



**FULL REPORT FROM THE CARTER CENTER
On the Current State of Sudan Referenda Preparations**

October 29, 2010

As the referendum for the self-determination of Southern Sudan approaches, the Carter Center notes that the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission (SSRC) and Southern Sudan Referendum Bureau (SSRB) have recently made important progress in their preparations for the referendum. The establishment of referendum subcommittees, the release of a referendum calendar, and the arrival of registration materials are crucial and encouraging steps in the referendum implementation process.

Yet there are pressing issues to be resolved by the two partners, the governments, and the referendum authorities. Critically, the Government of Sudan (GoS), the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) should take steps to resolve negotiations over post-CPA issues, in particular determining how citizenship will be addressed, such that both sides uphold their obligations to the Interim National Constitution (INC) and Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Both governments and the international community should ensure that funding for the referendum is expedited and disbursed efficiently by referendum authorities in Northern and Southern Sudan.

Referendum officials face many challenges in preparing for the upcoming voter registration – set to begin in 17 days – and the January 9, 2011 referendum. Many critical tasks remain ahead. The SSRC should urgently publish rules and regulations for the voter registration process, broadly disseminate information as to how eligibility to vote in the referendum will be determined, issue accreditation procedures for domestic and international observers, announce campaign regulations, and take all necessary steps to prepare for a credible, inclusive registration period. The urgent disbursement of funds to the SSRC and SSRB and down to the state and county level is essential to ensure that the process meets its very tight timeline. Voter education is also a critical component of the process and the GoS, GoSS, the SSRC, SSRB and civil society should urgently expand efforts to inform voters about the procedures for registering and voting.

In order to ensure security and the protection of human rights for all citizens of Sudan, the National Congress Party (NCP) and Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) should desist from making inflammatory statements threatening a return to war and reaffirm their commitment to a credible and genuine referendum. In addition, the two parties should make efforts to educate the population about the status of post-referendum arrangements, with a particular focus on citizenship and the rights of minorities.

The failure to establish an Abyei Referendum Commission and resolve the question of who is eligible to vote in Abyei is of great concern. The parties should urgently address these issues and move forward with planning for the referendum in Abyei.

Citizenship

As the two parties to the CPA continue to negotiate on key post-referendum arrangements, they

should quickly come to an agreement on the principles for citizenship rights of minorities living in Northern and Southern Sudan and publicize this agreement to better enable the affected populations to make informed decisions about their future.

Large numbers of Southern Sudanese populations live in Northern Sudan. As Sudanese citizens, irrespective of the outcome of the referendum, they deserve the protection of the state, assurances of their citizenship, and unequivocal commitments that they will not be expelled in the wake of the referendum.¹ Given the context of uncertainty, fear and misinformation, GoS leaders need to underline their commitment to protect the rights of Southern Sudanese and take clear action to suppress racist discourse and calls for the expulsion of Southerners that violate the Interim Constitution.² Southern Sudanese interlocutors in several Northern states have reported to Carter Center observers that they fear reprisals following the referendum vote. Some community leaders have reportedly urged eligible Southern voters not to participate in the referendum rather than risk a backlash. The September 26 statements made by NCP Media Minister Kamal Mohammed Obeid -- indicating that Southerners will lose the right to citizenship in the North if the region voted for independence in the referendum and that Southerners would not be permitted to use hospitals or schools -- should be denounced by members of the ruling party.³ The Carter Center welcomes subsequent statements made by President Bashir indicating that the rights of Southerners in the North will be respected regardless of the outcome of the referendum.

Similarly GoSS leaders should assure Northern Sudanese living in Southern Sudan that the interests of Northerners in the South will be protected and respected, regardless of the outcome of the referendum results. The Carter Center welcomes recent assurances made by President Salva Kiir regarding the protections that will be granted to Northern Sudanese in the South.

Structure of the SSRC and Subsidiaries

A clear and consistent division of labor between the SSRC and its subsidiary bodies is critical to ensure the smooth functioning of the referendum administration. In the April 2010 elections, the Carter Center found that very little authority was devolved to the Southern Sudan High Elections Committee. Therefore, the Southern State High Committees had to communicate problems in the operations of the elections to Khartoum rather than Juba, and then wait for relevant responses. This flow of communication often delayed response time and contributed to inadequacies in the process. Given the predominance of activities in the South during the referendum, the SSRC should empower the SSRB in Juba by devolving substantial authority to the body, as outlined in the SSRA, and providing it with the appropriate resources to function effectively.⁴ The SSRC should continue its established practice of setting overarching policy and making legal clarifications on the process. However, when devising policies the SSRC should consult frequently with the SSRB to ensure that the regulations set by the Commission reflect the realities on the ground.

¹ *Id.*; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 2(1), 9 (1976).

² The Interim National Constitution of The Republic of the Sudan, Art. 23(2)b (2005).

³ As a signatory to the Convention, Sudan is required to guarantee the “right to public health, medical care” and “right to education” “without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin.” International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Art. 5(e), 5(e) (1969)

⁴ The Southern Sudan Referendum Act, Art. 18(3).

All technical responsibilities related to the referendum process in Southern Sudan should be delegated to the SSRB by the SSRC including: designing the operational plan, budgeting for activities in Southern Sudan, recruiting staff and committees, planning the number and distribution of referendum centers, coordinating with security forces, contracting services, disbursing funds to state committees, delivering materials and data processing. Devolution of these responsibilities will allow for the most expedient and appropriate solutions to be implemented.

As the Referendum Act provides Southern Sudanese with the right to participate in the referendum, the SSRC should ensure that all SSRC bodies have significant participation of Southern Sudanese, including the SSRC Secretariat, and referendum administration personnel in Northern states.

Resources

Although some funds have been contributed to the referendum administration by the GoS and GoSS, the majority of their commitments remain unmet. The Carter Center welcomes reports that the GoSS will soon release its remaining share of funding for the referendum administration. The SSRB should provide GoSS with the necessary documentation to ensure quick disbursement of these funds. The GoS should urgently follow suit and provide its share of funding to the referendum administration. With less than three months until the start of the Southern Sudan referendum, any further delays in funding will severely impact the hiring, training, and deployment of key staff and equipment. Any such setbacks could jeopardize a timely, credible referendum. In particular, funds are needed urgently for the recruiting and training of referendum center staff working on the registration process. Additional funds, transport, and communications and office equipment are also urgently needed at the state and county level to implement the registration. The GoS and GoSS should prioritize the provision of funds for the administration of the referendum in their respective budgets.

A significant amount of international funding commitments for the referendum have yet to be met. Members of the international community should immediately move forward to contribute funds for the administration of the referendum.

Referendum Calendar

Given the significance attached to the date of the referendum and the urgent need for the SSRB, the referendum State High Committees and other stakeholders to be able to plan activities properly, it is critical to widely publicize the newly established referendum calendar.

During the 2009 voter registration for the 2010 general elections, Carter Center observers found that significant numbers of Southern Sudanese residing in rural areas with scant access to transportation found it difficult to register in the four-week time period, due to logistical problems and a lack of adequate information about the process. The referendum registration process is likely to face many of the same challenges.

It is extremely critical that registration materials arrive in their locations well before the anticipated start of voter registration on November 15, so as not to shorten the registration period for residents of any particular area. In the 2009 voter registration exercise, the late or damaged arrival of materials contributed to the need for a one-week extension of the process. The SSRC should be prepared to respond to similar circumstances and consider extending the process if significant numbers of Southern Sudanese are unable to register due to the late arrival of materials.

It would be preferable to have a significant period of time between the publication of the final voter register and the polling period so that referendum staff have adequate time to prepare for polling once the register has been completed. However, given that the timeline recently released by the SSRC allocates only five days between the two processes, the GoS, the GoSS and the SSRC, and the SSRB must work together to ensure that the Commission and Bureau have the appropriate resources and are prepared well in advance to complete both the registry and plan for polling.

The Carter Center supports efforts to hold the Southern Sudan and Abyei referenda on the date prescribed by the CPA. The most important benchmarks, however, are to hold credible, genuine processes that reflect the will of Southern Sudanese and residents of Abyei.

Campaign Environment

It is critical to the credibility of the process that proponents of unity and secession are able to campaign freely and without fear.⁵ The outcome of the Southern Sudan referendum will impact the lives of all Sudanese and therefore all Sudanese should feel free to discuss their perspectives on the process without fear of intimidation or harassment. The NCP and SPLM should issue strong directives to party members not to interfere negatively in campaigns or events promoting dialogue on the future of Sudan.

Eligibility

The Southern Sudan Referendum Act establishes three categories of eligible voters, but does not state what evidence voters must present to prove eligibility. The first category is voters who are members of indigenous communities and whose families were residing in Southern Sudan on or before 1956.⁶ This group is eligible to register and vote in either Northern or Southern Sudan, and in the eight countries where out-of-country voting is being conducted.⁷ The second is voters who trace their ancestry to a Southern Sudanese ethnic community but whose families were not residing in Southern Sudan in 1956.⁸ The third is residents of Southern Sudan since 1956.⁹ Individuals in the second and third categories are eligible to vote in Southern Sudan, but not in Northern Sudan nor in the eight countries where out-of-country voting is being conducted.¹⁰

As noted above, the Referendum Act provides little guidance on how voters are expected to prove their eligibility at a referendum center. No official list of ethnic or indigenous communities of Southern Sudan has been issued, nor has any indication been provided of how voters are to prove that their ancestry can be traced to an ethnic community of Southern Sudan, or how to distinguish between an ethnic and indigenous community.¹¹ It is also unclear how voters will be able to establish that their family resided in Southern Sudan before 1956 or that their family has permanently resided in Southern Sudan since 1956.¹²

Although the first category of voters is eligible to vote in any referendum center and the second

⁵ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Art. 19(2); African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights, Art. 9.

⁶ The Southern Sudan Referendum Act, Art. 25(1).

⁷ *Id.* at Art. 27(4).

⁸ *Id.* at Art. 25(1).

⁹ *Id.* at Art. 25(2).

¹⁰ *Id.* at Art. 27(3).

¹¹ *Id.* at Art. 25(1).

¹² *Id.* at Art. 25.

and third categories are eligible to vote only in Southern Sudan, the Referendum Act allows for objections if the voter has “left his or her place of residence to another location for good.”¹³ This adds a residency requirement that is in conflict with other provisions of the Referendum Act and there are no clear criteria for how to determine if a voter has left “for good”.¹⁴ Without a clear standard, the process is vulnerable to inconsistent application and potential manipulation, which could result in large numbers of voters disenfranchised.¹⁵ It is critically important for the SSRC to issue clear guidelines as to how potential voters can prove their eligibility to register and vote in order to avoid confusion and problems at the referendum centers.¹⁶

Identification

In the event that a potential voter does not hold official identification documentation issued by a state authority or UNHCR, the Referendum Act allows for a local Chief to act as an “identifier” and either affirm or deny the identity of the person seeking registration.¹⁷ Registration officials may seek the assistance of other local authorities to verify either the identification document or the Chief’s testimony.¹⁸ Due to the fact that many Southern Sudanese do not have UNHCR or state-issued identification, these identifiers are likely to play an extremely significant role in the registration process. For this reason, the SSRC should make efforts to build transparency into the process of how the identifiers will be chosen by clearly explaining the criteria used to select the individuals and ensuring there is agreement amongst SSRC commission members on the guidelines. Once the identifiers are chosen, the SSRC should conduct careful and thorough trainings to ensure that the identifiers understand the eligibility criteria in the law and will apply them consistently and fairly.

During the 2009 registration process in Sudan, residency documents were issued to persons needing to prove their residency in order to register in a specific area. In some instances, Popular Committees issued proof of residency documents to voters directly outside of the registration centers. Carter Center observers reported that the checks on this system of residency document distribution were weak and that the distribution was not systematized.¹⁹ If new identity documents are issued ahead of the registration, this should be done in a consistent and systematic manner by appropriate authorities. The NCP and the SPLM should refrain from getting involved in the process of issuing identity documentation.

Training of Staff

The comprehensive training of referendum support staff is a key step to help ensure that national authorities are able to conduct a consistent and credible referendum for the people of Southern Sudan. The SSRC and SSRB should coordinate closely to ensure that staff receives uniform

¹³ *Id.* at Art. 30(1)b.

¹⁴ *Id.*

¹⁵ *Id.* at. 30(2), 31 (The Referendum Act provides that the Chief of the Referendum Center Committee in each referendum center shall appoint a committee who will hear objections to the preliminary register and that any person aggrieved by the committee’s decision may lodge an appeal to the competent court of law).

¹⁶ The United Nations General Comment 25, para 11 states that “States must take effective measures to ensure that all persons entitled to vote are able to exercise that right. Where registration of voters is required, it should be facilitated and obstacles to such registration should not be imposed. If residence requirements apply to registration, they must be reasonable...”

¹⁷ *Id.* at Art. 26.

¹⁸ *Id.*

¹⁹ TCC Statement, December 17, 2009, pg. 3, “Carter Center Commends Broad Participation in Sudan's Registration, Urges Additional Steps to Ensure Genuine Elections”

instructions in both the North and South and that training for identifiers is done in a transparent manner. International technical advisors project that there may be a need for over 11,000 staff to administer voter registration. The Carter Center welcomes reports that training has begun in Juba and urges relevant parties to continue to adhere to the referendum calendar and conduct cascade training as planned to ensure that registration staff are well prepared for their responsibilities.

Public Outreach and Civic Education

The conduct of outreach to the public on the details of the referendum process and the provision of civic education are key components of the SSRC mandate as outlined in the Referendum Act.²⁰ A lack of adequate accurate information in the public sphere could result in the spread of rumors and misinformation, creating anxiety or even endangering the process. According to reports from Carter Center observers, in some communities in Northern Sudan, Southern Sudanese are unaware that they have the right to participate in the referendum. The SSRC and the SSRB should work as transparently as possible to establish a public outreach committee and name contact persons to engage political parties and citizens from the village to the national level. The SSRC should work to ensure that parties and citizens understand the referendum process so that all eligible voters are able to participate fully in the referendum.²¹

In addition to voter education and information, Sudanese officials are obligated to provide widespread civic education throughout the different phases of the process. Given the significant impact of the decision to vote for unity or secession and the need to ensure that voters understand the options and implications of the vote before casting their ballots, special efforts should be made to inform voters of post-referendum arrangements. The Center is particularly concerned about the issue of citizenship and urges the NCP and SPLM negotiators to resolve it expeditiously and humanely.

As neutral bodies, the SSRC and the SSRB should take a lead role in public outreach efforts. They should work with non-partisan actors and civil society groups to design and organize a civic education program to ensure that clear and factual information is provided to the public.

As with voter education, it is critical that the SSRC and implementing partners use appropriate local language and that they incorporate traditional means of information dissemination for outreach efforts.²² In addition, voter information and civic education campaigns should make use of diverse media streams as well as face-to-face and public addresses. Specific efforts should be made to ensure that civic education extends to the difficult to reach rural areas in Southern Sudan. The SSRC should devolve responsibility for civic education activities to the regional offices in order to ensure the appropriate design of programming for the range of target communities.

Referendum Security

During the 2010 electoral process, Carter Center observers reported numerous concerns with the conduct of the Sudan People's Liberation Army's (SPLA) in the South and the role of the

²⁰ *Id.* at Art. 45(4).

²¹ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 25(b); United Nations Human Rights Commission, General Comment 25, para. 11. In addition, please see Human Rights and Elections, A Handbook on the Legal, Technical and Human Rights Aspects of Elections (1994) para. 75 for widely recognized good practice in this regard.

²² International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 25(b); and United Nations Human Rights Commission, General Comment 25, para. 11 which states that "Information and materials about voting should be available in minority languages."

national security forces in the North. It is critical that the problems that occurred in the run-up to and during the April 2010 elections are not repeated during the referenda processes. The GoSS and international actors should continue their work to enhance the institutional strength and professionalism of the military, police and other security forces in Southern Sudan. Police and soldiers nationwide should be educated about their role and responsibilities to protect citizens' human rights. The presence of irregular security forces around the registration and polling centers should be strictly prohibited and no unauthorized security presence should be allowed within the stations.

The Carter Center welcomes reports that security officials will utilize joint operations centers in each of the Southern state capitals and 25 priority counties to ensure coordination between police, security and the military. The members of security coordination bodies should liaise closely with referendum staff at the state and county level and observer groups to exchange information on security within each region and provide updates on serious security events.²³ Such bodies should become operational as soon as possible so they are in place for the start of voter registration and should remain active until after the results have been announced and the security environment is deemed to be sufficiently secure.

The GoS and the GoSS should issue strong directives to all security forces and police under their responsibility to adhere to regulations that enforce a clear delineation of responsibilities between these bodies. The police should be the first to respond to any security issue in the vicinity of referendum centers. They should be in place for the arrival of materials at the referendum centers, to ensure overnight security of the materials, and remain until materials are returned to the State High Committees.

There should be clear arrangements and demarcation between security, other armed forces and the police. A minimum distance from referendum centers should be agreed upon and strictly adhered to unless an emergency demands otherwise.

Voting in Northern Sudan and Out-of-Country Voting (OCV)

Members of the Southern Sudanese population living in Northern Sudan are important stakeholders in the future of Southern Sudan and they should be afforded every opportunity to participate meaningfully in the process.²⁴ There is scant information in the public sphere about the plans for administering the referendum in Northern Sudan. The SSRC should make public the details for voting as soon as possible to assure this population of their right to vote. The SSRC should take steps to create more than one referendum center in states where referendum officials anticipate large concentrations of Southerners and provide an adequate distribution of referendum centers and polling stations so as not to disenfranchise Southerners in the North.

The SSRC and supporting organizations should release detailed plans about the administration of out-of-country voting as soon as possible to ensure that members of the Southern Sudanese Diaspora can exercise their right to vote. Hiring and training referendum center officials should begin immediately to allow adequate preparation for voter registration and polling. Once registration procedures are finalized, education activities should begin to ensure that eligible voters understand details about the registration procedures and requirements. The accessibility of referendum centers is of particular importance for voters in refugee camps whose ability to travel

²³ The Southern Sudan Referendum Act, Art. 36(8).

²⁴ As citizens of Southern Sudan, the fundamental rights to vote, as protected by the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 13 (1) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 25 should be protected.

outside of the refugee camps is limited. The SSRC should provide additional information on how Southern Sudanese can be identified and whether they are required to reside in the countries in which they intend to vote. This is necessary so that the International Organization for Migration (IOM) can take appropriate steps to conduct the registration and inform eligible voters of the regulations. If identification documents are issued to Southern Sudanese for out-of-country voting they should be issued in a transparent and systematic manner.

Participation of Darfur and Pastoralists

Southern Sudanese in Darfur are eligible to participate in the referendum. Ongoing negotiations in Doha should seek to address continuing insecurity that could obstruct the free movement of voters, while easing restrictions on rights and freedoms to create an environment in which all eligible voters have the opportunity to participate in pre-polling activities. Authorities should provide adequate security to civil society members, referendum staff, voters, observers and other interested parties in order to allow them to participate fully in voter information campaigns and advocacy. The state of emergency, still applied throughout Darfur, restricts the freedoms necessary to hold an open and fully participatory vote. The GoS should consider lifting the state of emergency in areas secure enough to conduct polling and dedicate extra efforts to facilitate the security of the population.

The referendum will create new, uncertain and precarious conditions for some groups, particularly nomadic pastoralists who have historically traversed lands that lie in the border areas between the North and South. A large number of pastoralists enter the South on a yearly cycle in pursuit of their economic survival. The fact that these pastoralists do not own land and are not generally considered members of indigenous Southern tribes does not deny their attachment to the grazing lands and water in the South. While the CPA guarantees the rights of Northern pastoralists to enter Southern Sudan, observers have reported concerns that, if the referendum supports secession, undue restrictions will be placed on the movement of pastoralists that threaten their livelihoods.

The post-referendum discussions between the GoS and the GoSS are ongoing and include outstanding CPA issues. While these pertain to all citizens, particular attention should be paid to travel documents, citizenship and grazing rights for the pastoralist communities. Both sides should continuously engage with these groups on a local level to prevent conflict and address any legitimate grievances and concerns.

Abyei

The right of the people of Abyei to self-determination through the referendum as outlined in the Abyei Protocol of the CPA and the subsequent Abyei Area Referendum Act (AARA) is an important component of the implementation of the peace agreement. The Carter Center is greatly concerned that the Abyei Referendum Commission has not yet been established and the eligibility criteria for participation in the referendum remain unclear. The NCP and the SPLM should immediately conclude an agreement on the composition of the Abyei Referendum Commission so that the preparations for the referendum can move forward. Regardless of the outcome of the determination of eligibility criteria, referendum authorities, civil society groups, the local administration, and community leaders should conduct sensitization and dialogue efforts that explain the eligibility criteria to the communities living in and around Abyei and offer assurances that the rights of all persons living in and around Abyei will be respected.

According to Carter Center observer reports, there remains confusion among stakeholders as to whether the residents of Abyei who fit into the criteria for participation in the Southern Sudan referendum will have the opportunity to vote in both the Abyei referendum and the Southern

Sudan referendum. The SSRC and Abyei Referendum Commission, when it is formed, should clarify this issue and explain how the two referenda will be conducted in a manner that allows dual participation in the Abyei area.

Finally, the threatening language being used by the communities in and around Abyei and by the leadership of the NCP and the SPLM on the issue of participation in the Abyei referendum undermines the possibility of reaching an agreement on the issues obstructing the referendum. Relevant actors should uphold their commitments to the implementation of the peace agreement and refrain from threatening a return to war.²⁵

Media Environment

Domestic and international media have a critical role to play in providing balanced and accurate coverage of the referenda processes and the wider political environment.²⁶ There has been a worrying trend of recent newspaper pieces providing only negative, non-conciliatory reporting on current events. Newspapers in the Arabic and English press often fail to highlight positive developments but rather amplify hostile or combative statements made by the members of the NCP and SPLM. The Center has noted similar tendencies in the international media coverage of Sudan. Domestic and international media outlets should play a responsible role in reporting the facts as they occur and not distorting issues of contention between the major parties.

Background on the Carter Center's mission

The Carter Center's referendum observation activities commenced in Sudan in August 2010 in response to an invitation from the SSRC. In September 2010, the Center deployed 16 long-term observers from 12 nations to assess the referendum process in Southern Sudan and in the areas in the North where voting will occur. Four two-person observer teams are currently deployed in Southern Sudan, three teams in Northern Sudan, and one team in Abyei.

In November 2010, the Carter Center will deploy an additional 30 medium-term observers to observe the voter registration period throughout Sudan as well as at least two observers in each of the eight countries outside Sudan where voting will occur. As during its April 2010 elections observation mission, the Center will assess the referenda processes in Sudan based on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Interim National Constitution, Southern Sudan Referendum Act, and obligations for democratic elections contained in regional and international agreements, including the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.²⁷

The objectives of the Carter Center's observation mission in Sudan are to provide an impartial assessment of the overall quality of the referenda processes, promote an inclusive process for all Southern Sudanese, and demonstrate international interest in Sudan's referenda processes. The Carter Center conducts observation activities in accordance with the Declaration of Principles of International Election Observation and Code of Conduct that was adopted at the United Nations

²⁵ The Interim National Constitution of The Republic of the Sudan, Art. 23(2)b (2005).

²⁶ This is particularly relevant to public media sources. The AU Declaration on Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa, art. 6 states that "The public service ambit of public broadcasters should be clearly defined and include an obligation to ensure that the public receive adequate, politically balanced information, particularly during election periods."

²⁷ Sudan ratified the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) Feb. 18, 1986. The ACHPR came into force on Oct. 21, 1986. Sudan acceded to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) on March 18, 1986, which entered into force on March 23, 1976.

in 2005 and endorsed by 35 election observation groups.²⁸

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The Carter Center was founded in 1982 by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and his wife, Rosalynn, in partnership with Emory University, to advance peace and health worldwide. A not-for-profit, nongovernmental organization, the Center has helped to improve life for people in more than 70 countries by resolving conflicts; advancing democracy, human rights, and economic opportunity; preventing diseases; improving mental health care; and teaching farmers to increase crop production. For more than 20 years, the Carter Center has worked to improve health and prevent and resolve conflict in Sudan. Please visit www.cartercenter.org to learn more about the Carter Center.

²⁸ The Declaration of Principles in Arabic and English can be read at http://cartercenter.org/peace/democracy/des_declaration.html