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CONTACT: In Atlanta, Deborah Hakes 1 404-420-5124; In Nairobi, Stéphane Mondon +254 738 245 781

The Carter Center Finds Kenya Election Results Reflect Will of Voters

The Carter Center finds that in spite of serious shortcomings in the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission’s (IEBC) management of technology and tabulation of final election results, the paper-based procedure for counting and tallying presented enough guarantees to preserve the expression of the will of Kenyan voters.

The Center congratulates Uhuru Kenyatta on his election as the next president of Kenya, and praises outgoing Prime Minister Raila Odinga for taking his concerns with the conduct of the election to the Supreme Court and accepting their ruling, which upheld the final results announced by the IEBC on March 9. The presidential election petition proceedings conducted by the Supreme Court were held in a very professional and rigorous manner.

The Carter Center finds that several key areas related to the tabulation of results did not receive sufficient attention. The initial release of inaccurate figures transmitted by electronic means challenged citizen confidence in the IEBC. A lack of transparency in the national tally marred the final stages of the process. Party agents and observers were unable to observe these proceedings adequately, and the Center hopes that future tabulation processes will be organized in manner that allows for appropriate observer access.

While the IEBC met its constitutional obligation to publish final results within seven days of the March 4 election, the Center regrets the IEBC’s continued unwillingness to publish results by polling station, thereby missing an additional opportunity for the public to confirm that their choice was accurately recorded and reported.

“These realities point to the need for continued citizen vigilance and government acceptance that a vibrant civil society is key for Kenya’s democratic development,” said Carter Center Vice President for Peace Programs Dr. John Stremlau.

The 2013 elections presented the Kenyan people with their first opportunity to exercise their rights under the new constitution and to elect representatives to new bodies at the national and newly-created county level. This experiment in democracy and devolution of authority is a work in progress, and the Center hopes that all Kenyans will work together to strengthen democratic institutions.
A final comprehensive report of the Center’s overall assessment of the elections will be published in coming months.

The Carter Center has observed 94 elections in 37 countries, including the 2002 elections in Kenya. The Carter Center’s 60-member delegation was in Kenya at the invitation of the IEBC. The Center conducts election observation in accordance with the Declaration of Principles of International Election Observation and Code of Conduct for International Election Observation adopted at the United Nations in 2005. The Center assesses electoral processes based on states’ obligations for democratic elections contained in their regional and international commitments and in their domestic legal framework.

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Introduction

On March 9, Ahmed Issack Hassan, chairperson of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), announced the results of the presidential election, declaring Uhuru Kenyatta of The National Alliance (TNA) elected with 50.07 percent of the valid votes, ahead of his main challenger, Raila Odinga of Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), who garnered 43.3 percent of valid ballots cast. The tabulation of final results for parliamentarian, senator, female representative to parliament, county governor, and county assembly representative also had been completed at constituency and county level. The final turnout figures for the presidential election showed that over 86 percent of registered voters turned out to cast their vote.

The Center’s observers visited 40 constituency and county tally centers. The Carter Center finds that several key areas relating to the tabulation of results did not receive sufficient attention from the IEBC. The release of inaccurate figures from the electronic transmission of results and lack of transparency of the national tally marred the final stages of the process, however, the Center notes that in spite of discrepancies in early numbers released to the public, the IEBC managed to secure final results within the constitutional period of seven days. The Center welcomes the publication of results forms 34 and 36 on the IEBC website, although most of them were not effectively accessible, and regrets the IEBC’s continued unwillingness to publish results by polling station.

In view of an electoral process marred by technological and operational failures, The Carter Center congratulates the Kenyan people for having kept the peace in spite of suffering very long queues on election day, receiving inaccurate electronic results and information on spoiled votes, having not been provided with a secure electronic voter identification system, and being presented with uneven turnout figures on Forms 36. The IEBC should conduct an internal review of its handling of the voter register and an audit of its tally procedure in order to avoid these deficiencies in future elections. Despite serious shortcomings of the IEBC’s management of technology and release of information, The Carter Center finds that the paper-based procedure for counting and tallying presented enough guarantees to preserve the expression of the will of Kenyan voters.

Failure of Electronic Transmission of Results

Upon completion of the count at polling stations, the presiding officer was to key in the results on a handheld device that transmitted the information to a central server at the IEBC’s national tally center in Nairobi. The IEBC’s electronic transmission of results system was set up to display provisional results as they arrived without any filter or verification of incoming figures from the polling stations. In an effort to make the provisional results process transparent, the media received
these figures simultaneously. The information displayed was often inaccurate, displaying sums that did not match numbers on the screen and changes that were made overnight.

Two controversies in particular were created by the unchecked display of provisional results. The first originated from the display of more than 300,000 rejected ballots on March 5 that was reduced overnight to 30,000. The IEBC wrongly attributed the high number of rejected ballots on March 5 to the complexity of a simultaneous vote for six different positions, only later to state that the original high number was the product of a server malfunction that multiplied spoiled votes by a factor of eight. This controversy signaled an inadequate handling of numbers by the IEBC and undermined confidence in their capacity to tally final results with accuracy. The second controversy was created by the IEBC’s other March 5 announcement that rejected votes would be factored into the total sum of votes cast, which served as the basis for calculating the 50 percent threshold for the presidential election. This last-minute interpretation of the definition of "votes cast" in Article 138(4) of the constitution should have been taken well in advance and shared with stakeholders in order to avoid the confusion that followed this decision on such a crucial issue.¹

In the 2010 constitutional referendum, the use of an electronic data transmission system made the results available within 48 hours and strengthened public confidence in the IEBC. Since that referendum, technology has been used in biometric registration of voters, fingerprint scans at polling stations on election day to identify voters, and electronic transmission of provisional results from polling stations. In the use of electronic voter identification and electronic transmission of results, reliance on technologies that were only partially successful during the mock election exercise threatened to undermine the very trust they were designed to enhance. Although more thorough self-assessment by the IEBC and the collection of observer statements will hopefully yield lessons for the conduct of future elections, it appears that some of the problems encountered by the IEBC could have been avoided by using simpler, more reliable, and less costly solutions.

Conflicting Definitions of a Rejected Ballot

Another definitional issue further clouded the understanding of rejected votes. Rejected ballots were defined in different ways depending on which IEBC document was referenced. In the IEBC Election Manual, rejected ballots are defined as: a) ballots that were not stamped in the back, b) votes given for more than one candidate, c) uncertainty for whom the vote is cast, d) ballots that had different serial numbers than those issued to the polling station, and e) unmarked ballots. However, in the IEBC Polling Day Guide for Election Officials, rejected ballots are defined as a) unofficial ballot papers, b) those for which the intent of the voter was not clear, or c) the voter could be identified, thus breaching the secrecy of the vote. The existence of two separate definitions of invalid votes created a double standard for the invalidation of ballots and undermined the principle that the vote of one elector should be equal to the vote of another.²

¹ "A candidate shall be declared elected as President if the candidate receives more than half of the votes cast in the election and at least twenty five per cent of the votes cast in each of more than half of the counties"

² General Comments of the HRC on Art 25 of the PIDCP
Tabulation of Results

Tallying is an integral and important phase of the electoral process that ensures the will of voters is accurately and comprehensively reflected in the final results.³ The IEBC procedures required that tallying take place at the constituency and county level for all elections, and then be transmitted to the national level for final tallying and compilation of results of the presidential election. Upon completion of counting at polling stations, the presiding officer compiled and displayed result forms 34 and 35 respectively for presidential, national, and local elections. The tally forms, ballots, ballot boxes, and other sensitive materials were then collected and brought to the constituency tally center by the presiding officer, where they were inspected by election officials under the responsibility of the returning officer in the presence of party agents and observers.

At the constituency tally center, the returning officer completed Form 36 for each election, providing total votes for all polling stations in that constituency and released the results for county assemblies and members of parliament. Forms 36 were then delivered to the county tally center for governor, senate members and reserved women seats in the national assembly and to the national tally center for the presidential election. At the county level, the returning officer released the results for senator, governor, and women's representative to parliament.

At the polling station level, Carter Center observers reported that nearly 100 percent of stations visited had party agents present, and that complaints were submitted in only 4.2 percent of the cases, indicating that overall, IEBC personnel were considered by party agents to be compliant with procedures. In 95 percent of the occurrences observed, tally workers understood their responsibilities, and subsequently Carter Center observers evaluated the overall tally process as good or very good in 95 percent of cases. The failure of electronic transmission of results was confirmed at constituency level, where the returning officer did not receive them in almost 60 percent of cases. However, the returning officers did receive all required forms in more than 97 percent of the instances observed. Carter Center observers noted that the recovery of all the forms 34, 35, and 36 from returning officers took time, especially for the most distant constituencies. The Center's observers reported the rate of complaints submitted by party agents was higher at tally centers, reaching more than 12 percent.

On the evening of March 5, the IEBC stopped the electronic tally of provisional results after the server receiving them proved unable to compile incoming data. In a televised press conference, the chairman of the IEBC explained that the paper record of tabulation was the only legal base for final results; therefore electronic display of provisional results would be stopped. Although this had been the case all along, the IEBC’s prior emphasis on the electronic results system created a false public impression that the tabulation process was being started over from scratch when the legal tabulation process always had been ongoing.

Publishing of Tabulation Procedures

The availability of election-related procedures to the public in a timely manner in advance of an election is considered to be best practice for election management bodies.⁴ The Carter Center regrets that the IEBC did

³ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 25(b); AU, Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa, art. 1.

not prepare an operational manual of procedures for the national tabulation exercise. The absence of detailed procedures did not enable election officials to consistently troubleshoot data entry errors or counting discrepancies. The IEBC is also encouraged to provide adequate illustration of the layout of tally centers, and a clearly defined flow of materials and responsibilities for different election officials. These procedures should be published well in advance, shared with all stakeholders, and also address the review and audit of results by election officials to ensure adequate and transparent safeguards are in place and provide space and access for party agents, observers and media. In future elections, the Center recommends that the IEBC ensure that regulations and procedures regarding transmission, receipt, and data processing are communicated to electoral stakeholders well in advance and guarantee full access to the national tally center as stated in subsidiary legislation and recommend by both Kenya’s international obligations and electoral good practices.\(^5\)

Very brief descriptions of tabulation instructions were shared with Carter Center observers, but they appeared to be insufficient to guarantee the integrity and accuracy of numerical tabulation. Additionally, Carter Center observers did not have access to any written criteria for the placement on quarantine of mismatched results between forms 34 and 36 or other apparent errors on tabulation forms and the procedure put in place to troubleshoot them. The Center finds that while the tabulation process was open to observation at the constituency and county level, the national tally center did not provide enough transparency for observers or party agents to assess the overall integrity of tally of presidential results.

In spite of imprecise procedures, IEBC agents performed in an orderly manner and were able to compile results at the constituency and county level in due time. With more than 33,000 polling stations, an 86 percent turnout, and only a week to release the results, the potential for human error remained very high and led to discrepancies in the final results released by the IEBC.

**Lack of Transparency and Tabulation of Results**

One of Kenya’s core obligations concerns promoting transparency in elections and other public processes.\(^6\) In order to ensure such transparency, accepted best practice requires ballot tallies to be transmitted openly, and for the results to be published in a timely manner, including at the polling station level.\(^7\) To enable the public and other stakeholders to verify the accuracy of the results and to increase public confidence, it is important for the IEBC to publish the election results disaggregated by individual polling stations on its website. The Center remains concerned that several weeks after the elections detailed preliminary results disaggregated at the polling station level have not been published, as is widely recognized as a best practice to increase transparency.

The Carter Center commends the IEBC for setting up the national tally center in an accessible, centralized, and appropriate location. The IEBC allowed the press to set up on site and convened regular press conferences to update the public on the tabulation process. The public display of electronic provisional results at the time of their arrival at the national tally center was a positive measure toward transparency; however, as described above, the unreliability of the data displayed through the tabulation process undermined public trust in the IEBC. The dissemination of

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\(^5\) UN, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 19(2)

\(^6\) UN, United Nations Convention against Corruption, art. 13(a); AU, African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, art. 3(3)

\(^7\) CoE, Handbook for Observers of Elections, para. 4.6. EISA and Electoral Commissions Forum of SADC, PEMMO, p. 26
unchecked figures, especially the inaccurate number of rejected ballots, could have fueled a strong public reaction and damaged public trust in the ability of the IEBC to produce reliable election results.

Firsthand access to information is key in conducting credible and impartial observation, and The Carter Center regrets the IEBC decision to confine party agents and observers to the gallery of the national tally center, making effective observation impossible. In the absence of access to compiled documents and to IEBC personnel, the national tally of the presidential results forms was effectively rendered non-transparent for stakeholders and observers. In future elections, the Center strongly recommends that the IEBC design a tabulation process that accommodates both the security and transparency of results. This advance provision for transparency will be especially useful to the IEBC when incomplete, inaccurate, or otherwise problematic tabulation forms arise and/or when administrative decisions change the results that have already been released to the public at a lower level.

The Center also regrets the publication of provisional results while voting was still ongoing on March 5 in polling stations in Laisamis, Samburu, Kuresoi south, Nakuru east and west, Bahati, and Wagir.

**Presidential and Legislative Results**

On March 9, 2013, Uhuru Kenyatta was declared the fourth president-elect of Kenya by the chairman of the IEBC. Uhuru Kenyatta obtained 6,173,433 votes or 50.07 percent of the votes cast, reaching the required double threshold of 50 percent plus one vote and 25 percent of the votes in half of the counties in order to be elected in the first round of election. This margin was achieved with 8,418 votes, making it a very close victory. His closest contestant, Raila Odinga, received 5,340,546 votes or 43.31 percent of expressed votes. In third place, Musalia Mudavadi obtained 3.93 percent, and the other five presidential candidates each received less than one percent. Based on a preliminary analysis of the announced results, it appears that compared to Uhuru Kenyatta, Raila Odinga suffered from lower rates of voter registration and slightly lower turnout in his strongholds.

At least nine out of 10 registered voters cast their votes in 17 counties, translating to a massive turnout that shaped the eventual results. Official results from each of the counties indicate clear voting patterns in favor of one of the two leading contenders. In Uhuru Kenyatta’s stronghold of central Kenya, voter turnout was 94 percent in Nyandarua and Muranga counties and 93 percent in Nyeri county. For Raila Odinga, Homa Bay, Siaya, and Migori counties achieved voter turnout between 92 and 93 percent.

These figures reflect the critical regional and ethnic support for the two main contenders in the elections. Out of the 17 counties that reported the 90 percent-plus voter turnout, 11 were in Uhuru Kenyatta’s strongholds, which show that his Jubilee coalition did well in rallying followers in its strongholds to get out and vote. In contrast, the counties with the lowest voter turnout in the country were in some of Odinga’s Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (Cord) strongholds, notably, Kilifi (65 percent), Mombasa (66.6 percent), and Kwale (72 percent).

In both the Senate and the National Assembly, Kenyatta’s Jubilee Coalition has secured the majority of seats and has marshaled their numbers to win the coveted speaker’s position of both houses. In the National Assembly, Jubilee commands a majority of 195 seats whereas Cord secured
only 143 of the 350 seats. In the Senate, Jubilee and its affiliates secured the majority of 34 of the 68 seats while Cord managed 27 seats.

Only 193 women were candidates for parliamentary seats in the race outside of the reserved seats. Compared to the 12 elected members of the previous parliament, 16 women got elected outside of the reserved seats resulting in the overall increase of women in parliament, especially considering the augmentation of reserved seats for women in both chambers of parliament from 10 to a total of 63 reserved seats. However, no women were elected as governor or senator, which shows that progress needs to be made in order to fulfill the condition that no more than two-thirds of elective public bodies’ members should be of the same gender and to provide equal opportunities for women and men in the political sphere. Of the seats reserved for women, both Jubilee and Cord won 23 and Amani won one. In the senate, the Jubilee coalition has 23 compared to Cord’s 19.

In the new constitutional dispensation, parliament’s powers have been enhanced and most appointments by the executive branch have to get MPs’ endorsement. Therefore, parliament will be asked to approve cabinet nominees and diplomatic appointments. With Jubilee having the upper hand in both houses, it will find it easier to ensure proposals that require approval of the elected representatives are passed.

**County Results**

For the purposes of devolution, the constitution created 47 counties that are led by elected governors.

The official list of elected county assembly representatives reveals that parties allied to Cord enjoy a majority in the country’s major counties of Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu, and Kakamega. Parties allied to the Jubilee coalition control Nakuru, Kiambu, and Uasin Gishu counties. The list shows that out of the 85 elected county assembly representatives in Nairobi, the two main Cord partners, ODM and Wiper Democratic Movement, enjoy a slim majority of 43 members against TNA and Alliance Party of Kenya’s 42 members.

ODM is in total control in Mombasa county with all the 30 county representatives elected on its ticket. The Jubilee coalition is in control of the Nakuru county assembly with TNA and its principal ally, the United Republican Party (URP), having a total of 47 out of the 54 elected county representatives.

In Kiambu county, one of the biggest in the country with 59 wards, TNA enjoys a huge majority of 56 elected representatives with the remaining three elected on the tickets of Agano, GNU and Farmers parties. Cord is in control at the Kakamega county assembly which, like Kiambu, has 59 wards. Out of these, 41 county representatives are from Cord affiliate parties while the other eighteen are from parties allied to the Amani coalition, UDF, and New-Ford Kenya.

In Kisumu county with a total of 34 wards, ODM commands a majority of 29 elected representatives with its ally, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) having four representatives and another Cord affiliate, the Federal Party of Kenya has one county representative.

Further competition is expected in Bungoma county with a total of 44 wards, especially if the 18 members elected on parties allied to the Amani coalition decide to join forces with their three colleagues from the Jubilee coalition to face the 22 members elected on parties allied to Cord.

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8 Art. 27 (8) and 21 (b) of the Constitution
9 Art. 27 (3) of the Constitution
Discrepancies in the Voter Register and Released Numbers

The comparison of final results for the presidential election (recorded on Form 36), which served as the basis for the compilation of results, showed worrying discrepancies. First, in some cases the recorded number of ballots cast differed by several hundred to several thousand for the different elections in the same polling station. This resulted in turnout figures being different for each elective position in a given polling station where voters were supposed to cast all six ballots without exception. Second, the Center notes that the number of registered voters published with the presidential results released by the IEBC on March 9 differed from the voter statistics per county published by the IEBC on Feb. 24.

The Center also observed discrepancies between the provisional list of voters registered published on Dec. 18, 2012, and the voter statistics per county published by the IEBC on Feb. 24. While small adjustments would have been expected, a total variation of about 100,000 voters between the two documents suggests that their data have been moved in the register from one county to another without an explanation from the IEBC or the possibility of public scrutiny.

Additional discrepancies in the number of registered voters have emerged from the tabulation process. A significant number of registered voters recorded on Form 36 by returning officers in constituency tallies differed from those listed in the national voter register. While the number of voters recorded on forms 36 should have matched the voter register, it was very often not the case.

This lack of transparency in modifications to the national voting register that served as the basis for the organization of the elections is inconsistent with national and international standards for democratic elections.\footnote{Art.81 of Constitution requires Transparency of the electoral system, General comments on Art 25, Paragraph 11}

These numerical discrepancies in such important elections, the first under a new legal framework by a new IEBC, call for more rigor in the tally operation and more guidance for IEBC personnel. However, the Center has analyzed these discrepancies for all 290 parliamentary constituencies and concluded that although they raise serious concerns regarding the accuracy of numbers released by the IEBC, the differences did not favor any particular presidential candidate and therefore do not indicate an effort at partisan manipulation.

Election Dispute Resolution

Effective dispute resolution mechanisms are an integral part of ensuring that the will of the people is upheld during an electoral process.\footnote{UDHR, art. 21} With a renewed public confidence in its capacity to be a fair arbitrator of political divisions, the judiciary has played an active role since the very beginning of the electoral process. The most important role has been played by the Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice Willy Mutunga. The Carter Center commends the court for having upheld the highest standards of transparency of its hearing by having retransmitted live the entirety of the pre-trial conference and public hearing of the presidential election litigation process. As a pioneer measure, the Center hopes it will be reproduced in other parts of the world to ensure transparency and reinforce trust in electoral dispute resolution mechanisms.

A petition against the results of the presidential election can be filed by any citizen of Kenya. Any ground can be the basis for a petition as long as it is deemed sufficient by the court and is not
frivolous, vexatious, or scandalous. The deputy president-elect and the IEBC are automatically included as respondents to any petition against the results of presidential elections. The petition has to be submitted within seven days of the declaration of results and determined within 14 days after its filing. At the time of the filing, the petitioner must deposit a sum of 1,000,000 KSH as security for costs otherwise the petition will be dismissed. Article 83 of the electoral law gives extended powers to the courts in deciding on the outcome of the judicial process: "No election shall be declared to be void by reason of non compliance with any written law relating to that election if it appears that the election was conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Constitution or that the non compliance did not affect the result of the election." This article has clearly been written for the final results and is silent on non compliance effecting results of a first round election. The disposition makes it more difficult to void a presidential election that respected very broad constitutional principles. The Supreme Court has the power to make any order it may deem fit and just in the circumstance. Supreme Court decisions are not subject to appeal.

With regards to the other elections, a constitutional timeframe of 28 days after the declaration of results by the IEBC is set up in Article 87 for all petitions concerning an election other than the presidential. As the results for all other elections than presidential were gazetted on March 13, the deadline is therefore set for April 10. The high courts are responsible for hearing matters pertaining to parliamentary and gubernatorial elections. Magistrates' courts are receiving petitions against county assembly elections. A petitioner seeking to challenge a parliament or a county governor must deposit 500,000 KSH, while a petitioner seeking to challenge the election of a member of a county assembly shall deposit 100,000 KSH.

Three petitions against the presidential election results were submitted to the Supreme Court within the time frame indicated in the constitution. One petition from Jubilee supporters challenged the inclusion of rejected votes in the final tally of the presidential poll, while those from Raila Odinga and from the Africa Center for Open Governance (AFRICOG) both sought to invalidate the election and instigate the organization of fresh presidential elections. Attorney General Githu Muigai was admitted as friend of the court or amicus curiae.

There were five main arguments brought to the court by the petitioners:
1. Poll books, the biometric voter register, and the system for electronic transmission of results were poorly procured and prepared so they were bound to fail from the very beginning.
2. The failures of the electronic system and consequent return to printed lists of voters opened the system to manipulation which effectively took place on election day.
3. In spite of having been finalized and closed for registration on Feb. 20, the number of voters on the register was increased without any known explanation.
4. Forms 36 were manipulated in order to forge results as illustrated by instances of higher number of votes cast than voters registered.
5. The total number of votes cast for presidential candidates was higher than for the other elections even when taking into consideration spoilt and rejected ballots.

The court rejected a request from AFRICOG to require the IEBC to produce the manual register used in polling stations on election day on the basis of a lack of time to scrutinize documents from 33,000 polling stations. The court also rejected a demand from Cord for a forensic audit of the electronic tally system used by the IEBC to compile the presidential results and refused to accept a lengthy affidavit raising new allegations, including evidence from 122 constituencies, because the

\[12\] Art. 140 of the Constitution
evidence was filed without the permission of the Supreme Court and because there was no time for respondents to file a reasonable answer.

At the beginning of the proceedings, the Supreme Court ordered a verification of forms 34 and 36 for 22 polling stations to verify the number of votes cast, valid votes, and rejected votes. The judicial verification under the supervision of the registrar of the Supreme Court was not open to international observation, however Cord and Jubilee were able to send 10 observers each to scrutinize the process. The report from the registrar did not make mention of the figures obtained during the operation. The judicial team also scrutinized forms 34 and 36 for a total of 18,000 polling stations and found that 10 Forms 34 were missing along with 75 Forms 36. The team did not report on discrepancies between numbers in forms 34 and 36, thereby considerably reducing the added value of the exercise.

The two day pre-trial conference started on March 25 and was followed by two days of hearings. After another two days of deliberation, the Supreme Court rejected all petitions and confirmed the results of the presidential election on the last day of the constitutional timeframe, March 30. The written judgment of the Supreme Court will not be available for two weeks.

Raila Odinga made an appearance on TV acknowledging the decision of the Supreme Court and affirming his support for the rule of law and constitutional order. While reaffirming his arguments, his speech appealed for the respect for the Supreme Court decision and wished good luck to president-elect Uhuru Kenyatta and his vice president-elect William Ruto. The Carter Center encourages Cord supporters to remain calm and to respect the appeal of Raila Odinga for peace and unity of the country.

The presidential election petition proceedings were held in a very professional and rigorous manner. The lawyers representing petitioners avoided making personal accusations and the Supreme Court judges kept the hearings in line with the highest standards of professionalism and integrity necessary for the conduct of electoral litigation. The overall conduct of the presidential election disputes was conducted in accordance with international standards of democratic elections.

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