Taiwan: No Mandate for War, Support for Coercion

Cross-strait relations escalated at the opening of this year. In late December 2025, a large-scale drill by China’s People’s Liberation Army, titled “Justice Mission 2025,” brought together naval, air, and rocket forces to rehearse a full maritime blockade of Taiwan. Rockets from the drill landed within 24 nautical miles of the island, contributing to the normalization of PLA presence in Taiwan’s contiguous zone. In April 2026, Kuomintang Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun traveled through China on a widely publicized official visit that culminated in a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping. At the meeting, Cheng called for the promotion of peaceful cross-strait relations while Xi repeated the common refrain that China and Taiwan are “one family” and warned against foreign interference in the strait.

U.S. President Donald Trump’s visit to China in May caused concern among some American China experts that he would bargain away Washington’s commitment to Taiwan in exchange for better trade relations with China. While no official bargain occurred, Trump has delayed the signing of a $14 billion arms sale to Taiwan, stating it was a “very good negotiating chip.”

This survey’s findings capture changes in Chinese public opinion across an eventful period in cross-strait relations. Many of the shifts in Chinese attitudes toward Taiwan occurred before the current survey was fielded, pointing toward the impact of Cheng’s official visit. In other cases, the Trump-Xi summit appears to be an important hinge point. In all, Chinese continue to prefer a peaceful, diplomatic approach to cross-strait relations, but endorse the use of force should Taiwan declare formal independence. Further, while cultural and historical nationalist reasons for Taiwan’s importance still have the most resonance, the Chinese public has become more aware of the island’s importance in semiconductor manufacturing and U.S.-China high-tech competition.

China Pulse is a twice-annual survey research project measuring Chinese public opinion on international relations conducted by The Carter Center and Emory University. The data in this brief come from a survey fielded between April 16 and June 26, 2026.

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