year before an election, or should be written in the constitution or at a level higher than ordinary law.”

¹² The Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matter (CDL-AD(2002) 023rev, point 2.2.iv) says that the permissible departure from the norm should not be more than 10%, and should certainly not exceed 15% except in special circumstances (protection of a concentrated minority, sparsely populated administrative entity).

¹³ According to the last official population estimate made in January 2022, the whole population of Tunisia is 11,859,238, which would make the electoral quotient for one deputy approximately 78,538 inhabitants.

law.¹⁴ The late publication of the fundamental elements of the electoral law, including the new electoral system and constituency delimitation, one month before the beginning of the nomination process affected the understanding of the rules and competitiveness in several constituencies in-country and in most constituencies abroad.¹⁵ The requirement to collect 400 notarized endorsements represented the biggest challenge, discouraging potential candidates and affecting the competitiveness in several constituencies.¹⁶

The single-member constituencies with new delimitations and independent candidates set for this election greatly impacted the candidate nomination process. Candidacy has become individual, instead of list-based, in smaller constituencies than before. This has eliminated the role of political parties in approving and nominating candidates and the need for candidates to be political party members. While the new legislation opens the door to candidates with different profiles as well as newcomers who had not previously considered running for parliament, many of these candidates faced challenges in conducting campaigns because of the lack of public funding and support from political parties, among other issues. This was especially true for women and youth candidates.

The ISIE set the registration calendar for Oct. 17-24. The gathering of endorsements proved to be the most difficult step for potential candidates, who needed to convince 200 men and 200 women, 25% of them under 35 years of age, to endorse their candidacy and notarize their signatures in the municipalities, delegations, or IRIE offices. This was especially difficult for female and overseas candidates. Civil society organizations, media, and even members of political parties alleged that some candidates paid voters to endorse their candidacy. After consultation with regional coordinators, the ISIE decided to extend the registration deadline by three days to allow potential candidates to complete their applications with the required documents. In addition, some candidates said they had difficulty getting their criminal records (Bulletin 3) and municipality tax documents on time.

The ISIE regulation also required all candidates to have a platform explaining their political, social, and economic vision and have those endorsing their candidacy sign that they had read and accepted the platform. This requirement was driven by the new provision in the electoral law that allows a candidate to be recalled if they do not take sufficient steps to fulfill their platform.

The ISIE took one week to review and decide on the 1,427 candidates who applied, of whom 1,213 were men and only 214 women. On Nov. 3, the ISIE announced the preliminary list of 1,058 candidates who were accepted — 936 men and 122 women. Out of the 161 districts, 10 districts, including three abroad and seven in-country, had only one candidate. Eight in-country districts had just two candidates. Seven districts had no candidates. The highest number of candidacies was in the district constituency of Kasserine North-Zouhour, which had 22 candidates.

¹⁴ ICCPR, Article 25; AU, ACHPR, Article 13; Arab Charter on Human Rights, Article 24.

¹⁵ Venice Commission, CODE OF GOOD PRACTICE IN ELECTORAL MATTERS, Sec. “The fundamental elements of electoral law, in particular the electoral system proper, membership of electoral commissions and the drawing of constituency boundaries, should not be open to amendment less than one year before an election, or should be written in the constitution or at a level higher than ordinary law” CDL-AD(2002)023rev2-cor.

¹⁶ There were seven constituencies without candidates (all of them are abroad), and there were 10 constituencies with only one candidate, and 8 with just two candidates.

The ISIE shared the profiles of the accepted candidates; 50% work in public administrations, schools, and universities. There were several members of municipalities, including 27 mayors, 26 former MPs, and several members of civil society organizations. The new constitutional prohibition on combining parliamentary work with any other remunerative or non-remunerative professional activity led to fewer candidacies by lawyers, doctors, and other independent professionals.¹⁷ The new electoral system led to fewer female candidates, as the first-past-the-post system does not lend itself to quotas for female candidates like the proportional system does. Also, the new system led to an influx of candidates who had not previously run for political office.

Following the challenge period, two candidates were added to the acceptance list, and five candidates withdrew. On Nov. 22, the ISIE announced the final list of 1,055 accepted candidates, only 12% of whom were female.

Election Administration

An independent and impartial body charged with implementing elections is critical to ensuring the integrity of the electoral process. The electoral management body responsible for organizing the elections should be impartial in the performance of its public function.¹⁸ State practice sources suggest that the impartiality of election management bodies should be maintained at all levels, from the national commission to the polling station.¹⁹ The ISIE is in charge of ensuring the regularity, integrity, and transparency of the electoral process and of proclaiming the results.²⁰ Its independence was questioned by stakeholders throughout various stages of the electoral process.

The ISIE organized six different elections during the last decade without major technical issues; however, the Dec. 17 election was organized pursuant to a new constitution, a new electoral law, and new boundary delimitations set a few days before the start of the electoral period, which represented a difficult challenge.²¹

The ISIE board in charge of organizing the legislative elections is composed of five members who were appointed by the president on May 9, 2022.²² Initially, the board was composed of seven members, but before and during the constitutional referendum, one member resigned, and another was dismissed by the ISIE board.²³ The two members were not replaced. The appointment of the ISIE board by the president created the perception that the ISIE was an executive authority rather than an independent body.²⁴ Political parties and civil society organizations criticized the fact that

¹⁷ 2022 Tunisian Constitution, Article 61.

¹⁸ AU, ACDEG, art.17(1)

¹⁹ Venice Commission, Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters, sec. II.3.1.b

²⁰ 2022 Tunisian Constitution, Article 134.

²¹ The new constitution was published in the National Gazette (JORT) on Aug. 18, 2022, and DL-55, amending the electoral law, was published on Sept. 15, 2022.

²² Under the decree, the president must choose three former ISIE members, one judge with at least 10 years of experience from among three magistrates proposed by the Supreme Judicial Council, one administrative court judge with at least 10 years of experience from three magistrates proposed by the Council of the Administrative Magistrature, one judge of the financial order with at least 10 years among three magistrates proposed by the Council of the Financial Magistrature, and one engineer specializing in information systems and computer security, with at least 10 years of experience from among three engineers proposed by the National Center for Information Technology.

²³ ISIE decision dated Aug. 25, 2022.

²⁴ Venice Commission CDL-PI(2022)026.

the president had exclusive authority to appoint ISIE members, raising the perception that the new ISIE board was executing the president's decisions.

The ISIE is composed of an executive body headed by an executive director now appointed by the ISIE president, and 37 Independent Regional Authorities for Elections, or IRIEs, each of which is composed of three members.²⁵ The in-country IRIEs oversee 151 districts, each of which supervise from three to nine districts.²⁶

The ISIE published the electoral calendar for the parliamentary elections on Sept. 15. The calendar was amended once during the candidate registration process to extend the deadline for submission of applications by three days. CSOs criticized this extension as giving an advantage to candidates who waited until the last minute to file their paperwork. The three-day extension allowed for several candidates to complete their candidacies and for 178 new candidates.

The communication strategy of the ISIE was more reactive than proactive. It did not reach out to stakeholders and failed to initiate meetings with political parties and civil society organizations, waiting for these stakeholders to reach out to them. Contradictory statements by the vice president and the spokesperson about the role of political parties in the campaign, including the use of political party logos and platforms by candidates, confused stakeholders.²⁷ The ISIE also tended to communicate more through its Facebook page than its official website, which was considered useless according to stakeholders.

The ISIE used its discretion and authority to issue regulations to fill the gaps in the electoral law, including declaring that if two candidates received an equal number of votes, the younger candidate would be declared the winner and adding a rule requiring candidates to submit an electoral platform and have those endorsing their candidacy sign that they had read and accepted the platform, which was not included in the electoral law. Both actions appear to be outside the authority of the ISIE and should have been included in the law itself.

²⁵ ISIE decision 2022-28.

²⁶ Two IRIEs oversee nine constituencies, including Sousse and Ben Arous. Six IRIEs oversee three constituencies, including Kebili, Tozeur, Tataouine, Siliana, and Zaghouan.

²⁷ ISIE vice president's statement that "there is nothing preventing the participation of political parties from participating in the candidates' election campaigns" on the "RDV 9" program on Attesia TV on Sept. 30 (6 p.m.).

Link to the statement: <http://bit.ly/3PIRCZR>.

ISIE spokesperson's statement to Agence Tunis Afrique Press (TAP) that "political parties are not allowed to campaign during the election campaign period" on Sept. 29. Link to the statement: <https://bit.ly/3uGFhGg>.

Polling hours were set for 8 a.m. to 6 p.m.; as in previous elections, the ISIE issued special hours for several polling centers.²⁸ Additionally, for the first time in Tunisia, four constituencies in Medenine had longer hours, from 8 a.m. to 8 p.m., because of the Jewish Shabbat.²⁹

The late publication of the electoral law, which significantly amended the rules of these elections, left the ISIE with less than three months to organize the election. The different phases of the electoral process, especially the candidate registration, was a real challenge, but the IRIEs managed this phase well and according to regulation.

Voter Registration

According to international standards for voter registration, the register must be comprehensive, inclusive, accurate, and up-to-date, and the process must be fully transparent.³⁰

During the voluntary registration period for the referendum, only 80,000 new voters registered. The ISIE called on the president to issue a decree allowing for automatic registration due to the low number of new voters who registered.¹ Automatic registration resulted in the addition of 2,335,238 new voters. For the parliamentary election, approximately 61,000 new voters were automatically added to the list.

Each new voter was assigned to a polling station according to the address of their ID card.³¹ Because the ID card address does not reflect the current address for some voters, the ISIE allowed voters to update their polling station by providing proof of effective address via several offices in municipalities, using the online platform touenssa.isie.tn, or by text message. During the initial period from Sept. 26 to Oct. 13, 48,000 voters updated their polling station via the fixed offices, and 7,239 used the Touenssa platform and text messaging system. The ISIE has not published any relevant information for the second period from Oct. 28 to Nov. 20.

The ISIE published the preliminary list of voters on Sept. 26, 2022. At home, a total of 8,989,287 voters are on the list, 51% of whom are women, and a total of 350,469 voters, 38.6% of whom are women, are registered abroad. Polling stations were open from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m., with a maximum of 1,000 voters in each. The ISIE has not published the final list of voters for the parliamentary elections on its website or in the Official Gazette (JORT), which is not in line with the electoral

²⁸ The ISIE set opening at 9 a.m. and closing at 4 p.m. for 135 polling centers in constituencies in Kasserine [Kasserine south (28 PC), Sbiba-Jedliyan-Layoune (32 PCs), Tala – Hydra – Foussana (29 PCs), Majel Bel Abbes – Feryana (10 PCs), Kasserine North (1 PCs), Sbitla (35 PCs), Sidi Bouzid: (26 PCs) ((Sidi Bouzid East (3 PCs), Menzel Bouzinane (2 PCs), Beyr Hafi (10 PCs), Jelma- Sebbalet Ouled Asker (11 PCs), Jendouba: (45 PCs) Jendouba North – Fernana (13 PCs), Ghardimaou (24 PCs), Tabarka – Ain Draham (8 PCs), Kef: (15 PCs) (Kef ouest (1 PCs), Nabr Twiref – Sakiet Sidi Youssef (12 PCs), El Kalaa Khassba (2 PCs), Siliana: (6 PCs) (Siliana-Berguou (3 PCs) Makther – Rouhia (3 PCs)].

²⁹ The ISIE set opening at 8 a.m. and closing at 8 p.m. for 92 polling centers in four constituencies in Medenine [(Djerba Houmet Souk (24 PCs), Djerba Midoune (21 PCs), Djerba Ajim (12 PCs), and Jerjiss (35 PCs)].

³⁰ International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. *International Electoral Standards: Guidelines for Reviewing the Legal Framework of Elections*. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2002, p.p. 45)

³¹ For the legislative elections, the ISIE added 61,215 voters using automatic registration.

law.³² On Nov. 30, the ISIE published the breakdown of voters by polling centers, and the number of polling stations per polling center, without publishing the final number of voters countrywide.

Voter Education

The fulfillment of the international obligation of universal suffrage is partially dependent on effective voter education.³³ Considering the many changes to the electoral legal framework, including the electoral system and voter registration and the change in voting centers, voter education and information were even more important for these elections. Many CSOs criticized the ISIE for not undertaking a broad voter education program about these changes. There were a few spots broadcast on national TV, with sign language, and on national radio. As part of the second phase of voter registration, the ISIE had 32 sensitization spots on television during prime time, especially on Wataniya 2, and used local radio to broadcast the information.

During the last week of September, the ISIE posted several animated TV spots on how to check and update voter registration information, the dates of legislative elections at home and abroad, and the new districts in each IRIE on its official Facebook page. Moreover, a few CSOs undertook voter education activities targeting youth, women, and people with disabilities to encourage them to vote.

The lack of CSO involvement in the ISIE education campaign made it harder to reach voters. Unlike in previous elections, the ISIE did not coordinate or actively involve CSOs in outreach efforts.

Campaign

Political pluralism and an open campaign environment that enables genuine choices for voters are critical aspects of democratic elections. Equitable treatment of candidates and parties during an election is important for ensuring the integrity of the democratic election process. A genuine choice of candidates, a free electoral environment, a level playing field for contestants, and an open transparent campaign environment are all critical aspects of democracy. Equal treatment of candidates and parties is essential for ensuring the integrity of the democratic election process.³⁴

The campaign started on Friday, Nov. 25, and lasted 22 days. The campaign did not generate great interest from voters. Most candidates tried to contact voters directly and held small gatherings in coffee shops and markets, where they distributed flyers, instead of sponsoring large campaign events.³⁵ The lack of party involvement, low campaign spending limits, and no public funding also contributed to the low level of campaigning. Big billboards weren't used as in previous elections because of the high costs and low campaign-finance ceilings. Some candidates took advantage of available public space to put up posters.

³² Article 35 of ISIE Decision 2017-6 of 11 April 2017 on the rules and procedures for voter registration amended by Decision 2022-24 of Sept. 23, 2022: "The ISIE establishes the final electoral lists and publishes them on its website, and this, at the end of the appeal deadlines or once all judgments have been pronounced."

³³ ICCPR, Article 25.

³⁴ ICCPR, Article 25.

³⁵ Events observed in Sfax and Mahdia included door-to-door campaigning, setting up of tents, holding political cafes, and distributing flyers and involved a maximum of 50 people. Candidates said that they were trying to cover every locality of their constituency during the campaign period.

Before the start of the campaign, candidates affiliated with political parties who wanted to conduct activities using the party logo or platform were required to notify the ISIE by providing authorization from the legal representatives of the political party. Out of 1,055 candidates, only 61 notified the ISIE. They were from six political parties, with 37 from People Movement (Harakat Echaab). At campaign events observed by long-term observers (LTOs), 11.2% of candidates were affiliated with political parties. Many candidates preferred to run as independents even when they had party authorization, as they felt that running without political party links would give them an advantage.³⁶

The first week of the electoral campaign was mostly calm, with few campaign activities. Candidates engaged in activities that were most efficient and cost-effective. The Center's LTOs observed small gatherings outside candidates' headquarters and in weekly markets. Candidates also engaged in door-to-door campaigning. Beginning in the second week, candidates organized talks in coffee shops that were interactive and allowed voters to share their concerns about local issues. LTOs observed volunteers wearing t-shirts with their candidate's photo. Candidate posters with names, photos, and campaign platforms were present but not as visible as in previous elections. The campaign intensified during the last week, but in general, it remained more low-key than in previous parliamentary elections.

A review of candidate platforms revealed a focus on issues specific to the candidate's region, such as tourism, agriculture, and healthcare. Other topics included industrial development, cultural issues, international investment, youth employment, and public transport. Many female candidates' platforms dealt with youth employment; women's rights were mentioned in very few cases, mostly by women candidates. Only isolated candidates talked about the rights of persons with disabilities.

There was a noticeable disparity between the regions in the number of campaign activities. For example, in Sfax 1, the average number of activities reported to IRIEs was 50 per day, while in Ariana, it never exceeded 11 per day. There is no common strategy among IRIEs in the publication of the daily number of activities. According to the long-term observer reports, 95% of candidates reported their activities to IRIEs; however, IRIE monitors were not present at 38% of these events.³⁷

Observers noted that women were the most active candidates. Outside the capital, because of social norms, their campaigns sometimes lacked access to cafés, which prevented them from reaching out to male voters. Several women candidates reported that they were the target of smear campaigns online and faced insults and pressure to withdraw. The majority of women and young people were running for office for the first time and had limited resources. This put them at a disadvantage vis-à-vis male candidates, who were often wealthier, more experienced in elections,

³⁶ A candidate running for the first time in Sfax-West told to the Center that running as independent candidate would give him a better chance to win.

³⁷ Some IRIEs (Tunis 2, Ben Arous, Manouba, Bizerte, Nabeul 1, Nabeul 2, Jendouba, Kef, Gabès, Medenine, Tataouine, Kébili, Tozeur, Gafsa) didn't report on activities. Others (like Sousse, Zaghouan, and Sfax 2) published this information regularly, while other IRIEs (like Sidi Bouzid, Mahdia, and Kasserine) reported regularly before stopping in the last days of the campaign.

or had held municipal positions. Center observers noted a low percentage of women attending campaign events and an even lower youth presence.³⁸

Each candidate was given three minutes of free airtime on national television. The national television, Wataniya 2, started broadcasting nightly free time for each candidate beginning Nov. 25 from 6 p.m. to 8 p.m., starting with candidates from the Tunis governate, followed by each governate as listed in Decree Law 55.

Private television Attessia broadcasts a live show with candidates on weekdays. They randomly selected candidates to appear. On each show, four candidates from different constituencies answered questions in two-minute allotments without the opportunity to debate each other. Mosaïque FM, a radio station broadcasting from Tunis, also had a draw to pick candidates to be invited to the station's Midi show, which aired from 1 to 2 p.m. Female candidates enjoyed access to local and national radio, and media monitoring reports showed that 100 of the 122 female candidates were invited to appear.³⁹

Campaign Financing

International best practices strive to protect the principle of equal opportunities among candidates, as it is one of the main safeguards for democratic elections. According to international best practice, electoral legislation should specifically provide for the transparency of donations to candidates, standardized presentation of campaign accounts, reasonable limits on campaign expenditure, regular reporting mechanisms, and effective and dissuasive sanctions.⁴⁰

The electoral law and the ISIE decision on campaign financing do not allow political parties to contribute financially directly or in kind to any candidate campaign.⁴¹ Public financing of campaigns has also been eliminated in the latest amendment.

The electoral law provides only two possible ways of funding a candidate's campaign: self-financing (including in-kind contributions) and private financing (including in-kind contributions) from individuals limited to 20 times the official minimum monthly wage in the non-agricultural sectors.⁴² The overall cap for private financing per candidate is four-fifths of the constituency's overall spending limit.⁴³ Foreign financing is expressly prohibited, with an exception for financing of candidates running in electoral districts abroad.

The overall spending limit for each district is based on a formula that considers its population. The highest ceiling is in the district of Ariana-Medina, which has an approximate population of 135,497 and a ceiling of 40,807 TND (about US\$12,955) and the lowest is in the district of Remade-Dhiba, which has an approximate population of 14,630 and a ceiling of 4,600 TND (about US\$1,460).

³⁸ Many campaign activities observed by the Center did not include women or youth. Women represented 10% of the audience on average and youth 15% on average. Some events observed were attended by women only - all of these were held by women candidates.

³⁹ According to the HAICA's monitoring report published on Dec. 9, Mosaïque radio station interviewed during the period of campaign a total 28 women and 28 men drawn by lot.

⁴⁰ Council of Europe (Committee of Ministers) Recommendations (2003)4, Article 3(b).

⁴¹ Decision 20-2014 as amended by Decision 30-2022 establishing the rules, procedures, and methods for financing the election campaign.

⁴² Starting Oct. 1, 2022, the minimum monthly wage in non-agricultural sectors is set at 459.264 TND (\$US143.01). This means that private funding is capped at 9,185.280 TND (US\$2,860) per individual.

⁴³ Decree 806-2022, fixing the overall spending limit for the legislative election campaign of 2022.

The campaign-finance system suffers from a lack of transparency, as no interim reports are required. There is no real-time assessment of funding and expenditures, which deprives voters of important information. In addition, the legal process is not concluded in a timely manner. Another issue arose during the 2022 elections because of the elimination of public financing, which has a direct impact on equal opportunity among candidates, notably on candidates lacking the financial means to fund campaigns only through their own resources, disadvantaging especially women and young candidates who generally do not have sufficient private funds. Candidates with personal or family wealth were at an advantage.

Social Media Monitoring

Freedom of expression and an independent media are vital to enable democratic debate, ensure accountability mechanisms, and provide voters with accurate information.⁴⁴ International standards and agreements that Tunisia has signed also require that voters should be able to form opinion free of manipulative interference.⁴⁵

Online and offline content is subject to a legal framework that unduly restricts those freedoms, and selective lawsuits are increasingly used against voices critical of the government. In addition, the prevalence of negative campaigning, derogatory speech, and manipulative content on social media in Tunisia has heavily distorted the online space, in contradiction with this obligation.

Although the constitution guarantees freedom of expression and opinion, a combination of laws and decrees that criminalize peaceful speech and provide for prison terms are actively used against dissenting voices, contrary to international obligations.⁴⁶ Decree Law 54-2022 (DL 54) on disinformation further curtailed freedom of expression. It introduced disproportionate prison sentences of up to 10 years, depending on the person targeted by disinformation, for vaguely defined offences. This contradicts international standards.⁴⁷

Authorities have repeatedly targeted critical voices, arresting and prosecuting bloggers, activists, internet users, and journalists because of their social media posts and news articles, using the legal framework as a tool to curtail criticism rather than seek redress.⁴⁸ Lawsuits have resulted in prison

⁴⁴ International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights, Article 19; ICCPR, General Comment 34 on freedoms of opinion and expression; African Commission on Human and People's Rights Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa; U.N. Human Rights Committee Resolution 39/6 on Safety of Journalists.

⁴⁵ ICCPR, General Comment 25, para. 19: "Voters should be able to form opinions independently, free of violence or threat of violence, compulsion, inducement or manipulative interference of any kind."

⁴⁶ It includes laws such as the Penal Code, the Telecommunications Code, the Military Justice Code, the 2015 Anti-Terrorism Law, the Decree Law 54-2022 on disinformation. Laws include provisions criminalizing offenses such as insults against the head of state; defamation; knowingly harming or disturbing others' comfort via public telecommunications networks; insulting the flag or the army; publication of false information. See U.N. General Comment. 34, articles 37 and 47; see also AU DPFEA, Principle 22.

⁴⁷ U.N. General Comment 34, articles 25 and 38; as well as the joint declaration on freedom of expression and "fake news," disinformation and propaganda by the U.N., OSCE, OAS and ACHPR, section 2.a.

⁴⁸ Many EOM interlocutors reported that the number of prosecutions and arrests over peaceful speech has increased since 2020. More than 10 cases have been filed against CSOs and media in 2021 and 2022; and a politician, a blogger, a lawyer, a journalist, and an activist were prosecuted under DL 54. On Nov. 29, the journalist Khelifa Guessmi was sentenced to a one-year jail term under the 2015 Law on Anti-terrorism.

sentences and fines, leading to self-censorship, in a staggering setback from 2011.⁴⁹ On Nov. 11, after the publication of an article critical of the prime minister, the minister of justice filed a complaint against a journalist of the online outlet Business News based on DL 54, contrary to international standards.⁵⁰ In the lead-up to the elections, following the publication of news and social media posts critical of the ISIE, the ISIE sent at least three warning letters to individuals and media outlets, threatening to sue them under DL 54 if they continued sharing such news.

Media outlets and journalists also face a host of other challenges, including lack of financial sustainability, reduced access to public information, and increased offline and online violence that undermines their ability to report effectively, including on electoral matters.⁵¹ Limited access to official information has also impeded the work of fact-checking initiatives. Such trends tend to create a vacuum of verified information that enables the circulation of false, manipulative news.

Although Tunisia's election law includes provisions on online campaigning, it lacks precise definitions and does not fully encompass the nuances of social media. IRIEs and candidates have had different understandings and interpretations of legal provisions on the use of political ads online. Candidates were required to declare the social media accounts they intended to use for campaign purposes to the IRIEs, to be monitored by the ISIE. However, the ISIE did not release the list of accounts it monitored.⁵² The ISIE did not publish information on the violations it captured online, nor on the warnings or sanctions consequently applied, undermining the transparency of the process.⁵³

Eighty-six percent of the population over 13 years old had access to social media in 2022, although with access disparities throughout the country. With some 7.1 million users, Facebook was the preferred platform for sharing political information.⁵⁴ Digital literacy was limited, and voters were ill-equipped to assess the information they were exposed to.⁵⁵ Several quality fact-checking initiatives debunked false information, including on the electoral process. However, the reach of flagged debunked pieces was very small compared to that of viral manipulative posts.

Elections took place in a highly polarized political landscape online. More than half of the political posts monitored by the Carter Center's social media monitoring unit in Facebook pages and groups

⁴⁹ Lawsuits have been filed charging defamation, publication of false information, false allegations or insults against a public official, incitement to civil disobedience, or suspicion of terrorism.

⁵⁰ See the U.N. Human Rights Committee noted in General Comment 34, articles 38 and 42; see also paragraph 12 of the UNHCR Resolution 39/6 on safety of journalists.

⁵¹ According to the SNJT, 36 of the 232 assaults (15.5 percent) recorded against journalists between November 2021 and October 2022 were perpetrated by election officials, mostly by heads of polling centers.

⁵² Several IRIEs reported to The Carter Center that they also monitored candidates' social media pages, while other mentioned that the ISIE was in charge of it.

⁵³ The ISIE social media monitoring unit (SMMU) monitored violations committed by candidates on their social media accounts, on online media, and online pages of TVs and radio stations. Violations were referred to the IRIEs' legal teams for review, warnings or sanctions. Legal provisions of the electoral law provide for jail term or cancellation of elections.

⁵⁴ We are Social report Digital 2022: Tunisia.

⁵⁵ Joint declaration on freedom of expression and "fake news," disinformation and propaganda by the U.N., OSCE, OAS and ACHPR, section 3.e. says that "states should take measures to promote media and digital literacy."

contained negative campaigning, derogatory speech, and manipulative content.⁵⁶ Several information manipulation pieces circulated widely.⁵⁷ Their circulation showed signs of more-or-less sophisticated coordination between networks of pages, including pages with administrators located abroad and pages sharing the same administrators, as well as the use of imposter pages posing as media to deceive users. Such practices compromise the ability of voters to form opinions free of manipulative interference.

Most candidates used social media to campaign, however, some chose not to rely on social media, especially in remote areas.⁵⁸ Facebook was the most-used platform. Many candidates had individual, unverified profiles on Facebook rather than public pages.⁵⁹ The online activity and professionalism of candidates varied greatly.⁶⁰ Most candidates avoided engagement with voters online. While some candidates shared campaign material in Facebook groups, members of local groups also took it upon themselves to create posts supporting candidates.⁶¹

Candidates monitored by the Carter Center's social media monitoring unit rarely resorted to negative campaigns, derogatory speech, or manipulative content.⁶² More than 95 percent of the posts analyzed used a neutral tone. Candidates mostly shared posts about their campaign and media events (54 percent), or posters and slogans (26 percent). Only one in 10 posts mentioned their political platforms. Posts by individuals ridiculing the candidates and mocking their lack of political experience, and calls to boycott the elections by parties, politicians, and individuals gained momentum during the second week of the campaign.⁶³

Gender and Participatory Rights

⁵⁶ Monitoring of Facebook's most engaging posts referring to the three major political actors: Kais Saied, Abir Moussi, Ennahdha. Most negative campaigns targeted politicians or parties, although the electoral process itself was also targeted. Derogatory speech mostly involved accusations without proof, strong criticism, and insults, including gender-based insults. The Center also identified several instances of hate speech. Most of the manipulative content was made up of conspiracy theories and use of emotional manipulation.

⁵⁷ Disinformation claiming that Abir Moussi received foreign funds during the 2019 elections; information and disinformation battle over the court appearance of Rached Ghannouchi on Nov. 10; discreditation and insults of Abir Moussi by pages with high number of followers ("Baaroura:" translation "little sheep shit," which sounds like the nickname "little Abir," "Abboura"); coordinated narratives shared by imposter media pages on the killing of a young contraband trader to discredit Kais Saied.

⁵⁸ Several candidates mentioned the absence of public funding as a reason to campaign online. Some candidates preferred relying on door-to-door campaign or small-scale events, at times because of the limited access to social media, the lack of digital culture, or because they were well-known and involved in their communities.

⁵⁹ The reach of individual profiles is not as great as the reach of pages. Pages work as micro-blogging spaces and are the place for public figures to easily communicate with their supporters. The Center only monitored public pages for ethical reasons.

⁶⁰ Some candidates did not use their social media accounts, while others actively posted campaign events. Some engaged in more sophisticated communication online via QR codes and online survey to answer voters' questions.

⁶¹ At least one candidate in Kasserine received a warning by the IRIE after she was observed sharing campaign material in a group on Facebook that she did not declare to the IRIE.

⁶² The Center monitored Facebook public pages of 10 candidates with large audience in various constituencies.

⁶³ On Dec. 5, the ISIE released a Facebook post denouncing the ongoing smear campaign that was not related to candidates but constituted a "systematic campaign aimed at distorting the electoral process and influencing participation in this election," according to the Authority.

International and regional treaties widely recognize the right of women, youth, and persons with disabilities to participate in political and public affairs, including the right to vote and be elected.⁶⁴ Equality and non-discrimination are overarching international obligations and necessary to guarantee the enjoyment of these rights by individuals without distinction.⁶⁵ Temporary measures creating preferential treatment or quotas are recommended to achieve gender equality and women's integration in politics.⁶⁶

Women, youth, and persons with disabilities have been and remain underrepresented in Tunisian public and governance institutions. Unlike all the parliamentary and municipal polls held since 2011, the 2022 parliamentary elections did not include any provisions for ensuring the inclusion of women, youth, or persons with disabilities as candidates.⁶⁷ Most political parties and almost all the major women's rights and human rights CSOs listed the expected drop in the parliamentary representation of these groups as one of the main reasons to boycott the elections. It also led to harsh criticism of the new electoral law by political and CSO leaders supporting Kaïs Saïed.

Women

As in the 2014 constitution, the 2022 constitutional text mandates that the state achieve parity between men and women in elected assemblies. Just over 26% of the members of the parliament elected in 2019 were women. However, the majoritarian system adopted in 2022 does not lend itself to the election of women candidates and is not counterbalanced by any mechanism to fulfill this commitment.⁶⁸ Only 122 of the 212 women who applied to be candidates were accepted, representing 12% of the total candidates, the lowest percentage since before the revolution.⁶⁹ There were no women candidates in 71 districts, tantamount to *de facto* reserved seats for men in nearly half of the parliament (47%).⁷⁰ The absence of gender parity measures, combined with the endorsement requirements, was highly detrimental to women's candidacies. Women's lower financial resources and an entrenched conservative mindset that ascribes male dominance in the political domain were additional barriers, particularly in rural areas.

⁶⁴ ICCPR, Article 25, UDHR, Article 21, AU ACHPR, Article 13, CEDAW, Article 7, CRPD, Article 29, Youth African Charter, Article 11.

⁶⁵ UDHR, Article 2, ICCPR, Articles 2 and 26, CEDAW, Articles 2, 3, and 4; CRPD, Articles 3 and 4.

⁶⁶ CEDAW, Article 4, CEDAW General Recommendation No.5: Temporary Special Measures.

⁶⁷ 2011, 2014 and 2019 parliamentary elections foresaw vertical parity on lists and a financial incentive if the list included one candidate under 35 among the 4 top positions. 2018 municipal elections mandated vertical and horizontal parity on lists, a quota of 3 young candidates in the list, and a financial incentive for the inclusion of one person with disability among the 10 first candidates on the list.

⁶⁸ Reserved seats enable women or minorities' representation in majoritarian systems. Feminist organizations proposed to designate even numbers of seats in all the districts, with half of them assigned to each gender, as in the election of the High Council of the Judiciary in 2016. This gender parity mechanism was not taken into consideration by the president.

⁶⁹ In the 2019 elections, women accounted for 49% of the candidates on the lists thanks to the vertical parity obligation. They topped only 14.5% of lists, as there was no horizontal parity required.

⁷⁰ In the Medenine governorate, women are extremely underrepresented, making up less than 3% of the candidates. The highest representation of women candidates was 23% of women in Bizerte and Tunis. In 49 constituencies, there was only one female candidate.

The law that mandates gender parity in ISIE's leadership remains unheeded, and for the first time since its creation, there was no woman board member.⁷¹ At lower levels, women were better represented, and they were remarkably overrepresented as ISIE campaign monitors and polling staff for these elections.

Although women represent more than half of registered voters (50.5%), their turnout has decreased since 2014 and dropped further in the July 25 referendum. According to Carter Center long-term observers, their presence was extremely limited in most campaign events, especially in rural areas. but they were often represented in candidates' campaign staff.

Youth

The 2022 constitution removed the 2014 constitution's recognition of youth as "an active force in building the nation." The new electoral law's only youth-inclusion provision is the obligation for candidates to collect at least 25% of endorsement signatures from voters under 35. The minimum age to be a candidate for this parliament remains 23, but there are no measures facilitating the candidacy of young citizens in the new electoral system.

Endorsement requirements and the absence of public funding further restrained young candidates; only 4% of the contestants were aged 35 or younger, a record low level of youth candidacies. In the previous legislature, 29 MPs were under 35 (13 percent). Young Tunisians are largely involved in civil society activism but have steadily withdrawn from formal politics and elections since 2011, as evidenced by falling voter turnout in 2014 and 2019 parliamentary polls and in the 2022 referendum. They made up the bulk of citizen observers, campaign monitors, polling officers, campaign staff, and candidate's agents.

Persons with disabilities

The 2022 constitution no longer mentions persons with disabilities as rights holders.⁷² Only two candidates with disabilities managed to register, given the challenging endorsement requirements. Despite a pledge made by the ISIE, persons with disabilities were hardly recruited as polling staff.⁷³ Apart from including a sign language interpreter in ISIE's press conferences and producing one video spot with subtitles and sign language interpretation explaining the voting process, there was inadequate access to voter education material and information about candidates, which continued to discourage hearing and visually impaired voters from participating in the electoral process. By law, persons with disability cards may benefit from measures enabling their vote, including assistance for specific categories of disabilities; however, only a percentage of voters with disabilities hold this document.⁷⁴ Braille ballot devices made available in polling centers by the ISIE ensured the independent voting of visually impaired voters. There are no legal provisions

⁷¹ The Organic Law 2018-47 of Aug. 7, 2018, mandates gender parity in the board of the ISIE and in all independent constitutional bodies. For the 2019 elections, there was also a breach in the law, as there was only one woman among the nine board members of the ISIE.

⁷² Article 48 of 2014 constitution stipulated that "every disabled citizen shall have the right to benefit, based on the nature of the disability, from all measures that will ensure their full integration into society, and the State shall take all necessary measures to achieve this."

⁷³ A cooperation convention signed by the OTDDPH with the ISIE on Nov. 1. The ISIE pledged to comply with the legal obligation for public administrations to employ 2% of persons with disabilities.

⁷⁴ There were 438,000 disability card holders in 2018 according to the data of the Ministry of Social Affairs, while the World Health Organization estimates there are a million people with disabilities in Tunisia.

regarding assistance for illiterate voters, who are estimated to make up a significant percentage of the population, particularly among women from rural areas. Citizen observer groups deployed persons with disabilities and monitored the accessibility of the process and the assistance provided to voters with disabilities.⁷⁵

The electoral system, which eliminated gender parity provisions, failed to ensure any meaningful women representation in parliament, in contradiction with the state's constitutional obligation and reversing the past decade's achievements in terms of women's equal rights to participation in political affairs. The absence of facilitating measures also led to extremely low numbers of youth and people with disabilities among the contestants. Women and young citizens made up the majority of election workers and observers. The lack of accessible polling stations and deficient access to information continued to impair the participation of voters with disabilities.

Domestic Observers

The election legislation specifies the prerequisites for both local and international election observation, and it generally is in line with international standards of observation. Domestic observers reported no major difficulties with accreditation. The ISIE announced that the number of international accredited observers was 460, and domestic observers numbered 4,000.

Civil society organizations observed all aspects of the electoral process. Several observation groups joined a collaborative group to share observation tasks and information. They include the Tunisian Mediterranean Center (TU-MED), whose 104 observers focused on gender-based observation in rural and border areas in eight constituencies (Jendouba, Siliana, Gafsa, Kasserine, Kebili, Touzeur, Medenine, and Tataouine).

The Mourakiboun network conducted a sample-based observation, deploying 500 stationary observers fixed in the sample, as well as 342 mobile observers and 100 long-term observers to coordinate their work. ATIDE deployed 300 observers all over the country to observe the electoral campaign. They deployed 650 observers nationwide on election day, covering mainly the polling stations with the biggest number of voters.

Youth Without Borders (JSF) deployed around 392 mobile observers on election day to cover 12 governorates: Ariana, Ben Arous, Manouba, Bizerte, Jendouba, Beja, Nabeul, Sfax, Gabes, Sousse, and Medenine. CHAHED had a regional coordinator in each governorate and deployed 1050 observers to observe both the electoral campaign and the public administration to ensure that it was not biased in favor of any candidate.

The Tunisian Organization for the Defense of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (OTDDPH) deployed 120 mobile observers and 24 coordinators throughout the country to assess the accessibility of the voting process to people with disabilities (PWD).

Following election day, Chahed, JSF, Mourakiboun, and TUMED reiterated their criticism of the unilateral way in which the electoral law was amended. They also criticized the new electoral

⁷⁵ As during the 2022 referendum, IBSAR Association for the culture and leisure of the blind and visually impaired and the Organization for the Defense of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (OTDDPH) deployed observers with disabilities to monitor the campaign and polling day.

system for resulting in the exclusion of women and young candidates, a problem exacerbated by the absence of public funding. Mourakiboun criticized the legal framework for ignoring crucial principles of electoral standards. All mentioned the low-key nature of the campaign.

Chahed reported insufficient training of polling station workers and said that observers were denied access to the counting operation. Mourakiboun announced that according to its data, the turnout was 11.1% and asked the ISIE to publish the minutes of each polling station.

Election Dispute Resolution

Appeal procedures, and especially the powers and responsibilities of the various bodies involved in them, should be clearly regulated by law to avoid any positive or negative conflicts of jurisdiction. In addition, the right to file such appeals must be granted as widely as possible, open to every elector in the constituency and every candidate running in the election.⁷⁶ The guarantee of a timely remedy is integral to the principle of effective means of redress.⁷⁷

The electoral law gives candidates two days from the date of notification of the ISIE decision on candidacy to file a challenge. Challenges are filed with the competent regional circuits of the First Instance of the Administrative Court for in-country districts and the Circuits of First Instance of the Administrative Court in Tunis for districts abroad.⁷⁸ The regional courts received 54 challenges and accepted four.

First instance decisions can be appealed in front of the appeal circuits of the Administrative Court in Tunis within two days of notification of the first-instance decision. The appeal circuits received 15 appeals and dismissed nine on the substance, four on form, and reinstated two rejected candidates.⁷⁹

The Center followed the submission of challenges and attended most of the hearings, many of which were held on the weekends because of the short deadlines. The courts received challenges in an orderly and timely manner. Applicants were given the time to present their cases and arguments against the IRIEs' decisions. Most cases were related to issues with endorsements.

Overall, considering the shortened deadlines, the court handled the cases in an orderly manner while still giving complainants the opportunity to be heard. However, the deadlines proved challenging for appellants to gather the necessary evidence to present in court. Such a reduction in the timeframe also put pressure on candidates to follow court procedures for submitting applications and notifying the opposing party. It also increased the pressure on administrative court staff.

⁷⁶ European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters, CDL-AD (2002) 23.

⁷⁷ AU, AFCHPR, Article 7: "Every individual shall have the right to have his cause heard. This comprises: (a) the right to an appeal to competent national organs against acts violating his fundamental rights as recognized and guaranteed by conventions, laws, regulations and customs in force; (b) the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty by a competent court or tribunal; (c) the right to defense, including the right to be defended by counsel of his choice; (d) the right to be tried within a reasonable time by an impartial court or tribunal."

⁷⁸ Article 27, electoral law as amended by Decree 55/2022.

⁷⁹ Mohamed Hatem Hassine, Majel Bel Abbes - Feriana, IRIE Kasserine; and Mansour Essid, Jebiniana - El Aamra, IRIE Sfax 1.

Election Day

The voting process is the cornerstone of the obligation to provide the free expression of the will of the people through genuine, periodic elections.⁸⁰ The quality of voting operations on election day is crucial to determining whether an election was held according to democratic obligations. Holding elections by secret ballot is a core obligation under international law, and a recognized means of ensuring that the will of the people is expressed freely.⁸¹

Election day proceeded in a calm manner with no major irregularities observed or reported. Polling staff followed regulations, and voters were able to vote in secret. All observed polling stations closed on time, and given the low turnout, there were no voters queuing to vote. In a few polling stations, observers were not allowed to move from assigned seats, and some staff were reluctant to provide requested information.

Opening and Polling

Although Carter Center observers reported that 57 percent of the 26 observed polling stations did not open exactly at 8 a.m., all were open within 15 minutes of opening time. The Center observed 308 stations during polling and did not observe any major irregularities. In several polling stations, observers reported that they were obstructed in their observation and not allowed to move around the station to observe all aspects of the process. Some staff were reluctant to provide requested information to Center observers.

The presiding officer in 78% of polling centers was male, and in 65.5% of polling stations the presiding officers were female. No incidents were reported inside or outside polling stations, and 75% were assessed as accessible to the physically disabled. International and domestic observers were present in 34.6 percent of observed stations. All procedures were implemented in 100% of polling stations, and the environment was assessed as very good or reasonable in 100% of cases.

Closing and Counting

Implementation of procedures during the closing and counting was assessed as very good or reasonable in 96 percent of the 27 observed stations. The overall environment was assessed as very good or reasonable in 100% of observations. Only 18.52% of polling stations had domestic observers present during the closing and counting. Candidate agents were present in 55.56% of stations.

Tabulation

Center observers were present in all 27 tabulation centers. Observers in some centers were not able to make an accurate assessment of tabulation procedures as the distance between the workspace and the place for observers was too great to see what was happening. Also, in some centers observers were not allowed to approach the staff to ask questions. However, observers did not report any incidents or other irregularities and assessed the overall environment as very good or reasonable.

⁸⁰ ICCPR, articles 2, 25(a) and 9.

⁸¹ U.N., ICCPR, Article 25; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 23. EISA and Electoral Commission Forum of SADC Countries, Principles for Election Management, Monitoring, and Observation in the SADC Region, p. 24.

Background

The Carter Center was accredited by the ISIE to observe the elections and deployed more than 60 observers from 26 countries who visited 308 unique polling stations as well as the 27 tabulation centers.

The Center deployed a core team to observe the 2022 elections in June 2022 and 14 long term observers in mid-October.




The objectives of the Center's observation in Tunisia are to provide an impartial assessment of the overall quality of the electoral process, promote an inclusive process for all Tunisians, and demonstrate support for the country's democratic transition.

The Center assesses Tunisia's electoral process against the Tunisian constitution, its domestic electoral framework, and obligations and standards derived from international treaties, interpretive bodies, and state practice. Its mission is conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observers.

The Carter Center has had a presence in Tunisia since 2011. It observed the 2011 National Constituent Assembly elections, the 2014 and 2019 presidential and parliamentary elections, and the constitution-making process which resulted in the adoption of the 2014 constitution.

The Center wishes to thank the Tunisian officials, civil society members, political parties, individuals and representatives of the international community who have generously offered their time and energy to facilitate the Center's efforts to observe the electoral process.

Letter of Invitation

<p>République Tunisienne Instance Supérieure Indépendante pour les Elections</p>		<p>الجمهورية التونسية الهيئة العليا المستقلة للانتخابات</p>
<p>1999 / 22</p>	<p>A l'aimable attention</p> <p>de Madame Paige Alexander</p> <p>Directeur Exécutif du Centre Carter</p> <p>Atlanta</p>	<p>12 OCT. 2022</p>
<p>Excellence</p> <p>J'ai l'honneur de vous informer que des élections des nouveaux membres de l'Assemblée des Représentants du Peuple vont avoir lieu en Tunisie le samedi 17 décembre 2022.</p> <p>Dans ce cadre et fidèle à son ouverture sur les organisations internationales, l'Instance Supérieure Indépendante pour les Elections « ISIE », a le plaisir de vous faire part de sa disposition d'accueillir une Mission d'Observateurs de votre honorable Centre pour suivre les différentes étapes du processus électoral des élections.</p> <p>Par conséquent, et afin de faciliter l'éventuelle participation d'une mission d'observation représentant le Centre Carter, vos services compétents peuvent contacter le Directeur de Cabinet du Conseil de l'ISIE Mr. Tarek SAADI, (Téléphone 0021629968175- e-mail : tarak.saadi@isie.tn) ou Mme Zouhour BEN RHOUMA, chargée du bureau de la coopération internationale au cabinet du Conseil de l'ISIE (Téléphone 0021650484022- e-mail : zbenrhuma.96@gmail.com).</p> <p>Ils peuvent également contacter Mme Ines JLIDI Responsable de l'accréditation à l'ISIE (Téléphone 0021629997979 – e-mail : ines.jlidi@isie.tn) et consulter le site officiel de l'ISIE à l'adresse suivante (www.isie.tn) pour obtenir toutes les informations nécessaires concernant les documents, procédures et formalités requis.</p> <p>Dans l'attente de votre réponse, je vous prie Excellence, d'accepter ma très haute considération.</p>		
<div style="display: flex; align-items: center;">  <div style="text-align: center;">  <p>Le Président de l'ISIE</p> <p>Farouk BOUASKER</p> </div> </div>		
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> العنوان : 5 نهج جزيرة سردينيا – ضفاف البحيرة – 1053 تونس WWW.ISIE.TN </div>		

Annex H

Observer Checklists

Success: Form updated successfully.

Legislative Opening - v3 2

Tunisia IEO 2022



User/Team

Observation Time

1. Please select your STO Team Number

Select One:

STO 0101 STO 0102 STO 0103 STO 0104 STO 0201
 STO 0202 STO 0203 STO 0204 STO 0301 STO 0302
 STO 0303 STO 0304 STO 0401 STO 0402 STO 0403
 STO 0501 STO 0502 STO 0503 STO 0504 STO 0505
 STO 0601 STO 0602 STO 0603 STO 0604 STO 0701
 STO 0702 STO 0703

[STOTeamNumber]

2. Start of Observation (station) (please use 24 hour clock);

For example: 3:00 pm should be 15:00 hrs.

[StartTime]

3. Location Details

3.1. IRIE

Area of Responsibility

Select One:

Tunis 1 Tunis 2 Ariana Ben Arous Manouba Nabeul 1
 Nabeul 2 Zaghouan Bizerte Beja Jendouba El Kef
 Silliana Sousse Monastir Mahdia Sfax 1 Sfax 2
 Kairouan Kasserine Sidi Bouzid Gabes Medenine
 Gafsa Tozeur Kebeli Tataouine

[GeoArea]

3.4. Is the center in an urban or rural area?

Urban: Rural: defined subjectively per mission. Could include distance to cities....

Select One:

Urban Rural

[UrbanRural]

5. Number of stations at the center:

If the center and the station are the same, please answer "1".

[StationCount]

6. If present, please indicate the gender of the polling center's presiding officer:

If the presiding officer is not present now but appears before departure, please adjust this answer.

Select One:

Female Male Not observed

[POGender]

7. Were there obstacles or barriers on the way to the center that could have inhibited general access?

Select One:

Yes No

[Barriers]

Examples of barriers might include distance from villages or a dysfunctional bridge.

ANSWER ONLY IF Question #7 is equal to "Yes"

[BarriersDesc]

8. If "yes", please describe:

Describe the barriers to public access and to what extent it affected voter franchise.

CENTER?

If there is only one station per "center," then please answer this question as "OUTSIDE the STATION." Select "None" if you did not observe any prohibited or disruptive circumstances.

Select Multiple:

Prohibited campaigning Prohibited campaign material
 Ineffective queue management Intimidation Violence
 Security (beyond regulations) Bussing activities Other
 Significant disorder
 None

[DisruptOutCent]

ANSWER ONLY IF Question #9 excludes "None"

10. If any issues, please describe:

What were the prohibited/disruptive circumstances and how did they affect the process?

Select Multiple:

Prohibited campaigning Prohibited campaign material
 Ineffective queue management Intimidation Violence
 Security (beyond regulations) Other None
 Significant disorder

[DisruptInCent]

ANSWER ONLY IF Question #11 excludes "None" AND Question #5 is greater than 1

12. If any issues, please describe:

What were the prohibited/disruptive circumstances and how did they affect the process?

[DisruptInCentDesc]

ANSWER ONLY IF Question #5 is greater than 1

[StationID]

13. Polling Station ID:

14. Gender of the polling station's presiding officer:

Select One:

Female Male Mixed

[StationGender]

16. Number of staff working at the polling station (excluding presiding officer):

[StaffCount]

17. Number of FEMALE staff present (excluding presiding officer):

[FemaleStaff]

18. Number of registered voters:

[RegVoterCount]

19. Which, if any, of the following prohibited or disruptive circumstances did you observe INSIDE the STATION?

Select "None" if you did not observe any prohibited or disruptive circumstances.

Select Multiple:

Prohibited campaigning Prohibited campaign material
 Ineffective queue management Intimidation Violence
 Security (beyond regulations) Other None
 Significant disorder

[DisruptInStat]

ANSWER ONLY IF Question #19 excludes "None"

20. If any issues, please describe:

What were the prohibited/disruptive circumstances and how did they affect the process?

21. Were any of the following materials missing, insufficient, or incorrect?

A = Present and correct;
B = Missing (entirely absent);
C = Insufficient (fewer than required, but some present);
D = Incorrect (wrong)

21.1. *Indelible ink

Select One:

A B C D

[Ink]

21.2. *Booths/screens

Select One:

A B C D

[Booths]

21.4. *Ballot papers

Select One:

A B C D

[BallotPapers]

21.6. *Ballot box(es)

Select One:

A B C D

[BallotBox]

21.7. *Voter list(s)/FVR

Select One:

A B C D

[VoterList]

21.8. *Stamps

Select One:

A B C D

[Stamps]

21.9. *Seals/padlocks

Select One:

A B C D

[Seals]

21.17. Other

Select One:

A B C D

[OtherMat]

22. If materials are missing, insufficient, or incorrect, please describe, including any "other" materials noted:

[MissingMatDesc]

23. Does the station appear to be accessible to physically challenged persons, including the elderly? <i>The UN Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities establishes an obligation for states to take measures to identify and eliminate obstacles and barriers to accessibility. This requires that people with disabilities will have an opportunity to participate on an equal basis in both rural and urban areas.</i>	Select One: Yes No	[Accessibility]
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #23 is equal to "No" [AccessibilityDesc]		
24. If "no", please describe the impediments as well as any efforts to overcome the impediments or assist the challenged persons:		
25. Is a Braille ballot device available in the polling center for the visually impaired	Select One: Yes No	[BrailleDevice]
26. Did the polling station open during your observation?	Select One: Yes No	[OpeningObs]
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #26 is equal to "No" [OpeningObsDesc]		
27. If "no", please describe: <i>Why did the polling station fail to open on time?</i>		
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #26 is equal to "Yes" [OpeningTime]		
28. At what time did the polling station open?		
29. If the polling station opened MORE THAN 30 MINUTES late, what are the reasons for delay? <i>If the polling station opened less than 30 [can be edited] minutes late, please select "Not applicable".</i>	Select Multiple: Missing materials Absent polling staff Unrest Other	[OpeningLateReasons] Not applicable
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #29 excludes "Not applicable" [OpeningLateReasDesc]		
30. If the polling station opened more than 30 minutes late, please describe the reasons, including any "other" reasons noted:		
31. Before moving ahead, please review the following definitions regarding assessment of PROCEDURES. Mark the selection below to indicate that you understand the definitions and refer back to this page if needed. <i>FULLY — The procedure was always or almost always applied correctly. Any procedural errors observed were very minor.
 ADEQUATELY — The procedure was mostly applied correctly. Procedural errors observed did not appear to affect the integrity or transparency of the process.
 INADEQUATELY — The procedure was often not applied correctly. OR the procedural error may have compromised the integrity of the process (even if few instances were observed).
 NOT AT ALL — The procedure was omitted or was not followed meaningfully.
 NOT OBSERVED — Due to circumstances other than those described by the above, the observer was not able to assess the procedure.</i>		
32. How closely did each of the following procedures adhere to regulations? <i>A = Fully;
 B = Adequately;
 C = Inadequately;
 D = Not at all;
 E = Not observed</i>	Select One:	[BeforeProcedures]
32.1. *Ballot inventory	A B C D E	[BallotInventory]
32.2. *Empty ballot box demonstration	A B C D E	[BallotBoxDemo]
32.3. *Ballot box sealing	A B C D E	[OpeningBallotBoxSeal]
32.4. *Reading of seal numbers	A B C D E	[SealNumReading]
32.5. *Room configuration	A B C D E	[RoomConfig]
32.7. *Checking of seal numbers for reopening	A B C D E	[SealNumCheck]
33. Please describe the reasons for not choosing "Fully" or "Adequately", if you did so:		[OpenProcedDesc]
34. How many agents representing candidates were present? <i>If possible, please list the name of the candidate and the gender of the representative.</i>		
36. What level of access did each of the following groups have? <i>A = Sufficient access;
 B = Deficient access (within regulations) — applied to one, some, or all;
 C = Deficient access (violation of regulations) — not able to participate as stipulated in regulations (not permitted entry; time limited in violation; applied to one, some, or all);
 D = Not present;
 E = Not observed</i>		
36.1. Candidate agents	Select One: A B C D E	[AccessAgents]
36.2. International observers	Select One: A B C D E	[AccessIntObs]
36.3. Citizen observers	Select One: A B C D E	[AccessCitObs]
36.5. Media	Select One: A B C D E	[AccessMedia]
36.6. Other	Select One: A B C D E	[AccessOther]
37. If any groups were not allowed sufficient access, please describe: <i>How were groups denied access and what was the impact?</i>		
38. Did you observe any interference in the opening process? <i>Please indicate which group(s) interfered. Select "No interference observed" if no interference was observed.</i>	Select Multiple: Candidate/party agents Polling staff Religious/traditional leaders International observers Voters Security Other Citizen observers Local officials No interference observed	[Interference]
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #38 excludes "No interference observed" [InterferenceDesc]		
39. If any interference, please describe: <i>How were groups causing interference and what was the impact?</i>		
41. Were there any officially lodged complaints? <i>If applicable, near the end of your observation, ask the Presiding Officer if present or ask observers from other organizations or candidate agents.</i>	Select One: Yes No	[OfficialComp]
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #41 is equal to "Yes" [OfficialCompDesc]		
42. If "yes", please describe: <i>Who filed complaints? What were the reasons? How were they addressed?</i>		
43. Were there any problems reported to you by those present rather than those observed directly by you? <i>(Reported by e.g., agents, observers, voters)</i>	Select One: Yes No	[ProbReport]
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #43 is equal to "Yes" [ProbReportDesc]		
44. If "yes", please describe: <i>Please note the actors involved, how it was resolved, the apparent impact, and any supporting evidentiary corroboration.</i>		
45. How would you evaluate candidate agents' performance?	Select One: Adequate Inadequate Not Observed/Observable	[AgentsEval]
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #45 is not equal to "Adequate" [AgentsEvalDesc]		
46. Please describe the reasons for not choosing "Adequate":		

47. Before moving ahead, please review the following definitions regarding the overall assessment of IMPLEMENTATION OF PROCEDURES BY STAFF. Mark the selection below to indicate that you understand the definitions and refer back to this page if needed. VERY GOOD — Procedures were always or almost always applied correctly. Any procedural errors observed were very minor and did not affect the integrity or transparency of the process. REASONABLE — Procedures were mostly applied correctly. Procedural errors observed did not appear to affect the integrity or transparency of the process. POOR — Procedures were not applied correctly; OR procedural errors significantly affected the transparency of the process and/or may have compromised the integrity of the process. NOT CREDIBLE — Important procedures were not followed correctly and these problems likely compromised the integrity of the process.										
48. What is your team's evaluation of the implementation of procedures by staff? This evaluation should be based upon the procedures evaluated earlier in the checklist as well as any procedural factors that may have been omitted from the checklist. Please refer back to the answers provided to questions about procedures as needed to inform the overall evaluation.					Select One:	Very Good	Reasonable	Poor	Not Credible	[BeforeProcedImp]
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #48 is not equal to "Very Good" AND Question #48 is not equal to "Reasonable"										[ProcedImpEvalDesc]
49. What were the main reasons for not choosing "Very Good" or "Reasonable"?										
50. Before moving ahead, please review the following definitions regarding the overall assessment of the OPENING ENVIRONMENT AND PROCESS. Mark the selection below to indicate that you understand the definitions and refer back to this page if needed. VERY GOOD — No significant problems were observed with the implementation of procedures or environment. The process was fully transparent. REASONABLE — Observed problems did not significantly affect the integrity or transparency of the opening process, but there is room for improvement. POOR — Significant problems with any of the following may have compromised the integrity of the process: errors in implementing opening procedures; polling staff subject to intimidation or interference; observers restricted. NOT CREDIBLE — Observed problems with the opening likely compromised the integrity of the process.					Select One:	Very Good	Reasonable	Poor	Not Credible	[BeforeOpenEnv]
51. What is your team's overall assessment of the election environment and process?					Select One:	Very Good	Reasonable	Poor	Not Credible	[ElecEnv]
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #51 is not equal to "Very Good" AND Question #51 is not equal to "Reasonable"										[ElecEnvDesc]
52. What were the main reasons for not choosing "Very Good" or "Reasonable"?										
53. Any other comments?										[AddComments]
54. End of Observation (Station):										[EndTime]

Success: Form updated successfully.

Legislative Polling - v3 2

Tunisia IFOM 2022



User/Team					
Observation Time					
1. Please select your STO Team Number					
Select One: [STOTeamNumber]					
STO 0101 STO 0102 STO 0103 STO 0104 STO 0201					
STO 0202 STO 0203 STO 0204 STO 0301 STO 0302					
STO 0303 STO 0304 STO 0401 STO 0402 STO 0403					
STO 0501 STO 0502 STO 0503 STO 0504 STO 0505					
STO 0601 STO 0602 STO 0603 STO 0604 STO 0701					
STO 0702 STO 0703					
2. Start of Observation (station) (please use 24 hour clock): [StartTime]					
For example: 3:00 pm should be 15:00 hrs.					
3. Location Details					
3.1. IRIE [GeoArea]					
Area of Responsibility					
Tunis 1 Tunis 2 Ariana Ben Arous Manouba Nabeul 1					
Nabeul 2 Zaghouan Bizerte Beja Jendouba El Kef					
Silliana Sousse Monastir Mahdia Sfax 1 Sfax 2					
Kairouan Kasserine Sidi Bouzid Gabes Medenine Tataouine					
Gafsa Tozeur Kebeli					
3.4. Is the center in an urban or rural area? [UrbanRural]					
Urban Rural					
5. Number of stations at the center: [StationCount]					
If the center and the station are the same, please answer "1".					
6. If present, please indicate the gender of the polling center's presiding officer: [POGender]					
If the presiding officer is not present now but appears before departure, please adjust this answer.					
Female Male Not observed					
7. Were there obstacles or barriers on the way to the center that could have inhibited general access? [Barriers]					
Yes No					
Examples of barriers might include distance from villages or a dysfunctional bridge.					
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #7 is equal to "Yes"					
8. If "yes", please describe: [BarriersDesc]					
Describe the barriers to public access and to what extent it affected voter franchise.					
9. Which, if any, of the following prohibited or disruptive circumstances did you observe OUTSIDE the CENTER? [DisruptOutCent]					
Prohibited campaigning Prohibited campaign material					
Ineffective queue management Intimidation Violence Significant disorder					
Security (beyond regulations) Bussing activities Other None					
If there is only one station per "center," then please answer this question as "OUTSIDE the STATION." Select "None" if you did not observe any prohibited or disruptive circumstances.					
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #9 excludes "None"					
10. If any issues, please describe: [DisruptOutCentDesc]					
What were the prohibited/disruptive circumstances and how did they affect the process?					
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #5 is greater than 1					
11. Which, if any, of the following prohibited or disruptive circumstances did you observe INSIDE the CENTER (but outside the stations)? [DisruptInCent]					
Prohibited campaigning Prohibited campaign material					
Ineffective queue management Intimidation Violence Significant disorder					
Security (beyond regulations) Other None					
Select "None" if you did not observe any prohibited or disruptive circumstances.					
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #11 excludes "None" AND Question #5 is greater than 1					
12. If any issues, please describe: [DisruptInCentDesc]					
What were the prohibited/disruptive circumstances and how did they affect the process?					
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #5 is greater than 1					
13. Polling Station ID: [StationID]					
14. Gender of the polling station's presiding officer: [StationGender]					
Female Male Mixed					
16. Number of staff working at the polling station (excluding presiding officer): [StaffCount]					
17. Number of FEMALE staff present (excluding presiding officer): [FemaleStaff]					
18. Number of registered voters: [RegVoterCount]					
19. Approximate number of voters who have voted by time of arrival: [VotedCount]					
If the number of voters is not directly recorded by the polling staff, it may be necessary to ask the presiding officer or other staff to estimate the number of voters or calculate by other means.					
20. Which, if any, of the following prohibited or disruptive circumstances did you observe INSIDE the STATION? [DisruptInStat]					
Prohibited campaigning Prohibited campaign material					
Ineffective queue management Intimidation Violence Significant disorder					
Security (beyond regulations) Other None					
Select "None" if you did not observe any prohibited or disruptive circumstances.					
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #20 excludes "None"					
21. If any issues, please describe: [DisruptInStatDesc]					
What were the prohibited/disruptive circumstances and how did they affect the process?					
22. Were any of the following materials missing, insufficient, or incorrect?					
A = Present and correct; B = Missing (entirely absent); C = Insufficient (fewer than required, but some present); D = Incorrect (wrong)					
22.1. *Indelible ink [Ink]					
A B C D					
22.2. *Booths/screens [Booths]					
A B C D					
22.4. *Ballot papers [BallotPapers]					
A B C D					
22.6. *Ballot box(es) [BallotBox]					
A B C D					
22.7. *Voter list(s)/FVR [VoterList]					
A B C D					
22.8. *Stamps [Stamps]					
A B C D					
22.9. *Seals/padlocks [Seals]					
A B C D					

22.17. *Other	Select One: A B C D	[OtherMat]
23. If materials are missing, insufficient, or incorrect, please describe, including any "other" materials noted:		[MissingMatDesc]
24. Is a Braille ballot device available in the polling center for the visually impaired	Select One: Yes No	[BrailleDevice]
25. Does the station appear to be accessible to physically challenged persons, including the elderly? <i>The UN Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities establishes an obligation for states to take measures to identify and eliminate obstacles and barriers to accessibility. This requires that people with disabilities will have an opportunity to participate on an equal basis in both rural and urban areas.</i>	Select One: Yes No	[Accessibility]
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #25 is equal to "No"		[AccessibilityDesc]
26. If "no", please describe the impediments as well as any efforts to overcome the impediments or assist the challenged persons:		
27. How closely did each of the following procedures adhere to regulations? <i>A = Fully;
B = Adequately;
C = Inadequately;
D = Not at all;
E = Not observed</i>		
27.1. *Checking for ink	Select One: A B C D E	[InkCheck]
27.2. *Voter identification	Select One: A B C D E	[VoterID]
27.3. *Crossing names out/signing voters list	Select One: A B C D E	[SigningList]
27.4. *Ballot issuing	Select One: A B C D E	[BallotIssue]
27.5. *Ballot stamping	Select One: A B C D E	[BallotStamp]
27.6. *Inking fingers	Select One: A B C D E	[Inking]
27.7. *Ballot casting	Select One: A B C D E	[BallotCasting]
27.8. *Checking under veils	Select One: A B C D E	[CheckVeils]
27.9. *Assisted voting	Select One: A B C D E	[AssistVote]
28. Please describe the reasons for not choosing "Fully" or "Adequately", if you did so:		[ProceduresDesc]
29. Which, if any, of the following ineligible voters were allowed to vote?	Select Multiple: Persons not on list — unauthorized Persons without ID Voters already inked Voters by proxy (e.g. relatives) No ineligible voters allowed Persons with unauthorized ID Voters with spoiled ballots Underage persons Security personnel — unauthorized Voters already crossed off list Other	[IneligibleVoters]
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #29 includes "Other"		[IneligibleDesc]
30. Please describe, including any "others" noted:		
31. Which, if any, of the following eligible voters were NOT allowed to vote?	Select Multiple: Persons on list with ID Party/candidate agents No eligible voters prevented Polling staff Journalists — national EMB members Citizen observers Other	[EligibleVoters]
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #31 excludes "No eligible voters prevented"		[EligibleDesc]
32. Please describe, including any "others" noted:		
33. Are ballot boxes correctly sealed? <i>All seals should be correctly applied and ballot boxes should be secure from tampering.</i>	Select One: Yes No	[BallotBoxSeal]
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #33 is equal to "No"		[BallotBoxSealDesc]
34. If "no", please describe:		
35. Are additional polling materials secured from potential theft or misuse? <i>Additional materials should be stored compactly and out of the way of traffic in the polling station. Disorganized or poorly stored materials are vulnerable to tampering.</i>	Select One: Yes No	[MatSecure]
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #35 is equal to "No"		[MatSecureDesc]
36. If "no", please describe		
37. Is the polling station layout in accordance with regulations? <i>A HINT SHOULD INCLUDE THE REGULATIONS WHICH DETERMINE LAYOUT PROCEDURES.</i>	Select One: Yes No	[LayoutReg]
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #37 is equal to "No"		[LayoutRegDesc]
38. If "no", please describe:		
39. Does the polling station layout effectively facilitate the flow of voters? <i>The layout should allow voters to move through the process without skipping steps or crossing paths with other parts of the queue.</i>	Select One: Yes No	[LayoutFlow]
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #39 is equal to "No"		[LayoutFlowDesc]
40. If "no", please describe:		
41. Are voters able to cast their ballots in secret? <i>Secrecy of the ballot should not be undermined or violated because of crowding or exposed booths.</i>	Select One: Yes No	[BallotSecret]
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #41 is equal to "No"		[BallotSecretDesc]
42. If "no", please describe:		
43. Was the number of staff working in the polling station sufficient for an efficient and orderly process? <i>(OPTIONAL) A hint may include indicators of disorder or delay when caused by an insufficient number of polling staff.</i>	Select One: Yes No Not observed	[StaffSufficient]
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #43 is equal to "No"		[StaffSufficientDesc]
44. If "no" or "not observed", please describe:		
45. How long did a typical voter have to wait in the queue before entering the polling station? <i>If there is no queue, enter 0, otherwise, ask the second or third voter in line how long they have waited so far to inform your estimate.
Provide your answer in minutes. For example, if a voter waited 1.5 hours, enter 90 (minutes).</i>		[LineWait]
46. How long did it take a typical voter to complete the voting process once they entered the polling station? <i>The voting process begins when the voter enters the polling station and ends when the voter has cast his or her ballot and is able to leave the polling station. Watch two or three voters carry out the voting process, and provide an estimate in minutes of how long the process took.</i>		[VoteTime]

47. Which, if any, of the following irregular processes did you observe?	Select Multiple: <input type="checkbox"/> Multiple voting <input type="checkbox"/> Illicit assistance <input type="checkbox"/> Violation of secrecy of the ballot <input type="checkbox"/> Ballot stuffing <input type="checkbox"/> Family voting <input type="checkbox"/> Interruption of voting <input type="checkbox"/> Possible vote buying/selling <input type="checkbox"/> Other <input type="checkbox"/> Voter intimidation <input type="checkbox"/> No irregularities observed	[IrregProcess]
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #47 excludes "No irregularities observed"		
48. If any irregularities, please describe: <i>Please comment on the frequency and severity of the irregularities, noting the extent of their impact on the voting process.</i>		[IrregProcessDesc]
49. How many agents representing candidates were present? <i>If possible, please list the name of the candidate and the gender of the representative.</i>		[AgentsPresent]
51. What level of access did each of the following groups have? <i>A = Sufficient access;
B = Deficient access (within regulations) — applied to one, some, or all;
C = Deficient access (violation of regulations) — not able to participate as stipulated in regulations (not permitted entry; time limited in violation; applied to one, some, or all);
D = Not present;
E = Not observed</i>		
51.1. Candidate agents	Select One: <input type="radio"/> A <input type="radio"/> B <input type="radio"/> C <input type="radio"/> D <input type="radio"/> E	[AccessAgents]
51.2. International observers	Select One: <input type="radio"/> A <input type="radio"/> B <input type="radio"/> C <input type="radio"/> D <input type="radio"/> E	[AccessIntObs]
51.3. Citizen observers	Select One: <input type="radio"/> A <input type="radio"/> B <input type="radio"/> C <input type="radio"/> D <input type="radio"/> E	[AccessCitObs]
51.5. Media	Select One: <input type="radio"/> A <input type="radio"/> B <input type="radio"/> C <input type="radio"/> D <input type="radio"/> E	[AccessMedia]
51.6. Other	Select One: <input type="radio"/> A <input type="radio"/> B <input type="radio"/> C <input type="radio"/> D <input type="radio"/> E	[AccessOther]
52. If any groups were not allowed sufficient access, please describe: <i>How were groups denied access and what was the impact?</i>		[AccessDesc]
53. Did you observe any interference in the polling process? <i>Please indicate which group(s) interfered. Select "No interference observed" if no interference was observed.</i>	Select One: <input type="checkbox"/> Candidate/party agents <input type="checkbox"/> Polling staff <input type="checkbox"/> Religious/traditional leaders <input type="checkbox"/> International observers <input type="checkbox"/> Media <input type="checkbox"/> Voters <input type="checkbox"/> Security <input type="checkbox"/> Other <input type="checkbox"/> Citizen observers <input type="checkbox"/> Local officials <input type="checkbox"/> No interference observed	[InterferencePolling]
54. If any interference, please describe: <i>How were groups causing interference and what was the impact?</i>		[InterferenceDesc]
56. Were there any officially lodged complaints? <i>If applicable, near the end of your observation, ask the Presiding Officer if present or ask observers from other organizations or candidate agents.</i>	Select One: <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No	[OfficialComp]
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #56 is equal to "Yes"		[OfficialCompDesc]
57. If "yes", please describe: <i>Who filed complaints? What were the reasons? How were they addressed?</i>		
58. Were there any problems reported to you by those present rather than those observed directly by you? <i>(Reported by e.g., agents, observers, voters)</i>	Select One: <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No	[ProbReport]
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #58 is equal to "Yes"		[ProbReportDesc]
59. If "yes", please describe: <i>Please note the actors involved, how it was resolved, the apparent impact, and any supporting evidentiary corroboration.</i>		
60. How would you evaluate voters' understanding of voting procedures?	Select One: <input type="radio"/> Adequate <input type="radio"/> Inadequate <input type="radio"/> Not Observed/Observable	[VotUnderst]
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #60 is not equal to "Adequate"		[VotUnderstDesc]
61. Please describe the reasons for not choosing "Adequate":		
62. How would you evaluate candidate agents' performance?	Select One: <input type="radio"/> Adequate <input type="radio"/> Inadequate <input type="radio"/> Not Observed/Observable	[AgentsEval]
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #62 is not equal to "Adequate"		[AgentsEvalDesc]
63. Please describe the reasons for not choosing "Adequate":		
64. Before moving ahead, please review the following definitions regarding the overall assessment of IMPLEMENTATION OF PROCEDURES BY STAFF. Mark the selection below to indicate that you understand the definitions and refer back to this page if needed. <i>VERY GOOD — Procedures were always or almost always applied correctly. Any procedural errors observed were very minor and did not affect the integrity or transparency of the process.

 REASONABLE — Procedures were mostly applied correctly. Procedural errors observed did not appear to affect the integrity or transparency of the process.

 POOR — Procedures were not applied correctly; OR procedural errors significantly affected the transparency of the process and/or may have compromised the integrity of the process.

 NOT CREDIBLE — Important procedures were not followed correctly and these problems likely compromised the integrity of the process.</i>	Select One: <input type="radio"/> I have read and understand the definitions.	[BeforeProcedImp]
65. What is your team's evaluation of the implementation of procedures by staff? <i>This evaluation should be based upon the procedures evaluated earlier in the checklist as well as any procedural factors that may have been omitted from the checklist. Please refer back to the answers provided to questions about procedures as needed to inform the overall evaluation.</i>	Select One: <input type="radio"/> Very Good <input type="radio"/> Reasonable <input type="radio"/> Poor <input type="radio"/> Not Credible	[ProcedImpEval]
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #65 is not equal to "Very Good" AND Question #65 is not equal to "Reasonable"		[ProcedImpEvalDesc]
66. What were the main reasons for not choosing "Very Good" or "Reasonable"?		
67. Before moving ahead, please review the following definitions regarding the overall assessment of the ENVIRONMENT AND PROCESS. Mark the selection below to indicate that you understand the definitions and refer back to this page if needed. <i>VERY GOOD — No significant problems were observed with the implementation of procedures or environment. The aggregation process was fully transparent.

 REASONABLE — Observed problems did not significantly affect the integrity or transparency of the aggregation process, but there is room for improvement.

 POOR — Significant problems with any of the following may have compromised the integrity of the results: errors in implementing aggregation procedures; election staff subject to intimidation or interference; observers restricted; sensitive materials not secured.

 NOT CREDIBLE — Observed problems with the aggregation likely compromised the integrity of the results</i>	Select One: <input type="radio"/> I have read and understand the definitions.	[BeforeElecEnv]
68. What is your team's overall assessment of the election environment and process?	Select One: <input type="radio"/> Very Good <input type="radio"/> Reasonable <input type="radio"/> Poor <input type="radio"/> Not Credible	[ElecEnv]
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #68 is not equal to "Very Good" AND Question #68 is not equal to "Reasonable"		[ElecEnvDesc]
69. What were the main reasons for not choosing "Very Good" or "Reasonable"?		
70. Any other comments?		[AddComments]
71. End of Observation (Station):		[EndTime]

Success: Form updated successfully.

Legislative Closing- v3 2

Tunisia IEOM 2022



User/Team

Observation Time

1. Please select your STO Team Number

Select One:

[STOTeamNumber]

STO 0101	STO 0102	STO 0103	STO 0104	STO 0201
STO 0202	STO 0203	STO 0204	STO 0301	STO 0302
STO 0303	STO 0304	STO 0401	STO 0402	STO 0403
STO 0501	STO 0502	STO 0503	STO 0504	STO 0505
STO 0601	STO 0602	STO 0603	STO 0604	STO 0701
STO 0702	STO 0703			

2. Start of Observation (station) (please use 24 hour clock):

[StartTime]

For example: 3:00 pm should be 15:00 hrs.

3. Location Details

3.1. IRIE

Select One:

[GeoArea]

Area of Responsibility

Tunis 1	Tunis 2	Ariana	Ben Arous	Manouba	Nabeul 1
Nabeul 2	Zaghouan	Bizerte	Beja	Jendouba	El Kef
Siliana	Sousse	Monastir	Mahdia	Sfax 1	Sfax 2
Kairouan	Kasserine	Sidi Bouzid	Gabes	Medenine	Tataouine
Gafsa	Tozeur	Kebeli			

3.4. Is the center in an urban or rural area?

Select One:

[UrbanRural]

Urban: Rural: defined subjectively per mission. Could include distance to cities...

Urban Rural

5. Number of stations at the center:

[StationCount]

If the center and the station are the same, please answer "1".

6. If present, please indicate the gender of the polling center's presiding officer:

Select One:

[POGender]

If the presiding officer is not present now but appears before departure, please adjust this answer.

Female Male Not observed

ANSWER ONLY IF Question #5 is greater than 1

[StationID]

13. Polling Station ID:

14. Gender of the polling station's presiding officer:

Select One:

[StationGender]

Female Male Mixed

16. Number of staff working at the polling station (excluding presiding officer):

[StaffCount]

17. Number of FEMALE staff present (excluding presiding officer):

[FemaleStaff]

18. Number of registered voters:

[RegVoterCount]

21. Did you observe the official closing of the polling station?

Select One:

[ClosingObs]

Generally, a polling station is closed when announced by the judge. Depending on regulations and implementation, it may be distinct from the time of the last vote.

Yes No

22. If "no", please describe:

[ClosingObsDesc]

23. At what time was the closing of the polling station announced?

[ClosingAnnounced]

The closing time should match the time in regulations unless an emergency change was made by the EMB.

24. Approximately how many voters were waiting in the queue at the time of closing?

Select One:

[ClosingQueue]

0 1-10 11-25 26-50 51-100 More than 100

25. Did you observe the last vote at the polling station?

Select One:

[LastVoteObs]

Yes No

ANSWER ONLY IF Question #25 is equal to "Yes"

[LastVoteTime]

26. If "yes", at what time did the last voter vote?

ANSWER ONLY IF Question #24 is not equal to "0"

Select One:

[ClosingQueueEligible]

Yes No Not observed

27. Were all eligible persons in the queue at the time of closing allowed to vote?

Select One:

[ClosingQueuePrevent]

Yes No Not observed

28. Were any and all voters prevented from joining the queue after closing?

31. How closely did each of the following procedures adhere to regulations?

A = Fully;
B = Adequately;
C = Inadequately;
D = Not at all;
E = Not observed

31.1. Closing announcement

Select One:

[ClosingAnnouncement]

A B C D E

31.2. Sealing of ballot boxes (incl. slot)

Select One:

[BallotBoxSealing]

A B C D E

31.3. Recording of seal numbers

Select One:

[SealNumRecording]

A B C D E

31.4. Securing of sensitive polling materials

Select One:

[MaterialSecuring]

A B C D E

32. Please describe the reasons for not choosing "Fully" or "Adequately", if you did so:

[ProceduresDesc]

33. How many agents representing candidates were present?

[AgentsPresent]

If possible, please list the name of the candidate and the gender of the representative.

35. What level of access did each of the following groups have?

A = Sufficient access;
B = Deficient access (within regulations) — applied to one, some, or all;
C = Deficient access (violation of regulations) — not able to participate as stipulated in regulations (not permitted entry; time limited in violation; applied to one, some, or all);
D = Not present;
E = Not observed

35.1. Candidate agents

Select One:

[AccessAgents]

A B C D E

35.2. International observers

Select One:

[AccessIntObs]

A B C D E

35.3. Citizen observers

Select One:

[AccessCitObs]

A B C D E

35.4. Media

Select One:

[AccessMedia]

A B C D E

35.5. Other

Select One:

[AccessOther]

A B C D E

36. If any groups were not allowed sufficient access, please describe:

[AccessDesc]

How were groups denied access and what was the impact?

37. Did you observe any interference in the closing process?	Select One: Candidate/party agents International observers Citizen observers Polling staff Media Voters Security Local officials Religious/traditional leaders Other No interference observed	[InterferenceClosing]
38. If any interference, please describe: <i>How were groups causing interference and what was the impact?</i>		[InterferenceDesc]
40. Were there any officially lodged complaints? <i>If applicable, near the end of your observation, ask the Presiding Officer if present or ask observers from other organizations or candidate agents.</i>	Select One: Yes No	[OfficialComp]
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #40 is equal to "Yes"		[OfficialCompDesc]
41. If "yes", please describe: <i>Who filed complaints? What were the reasons? How were they addressed?</i>		
42. Were there any problems reported to you by those present rather than those observed directly by you? <i>(Reported by e.g., agents, observers, voters)</i>	Select One: Yes No	[ProbReport]
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #42 is equal to "Yes"		[ProbReportDesc]
43. If "yes", please describe: <i>Please note the actors involved, how it was resolved, the apparent impact, and any supporting evidentiary corroboration.</i>		
44. How would you evaluate candidate agents' performance?	Select One: Adequate Inadequate Not Observed/Observable	[AgentsEval]
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #44 is not equal to "Adequate"		[AgentsEvalDesc]
45. Please describe the reasons for not choosing "Adequate":		
46. Before moving ahead, please review the following definitions regarding the overall assessment of IMPLEMENTATION OF PROCEDURES BY STAFF. Mark the selection below to indicate that you understand the definitions and refer back to this page if needed. <i>VERY GOOD — Procedures were always or almost always applied correctly. Any procedural errors observed were very minor and did not affect the integrity or transparency of the process.

 REASONABLE — Procedures were mostly applied correctly. Procedural errors observed did not appear to affect the integrity or transparency of the process.

 POOR — Procedures were not applied correctly. OR procedural errors significantly affected the transparency of the process and/or may have compromised the integrity of the process.

 NOT CREDIBLE — Important procedures were not followed correctly and these problems likely compromised the integrity of the process.</i>	Select One: I have read and understand the definitions.	[BeforeProcedImp]
47. What is your team's evaluation of the implementation of procedures by staff? <i>This evaluation should be based upon the procedures evaluated earlier in the checklist as well as any procedural factors that may have been omitted from the checklist. Please refer back to the answers provided to questions about procedures as needed to inform the overall evaluation.</i>	Select One: Very Good Reasonable Poor Not Credible	[ProcedImpEval]
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #47 is not equal to "Very Good" AND Question #47 is not equal to "Reasonable"		[ProcedImpEvalDesc]
48. What were the main reasons for not choosing "Very Good" or "Reasonable"?		
49. Before moving ahead, please review the following definitions regarding the overall assessment of the CLOSING ENVIRONMENT AND PROCESS. Mark the selection below to indicate that you understand the definitions and refer back to this page if needed. <i>VERY GOOD — No significant problems were observed with the implementation of procedures or environment. The process was fully transparent.

 REASONABLE — Observed problems did not significantly affect the integrity or transparency of the closing process, but there is room for improvement.

 POOR — Significant problems with any of the following may have compromised the integrity of the results: errors in implementing closing procedures; polling staff subject to intimidation or interference; observers restricted.

 NOT CREDIBLE — Observed problems with the closing likely compromised the integrity of the results.</i>	Select One: I have read and understand the definitions.	[BeforeCloseEnv]
50. What is your team's overall assessment of the election environment and process?	Select One: Very Good Reasonable Poor Not Credible	[ElecEnv]
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #50 is not equal to "Very Good" AND Question #50 is not equal to "Reasonable"		[ElecEnvDesc]
51. What were the main reasons for not choosing "Very Good" or "Reasonable"?		
52. Any other comments?		[AddComments]
53. End of Observation (Station):		[EndTime]

User/Team					
Observation Time					
1. Please select your STO Team Number					
<div> <div>Select One:</div> <div> <div>STO 0101</div> <div>STO 0102</div> <div>STO 0103</div> <div>STO 0104</div> <div>STO 0201</div> </div> </div> <div> <div>STO 0202</div> <div>STO 0203</div> <div>STO 0204</div> <div>STO 0301</div> <div>STO 0302</div> </div> <div> <div>STO 0303</div> <div>STO 0304</div> <div>STO 0401</div> <div>STO 0402</div> <div>STO 0403</div> </div> <div> <div>STO 0501</div> <div>STO 0502</div> <div>STO 0503</div> <div>STO 0504</div> <div>STO 0505</div> </div> <div> <div>STO 0601</div> <div>STO 0602</div> <div>STO 0603</div> <div>STO 0604</div> <div>STO 0701</div> </div> <div>STO 0702</div> <div>STO 0703</div>					
2. Start of Observation (station) (please use 24 hour clock): For example: 3:00 pm should be 15:00 hrs.					
3. Location Details					
3.1. IRIE					
Area of Responsibility					
<div> <div>Select One:</div> <div> <div>Tunis 1</div> <div>Nabeul 2</div> <div>Siliana</div> <div>Kairouan</div> <div>Gafsa</div> </div> </div> <div> <div>Tunis 2</div> <div>Zaghouan</div> <div>Sousse</div> <div>Kasserine</div> <div>Tozeur</div> </div> <div> <div>Ariana</div> <div>Bizerte</div> <div>Monastir</div> <div>Sidi Bouzid</div> <div>Kebeli</div> </div> <div> <div>Ben Arous</div> <div>Beja</div> <div>Mahdia</div> <div>Gabes</div> </div> <div> <div>Manouba</div> <div>Jendouba</div> <div>Sfax 1</div> <div>Medenine</div> </div> <div> <div>Nabeul 1</div> <div>El Kef</div> <div>Sfax 2</div> <div>Tataouine</div> </div>					
3.4. Is the center in an urban or rural area? Urban: Rural: defined subjectively per mission. Could include distance to cities...					
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #5 is greater than 1					
13. Polling Station ID:					
14. Gender of the polling station's presiding officer:					
16. Number of staff working at the polling station (excluding presiding officer):					
17. Number of FEMALE staff present (excluding presiding officer):					
18. Number of registered voters:					
23. Please record the number of ballots in each of the following categories:					
23.1. Ballots received					
23.2. Unused ballots					
23.3. Blank ballots (if counted separately)					
23.4. Ballots in box					
23.5. Valid ballots					
23.6. Invalid ballots					
23.7. Spoiled ballots					
24. How closely did each of the following procedures adhere to regulations? A = Fully; B = Adequately; C = Inadequately; D = Not at all; E = Not observed					
24.1. Ballot verification and sorting					
24.2. Ballot counting					
24.3. Reconciliation					
24.4. Recounting of ballots					
24.5. Contested ballots					
24.6. Completion of protocol form					
24.7. Announcement of results (verbal)					
24.8. Posting of results (at station/center)					
25. Please describe the reasons for not choosing "Fully" or "Adequately", if you did so:					
26. Did agents have an opportunity to sign the results?					
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #26 is not equal to "Yes"					
27. If "no" or "not observed", please describe:					
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #26 is equal to "Yes"					
28. If "yes", did any agents elect not to sign the results?					
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #28 is equal to "Yes"					
29. If "yes", please describe:					
30. How many agents representing candidates were present? If possible, please list the name of the candidate and the gender of the representative.					
32. What level of access did each of the following groups have? A = Sufficient access; B = Deficient access (within regulations) — applied to one, some, or all; C = Deficient access (violation of regulations) — not able to participate as stipulated in regulations (not permitted entry; time limited in violation; applied to one, some, or all); D = Not present; E = Not observed					
32.1. Candidate agents					
32.2. International observers					

32.3. Citizen observers	Select One: A B C D E	[AccessCitObs]
32.4. Media	Select One: A B C D E	[AccessMedia]
32.5. Other	Select One: A B C D E	[AccessOther]
33. If any groups were not allowed sufficient access, please describe: How were groups denied access and what was the impact?		
34. Did you observe any interference in the counting process?	Select One: Candidate/party agents Polling staff Religious/traditional leaders Media Voters Other International observers Security No interference observed Citizen observers Local officials	[InterferenceCounting]
35. If any interference, please describe: How were groups causing interference and what was the impact?		
37. Were there any officially lodged complaints? If applicable, near the end of your observation, ask the Presiding Officer if present or ask observers from other organizations or candidate agents.	Select One: Yes No	[OfficialComp]
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #37 is equal to "Yes"		
38. If "yes", please describe: Who filed complaints? What were the reasons? How were they addressed?		[OfficialCompDesc]
39. Were there any problems reported to you by those present rather than those observed directly by you? (Reported by e.g., agents, observers, voters)	Select One: Yes No	[ProbReport]
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #39 is equal to "Yes"		
40. If "yes", please describe: Please note the actors involved, how it was resolved, the apparent impact, and any supporting evidentiary corroboration.		[ProbReportDesc]
41. How would you evaluate candidate agents' performance?	Select One: Adequate Inadequate Not Observed/Observable	[AgentsEval]
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #41 is not equal to "Adequate"		
42. Please describe the reasons for not choosing "Adequate":		[AgentsEvalDesc]
43. Before moving ahead, please review the following definitions regarding the overall assessment of IMPLEMENTATION OF PROCEDURES BY STAFF. Mark the selection below to indicate that you understand the definitions and refer back to this page if needed. VERY GOOD — Procedures were always or almost always applied correctly. Any procedural errors observed were very minor and did not affect the integrity or transparency of the process. REASONABLE — Procedures were mostly applied correctly. Procedural errors observed did not appear to affect the integrity or transparency of the process. POOR — Procedures were not applied correctly; OR procedural errors significantly affected the transparency of the process and/or may have compromised the integrity of the process. NOT CREDIBLE — Important procedures were not followed correctly and these problems likely compromised the integrity of the process.		
44. What is your team's evaluation of the implementation of procedures by staff? This evaluation should be based upon the procedures evaluated earlier in the checklist as well as any procedural factors that may have been omitted from the checklist. Please refer back to the answers provided to questions about procedures as needed to inform the overall evaluation.	Select One: Very Good Reasonable Poor Not Credible	[ProcedImpEval]
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #44 is not equal to "Very Good" AND Question #44 is not equal to "Reasonable"		
45. What were the main reasons for not choosing "Very Good" or "Reasonable"?		[ProcedImpEvalDesc]
46. Before moving ahead, please review the following definitions regarding the overall assessment of the ENVIRONMENT AND PROCESS. Mark the selection below to indicate that you understand the definitions and refer back to this page if needed. VERY GOOD — No significant problems were observed with the implementation of procedures or environment. The counting process was fully transparent. REASONABLE — Observed problems did not significantly affect the integrity or transparency of the counting process, but there is room for improvement. POOR — Significant problems with any of the following may have compromised the integrity of the results: errors in implementing counting procedures; counting staff subject to intimidation or interference; observers restricted. NOT CREDIBLE — Observed problems with the counting likely compromised the integrity of the results.		
47. What is your team's overall assessment of the election environment and process?	Select One: Very Good Reasonable Poor Not Credible	[ElecEnv]
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #47 is not equal to "Very Good" AND Question #47 is not equal to "Reasonable"		
48. What were the main reasons for not choosing "Very Good" or "Reasonable"?		[ElecEnvDesc]
49. Any other comments?		[AddComments]
50. End of Observation (Station):		[EndTime]

Success: Form updated successfully.

Legislative Aggregation - v3 2

Tunisia IEOM 2022



User/Team					
Observation Time					
1. Please select your STO Team Number					
Select One: [STOTeamNumber]					
STO 0101 STO 0102 STO 0103 STO 0104 STO 0201					
STO 0202 STO 0203 STO 0204 STO 0301 STO 0302					
STO 0303 STO 0304 STO 0401 STO 0402 STO 0403					
STO 0501 STO 0502 STO 0503 STO 0504 STO 0505					
STO 0601 STO 0602 STO 0603 STO 0604 STO 0701					
STO 0702 STO 0703					
2. Start of Observation (station) (please use 24 hour clock): [StartTime]					
For example: 3:00 pm should be 15:00 hrs.					
3. Location Details					
3.1. IRIE [GeoArea]					
Area of Responsibility					
Tunis 1 Tunis 2 Ariana Ben Arous Manouba Nabeul 1					
Nabeul 2 Zaghouan Bizerte Beja Jendouba El Kef					
Siliana Sousse Monastir Mahdia Sfax 1 Sfax 2					
Kairouan Kasserine Sidi Bouzid Gabes Medenine Tataouine					
Gafsa Tozeur Kebelli					
5. Were there obstacles or barriers on the way to the center that could have inhibited general access? [Barriers]					
Yes No					
Examples of barriers might include distance from villages or a dysfunctional bridge.					
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #5 is equal to "Yes" [BarriersDesc]					
6. If "yes", please describe:					
Describe the barriers to public access and to what extent it affected voter franchise.					
7. Which, if any, of the following prohibited or disruptive circumstances did you observe OUTSIDE the CENTER? [DisruptOutCent]					
Select Multiple:					
Prohibited campaigning Prohibited campaign material					
Ineffective queue management Intimidation Violence Significant disorder					
Security (beyond regulations) Bussing activities Other None					
If there is only one station per "center," then please answer this question as "OUTSIDE the STATION." Select "None" if you did not observe any prohibited or disruptive circumstances.					
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #7 excludes "None" [DisruptOutCentDesc]					
8. If any issues, please describe:					
What were the prohibited/disruptive circumstances and how did they affect the process?					
9. Which, if any, of the following prohibited or disruptive circumstances did you observe INSIDE the CENTER (but outside the stations)? [DisruptInCent]					
Select Multiple:					
Prohibited campaigning Prohibited campaign material					
Ineffective queue management Intimidation Violence Significant disorder					
Security (beyond regulations) Other None					
Select "None" if you did not observe any prohibited or disruptive circumstances.					
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #9 excludes "None" [DisruptInCentDesc]					
10. If any issues, please describe:					
What were the prohibited/disruptive circumstances and how did they affect the process?					
12. Does the station appear to be accessible to physically challenged persons, including the elderly? [Accessibility]					
The UN Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities establishes an obligation for states to take measures to identify and eliminate obstacles and barriers to accessibility. This requires that people with disabilities will have an opportunity to participate on an equal basis in both rural and urban areas.					
Select One: Yes No					
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #12 is equal to "No" [AccessibilityDesc]					
13. If "no", please describe the impediments as well as any efforts to overcome the impediments or assist the challenged persons:					
14. How closely did each of the following procedures adhere to regulations?					
A = Fully; B = Adequately; C = Inadequately; D = Not at all; E = Not observed					
14.1. Receipt of materials [AggProA]					
Select One: A B C D E					
14.2. Data recording/entry [AggProB]					
Select One: A B C D E					
14.3. Tabulation [AggProC]					
Select One: A B C D E					
14.4. Proclamation/display of results [AggProD]					
Select One: A B C D E					
14.5. Quarantined materials/results [AggProE]					
Select One: A B C D E					
14.6. Recount [AggProF]					
Select One: A B C D E					
15. Please describe the reasons for not choosing "Fully" or "Adequately", if you did so: [ProceduresDesc]					
16. Total number of polling station results this tabulation center is responsible for [NumPoll]					
Leave blank if unknown/not observable.					
17. Number of polling station results received to date [PollNumRec]					
Leave blank if unknown/not observable. Include TOTAL number of results quarantined.					
18. How many polling station results have been processed to date [PollNumProc]					
Leave blank if unknown/not observable.					
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #14.5 is not equal to "E" [QuarQ1]					
19. Number of polling station results quarantined to date					
Leave blank if unknown/not observable.					
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #14.5 is not equal to "E" [QuarQ2]					
20. Please describe quarantine					
E.g., reasons for quarantine, PC/PS IDs of those quarantined.					
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #14.6 is not equal to "E" [QuarQ3]					
21. How many quarantined results have been processed to date					
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #14.6 is not equal to "E" [RecountQ1]					
22. How many polling stations require the recount of materials					
Leave blank if unknown/not observable.					
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #14.6 is not equal to "E" [RecountQ2]					
23. Please describe recount					
E.g., overall situation, PC/PS IDs.					

ANSWER ONLY IF Question #14.6 is not equal to "E"		[RecountQ3]
24. How many recounts of polling station results have taken place to date <i>Leave blank if unknown/not observable.</i>		
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #14.6 is not equal to "E"		[RecountQ4]
25. How many recounts confirmed the earlier tallies <i>Leave blank if unknown/not observable.</i>		
26. Were there any results that should have received further investigation but did not <i>You can ask the presiding officer</i>		[ScrunQ1]
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #26 is equal to "Yes"		[ScrunQDes]
27. If "yes," please describe		
28. How many agents representing candidates were present? <i>If possible, please list the name of the candidate and the gender of the representative.</i>		[AgentsPresent]
30. What level of access did each of the following groups have? <i>A = Sufficient access;
B = Deficient access (within regulations) — applied to one, some, or all;
C = Deficient access (violation of regulations) — not able to participate as stipulated in regulations (not permitted entry; time limited in violation; applied to one, some, or all);
D = Not present;
E = Not observed</i>		
30.1. Candidate agents	Select One: A B C D E	[AccessAgents]
30.2. International observers	Select One: A B C D E	[AccessIntObs]
30.3. Citizen observers	Select One: A B C D E	[AccessCitObs]
30.5. Media	Select One: A B C D E	[AccessMedia]
30.6. Other	Select One: A B C D E	[AccessOther]
31. If any groups were not allowed sufficient access, please describe: <i>How were groups denied access and what was the impact?</i>		
32. Did you observe any interference in the opening process? <i>Please indicate which group(s) interfered. Select "No interference observed" if no interference was observed.</i>		[Interference]
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #32 excludes "No interference observed" 33. If any interference, please describe: <i>How were groups causing interference and what was the impact?</i>		
35. Were there any officially lodged complaints? <i>If applicable, near the end of your observation, ask the Presiding Officer if present or ask observers from other organizations or candidate agents.</i>		[OfficialComp]
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #35 is equal to "Yes"		[OfficialCompDesc]
36. If "yes," please describe: <i>Who filed complaints? What were the reasons? How were they addressed?</i>		
37. Were there any problems reported to you by those present rather than those observed directly by you? <i>(Reported by e.g., agents, observers, voters)</i>		[ProbReport]
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #37 is equal to "Yes"		[ProbReportDesc]
38. If "yes," please describe: <i>Please note the actors involved, how it was resolved, the apparent impact, and any supporting evidentiary corroboration.</i>		
39. How would you evaluate candidate agents' performance?		[AgentsEval]
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #39 is not equal to "Adequate"		[AgentsEvalDesc]
40. Please describe the reasons for not choosing "Adequate":		
41. Before moving ahead, please review the following definitions regarding the overall assessment of IMPLEMENTATION OF PROCEDURES BY STAFF. Mark the selection below to indicate that you understand the definitions and refer back to this page if needed. <i>VERY GOOD — Procedures were always or almost always applied correctly. Any procedural errors observed were very minor and did not affect the integrity or transparency of the process.
 REASONABLE — Procedures were mostly applied correctly. Procedural errors observed did not appear to affect the integrity or transparency of the process.
 POOR — Procedures were not applied correctly; OR procedural errors significantly affected the transparency of the process and/or may have compromised the integrity of the process.
 NOT CREDIBLE — Important procedures were not followed correctly and these problems likely compromised the integrity of the process.</i>		[BeforeProcedImp]
42. What is your team's evaluation of the implementation of procedures by staff? <i>This evaluation should be based upon the procedures evaluated earlier in the checklist as well as any procedural factors that may have been omitted from the checklist. Please refer back to the answers provided to questions about procedures as needed to inform the overall evaluation.</i>		[ProcedImpEval]
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #42 is not equal to "Very Good" AND Question #42 is not equal to "Reasonable"		[ProcedImpEvalDesc]
43. What were the main reasons for not choosing "Very Good" or "Reasonable"?		
44. Before moving ahead, please review the following definitions regarding the overall assessment of the ENVIRONMENT AND PROCESS. Mark the selection below to indicate that you understand the definitions and refer back to this page if needed. <i>VERY GOOD — No significant problems were observed with the implementation of procedures or environment. The aggregation process was fully transparent.
 REASONABLE — Observed problems did not significantly affect the integrity or transparency of the aggregation process, but there is room for improvement.
 POOR — Significant problems with any of the following may have compromised the integrity of the results: errors in implementing aggregation procedures; election staff subject to intimidation or interference; observers restricted; sensitive materials not secured.
 NOT CREDIBLE — Observed problems with the aggregation likely compromised the integrity of the results</i>		[BeforeElecEnv]
45. What is your team's overall assessment of the election environment and process?		[ElecEnv]
ANSWER ONLY IF Question #45 is not equal to "Very Good" AND Question #45 is not equal to "Reasonable"		[ElecEnvDesc]
46. What were the main reasons for not choosing "Very Good" or "Reasonable"?		
47. Any other comments?		
48. End of Observation (Station):		

Annex I

Legislative Election Results: First and Second Round

IRIE	Legislative constituency/ district	Candidates	# of votes	Percentage	# of votes	Percentage	Elected MPs
Ariana	Ariana Ville	1. Najla Lahiani	5001	74.82	N/A	N/A	Elected
		2. Med Ghassen Chebbi	1683	25.17	N/A	N/A	
	Cit� Ettadhamen	1. Tarak Rebai	1578	41.2	2238	51.79	Elected
		2. Mehrez Ayari	1174	30.65	2083	48.21	
		3. Imed Souli	1078	28.14			
	Kal��at Andalous – Sidi Thabet	1. Fay��al Seghaier	1975	51.23	N/A	N/A	Elected
		2. Rami Dridi	1086	28.17	N/A	N/A	
		3. Hatem Haddad	794	20.59			
	Mnihla	1. Maha Ameur	1307	31.12	3102	69.74	Elected
		2. Tarak Mejri	909	21.64	1346	30.26	
		3. Mohamed Bilel Ghanmi	868	20.67			
		4. Hassen Laamri	586	13.95			
		5. Adel Hermia	530	12.62			
	Raoued 1	1. Aymen Boughdiri	1134	61.03	N/A	N/A	Elected
		2. Joudi Rouafi	724	38.97	N/A	N/A	
	Raoued 2	1. Abdelhalim Bousemma	1689	100	N/A	N/A	Elected
	Soukra 1	1. Aymen Ben Salah	1310	36.36	2183	66.55	Elected
		2. Mawaheb Garchi	963	26.73	1097	33.45	
		3. Fay��al Zara��i	691	19.18			
		4. Rached Mathlouthi	639	17.73			
	Soukra 2	1. Faten Nsibi	1383	100	N/A	N/A	Elected
Bizerte	Bizerte Nord	1. Sami Essayed	2565	59.53	N/A	N/A	Elected
		2. Fatma Rebi��	1744	40.47	N/A	N/A	
	Bizerte Sud	1. Fethi Mechergui	732	21.44	1564	51.06	Elected
		2. Ali Jemii	729	21.35	1499	48.94	
		3. Ahmed Dhaouadi	707	20.71			
		4. Naouel Ma��laoui	663	19.42			
		5. Monji Saidani	583	17.08			
	Ghar El Melh – Alia – Ras Jebel	1. Youssef Tarchoun	1395	21.2	3070	54.89	Elected
		2. Wafa Ben Slimen	1124	17.08	2525	45.11	
		3. Gaddour Hafidh	1062	16.14			
		4. Hamdi Kaouach	866	13.16			
		5. Hatem Zaim	699	10.62			
		6. Jaleleddine Rhima	644	9.79			
		7. Abdellatif Dridi	426	6.47			
		8. Abdelouahed Gaboubi	365	5.55			
	Mateur – Utica	1. Ahmed Saidani	1385	30.85	2222	51.63	Elected
		2. Samir Belmoumen	983	21.9	2082	48.37	
		3. Jalel Touhami	857	19.09			
		4. Walid Hbabou	688	15.33			
		5. Habib Rezgi	576	12.83			

IRIE	Legislative constituency/ district	Candidates	# of votes	Percentage	# of votes	Percentage	Elected MPs
Bizerte	Menzel Bourguiba – Tinja	1. Mejda Ouerghi	1999	48.53	3611	73.72	Elected
		2. Hela Troudi	664	16.12	26.28	1287	
		3. Hana Hadded	513	12.45			
		4. Moncef Satouri	397	9.64			
		5. Hadhemi Cheniti	298	7.23			
		6. Mohamed Fethi Bejaoui	248	6.03			
		7. Selim Harraga	0	0			
	Menzel Jemil – Jarzouna	1. Sirine Bousendel	1156	25.13	2624	64.69	Elected
		2. Ridha Gharbi	953	20.72	1432	35.31	
		3. Nesserine Khemiri	771	16.76			
		4. Adel Germazi	719	15.63			
		5. Mekki Chakroun	695	15.11			
		6. Walid Bouabsa	306	6.65			
	Sejenane – Djoumine – Ghezala	1. Sami Toujani	3664	33.62	5092	46.81	
		2. Ridha Sahbani	3136	28.78	5785	53.19	Elected
		3. Mohamed Saidani	1426	13.08			
		4. Younes Mecherghi	1300	11.93			
		5. Sami Houiji	773	7.09			
		6. Sami Maâlaoui	599	5.5			
Manouba	Douar Hicher	1. Ali Bouzouzia	2317	54.93	N/A	N/A	Elected
		2. Chiheb Yahmadi	1901	45.07	N/A	N/A	
	Jedeida – Tebourba – El Battan	1. Abderrazek Aouidet	2041	30.51	4181	68.45	Elected
		2. Oussama Oualhazi	1200	17.94	1927	31.55	
		3. Mohamed Hammami	902	13.48			
		4. Lazher Jelassi	894	13.36			
		5. Taoufik Jalleli	763	11.41			
		6. Nabil Ben Slimane	455	6.8			
		7. Malek Chehibi	435	6.5			
	Manouba	1. Asma Derouich	934	22.35	1944	51.27	Elected
		2. Abdennacer Tijani	889	21.27	1848	48.73	
		3. Anis Mejri	884	21.15			
		4. Faouzi Chaabani	792	18.96			
		5. Najd Khalfaoui	680	16.27			
	Mornaguia – Borj El Amri	1. Saber Jlassi	1163	18.63	2940	58.79	Elected
		2. Makrem Hanafi	969	15.52	2061	41.21	
		3. Saousen Sallami	905	14.49			
		4. Habib Jlassi	635	10.17			
		5. Sami Hammami	601	9.63			
		6. Mohamed Hamrouni	519	8.31			
		7. Hamed Arfaoui	488	7.82			
		8. Mahjouba Jlassi	411	6.58			
		9. Abdeljlil Nouri	208	3.33			
		10. Hamza Aouinti	193	3.09			
		11. Aymen Ferchichi	152	2.43			

IRIE	Legislative constituency/ district	Candidates	# of votes	Percentage	# of votes	Percentage	Elected MPs
Manouba	Oued Ellil	1. Mohamed Ali Saïdi	1166	20.66	2551	47.79	
		2. Meriem Chérif	1051	18.62	2787	52.21	Elected
		3. Heifa Arfaoui	658	11.66			
		4. Tarek Khoufi	617	10.93			
		5. Hatem Khiari	596	10.56			
		6. Moncef Bouzazi	469	8.31			
		7. Manel Charki	436	7.73			
		8. Saleh Eddine Bourokâa	328	5.81			
		9. Zied Othmani	322	5.72			
Tunis 1	Bab Bhar – Sidi El Bechir	1. Adel Bousalmi	2658	100	N/A	N/A	Elected
	Hrairia	1. Ezzedine Teieb	2184	45.02	2579	53.73	Elected
		2. Yosra Sassi	1452	29.93	2221	46.27	
		3. Mohamed Ali Ben Arousi	652	13.44			
		4. Mehrez Bou Allague	563	11.61			
	Kabaria	1. Mohamed Kamel Bouthouri	1474	29.76	2561	49.98	
		2. Salah Mbarki	1402	28.31	2563	50.02	Elected
		3. Ahmed Sassi	1150	23.22			
		4. Hamouda Bouali	927	18.72			
	Sijoumi – Ezzouhour	1. Sirine Mrabet	1757	44.49	2092	58.14	Elected
		2. Fethi Dekhil	988	25.27	1506	41.86	
		3. Sami Ben Hassan	623	15.93			
		4. Mohamed Zied Yahiaoui	542	13.86			
	La Medina – Bab Souika	1. Amel Meddeb	1704	56.26	N/A	N/A	Elected
		2. Ahmed Bou Malouka	1325	43.74	N/A	N/A	
	El Ouardia – Jebel Jelloud	1. Mohamed Amine Ouerghi	1065	34.47	1788	58.97	Elected
		2. Farès Lahmer	763	24.69	1244	41.03	
		3. Naziha Ghizaoui	721	23.33			
		4. Monjia Jendoubi	541	17.51			
	Sidi Hassine	1. Adel Dhief	1650	36.76	2951	58.63	Elected
		2. Adel Jemii	1463	32.59	2082	41.37	
		3. Adem Ben Rejeb	1376	30.65			
Tunis 2	Carthage – La Marsa	1. Maher Ktari	2802	44.1	4299	67.52	Elected
		2. Samir Fourati	1295	20.38	2068	32.48	
		3. Mehdi Toumi	1237	19.47			
		4. Mourad Hedhli	639	10.05			
		5. Moahmed Ali Bouaziz	381	6			
	Cité El Khadhra – El Menzah	1. Thabet El Abed	2956	100	N/A	N/A	Elected
	El Tahrir – Bardo	1. Dhafer Sghiri	1536	22.8	3413	53.87	Elected
		2. Hassen Yaakoub	1445	21.45	2923	46.13	
		3. Zakia Kasraoui	1216	18.05			
		4. Mansour Belhaj	844	12.53			
		5. Fatma Ben Hassine	658	9.77			
		6. Ouajdi Mejri	586	8.7			
		7. Noureddine Abdelkader	453	6.72			
	La Goulette	1. Hichem Hosni	1588	100	N/A	N/A	Elected

IRIE	Legislative constituency/ district	Candidates	# of votes	Percentage	# of votes	Percentage	Elected MPs
Tunis 2	Le Kram	1. Sonia Ben Mabrouk	1266	34	1662	53.13	Elected
		2. Majed Bahri	1242	33.36	1466	46.87	
		3. Belkacem Krouma	1215	32.63			
	El Omrane – El Omrane Supérieur	1. Lotfi Hammami	1481	46.94	2550	55.99	Elected
		2. Hamdi Melliti	1156	36.64	2004	44.01	
		3. Mohamed Sassi	518	16.42			
		4. Seifeddine Fehri	0	0			
Ben Arous	Ben Arous – Medina Jedida	1. Olfa Marouani	1668	30.63	2998	57.68	Elected
		2. Fethi Khemissi	842	15.46	2200	42.32	
		3. Dhouha Arfaoui	772	14.18			
		4. Faouzi Ouerfelli	665	12.21			
		5. Wassim Neffati	599	11			
		6. Hssouna Mansouri	543	9.97			
		7. Mohamed Abdelaziz Manoubi	356	6.54			
		8. Saber Aifi	0	0			
	Boumhel El Bassatine – Ezzahra	1. Kamel Farrah	1895	38.71	2626	57.98	Elected
		2. Outail Aouij	1207	24.66	1903	42.02	
		3. Bouthaina Kasmi	1205	24.62			
		4. Mehdi Lassoued	588	12.01			
	Fouchana	1. Mourad Khezami	2231	55.82	N/A	N/A	Elected
		2. Sawsen Jebali	1766	44.18	N/A	N/A	
	Hamam Lif – Hammam Chott	1. Dhouha Selmi	1195	23.19	2741	55.81	Elected
		2. Mohamed Tahar Mokh	1159	22.49	2170	44.19	
		3. Najet Melaiki	922	17.89			
		4. Lotfi Seghiri	697	13.52			
		5. Omar Bou Jemâa	558	10.83			
		6. Adel Jouini	378	7.33			
		7. Belhassen Chine	245	4.75			
	Rades – Megrine	1. Brahim Bouderbala	3700	55.65	N/A	N/A	Elected
		2. Makrem Sabri	1479	22.24	N/A	N/A	
		3. Riadh Tbarki	1470	22.11	N/A	N/A	
	Mohamedia	1. Fakhri Abdelkhalak	1133	28.55	2012	51.75	Elected
		2. Bilel Hamdi	790	19.91	1876	48.52	
		3. Mohamed Naâmour	599	15.1			
		4. Fethi Safsafi	580	14.62			
		5. Haythem Kediri	478	12.05			
		6. Othmane Ben Haj Omar	388	9.78			
	Mornag	1. Sabri Mares	1679	24.94	2742	41.38	
		2. Aziz Ben Lakhdher	1515	22.5	3885	58.62	Elected
		3. Ezzedine Abbassi	1501	22.3			
		4. Fatma Bouadila	801	11.9			
		5. Taher Drisi	708	10.52			
		6. Meriem Lariani	528	7.84			
	El Mourouj – Bir El Kassâa	1. Maher Boubaker Hadhri	2663	100	N/A	N/A	Elected
	El Mourouj – Farhat Hached	1. Wajdi Ghaoui	934	52.6	N/A	N/A	Elected
		2. Hanen Bibi	842	47.4	N/A	N/A	

IRIE	Legislative constituency/ district	Candidates	# of votes	Percentage	# of votes	Percentage	Elected MPs
Nabeul 1	Dar Chaabane El Fehri – Beni Khia	1. Sami Raies	3792	49.03	5063	70.91	Elected
		2. Habib Gattoussi	1253	16.2	2077	29.09	
		3. Ilhem Ben Amou	993	12.84			
		4. Ahmed Mechmech	857	11.08			
		5. Abdellatif Bâili	839	10.85			
	Kelibia – Hammam Ghezaz	1. Fadhel Ben Torkia	3411	45.17	4190	52.2	Elected
		2. Néjiba Ben Hassine	2216	29.35	3837	47.8	
		3. Bilel Horri	893	11.83			
		4. Walid Trabelsi	708	9.38			
		5. Aymen Larnaout	323	4.27			
	Korba	1. Aissa Raies	1503	21.56	2877	48.3	
		2. Noura Chabrak	1498	21.49	3080	51.7	Elected
		3. Aref Nechi	1418	20.34			
		4. Mohamed Amine Chaabane	1148	16.47			
		5. Mohamed Ghazi Gharbi	694	9.96			
		6. Marouan Dridi	358	5.13			
		7. Mohamed Ramzi Yadâas	250	3.58			
		8. Mohamed Tarek Yadâas	103	1.47			
	Menzel Bouzelfa – El Mida	1. Rim Séghir	1970	37.55	3203	52.45	Elected
		2. Adel Skouri	1242	23.59	2904	47.55	
		3. Ahmed Ben Kaêeb	1238	23.67			
		4. Mohamed Ali Ben Letifa	797	15.19			
	Menzel Temime	1. Hssan Boussema	1085	19.42	3042	60.99	Elected
		2. Abdelhakim Chaabani	1049	18.78	1946	39.01	
		3. Helmi Saoud	959	17.16			
		4. Ramzi Kébir	634	11.35			
		5. Housseem Bounenni	528	9.45			
		6. Hafedh Ayed	447	8			
		7. Firas Jlassi	357	6.39			
		8. Med Ali Hamam	348	6.23			
		9. Sarhane Jendoubi	180	3.22			
	Nabeul	1. Anouer Marzouki	2853	30.15	5924	60.17	Elected
		2. Ahmed Mtibâa	2224	23.5	3922	39.83	
		3. Nabil Khénine	1203	12.71			
		4. Habib Khalil	1018	10.76			
		5. Jameleddine Rommani	627	6.62			
		6. Mohamed Selim Benabda	583	6.16			
		7. Karim Taleb	441	4.65			
		8. Said Knioua	294	3.11			
		9. Malek Saihi	221	2.34			
Nabeul 2	Bou Argoub – Beni Khalled	1. Abdeljelil Hénî	2319	35.11	4101	56.26	Elected
		2. Béchir Aounallah	2024	30.64	3188	43.74	
		3. Noureddine Khiari	1125	17.03			
		4. Chokri Ben Saleh	592	8.96			
		5. Zoubaier Balâazi	545	8.25			

IRIE	Legislative constituency/ district	Candidates	# of votes	Percentage	# of votes	Percentage	Elected MPs
Nabeul 2	Grombalia	1. Mohamed Ali Fennira	1411	22.16	4216	60.8	Elected
		2. Abdelkader Dhib	1327	20.84	2718	39.2	
		3. Omar Ben Nesib	906	14.23			
		4. Nouredine Bargui	824	12.94			
		5. Abdelmajid Saïdi	683	10.73			
		6. Anis Khalfaoui	669	10.51			
		7. Mouafak Marzouki	547	8.59			
	Hammamet	1. Yassine Mami	3121	34.65	4942	57.94	Elected
		2. Anouar Tâalouch	2455	27.26	3587	42.06	
		3. Saber Gabsi	1727	19.18			
		4. Ali Chaouech	1703	18.91			
	Haouaria – Takelsa	1. Mohamed Ben Saïd	1462	23.49	3234	55.07	Elected
		2. Abdelaziz Lasta	1344	21.59	2639	44.93	
		3. Ali Ben Snoussi	1269	20.39			
		4. Jemil Hajri	1266	20.34			
		5. Fethi Zayedi	883	14.19			
	Soliman	1. Abdelkader Ben Zeineb	3250	43.97	4925	67.51	Elected
		2. Sami Meddeb	1208	16.34	32.49	2370	
		3. Haythem Ghaleb	823	11.14			
		4. Aziz Agrebi	680	9.20			
		5. Mohamed Ben Jehmi	667	9.02			
		6. Âahd Dey	468	6.33			
		7. Mohamed Amine Nouira	295	3.99			
Zaghouan	Bir Mchergua – Fahs	1. Housseem Bouguarras	1717	22.84	3536	48.37	
		2. Nacer Channoufi	1488	19.8	3775	51.63	Elected
		3. Mohamed Ramzi Khemis	1483	19.73			
		4. Jalel Ben Tmassek	1351	17.97			
		5. Nizar Hajjaji	713	9.49			
		6. Mounir Jazzar	459	6.11			
		7. Sofien Harrath	306	4.07			
	Nadhour – Saouaf	1. Hasan Ben Ali	2097	29.33	6136	67.13	Elected
		2. Khaled Souid	959	13.41	3005	32.87	
		3. Sami Haj Ibrahim	934	13.06			
		4. Oussama Farjallah	744	10.41			
		5. Omar Dabbousi	681	9.53			
		6. Zied Fraj	596	8.34			
		7. Mohamed Taamalli	596	8.34			
		8. Adel Ben Said	333	4.66			
		9. Borhen Haj Hassine	209	2.92			
	Zaghouan – Zriba	1. Riadh Mallaf	1114	14.77	2601	47.08	
		2. Zina Jeballah	1020	13.52	2924	52.92	Elected
		3. Azzouz Ben Mabrouk	847	11.23			
		4. Nasreddine Ghaleb	789	10.46			
		5. Mourad Hachi	773	10.25			
		6. Hechmi Saidi	723	9.59			
		7. Imed Mensi	718	9.52			
		8. Hassen Miled	547	7.25			
		9. Houda Khélil	538	7.13			
		10. Chédli Hammas	473	6.27			

IRIE	Legislative constituency/ district	Candidates	# of votes	Percentage	# of votes	Percentage	Elected MPs
Beja	Amdoun -Nefza	1. Ridha Dallai	2432	34.7	4921	54.63	Elected
		2. Maher Fraihi	1522	21.72	4087	45.37	
		3. Kamel Hamdi	1466	20.92			
		4. Atef Zammeli	910	12.99			
		5. Mokhtar Dellai	678	9.67			
	Beja Nord	1. Khaoula Mattoussi	1301	25.11	2243	41.04	
		2. Boutheina Ghanmi	944	18.22	3222	58.96	Elected
		3. Samir Bou Ali	856	16.52			
		4. Mohamed Ghozi	524	10.11			
		5. Mourad Achouri	523	10.09			
		6. Imed Hamdi	460	8.88			
		7. Fethia Mhamdi	437	8.43			
		8. Mohamed Zouabi	137	2.64			
	Beja Sud -Thibar - Teboursouk	1. Hatem Kalai	1754	31.2	2679	44.96	
		2. Aouatef Cheniti	1310	23.31	3280	55.04	Elected
		3. Mohamed Montasar Oueslati	908	16.15			
		4. Taher Boukari	469	8.34			
		5. Nizar Kethiri	422	7.51			
		6. Aymen Ghedira	327	5.82			
		7. Nizar Bouani	289	5.14			
		8. Ilyes Rajhi	142	5.53			
	Majaz Al Bab - Goubellat - Testour	1. Sofien Trabelsi	1474	24.61	3361	45.17	
		2. Moez Riahi	925	15.45	4079	54.83	Elected
		3. Foued Mattoussi	899	15.01			
		4. Aida Trabelsi	738	12.32			
		5. Ridha Nefzi	657	10.97			
		6. Ahmed Houimli	641	10.7			
		7. Fethi Riahi	374	6.25			
		8. Chamseddine Trabelsi	281	4.69			
Jendouba	Bou Salem - Balta	1. Slah Ferchichi	3298	41.54	5052	73.13	Elected
		2. Sami Sakouhi	796	10.03	1856	26.87	
		3. Amira Kalboussi	781	9.84			
		4. Hichem Hamdi	704	8.87			
		5. Sleh Hannachi	648	8.16			
		6. Rami Aouadhi	478	6.02			
		7. Sami Bouselmi	426	5.37			
		8. Fethi Baldi	408	5.14			
		9. Soumaia Sakouhi	400	5.04			
	Ghardimaou - Oued Melliz	1. Raouf Fekiri	1949	24.58	5288	60.34	Elected
		2. Abdellatif Marzouki	1305	16.46	3475	39.66	
		3. Sebti Saadouni	730	9.21			
		4. Kamel Kilaïi	719	9.07			
		5. Hatem Hafssouni	667	8.41			
		6. Chedia Hafssouni	639	8.06			
		7. Hassine Adaili	475	6.82			
		8. Raouf Bouzazi	473	5.45			
		9. Omar Sdiri	432	5.96			
		10. Mnaouer Ghraïdi	541	5.99			

IRIE	Legislative constituency/ district	Candidates	# of votes	Percentage	# of votes	Percentage	Elected MPs
Jendouba	Jendouba	1. Hatem Houaoui	2554	37.57	3554	59.34	Elected
		2. Hassen Ayadi	1117	16.43	2435	40.66	
		3. Hayet Chaabi	876	12.89			
		4. Adel Sekhiri	640	9.41			
		5. Salma Marzouki	510	7.5			
		6. Helmi Khazri	488	7.18			
		7. Mohamed Hazem Rahoui	358	5.27			
		8. Ramzi Ouerghi	255	3.75			
	Jendouba Nord – Fernana	1. Mohsen Hermi	3524	51.89	N/A	N/A	Elected
		2. Adel Ayadi	1040	15.31	N/A	N/A	
		3. Ali Hezzi	822	12.1	N/A	N/A	
		4. Adel Gelmami	811	11.94	N/A	N/A	
		5. Mourad Traidia	594	8.75	N/A	N/A	
	Tabarka – Ain Draham	1. Houda Soumri	1604	19.16	3901	48.76	
		2. Mohamed Yahyaoui	1492	17.82	4100	51.24	Elected
		3. Hamed Methenni	1360	16.24			
		4. Hanen Saidi	953	11.38			
		5. Houcine Hasnaoui	846	10.1			
		6. Abdallah Saidi	670	8			
		7. Bechir Askri	474	5.66			
		8. Belgacem Mlaouhi	386	4.61			
		9. Abdelmajid Ben Zarrouk	298	3.56			
		10. Mohsen Mechergui	290	3.46			
Kef	Nebeur -Touiref – Sakiet Sidi Youssef – Tajerouine – Kalaat Senane	1. Imed Eddine Sediri	1345	15.46	4057	54.35	Elected
		2. Ayed Jendoubi	1079	12.4	3408	45.65	
		3. Hedi Karia	818	9.4			
		4. Anis Dhief	796	9.15			
		5. Mohamed Naceur Semida	767	8.81			
		6. Cheima Aouled Gheriba	738	8.48			
		7. Khaled Ouari	703	8.08			
		8. Abdelkader Abdallah	467	5.37			
		9. Mounir Tlili	459	5.27			
		10. Dhakouan Jbebli	452	5.19			
		11. Itimed Hammadi	427	4.91			
		12. Mohamed Selim Hambli	368	4.23			
		13. Maher Rouabhia	283	3.25			

IRIE	Legislative constituency/ district	Candidates	# of votes	Percentage	# of votes	Percentage	Elected MPs
Kef	Kef Ouest – Kef Est	1. Yasser Karrari	1445	17.45	4179	58.81	Elected
		2. Mehdi Ben Doua	1083	13.08	2927	41.19	
		3. Omar Ghidaoui	893	10.79			
		4. Selim Tebessi	811	9.8			
		5. Lotfi Zouita	634	7.66			
		6. Bechir Feridhi	631	7.62			
		7. Youssef Jaffali	533	6.44			
		8. Khaled Boughanmi	427	5.16			
		9. Mariem Laghmani	378	4.57			
		10. Chiheb Jebali	352	4.25			
		11. Nejib Mahjoubi	337	4.06			
		12. Kamel Araar	288	3.48			
		13. Mohamed Iheb Zoghlemi	261	3.15			
		14. Lamia Assidi	206	2.49			
	Kalaa Khasbat – Jerissa – Ksour – Dahmani – Sers	1. Rim Maâchaoui	2108	23.38	4365	52.6	Elected
		2. Taoufik Ouertani	1576	17.48	3934	47.4	
		3. Hatem Boubakri	1257	13.94			
		4. Atef Naïmi	1164	12.91			
		5. Borhen Eddine Zoghlemi	772	8.56			
		6. Aymen Bouzarraâ	646	7.16			
		7. Nebil Slaimi	609	6.75			
		8. Ali Chikhaoui	443	4.91			
		9. Yassine Samâali	439	4.87			
Siliana	Bouarada – Gaafour – El Krib- Sidi Bourouis – El Aroussa	1. Rochdi Rouissi	1888	29.47	4271	55.23	Elected
		2. Sami Guitouni	1554	24.26	3462	44.77	
		3. Hassine Oueslati	949	14.81			
		4. Lassad Mejri	939	14.66			
		5. Ramzi Ferchichi	638	9.96			
		6. Mohamed Tlili	438	6.84			
	Makthar – Rouhia – Kesra	1. Chahid Ourabi	1672	17.56	4459	42.86	Elected
		2. Mohamed Hédi Allani	1382	14.52	5944	57.14	
		3. Jalel Hafidh	1120	11.55			
		4. Abdelkarim Askri	1061	11.15			
		5. Tarek Makhzouni	994	10.44			
		6. Fethi Bounabi	611	6.42			
		7. Fraj Aouina	595	6.25			
		8. Ouarda Lassoued	499	5.24			
		9. Lazher Boughoufa	463	4.86			
		10. Kais Telili	404	4.24			
		11. Abdessatar Badreddine	387	4.07			
		12. Bassem Mrabti	331	3.41			
	Siliana – Bargou	1. Basma Hammami	1949	33.3	3501	54.86	Elected
		2. Ahmed Rjab	1117	19.09	2881	45.14	
		3. Faouzi Hammouda	741	12.66			
		4. Adel Kharroubi	707	12.08			
		5. Ezzedine Kherissi	592	10.12			
		6. Othmen Naoui	384	6.56			
		7. Aymen Youraoui	362	6.19			

IRIE	Legislative constituency/ district	Candidates	# of votes	Percentage	# of votes	Percentage	Elected MPs
Kairouan	Alaa – Hajeb El Ayoun	1. Walid Hajji	2113	20.77	7368	69.16	Elected
		2. Mohamed Ali Sboui	1631	16.04	3285	30.84	
		3. Faouzi Jamâaoui	1145	11.26			
		4. Lazher Nasri	1136	11.17			
		5. Malek Hedhibi	1057	10.39			
		6. Béchir Jedii	734	7.22			
		7. Mnaouer Metiri	698	6.86			
		8. Noureddine Marzouki	660	6.49			
		9. Mohamed Nebil Zeidi	379	3.73			
		10. Khaled Saidi	334	3.28			
		11. Mohamed Moncef Kraoui	284	2.79			
	Bouhajla	1. Mokhtar Aifaoui	2519	31.99	4003	54.49	Elected
		2. Lotfi Ghéribi	1277	16.22	3343	45.51	
		3. Fethi Douzi	1063	13.5			
		4. Thabet Héni	928	11.79			
		5. Monji Bougerra	782	9.93			
		6. Fethi Theiri	626	7.95			
		7. Chaker Cherigui	480	6.1			
		8. Hassen Talbi	199	2.52			
	Chebika – Haffouz	1. Khalil Sakka	3889	40.38	4840	47.6	
		2. Lotfi Saadaoui	2116	21.97	5327	52.4	Elected
		3. Sofien Saoudi	1342	13.93			
		4. Khaled Tiahi	1280	13.29			
		5. Moncef Jabnoui	431	4.48			
		6. Mohsen Abdellaoui	314	3.26			
		7. Fethi Idoudi	259	2.69			
	Kairouan Nord	1. Aymen Nagra	1280	20.66	3509	61.41	Elected
		2. Abdelmajid Mejri	919	14.83	2205	38.59	
		3. Maher Ben Mira	848	13.69			
		4. Heifa Raies	797	12.87			
		5. Habib Jehinaoui	731	11.8			
		6. Chedhli Jhinaoui	482	7.78			
		7. Iskander Balti	401	6.47			
		8. Oualid Dhouibi	379	6.12			
		9. Rim Zargui	358	5.78			
	Kairouan Sud	1. Taieb Talbi	1691	22.84	4199	55.79	Elected
		2. Omar Negazi	1633	22.05	3328	44.21	
		3. Hatem Haddeji	1383	18.68			
		4. Latifa Msahli	841	11.36			
		5. Wafa Rahmani	555	7.49			
		6. Baligh Zairi	534	7.21			
		7. Nefaa Labib	494	6.67			
		8. Moncef Hamzaoui	274	3.7			

IRIE	Legislative constituency/ district	Candidates	# of votes	Percentage	# of votes	Percentage	Elected MPs
Kairouan	Nasrallah – Menzel Mehiri – Echrarda	1. Kamel Karâani	1376	20.74	4455	68.57	Elected
		2. Bouthaina Belhaj	1018	15.34	2042	31.42	
		3. Mokhtar Souidi	895	13.49			
		4. Mokhtar Hamdaoui	852	12.84			
		5. Mohamed Toumi Hjiri	748	11.27			
		6. Mourad Bargaoui	726	10.94			
		7. Hedi Helal	638	9.61			
		8. Achref Jemli	383	5.77			
	Sbikha – Oueslatia – Ain Djeloula	1. Nabil Hamdi	1841	15.96	5973	53.39	Elected
		2. Salem Nasrallah	1440	12.48	5215	46.61	
		3. Jamel Lahmer	1271	11.02			
		4. Taieb Mansi	1043	9.04			
		5. Faouzi Dhouioui	1006	8.72			
		6. Oualid Chihaoui	858	7.44			
		7. Fethi Cherif	824	7.14			
		8. Sadek Abdaoui	727	6.3			
		9. Adel Farhani	623	5.4			
		10. Abdesslem Farhani	615	5.33			
		11. Kamel Azouzi	486	4.21			
		12. Béchir Amine	483	4.19			
		13. Lotfi Raaboub	319	2.77			
Mahdia	Boumerdes – Souassi	1. Imed Aouled Jebiril	2110	19.78	4907	56.72	Elected
		2. Mohsen Karchoud	1648	15.45	3745	43.28	
		3. Taoufik Fraj	1300	12.18			
		4. Jilani Haj Ahmed	1144	10.72			
		5. Zied Bouchniba	1041	9.76			
		6. Saleh Saleh	952	8.92			
		7. Abdelouheb Bousetta	690	6.47			
		8. Khaled Ben Khelifa	654	6.13			
		9. Hédi Kassouma	439	4.13			
		10. Ameer Farhat	394	3.69			
		11. Mokhles Abid	297	2.78			
	Chebba – Melloulech – Sidi Alouane	1. Bilel Ben Mechri	2057	20.84	4760	55.24	Elected
		2. Wahib Chmak	1403	14.21	3857	44.76	
		3. Amira Charfeddine	1095	11.09			
		4. Atef Ben Hassine	1059	10.73			
		5. Ouahib Gharsallah	989	10.02			
		6. Habib Fraj	823	8.34			
		7. Hédi Ayyat	684	6.93			
		8. Bassem Seghir	644	6.52			
		9. Mohamed Ameer	573	5.8			
		10. Wissem Chouâib	545	5.52			
	El Djem	1. Fethi Rejab	1309	25.68	2546	55.31	Elected
		2. Naouel Ben Nsir	930	18.25	2057	44.69	
		3. Nasreddine Kassouma	864	16.95			
		4. Sami Saïd	755	14.81			
		5. Samira Nsir	502	9.85			
		6. Ilyes Rkaia	493	9.67			
		7. Ramzi Jnaieh	244	4.79			

IRIE	Legislative constituency/ district	Candidates	# of votes	Percentage	# of votes	Percentage	Elected MPs
Mahdia	Mahdia	1. Ahmed Bennour	1916	25.56	3294	53.82	Elected
		2. Mohamed Houas	1610	21.48	2862	46.18	
		3. Saber Belhaj	1294	17.26			
		4. Fattouma Ghoul	1199	16			
		5. Sami Alaya	1024	13.66			
		6. Sahbi Jedidi	453	6.04			
	Ouled Chamakh – Hbira – Chorbane	1. Mounir Kammouni	910	11.05	3037	54.64	Elected
		2. Mohsen Ben Abdallah	903	10.96	2521	45.36	
		3. Chokri Ben Ali	869	10.55			
		4. Abdelkarim Zarzoum	783	9.5			
		5. Oualid Ben Abid	682	8.28			
		6. Mohame Kamel Belhassen	579	7.03			
		7. Hassen Wannes	557	6.76			
		8. Raouf Belhaj	446	5.42			
		9. Ouissem Farah	431	5.23			
		10. Habib Chouigi	411	4.99			
		11. Lotfi Ben Ali	394	4.78			
		12. Ali Jaballah	362	4.39			
		13. Mohamed Abdallah	316	3.84			
		14. Mohamed Ellouh	310	3.76			
		15. Rabi Jabbar	285	3.46			
	Rejiche – Ksour Essef – Bradaa	1. Hedi Tarchoun	1606	21.23	2725	35.9	
		2. Mohamed Ben Hassine	1392	18.4	4866	64.1	Elected
		3. Abderrahmane Bouzidi	1047	13.84			
		4. Romdhane Rouis	812	10.74			
		5. Zouhaier Ben Salama	735	9.72			
		6. Fethi Hileli	538	7.11			
		7. Mehdi Othmane	454	6			
		8. Nebil Zkerni	417	5.51			
		9. Sassi Chaabane	294	3.89			
		10. Sonia Sioud	269	3.56			
Monastir	Jammel	1. Mohamed Zied Maher	1818	29.29	3804	67.2	Elected
		2. Abdelkaddous Brahem	1290	20.79	1857	32.8	
		3. Fares Kébir	1204	19.4			
		4. Mustapha Boudega	879	14.16			
		5. Naceur Abed	512	8.25			
		6. Ali Ajmi	503	8.11			
	Ksar Hellal – Ksibet El Mediouni	1. Montassar Ben Amor	1541	20.61	2503	33.88	
		2. Fakhreddine Fadhloun	1490	19.94	4884	66.12	Elected
		3. Baïrem Anis Guilouzi	997	13.34			
		4. Ilyes Saïdane	979	13.1			
		5. Lotfi Chaouch	721	9.65			
		6. Khaled Ben Salem	719	9.62			
		7. Hasan Bouslama	533	7.13			
		8. Youssef Zaoui	494	6.61			

IRIE	Legislative constituency/ district	Candidates	# of votes	Percentage	# of votes	Percentage	Elected MPs
Monastir	Moknine	1. Hichem Mhaouech	1695	20.81	3529	45.3	
		2. Hamdi Ben Abdelaali	1249	15.33	4262	54.7	Elected
		3. Ouissem Gabsi	1147	14.08			
		4. Adel Ghadhab	1087	13.34			
		5. Lotfi Bellazreg	670	8.22			
		6. Taoufik Hamza	670	8.23			
		7. Chokri Ben Hnia	663	8.14			
		8. Majdi Tboulbi	581	7.13			
		9. Oualid Ben Jaouhed	384	4.72			
	Monastir 1	1. Yousri Baoueb	1575	43.71	2204	57.52	Elected
		2. Mohamed Yafet Ben Hamida	1340	37.19	1628	42.48	
		3. Ali Batbout	688	19.1			
	Monastir 2	1. Salah Sayadi	2034	39.05	2706	51	Elected
		2. Oussama Skemma	1579	30.31	2600	49	
		3. Mohamed Nacer Ben Amine	1012	19.43			
		4. Sami Hazgui	584	11.21			
	Sahline – Ouerdanine – Bembla	1. Sami Haj Omar	2475	27.06	4544	51.97	Elected
		2. Ouannes Brahem	1754	19.2	4200	48.03	
		3. Omar Mansour	1403	15.36			
		4. Maroua Bougamra	864	9.46			
		5. Abdessattar Aanes	780	8.54			
		6. Mohamed Khalfallah	627	6.86			
		7. Hamza Séghir	481	5.26			
		8. Ali Mensi	459	5.02			
		9. Fethi Bakkar	293	3.21			
	Teboulba – Bekalta – Sayada- Lamta – Bou Hjar	1. Riadh Bilel	3177	41.14	5330	71.21	Elected
		2. Issam Guerfal	1344	17.4	2155	28.79	
		3. Youssef Chaouch	1235	15.99			
		4. Makrem Hamed	942	12.2			
		5. Raoudha Ben Khahla	567	7.35			
		6. Sami Lahmar	457	5.92			
	Zeramdine – Beni Hassen	1. Omar Ben Amor	1307	16.31	3537	50.2	Elected
		2. Nabil Hadded	1305	16.29	3509	49.8	
		3. Kamel Iffa	1271	15.86			
		4. Raouf Soud	927	11.57			
		5. Monji Dhemid	902	11.26			
		6. Nedhir Sessi	761	9.5			
		7. Aymen Zenati	495	6.18			
		8. Lotfi Ferjani	331	4.13			
		9. Naima Abed	277	3.46			
		10. Sonia Chouikh	253	3.15			
		11. Marouane Ghazzi	184	2.29			

IRIE	Legislative constituency/ district	Candidates	# of votes	Percentage	# of votes	Percentage	Elected MPs
Sousse	Enfidha – Bouficha – Hergla	1. Mohamed Ahmed	3585	26.34	6230	53.74	Elected
		2. Abdallah Mzoughi	1662	12.21	5363	46.26	
		3. Abdelmajid Riahi	1105	8.12			
		4. Chokri Kochbati	1051	7.72			
		5. Foued Ayari	1041	7.65			
		6. Salem Lahyoul	973	7.15			
		7. Moez Ibrahim	842	6.19			
		8. Ibrahim Belkacem	822	6.04			
		9. Nadia Ben Séghir	735	5.4			
		10. Raouf Houcine	635	4.67			
		11. Imen Ben Abdelkader	388	2.85			
		12. Hedi Boubaker	358	2.63			
		13. Hamouda Bousaadia	239	1.76			
		14. Maher Ghfira	172	1.27			
	Hammam Sousse – Akouda	1. Souad Ben Abderrahman	1427	28.69	2407	49.71	
		2. Sofien Ben Halima	1290	25.94	2435	50.29	Elected
		3. Mohamed Hédi Kader	1239	24.92			
		4. Moez Halloul	1017	20.45			
	Kalaa Kebira – Sidi Bou Ali – Kondar	1. Nabil Fradi	2358	27.42	3697	45.28	
		2. Moez Ben Youssef	1494	17.37	4468	54.72	Elected
		3. Ali Ben Mime	1410	16.39			
		4. Mohamed Abdelhamid	757	8.8			
		5. Mohamed Amine Chouri	682	7.93			
		6. Matar Sid	558	6.49			
		7. Jamel Halaoua	541	6.29			
		8. Sofien Lakhel	461	5.36			
		9. Riadh Ben Aoun	340	3.95			
	Msaken	1. Houssein Mahjoub	1742	30.68	2773	61	Elected
		2. Haykel Ben Abdallah	1507	26.54	1773	39	
		3. Ridha Séghir	1275	22.46			
		4. Noura Rezk Allah	626	11.02			
		5. Mohamed Amine Khélifi	528	9.3			
	Sidi El Heni – Kalaa Sghira	1. Mahmoud Amri	1991	54.94	N/A	N/A	Elected
		2. Moez Abid	1633	45.06	N/A	N/A	
	Sousse Jaouhara	1. Hamdi Ben Salah	1468	29.02	2343	51.56	Elected
		2. Mohamed Tahar Oued	1339	26.47	2201	48.44	
		3. Walid Mrad	1141	22.55			
		4. Karim Msaddek	1111	21.96			
	Sousse Ville – Sousse Sidi Abdelhamid	1. Makrem Laguam	2065	34.57	2894	48.89	
		2. Abdelkader Ammar	1004	16.18	3026	51.11	Elected
		3. Ridha Mejri	989	16.56			
		4. Mbarka Ragoubi	848	14.19			
		5. Amir Ben Mekni	545	9.12			
		6. Zahreddine Ben Ali	523	8.75			
	Sousse Riadh	1. Hela Jaballah	1444	35.62	2097	52.82	Elected
		2. Sami Adhari	1099	27.11	1873	47.18	
		3. Lotfi Ezzedini	1005	24.79			
		4. Kamel Kasraoui	506	12.48			
	Zaouiet – Ksibet – Thrayet	1. Youssef Toumi	2543	68.2	N/A	N/A	Elected
		2. Lotfi Romdhane	1186	31.8	N/A	N/A	

IRIE	Legislative constituency/ district	Candidates	# of votes	Percentage	# of votes	Percentage	Elected MPs
Gafsa	Gafsa Nord – Sidi Aich – Ksar – Zenouch	1. Néjib Akermi	1449	21.32	3824	55	Elected
		2. Bouali Rebah	1427	21	2883	45	
		3. Walid Gharsallah	1271	18.7			
		4. Lazher Benâasi	1106	16.28			
		5. Habib Zouari	966	14.22			
		6. Mejdi Mhamdi	576	8.48			
	Gafsa Sud	1. Mohamed Ali	1265	16.11	4339	62.28	Elected
		2. Nacer Kheireddine	1008	15.84	2628	37.72	
		3. Med Nebil Zaich	806	10.26			
		4. Tijani Jahellah	785	10			
		5. Afifa Benni	717	9.13			
		6. Jilani Khedhir	680	8.66			
		7. Hadhemi Tej	645	8.21			
		8. Khaoula Derouich	466	5.93			
		9. Nedja Slimane	442	5.63			
		10. Ridha Jedlaoui	382	4.86			
		11. Abdallah Ghaieb	350	4.46			
		12. Sassi Ben Amor	307	3.91			
	Guetar – Belkhir – Sened	1. Nouredine Hidouri	848	13.25	2567	39.97	
		2. Nouri Jeridi	639	9.99	3856	60.03	Elected
		3. Kheireddine Ben Abdallah	586	9.16			
		4. Hafeth Khelifi	526	8.22			
		5. Abdelkader Laâter	523	8.17			
		6. Msaddak Ouannes	501	7.83			
		7. Wael Manoubi	479	7.49			
		8. Abdelouaheb Chibeni	461	7.2			
		9. Salem Sanadi	450	7.03			
		10. Naceur Gamoudi	430	6.72			
		11. Hamza Sanadi	353	5.52			
		12. Ferida Gorbeya	337	5.27			
		13. Ali Khelifa	266	4.16			
	Oum Larais – Sidi Boubaker – Redeyef – Metlaoui – Mdhila	1. Tarak Brahmi	2383	16.37	5861	43.52	
		2. Mohamed Mejdi	1993	13.69	7605	56.48	Elected
		3. Sihem Mhamdi	1715	11.78			
		4. Zakia Latrech	1694	11.63			
		5. Ali Sallami	1104	7.58			
		6. Bou Ali Bou Aouni	896	6.15			
		7. Nouredine Hénî	867	5.95			
		8. Mehrez Mabrouki	843	5.79			
		9. Houcine Barhoumi	760	5.22			
		10. Emna Mansouri	527	3.62			
		11. Ouassim Kasmi	480	3.3			
		12. Abderrahmane Khelifi	351	2.41			
		13. Said Bouslahi	313	2.15			
		14. Monji Amidia	301	2.07			
		15. Fayçal Cheriti	256	1.76			
		16. Walid Azeza	77	0.53			

IRIE	Legislative constituency/ district	Candidates	# of votes	Percentage	# of votes	Percentage	Elected MPs
Kasserine	Kasserine Nord – Ezzouhour	1. Hatem Labbaoui	1600	11.99	5068	50.53	Elected
		2. Makrem Dekhili	1493	11.19	49.62	49.47	
		3. Omar Nasri	1012	7.59			
		4. Boudali Assili	1001	7.5			
		5. Farouk Nasrelli	926	6.94			
		6. Mnaouer Ksoumi	845	6.33			
		7. Tarek Retibi	737	5.52			
		8. Nasr Ghodhbani	720	5.4			
		9. Chaouki Janhaoui	653	4.89			
		10. Tarek Haddaoui	441	3.31			
		11. Tijani Kahri	430	3.22			
		12. Walid Belkasm	428	3.21			
		13. Hassen Rhimi	385	2.89			
		14. Walid Khadhraoui	381	2.86			
		15. Fayçal Hermassi	377	2.83			
		16. Mahmoud Kahri	367	2.75			
		17. Saber Bertouli	316	2.37			
		18. Adnen Nasri	308	2.31			
		19. Heikel Rouafi	291	2.18			
		20. Bouraoui Saïdaoui	281	2.11			
		21. Omar Bertouli	248	1.86			
		22. Ridha Chekhari	101	0.75			
	Kasserine Sud – Hassi El Ferid	1. Mohamed Lanouer Hagui	1975	33.89	3439	48.35	
		2. Abdelaziz Chaabani	1252	21.49	3673	51.65	Elected
		3. Marouen Dhibi	1006	17.26			
		4. Malek Hajji	564	9.68			
		5. Abdelkader Chaabani	558	9.58			
		6. Mondher Hajji	472	8.1			
	Magel Bel Abbes – Feriana	1. Mohamed Chaabani	2608	28.2	5928	51.02	Elected
		2. Tarek Mbarki	2119	22.91	5690	48.98	
		3. Mohamed Séghir Mbarki	1577	17.05			
		4. Ali Chaabani	880	9.52			
		5. Ahmed Ridha Tlili	649	7.02			
		6. Rached Borji	637	6.86			
		7. Mohamed Hatem Hassine	406	4.39			
		8. Abdellatif Tlili	372	4.02			

IRIE	Legislative constituency/ district	Candidates	# of votes	Percentage	# of votes	Percentage	Elected MPs
Kasserine	Sbiba – Jedeliane – Ayoun	1. Mohamed Amine Mbraki	2252	19.8	8280	59.49	Elected
		2. Mohamed Kamel Khalfi	1896	16.67	5639	40.51	
		3. Mohamed Bellili	1598	14.05			
		4. Abdennibi Toumi	1138	10.01			
		5. Ali Hannachi	1000	8.79			
		6. Farouk Khachnaoui	719	6.32			
		7. Abdessamad Kertli	687	6.04			
		8. Chedhli Hanzouli	611	5.37			
		9. Hassen Marakchi	491	4.32			
		10. Mesbeh Kasmi	462	4.06			
		11. Tarek Boughdiri	288	2.53			
		12. Lazhar Ghazleni	231	2.04			
	Sbeitla	1. Hamadi Ghilani	2669	24.21	5616	55.89	Elected
		2. Jamel Harhour	1740	15.78	4433	44.11	
		3. Abdejlil Khachnaoui	1653	14.99			
		4. Mahmoud Abbas Amri	1433	12			
		5. Abdelkader Remili	743	6.74			
		6. Asia Abbasi	511	4.63			
		7. Walid Mahfoudhi	470	4.26			
		8. Aroussi Missaoui	417	3.78			
		9. Abdelbaset Hlali	341	3.09			
		10. Abderrazek Hrzi	285	2.59			
		11. Feyçel Ifaoui	255	2.31			
		12. Chaabane Hlali	195	1.77			
		13. Néjib Hrzi	190	1.72			
		14. Wael Mahmoudi	123	1.12			
	Thala – Hidra – Foussana	1. Ammar Idoudi	2647	21.96	6680	61.47	Elected
		2. Chokri Omri	1554	12.9	4187	38.53	
		3. Abdeddayem Khemiri	1512	12.55			
		4. Néjia Khélifi	1158	9.61			
		5. Mohamed Bethiefi	917	7.61			
		6. Mohamed Arbi Hajji	849	7.04			
		7. Mohamed Saleh Assidi	772	6.41			
		8. Rbii Barkaoui	747	6.2			
		9. Mohamed Hédi Amri	650	5.39			
		10. Eya Hichri	622	5.16			
		11. Begacem Mansouri	329	2.73			
		12. Rania Zarai	294	2.44			
Sfax 1	Bir Ali Ben Khelifa	1. Manel Bdida	1204	19.18	2722	61.1	Elected
		2. Abdelmajid Aouled Ali	768	12.24	1733	38.9	
		3. Ali Ben Chemakh	628	10			
		4. Hafedh Ben Ammar	610	9.72			
		5. Cherif Bouhali	526	8.38			
		6. Abdessalem Ben Amara	495	7.89			
		7. Houcine Raouak	483	7.69			
		8. Hédi Sabri	438	6.98			
		9. Monji Ben Masaoud	424	6.75			
		10. Kamel Ben Amara	380	6.05			
		11. Abderrahime Chebali	321	5.11			

IRIE	Legislative constituency/ district	Candidates	# of votes	Percentage	# of votes	Percentage	Elected MPs
Sfax 1	Hench	1. Issam Chouchen	1337	20.73	2800	53.74	Elected
		2. Hédi Azaoui	1019	15.8	2410	46.26	
		3. Hatem Hamdi	762	11.81			
		4. Abdelmajid Ben Brahim	738	11.44			
		5. Hassen Hanchi	622	9.64			
		6. Ajmi Khadim Allah	581	9.01			
		7. Ali Ben Abdallah	548	8.5			
		8. Mohamed Ajili	463	7.18			
		9. Salem Assili	380	5.89			
	Jebina - El Amra	1. Abdelhafeth Ouhichi	1708	26.49	3047	56.24	Elected
		2. Kamel Adouani	982	15.23	2371	43.76	
		3. Yahia Rhaïem	822	12.75			
		4. Youssef Bouafia	609	9.44			
		5. Chokri Mahjoubi	508	7.88			
		6. Mansour Essid	485	7.52			
		7. Yahia Adouani	413	6.41			
		8. Naceur Ghali	362	5.61			
		9. Adel Guirat	306	4.75			
		10. Ridha Ben Hsouna	253	3.92			
	Kerkennah	1. Mahmoud Chalhaf	763	23.4	1625	55.54	Elected
		2. Adel Larguech	617	18.93	1301	44.46	
		3. Moncef Fekir	435	13.34			
		4. Rached Chôour	418	12.82			
		5. Hafedh Khelif	373	11.44			
		6. Mohamed Ezzedine	357	10.95			
		7. Morsi Feki	297	9.11			
	Menzel Chaker	1. Mohamed Euchi	1773	26.99	2842	46.89	
		2. Hassen Jarboui	1290	19.64	3219	53.11	Elected
		3. Abdellatif Chaieb	1137	17.31			
		4. Nejeh Tayari	576	8.77			
		5. Wahid Dahmani	502	7.64			
		6. Heikel Mhadhbi	399	6.07			
		7. Ayoub Ben Saad	323	4.92			
		8. Mohamed Meddeb	307	4.67			
		9. Mounir Jarboui	262	3.99			
	Sakiet Eddaier	1. Tarak Mehdi	2259	34.73	3321	51.63	Elected
		2. Naouar Charfi	1425	21.91	3111	48.37	
		3. Mohamed Daoud	1073	16.5			
		4. Feiza Belhaj	1065	16.37			
		5. Mohamed Ali Jeridi	682	10.49			
	Sakiet Ezzit	1. Malik Kammoun	2055	23.41	4335	57.55	Elected
		2. Mohamed Kammoun	1615	18.4	3197	42.45	
		3. Sajiâa Jellouli	956	10.89			
		4. Chiraz Chouikh	936	10.66			
		5. Sami Jaouadi	838	9.55			
		6. Younes Oualha	738	8.41			
		7. Mohamed Yenzi	614	7			
		8. Mohamed Frikha	543	6.19			
		9. Najla Feki	482	5.49			

IRIE	Legislative constituency/ district	Candidates	# of votes	Percentage	# of votes	Percentage	Elected MPs
Sfax 2	Agareb	1. Chokri Ben Bahri	1772	42.29	2537	68.94	Elected
		2. Kamel Bakkeri	821	19.59	1143	31.06	
		3. Riadh Ben Karim	720	17.18			
		4. Nebil Akecha	461	11.01			
		5. Rafik Ben Drah	416	9.93			
	Sfax Ouest	1. Saber Masmoudi	2494	30.85	4250	59.75	Elected
		2. Sarhane Nasri	1241	15.35	2863	40.25	
		3. Aymen Belfeki	896	11.08			
		4. Ahmed Jabal	872	10.79			
		5. Samir Cherif	795	9.83			
		6. Mokhles Belaalia	783	9.69			
		7. Nejeh Bousnina	629	7.78			
		8. Adel Zargani	374	4.63			
	Sfax Sud	1. Fatma Mseddi	3446	39.2	5668	68.47	Elected
		2. Youssef Aoui	1090	12.4	2610	31.53	
		3. Hacib Fakhfekh	929	10.57			
		4. Mohamed Ramzi Ben Youssef	873	9.93			
		5. Sami Kammoun	860	9.78			
		6. Mohamed Abdelmalak	667	7.59			
		7. Sami Jerbi	583	6.64			
		8. Mehdi Gargouri	342	3.89			
	Sfax Ville	1. Moez Barkallah	2135	26.61	4208	53.45	Elected
		2. Abdennacer Najeh	1627	20.28	3665	46.55	
		3. Meriem Cherif	1355	16.88			
		4. Walid Krichane	1297	16.16			
		5. Oumaima Sabbahi	828	10.32			
		6. Jaouher Ben Younes	410	5.11			
		7. Mourad Madhi	372	4.64			
	Skhira – El Ghraiba – Mahres	1. Ibrahim Hassine	2757	27.11	4915	50.26	Elected
		2. Sélim Mechi	1885	18.53	4865	49.74	
		3. Salem Belkacem	1397	13.73			
		4. Chamseddine Salama	809	7.95			
		5. Anouar Ben Mahmoud	684	6.72			
		6. Habib Omran	532	5.23			
		7. Ali Chaouachi	524	5.15			
		8. Bougerra Ghenaya	518	5.09			
		9. Samir Adalet	390	3.84			
		10. Zied Menaii	350	3.44			
		11. Mounir Akrouit	326	3.21			
	Thyna	1. Aymen Marâaoui	860	20.41	2206	52.66	Elected
		2. Ghada Ben Debabis	842	19.99	1983	47.34	
		3. Aymen Amri	743	17.64			
		4. Salah Amri	571	13.55			
		5. Chahin Khelifi	440	10.44			
		6. Nidhal Ben Massaoud	417	9.9			
		7. Haythem Gheribi	340	8.07			

IRIE	Legislative constituency/ district	Candidates	# of votes	Percentage	# of votes	Percentage	Elected MPs
Sidi Bouzid	Bir El Hfay – Sidi Ali Ben Aoun	1. Jalel Khedmi	1680	17.95	4976	53.45	Elected
		2. Mejdî Jebli	1200	12.82	4333	46.55	
		3. Marouan Arfaoui	1159	12.38			
		4. Maammer Yousfi	965	10.31			
		5. Tarek Neili	857	9.16			
		6. Mondher Ebdelli	824	8.8			
		7. Yassine Jeddi	726	7.76			
		8. Majed Akrimi	602	6.43			
		9. Heyhem Karoui	532	5.69			
		10. Najet Aroussi	502	5.37			
		11. Riadh Jebli	312	3.33			
	Jelma – Sabalat Ouled Asker	1. Salah Selmi	1150	13.92	4829	67.66	Elected
		2. Abdelmoula Boubaker	1116	13.51	2308	32.34	
		3. Taoufik Amri	1073	12.99			
		4. Hatem Derbali	991	12			
		5. El Béhi Derbali	851	10.3			
		6. Bilel Mraïdi	663	8.03			
		7. Seifeddine Dhaoui	570	6.9			
		8. Ridha Zelâiti	388	4.7			
		9. Ahmed Harrathi	373	4.52			
		10. Faouzi Seghiri	328	3.98			
		11. Yousra Aouni	325	3.94			
		12. Faouzi Ghoulani	244	2.95			
		13. Ali Khachnaoui	187	2.26			
	Menzel Bouzaïene – Meknassi – Mazzouna	1. Badreddine Gammoudi	3112	24.77	7138	51.36	Elected
		2. Ali Fahem	3001	23.89	6759	48.64	
		3. Fethi Zouidi	2165	17.24			
		4. Monji Smari	861	6.85			
		5. Lotfi Abbasi	769	6.12			
		6. Khadija Saad	582	4.63			
		7. Chokri Kasmi	509	4.05			
		8. Faouzi Gammoudi	469	3.74			
		9. Ahmed Hamdi	405	3.22			
		10. Nebil Ben Amor	365	2.91			
		11. Sourour Mahfoudhi	324	2.58			
	Regueb – Saida – Ouled Haffouz	1. Khaled Mabrouki	2681	24.46	6104	53.42	Elected
		2. Arbi Kadri	1919	17.51	5323	46.58	
		3. Mokhtar Jellali	1244	11.35			
		4. Khelifa Harrabi	1104	10.07			
		5. Sarhane Khelifi	902	8.23			
		6. Mohamed Abidi	825	7.53			
		7. Aouatef Khelifi	815	7.44			
		8. Béchir Abdellaoui	620	5.66			
		9. Fayçal Omri	378	3.45			
		10. Yassmina Amri	250	2.27			
		11. Akrem Hénî	222	2.03			

IRIE	Legislative constituency/ district	Candidates	# of votes	Percentage	# of votes	Percentage	Elected MPs
Sidi Bouzid	Sidi Bouzid Est – Souk Jedid	1. Abdessatar Zerai	2925	37.92	5111	60.59	Elected
		2. Touhami Abdouli	1199	15.54	3324	39.41	
		3. Taoufik Amari	1082	14.03			
		4. Tahar Zaidi	685	8.88			
		5. Samia Hajlaoui	682	8.84			
		6. Mohamed Amine Bouzidi	640	8.3			
		7. Bassem Hlel	501	6.49			
	Sidi Bouzid Ouest – Hichria	1. Chafik Zaafour	951	9.34	4969	60.98	Elected
		2. Khelifa Touil	801	7.87	3180	39.02	
		3. Habib Dhahri	783	7.69			
		4. Mohamed Ali Bargougi	781	9.34			
		5. Aroua Hamdouni	718	7.05			
		6. Zouhair Kadri	692	6.8			
		7. Med Séghir Jellali	648	6.36			
		8. Youssed Jellali	622	6.11			
		9. Amel Gammoudi	610	5.99			
		10. Walid Heni	525	5.16			
		11. Sofien Séghir	487	4.78			
		12. Aymen Salhi	422	4.14			
		13. Kais Bouazizi	401	3.94			
		14. Raja Brahmi	393	3.86			
		15. Mohamed Hedi Bargougi	370	3.63			
		16. Hssouna Bouazizi	368	3.61			
		17. Abdelkarim Bakkari	314	3.08			
		18. Raja Kaddoussi	297	2.92			
Tozeur	Degueche – Hammat Al Jarid- Tamaghza	1. Nabih Thabet	1477	23.37	2941	57.04	Elected
		2. Mohamed Aouali	1270	20.09	2215	42.96	
		3. Atef Allouchi	1066	16.86			
		4. Mohamed Oualid Darghouthi	628	9.94			
		5. Ahmed Ben Mohamed	590	9.33			
		6. Belkacem Harakati	508	8.04			
		7. Olfa Mbarki	433	6.85			
		8. Kamel Trad	349	5.52			
	Nefta – Hazoua	1. Nizar Seddik	568	30.57	1121	60.37	Elected
		2. Lassaad Selihi	446	24	736	39.63	
		3. Mohsen Lamouchi	421	22.66			
		4. Rabiaa Brira	312	16.79			
		5. Taieb Issaoui	111	5.97			
	Tozeur	1. Ramzi Chetoui	1311	21.8	2984	51.04	Elected
		2. Zaied Triki	1218	20.25	2862	48.96	
		3. Mohamed Jabbar	840	13.97			
		4. Sofien Abbes	824	13.7			
		5. Noura Bouêga	811	13.48			
		6. Adel Zebidi	578	9.61			
		7. Mohamed Néjib Grari	433	7.2			

IRIE	Legislative constituency/ district	Candidates	# of votes	Percentage	# of votes	Percentage	Elected MPs
Gabes	Gabes Ville – Gabes Ouest	1. Badran Khedhri	740	14.68	2168	49.83	
		2. Issam Bahri Jebri	1211	24.03	2183	50.17	Elected
		3. Kamel Habib	735	14.58			
		4. Riadh Heider	650	12.9			
		5. Fedhel Trabelsi	617	12.24			
		6. Mehrez Benalia	616	12.22			
		7. Neji Jeridi	471	9.35			
	Gabes Sud	1. Thameur Mezhoud	1077	21.67	2106	52.74	Elected
		2. Houcine Yaakoub	789	15.87	1887	47.26	
		3. Ouadie Dedi	708	14.24			
		4. Moataz Hassine	676	13.6			
		5. Mohamed Amine Nokh	622	12.51			
		6. Ridha Mbarki	598	12.03			
		7. Seifallah Mgrhi	501	10.08			
	Ghannouch – Metouia – Oudhref – Menzel Habib	1. Nour El Houda Sbaiti	956	15.36	2986	60.09	Elected
		2. Maher Sghaier	975	15.67	1983	39.91	
		3. Mohamed Zâatra	499	8.02			
		4. Salem Ajmi	508	8.16			
		5. Ridha Maaloul	668	10.73			
		6. Med Khiri Hajjej	407	6.54			
		7. Sessi Alaia	822	13.21			
		8. Amel Amari	421	6.77			
		9. Abderrazek Hedoui	542	8.71			
		10. Mourad Hafidh	425	6.83			
	Hamma – Hamma Ouest	1. Ahmed Sahli	1070	16.12	2643	47.05	
		2. Faouzi Daâs	1021	15.38	2975	52.95	Elected
		3. Othmen Ebdelli	780	11.75			
		4. Oualid Miled	765	11.52			
		5. Oualid Msaadi	676	10.18			
		6. Touhami Rafii	623	9.38			
		7. Lanouer Retimi	513	7.72			
		8. Oualid Thebti	572	8.61			
		9. Ahmed Mekki	271	4.08			
		10. Ali Chelbi	200	3.01			
		11. Oussama Charfeddine	146	2.19			
	Mareth – Dekhilet Toujane – Matmata – Matmata Nouvelle	1. Abdessalem Dahmani	2126	31.72	3926	53.74	Elected
		2. Lazhar Lassoued	1278	19.07	3379	46.26	
		3. Maher Fekiri	1085	16.19			
		4. Mokhtar Dedi	1008	15.04			
		5. Ali Ajela	648	9.67			
		6. Massoud Ben Ahmed	557	8.31			
Kebili	Douz	1. Boubaker Ben Yahia	1293	37.85	1755	57.13	Elected
		2. Abdallah Ben Salem	874	25.59	1317	42.87	
		3. Mohamed Bennacer	626	18.33			
		4. Mohamed Fethi Dabbek	623	18.24			
	Faouar – Rjim Maatoug	1. Mohamed Ben Hamid	1154	35.66	1950	45.18	
		2. Elyes Boukoucha	946	29.23	2366	54.82	Elected
		3. Abderrazek Touil	710	21.94			
		4. Housseem Ben Khelifa	426	13.16			

IRIE	Legislative constituency/ district	Candidates	# of votes	Percentage	# of votes	Percentage	Elected MPs
Kebili	Kebili – Souk El Ahed	1. Taher Ben Mansour	2647	37.67	4524	61.97	Elected
		2. Hakim Hassine	1898	27.01	2776	38.03	
		3. Najla Ben Miloud	1061	15.1			
		4. Mohamed Ammar	605	8.61			
		5. Fayçal Maâli	560	7.97			
		6. Hanen Hajri	255	3.63			
Medenine	Ben Gardane	1. Ali Zaghdoud	1625	26.18	3133	56.38	Elected
		2. Ahmed Ben Meftah	1011	16.29	2424	43.62	
		3. Jihed Néji	789	12.7			
		4. Abdessalem Regad	702	11.31			
		5. Mohamed Nabigh	669	10.77			
		6. Aymen Douzi	602	9.7			
		7. Houssine Abdelkbir	420	6.77			
		8. Mabrouk Zakrouba	390	6.28			
	Beni Khedache	1. Abdessalem Hamrouni	1332	100	N/A	N/A	Elected
	Djerba Houmt Souk	1. Ghassen Yamoun	2756	51.2	N/A	N/A	Elected
		2. Mohamed Trabelsi	1235	22.94	N/A	N/A	
		3. Ali Ben Hassen	788	14.64	N/A	N/A	
		4. Elyes Gatersi	604	11.22	N/A	N/A	
	Djerba Midoun – Djerba Ajim	1. Mohamed Bouchaahma	1812	44.46	1863	49.29	
		2. Badis Belhaj Ali	1420	34.84	1917	50.71	Elected
		3. Mourad Ben Abdallah	844	20.7			
	Medenine Nord	1. Sawsen Mabrouk	1135	31.81	1792	52.23	Elected
		2. Tarak Ali	777	21.78	1639	47.77	
		3. Nejib Selmi	721	20.21			
		4. Magtouf Sakli	563	15.78			
		5. Jamel Ben Abdallah	372	10.43			
	Medenine Sud – Sidi Makhlouf	1. Mohamed Dhaou	1048	16.65	2793	55.49	Elected
		2. Nacer Reguad	1013	16.09	2240	44.51	
		3. Jamel Jouili	903	14.34			
		4. Taher Hazel	821	13.04			
		5. Fethi Gharsallah	749	11.89			
		6. Mabrouk Jarou	741	11.77			
		7. Abderrazek Bâaka	686	10.9			
		8. Chokri Hamed	247	3.92			
		9. Hamza Chemakh	88	1.4			
	Zarzis	1. Ahmed Chafter	1429	36.21	2223	49.74	
		2. Messaoud Grira	1408	35.67	2246	50.26	Elected
		3. Samir Abichou	1110	28.12			

IRIE	Legislative constituency/ district	Candidates	# of votes	Percentage	# of votes	Percentage	Elected MPs
Tataouine	Dhiba – Remada	1. Béchir Bouchnak	847	46.13	997	47.52	
		2. Mokhtar Abdelmoula	537	29.25	1101	52.48	Elected
		3. Mohamed Lahzin	452	24.62			
	Tataouine Nord – Beni Mehira – Smar	1. Moncef Maaloul	1010	22.02	2050	54.39	Elected
		2. Abdallah Ouerghmi	746	16.26	1719	45.61	
		3. Belkacem Nefis	700	15.26			
		4. Fetah Charyout	655	14.28			
		5. Adel Aouini	601	13.1			
		6. Lotfi Aouini	536	11.69			
		7. Nejib Charbout	339	7.39			
	Tataouine Sud – Bir Lahmar – Ghomrassen	1. Mustapha Boubakri	744	27.03	1280	58.47	Elected
		2. Khadija Ben Amara	540	19.61	909	41.53	
		3. Boubakker Ben Aoun	533	19.36			
		4. Saleh Dhib	528	19.18			
		5. Jamel Jdiâa	408	14.82			
Italy	Italie	1. Sami Ben Abdelâali	644	100	N/A	N/A	Elected
France 2	France 2	1. Omar Barhoumi	521	100	N/A	N/A	Elected
France 3	France 3	1. Riadh Jaidane	665	100	N/A	N/A	Elected

Annex J

Links to Citizen Observer Election Statements and Reports

Mourakiboun *(Available only in Arabic)*

Referendum

Preliminary statement No. 1: <https://bit.ly/3K4iLOU>

Preliminary statement No. 2: <https://bit.ly/3Gj88XA>

Post-referendum statement: <https://bit.ly/3KduniB>

Parliamentary elections

First round preliminary statement: <https://bit.ly/3UdMzNu>

First round post-election statement: <https://bit.ly/3MkAvZ4>

Runoff post-election statement: <https://bit.ly/3o8rp7L>

Tunisian Association for the Integrity and Democracy of Elections *(known by its French acronym, ATIDE)*

Referendum *(Available only in Arabic)*

Preliminary statement No. 1: <https://bit.ly/40XGl6A>

Preliminary statement No. 2: <https://bit.ly/435WFnR>

Preliminary statement No. 3: <https://bit.ly/43akkmY>

Preliminary statement No. 4: <https://bit.ly/43bhxKz>

Post-referendum statement: <https://bit.ly/3KK6PUd>

Parliamentary elections *(Arabic)*

First round preliminary statement No. 1: <https://bit.ly/3Mjt04x>

First round preliminary statement No. 2: <https://bit.ly/438HnyD>

First round preliminary statement No. 3: <https://bit.ly/3Udj2DD>

First round preliminary statement No. 4: <https://bit.ly/3KB4zhM>

Runoff preliminary statement No. 1: <https://bit.ly/3mbLtFu>

Runoff preliminary statement No. 2: <https://bit.ly/3ZYCF3X>

Runoff preliminary statement No. 3: <https://bit.ly/3ZJlAta>

(French)

First round preliminary statement No. 1: <https://bit.ly/3mh08zf>

First round preliminary statement No. 2: <https://bit.ly/3Mn6gAG>

First round preliminary statement No. 3: <https://bit.ly/435oflc>

First round preliminary statement No. 4: <https://bit.ly/3KfYDcu>

Runoff preliminary statement No. 1: <https://bit.ly/3GIF01Q>

Runoff preliminary statement No. 2: <https://bit.ly/407bhR0>

Runoff preliminary statement No. 3: <https://bit.ly/403cUPN>

CHAHED Observatory Referendum *(Available only in Arabic)*

Preliminary statement No. 1: <https://bit.ly/3KxQjFl>

Preliminary statement No. 2: <https://bit.ly/3KWCVpq>

Preliminary statement No. 3: <https://bit.ly/3MGG5VQ>

Preliminary report: <https://bit.ly/41oAqrv> Parliamentary elections

First round preliminary statement No. 1: <https://bit.ly/404K0Pl>

First round preliminary statement No. 2: <https://bit.ly/3Ux7zPy>

First round preliminary statement No. 3: <https://bit.ly/43H2gS3>

First round preliminary statement No. 4: <https://bit.ly/3zS7KeO>

First round preliminary report: <https://bit.ly/3GDx6kt>

Runoff preliminary statement No. 1: <https://bit.ly/3MEgNaM>

Runoff preliminary statement No. 2: <https://bit.ly/41qVyO6>

Runoff preliminary statement No. 3: <https://bit.ly/3zS2SX4>

Mediterranean Tunisian Center (TU-Med) *(Available only in Arabic)*

Referendum

Preliminary statement No. 1: <https://bit.ly/3MBCSGX>

Preliminary statement No. 2: <https://bit.ly/3zRHx02>

Parliamentary elections

First round preliminary statement No. 1: <https://bit.ly/3zS3Um3>

First round preliminary statement No. 2: <https://bit.ly/3L657wB>

Runoff preliminary statement: <https://bit.ly/43lZt0a>

Youth Without Borders *(known by its French acronym, JSF)*

Referendum *(Arabic)*

Preliminary statement No. 1: <https://bit.ly/43o60Yp>

Preliminary statement No. 2: <https://bit.ly/3myurBS>

(English)

Preliminary statement No. 1: <https://bit.ly/3GB3Bjh>

Preliminary statement No. 2: <https://bit.ly/3GDwNpC>

Parliamentary elections *(Available only in Arabic)*

First round preliminary statement No. 1: <https://bit.ly/3mytQ36>

First round preliminary statement No. 2: <https://bit.ly/4167bdd>

First round preliminary statement No. 3: <https://bit.ly/415CtRG>

Runoff preliminary statement No. 1: <https://bit.ly/3UzzU7Z>

Runoff preliminary statement No.2: <https://bit.ly/3mqdBFh>

Runoff preliminary report: <https://bit.ly/3MXiPmP>

Ofiya Coalition

Referendum *(Available only in Arabic)*

Preliminary statement No. 1: <https://bit.ly/41tziDf>

Preliminary statement No. 2: <https://bit.ly/3oazl2X>

Preliminary statement No. 3: <https://bit.ly/3moDt4p>

Parliamentary elections

First round statement: <https://bit.ly/40kSFgR>

Runoff preliminary statement No. 1: <https://bit.ly/40Wg4WR>

Runoff preliminary statement No. 2: <https://bit.ly/41huqkA>

Tunisian Organization for the Defense of Rights of People with Disabilities *(known by its French acronym, OTDDPH) (Available only in Arabic)*

Referendum

Preliminary statement No. 1: <https://bit.ly/3oeVMJu>

Preliminary statement No. 2: <https://bit.ly/3mrcllg>

Parliamentary elections

First round preliminary statement No. 1: <https://bit.ly/3mwdhok>

First round preliminary statement No. 2: <https://bit.ly/3UzZnOL>

Runoff preliminary statement No. 1: <https://bit.ly/3Uz4Y7F>

Runoff preliminary statement No. 2: <https://bit.ly/3mtApUn>

Runoff preliminary report: <https://bit.ly/41rbArg>

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The Carter Center was founded in 1982 by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and his wife, Rosalynn, in partnership with Emory University, to advance peace and health worldwide. A not-for-profit, nongovernmental organization, the Center has helped to improve life for people in more than 80

countries by resolving conflicts; advancing democracy, human rights, and economic opportunity; preventing diseases; and improving mental health care. Please visit www.cartercenter.org to learn more about The Carter Center.



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